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23 - 26
JUNE 2003
EVIDENCE HEARD
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
INQ 1094 (Private, B Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 164 (Sergeant, Signals Platoon, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); Soldier 129 (Staff Sergeant, Royal Army Pay Corps, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); INQ 61(Corporal, 3 Company, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); Soldier 159 (Major, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment); Soldier 139 (Staff Sergeant, 53 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment); Soldier 110 (Second Lieutenant, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 160 (A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 12 (Private, 8 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 201 (Battalion Ammunitions Storeman, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 2238 (Lieutenant, 10 Platoon, C Company, 1 Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ 635 (Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 989 (Corporal, C Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Anglian Regiment) and INQ 2033 (Captain, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 23 June 2003 INQ 1094, Soldier 164, Soldier 129, INQ 61, Soldier 159
Tuesday 24 June 2003 Soldier 139, Soldier 110, Soldier 160
Wednesday 25 June 2003 INQ 12, Soldier 201, INQ 2238
Thursday 26 June 2003 INQ 635, INQ 989, INQ 2033
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry heard from a large number of former soldiers. INQ 12 (C Company, 1 Para) was the subject of disciplinary proceedings for kicking a protestor whilst he was on the ground at Magilligan beach the week before Bloody Sunday. Numerous people also complained he was violent and abusive towards prisoners on Bloody Sunday itself. Soldier 160 (Royal Green Jackets) admitted to doctoring rubber bullets.
INQ 1094
Private, B Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 28 July 1999 [C1094]
INQ 1094 was a driver in B Company of 1 Para. On 30 January 1972 he was Major Nichols’ driver. Major Nichols was Colonel Wilford’s second in command. INQ 1094 drove a land rover and also operated the radio. INQ 2110 may also have been in the vehicle, he was Major Nichols’ bodyguard.
INQ 1094 recalled being deployed to Derry shortly before 30 January 1972 when he recalls some Paras being sent into the estates to tempt out trouble makers. However the operation did not succeed. INQ 1094 said this was not the aborted Operation Hailstone conducted the previous summer. He believed it was only a week before Bloody Sunday and linked to the planned civil rights march.
30 January 1972
INQ 1094 remembered parking in the corner of the churchyard off Great James Street. Major Nichols went off with his bodyguard and INQ 1094 waited by the land rover. Whilst he was waiting a shot hit the Presbyterian Church. INQ 1094 said he shouted a warning to soldiers who were on the wall and then reported the shot over the radio. He thought he reported it on the Battalion Net but there is no record of him having done so. He agreed therefore he might have reported it over the Company Net for which there was no log. INQ 1094 said he did not recall hearing any other gunfire before this shot or hearing rubber bullets being fired. He said he did not make a written note of the shot himself because he was giving cover to the soldiers on the wall. INQ 1094 asked for a sniper to be sent forward and Soldier K subsequently arrived.
Going In
INQ 1094 was then called forward to a barrier and he went into the Bogside on foot with Major Nichols and INQ 2110. However he became separated from Major Nichols and his bodyguard. INQ 1094 was carrying a radio.
There was a lot of confusion and INQ 1094 wandered around. At one point he saw a body lying on the ground to his left. There were people taking cover at some stairs and there was some corrugated iron leaning against the stairs giving extra cover. INQ 1094 remembered seeing a priest waving a white handkerchief trying to get to the body. INQ 1094 could not describe the body other than to say there was a lot of blood and he believed the person was dark haired. His recollection was that the priest led people carrying the body back through the barrier through which he had come.
He then remembered being on rough open ground and seeing soldiers wheeling a wheelbarrow or cart full of SLR rifles. He remembered this because it was unusual and struck him as a strange way to move rifles. There were 40-50 rifles and they had their magazines removed. The soldiers were Paras but he did not know which unit they were from. He did not remember where they went.
Soldier 164
Sergeant, Signals Platoon, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1968] and to this Inquiry in February 2000 [B1970] and on 12 June 2003 [B1970.0007]
Soldier 164 was second in command of the Coldstream Guards signals platoon. On 30 January 1972 his commanding officer, INQ 598, told him to set up a temporary observation post on the city walls. The post he established was somewhere between the Double Bastion to the south and the Walker monument to the north. He marked the approximate location on a map [B1969.0001]. Soldier 164 said he thought his was the only Coldstream Guards’ observation post (OP) on the walls that day. The other OPs were manned by the Royal Anglian Regiment. Soldier 129 was with him at the OP as were another corporal and a guardsman.
Gunfire
In his RMP statement Soldier 164 refers to hearing baton rounds fired and then, 3 minutes later, hearing 6-8 rounds of automatic fire. His statement gives the time as approximately 16:00. He then describes hearing more baton rounds and then “general shooting” in the region of the Rossville Flats. He described this as going on for about 30 minutes.
Then at 16:38 he says his position came under fire from Meenan Square with a single high velocity shot striking the wall behind him. This was during the general shooting. Then at 16:42 he recorded 2 more incoming high velocity rounds, again from Meenan Square, this time directed at the Royal Anglian Regiment position to his left (south).
Soldier 164 said the timings would have come from the battalion radio log which he would have seen before making his statement. He said he no longer had any memory of the gunfire but that he counted the rounds in 1972 and that at that time he was quite familiar with automatic fire. He said he would have reported the automatic gunfire.
The Radio Logs
The Porter transcripts (Mr. Porter made amateur recordings of the army transmissions on the Brigade Net) record a report from the Coldstream Guards (call sign 76) to Brigade at 16:15 [W0130]. That message refers to two high velocity shots heard in the region of Free Derry Corner and that people were lying on the ground. At 16:17 there is a report from the Royal Anglians (call sign 54A) of 4 shots fired at their position and two returned. These messages suggest the gunfire occurred earlier than Soldier 164 had recorded in his RMP statement. Soldier 156, a private in the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment, said in his statement [B1934] that there were two shots fired at his position at the Double Bastion at 16:15. Soldier 164 said he had no knowledge of this. He was told those manning the position to his left were from the Royal Anglians not the artillery. He said he only heard the return of fire, he did not see it. It came from his left so assumed it was fired from the Double Bastion. In fact a Royal Anglian sniper was stationed slightly further south in a derelict building in Long Tower Street. He admits firing two rounds at 16:42. This exchange is recorded in the Royal Anglians’ radio log [W0103] as one incoming round and two returned at 16:41. Soldier 164 accepted this was probably what he heard.
The only mention of machine gunfire in the radio transcripts is at 16:47 [W0138] where the Royal Anglians record returning fire on a gunman. Soldier 164 said he believed his statement was correct even though it did not tally with the contemporaneous radio reports.
When questioned by Karen Quinlivan on behalf of some of the families, Soldier 164 conceded he had no recollection of over 100 SLR rounds fired by the Paras. This was the only time he had manned an observation post during this tour of Northern Ireland and he had no knowledge of what soldiers referred to as the ‘Derry Sound,” i.e. the echoes experienced in Derry because the sound of gunfire reverberated off buildings. However he stood by his 1972 account and could provide no explanation as to why his reports did not appear in the logs/transcripts.
