|
|
|
12 - 15 MAY 2003
Evidence
heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Martin Ingram (former Corporal, Force Research Unit and 121 Intelligence Section); David (Director of Intelligence - Northern Ireland); Officer Y (Sergeant, 121 Intelligence Section) and Soldier S (Private, Motor Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 12 May 2003 Martin Ingram
Tuesday 13 May 2003 David
Wednesday 14 May 2003 Officer Y, Soldier S
Thursday 15 May 2003 Soldier S
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry heard from former members of the army’s secret Force Research Unit (FRU), the former Director of Intelligence for Northern Ireland (MI5) and Soldier S of Support Company. Soldier S admits to firing twelve rounds on Bloody Sunday.
Martin Ingram
Corporal, Force Research Unit
Made Statements to the Inquiry on 26 July 2002 [KI0002.0001], 10 February 2003 [KI0002.0032] and 17 March 2003 [KI0002.0040].
Martin Ingram is a former member of the British Army’s secret agent handling/intelligence section in Northern Ireland, the Force Research Unit (FRU). Martin Ingram is not his real name.
He joined the Intelligence Corps in 1980. In 1981, after training, he joined 121 Intelligence Section as a Lance Corporal. 121 Intelligence Section were based at Head Quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI). The unit supplied intelligence support for the General Officer Commanding (GOC) and Commander Land Forces (CLF). They were attached to G2, the intelligence wing of HQNI. G2 desk officers were graded GSO2 or GSO3 and were captains or majors.
Mr. Ingram began in the 3 Special Collation Team (SCT) whose sole function was inputting RUC Special Branch intelligence reports, known as SB50s or RIRACS, onto the army 3702 computer system. This was a boring job done in shifts, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The RUC did not want their reports filed on computer so they were not told of the practice.
SB50s were photocopied and circulated within G2. The originals were formally recorded in the HQNI Registry by being entered in the MoD Form 102 books. This was the official procedure whereby a secret document is recorded as having been received and filed in a particular place. The photocopies were not entered because the SB50s should not have been copied or the information entered in the computer.
Mr. Ingram spent 2 or 3 months in the SCT before he engineered himself a more interesting posting in G2. After a brief spell working on Loyalist paramilitaries he was transferred to the Derry Republican desk. Officer Y was Mr. Ingram’s immediate superior whilst on the Loyalist Desk. Mr. Ingram had a level one password which gave him full access to all the intelligence on the 3702 database. This meant he had access to source material from RUC Special Branch, the FRU and some MI5 and MI6 material. MI5 and MI6 source reports were not entered onto the database but in some cases the actual intelligence from these source reports was entered. At the time MI5 was not a big player in running agents in Northern Ireland.
All HQNI intelligence staff had level one passwords. This was between 10 and 20 people. Mr. Ingram was a collator and worked directly to his GSO2 desk officer. He would see perhaps 6 or 7 files a week and these might contain one or two Security Service documents. He saw these files so that he would be kept up to date on developments. MI5 had very few agents in Northern Ireland at this time. So far as he was aware there was no sifting of documents before they were circulated within G2.
There was also a personality card index which contained detailed information of people of interest. Martin McGuinness would certainly have been on the index. In addition to personal information it also referred to relevant intelligence reports.
Report on Bloody Sunday
When he started at the Derry desk he knew nothing about Derry so began reading intelligence files and searching the computer for information. The GSO2s, senior officers, relied on their junior NCOs (Non commissioned officers) to keep them briefed. The collators were their eyes and ears. Mr. Ingram therefore decided to earn brownie points by preparing a paper on Bloody Sunday. He did this as an informal project in his own time as part of his familiarisation with Derry’s history. Junior NCOs often did such projects. Bloody Sunday was by far the most significant event to have occurred in the city. The report he wrote was based on information he obtained from the computer. He simply did a search on the words ‘Bloody Sunday’. It worked like a modern Internet web search giving a list of titles with intelligence or information on Bloody Sunday. These titles then provided access to the full text of source reports which had been entered on the database.
The paper he wrote was three or four pages long and he would have given it to his GSO2 Major. The purpose was to collate the material rather than come to any conclusions. It would have gone into the filing system and may have been archived. Mr. Ingram also recalled there was a file called Bloody Sunday in the G2 registry. There were in excess of 50 documents in it.
At the time the intelligence coverage of Derry was good. Mr. Ingram often visited Derry with his GSO2. SB50s relating to Derry would be copied to Force Research Unit north, also known as Force Research Office (North).
