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16 - 19
JUNE 2003
Evidence
heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Colonel Loden (formerly Major Loden, Company Commander, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 136 (2nd Lieutenant, 3 Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 555 (Gunner, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 486 (Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ 891 (Lance Corporal, Support Company, 1 Coldstream Guards); INQ 236 (Gunner, 53 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); and Soldier 156 (Private, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 16 June 2003 Major Loden, Soldier 136
Tuesday 17 June 2003 Major Loden, INQ 555
Wednesday 18 June 2003 Major Loden, INQ 486, INQ 891
Thursday 19 June 2003 Major Loden, INQ 236, Soldier 156
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
Major (now Colonel) Loden began giving evidence last week. He was commander of Support Company on 30 January 1972. All his evidence is dealt with in this report.
Colonel Loden
Formerly Major Loden, Company Commander, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements on 31 January 1972 [B2212], 17 February 1972 [B2216], to the Widgery Tribunal (undated) [B2241] and to this Inquiry in September 2000 [B2283.0001]
Army Career
Major Loden joined the army after leaving school in 1959. He was posted to the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 Para) after completing officer training. He was posted to Bahrain between 1962 and 1963. In 1964 he was part of the United Nations force in Cyprus where he first came under live fire. He returned to Bahrain briefly in 1965 before being appointed to the 4th Division in West Germany. He remained in Germany until returning to 1 Para in 1966 as the Battalion Intelligence Officer.
Major Loden went to Aden with 1 Para in 1967. In June 1967 22 British Soldiers were killed and 30 wounded. Major Loden was awarded the Military Cross for rescuing some of the wounded men. He said in his statement his time in Aden gave him “considerable experience of being under fire in an urban environment and commanding men in such circumstances.” On his return to England he was appointed staff officer at Brigade Head Quarters (HQ) in Aldershot. The HQ moved to Lurgan in Northern Ireland towards the end of 1970.
In May 1971 he returned to 1 Para and took command of Admin or HQ Company at Palace Barracks, Holywood. He took over as commander of Support Company on 6 December 1971.
30 January 1972
Major Loden said he had forgotten much of the detail of what happened on Bloody Sunday and he now found it difficult to separate memories from what he has seen on television or in photographs over the years. However he said he still recalled certain incidents. He said his best evidence was that he gave at the time in 1972.
His first statement, which includes his Diary of Operations, was made on 31 January 1972. He made a further statement on 17 February 1972 and a draft supplementary statement to the Widgery tribunal team, although the later is unsigned and undated. Major Loden confirmed all three documents were made by him however he said the manuscript alterations to the later were not his and he did not agree with them.
Briefings
Major Loden said he vaguely recalled receiving a warning order in the week prior to 30 January 1972. They were told there was to be a civil rights march on the Sunday and the Battalion was to be sent to Derry.
On the Saturday Colonel Wilford held a Battalion Orders Group (O Group) with the company commanders and other senior personnel. Major Loden did not recollect any written orders, save the Signals Instruction dealing with radio frequencies and call signs to be used. There would have been some sort of intelligence briefing as to the situation in Derry. Major Loden’s understanding was that the IRA were fairly prominent and his general impression was that anarchy ruled in parts of Derry. His only memory of the briefing was that they were to arrest rioters, if rioting took place, in the area around Aggro Corner. There was no detailed plan at this stage. In fact there was never a detailed tactical plan so far as he was aware. He said he recalled a strong message that the operation was to be low key and peaceful marchers were to be left alone. Major Loden agreed the original plan was a pincer movement to trap rioters between the various companies not for a frontal assault as eventually transpired.
Major Loden said he could not remember whether or not the possibility of being fired on was discussed but there was no discussion as to the risk to civilians in any gun battle.
Major Loden then briefed his platoon commanders later the same day. The platoon commanders then briefed the men in their platoons and Major Loden toured these briefings. He did not hear any suggestion that the soldiers should “get some kills tomorrow.” An extra platoon called Guinness Force or Composite Platoon was attached to Support Company for the Derry operation. This was made up of non-operational soldiers from Head Quarters Company. It was briefed and commanded by Captain 200 (also known as Captain SA8).
Reconnaissance
Major Loden confirmed the original plan was to deploy through the Presbyterian Church. The intention was to go over the wall next to the church although he had never seen it before the morning of 30 January. Only Colonel Wilford had done a reconnaissance of Derry. When questioned Major Loden agreed it would have been possible to have realised the wall was an impractical route had more reconnaissance been done in advance however the Battalion was busy in Belfast.
Deployment in Derry
Major Loden said his first memory of being in Derry is of speaking to Colonel Wilford at the Presbyterian Church after midday. They discussed deploying men over the wall next to the church and machine gun platoon into a building close to William Street. He remembers the motor platoon cutting wire but cannot remember where this was. In his second statement he refers to beginning a recce at 12:20 and Colonel Wilford warning him they may have to go over the church wall or through one of the army barriers. He also mentions discussing with Colonel Wilford sending the machine gun platoon into the derelict building on William Street known as Abbey Taxis.
At 12:45, according to Major Loden’s contemporaneous accounts, machine gun platoon were warned they were to deploy to the derelict building. They were to go their as a second option for deploying into William Street in addition to the Presbyterian Church. At this stage the plan was to deploy one platoon via the derelict building and another over the church wall with two more in reserve. There was no intention of deploying in vehicles at this point. In the meantime Major Loden based himself and his company HQ on a roof or in a room to the west of the church overlooking William Street and Aggro Corner.
The First Shots
At 15:45 Major Loden ordered machine gun platoon forward to the derelict building. Once in the building 2 members of the platoon, Soldiers A and B, admit to firing 5 shots at what they claimed to be a nail bomber. In fact these shots hit and wounded Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Shortly before or after these shots a single shot hit the drainpipe of the Presbyterian Church. Major Loden was in his observation post to the west of the church when both these events happened.