Soldier 129
Staff Sergeant, Royal Army Pay Corps, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1803] and to this Inquiry in 1999 [B1805.0007]
Soldier 129 was an administrative soldier, the 30 January 1972 was the first and only time he manned an observation post. This was his first tour of Derry.
In his 1972 account Soldier 129 describes being with Soldier 164. However he could not now remember him at all. INQ 350 and INQ 564 were also at the OP. Soldier 129 said he could not remember much of what he could see. He could not see Free Derry Corner; he just remembered a lot of flats and houses.
He said he heard gunfire but whether it was baton rounds or rifles being fired he could not say. It was in quick succession but he could not say if it was automatic. In his recent statement he referred to hearing a barrage of SLR shots. He was not familiar with the sound of gunfire. He had only been on patrol in the city twice and on neither occasion did they come under fire. His only experience of gunfire was occasionally hearing it in the distance when stationed at the barracks.
At one point a shot hit the wall behind him. He also saw two artillery (22 LADR) gunners kneeling with their rifles raised and looking out of the battlements. In his statement he referred to one of the gunners firing at least one shot but he only heard the report and knew it came from his left. For this reason he assumed it was one of the artillery gunners who had fired. He accepted however that the shot(s) could have come from the Royal Anglians, who he was unaware of, positioned further to his left (south).
Soldier 129 did not see any civilian gunmen or anyone shot. He said the times given in his RMP statement must have come from the RMP themselves. He never saw the radio logs. They must also have given him the locations because he was not familiar with them. INQ 2035 took both his statement and that of Soldier 164, only 20 minutes before.
INQ 61
Corporal, 3 Company, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 19 November 1999 [C0061]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 61 was stationed in one of the observation posts at the Blighes Lane factory. INQ 61 said he thought there were two OPs at the factory each with a 180º view towards the Bogside. From his position INQ 61 thought he could see Free Derry Corner and part of the Rossville Flats but not the waste ground to the north.
In his statement INQ 61 referred to seeing a lorry stop at Free Derry Corner and hearing Bernadette Devlin address the crowd over a loud hailer. He saw the crowd drop to the ground and then heard the sound of gunfire. He associated the sound of the gunfire with the movement of the crowd since they were so close together. The sound only reached him later because he was so far away.
He described hearing what he believed to be 2 low velocity “pops” followed by 2 high velocity “cracks.” He said he thought the low velocity shots came from close to the Bogside Inn and that the 2 high velocity shots were the army returning fire. He also recalls hearing a message over the radio “positive hit, gunman Bogside Inn.”
INQ 61 did not hear the shots fired by Soldiers A and B from the derelict building in William Street before the Paras went in.
He describes hearing two more low velocity rounds and one or two more high velocity rounds, then another radio message about hitting another gunman at the Bogside Inn. He assumed the low velocity fire was civilian.
The Radio Logs
The Porter transcripts record that the crowd was dispersing at 16:14 because the Paras had deployed. Then at about 16:15 there is a record of 2 high velocity shots at causing the crowd to lie down. Another message at 16:17 refers to 4 shots fired at the city walls and 2 rounds being returned. At 16:21 there is reference to two more shots fired at a gunman at the Bogside Inn and man being seen to fall. There is then another shot fired at the walls. INQ 61 agreed the delay between the crowd going down and the shots he heard from further south could have been 2 or three minutes.
INQ 61 then heard a lot of high velocity gunfire. He said he assumed it was a gun battle because he wanted to believe they were returning fire and not just opening fire on innocent people.
Soldier 159
Major, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1951] and to this Inquiry [B1953]
Soldier 159 was the commander of 53 Battery of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment. He was on his first tour of Northern Ireland in January 1972. Although he described the Bogside and Creggan as dangerous he said the army was generally accepted in Derry. This he based on the fact that they would receive cups of tea from both communities. However they did not patrol the Bogside ‘no go’ area. He described the IRA as a “boy scout” type organisation which orchestrated riots amongst young people as out of school activities. One of his sergeant majors was shot whilst on duty during a riot. There was one particular IRA member who they referred to as the Quarter master because he handed out stones at riots. Soldier 159 arrested him at one point. He could not now remember his name.
Paras on City Walls
The night before 30 January 1972 Soldier 159 was on duty on the city walls and saw a group of officers from the Parachute Regiment being escorted along the wall. There were three or four of them. He did not speak to them and could not say what rank they were. Soldier 159 said he had been told they would be there and assumed it was his commanding officer or the second in command who told him this.
30 January 1972
Soldier 159 was based at OP Charlie on Bloody Sunday. This was a permanent observation post on the city walls just north of the Walker monument. On 30 January 1972 there were also OPs at the Double Bastion to the south and one north of OP Charlie just south of Butcher’s Gate. There were four men stationed at OP Charlie, 2 at the Double Bastion and 2 more at the northern OP. Soldier 122 was at Butcher’s Gate with a platoon of men. There was another troop patrolling up and down the city walls.
General Ford
Soldier 159 recalled speaking to General Ford at some point and this is confirmed in General Ford’s diary. He refers to speaking to a major in 53 Battery LADR at 14:45.
Gunfire
Soldier 159 referred to hearing Bernadette Devlin speaking at Free Derry Corner and then hearing gunfire. He thought the first two rounds were fired at the Double Bastion OP. They were definitely high velocity. These were timed at 16:14 in his RMP statement. Soldier 159 said this must have come from the signaller’s log.
Radio Logs
The 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment log [W0097] records the Paras entering the Bogside at 16:10 and at 16:15 the crowd dispersing rapidly. Then also at 16:15 there is a report from 11 Battery of 2 incoming rounds at call sign 5. Soldier 159 said he did not know who call sign 5 was but 11 Battery were stationed much further north and he did not think they would have heard the rounds at the Double Bastion.
The Porter transcripts [W0130] record 4 shots fired at call sign Quebec 21 and two high velocity rounds returned. Quebec 21 was the Royal Anglians position in the derelict houses in Long Tower Street. Soldier 159 said he was not conscious of the return fire.
Soldier 159 made his way to the Double Bastion after the initial gunfire, whilst there another shot hit the wall below him. Four minutes later two more shots hit the wall to his left (south). In his RMP statement Soldier 159 had described these shots as coming at 16:34, i.e. 20 minutes after the first shots. He could not now recall how long he stayed at the Double Bastion.
In his RMP statement Soldier 159 then says he went to Butcher’s Gate and at 16:38 heard two more high velocity rounds fired at the walls between the Double Bastion and Bishops Gate. Soldier 159 agreed Bishops Gate and the Double Bastion were a long way from Butcher’s Gate. He could not now remember hearing these shots but presumed his original statement was correct.
Thompson
Soldier 159 also claims to have heard a Thompson sub machine gun but could not, even in 1972, say when he heard it or where it was fired from other than the general direction of the Rossville Flats. In evidence he said he was “100% certain” he heard a Thompson but conceded he did not report it before making his statement to the RMP.