Force Research Unit (FRU)
In 1982 Mr. Ingram was posted to the north detachment of the Force Research Office (FRO(N)). The FRU was divided into three sections: Head quarters West, based in Derry; FRO(N), also in Derry and FRO(W) in Belfast. He was promoted to Corporal and his job was to analyse and collate reports generated by FRU agent handlers following their meetings with Derry agents. His detachment commander was a major who subsequently died on the Chinook helicopter which crashed on the Mull of Kintyre. Because of a shortage of agent handlers Mr. Ingram did act as a co-handler for some agents. He saw intelligence from all agencies with relevance to his area.
The material Mr. Ingram saw, whether at HQNI or at FRO(N), indicated the Derry Civil Rights Association and the Derry Young Hooligans had been infiltrated by the security forces in 1972. He could not say now whether this was by the army or RUC. He saw material dating from 1972 and recent material. Even in 1982 information was still coming in about Bloody Sunday. It was a subject agents were always asked about when they were debriefed. Mr. Ingram said only about 10% of the material gathered in an agent debriefing would be disseminated in the form of source reports. The full details would be in the relevant contact reports.
The purpose of an intelligence report is to turn information from an agent into useful intelligence. This was done by an agent handler commenting on the information and relating it to other information such that the reader of the report would gain some insight into a particular issue.
Martin McGuinness on Bloody Sunday
At no time did Mr. Ingram come across any information suggesting Martin McGuinness had fired a weapon on Bloody Sunday. He did however see documents suggesting Martin McGuinness was under surveillance during the march. He was positive he saw sighting reports regarding Bloody Sunday and that Martin McGuinness featured in these. He said he could not be certain which unit had performed the surveillance. There were reports from local units but there was probably a specialist surveillance unit there as well. The names often changed and he did not know which specialist unit would have been operating in Derry at the time. However a unit like the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) or 14 Signals Intelligence would have been there.
He could not remember where Martin McGuinness was sighted. FRO(N) had an ongoing interest in Mr. McGuinness so Mr. Ingram remembered seeing the sighting reports about him. He also saw reports on others but cannot remember who they were. The reports mainly focused on those McGuinness was seen with. Photographs would almost certainly have been taken as well although he did not see any. He believed the reports he saw concerned surveillance from the observation posts on the city walls and the Masonic Hall.
Since FRU had an ongoing interest in Mr. McGuinness, Mr. Ingram would have expected to have seen any agent reports suggesting he had fired a weapon on Bloody Sunday. He was therefore doubtful about the authenticity of the alleged 1984 Infliction report about Mr. McGuinness having confessed to firing a Thompson machine gun. He would also have expected such a report to have been talked about given McGuinness’ prominence.
Mr. Ingram now accepts that Infliction does exist but he retains doubts about the documents produced to the inquiry suggesting Mr. McGuinness fired on Bloody Sunday. He never saw any Infliction documents. He insisted however he did see MI5 intelligence reports similar to the one circulated in relation to Infliction/Mr. McGuinness/Bloody Sunday [G0109.0670]. He said there should be registry documents, similar to the MOD’s Form 102, which would allow the document to be traced and its authenticity tested.
What Happened on Bloody Sunday
Mr. Ingram’s overall assessment of the material he saw in relation to Bloody Sunday, both at HQNI and at FRO(N), was that no shots were fired at the army before they opened fire. He said there were conflicting reports, some of which suggested there had been civilian gunfire, but read as a whole the information did not support the army case that the IRA had opened fire first or that dead bodies had been secretly buried across the border. There were reports of some of the wounded being treated in the Republic. Indeed Mr. Ingram said some of the security forces’ agents were involved in ferrying people over the border. Mr. Ingram’s view, having read all the relevant intelligence, was that the army over reacted.
There was also intelligence from before the event suggesting neither the Official nor Provisional IRA intended to undertake military action on Bloody Sunday. He saw this in contact reports from agents and in an intelligence report. He could not remember if the intelligence report was an army MISR (Military Intelligence Source Report) or an RUC Special Branch SB50. He thinks it was an SB50. Mr. Ingram was involved in relocating compromised agents, such as Frank Hegarty (also known as agent 30:18). Before being relocated an agent would be thoroughly debriefed and one of the matters which would be raised would be Bloody Sunday. There was a MISR produced following a debriefing of Frank Hegarty which Mr. Ingram thinks referred to the IRA having no plans for action on Bloody Sunday.
Agents in Derry
Mr. Ingram could not remember exactly how many agents were active in Derry in January 1972 but he believed there were around 14 to 20. Furthermore agents from outside Derry would have attended the march. He saw MISRs which indicated agents from Belfast had attended and were subsequently debriefed about what had happened. He knew this because the code numbers in the documents, the army ones at least, indicated agents from Belfast were present. He believed agents from other areas would have been asked to attend by the security forces and people who happened to be agents would have been asked to attend by organisations such as the Civil Rights Association.