Major Loden said he was absolutely positive the shot which hit the drainpipe preceded the firing by machine gun platoon. However neither event was reported to the Paras’ Battalion HQ or Brigade HQ, consequently they are not timed on the radio logs. Major Loden times them both at 15:55 in his Diary of Operations but said he did not know where he had obtained the times for his Diary. Major Loden could not explain why he could be so certain of the sequence of these first shots other than saying he recalled the incident very well. He denied he was just asserting the drainpipe shot came first to suggest the IRA fired first on Bloody Sunday.
Major Loden said he was not overly concerned by the incoming shot since his experience was that once they were deployed in force the IRA would not attempt a gun battle. He agreed it was his responsibility to ensure the firing by machine gun platoon was reported back to Brigade. He could not explain why this was not done. He did remember his signaller was not in the observation post with him but at ground level below him. He had to shout orders to the signaller.
Damien Donaghy and John Johnston
Major Loden had said in evidence to Lord Widgery that he had seen a civilian shot in William Street. He referred to seeing a man fall after hearing gunfire from machine gun platoon. However in evidence to this Inquiry he said he could no longer recall this. Furthermore he had recorded in his Diary of Operations that he had been told a nail bomber had been shot, he did not refer to having seen this personally. Elsewhere in the Diary he does indicate where he had actually witnessed events.
It was put to him by Arthur Harvey QC, on behalf of some of the families, that no nail bomber was shot and the account in the Diary was very misleading. In particular the Diary says the soldiers only fired after having been ordered to do so by their platoon commander. However neither Soldier A or B said they were ordered to fire and the platoon commander says he did not know what happened because he was elsewhere tending to the platoon radio operator who had been injured in a fall. He had not given any order to fire. Major Loden denied he had constructed a sanitised account suggesting the soldiers were acting under the supervision and control of their commander. He said he would not have said he had seen a man shot unless he had done so. He only saw one man fall yet Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot within seconds of each other in roughly the same place. Major Loden’s account accords with that of Soldiers A and B, in so far as they claim to have shot a single target, but none of them admit to seeing a second man fall. Major Loden did not claim to have heard or seen any nail bombs exploding on the waste ground close to the derelict building.
No Order for Support Company to Go In
Major Loden claims he was given a warning order at 16:00 to have his men return to their vehicles and prepare to advance through barrier 12 in Little James Street. This order would have come from Brigade via Battalion HQ. Major Loden says this was the first he knew of the change of plan, i.e. that the Presbyterian Church route had now been abandoned. However neither the warning order, nor the subsequent order to deploy (at 16:10), appear in any of the radio logs. Nor were these apparent orders recorded on the Porter tapes. (Mr. Porter made amateur recordings of the actual army radio transmissions on the day.) The only orders which are recorded are for C Company to deploy through barrier 14. Major Loden could not explain why this was but insisted he did receive an order to go through barrier 12 and would not have done so without an order.
16:15 Barrier 12
In his Diary Major Loden recorded that his order to deploy was given at 16:10 but they did not actually move from the church until 16:13 because of the time taken to get all the men back to their vehicles. The actual order for C Company to deploy through barrier 14, recorded in the radio logs and on the Porter tapes, had a caveat that there were to be “No running battles down Rossville Street.” Major Loden was never told this. He said he did not recognise the instruction “no running battles.” Had he been told a limit of exploitation he would not have gone beyond it. At one point in answering questions from Gerard Elias QC, representing some of the soldiers, Major Loden said he would not have gone down Rossville Street had he been given this order. However he then changed his mind and said he could not speculate what he would have done. In any event he claimed what transpired was not a running battle down Rossville Street. Asked by Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, what would have constituted a running battle down Rossville Street Major Loden said continuing down to Free Derry Corner.
Major Loden agreed that so far as he was aware there was no coordination between his company and C Company as to how and where they would link up.
Delay at Barrier 12
When Major Loden got to barrier 12 the soldiers there appeared surprised and seemed unaware his men were going to deploy through the barrier. Consequently there was some delay, 30 seconds according to Major Loden, whilst he remonstrated with the commanding officer at the barrier to open it and let his vehicles through. The officer was reluctant. Major Loden agreed that this suggested the officer at the barrier had not received an order that the Paras were going to come through there. As a result of the delay at the barrier the rioters ran away towards Aggro Corner. Because of this the pincer movement went out of the window and it became a frontal assault chasing the rioters in vehicles. There was no attempt to throw a cordon across the waste ground.
Going In
Support Company drove through barrier 12 and down Little James Street. Major Loden’s command pig followed the two pigs of motor platoon commanded by Lieutenant N and Sergeant O. They paused at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street (Aggro Corner) but since the crowd had already run a long way south Major Loden urged them on down Rossville Street. He did this over the radio. However the positions in which Lieutenant N and Sergeant O’s pigs eventually ended up were down to their respective initiatives.
Major Loden had ordered that the two empty pigs belonging to machine gun platoon join the convoy which ended up in Rossville Street. He had intended the pigs to go to the derelict building to pick up the soldiers there but this never happened. In the meantime machine gun platoon moved out of the derelict building and advanced on foot toward the Rossville Flats although Major Loden did not know this at the time. Arthur Harvey QC suggested the decision to include the machine gun platoon pigs in the middle of the convoy meant that by the time they all stopped in Rossville Street the composite platoon and anti tank platoon were separated from motor platoon, who were at the front, by over 100 metres. Major Loden denied this caused any problem in linking up to conduct the arrest operation or that the anti tank platoon being so far behind took them out of the action.