Soldier 159 made no reference in either of his statements to the 108 SLR rounds fired by the Paras. He said he must have been aware of them at the time but was not asked about them. He denied that his reference to a Thompson but not to hearing any of the Paras’ gunfire was influenced by his awareness that civilians had been killed. He denied deliberately excluding reference to the large volume of shooting by the Paras and said others were in a better position than him to comment. However the reference to hearing automatic fire from a Thompson appears at the very end of his RMP statement as a general comment after he had said “I am unable to give a detailed account of other shooting incidents…” This suggested he was asked about shooting generally. He said the Thompson was the only piece of information he thought might be useful.
He insisted he could not have been mistaken as to hearing a Thompson.
Soldier 139
Staff Sergeant, 53 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1860] and this Inquiry on 21 March 2000 [B1862]
Soldier 139 was in charge of a platoon of about 32 men. He was on his second tour of Northern Ireland. He was based at the Craigavon Bridge and on 30 January 1972 was on observation duties on the city walls.
30 January 1972
Soldier 139 was at the OP Charlie observation post near to the Masonic car park. OP Charlie was an armour plated sentry box [see photograph EP0001.00001]. In the box itself were Sergeant 025 with a sniper rifle and Soldier 012, who was a radio operator. The operations room was at the Masonic car park.
Soldier 139 said he was not aware of the other regiments who were also stationed on the city walls that day. There were a number of RUC men on the walls but Soldier 139 had no liaison with them. He wandered up and down the walls. He saw the march and the army helicopter flying above. He heard over the radio that there was “bother” in William Street. Sergeant 025 shouted that he had seen or heard a nail bomb explode but Soldier 139 did not see or hear this. He did not hear automatic gunfire and does not recall hearing any low velocity gunfire.
In his RMP statement Soldier 139 said he heard many high velocity shots but did not see any shooting. He also says he saw the Paras approaching the rubble barricade and being stoned by youths from Colombcille Court. He also referred to hearing baton rounds fired. He refers to relaying information to his Head Quarters but cannot now recall what he meant by this.
By reference to photographs taken from OP Charlie {P0233.0070B] it was demonstrated that one cannot see Kells Walk or the vast majority of Colombcille Court from that OP. Soldier 139 conceded he might have got the names of the buildings wrong. However even if he meant Glenfada Park, which could be seen, he could not have seen Paras approaching the rubble barricade because Rossville Street to the north of the rubble barricade is completely obstructed by Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
Glenfada Park North
If he had confused Glenfada Park North for Colombcille Court then he may have seen people running across Glenfada Park North. He also referred to seeing soldiers with their rifles at their shoulders crossing Colombcille Court and this may in fact have been Paras in Glenfada Park. His reference to having seen a body carried across Colombcille Court would then be people carrying someone west across Glenfada Park as is pictured in photograph P0436.
Body Carried Away
In his recent statement Soldier 139 refers to seeing 4 men carrying a body to a car. He could not tell if the person was dead or alive but he assumed he was just injured. He was being carried by his coat. The men put the man in a car which appeared in the area of Kells Walk. The car then drove off to the West. He referred to the same incident in his contemporaneous RMP statement but in different terms. There he referred to seeing 2 dead bodies which he cannot now recall. He said he saw another injured man put into a car by three men near to Joseph Place. The car then drove off to the Lecky Road. He accepted the earlier account was more likely to be correct.
In his later statement he also refers to a vague recollection of seeing 3 or 4 men carrying a body towards an alleyway on the west side of Colombcille Court. This was approximately 10 minutes after the car with the other body had driven off. He had made no reference to this incident in his 1972 account.
Finally he referred to seeing a body draped in a civil rights association banner behind the south end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He saw civilian ambulances removing bodies from that area and people photographing the blood stained banner.
There is reference in the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment radio log [W0098] to people photographing the NICRA banner at 17:11. However there is no reference to a body being placed in a car. Soldier 139 said this would have been reported over the radio and he could not explain why it did not appear in the log.
Patrick Campbell
The Inquiry has other evidence that a man called Patrick Campbell was injured on Bloody Sunday and he was helped by two men to a house in St. Columb’s Wells and from there into a car. One of the men who assisted Mr. Campbell was William McGoldrick. He has given evidence to the Inquiry [AM0252.0005].
Daniel McGowan
Another of those injured on Bloody Sunday, Daniel McGowan, made statements to Lord Widgery and to this Inquiry [AM0255]. He said two men dragged him by his arms to a house in St. Columb’s Wells where he too was placed in a car.
Soldier 139 was unable to confirm whether or not he saw either of these men but he could not see into St. Columb’s Wells from his position.
Soldier 110
Second Lieutenant, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 3 and 4 February 1972 [B1724] and to this Inquiry [B1726.0002]
Soldier 110 was commander of 7 Platoon of C Company of 1 Para. He did not go to Magilligan but did remember being deployed in some woods outside Derry on one occasion.
INQ 5 was Soldier 110’s signaller. He recalls returning from parachute training in Cyprus and being deployed to Derry straight from the ferry, via Palace Barracks. Soldier 110 confirmed he was in Cyprus at some point but he could not say whether or not this was immediately prior to Bloody Sunday. He could not remember the briefing for 30 January 1972.
Soldier 110 made a statement to the RMP on 4 February 1972 [B1724] and the Inquiry has a copy of this. However the first line of the statement reads: “further to my statement of 3 February 1972” and the Inquiry has been unable to trace any earlier statement.
Going In
Soldier 110 recalled deploying through barrier 14 in William Street but could not remember whether or not his platoon went in first. He identified what may be his image on a still taken from Video 1 of C Company before they deployed through barrier 14. He said there were 20-30 rioters in William Street before they went in. He went down William Street towards the junction with Rossville Street.
Gunfire
In his second RMP statement Soldier 110 claims to have heard 8 shots from a Thompson sub machine gun whilst at the junction of Rossville Street/William Street. The gunfire is timed at 15:45 but this is about 25 minutes before the Paras deployed into the Bogside. He describes the gunfire as coming from “the 2 storey flats west of Kells Walk.” In his statement to this Inquiry he refers to hearing gunfire whilst coming up William Street towards Rossville Street. Soldier 110 said he still had a clear memory of hearing gunfire but could not now say it was automatic. He said his recollection now was of both high and low velocity gunfire as he ran up William Street.
When he got to Rossville Street Soldier 110 says he could see Support Company’s vehicles in Rossville Street. He therefore decided to direct his platoon to the left across the waste ground to the rear of the Chamberlain Street houses. He accepted he and his men were exposed as they crossed the waste ground and that they were not fired on at this time. In fact Soldier 110 says he was not personally fired on at all.
There is a portion of Video 1 which shows Paras crossing the waste ground in the manner Soldier 110 described. However in this clip Support Company’s vehicles are already parked at the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. One or two vehicles can be seen manoeuvring north in Rossville Street. Soldier 110 said the clip could show his men as they advanced to the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses. He identified INQ 1799 on the video crouched behind the burnt out Bedford van on the waste ground close to Eden Place.