Retention of Documents
Mr. Ingram’s view was that original source reports from agents were never destroyed and even once an agent was deactivated their file would be retained. There were occasions on which old agents were reactivated and their old files would have to be called back.
Classified military documents were stored by reference to registry books called MOD Form 102. The books detail the life of a secret document from creation to distribution and its destruction (if that occurred). When distributed outside a unit a secret document is forwarded with a MOD Form 24 receipt. This has to be returned by the recipient. The receiving unit enters the document in their own MOD Form 102. The MOD Form 102 is itself classified and recorded in a master MOD Form 102.
Army Career
Mr. Ingram left Derry/FRO(N) in late 1984 when he was posted to deal with counter terrorism in Great Britain. In mid 1987 he was posted to Belize and on his return he requested to attend a course at Repton Manor in Ashford, Kent. This included agent running. He was then posted back to Northern Ireland at St. Angelo near Enniskillen. His posting was to augment the small detachment in response to the Enniskillen bombing. This unit was commanded by FRO(N). He remained at St. Angelo until 26 September 1990.
His last report included a recommendation for promotion from Lieutenant Colonel (now Brigadier) Kerr of the FRU. He was posted to the Ministry of Defence in London at his own request where he joined the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). He held an Enhanced Positive Vetting (EPV) position working primarily on the Israel and Syrian desks. EPV is the highest clearance giving access to Top Secret material.
Mr. Ingram notified Vetting of his intention to marry and this created difficulties with his clearance. He effectively had to choose between his army career and his fiancée. He therefore applied for and received premature voluntary retirement.
In a letter dated 8 May 2003 [KI0002.0043] the MoD sought to suggest Mr. Ingram did not join the FRU until late 1993 but Mr. Ingram thought this was incorrect. His major on joining the FRU was killed in the Chinook crash and therefore was not Officer Z who has provided evidence to the Inquiry. Indeed Mr. Ingram said he had a photograph of Officer Z, the deceased major and himself at an FRU reception. Mr. Ingram described the MoD as the Ministry for Disinformation.
Officer Z, in his statement [KZ0001.0001] also seeks to suggest the clerk referred to by Mr. Ingram as being at FRO(N) was in fact at HQ (W). However Mr. Ingram said his lawyers have an affidavit from the clerk where he says he was the FRO(N) clerk. There was also a female clerk who joined FRO(N) and the other clerk then went to HQ(W). In any event the two offices are very close to each other.
Mr. Ingram says he did have access to screening reports for old agents whilst at FRO(N) even though they were no longer used by the time he was in Ireland. The screening reports used to be prepared when an agent was first recruited. These were kept so that FRU could circumvent the RUC’s prohibition on recruiting new agents. New agents had to be screened unless they were former army personnel, as in the case of Brian Nelson, or were old agents being re-activated. It was to allow re-activation of old agents, without a fresh screening, that FRU kept old screening reports.
Originally agents were run on a fragmented basis with Field Intelligence NCOs (FINCOs), part of the Intelligence Corps, reporting to the local Brigade. The system was centralised by creating the FRU. The FRU took over all existing agents and therefore had to have access to all the existing agent files. For example Frank Hegarty was an agent before and after Bloody Sunday. His material was passed to FRU.
Contacting the Inquiry
In 2000 Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times contacted Greg McCartney, solicitor for the family of James Wray, on Mr. Ingram’s behalf. Mr. Ingram then supplied information to Mr. McCartney about Bloody Sunday. Mr. Ingram did this because he wanted the Inquiry to have access to all relevant information and he was suspicious that the army would not make full disclosure. This suspicion was based on his experience with the Stevens Inquiries. (Sir John Stevens, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, has conducted three inquiries into collusion between the Northern Ireland security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries.) Mr. Ingram helped Mr. Stevens locate documents that had not been disclosed to him by the army.
Mr. Ingram was shown the documents the Inquiry has relating to Infliction. Mr. Ingram had never seen these documents before and had never heard of Infliction. He initially doubted the authenticity of the documents or whether Infliction actually existed. In any event he had never heard of the suggestion that Martin McGuinness had fired on Bloody Sunday. In May 2001 Eamonn McCann of the Sunday Tribune wrote a series of articles casting doubt on the Infliction allegation. These articles, although inaccurate in places, were based on information from Mr. Ingram.