Major Loden had no explanation as to why his Battalion HQ did not tell Brigade HQ that Support Company had driven right into the Bogside. In fact the radio logs are completely misleading in that they record Support Company as having gone in via the Presbyterian Church and never going beyond William Street [W0130]. Consequently Brigade was left with the impression they were conducting an arrest operation in the region of Aggro Corner as per the original plan. Major Loden said he was not aware Brigade was under the impression the operation would be conducted on foot rather than from vehicles. He said once the decision was made to go in via barrier 12 they had to use vehicles to get to the crowd.
Sceptical About Incoming Fire
In his Diary of Operations Major Loden records three rounds hitting Sergeant O’s pig as they drove down Rossville Street. Major Loden said he could not recall who had told him this but in evidence to Lord Widgery he expressed doubts about whether it actually happened. He said he was sceptical about the report because when inside a moving pig it was difficult to distinguish the sound of a bullet strike from that of other missiles.
Signallers
Major Loden’s command vehicle initially parked on Rossville Street close to the junction with Pilot Row. Major Loden confirmed the radio operator pictured standing on the left of photograph EP0002.0007 was probably INQ 627. This was because INQ 627 was one of his signallers, he is standing close to Major Loden’s pig and his other signaller, Soldier 033, was much taller. There were a total of five people in Major Loden command group; himself, a driver, two signallers and Company Sergeant Major Lewis.
Arrests
In his statement to the Inquiry Major Loden refers to confronting 4 men as soon as he debussed from the pig. He claimed they appeared to be sizing them up and deciding whether or not to attack. Major Loden said he took the initiative and broke his baton on one of them. However in all his earlier accounts he had referred to only two men, who he claimed to be throwing stones and who were arrested by his driver and another in his group. In fact Major Loden’s driver says he did not make an arrest but both his signallers do claim to have done so. There is also some dispute as to whether or not the signallers did in fact make the arrests they claim and, if they did, the people they claim to have arrested were not in Rossville Street when arrested. (Soldier 033 claims to have arrested a Mr. McGilloway who is pictured prior to his arrest at the south gable end of Glenfada Park North. INQ 627 claims to have arrested a Mr. Doherty close to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.) Major Loden agreed it was highly unusual for radio operators to make arrests and accepted this had an adverse effect on his ability to communicate with battalion HQ and his platoon commanders. However he said the arrests were over very quickly and in any event he had two radios in the back of his pig which he was perfectly capable of operating. He accepted his group was not a snatch squad but claimed the arrests were forced upon them by circumstance. He then got on with commanding the company. In fact a total of only 6 people were arrested in the whole of Rossville Street and the waste ground.
Batoning arrestee
Before making his statement to this Inquiry in 2000 Major Loden had never previously mentioned batoning anyone, let alone breaking his baton in the process. However Soldier 027 had said he witnessed Major Loden striking a prisoner. In an account he wrote in 1975 Soldier 027 refers to being astonished to see Major Loden lean out of the back of his pig and hit a prisoner on the head with his baton. This is alleged to have occurred after the main gunfire. Major Loden said he did not see the relevance of referring to using his baton before and described Soldier 027’s account as a “complete fantasy.”
William Dillon
Major Loden said he was not one of the soldiers pictured arresting William Dillon. The photographs show Mr. Dillon being led towards Major Loden’s pig but he could not identify himself anywhere. He said he did not know what happened to the two men arrested by his crew. He agreed his signallers should have remained close by at all times.
Moving the Command Vehicle to Block 1
Major Loden claims to have heard a burst of automatic gunfire, about 15 rounds, very soon after debussing. He also claims that as a result of this he immediately instructed his team to get back into the pig and move it to the cover of the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He claims the gunfire, the arrests and moving the pig came very close together and very soon after they debussed. In fact in one statement he says the incoming gunfire was within 30-60 seconds of debussing from the pig.
Major Loden claims not to have seen anything of what occurred in the Rossville Flats car park or at the rubble barricade because his view was restricted once he was parked close to the north end of Block 1. He also claims that during these 10 minutes when the majority of the firing took place he was also unable to communicate with his platoon commanders because they were busy “repelling attacks” on them. However the photographic and video evidence clearly demonstrates that Major Loden’s vehicle remained in Rossville Street throughout the majority of the time when the shooting occurred. Major Loden accepted the evidence indicated he did not move to Block 1 until much later than he had claimed.
Company Sergeant Major Lewis said in his statement that he went over to the Kells Walk wall to enquire about all the gunfire being directed from there toward the rubble barricade. He says that he returned to the command vehicle to speak to Major Loden and only then was a decision made to move.
Major Loden said he was completely unaware that Lieutenant N had fired warning shots up Eden Place very soon after deploying onto the waste ground. He was informed of this later but denied Lieutenant N’s conduct would have led other soldiers to believe, falsely, they were being fired on. However, as Lord Saville pointed out, others would assume Lieutenant N was firing in accordance with the Yellow Card, the army’s rules of engagement, which only permitted firing at targets posing a threat to life. It was therefore likely they would conclude Lieutenant N was either returning fire or firing at a gunman/nail bomber.
Incoming Gunfire
Major Loden claims to have heard incoming rifle fire as well as the automatic fire. He said the incoming fire was exceptional, there was a lot of it and it surprised him. He said he heard incoming fire both before and after moving to Block 1. His only explanation for the fact that no soldier was hit was luck and that the IRA was not as accurate in their shooting at that time as they later became. In response to a question from Lord Saville Major Loden said he could not have mistaken echoes of army fire for incoming fire.
The Rubble Barricade
Major Loden said in evidence he did not see the crowd of people at the rubble barricade as pictured in various photographs but he accepted these suggested there was no gunfire from the barricade at the time the photographs were taken. There is one photograph [E0015.00006] in which in the background a soldier carrying a baton can be seen standing on the waste ground close to the command pig. Major Loden agreed this could be him.
The combination of photographic and video evidence suggests that by the time the command pig moved to Block 1 the crowd at the rubble barricade had disappeared and Jackie Duddy’s body had already been removed from the Rossville Flats car park. In other words most of the shooting in the car park and at the rubble barricade had already happened.