Gunman
In his statement to this Inquiry Soldier 110 claims to have seen a civilian gunman run across the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He described the man as a youth with long hair carrying a long object that looked like it could be a rifle. In his RMP statement he referred to seeing the butt of the rifle but in evidence he claimed to have a clear recollection of seeing both the butt and the barrel. He said the rifle was tucked under the man’s right arm so that his body was between him and the rifle as he ran from right to left. He only saw the man very briefly. Soldier 110 said he was behind one of the last houses in Chamberlain Street when he saw the man across the Rossville Flats car park. There were no other soldiers at the end of Chamberlain Street when he got there. There were very few, if any, people in the car park.
Soldier 110 could not say why he was asked to make his second RMP statement but denied he was invited to say he had witnessed things he had not seen as Soldier 018 had told the Inquiry. Soldier 018 had made an RMP statement on the same day. He said he did not shoot the gunman because he was only carrying a baton and not his SLR.
No one in 7 Platoon arrested anyone. There was no one to arrest.
Soldier 160
Private, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to the RMP and to this Inquiry on 26 July 2000 [B1956]
Soldier 160 was a Private in the 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets. He was briefed by Lieutenant 116 for the operation on 30 January 1972. His understanding was that the Civil Right Association wanted to show it could hold a big march without any violence. However the army was expecting rioting.
He was stationed behind barrier 14 In William Street. During the riot they were ordered to fire baton rounds. This did not do much good but it did make them feel better. They were hoping to hit the rioters. He admitted that they were firing wildly. He said the “cowboy element” came into play. It was hit and miss because the baton rounds generally fell short.
Hearing Thompson was a Lie
Soldier 160 said he had no recollection of making his RMP statement but knew he had made it and always felt he should correct one aspect of it. In the statement he referred to hearing automatic gunfire from a Thompson sub machine gun. He said he knew he had not heard a Thompson and this played on his conscience for 28 years before he corrected it in his statement to this Inquiry. In the RMP statement he refers to hearing a Thompson both before and after the Paras went in but now says he heard neither.
He also said he had spoken to a colleague, UNK 674, about hearing the Thompson. However he could not now remember UNK 674 let alone speaking to him. His present recollection was that he had spoken to UNK 483. He said he had hoped when he spoke to UNK 483 that he would confirm he had heard a Thompson so that he need not feel so guilty about lying. However UNK 483 confirmed he had not. Soldier 160 said he told UNK 483 he had heard the Thompson to retain credibility with his mates.
Soldier 160 said he did not know why he did not tell the RMP about hearing SLR gunfire. He said he must have heard this but no longer had any memory of this. He said he could not say why he made up the account of hearing the Thompson. He said the rumour that the Paras were fired on did the rounds straight away. He could not remember being told a Thompson had been fired or to say he had heard it. He said he was not put under pressure to say what he did but he would expect others to have said they had heard incoming gunfire even if they had not. He said it was like osmosis.
Doctoring Rubber Bullets and Spare Ammunition
Soldier 160 admitted that he and other soldiers would doctor rubber bullets by cutting a piece off the bottom of the round and inserting broken glass into the case before replacing the round. It was done out of boredom and for fun. The glass generally fell only a few feet in front of the person firing the bullet. He had done this on at least a couple of occasions and knew other soldiers also did it. He denied knowing of anyone inserting objects into the top of the rubber bullets. He said he did not think he or others doctored rubber bullets on Bloody Sunday because it was such a tense situation.
Soldier 160 also admitted it was common for soldiers to have small private supplies of ammunition to replace lost rounds. He said he could not remember but suspected he had spare rounds on Bloody Sunday.
INQ 12
Private, 8 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RUC on 10 March 1972 [C0012.0009], to the RMP on 19 May [C0012.0010] and 17 November 1972 and to this Inquiry [C0012.0001]
INQ 12 gave evidence behind a screen with the agreement of the Inquiry.
Originally INQ 12 did not admit that he was present at the demonstration at Magilligan beach a week before Bloody Sunday. He only included reference to Magilligan in his statement to this Inquiry when he was shown his earlier statements.
Magilligan
Not only was INQ 12 party to the baton charge C Company made on demonstrators on the beach but he was the soldier who was caught on television kicking a demonstrator whilst he lay on the ground. INQ 12 said that when he made his statement he had forgotten that he was there or that he was subjected to a discipline board as a result of the television coverage. He denied seeking to keep this from the Inquiry.
INQ 12’s account of what happened was that his platoon advanced into the crowd and was then withdrawn. He became isolated and was attacked. He was surrounded by a number of people who were trying to take his rifle off him. The man on the ground had hold of his leg and was trying to bring him down. He had to kick the man and the ground to free himself. INQ 12 said this was accepted at the discipline board and he was cleared of assault. His account differs from that given by Colonel Wilford to Lord Widgery [WT-DAY11-0058]. Colonel Wilford had said INQ 12 was cleared because he justifiably lost his temper. INQ 12 denied he had lost his temper.
The video of the television footage of the Magilligan incident was played and in it two paratroopers are clearly seen to kick and man who is being held on the ground by a third soldier. INQ 12 denied this was the clip depicting the incident where he kicked a man on the ground. He insisted he had a rifle and the two Paras seen to kick the man do not appear to have rifles.
30 January 1972
In his statement INQ 12 described being behind barrier 14 in William Street when there was a sea of bricks, bottles, petrol bombs and acid bombs. He claimed to have seen petrol bombs break and soldiers’ feet set alight. He said in evidence, although it was not mentioned in his statement, that he saw a soldier using a fire extinguisher to put out another soldiers feet which had been set alight. He also claimed to have smelt acid from acid bombs. Although he accepted he might have confused the presence of acid bombs with another riot on a different occasion he insisted he had seen petrol bombs. However this is not borne out by the video evidence or that of the officer commanding the soldiers at barrier 14. Major INQ 2079 was commanding A Company of the 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets. He said the missile throwing was quite intense but that there were no bombs of any description.
INQ 12 said his understanding of his role was to push rioters towards Support Company who would be coming in from a different direction. They would arrest any rioters they caught. They would then bring them back to the RMP or RUC.
Going In
INQ 12 said he went through barrier 14 and then turned left down Chamberlain Street. He claimed that they came under fire in Chamberlain Street and took cover in a house. He said in evidence, but had not mentioned in any of his statements, seeing bullets strike the ground in the middle of the road. In order to take cover another soldier kicked in a front door and he sheltered in the doorway. The soldier who kicked in the door stood in the hall and told the occupants to remain where they were.
Gunfire
In his statement he said the gunfire was semi automatic and high velocity. However in evidence he said it was low velocity. He said it did not sound like SLR fire. He said the gunfire came directly at them from the direction of the flats. He said he was sure the sound he heard was not that of baton rounds being fired. However he did not mention coming under fire in any of the three statements he made in 1972.
