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6 - 9 MAY 2003
Evidence
heard
This week the
Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
‘Julian’ (former
Agent Runner in F Branch, MI5); Officer A (current Head of Irish Counter
Terrorism Branch, MI5); Officer B (MI5); David Shayler (former MI5
officer); Annie Machon (former MI5 officer); Officer E (senior
management, MI5); Officer F (middle management, MI5) and Officer G
(middle management, MI5).
Summary of Evidence
Tuesday
6 May 2003
‘Julian’
Wednesday
7 May 2003
‘Julian’, Officer A
Thursday
8 May 2003
Officer A, Officer B, David Shayler, Annie Machon
Friday
9 May 2003
Office E, Office F, Office G
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets
refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
The Inquiry began hearing evidence this week from former and serving members of the Security Service (SS), also known as MI5. The names of these witnesses were withheld and they were screened from the public and the families. Even job titles and names of departments within MI5 were withheld so as not to prejudice the workings of the Security Service.
‘Julian’
Former Agent handler, F Branch, MI5
Made four Statements to the Inquiry on: 2 February
2000 [KJ0004.0001], 29 June 2001 [KJ0004.0003], 19 June 2002 [KJ0004.0007] and
21 March 2003 [KJ0004.0030].
Julian is the codename under which this witness operated in 1972 and is the name by which he is known to the Inquiry. In 1972 Julian had been an MI5 officer for 5½ years. He worked as an agent handler in the anti-subversion section called F Branch. His immediate boss is known as ‘James.’ Both were based in London but they reported to the director of F Branch in London and ‘David’, the Director of Intelligence for Northern Ireland. At the time the army, RUC and MI5 all operated independent intelligence networks in Northern Ireland and it was up to each organisation to decide what information to share. Since the army and RUC Special Branch were both running IRA informers MI5 were tasked to concentrate on the extreme right. However they did also monitor the IRA.
Julian handled agents in Ireland but day to day contact was often maintained through Army intelligence officers since they were resident there. Observer B was one such agent. Observer B has made a statement to the Inquiry [KO0002.0002] but has apparently since died. Mr. Roxborough, counsel to the Inquiry, stated it is believed Observer B is dead but he had been unable to confirm this for certain.
Observer B
An army intelligence officer known to the Inquiry as I.O.1 introduced Observer B to MI5. I.O.1 worked at Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) headquarters in Knock. An intelligence officer of the Parachute Regiment had originally recruited Observer B and he worked for them for about four months before being handled by I.O.1. Lord Saville ruled that Julian could not be asked if Observer B was in fact a former member of the Parachute Regiment since it might lead to his identification and thereby create a risk to his life (even though he is apparently already dead).
I.O.1 passed on intelligence from Observer B to MI5 via Julian or James. As of July 1971 James took over control of handling Observer B however he continued to meet I.O.1 regularly. I.O.1 would report back to Julian or James but might also report matters directly to RUC Special Branch or David if the information was urgent.
Observer B’s Reliability
Observer B was tasked to gather intelligence on both Loyalist and Republican groups. He was not based in Derry but visited the city frequently. Julian considered Observer B’s intelligence to be reliable but neither he nor James ever made any written assessment of Observer B even when taking over control in July 1971. Julian claimed he did not know the meaning of the intelligence grades, B3 and C6, which the army had attributed to Observer B in April and June 1970 respectively. It was put to Julian it seemed strange that he should not know the meaning of these intelligence gradings since in some cases they appear in documents where the Director of Intelligence was asking Julian to verify the credibility of Observer B’s information. Furthermore he purported to rely on the army’s assessment of Observer B’s reliability but without understanding what their gradings meant.
I.O.1 made a character assessment of Observer B in June 1970 which said he was “strongly anti-Republican and intensely loyal to the United Kingdom.” However Julian did not think this meant he was biased. Nor did he consider the fact that he had been recruited by the Paras or that he was English made Observer B less than dispassionate. Julian said Observer B was also opposed to Loyalist violence. Although Julian accepted B was enthusiastic he denied his reliability was suspect.