Man with Megaphone
Major Loden said he was not the soldier who can be seen on Video 48 walking in Rossville Street shouting orders through a megaphone. He said this was probably Captain 200 (also known as Captain SA8) who was commanding Guinness Force (also called composite platoon). Major Loden agreed the video tended to suggest the soldiers were not under fire.
Major Loden also said he did not see, or could not recall seeing, soldiers gathering at the low wall to the south of Kells Walk from where much of the shooting occurred. The video indicates this occurred before Major Loden’s vehicle moved and he would therefore have been very close to the wall.
The Killings
Major Loden could not explain why he had seen nothing of what occurred at the rubble barricade or in the Rossville Flats car park. At one point he suggested he could have been using the radio in the back of his vehicle but he accepted if this were the case he would have been standing in the vehicle looking out of the Perspex turret on top. At another point he said he might have seen the shootings but forgotten them. When asked why, if that were the case, there is no mention of his having seen any of the shootings in his 1972 accounts he said he probably was not asked. He denied he should or would have volunteered such information. However what he did say in 1972 [B2222] was that he saw no unnecessary violence or indiscriminate shooting. He claimed there was no firing into the crowd at the Rossville Flats or any rounds discharged as soldiers debussed. He claimed this was him giving an overview rather than seeking to rebut allegations being made against the army.
Major Loden claimed not to have seen Michael Kelly lying at the rubble barricade after having been shot by Soldier F. Nor did he see Michael McDaid, William Nash or Michael Young all shot dead at the barricade. He also denied seeing Hugh Gilmour shot at the barricade. He is pictured in P0441 close to the door of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats from where he stumbled to the south end of the Block before he died. Major Loden said he did not think he had forgotten these scenes but that he had not seen them because he was “scanning the area” and only saw “snap shots.” He also claims not to have seen Jackie Duddy shot dead in the car park or his body being attended to. Nor did he see Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley or Peggy Deery shot in the car park.
Major Loden denied he failed to exert any control over his men or their firing. He said it was not his job to control every individual soldier but that control was delegated down the chain of command through platoon commanders to platoon sergeants and corporals.
What he Did See
Major Loden does claim to have seen soldiers from motor platoon firing from near to his position at the north end of Block 1. In evidence to Lord Widgery he said the soldiers who were firing were themselves under fire. He also claimed to have seen a body in the middle of the car park. However he had not mentioned motor platoon firing, incoming fire or seeing a body in his 1972 statements. Furthermore almost all the firing done by motor platoon into the Rossville Flats car park was over by the time Major Loden got to Block 1. He said he could not now recollect seeing the body.
Major Loden also says he saw soldiers firing from the Kells Walk wall toward the rubble barricade from his position at Block 1. However he says what concerned him was the unusual amount of incoming fire. He said this was high velocity gunfire. He had said to Lord Widgery that he saw soldiers at Kells Walk engaging a target at the rubble barricade but he now says he no longer recalls this. He had also told Lord Widgery that there was a lot of firing going on and that he had seen two or three casualties behind the rubble barricade. In evidence to this Inquiry however he said he did not see any casualties until later but that he had seen people lying behind the barricade when the gunfire was going on. His evidence to Lord Widgery also included seeing soldiers at the ramp north of Glenfada Park North. At the same time he had claimed there was a mixture of high and low velocity incoming gunfire.
However by the time Major Loden was at Block 1 anti tank platoon had moved into Glenfada Park. There were soldiers still at the Kells Walk wall but they were from composite platoon and they claimed to have fired at targets not at the rubble barricade but on the pavement at the west side of Block 1. Soldiers K, L and M said they fired at one or two people crawling along the pavement towards Block 1. Major Loden accepted he might have seen these soldiers firing but said he would not have seen their targets. He said he did not recall ever being told they fired at people crawling along the pavement.
Major Loden claimed at some point he crossed Rossville Street to go to the Kells Walk wall however in evidence he said he could not be sure he had not in fact gone to the ramp at Glenfada Park. He claims not to have been aware of the firing in Glenfada Park until he was told about it during debriefing. However Colonel Wilford has said Major Loden mentioned firing in Glenfada Park when they spoke at Block 1. He said Major Loden also told him about two bodies on the rubble barricade.
Major Loden claimed not to recall where the bodies were on the barricade or who told him about them. He said he did not recall seeing Alex Nash waving from the barricade in an attempt to stop the soldiers firing. When question by Michael Mansfield QC, representing the Nash family (Alexander Nash was injured on Bloody Sunday and his son William was shot dead at the barricade), Major Loden accepted had he seen this it would have been his responsibility to intervene and gain control of the firing.
Major Loden did not see any civilian gunmen or bombers.
Bodies in the Pig
Major Loden denied ever seeing the three bodies collected from the rubble barricade in Lieutenant N’s pig. CSM Lewis describes an intense discussion between Major Loden and a padre about the bodies in the pig but Major Loden claimed no recollection of it. Father Irvine’s evidence [H0009.0019] was that a very distressed woman in the Rossville Flats told him of the bodies in the pig. He went immediately to the army vehicles below and asked about the bodies. There was a soldier guarding the pig who looked extremely frightened. Both this soldier and an officer who was nearby denied there were any bodies in the pig so he returned to the woman in the Rossville Flats assuming she was mistaken. However she insisted what she said was true so he went to the pig again and told the soldier guarding it he was going to open the door. He was told he would be shot if he did so. He therefore shouted to Father Mulvey, who was also nearby, that he had been told he would be shot when he opened the door. Father Mulvey replied that they would have to shoot him as well and with this Father Irvine opened the pig door. Inside there were three bodies. He got into the pig and anointed the bodies. When he got out he told the soldiers they had lied to him but they just smirked. Major Loden claimed he did not witness the incident.