Gunman
INQ 12 then claims to have seen a civilian gunman walking across the roof of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He said the man came around a structure which looked like a shed and moved to the edge of the roof. He hunkered down as if to get into a firing position. INQ 12 says he definitely saw a rifle. When shown a photograph of the roof of Block 2 INQ 12 accepted there was no structure resembling a shed but he nevertheless insisted his recollection was correct. He said he did not have his rifle and before anyone else could engage the gunman the Lieutenant commanding 9 Platoon ordered that no one fire because Support Company were in the building clearing it of gunmen. INQ 12 agreed the gunman he claimed to have seen would have been clearly visible to observers and snipers positioned on the city walls and on the roof of the Embassy Ballroom. He said as far as he knew everybody in his platoon noticed the gunman.
The next thing INQ 12 says happened was that one of their pigs drove down the street and parked across it close to the house he was in. A woman then approached them and asked for an ambulance to be called for two injured people inside another house. INQ 12 said his platoon sergeant detailed him and Corporal 007 to enter the house to ascertain the injuries. INQ 12 said this was definitely not the house he had taken cover in.
33 Chamberlain Street
When he got into the house he found that it was full of people. Although he was sent in specifically to find the injured people he claims never to have seen Peggy Deery or Michael Bridge both of whom had been taken to 33 Chamberlain Street after being shot in the Rossville Flats car park. INQ 12 claims that he recognised some of the 20-30 people in the house as having been in the crowd rioting at William Street.
Again INQ 12 had made no mention at all of 33 Chamberlain Street or detaining people in a second house when he first made his statement to this Inquiry. Only after he had been shown documents which he had signed concerning people he apparently claimed to have arrested in the house did he say he recalled it. In fact he said his statement went through 5 or 6 drafts before he gave his account of what happened in 33 Chamberlain Street.
INQ 12 had made a statement to the RUC on 10 March 1972 [C0012.0009] as a result of complaints made by people arrested in the house. In that statement he referred to seeing around 60 people rioting in William Street. Amongst them he claimed to recognise a man with a moustache wearing a white Mack and brown shoes. He claimed to have seen the man run down Chamberlain Street and enter a house. He later entered the house as a result of the woman asking for assistance for the injured people where he arrested the man (George Nelis) and 21 others. In that statement he only refers to entering one house and makes no reference to coming under fire. INQ 12 said this was because he was not asked about this at that time. He said he had not sought to hide his involvement in the Chamberlain Street arrests when he gave his statement to Eversheds.
INQ 12 said he was told to bring everybody out of the house. He said he did not arrest the 22 men but that they were detained for screening at Fort George. He agreed “choice language” was used by both sides and he admitted to swearing. However he denied calling anyone an “Irish Bastard.”
INQ 12 says he also recalls Colonel Wilford being in Chamberlain Street whilst they were dealing with the prisoners.
Jackie Duddy
INQ 12 was in Chamberlain Street when Father Daly led a group of people carrying the body of Jackie Duddy up Chamberlain Street and into Harvey Street. INQ 12 said he was on the opposite side of Chamberlain Street when INQ 1334 approached the group. INQ 12 claimed INQ 1334 was offering help not trying to search for weapons.
Photographs
Once outside the people were put up against a wall and searched. Nothing was found. There is a photograph showing four of those detained sitting facing a wall at the north end of Chamberlain Street. They are guarded by two soldiers who INQ 12 identified as INQ 1334 and INQ 2000. INQ 1334 had insisted when he gave evidence it was not him in this photograph.
INQ 12 identified a number of soldiers in photograph P0253 standing on the corner of William Street/Chamberlain Street namely: INQ 579, INQ 2151, INQ 2000, INQ 2045 and himself. INQ 12 said this photograph was taken after the shooting had finished and after he had returned from taking prisoners to Fort George.
Fort George
INQ 12 said he and 2 or 3 others in his platoon accompanied the prisoners to Fort George in a 4 tonne lorry. They just dropped the prisoners off and returned to Chamberlain Street. He later went back to Fort George when he was photographed with 3 of the prisoners.
INQ 12 made a statement about the arrests to the RMP on 19 May 1972 [C0012.0010]. There he said prisoners were placed against a wall and spread-eagled. Their legs were separated by being kicked apart. He says he did not kick the prisoners 6 of whom he claimed to have recognised as having been throwing stones in William Street. However in his statement to the RUC two months earlier he had said he could not identify Mr. Nelis as having been throwing stones. He does not mention making two journeys to Fort George in either statement.
INQ 12 described the process at Fort George as going in, prisoners being lined up against a wall and having his picture taken with some of them. He then stood at a desk and made a brief statement to the RMP. However none of the statements he made in respect of the six people he was photographed with and deemed to have arrested refer to the men having been rioting in William Street. They just refer to INQ 12 recognising them as having been in 33 Chamberlain Street. He was asked why, if he had really recognised them as having been in the crowd in William Street, he had not said so at the time. He said he was not asked.
Threats and Violence
George Nelis, one of those arrested in 33 Chamberlain Street made a statement to the Inquiry [AN0009.0004] in which he alleged INQ 12 threatened him whilst he was crouched down facing the wall at the end of Chamberlain Street. Mr. Nelis says a Para told him that he had been shot whilst in Belfast and that he had got revenge by killing 4 men in Belfast. He described how he had shot each of the four men and then said he was going to kill Mr. Nelis. Given what he had already seen of the Paras in Derry Mr. Nelis feared he was going to be killed at any minute. INQ 12 agreed he had been wounded in Belfast but said he had no idea how Mr. Nelis knew this. He denied telling him or threatening him. INQ 12 said he did not bare a grudge after being shot.
Joseph Hutchman made a statement on 1 March 1972 [AH0091.0007] saying a private came into the house in Chamberlain Street and ordered everyone out. He was short and Scottish. INQ 12 is 5 foot 6 inches and from Scotland. Mr. Hutchman says a woman objected to his foul language and INQ 12 replied “I had enough of you fucking Irish bastards…” Later when they arrived at Fort George and were getting out of the lorry INQ 12 referred to the Alsatian guard dogs saying “are those dogs hungry? There’s plenty of fresh meat here.”
Morris McColgan said he was searched whilst lined up against some barbed wire. The ‘arresting’ soldier was called over at random and he was told he would be identified as a rioter. One particular soldier tried to force his hands onto the barbs on the barbed wire until an RUC officer stopped him [AM0124.0005]. He identified the soldier as the one with whom he was photographed (INQ 12) who he described as short, stocky and Scottish.
Matthew Campbell, a 50 year old docker, made a statement on 7 March 1972 [AC0140.0001]. He said a “wee stout Scots soldier” used the most obscene language and handled him very roughly. They were thrown down from the lorry and the same soldier said to the dog handlers “are you short of meat, there’s plenty of fresh meat here.”
William Carlin made a statement to the Inquiry {AC0040.0004] saying that 2 Paras gave a young man a hammering in the lorry on the way to Fort George. They punched the man and hit him with a rifle butt. He also recalls the “fresh meat for the dogs” remark.
William Duddy [AD0152.0002] referred to a stocky, Scottish Para bursting into the house and calling everyone “Irish bastards.” He also said, “shoot the fuckers” when they were lined up outside. At the same time Mr. Duddy heard a rifle being cocked.