David
Director of Intelligence Northern Ireland, MI5
Made Statements to the Inquiry on 17 February 2000 [KD0002.0001] and 11 April 2003 [KD0002.0003]
David was appointed as MI5’s security liaison officer in Northern Ireland in 1970. He is now 84 years old. He gave evidence to the Inquiry via a video link. He did not want to come to the Inquiry in person because he found it difficult to concentrate and after being asked to consider documents it took him a long time to recover. He had come to London to prepare his statements and to go through documents with MI5. When giving evidence he was assisted by Mr. Tate, the solicitor to the Inquiry. Although not revealed at the outset of his evidence it transpired that also present in the room from which he was giving evidence were David’s son and a serving officer of MI5.
Director of Intelligence Northern Ireland
After about three months David was appointed Director of Intelligence for Northern Ireland and given the equivalent army rank of major general. He was based at army head quarters in Lisburn (HQNI).
Director of Intelligence was a new post and there were no established procedures. David was tasked to co-ordinate intelligence gathering for all security force agencies operating in Northern Ireland. His department consisted of army and MI5 officers. Only his deputy was from army Intelligence Corps. There were about four MI5 staff under him. He also liased with RUC Special Branch. His staff received intelligence from the RUC and army but also obtained intelligence for themselves. Intelligence was collated and assessed before being circulated in reports to Whitehall and the intelligence community.
David denied he was concerned with analysis of what he called operational intelligence. He claimed he simply acted as a conduit for this material which he passed on to the army and RUC. His concern was what he called security intelligence to do with long term matters.
David’s priority was to improve Special Branch through assistance and training. He also sought to co-ordinate Special Branch and army operations so that they were not falling over each other. He sought to encourage the RUC and army to exchange intelligence and forward significant material to him. He also assessed security to ensure agents were not killed as a result of sloppy handling.
The department produced intelligence reports which David would check for accuracy if there was time. He rarely personally received the Brigade intelligence summaries, army or Ministry of Defence reports.
David met senior army and MoD civilians every morning. He would begin the meeting by briefing everyone on developments in intelligence in the last 24 hours. He would also receive information at the briefings. He also tried to meet the head of RUC Special Branch every day and the Military Intelligence Liaison Officer. These meetings were generally at RUC HQ at Knock.
Visiting Derry on 9 January 1972
David initially denied going to Derry to gather intelligence on the proposed NICRA march. He was shown the memorandum [C0048-0299] from General Ford titled “The Situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972.” There General Ford says he tasked the Director of Intelligence to go to Derry to gather the latest intelligence on the organisers’ plans for the march. At this stage it was believed the march would be on 16 January although it was subsequently delayed until 30 January. In his statement David said he did not recall going to Derry on 6 January. However General Ford’s memo refers to the Director of Intelligence having gone to Derry ‘yesterday’. The memo was written on 10 January concerning General Ford’s visit on 7 January therefore General Ford was talking about David having been in Derry on the 9th.
David insisted in evidence he was never tasked to go to Derry by General Ford. He said he worked to General Tuzo, not General Ford. He also denied any recollection of going to Derry on 9 January 1972. However when questioned by Michael Mansfield QC on behalf of some of the families David accepted he must have gone to Derry on 9 January. This was because he was shown a telegram [KJ0004.0062] he had written on 10 January referring to having been in Derry yesterday. However he still said he did not recall doing so and was adamant if he did go it was of his own volition and not at General Ford’s request. He had no recollection of reporting to General Tuzo about the proposed march.
David said he definitely did not keep a diary and was not aware of having made any notes of his visit to Derry. He said any intelligence he gathered personally would be noted by one of his staff. He said he did remember the names of his staff and it was agreed he should provide the names to Mr. Tate so that further documents of relevance to the Inquiry could be traced.
David denied any involvement in the planning of the army’s Bloody Sunday operation. He also denied any knowledge of General Ford’s view, as expressed in his memorandum of 10 January 1972, that the only way to restore law and order in Derry was to “shoot selected ring leaders of the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans).”
Perception of the Civil Rights Association
In his telegram of 10 January 1972 David refers to the proposed march and its organisers, including the Derry Civil Rights Association, as the “lunatic Left”. However David said he could not recall the document or the period. He denied he and MI5 equated NICRA with the IRA even though Julian’s file note of 31 January 1972 [KJ0004.0067] refers to the march being organised by “members of the IRA.” Intelligence Summary 101 covering the period before the march [G0072-0451] refers to “civil rights groups … whether IRA Goulding or Brady aligned will attempt to cause maximum embarrassment to the security forces.”
Intelligence before Bloody Sunday
David said he could not recall any specific intelligence concerning the IRA’s plans for the National Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march. However he claimed the IRA’s tactic of joining marches to cause trouble for the security forces was “endemic”. Local Special Branch intelligence would probably have gone direct to the Brigade commander without coming through him.
