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PLEASE NOTE:
This executive summary has been edited to protect the identity of certain persons in order to preserve their right to life and their right to a fair trial.
The full submission which it summarises is confidential for the same reasons.
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British Irish rights watch SUBMISSION TO THE BILLY WRIGHT INQUIRY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. INTRODUCTION
British Irish rights watch is an independent non-governmental organisation and registered charity that monitors the human rights dimension of the conflict and the peace process in Northern Ireland. Our services are available to anyone whose human rights have been affected by the conflict, regardless of religious, political or community affiliations, and we take no position in the eventual outcome of the peace process.
This submission is addressed to the Inquiry into the murder in 1997 of Billy Wright, who was killed by other prisoners while himself an inmate of the Maze prison in Northern Ireland. The Inquiry was established as a result of recommendations made by Judge Peter Cory. British Irish rights watch concurs with Judge Cory’s finding that there is evidence of collusion in the murder of Billy Wright and the purpose of this submission is to set out so much as is known to us of the facts in the case and to suggest potential lines of further enquiry.
Billy Wright, a leader of the loyalist paramilitary group the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), was murdered on 27th December 1997 by three members of the republican paramilitary group, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): Christopher “Crip” McWilliams, John Kenneway, and John “Sonny” Glennon. Billy Wright was on his way to a prison visit from his girlfriend when the three INLA men climbed over the prison roof and shot him inside the prison transport van. The three men then gave themselves up and on 20th October 1998 they were convicted of murder and possession of a firearm and ammunition with intent to endanger life. They were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and 20 years for the firearms offence, but served only two years in jail under the early release provisions of the Good Friday Agreement.
There are a number of disturbing factors concerning this murder, which are set out below. These matters have led Billy Wright’s father, David Wright, to conclude that his son’s murder was “state-arranged, state-sponsored and state-sanctioned, in collusion with some of those in prison management”. British Irish rights watch is not in a position to say whether his suspicions are correct, but it is clear to us that there are a number of serious questions surrounding this murder that have not been adequately answered, despite a police investigation, an inquiry by a senior English prison official, a trial and an inquest. It is therefore crucial that the present Inquiry establish all the circumstances surrounding the murder and how it was possible for it to occur. Mr Wright is entitled to know the truth so that, if there was collusion in this murder, it is exposed and remedied, and so that the wider public can have confidence in the administration of justice and rule of law in Northern Ireland, without which there is little hope of it ever becoming a stable society.
2. THE INQUIRY’S TERMS OF REFERENCE
The present Inquiry was established following the recommendations of Judge Peter Cory in October 2003. The terms of reference given to the Inquiry are, however, notable for three omissions. First, they make no mention of collusion. Secondly, they make no mention of the various investigations which took place after the death, such as the police investigation, the inquest, and internal prison investigations. Thirdly, there is evidence to suggest that Billy Wright was jailed in order to take him out of circulation because he was an impediment to the Northern Ireland peace process, which we believe should be examined.
Judge Cory called his investigation the Collusion Investigation, and viewed his primary task as the examination of whether there was a case to answer that collusion may have occurred. In Billy Wright’s case, he found that there was, and accordingly he recommended a public inquiry. It seems to us, therefore, that this Inquiry must also look into the question of collusion. In addition, although, as Judge Cory has correctly identified, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Billy Wright’s murder could and should have been prevented, which points to many acts of potential collusion before his death, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest an attempted cover-up after the murder. In our submission, to look at the events leading up to Billy Wright’s murder but to fail to examine what happened afterwards will mean that only half the truth will emerge.
Similarly, there are events that preceded the murder which may not be covered by the current terms of reference as they stand. These include the circumstances in which Billy Wright found himself in jail in the first place. In our submission, it will not be possible to gauge the motives behind, or the extent of, any collusion without beginning at the beginning.
British Irish rights watch believes that these important aspects of the case must be examined by the present Inquiry. We therefore respectfully request that the Inquiry seeks to amend its terms of reference to include all relevant events preceding and following the murder. We also ask that either the word “collusion” is included in the terms of reference or that the Inquiry makes a statement making it clear that it intends to interpret the terms of reference to include any act of collusion.
3. SECURITY IN THE MAZE PRISON
At the time of Billy Wright’s murder the Maze prison housed opposing paramilitary factions in segregated blocks. Two of the factions, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were not participating in ceasefires at the time, and were violently opposed to one another. Their prisoners were housed in the same prison block – H-block 6.
The authorities’ ability to manage the prison was weakened by violence against prison officers; the strength of the officers’ trade union, the Prison Officers Association; and unrealistic government policies of criminalisation of paramilitaries and enforced integration of prisoners.