Order to Ceasefire
Major Loden ordered a ceasefire from his position at the north end of Block 1. In evidence to Lord Widgery he said he did this whilst soldiers were firing from his position south along the west side of Block 1. The ceasefire order is captured on Video 3 [5 minutes; 16 seconds]. Gerald Seymour, a television journalist, is doing a report to the camera whilst sheltering behind the north end of Block 1. As he is speaking he flinches as the sound of gunfire is heard behind him (west). After two shots Major Loden is heard to shout, “Cease firing!” Then a hand, presumably that of a soldier, can be seen over Mr. Seymour’s left shoulder apparently gesturing toward the pavement/south along the west side of Block 1.
There is then a break in the tape and it restarts looking at a slightly different angle but the camera is in roughly the same place. A further three shots are heard and Major Loden can just be seen emerging from the back of his pig to shout a further ceasefire: “do not fire back for the moment; unless you can identify a positive target.” Major Loden denied ordering the ceasefire because soldiers were firing without having positive targets. The CSM, who may be the tall soldier next to Major Loden in the video clip, then called for an ammunition check.
Major Loden denies he was concerned about the firing but Captain 200 recalls a conversation with him in which, he says, they both expressed their concerns about “the amount of unjustified and unnecessary firing.” Major Loden was shown a photograph of a window, on the third floor of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, punctured by six bullet holes. A photographer, Mr. Grimaldi, and his girlfriend, Ms. North, were in the room when Soldier F fired 5 shots and Soldier G fired once at the window. Soldiers F and G had just returned from firing in Glenfada Park when this happened. Major Loden said he had no recall of the incident, which happened at the end of the firing, but that the soldiers might have mistaken Mr. Grimaldi’s camera for a weapon. He denied this was an example of his willingness to justify his soldiers shooting at civilians. These shots are not recorded in his list of engagements.
Soldier 027 has given evidence that Soldier G was leaning over the bonnet of a pig and firing into Block 1 after Major Loden had ordered a ceasefire. He says the CSM then said to Soldier G “That’s enough!” Soldier 027 also said when CSM Lewis told Colonel Wilford that Soldiers F and G were a problem Colonel Wilford said they had “better be packed off to the SAS.” Major Loden said he did not hear this.
Major Loden said he could not explain why the radio logs recorded only two bodies at the barricade when it appears he and others knew full well there were at least three. Nor could he explain why in an interview given at the scene Father Mulvey could tell Gerald Seymour there were three bodies at the barricade and two more behind Block 1. This suggested immediately after the firing stopped Father Mulvey knew more about what had happened than Major Loden did and he was supposed to be in command.
Ammunition Check
It was the job of the CSM to do an ammunition check and this would have been done as a matter of course. However Major Loden said he specifically ordered an ammunition check be done once the firing ceased because the circumstances were wholly exceptional. It was not normal for so many rounds to have been fired.
Debriefing at Clarence Avenue
Major Loden claims that once Support Company returned to their forming up position (FUP) in Clarence Avenue he sent for the soldiers who had fired. He says he interviewed each of the soldiers in the back of his pig and made notes in his pocket notebook. He claims to have recorded what they fired at and from where they fired. He then tore out the relevant pages from the notebook and handed these in to someone at Battalion HQ. He said he did not now remember to whom he had given the notes and said he had never seen them again.
The List of Engagements [B2214]
Major Loden’s debrief of the firers at the FUP purportedly gave rise to a typed list of 15 alleged engagements [B2214]. This list (hereafter ‘the List’) purports to record what the soldiers fired at and from where they fired. It does not record who fired or how much ammunition they fired.
Major Loden said the List was intended to record all the engagements, irrespective of whether or not a target had actually been hit but it did not attempt to record how many rounds had been fired. He confirmed that had two soldiers told him they both fired at the same target he would have recorded this as two separate engagements. He said he thought the List included the firing by soldiers in the composite platoon but he could not recall for certain. He said he did not think anyone realised at the time that some of the soldiers from motor platoon, including Sergeant O and Soldier P, were at Altnagelvin hospital when he was debriefing those who fired. The List therefore did not include their firing. In fact Major Loden’s evidence to Lord Widgery was that he had interviewed all those who had fired. Major Loden said nothing in the soldiers’ manner caused him to doubt the accuracy of the information they gave him.
Major Loden said the soldiers had come to him platoon by platoon and on the basis of what they told him he wrote down the grid references of their location and that of their targets by reference to his map[B2287]. He did not mark the map itself. He said he was absolutely sure he made no notes other than the words contained in the typed list. He claimed it was standard army procedure not to record the names of soldiers and this was why he did not note who had fired at which target. Consequently it is only by reference to the accounts that the firers gave to the RMP that one can identify who is involved in which engagement. However even then, the alleged engagements do not account for all the targets the soldiers claim to have fired at and some do not appear to relate to any target of any soldier. Very few, if any, account for those who were actually shot.
Captain 200 had made a similar list of who had fired in respect of the composite platoon. In his list Captain 200 did identify by name the soldiers who fired. Major Loden insisted he had been trained never to include soldiers’ names in military reports. He said no one ever asked him to identify the soldiers involved in the engagements he had listed. He said he did not speak to the RMP at Clarence Avenue and he had no more to say on the matter. He denied the list was wholly unsatisfactory but accepted, when questioned by Lord Saville, the List fell very far short of a full account of what had happened.
The Shot Plots
The grid references given in the List have been plotted on a map and the resulting shot plot gives a representation of where the soldiers were when they fired and the locations at which they fired. Incidents 1 to 6 on the List deal with firing in the Rossville Flats car park however none of the recorded locations of alleged targets appears to accord with any of the people shot in the car park. Major Loden claimed when giving evidence that after he handed in his notes he never had an opportunity to check the typed version and that he did not even see it until shortly before giving evidence to Lord Widgery. He also claimed the List itself did not contain the information he had written in his notes. However, as Lord Saville pointed out, the List was annexed to Major Loden’s statement/Diary of Operations signed on 31 January 1972. Major Loden then accepted he must have seen the typed copy the next day.