David said in evidence that he had asked MI5 to find documents supporting his view that IRA exploitation of marches to attack the security forces was endemic. He said he dealt with these documents in his second statement. However no one, including Lord Saville and Christopher Clarke QC, had seen this statement which for some reason had not been passed to the Inquiry. After a lengthy adjournment David’s second statement of 11 April 2003 was circulated. In that statement David referred to three Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) documents already disclosed to the Inquiry.
The JIC was a Cabinet Committee. There was a JIC in London and another in Ireland, JIC (A), as part of the Stormont government.
David and MI5 sought to rely on the three JIC documents as supporting the contention that the IRA exploited marches to attack the security forces [JIC(A)(71)(SA)108, 115 and 118]. The information relied on had previously been redacted (blanked out) from the copies disclosed to the parties. During the long adjournment substantially less redacted copies of the JIC documents were disclosed. However these only refer to incidents months before January 1972 and not involving civil rights marches. Nor do they refer to the IRA attacking security forces, just street disorder. However David insisted there was a very great deal of evidence to suggest the IRA did use marches to attack security forces.
It was put to him by Barry Macdonald QC that the absence of any reference to the threat of IRA activity in the Intelligence Summaries before the march suggested there was no such intelligence. However David declined to accept or comment on the suggestion.
David said he could not recall anything of the documents shown to him by the Inquiry or his attendance at meetings such as the Director of Operations Committee held at HQNI on 26 January 1972. He chaired these meetings but had no recollection of this particular meeting. He occasionally attended JIC meetings. He did not attend the JIC meeting on 27 January 1972 at which the prospect of a “shooting war” developing on 30 January was raised. He did not know where this information had come from.
He did not remember the agents known to the Inquiry as Observers B and C. He said he only recalled Julian, the agents’ MI5 handler, after meeting him recently. He claimed the volume of paperwork at the time was vast and he could not remember details at this distance in time.
The Telegram of 27 January 1972
David did not recollect the telegram of 27 January 1972, known to the Inquiry as the David Signal, which he apparently sent to Brigadier McLellan at 8 Brigade and ACC Johnston of the RUC SB. The only copy of this document available to the Inquiry was provided by the RUC after examination of their files. It included a covering letter to ACC Johnston signed by David. David confirmed the letter contained his handwriting and signature. The signal warned Brigadier McLellan of an alleged threat that the IRA were intending to use the NICRA march as cover for an attack on the security forces. It has been suggested that this information came from Observer C, MI5’s agent in Derry, via Julian.
The signal was not initialled by David as was his practice but he said he doubted it would have been sent by his staff without his approval. David described the intelligence in the signal as operational, i.e. concerning law and order issues. As such David claimed he acted merely as a conduit and took no steps to verify the information. He denied this was his function. He also denied it was irresponsible for him to circulate information which had not been verified suggesting the IRA were going to exploit the NICRA march. He said he was primarily concerned with long term security intelligence. The signal contains no assessment of the agent’s reliability. David said this was unusual but may have been because Brigadier McLellan knew the source himself.
David also had no memory of the file notes made by Julian and James, Julian’s immediate superior, regarding intelligence for Bloody Sunday. The file notes were made on 31 January, the day after Bloody Sunday, rather than 26 January, the day Observer C allegedly reported the information to Julian. The signal, dated 27 January, refers to numerous street names and other detail and was purportedly written following a meeting between David and Julian on 26 January. However James’ note of 31 January refers to David ringing that morning to request “the gist” of the information provided last week. David could not explain how, or from what, he came to write the signal or why he should telephone James after the event to request the information be supplied again.
David said he was not in Derry on 30 January 1972 but he did see General Ford leave Lisburn by helicopter to go to Derry.
Psychological Warfare Operations (psy-ops)
David claimed he “did not recollect” any psychological warfare operations. He did know of Colin Wallace, who had given evidence to the Inquiry about psy-ops including an operation called ‘Clockwork Orange,’ but said he did not work with him. David claimed Colin Wallace would not have had access to any secret intelligence.
He said he had no knowledge now or then of any activity by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6. He would not have been told about this.
Officer Y
Sergeant, 121 Intelligence Section
Made Statement to the Inquiry [KY0001.0001]
Officer Y joined the Intelligence Corps in 1977. He was posted to 121 Intelligence Section at HQNI in March 1981. He was the corporal on the desk dealing with Loyalist paramilitaries. In December 1981 he became the sergeant on the Republican desk. In June 1983 he was posted to Hong Kong.