All these factors had serious implications for security within the Maze. On 10th December 1997, IRA prisoner Liam Averill escaped. An inquiry into his escape by Martin Narey, Director of Regimes in the Prison Service of England and Wales, was already under way when Billy Wright was murdered, and Narey’s terms of reference were extended to include the murder. However, the scope of his enquiries into Billy Wright’s death was restricted, at the request of the RUC (the former name of the Northern Ireland police).
4. THE LVF AND INLA IN THE MAZE PRISON
Billy Wright was the leader of the LVF within the Maze. He was also a focal point for loyalists opposed to the peace process. On 7th March 1997, he was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment on charges of threatening to kill a woman and perverting the course of justice. The sentence seemed unusually heavy, and many observers suspected Billy Wright had been taken out of action in order to facilitate the peace process. His appeal was due to be heard in February 1998.
LVF members convicted by the courts were initially sent to Maghaberry, an integrated prison, where they agitated for segregation. In April 1997 they were moved to H-block 6 in the Maze, which they shared with INLA.
Tension between the LVF and the INLA prisoners was inevitably high. LVF prisoners allege that in late October and early November, INLA prisoners started sending home their music systems and boasted they were planning a “spectacular”, which is a colloquial term for a high profile act of violence.
5. THE MURDER OF BILLY WRIGHT
There is no dispute about who killed Billy Wright. Three INLA inmates - Christopher McWilliams, John Kenneway, and John Glennon - have been convicted of the murder, and INLA has claimed responsibility for the shooting. There are, however, several aspects of the murder that raise serious questions about security in the prison and the possibility of collusion. Each of these matters is examined below.
6. the decision to house the lvf and inla in the same block
The Minister of State for Northern Ireland responsible for prisons was initially content for Billy Wright to be transferred from Maghaberry prison to the Maze. However, by April 1997, the Minister became opposed to the transfer due to the risks involved and concluded that the transfer should not go ahead. Nonetheless, the Minister ultimately approved the transfer. Billy Wright was also aware of the security risks involved, but he continued with his petition to be moved to the Maze. In addition, the Prison Officers’ Association expressed their concerns to the Minister of State and told him that there were insufficient resources to cope with the arrival of LVF prisoners in the Maze.
The Narey report concluded that the decision to house the two factions in the same block at the Maze was not unreasonable. While it is undoubtedly true that the political situation put the prison authorities under great pressure to accede to the demand for segregation, the decision to house two opposing factions, neither of which was on ceasefire, in the same block seems extraordinary. Judge Cory reached the conclusion in his report that housing the LVF in H Block 2 would have ensured that they were not exposed to attacks by hostile rival factions.
7. the decision to transfer christopher mcwilliams and john kenneway from maghberry to the maze
In May 1997 McWilliams and Kenneway were moved to the Maze and housed with other INLA prisoners in the same block as Billy Wright, despite INLA threats against Billy Wright, and despite the fact that the two men had been involved in a hostage-taking incident involving weapons at Maghaberry. Indeed, it may have been Billy Wright who was their original target when they took a prison officer hostage in February 1997. According to an internal report into the incident, a source had indicated that the firearms used were brought into Maghaberry so that McWilliams could kill Billy Wright.
8. the failure to heed warnings about the lack of rooftop security and the possibility of an attack
The prison authorities failed to heed specific warnings from its own officers about the insecurity of the roof area and the possibility of an attack on Billy Wright. Several months prior to the murder, a prison officer had reported seeing INLA prisoners eyeing up the fences in the exercise yard. Prison staff met in September 1997 to discuss security, and their concerns were passed on to the prison management by Prison Officers’ Association representatives. In particular, they voiced concerns about the ease with which INLA prisoners could gain access to the LVF wings over the prison roof. Another prison officer wrote a report to one of the prison governors raising similar concerns about the possibility of access being gained by prisoners to the roof. At a meeting with prison governors, some prison staff emphasised the threat posed by the INLA prisoners, mentioning Billy Wright as a particular target of their hatred and the fact that they had recently been able to smuggle a gun into Maghaberry prison.
9. the failure to heed intelligence or analyse the danger posed by inla
The prison authorities compiled monthly intelligence assessments, summarising intelligence information gained from staff and prisoners. In the months leading up to the murder, these included information about Billy Wright, the LVF and INLA. Judge Cory concluded that a number of agents from various branches of the security forces, including MI5, reported threats against Billy Wright and the fact that he was a particular INLA target. Some of these threats were passed on to Special Branch. Whether or not this intelligence was passed on to the prison authorities, they had their own intelligence information from their own staff, including specific warnings about the safety of Billy Wright.