Not only do the grid references not accord with those who were actually shot, once plotted, they give rise to absurdities such as a number of shots passing through buildings before reaching their targets. Major Loden said he had plotted the references himself about a week before giving evidence but claimed no one had ever done so before or compared the List with the evidence soldiers had given in the statements to the RMP.
There is also a shot plot which had been produced for the Widgery tribunal. This document [Q0007] plots all the rounds the soldiers claim to have fired according to the accounts they provided to the RMP. The discrepancies between this plot and that from Loden’s List are considerable. Significantly whilst some of the firers’ targets are reflected in the List others are not. For example Soldier C claimed to have fired at a gunman in the Rossville Flats, which is in the List, but also claims to have fired at a man with a machine gun at the south west corner of the Rossville Flats car park, this shot and target are not included. It is not even possible to tell whether or not the List includes those who fired from composite platoon since item 13 would appear to relate to one of the shots fired by Soldiers K, l or M but their other shots are not included. Asked whether he had spoken to the soldiers from composite platoon he said “maybe, maybe not.”
Discrepancies
Item 4 on the List refers to a gunman with a pistol being shot behind a barricade in Chamberlain Street. However there was no barricade in Chamberlain Street and the grid reference given places the gunman in the north east corner of the Rossville Flats car park. Major Loden said he could not explain this. Item 8 on the list appears to relate to the alleged shooting of a nail bomber by machine gun platoon from the derelict building on William Street. However the grid reference for the firer places him to the north of the Presbyterian Church. Even assuming this is a mistake the List records only one soldier firing not two as in fact happened. Major Loden said perhaps only the senior of the two came forward. He said he was trying to find out what had happened in as much detail as possible. He accepted he did not in fact speak to all the soldiers who fired.
Item 11 refers to the shots Soldier H fired at toilet window in Glenfada Park. Soldier H subsequently claimed to have fired 19 shots at this window. Major Loden said he was not told this at the time. Items 14 and 15 are identical and each refers to a body collected at the barricade. However the army collected three bodies from the barricade. Christopher Clarke QC asked if Major Loden had not thought to try and identify who had shot the other person whose body he knew to have been collected but Major Loden said he had other operations to deal with and it was in the hands of the RMP.
Did it Ever Happen
None of the soldiers who fired has ever said that they were told to or did in fact speak to Major Loden in the back of his pig whilst at the FUP in Clarence Avenue. Nor is the interviewing process recalled by any of Major Loden’s staff, including his driver, signallers and CSM Lewis. Major Loden insisted he did interview the soldiers as he had described but he had no explanation as to why no one else has ever mentioned it. Furthermore General Jackson, who was then a captain and battalion adjutant, also claimed no memory of it when he gave evidence to the Inquiry recently.
The Mystery Manuscripts
In answer to a question from Mr. Toohey, Major Loden said he had made a manuscript statement the next day and handed this in to be typed. This became what is referred to as his Diary of Operations [B2212]. However on Thursday 12 June 2003, on the forth day of Major Loden’s evidence to the Inquiry, a manuscript copy of the Diary was revealed. It is not in Major Loden’s handwriting. When asked about who had written it Major Loden said it was not him but it looked as if it was written by General Mike Jackson who is now Chief of the General Staff. In addition to this there also emerged for the first time a handwritten copy of the List of engagements, also apparently in General Jackson’s hand. Christopher Clarke QC said the documents had been disclosed to the Inquiry overnight. He said “Mr. Jeremy Williams of the Ministry of Defence …. realised that an issue arose in relation to the typescript document and remembered seeing this document and wondered whether we had got it and, in case we had not, supplied it to us. But so far as we can tell we have never seen the manuscript version.” Further checks revealed the Inquiry had never previously been provided with these documents.
Major Loden was unable to explain why General Jackson had apparently re-written his notes or indeed written his statement/Diary of Operations. He described the sudden emergence of these documents as mysterious and as having nothing to do with him. Even by the time Major Loden came to be questioned by counsel for the families a week later the originals of the manuscripts had still not been produced to the Inquiry.
Michael Mansfield QC pointed out that the manuscript Diary of Operations contained a large number of alterations and corrections indicating that General Jackson was not copying out notes already prepared but actually drafting the document himself. It also appears that a number of the corrections have been initialled by General Jackson. Major Loden could not explain how the document came to be drafted. He said he thought he had drafted it himself and handed it in to be typed. However he said Captain, as he then was, Jackson may have interviewed him. Major Loden insisted he did not task Captain Jackson or anyone else to go away and prepare the Diary/statement for him. The document, dated 31 January 1972, also makes no reference to Major Loden interviewing the soldiers in his pig the day before. Nor are the interviews mentioned in Major Loden’s Widgery statement.
Major Loden denied that he was aware of growing public disquiet during the hours after the shootings. He denied being under pressure to justify what had happened. He denied the fact that he did not record the names of the soldiers who had fired was suspicious. He said the RMP were told who fired although he did not tell them. Major Loden said he was not aware of the significance the List took on or that it was very widely circulated including the House of Commons.
The Radio Logs
The radio log for 1 Para [W0091] records a sitrep (situation report) at 18:10 giving a list of casualties and ammunition expended company by company. Against Support Company it records 108 live rounds fired and 64 rubber bullets fired. Major Loden said he did not know who had made the sitrep and although he had ordered an ammunition check he did not think the information was passed to him. However the sitrep is recorded at precisely the time Major Loden claims to have been completing his debrief at Clarence Avenue. What is more the sitrep and the Loden List do not tally. The sitrep says 6 nail bombers were engaged whereas the List has 7. As for gunmen the sitrep has 7 but the List has 9 and this does not include 5 more alleged gunmen engaged by composite platoon. Finally the sitrep records Support Company as having fired 64 rubber bullets but in his Diary Major Loden only accounts for 57. Major Loden could not offer any explanation for the discrepancies.