Payment for Information
In his statement Observer B implied he was never on MI5’s payroll although he admitted receiving expenses. Julian denied his own failure to mention the fact that B was subsequently given a salary and bonuses was in anyway an attempt to mislead the Inquiry. He only mentioned Observer B’s salary in his second statement when asked by the Inquiry to give further details of his dealings with Observer B. There he revealed that in August 1972 Observer B was receiving £50 per month plus expenses. He was also paid a bonus of £500 in August 1972. By the end of 1973 he had a salary of £65 per month and “received occasional bonus payments”. By this time he was being handled by someone else in F Branch.
In February 1973 Observer B’s case officer recorded “he seemed to be trying to earn his pay with unfounded speculation and predictions”.
Bloody Sunday
A file note on Observer B’s MI5 file [KM0010.0005] records that Julian met B on 27 January 1972 and gave him £10. Julian could not remember this meeting but did recall a later meeting on 2 February 1972 in Manchester. This was in response to an urgent request from David to debrief him about his claim to have seen IRA arms being moved on Bloody Sunday.
Source in Derry
The initial request for a debriefing was in the form of a telegram from David to James [KJ0004.0075]. The telegram is numbered 22 and dated 31 January 1972. David instructs James/Julian to get their “source in Londonderry” to confirm the contents of an RUC Special Branch report about IRA arms allegedly seen in vehicles on Bloody Sunday. When this and other documents were originally disclosed to the Inquiry it was assumed this source was Observer B since neither Julian nor James made any reference in their original statements to there being an Observer C. However Julian accepted the reference to “source in Londonderry” actually meant Observer C. He was the only agent they had resident in Derry tasked to report on the IRA. Consequently, as originally disclosed, telegram 22 of 31 January appeared to be referring to the Manchester debriefing of Observer B rather than a debriefing of Observer C, the results of which have not been disclosed.
In a later telegram, number 23 [G0123.0818], dated 1 February 1972, David says he has now established the RUC report regarding IRA arms on Bloody Sunday originated from Observer B. It appears Observer B had provided the report to I.O. 1. David requests Julian to debrief Observer B at the meeting in Manchester on 2 February 1972.
On 3 February 1972 Julian made a report of the debriefing [G0123.0813 also at KO0002.0009]. The report identifies ‘minor’ inaccuracies in the original RUC report. This was sent to David and MI5’s Irish Desk. Julian could not recall the detail of what was discussed at the debrief and relied on the written report. The report contradicts the account given in Observer B’s statement in so far as it refers to weapons being distributed from cars whereas the statement talks of weapons being in, or loaded into, vehicles. There is also a discrepancy as to whether the information came from one or two sub sources. Julian also made a note of this meeting on 4 February 1972 [KM0010.0004]. In this he refers to meeting Observer B at Manchester Piccadilly Station and giving him £5.
Unknown Sub sources
Observer B attributes the information about IRA arms to two sub sources, i.e. people to whom he had spoken. Observer B had no direct knowledge of the alleged movement of weapons. Julian’s report however only refers to one sub source. Julian agreed he never met or knew the identities of any sub sources to whom Observer B referred and he had never therefore conducted any assessment as to their reliability. He said he relied on Observer B’s judgement as to their reliability. The information regarding IRA arms was therefore from untested sources, unknown to MI5 and supplied by a source MI5 had themselves never assessed. Julian denied this rendered the information suspect. The original RUC version is grade B3 in David’s telegram but Julian claimed he never knew what this grading meant.
Julian could not recall being told about the alleged drilling of IRA auxiliaries in Derry in the week before Bloody Sunday as claimed in Observer B’s statement. The suggestion is not recorded in any of the MI5 documents disclosed to the Inquiry. Julian agreed he would have expected this to have been reported and that it apparently was not suggested Observer B may have been mistaken about the date.