In October 1997, the prison governor responsible for safety at the Maze assessed that INLA was planning a “spectacular,” meaning some kind of high profile attack, and noted the reports that INLA prisoners had been paying particular attention to the watchtowers and yard fences. This, along with the other intelligence received, should have been enough to alert the prison authorities to the fact that INLA might seek to kill Billy Wright, and yet they took no steps to prevent the murder.
Crucial to the consideration of whether or not there was collusion in Billy Wright’s murder must be what was known by whom, when it was known, and the source of the intelligence reports.
10. the smuggling of weapons into the jail
The gun used to kill Billy Wright had been used only three months earlier by INLA in a so-called punishment shooting in Belfast. Somehow, whether through collusion between prison officers and INLA or by some other means, it and another weapon were smuggled into the Maze. Whoever was involved, it seems that getting the gun into the prison was fairly easy as security was lax.
11. the cutting of the wire fence
The murderers also had access to wire cutters and were able to cut a large hole in the prison fence completely undetected.
12. the inclusion of both lvf and inla names on the visitors list
Prisoners were given the names of both LVF and INLA prisoners due to receive visits on the day of the murder. The prison officer responsible was unable to account for this serious lapse in security when she gave evidence at the inquest on Billy Wright. Judge Cory concluded that a public inquiry into the murder of Billy Wright should determine whether it was indeed a simple error that led to the wrong prisoners’ lists being given to LVF and INLA prisoners, or whether this incident is “an indication of something more sinister.” Either way, it seems that Kenneway, McWilliams and Glennon were forewarned that Billy Wright would be receiving a visit in the morning of 27th December 1997 and were thus able to prepare themselves for the attack.
13. the defective security camera
Five days before the murder, the overhead security camera overlooking the rooftop of H-block 6 was reported defective by the Senior Officer on Duty. It remained inoperative, with the consequence that the three murderers were able to traverse the roof of H-block 6 undetected by any security camera. Despite the fact that the Prison Estate Management had no record of the defect in the camera, a service report indicates that a repair team carried out the necessary repairs on 28th December 1997. Given the fact that opposing paramilitary factions, neither of which was on ceasefire, were housed in H-block 6, it might have been expected that this repair would have been treated with greater urgency.
14. the manning of the watchtower
A prison officer on duty in the watchtower overlooking the prison roof was called away from his post twice on the day of the murder, including at the time of the murder, despite standing orders that the watchtower in H-block 6 should never be left unmanned. The prison governor who issued the order to stand down the watchtowers insists that when he did so he specifically excluded the watchtowers in H-block 6 from the order. However, this version of events is disputed by a representative of the Prison Officers’ Association, who states that he argued with the governor after the order was given and threatened him with staff action so that he would rescind the order to stand down the H-block 6 watchtowers. By the time that the officer manning the watchtower in H-block 6 overlooking the INLA exercise yard had returned to his post, the murder of Billy Wright had already taken place.
An independent surveyor has concluded that, had the watchtower been manned, the alarm would have been raised in sufficient time for the prison officers, and Billy Wright himself, to have taken action which might have thwarted the murder.
15. access to the exercise yards
On the morning of Billy Wright’s murder, LVF prisoners were denied access to their exercise yard, whereas INLA prisoners were permitted into their exercise yard. It is not clear why there was this difference on that particular morning. In addition, it seems that the three murderers were able to enter the exercise yard through the turnstile on their wing and to return to their wing afterwards through the same turnstile. Since turnstiles are usually designed to operate in one direction only, it is not known how this was possible.
16. the parking of the vans
Normally, the van conveying INLA prisoners to visits and that used for LVF prisoners were parked adjacent to their respective wings. On the day of the murder, the positions of the vans were reversed, so that the LVF van was beside the INLA wing and the INLA van was beside the LVF wing.
17. the closing of the gates
The gates to H-block 6 forecourt form an airlock, with an outer and an inner set of gates. When the murder of Billy Wright occurred, the van in which he was sitting was already in motion towards the inner gates. When the three murderers appeared, brandishing weapons, the driver of the van states that he was going to accelerate, to get through the first set of gates and into the safety of the airlock. However, the prison officer manning the gates tried to close the first set, preventing the van from going through. Had the gates been open, the van may have been able to get inside the airlock and be secured behind the gates before the murderers were able to reach Billy Wright.
18. the timings involved in the murder
The timing of the INLA attack was crucial to the success of its aim – the murder of Billy Wright. In Judge Cory’s opinion, some of the apparently coincidental “irregularities” that occurred on that day need to be considered in light of this need for precise timing. It is therefore extremely important that an exact sequence and chronology of events on 27th December 1997 be created, in order to establish who was exactly where and what they were in a position to do as events unfolded.