Michael Mansfield QC pointed out Major Loden had given contradictory and inaccurate accounts as to the creation of both the List and his Diary. He had claimed to have conducted interviews with all the soldiers at Clarence Avenue but no one else remembers this happening. He claimed to have handed his notes in to Battalion HQ but no one recalls receiving them. He claimed never to have seen the typed List or had an opportunity to correct it when in fact he had. He claimed to have personally written the Diary of Operations when in fact it was written by General Jackson. Mr. Mansfield suggested that Major Loden’s evidence that the List was his best endeavour to discover what really happened was nonsense and that it was in fact an attempt to fabricate evidence justifying what his soldiers had done in killing innocent civilians.
Barry McGuigan
Mr. McGuigan was shot dead behind Block 1 of the Rossville Flats whilst waving a white handkerchief. His killing is not recorded in Major Loden’s List. Michael Mansfield QC, on behalf of the McGuigan and Nash families, asked Major Loden if any paras had ever told him that they made a mistake. He said they had not. He agreed that in 1972 his position was that they had shot legitimate targets. His only explanation as to how 13 innocent civilians came to be killed was that they must have been shot by soldiers in the mistaken belief that they were armed. He could not explain how the soldiers apparently did not hit the targets they claimed to have shot at. When asked by Mr. Mansfield QC whether he would now take the opportunity to apologise to the McGuigan family Major Loden said he preferred to await the outcome of the Inquiry.
Debriefing at Battalion HQ
In his statement to the Inquiry CSM Lewis describes Major Loden arriving at the Battalion HQ (a lorry called the ‘Gin Palace’) parked at a Police Station. He says that as Major Loden went in RUC officers clapped. Major Loden said he did not recall this happening but said it was disgraceful if it did. CSM Lewis goes on to say Major Loden was not in the HQ very long and when he came out he looked very shaken. He told CSM Lewis there were 11 dead and said “we’re in trouble.” Major Loden said he did not remember saying this but agreed he might well have done so and that he probably was shaken. He said it was an extremely serious situation. Michael Mansfield QC asked him why, if he had done as he claimed, he was shocked at the number of casualties? His evidence was that he had already debriefed those who had fired. What is more when the number of hits and bodies recorded in the List are added up they come to 13. Since soldiers only ever shoot to kill he must have known before going to Battalion HQ there were probably 13 dead. Major Loden claimed he did not recall ever adding up the number of hits on the List.
Preserving the Rifles as Evidence
Major Loden said he was aware of the practise of removing weapons from soldiers on occasions so as to preserve them for examination. However this was not done on 30 January 1972. Major Loden said they did not know what other operations may be required of them and they had no spare rifles in Derry. The soldiers could not be left without weapons.
Briefing Soldiers on Evidence to Lord Widgery
Soldier 219, the Battalion medical officer, has described being called back from leave for a briefing about the Widgery tribunal. He said all the soldiers were called together in a hall at Palace barracks. There they were briefed by officers and civilians he assumed to be lawyers. He was very unhappy about the briefing because they were being told what to say. Major Loden said he did not believe the account. He also said he could not recall attending any meetings with soldiers and Mr. Heritage, one of the solicitors working for the Widgery tribunal. However there are written records [B0235] of Major Loden attending Soldier H’s interview with Mr. Heritage. Mr. Heritage has said officers attended a number of the interviews and that they often made inappropriate interventions. Soldier H made no reference in his statement to Mr. Heritage of having been ordered to cease firing by CSM Lewis. Soldier H claims to have fired 19 shots into a toilet window in Glenfada Park, changing magazines in the process. Lord Saville asked if Major Loden believed this is what he did and Major Loden said he did although it was “very strange.” Major Loden denied being aware of soldiers having been ordered to give evidence to Lord Widgery or that this was a device to protect them from prosecution since they were given no choice.
Hindsight
Major Loden denied, even with the benefit of hindsight, that mistakes were made. He said they did the best they could in the circumstances. Major Loden denied there was any intention to teach the people of the Bogside a lesson or to show them who was in charge.
Soldier 136
2nd Lieutenant, 3 Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statements to the RMP on 3 February 1972 [B1838.0005] and to this Inquiry [B1838.0001]
Soldier 136 briefed his platoon for the operation on 30 January 1972 and his notes for the briefing are preserved at G0095C.0580.0006. These notes also deal with the week prior to 30 January and refer to a visit by General Tuzo. Soldier 136 said he could not recall the general’s visit or the purpose of the visit.
Most Crucial Event
Soldier 136’s notes record General Tuzo as having said that the forthcoming march could be “the most crucial event in the Ulster crisis.” He explains that if the Civil Rights Association starts the violence then they will loose credibility but if the army start it then it could cause a flare up all over Northern Ireland. Soldier 136 could not remember where he had got this information but he assumed the general’s comments must have been passed down to him by his company commander. He said he believed the purpose of the comments was to reinforce the need for soldiers, who were generally very young, to act in accordance with instructions and be careful in what would be stressful circumstances.
The notes also refer to the need for the security forces to be strictly controlled and for there to be no repeat of Magilligan.
30 January 1972
Soldier 136 had 2 snipers in buildings commanding a view of Waterloo Street and the Rossville Flats but he could not now remember exactly where they were. The trained sniper in the platoon was UNK 497.
The only reference to gunfire in Soldier 136’s contemporaneous account is to a burst of automatic gunfire he believed to have come from a Thompson sub-machine gun. Therefore, according to that account, he did not hear any of the 108 SLR rounds fired by the Paras. He could not now remember when he heard the gunfire or why he was asked to make a statement to the RMP. He said he was probably asked because he had heard shooting.