As the Republican desk sergeant Officer Y supervised the junior NCOs, in particular the desk collator and the collators working on the three brigade areas (3, 8 and 39 Infantry Brigades). He also supervised the Loyalist desk NCOs, the military clerk and a draughts woman. He reported to the warrant officer in command of the section. Martin Ingram was one of the JNCOs under him.
Most of the collators were on their first posting since completing their intelligence training at the intelligence centre in Ashford, Kent. They spent their time filing extracts from intelligence reports and open source material such as newspaper clippings. Most of the intelligence came from RUC RIRACs (RUC Intelligence Report and Comment) and MIRS (Military Intelligence Source Reports). The role of an HQNI Desk Officer was to assess current and historical intelligence to predict what was likely to happen in the forthcoming week. MI5 and other agencies’ reports were circulated within the section but these were not collated on 121 Intelligence Section’s files. These would include MI5 source reports. Officer Y said he had not heard RIRACS referred to as SB50s.
Each name on each RIRAC or MISR had to be checked against the database. The reports were then photocopied and paragraphs cut out to be pasted onto sheets of A4 paper to be filed on the relevant personal and subject files. The cut and pasted paragraphs were referred to as ‘extracts’. The reports had to be entered in the MOD Form 102 classified document register. Officer Y said they had a dispensation allowing them not to record every photocopy in the MOD Form 102. Instead the locations of the copies were recorded on the bottom of the extract sheets. He said he was unaware whether or not the RUC consented to the practice.
Each collator had a 4 drawer filing cabinet in the office. There was also a store room immediately below containing about 25 more filing cabinets. These held the files used less often or full volumes of larger files which had current volumes in the office. When space was required older files would be weeded to remove newspaper cuttings, etc. Any secret document could not be destroyed without the signature of the warrant officer and a witness.
Officer Y’s job was to mark up incoming reports with the references for the files onto which the extracts should be placed. The reports were also entered on the computer by the 3 Special Collation Team. Originally this was done with a cross referencing system. However this meant it was necessary to read a complete report on the computer to find a particular piece of information on a particular individual. The system was changed so that personal files and subject files were created on the computer so that the computer files corresponded to the paper files. Once this was done the computer would just bring up the relevant section of a report, although the whole report could still be accessed. Historical data was not loaded onto the computer because the did not have the man power to do it. However the personality card index was loaded. This was a simple card index of all people of interest. The card would contain brief information from reports until, if necessary, a personal file was created for the individual. The card would then just refer to the file. The index was still being loaded onto the computer when Officer Y left in 1983.
Collators were occasionally asked to do special projects such as collating all information on rocket propelled grenade attacks in Belfast. Another project involved producing a handbook called “Notes on Terrorist Organisations in Northern Ireland.” Officer Y said he did not recall anyone doing a project on Bloody Sunday or there being any specific files kept on Bloody Sunday. However he accepted collators did do their own private research and Mr. Ingram could have produced a report for his desk officer.
Observers B, C and D
At lunchtime on Wednesday 14 May 2003 Alan Roxborough, counsel to the Inquiry, finally confirmed he had now seen conclusive evidence that the agents known to the Inquiry as Observers B, C and D were all dead. When the evidence concerning these witnesses began last week he had said he was fairly certain this was the case but only now, after the bulk of the intelligence evidence had been completed, was this confirmed.
Soldier S
Private, Motor Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the Royal Military Police on 30 January 1972 [B0693] and 4 February 1972 [B0703], to the Widgery Tribunal on 5 March 1972 [B0706] and to this Inquiry in 2000 [B0724.0001]and on 15 February 2001 [B0724.0009].
Soldier S joined the Parachute Regiment as a private after completing basic training. He was then posted to Northern Ireland with 1 Para. He had been in Northern Ireland for 16 months by 30 January 1972. At that time he was aged 18.
After giving evidence to the Widgery Tribunal Soldier S was transferred to “special forces” with whom he was engaged for 9 months in a “separatist war” in the Middle East. The unit with which he was serving and the exact conflict were not disclosed for reasons of “security”. However Soldier S admitted to firing literally thousands of rounds and killing lots of people before he was himself seriously injured in a firefight. He left the army in 1974/5.
Soldier S claimed he had very little memory of the events of 30 January 1972 and that as a result of his subsequent experience in the Middle East it was not the most serious incident in which he was involved. He said in his statement to the Inquiry that reading his earlier 1972 accounts did not assist in helping him recall the events.
30 January 1972
Soldier S was in Motor Platoon and drove Lieutenant N’s pig. He remembered driving the pig through the barrier with Lieutenant N sitting next to him. There was some delay at the barrier. He said in his statement to the Widgery tribunal that he expected to stop at William Street but that Lieutenant N ordered him to continue. He drove the pig down Rossville Street and onto the waste ground. There he claims to have a distinct memory of incoming fire as he got out. He says he ran to the backs of the houses of Chamberlain Street to take cover.