19. the questioning of inla prisoners
Although the names of the three main perpetrators are known, it is obvious that other INLA prisoners in H-block 6 would have known about the plan and may have acted as accessories before or after the crime. Indeed, the RUC officers investigating the murder thought that there were others involved in the crime. Yet the 13 other INLA prisoners were not arrested or interviewed by the RUC until 28th January 1998. While it might reasonably be anticipated that INLA would not have co-operated with the RUC, such a long gap certainly would have facilitated getting stories straight and the destruction of any evidence.
20. the army’s interest in the murder
It would appear that the army took an immediate interest in the murder of Billy Wright and produced at least two detailed intelligence reports about it. While the army was responsible for guarding the outer perimeter of the Maze prison, it is not clear what interest it would have in the murder, which took place wholly inside the H-block 6 compound. It is important to establish the reason why the army was so interested in Billy Wright and his murder.
21. the failure of the prison service to learn from the murder
Judge Cory’s report demonstrates the failure of the Northern Ireland Prison Service to take robust action to prevent a recurrence of the type of attack which resulted in Billy Wright’s murder.
22. the failure to call key witnesses at the inquest and to disclose relevant information
David Wright attended the inquest on his son’s death, and represented himself without benefit of a lawyer. The Coroner refused to call certain senior prison officers as witnesses and refused to disclose certain depositions to David Wright, who had to judicially review the Coroner in order to obtain access to the documents. The government refused to disclose the identity of the officer in charge of the Maze on the day of the murder, on security grounds. The Police Service of Northern Ireland has also refused to disclose the murder investigation file to David Wright, even though the investigation is closed. David Wright lodged an action for judicial review of the refusal to hand over the police file, but this was unsuccessful. Subsequently, a Member of Parliament announced that he had been sent the police file and that its contents gave rise to a number of serious questions.
23. the government’s response
The government have repeatedly said they see no grounds for an independent public inquiry into the murder of Billy Wright, although this was not the conclusion reached by Judge Cory. They have also failed to account for the leaking of photographs of Billy Wright’s body to the media and for the leaking of information about traces of cannabis allegedly found in Billy Wright’s blood and urine.
24. THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE INQUIRY INTO BILLY WRIGHT’S DEATH
It is crucial that the present Inquiry provide an effective investigation into the murder of Billy Wright, which is compliant with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has already laid out a set of principles on how a government should approach the investigation of such cases in accordance with Article 2. In the present case, it is for this Inquiry to ensure that they are finally applied, as the various investigations that have already taken place have fallen short in a number of ways.
25. CONCLUSION
Billy Wright’s reputation as a paramilitary leader who did not support the Northern Ireland peace process is irrelevant to any consideration of whether there should be an effective investigation into his death. The central question is whether the government did all that it could or should have done to protect his right to life, regardless of his history. His family, who are not themselves involved in violence of any kind, deserve no less than any other family in their search for truth and justice.
Primary responsibility for Billy Wright's murder obviously resides with the three INLA men who killed him in cold blood. However, that such a notorious figure could have been so easily murdered within the confines of a prison also places a very high responsibility on the state, both in relation to Billy Wright himself and in relation to the terrible aftermath unleashed by his death, which led to a series of further murders. It may be that the state's responsibility lies in nothing more - or less - than mismanagement and incompetence. Even so, when the list of poor decisions and mistakes is as long as it is in this case, rigorous scrutiny is required to ensure no future repetition.
When someone with a profile as high as Billy Wright's is murdered by a group like INLA inside a jail, the question must arise as to whether or not there was any collusion in the murder. On the face of it, collusion between the prison authorities or individual prison officers with INLA may seem unlikely, since most prison officers come from a unionist or loyalist background and INLA is a republican group. Indeed, INLA has strenuously denied that any collusion was involved, but that is only to be expected. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which some loyalists and republicans had common cause in wanting Billy Wright eliminated. There can also be no doubt that in the minds of many people Billy Wright was seen as an impediment to the peace process. There will be many, including Billy Wright's father, members of the loyalist community, human rights groups and others, who will find the coincidence of so many factors in one death highly suspicious. Now that Judge Cory has been able to examine documents that were not available to BIRW, some of which are still not in the public domain, it has become clear that many aspects of Billy Wright’s murder point towards collusion, even absent any active co-operation between INLA and state agents. Billy Wright’s life and especially his murder, have left a dark legacy in Northern Ireland. If there was collusion in his murder, a failure to expose that collusion and remedy it will leave a darker legacy yet.
MARCH 2005
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