INQ 555
Gunner, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 21 September 2000 [C0555]
INQ 555 was on his second tour of Northern Ireland in January 1972. His unit was stationed on the city walls but he could not now remember exactly where. He thought they were at the double bastion. He could see the upper levels of the south of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He had not made a statement before 2000.
Gunfire
INQ 555 described hearing gunfire from his position on the walls. He said it sounded like a fire fight by which he meant a fast, intense exchange of gunfire. He was frightened by the gunfire so kept back from the edge of the wall. He thought there was both high and low velocity gunfire but he was not trained in recognising gunfire.
INQ 555 also thought he saw a man in dark clothing carrying what might have been a rifle. He described the man as being about 700 metres away because he appeared very small but he accepted he did not really know. He had marked the man’s approximate position on a plan [C0555.0006] but this placed him only 150 metres from the city walls. He said the rifle might in fact have been something else like an umbrella.
INQ 555 also recalled an incident involving a priest driving a car with an injured man in the back. INQ 555 thought he was present at a checkpoint when the car was stopped. The priest was agitated and INQ 555 thought he found a cache of rifles in the boot. However he thought the vehicle was a Volkswagen Beetle which does not have a boot in the rear. He now accepts this did not happen on Bloody Sunday. There may have been a priest who was stopped and he may have been agitated because he was being prevented from taking an injured man to hospital but there was no evidence that a cache of arms was found in the boot of a car on Bloody Sunday, let alone a car driven by a priest.
INQ 486
Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 2 July 2000 [C0486]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 486 was stationed in a derelict building just below the double bastion of the city walls. He was with one other soldier whose name he cannot remember.
He saw the march go past and then heard someone say they had seen people with weapons. He described hearing a bullet strike the corner of the double bastion. No one returned fire but he then claims to have heard about 6 more shots all directed at the city walls. Soldiers in other derelict buildings in front of him then returned fire. INQ 486 described an exchange of fire of about 50-60 rounds.
The radio log for 1 Royal Anglian Regiment refers to 4 shots from a gunman and 2 shots being returned by an army sniper. Later 5 more shots are recorded as having been fired by another army sniper at 2 alleged gunmen. INQ 486 said he heard a lot more than 7 or 8 shots. He described constant firing for about 10-15 minutes.
Soldier 113
Lance Corporal, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statements to the RMP [B1733] and to this Inquiry [B1735.0001]
Soldier 113 did attend the Inquiry but refused to enter the chamber to give evidence. The tribunal took the view there was no point in subpoenaing him to give evidence. He was one of the soldiers who manned Barrier 14.
INQ 891
Lance Corporal, Support Company, 1 Coldstream Guards
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0891]
INQ 891 was on his forth tour of Northern Ireland in January 1972. He said there had been a rumour that his company would be called upon to do the arrest operation on 30 January but that the Paras were drafted in in the end.
INQ 891 was manning an observation post (OP) in Blighes Lane factory on Bloody Sunday. This provided a view down onto the Bogside but the view was obstructed by buildings at various points.
INQ 891 said he recalled seeing Bernadette Devlin speaking to the crowd from the back of a coal lorry but it was unclear whether or not he could in fact see Free Derry Corner from his observation post. He described a burst of automatic gunfire and seeing the crowd dive for cover. He did not hear any SLR gunfire at all during the day.
It was unclear from INQ 891’s evidence what he could see, what he did see or what he heard. In fact it was not completely clear he was on duty on Bloody Sunday since C Company appear to have been manning the other observation posts at Blighe’s Lane that day and INQ 891 agreed one would expect all the OPs to be manned by the same company.
INQ 236
Gunner, 53 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0236]
INQ 236 believed he was stationed on the city walls on 30 January 1972. He could not recall exactly where he was but thought he was at or close to Butcher’s Gate. He also recalled an incident in which a pig, which he said belonged to 53 Battery and not 1 Para, was fired on by a man with a machine gun. He said the pig was patrolling the Bogside and that as it turned a man came out from a door way and fired at it. He said the man ducked back into the doorway and came out again two or three times. Each time he fired at the pig which was going round and round. On the third occasion INQ 236 took aim with his sniper’s rifle and fired a single shot at the gunman. He missed. He says he reported the incident to his Lieutenant UNK 79 and made a statement to the RMP.
However there is no record of INQ 236 ever firing a shot on Bloody Sunday. Nor is there any record of a Lieutenant UNK 79 being on duty or the incident involving the pig and the gunman. The Inquiry has been unable to trace any statement INQ 236 made to the RMP. In the end INQ 236 conceded the incident might have occurred on another day.
Soldier 156
Private, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1934], Widgery Tribunal [B1937] and to this Inquiry [B1939]
Soldier 156 was in a sangar on the city walls close to the Masonic car park. Soldier 124 says he was a radio operator and with Soldier 156 in the sangar but Soldier 156 had no memory of Soldier 124.
In his RMP statement Soldier 156 records two shots being fired at his location on the city walls at 16:15. Then at 16:25 he records machine gun fire and at 16:34 two more shots directed at his sangar. The same incidents are recorded in Soldier 124’s RMP statement. Soldier 156 said they probably kept a log in the sangar.
Soldier 156 denied he could have mistaken multiple SLR shots fired at the same time for automatic gunfire. However the radio logs do not record the automatic gunfire.
Soldier 156 also refers to an army sniper in a derelict building about 50 metres to his left returning fire with three shots after the 2 incoming rounds. Soldier 156 denied speaking to Channel 4 News who had recorded a soldier speaking about an incident where a sniper returned fire from the city walls.
Nowhere does Soldier 156 make any reference to the 108 SLR rounds fired by the Paras.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