Enhanced Aerial Video
In his statement to the Inquiry Soldier S claimed to have identified himself on the video taken from the army helicopter moving from the pig to the back of Chamberlain Street. However when questioned about this he said he had subsequently been shown “a far more detailed video … and it shows clearly… that it is not me running towards the wall.” He said this video was the same footage but “frame enhanced and slowed down.” This was shown to him recently.
When shown the copy of the video available to the Inquiry [Video 2] Soldier S said, “I’m sorry I cannot identify anything from that.” The copy the Inquiry has is very unclear and it is difficult to distinguish vehicles let alone people. Soldier S went on to say that having seen the enhanced version he was convinced the person he thought to be him, moving from the pig towards the back of Chamberlain Street, could not be him because he was still in the pig. He was unable to explain how he knew he was still in the pig and contradicted himself by saying the figure he believed to be himself merged with another figure, both outside the pig, and this was why he was originally mistaken.
Mr. Glasgow QC, representing Soldier S, interjected to say the video was shown to Soldier S in conference on his instructing solicitor’s laptop computer. Soldier S and Mr. Glasgow QC suggested the greater clarity derived from the fact that the screen on the laptop was smaller than those being used by the Inquiry. Mr. Glasgow had asked that Soldier S be shown the video again because the figure he appeared to have identified as himself could be seen to emerge from the back of the pig as opposed to the driver’s door.
Incoming Gunfire
Soldier S claimed that he came under fire immediately he emerged from the pig. He was shown a series of photographs [P0853, P0854, P0272] none of which appeared to show soldiers or civilians ducking or taking cover. Indeed in P0273 Lieutenant N can be seen looking up Eden Place towards Harvey Street, apparently unconcerned by any incoming fire to his right. In his first statement to the RMP Soldier S had not claimed to come under fire at this stage. He could not explain this omission. He agreed the fact that he had parked the pig with the rear doors opening towards the Rossville Flats suggested he did not perceive a threat of gunfire from that direction. David Capper, a BBC radio journalist, who was standing close to the location of the pig had given evidence to the Inquiry [M0009.0018]. He said he saw the pigs pull up and the soldiers get out. They immediately started firing. He was certain they were not under fire at the time. A soldier pointed a rifle at him and he showed his recording equipment to demonstrate he was a journalist. Soldier S denied firing from the hip or pointing his rifle at Mr. Capper.
Charles McMonagle
As the driver of the pig Soldier S was supposed to guard it, but instead he moved along the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses towards the Rossville Flats. Soldier V has said in his statement that he was with Soldier S but Soldier S claimed not to remember who he was with. Charles McMonagle, who was wearing the first aid uniform of the Knights of Malta, can be seen standing in the background of photographs P0272 and P0273. Two soldiers are approaching his position. In photograph P0278 Mr. McMonagle is pictured lying on the ground with his back against a wall with his hands in the air. The two soldiers have passed his position and can be seen a few feet away advancing towards the Rossville Flats. The one closest to him has a lance corporal’s stripe. Soldier V was a lance corporal. Soldier S accepted there was no reason why the other soldier could not be him given his evidence and that of Soldier V.
Mr. McMonagle’s evidence to the Inquiry was that he witnessed Support Company deploy onto the waste ground. Immediately one soldier began firing from the hip towards the Rossville Flats car park. That soldier then saw him and pointed his rifle in his stomach. He screamed “Red Cross” and the soldier then began to search his first aid bag. He was joined by another soldier and the contents of the bag were emptied onto the ground. He was thrown to the ground and told not to move. The soldiers then moved towards the Rossville Flats through a gap in the wire fence. Soldier S denied being involved in any such incident.
Another witness, Brian Johnston, had given evidence of seeing two soldiers at this location, i.e. the gap in the wire fence, hitting civilians with their rifles as they tried to escape to the Rossville Flats. Again Soldier S denied assaulting anyone.
Firing 12 Rounds
Soldier S has previously recorded an account claiming to have engaged a gunman who fired at him from the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. This happened whilst Soldier S was at the back of 34 Chamberlain Street, the penultimate house before the Rossville Flats car park. He remembers Sergeant O being to his right next to his pig. All he claims to remember now is that the exchange was over quickly. He said he did not know how many rounds he fired, from where he fired or how many targets he engaged.