James McDermott made a statement to the RUC on 7 March 1972 [AM0184.0002]. He was 52 at the time. He refers to Mrs. Nelis asking for an ambulance to be called. A small Scottish soldier hit him several times with a baton and said “Every fucking pig of an Irishman” was under arrest. He also referred to the “fresh meat” comment. He was charged with throwing stones which was not true.
Thomas Meehan made a statement on 26 February 1972 [AM0393.0002]. He described a “wee stout Scottish soldier” who was very aggressive and threatened several people. In particular he picked on two who had long hair and accused them of being at Magilligan. INQ 12 claimed he was not under threat of disciplinary action over Magilligan on 30 January 1972 since the investigation was concluded by then.
George O’Neil also made a statement on 7 March 1972 in which he said a small Scottish soldier claimed to have shot a lot of people in Belfast and that he was going to shoot George Nelis too. He also refers to the “fresh meat” comment.
Otto Sclindwein made a statement to the Inquiry [AS0002.0003] saying he was hit in the side with a rifle butt by a small Scots soldier.
Others including Joseph McGurk, James Furgason and Kevin Leonard made allegations that INQ 12 had threatened, abused or assaulted them. INQ 12 said he could not explain why so many people had made so many untrue allegations about him.
Soldier 201
Battalion Ammunitions Storeman, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on14 February 1972 [B2023] and to the Inquiry [B2029.0001]
Soldier 201 was the ammunitions storeman for 1 Para in January 1972. He was responsible for the issuing of ammunition to the companies and maintaining the armoury records. There were also storemen for each of the companies. Each company had its own armoury but they were all part of the same complex within Palace barracks.
A large quantity of ammunition would have been issued to each of the companies at the beginning of the 2 year tour of Northern Ireland. Soldier 201 did not therefore actually issue live ammunition. The companies had sufficient 7.62mm and 9mm rounds for the whole period. Had they needed more it would have been issued but this did not arise. Soldier 201’s primary function was to issue baton rounds and CS gas. These were regularly re supplied to the companies on request. He also maintained a master record of the whole battalion’s ammunition.
Soldier 201 said there were two types of documents which recorded the use and distribution of ammunition. There was a book 183 ledger which contained a running tally of the ammunition held in both the battalion armoury and each of the company stores. There were also certificate 1033 issue vouchers. These were used to authorise and record the movement and use of ammunition. So the 183 ledger had a total for each type of ammunition held by the battalion and where it was all located. When a company used ammunition this would be reported to him on a 1033 voucher. The quartermaster would type out the voucher stating how much ammunition a company had expended. This would be signed by the major commanding the company and stamped by the quartermaster. This would confirm the number of rounds expended and that they were issued rounds. This was then checked and signed by the commanding officer. When the voucher was received by Soldier 201 he would then amend the running tally in the 183 ledger accordingly. The process began with the company sergeant major advising the quartermaster as to the amount of ammunition expended.
Checks were conducted of the battalion stores on a weekly basis. The check would be done by a company orderly sergeant or an officer. Who did it varied from week to week. They would pick a particular type of ammunition, e.g. grenades, and do a physical count to ensure the ledger tally was correct. Similar checks would be performed in the company stores.
Soldier 201 said no one ever reported to him that a single round had been lost.
Soldier 201 made a statement to the RMP on 29 January 1972 where he gave the running totals for live ammunition for each of the companies as at 2 February. This records that Support Company had 4,050 rounds of 7.62mm and 255 rounds of 9mm. He also said in the statement that 108 rounds were expended on 30 January and that those rounds were replaced by him to the relevant company. He also said he had replaced the expended rounds when he gave evidence to Lord Widgery [B2028]. However Soldier 201 explained what he meant was that he accounted for the rounds in the ledger and issued the relevant vouchers not that he actually issued live ammunition. By issuing he meant on paper. He said he would never actually replace used rounds. He would only ever issue new live rounds in boxes of 700 or 900 if the company stores were depleted. This was never necessary because they were issued with sufficient ammunition at the beginning of the tour.
So far as baton rounds were concerned he would have replenished these stocks with actual ammunition but so far as he knew no baton rounds were reported to have been used on Bloody Sunday. In fact Support Company fired between 57 and 64 baton rounds.
At the end of the tour the ammunition technician seals the ammunition and issues a certificate to say the ledger is in order. The ledger was then burnt.
Soldier 201 said he did not recall the identity of the storeman for Support Company at that time.
He said it was possible to identify from which batch a particular round had come because they were all marked on the bottom. He said he had no knowledge of weapons ever being preserved for inspection by the Special Investigations Bureau.
In respect of Guinness Force (also called Composite Platoon) Soldier 201 said he did not know where their ammunition would have come from on Bloody Sunday. They would have got their rifles from their company armoury, e.g. HQ company, however since they were attached to Support Company for the operation they could have got their ammunition either from their own armoury or Support Company’s. It was usual to draw ammunition and magazines at the same time as drawing a weapon. Magazines were manually filled by the individual soldier because the springs could be damaged if the magazines were left full. Only those soldiers on immediate call would draw loaded magazines.
INQ 2238
Lieutenant, 10 Platoon, C Company, 1 Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 6 April 2003 [C2238]
INQ 2238 had only been in Northern Ireland for 6 months in January 1972. His memory of 30 January 1972 was very poor. He could not be certain he was in 10 platoon, in fact he thought he was in 9 platoon until counsel to the Inquiry identified the men he recalled being in his platoon as members of 10 platoon.
INQ 2238 thought he was stationed at Bishops Gate under the city walls but 10 platoon was recorded as having been based further south at barrier 21 at the junction of Ferguson Street and Bishops Street Without.
Despite his confusion as to his unit and location INQ 2238 claimed to have a clear memory of hearing a “serious burst” of automatic gunfire from a Thompson sub machine gun. He said it was at least 10 rounds and lasted several seconds. He said he heard it very clearly and presumed therefore that it had been fired from a roof top since if fired at ground level the sound would have been muffled by buildings. Although his recollection was of being down at street level within the city walls some distance from the Bogside INQ 2238 insisted he could not have been mistaken.
He then described hearing high velocity gunfire lasting several minutes. He said there were 5-15 rounds. He had never heard fire like it before in Derry. In fact his own regiment fired 18 rounds and the Paras fired at least 108.
INQ 2238 said his working hypothesis everyday was that the IRA would attempt to trap the army into committing an atrocity.
INQ 635
Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 20 March 2000 [C0635]
INQ 635 had never made a statement about the events of 30 January 1972 until he made his statement to the Inquiry in March 2000. He was a private in the anti tank platoon which was commanded by Lieutenant 119.
INQ 635’s first memory is of being told to act as bodyguard to Major Loden during a meeting between senior officers at an observation post. He was only acting as a bodyguard for that meeting and was just chosen because he was available.
His next memory was of debussing from the pig in Rossville Street after they had driven through the army barrier. He was in a section of 6-8 men but could not remember who else was in his section. However other evidence suggests he was in the first of the two anti tank platoon pigs with Lieutenant 119 and Soldier H. Soldier H has claimed that before they debussed the pig came under a hail of bullets. INQ 635 said he had no recollection of this. He also had no recollection of cocking his rifle in the pig. Lieutenant 119 says he did cock his rifle and the others in the pig did the same.