Intelligence about Bloody
Sunday
Julian also wrote a telegram [G0123.0822] on the ‘Attitude of the Catholic Population to shootings on 30 January 1972.’ This followed a detailed debriefing of Observer B that took place in Northern Ireland. The telegram records the “date of information” as 22 February 1972. Julian said he believed this meant the date Observer B acquired the information. Julian had been tasked by David to discover any information which might be of assistance to the Widgery Tribunal. Julian reported that Observer B had spoken to someone who lived in the Bogside who claimed a civilian gunman had fired at the Paras in Glenfada Park North. He marked the position of the gunman at ‘X’ on a plan [G0123.0825.0001].
The plan also shows an arrow running from the rubble barricade, north up Rossville Street and into Glenfada Park. Next to this are the words “route said to be taken by army.” Julian confirmed he wrote these words on the basis of information supplied by Observer B. The report continues with a claim that the Paras were “pinned down at the rubble barricade” and had to adopt the route marked in order to attack the civilian gunman at X. The source also claims to have seen bullet marks consistent with the Paras having been fired at from point X. Julian accepted he did not know and had never met the sub source whose account Observer B had reported to him. He said he was unaware that the Paras never claimed to have been pinned down at the rubble barricade. He denied it was his responsibility to check the accuracy of the report. He relied on the reliability of Observer B.
Another report concerning Observer B [G0123.0826] dated 29th February 1972 reads “further to the Alvis report (copy attached) source has come up with the following additional information….” MI5 did not wish the meaning of ‘Alvis’ to be revealed but it was/is a means of communication. Julian could not explain why the Alvis report was not attached and had not been disclosed to the Inquiry. The 29 February report claimed Observer B had spoken to someone in the Rossville Flats who refused to discuss what happened on Bloody Sunday. Observer B however concluded the man “knew the army version of events was more accurate than the IRA/civil rights version but was not prepared to say so". Again Julian had no idea who this alleged source was. Julian believed he was the author of this report. Julian could not explain why a further report concerning Observer B written by James had not been disclosed. Julian said he would expect it to be in Observer B’s files at MI5.
Julian had read Observer B’s draft statement whilst preparing his own first statement. However he did not raise or correct the inaccuracies in it such as the fact that Observer B did become a salaried agent. Julian said this was because he had not at that time been shown the files and refreshed his memory.
MI5 Misleading the Inquiry about Observer C
Julian made his fourth statement on 21 March 2003. He admitted that this statement was drafted for him by MI5. In it he deals with the telegram of 27 January 1972 from David to 8 Infantry Brigade (known as the David Signal) and the disclosure of Observer C. Julian claimed it was only when he read the information contained in the David Signal that he was able to remember for the first time that there was a source, Observer C, in Derry. Observer C was in fact MI5’s only agent resident in Derry tasked to report on the IRA but his existence had not been revealed prior to disclosure of Julian’s final statement last month.
Julian denied this failure represented an attempt to hide Observer C’s existence from the Inquiry. He further denied suggestions put by Barry Macdonald QC that the documents disclosed before 21 March 2003 had been carefully selected so that information, which had in fact come from Observer C, appeared to have originated from Observer B. He denied he or MI5 had attempted to mislead the Inquiry in hiding the existence of Observer C. Mr. Macdonald QC asked if there were any other agents whose existence had not been disclosed to the Inquiry and Phillip Sales QC interjected on behalf of MI5 to object. Lord Saville stated he certainly wanted to know if there were any other agents who might provide information of relevance to the Inquiry. Julian said there were other MI5 agents in Derry at the time but none were of relevance to Bloody Sunday.
Julian claimed it was only when he was shown the David Signal by MI5 in about March 2003 that he recalled Observer C and MI5 were then able to trace the files. When asked what it was about the Signal which prompted his memory Julian said it was the fact that it concerned a march in the Bogside in Derry. It was put to him he knew full well that Bloody Sunday concerned a march in the Bogside and there was nothing he could point to which explained the sudden discovery of Observer C. Julian said after he remembered Observer C’s existence MI5 found and showed him all the relevant agent files and he was able to recall more details about Observer C.