Account to the Royal Military Police
Soldier S made statements to the RMP on the evening of Bloody Sunday, at 22:30, and again on the 4th February 1972. He said he did not remember anything of making these statements and accepted they contained a number of inaccuracies. He denied these were lies and said that certain things must have been inserted in the statements by the RMP officers. He said he was only an 18 year old soldier and the RMP could be intimidating. His explanation for the inaccuracies in the statements was that the RMP put things in the statements that were wrong. He said he should not have signed them and apologised to the Inquiry. However he was unable to explain, given his claim that he had no recollection of what happened on Bloody Sunday or of the statements being taken, how he now came to say certain passages in the statements were inaccurate and others were truthful.
He admitted he did not see any nail bombs even though he says that he did in both his RMP statements. However he claimed his account of engaging the gunman was “definitely truthful”.
Shooting through the Crowd
In his first RMP statement (RMP 1) Soldier S claimed a gunman fired at him from the gap between Block 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He refers to having been in his position, behind 34 Chamberlain Street, for five minutes before this happened. He claimed the gunman fired 4 shots towards him from a kneeling position. The shots struck a wall 50 metres behind him. In his later statement for the Widgery tribunal he says the shots struck only 5 metres behind him and in evidence to Lord Widgery “somewhere” to his rear.
Soldier S then says he fired 3 shots at the gunman but the crowd in the car park “moved and closed the gap.” It was put to him that it was extraordinary to suggest the crowd, who can be seen in photographs clearly running for cover, should actually run into the line of fire. At first Soldier S said he had no idea if the crowd had heard the gunfire but Lord Saville intervened to say that it was reasonable to suppose the crowd, which was within feet of the alleged gunman, could not fail but to have been aware of the shooting.
In the statement (RMP 1) Soldier S goes on to say that the exchange of gunfire between him and the gunman was repeated thirty seconds later when a gap in the crowd opened up again. He is actually recorded as saying this happened four times, each time an exchange of gunfire between him and the gunman and each time the crowd obstructing his view, all at approximately thirty second intervals. On the final occasion Soldier S claimed to have hit the gunman.
It was put to him by Mr. Macdonald QC that the account was completely ridiculous and that it was obvious from the photographs taken minutes before the alleged encounter that the crowd was already thinning very fast as people ran south [P1015, P1016]. It was suggested there was no crowd in the car park by this time and anyone who had been there would certainly not be repeatedly moving between the cross fire. Soldier S said he stood by the account. He denied inventing an incredible story to explain his firing 12 rounds indiscriminately. Soldier S could not explain why his firing was not recorded anywhere on Major Loden’s list of engagements. He claimed he had no recollection of speaking to Major Loden or the ammunition count.
Mr. Macdonald pointed out that he was the only soldier who admitted firing more than 10 shots in the car park area and that he was therefore most likely to be the soldier refereed to by INQ 444 of C Company as firing rapidly from the hip into the car park. Soldier S denied firing from the hip.
Gunman in Block 1
In his second statement to the RMP Soldier S gives a description of Sergeant O coming under fire from a gunman in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The description includes seeing bullets striking the ground close to Sergeant O’s pig. However in his later statement to the Widgery tribunal Soldier S says this gunman was out of sight behind him towards Block 3. Soldier S accepted the account in his 2nd RMP statement was “inaccurate” but refused to accept it was a lie. He said “things may have been altered to suit things at the time.” He denied Sergeant O had told him to say this. He accepted he did not see any gunman open fire from the flats or see any bullets striking the ground in front of Sergeant O’s pig.
What He Did Not See
Soldier S claimed not to have witnessed people surrounding the body of Jackie Duddy, nor the shooting of Michael Bridge, Peggy Deery or Michael Bradley all of whom were shot either close to his position or within his line of sight. He claimed to have no knowledge of the shootings and denied that he could have been responsible for shooting any of them. He also did not see the alleged nail bombers Soldier V and Lieutenant N claimed to have shot right in front of him. He also claimed to have no recollection of driving Lieutenant N’s pig through the rubble barricade and reversing into Glenfada Park before collecting three bodies from the rubble barricade.
Telephone Calls to the Families
Michael Mansfield QC asked if Soldier S was familiar with the names Nash and McGuigan. Soldier S said he was not. William Nash was killed on Bloody Sunday and his father Alexander Nash was wounded. Bernard McGuigan was also shot dead. It was put to Soldier S, who has a Welsh accent, that his voice was recognised by both Mr. Nash’s daughter and Mr. McGuigan’s. They had each received telephone calls during Easter 1997 from a man with a Welsh accent. The man rang in the early hours of the morning. He was very distressed, crying and said, “Forgive me. I’m sorry for what happened.” Both calls were traced to a public telephone in a bar in a village. Soldier S denied any association with the location. Soldier S denied making the calls. He said Soldier P was also Welsh.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