Gunmen
In his statement INQ 635 referred to coming under fire, or being told he was under fire, as soon as he debussed. However in evidence he said he did not recall either being aware of incoming fire or anyone shouting a warning. What he remembered was everyone immediately taking cover behind a low wall to the south of Kells Walk. He said he saw 3 or 4 people walk out from the south of Glenfada Park North across Rossville Street, behind the rubble barricade. He claims at least two of these people were armed with what he thought were rifles. This is what led him to take cover and he assumed the others had also seen the gunmen. They were so blatant he did not feel it was necessary to shout a warning to the others.
INQ 635 was unable to provide any description of the alleged gunmen and only saw what he thought was the wooden stock of the rifles. However he claimed to be absolutely certain what he saw were at least two men with rifles. He said the men walked across the rubble barricade in full view of him and the other soldiers however he did not attempt to engage them, he simply went to the wall to take cover. He agreed the gunmen made no attempt to crouch down and were therefore very exposed to being shot. His only explanation was that they were unprofessional. He claimed there was no crowd at the rubble barricade at this point.
When he got to the wall he took cover and claims not to have looked over the wall. There were 6-7 others from his platoon at the wall and as soon as he got there they started to shoot at the rubble barricade. He claimed he could not remember who else was at the wall other than Corporal David Longstaff. He said he did not see who fired or see what happened at the rubble barricade. He did not see the gunmen again.
INQ 635 said he never saw the gunmen in a firing position. He claimed he did not engage the gunmen as soon as he saw them, before they could get into a position to fire themselves, because his first consideration was cover. He said he did not join in the firing from the low wall or provide covering fire for those engaging the gunmen because others were dealing with the situation. He said he could not remember who fired. They fired more than 2-3 shots.
Soldiers E, F and J all admit to having fired at the rubble barricade from the low wall at Kells Walk.
Soldier 027 had said in his statement [B1565.0040] and another document [B1565.0005] that he had seen INQ 635 firing at the low wall but when he gave evidence he said he could not be sure it was INQ 635. INQ 635 denied firing at all. In his RMP statement Soldier 027 referred to being told to move up by Captain 200. They leap frogged Guinness Force and took up positions at the low wall. From there he could see a crowd of civilians at the rubble barricade. Members of his platoon then fired at a sniper at the rubble barricade and he witnessed bullets strike the barricade. He says INQ 635 and Soldier F were at the wall. He saw a civilian who he described as having a weapon fall almost immediately. However when he gave evidence to the Inquiry he admitted lying about the rifle. INQ 635 said he saw at least two rifles.
On another occasion Soldier 027 said he believed INQ 635 fired 10 dumb-dumb bullets from a private supply. He also said others fired private supplies of ammunition. INQ 635 said this was not true. He had heard of some soldiers having one or two spare rounds in their pockets.
INQ 2003 had said INQ 635 had told him he had shot someone in Glenfada Park on Bloody Sunday. However INQ 2003 has since admitted this is not true. INQ 635 said he never had any such conversation with INQ 2003.
INQ 635 did not remember any incoming fire or any nail/petrol bombs. He did not see any other gunmen or hear any automatic gunfire. He said he did not know about the army fire into Rossville Flats car park until he was told about it later.
INQ 635 claims he did not go forward from the Kells Walk wall. However he does admit being in a car park to the right (i.e. west) of Kells Walk. The car park was surrounded by flats which he remembers as having been raised on stilts. These flats were not as high as the Rossville Flats. He described seeing 3 or 4 civilians running away across the other side of the car park. He also recalled being in a covered area. The car park was not covered but where he entered it was. There were only one or two cars in the car park.
Although he denied ever being in Glenfada Park INQ 635 agreed the image closest to the scene he remembered was that of the north eastern entrance to Glenfada Park. Photograph P0429 shows the entrance which is covered by a walkway.
Escorting Prisoners
INQ 635 says he was then given a line of prisoners to escort. In evidence he said he did not arrest these people, he simply led them north to another group of soldiers at a holding area. Before he received them the prisoners were in an L-shaped line against a wall. He said he did not see the prisoners doing anything illegal, they had already been arrested when he saw them.
However INQ 635 is recorded as having arrested three men; George Irwin, James McNulty and John Rodgers. The first two were arrested at the south gable end of Glenfada Park North. Mr. Rodgers claims to have been arrested whilst in a taxi in William Street. INQ 635 is pictured with each of the men in three arrest photographs. In an arrest statement made to the RMP INQ 635 is recorded as claiming to have seen George Irwin throwing stones at the security forces in Rossville Street. INQ 635 signed similar statements making similar allegations against Mr. McNulty and Mr. Rodgers. INQ 635 claimed he had no memory of the arrests or making the statements.
When questioned by Seamus Tracey on behalf of some of the families INQ 635 refused to say what he believed happened on Bloody Sunday. He said his opinion was his own and he did not want to discuss it. He denied his reluctance to voice his opinion was because it would reflect badly on the Parachute Regiment. He accepted his claim to have seen gunmen at the rubble barricade was extremely significant but claimed he could not remember whether he told his platoon commander. He could give no explanation as to why he had never given an account before 2000.
INQ 635 agreed he had no recollection of any offensive action against the soldiers whether stone throwing, gunfire or bombs. He did not remember discussing what happened with others in the platoon. He said he found out about the deaths from the news.
INQ 989
Corporal, C Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0989]
In January 1972 INQ 989 was a Corporal or Lance Corporal and was coming towards the end of a 2 year tour of duty in Northern Ireland. INQ 989 was not sure exactly where he was on 30 January 1972. He thought he had been asked to set up an observation post (OP) in a derelict house close to the city walls. He thought he was with INQ 1257 who was a sniper.
Other evidence suggests INQ 989 did set up an OP and was with INQ 1257 but that they were at the junction of Abercorn Road and Bishops Street. INQ 989 said he thought he was also with INQ 778 rather than INQ 764 who is recorded as having been in the same derelict house.
INQ 989 had no recollection of hearing any gunfire and did not think he was aware that members of his regiment had fired on Bloody Sunday. In his statement he described laughing and clapping as the body count came over the radio. They were celebrating because they thought the people who had been shot were terrorists. He now accepts this was not the case. He said they just assumed the people who were shot were terrorists. This was a first reaction; it was not based on any factual knowledge.
INQ 2033
Captain, Battalion Signals Officer, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C2033]
INQ 2033 was the Battalion Signals Officer for 1 Para on 30 January 1972. He had previously commanded machine gun platoon and anti tank platoon. He had been to Derry once before for an abortive operation.
INQ 2033 was based in the battalion HQ known as the ‘Gin Palace.’ This was a mobile communications lorry fitted with radios. It was staffed by signallers INQ 1115 and INQ 2576, Sergeants INQ 2006 and INQ 720, and another Captain, INQ 1853. The vehicle had loudspeakers so that everyone could hear what was said over the radio. Captain 1853 was operating the battalion net and INQ 2033 was on the Brigade net. In addition to the two ordinary radios there was also an encrypted radio called the BID150.