Julian insisted he had just forgotten about Observer C despite the fact that he was the most important agent reporting on the IRA in Derry at the time and considered such an important agent that his information had on occasions been passed to the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister. Julian said James’ statement, which implied MI5 had no such source in Derry, was inaccurate and this was because James was very old and very ill at the time he made it. James has since died. Even David, the Director of Intelligence for Northern Ireland claimed to have no recollection of Observer C.
No Intelligence Supporting the
Army Case
Mr. Macdonald QC put it to Julian that the reason neither he nor James had mentioned the existence of Observer C was that Observer C had been specifically tasked to obtained information about what had happened on Bloody Sunday and that he had failed to produce any information which could assist the army’s case. Julian denied this and insisted Observer C was unable to provide the information sought because he was prevented from doing so by his particular circumstances at the time. However Julian accepted, after being shown the documentary evidence, that he had met or had contact with Observer C on 7 or 8 occasions between 30 January 1972 and 19 April 1972. In none of these documents is there any reference to information about Bloody Sunday.
Intelligence in the David
Signal
Julian made a file note [KJ0004.0069] concerning his meeting with Observer C at Observer D’s home on 26 January 1972. This note was not made until 31 January 1972 but refers to him having passed information verbally to David that evening, i.e. the 26th. This apparently explains the origin of the David Signal the next day. Julian could not explain why he had made no note of the meeting on 26 January until after the event about which Observer C was speculating. A map reference appears in both Julian’s note and the David Signal. Julian presumed this came about by his meeting David on 26 January to brief him about the meeting with Observer C and David showing him a map. Julian would not have had a map of Derry.
James also made a file note [KJ0004.0073] on 31 January 1972 concerning the 26 January meeting with Observer C. This note records the fact that David rang on 31 January requesting James forward to the Ministry of Defence immediately the gist of the information from the meeting on the 26th. It continues:
"A reliable source reported on 26th January that the organisers of the Londonderry march on 30th January were planning their route to pass the maximum number of flashpoints and had prepared alternative routes as they knew they would be stopped by the Security Forces. It was believed that the marchers would be armed with stones and bottles and that the IRA would use the crowd as cover for sniping attacks on the Security Forces. The organisers were determined to have their revenge for Magilligan, which they regarded as a humiliating defeat. Also that the hooligan element would be used to create diversions and draw the troops away from the main route."
Julian said he could not remember if this information concerned Observer C’s belief of what was to happen or whether it was the opinion of a sub source. He did not know the basis for the suggestion that the IRA would use the crowd as cover for sniping. He did not check or follow up the information from Observer C before Bloody Sunday because he did not have time.
Julian said he had no knowledge of documents dated 8 December 1971 [KJ0004.0057] and 13 December 1971 [KJ0004.0059] from James to David and from the head of James’ section to the Director of F Branch concerning army operations in Derry at that time. The latter was appraising the Director of F Branch of Observer C’s activities in providing intelligence to support recent army activity. Julian said he could not explain what was meant by “information was needed by the army as backing for their more forward tactics”. He said he did not write it and had no knowledge of it.
Officer A
Director of Irish Counter Terrorism Branch, MI5
Made Statements to the Inquiry on 12 April 2000
[KA0002.0001], two on 16 January 2003 [KA0002.0020 and KA0002.0025] and another
on 26 January 2003 [unknown].
Officer A joined MI5 in 1975 and is now a senior manager heading the branch responsible for countering Irish terrorism. In 1984 he was an agent runner dealing with the agent known to the Inquiry as Infliction. Officer A clarified that Infliction was not actually the codename for the agent but the name for the agent running operation which handled him. Infliction had an MI5 code number. Officer A did not disclose which section he was working for whilst handling Infliction, however the agent running section was subsequently called T8 and at sometime previously was called F8. According to Officer A Infliction was at one time a leading member of the Provisional IRA.
Officer A said agents were informers who are run and controlled by the Security Service. Officer A said they would have an agreement with each agent which would require of the agent that he or she be reliable and honest. He admitted there were often problems ensuring agents complied with the terms of their agreements. There were areas of difficulty with Infliction and he had not always acted within the terms of the understanding that had been established. There was no written contract between Infliction and MI5.
Infliction’s Reliability
Officer A only handled Infliction for six or seven months. During this time they met frequently. Infliction had been an agent of MI5 for some years and had a number of handlers before Officer A. Officer A had only been handling him for about two months when, in April 1984, Infliction provided information concerning Martin McGuinness and Bloody Sunday. Officer A said Infliction was on the most part reliable but there were occasions when he refused to provide information or did not tell the truth. On one or two occasions he had invented intelligence. On other occasions he had lied to protect his own security. Officer A had not said this in his first statement. He denied he had only mentioned the fact that Infliction had lied and fabricated intelligence because David Shayler had made a statement to the Inquiry casting doubt on Infliction’s reliability. Officer A said he had sought the views of Infliction’s other handlers and reviewed Infliction’s files. The other case officers did not dissent from his view that Infliction was for the most part reliable.
Officer A said that much of Infliction’s information could not be verified at the time. This was partly due to the secrecy of the Provisional IRA. There was little other information from other agents and finding collateral was difficult. Officer A said this inability to verify Infliction’s information led to scepticism amongst some within MI5, not least because of the importance of the information concerned. There was little to corroborate or contradict Infliction’s reports. Officer A said Infliction was never dishonest, so far as he was aware, when providing information about Mr. McGuinness. Infliction provided many hundreds of reports many of which were subsequently corroborated. A key aspect of Officer A’s job was to identify the areas where Infliction could provide information and others where his reports might be less reliable. No agent was totally believed.
David Shayler’s evidence was that the view of many within T Branch in 1993 was that Infliction was a “bullshitter.” He says this was the word used to describe Infliction by an officer on the T8 the agent running section. Officer A said there were those who were sceptical about Infliction but he insisted only very few people knew enough about his information to make a accurate assessment. Officer A was not in T8 whilst David Shayler was employed by MI5. Officer A was unable to say whether or not he was in T Branch at all in 1993. He was not sure, he might have been. Infliction had ceased to provide information by 1993.
Assessments of Agents
The relevant agent running section assesses an agent’s reliability. They have three categories: reliable; reliability not fully established/tested; and reliability not tested. There is no category for unreliable because MI5 would not retain an agent deemed unreliable. Between 1990 and 1993 MI5 undertook a major re-evaluation of Infliction. They re-analysed all Infliction’s reports. Officer A said by the end of the re-evaluation everyone who knew the material considered Infliction to be reliable.
Under the current regime, as opposed to that operating in 1984, MI5 also grades the intelligence or product provided by an agent. This is done by recipient officers/sections grading the reliability of the material. The relevant desk officer receiving information would grade it and pass the grading back to the agent running section. This was not the practice in 1984.
Paying Agents for Information
Officer A claimed agents were not paid for particular pieces of information which they provided. However Infliction was, in 1984, paid a salary of between £15,000 and £20,000. He was also paid bonuses when information he provided was extremely good or he had worked very hard. He might also have been bought a car or received similar rewards. He was toward the top end of the scale as regards paid agents reflecting his access to high level IRA information and the risks he took.
Officer A described Infliction as having been motivated by money and disillusionment with IRA violence. This was Officer A’s own interpretation based upon numerous conversations with Infliction. The issue of money came up frequently.
The McGuinness/Bloody Sunday Allegation
Officer A had an informal discussion with Infliction in April 1984 when Infliction raised the issue of Martin McGuinness’ role on Bloody Sunday. This was during the course of a conversation which dealt with a number of topics. Officer A said he did not know why Infliction raised the issue. Officer A subsequently typed up his notes of this meeting in the form of a telegram to head office [G0109.0667]. The report says Martin McGuinness had admitted to Infliction that on Bloody Sunday he had fired a single shot from a Thompson sub-machine gun and that this shot had precipitated the whole incident.