Problems with the Battalion Net
Early in the day they had problems with the battalion net. The frequency was jammed for about 15-20 minutes. This was probably because someone had left a radio on transmission preventing anyone else from broadcasting. INQ 2033 was recorded in a bugged telephone conversation discussing the problems with the battalion net. When played the tape he recognised his voice and said he probably telephoned a friend in another unit to ask if they were experiencing any problems. They had hooked up a telephone link from the Gin Palace into the local exchange.
INQ 2033 said the typed copy of the 1 Para radio log [W0090] available to the Inquiry would have been compiled by someone in the intelligence section from manuscripts notes made at the time by the signallers in the Gin Palace. INQ 2033 said the signallers kept near enough verbatim notes of the radio transmissions with precise timings. The typed version of the 1 Para log is only a précis and the times have been rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. INQ 2033 said he could not believe the log was allowed to go forward in the state it is in. He said INQ 7, the intelligence officer, may have had something to do with producing the log. He said he could not understand why his manuscript logs were not used at the Widgery tribunal.
There are only seven brief entries in the typed log for the crucial period between 16:00 and 16:30. INQ 2033 said it was possible the units on the ground were so busy that this is all that was broadcast.
Contact Report
INQ 2033 said he had a recollection of receiving a contact report over the radio. He agreed this could have been the message from Support Company recorded in the typed version of the 1 Para radio log [W0090] at 16:15, “Gunman, pistol, returned fire.” The log notes that this report was passed to brigade but there is no entry in the brigade log suggesting it ever was. INQ 2033 accepted brigade may not have been informed. He said they might have been waiting for more details before advising brigade and then forgotten to do so. Consequently brigade was not told of the first alleged encounter with a gunman.
Bodies Crossing the Border
INQ 2033 claimed he had a clear recollection of a report over the brigade net from a sub unit at the Irish border concerning a vehicle with bodies in it. INQ 2033 claimed the border unit was asking brigade whether or not they should stop a vehicle with dead bodies in it from crossing the border. He said he was shocked that brigade said the vehicle should be allowed through without being searched. INQ 2033 claimed this was late in the day and whoever was in control at brigade at the time did not know what they were doing.
However there is nothing in the brigade or 1 Para radio logs confirming this and it does not appear on the tapes of the actual transmissions on the brigade net. Mr. Porter made amateur recordings of all but the encrypted communications between brigade and all the units active on Bloody Sunday. These tapes have been transcribed to provide a verbatim record of the radio transmissions on the brigade net (the Porter logs). Even though the available evidence contradicted his memory INQ 2033 insisted it was a distinct recollection. INQ 2033 refused to accept he could have been confusing a message at 16:26 from brigade to other units instructing them not to stop ambulances inside Derry or a later message concerning injured people being moved out of the city.
Porter Tapes
INQ 2033 sought to suggest the Porter tapes were not complete and might have been tampered with because they did not contain messages which he recalled or which were in the brigade log. Aside from the alleged border incident INQ 2033 said there was no reference in the Porter logs to nail bombs having been found on the dead body of a youth. There is an entry in the brigade log at 18:30 [245 at W0053] from the Royal Anglians concerning a dead youth with nail bombs. There is no corresponding record in the Porter logs. However Christopher Clarke QC suggested the message could have been passed to brigade over the telephone rather than the radio. The Porter log does record a time when brigade instructs the Gin Palace to telephone them but that the line was engaged when they tried to do so. It is possible this was because brigade was speaking to the Royal Anglians on the telephone at this time.
Another possible explanation was that the Royal Anglians broadcast this particular message over their secure BID150 radio. INQ 2033 had suggested this was a possible explanation when he made his statement however he sought to retreat from it in evidence. Eventually he accepted other units probably did have BID150s and it was a possible reason for the discrepancy.
The other message recorded in the brigade log but not in the Porter Logs is a report from the UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment) concerning the Irish Army dispatching ambulances. INQ 2033 accepted this too could have been passed by telephone or over the encrypted radio.
Colonel Wilford’s Communications
Colonel Wilford did have a direct line of communication with brigade whilst he was with his land rover. This was fitted with a PYE radio which could communicate on the brigade net. However INQ 2033 thought the PYE radio could not be carried by a signaller and therefore once he left his vehicle Colonel Wilford had to relay messages over the battalion net via the Gin Palace and they then passed them on to brigade. INQ 2033 disputed the suggestion made by one of Colonel Wilford’s signallers that one of the A41 man pack radios was tuned to the brigade net. He said only the PYE radios could communicate with brigade.
INQ 2033 was of the view that the Gin Palace did not move from its original location in the Foyle College car park even though others refer to it having moved further forward.
BID150 Encryption
INQ 2033 said the sound quality on the BID150 was not good and he thought he only used it 3 or 4 times to provide brigade with sitreps (situation reports). He thought brigade used it even less than he did. Mr. Porter says he was told soon after Bloody Sunday that there were no communications over the secure means on Bloody Sunday because the BID150 used a lot of current and the batteries ran flat. INQ 2033 said he did not recall any such problem and in any event they could just start the vehicle’s engine and recharge the batteries. INQ 2033 disputed Colonel Steele’s evidence that the BID150 was used exclusively to order the Paras in.
Pressurising Brigade
INQ 2033 agreed the messages in the logs where Colonel Wilford moves his units forward awaiting orders and says he would like to deploy one of his sub units to catch yobbos were attempts by Colonel Wilford to encourage brigade to order the Paras in. These were Colonel Wilford’s efforts and they were simply relayed by the Gin Palace. However later 1 Para HQ asked the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment manning barrier 14 to tell brigade there was still rioting going on “because brigade do not appear to believe us.” INQ 2033 said this was probably them using their initiative to back up Colonel Wilford’s pressure on brigade. He said there could have been more ‘encouragement’ over the secure means but he could not now remember.
Order for One Sub Unit to Do Scoop Up – No Running Battle
INQ 2033 confirmed the order which was eventually given would have been passed on by him immediately word for word. He would not have abbreviated or interpreted the order. The order which was given was for C Company to do an arrest operation via barrier 14. The order also specifically states there is to be no running battle down Rossville Street. The 1 Para Log records that the Gin Palace told brigade that Support Company deployed through the Presbyterian Church to William Street. However Support Company drove through barrier 12 down Rossville Street, passed William Street. INQ 2033 said the log did not reflect the message that would have been given to brigade. It was abbreviated and must have been badly re typed when the log was created by the Intelligence Section. He said the original log would have included much more detail. The person compiling the typed log must have got it wrong. He could not explain why. INQ 2033 said brigade would not have been intentionally misled.
INQ 2033 agreed that the sitrep at 18:10 in the 1 Para Log that records the number of casualties and the number of rounds fired might have been a written note rather than anything broadcast over the radio. He said someone like the adjutant, Captain Jackson (as he then was), could have supplied the information. He did recall a gathering of company commanders, the adjutant and the intelligence officer at the Gin Palace and Colonel Wilford conducting a debriefing. He had no recollection of Major Loden debriefing the firers in his pig.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