The report does not say when the alleged conversation took place but Officer A said in his statement that he understood the admission to have been fairly soon after Bloody Sunday. Officer A said Infliction must have given him this impression but the timing of the alleged admission did not appear in any of the documentation and Officer A could not explain why he had made no note of this. He said he was now sure the conversation was fairly soon after Bloody Sunday but did not explain why he was sure. Officer A said he did not follow up this allegation with Infliction. He said he now regretted failing to do so. Officer B did subsequently return to the matter in his debriefing of Infliction in November 1984. Officer A said Infliction knew McGuinness well.
The information was then sent by telegram to MI5’s Belfast office [G0109.0668]. Officer A did not write this telegram because he was not in London at the time. (The author has not been disclosed.) It is dated 15 May 1984. It says the information is, “for dissemination as you see fit.” It also authorised further distribution to the RUC and army head quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI). Neither Officer A nor anyone else took any steps to verify the accuracy of the information before distributing it. The telegram makes no mention of the information being an admission by McGuinness; it simply says the source “commented” that McGuinness had fired the shot.
Officer A denied the difference was anything other than a mistake or an attempt to protect Infliction’s identity. He denied it was a deliberate distortion to increase the information’s credibility by implying Infliction had witnessed the shooting. Tom McCreanor, on behalf of the families, submitted this was possibly an attempt by the author to make the best of a ridiculous and incredible alleged admission. Officer A denied the discrepancy amounted to a complete distortion. He denied it was disinformation.
Belfast then drew up a Northern Ireland Intelligence Report (NIIR) based on the telegram [G0109.0670]. This was dated 17 May 1994. It was headed: “source description, reliability not fully tested.” This report was forwarded to the RUC and HQNI as well as the Northern Ireland Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and MI6. It was also sent to the British Embassy in Dublin.
Officer A took no further action in relation to this information and cannot recall any requests for further clarification or assistance. It was a matter for others to decide how to use the information. MI5 does not have and never has had any collateral intelligence to verify the allegation about Martin McGuinness’ role on Bloody Sunday.
Officer B
Senior Officer, Joint Security Service/Secret
Intelligence Service Section
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 30 November 2000
[KB0003.0001]
Officer B was an MI5 officer from 1974 until 1985. As the senior officer of the Joint Security Service (JSS) Officer B was responsible for security and administration of all agent operations in Northern Ireland. This included Infliction. The JSS was also known as the Irish Joint Section or IJS.
Officer B received the telegram of 15 May 1984 from MI5 in London. He then re-issued it in the form of a NIIR on 17 May 1984.
Later in 1984 MI5 senior management tasked Officer B to conduct a detailed debriefing of Infliction. Officer B conducted this debriefing in November 1984. The meeting was tape-recorded. One of the topics covered was the Bloody Sunday/McGuinnes allegation. Officer B raised the matter with Infliction during the course of the meeting as one of a number of issues which he had been tasked to follow up. He could not remember who had requested this particular matter be re-examined. Officer B claimed it was not his role to come to any assessment of the reliability of Infliction’s information. He said he formed no view as to its accuracy.
An Intelligence Transcript of the debriefing was compiled from the tape [KA0002.0018]. This is dated 26 November 1984. It is not a verbatim transcript but a detailed summary. Someone in the recently established F8 section prepared it. This subsequently became T8, the agent running section of the Irish counter-terrorism branch. The Intelligence Transcript was created from a verbatim transcript [KB0003.0004] of the tape(s).
The Intelligence Transcript says McGuinness “in his own mind feels he is as much to blame (as the British)”. However the actual verbatim transcript simply records Infliction as saying; “it was first precipitated by McGuinness, who, in his own way, is as much to blame”. The transcripts also record Infliction as saying McGuinness “who is a devout Catholic and has problems equating Marxism with Catholicism, has considerable guilt feelings about his own involvement in that incident”.
On 29 November 1984 Officer B produced another Intelligence Report dealing with the Bloody Sunday/McGuinness allegation [KA0002.0015]. This was sent from MI5 head office to a section of MI5 (unidentified) and a section of the IJS. The report is coded at ‘C’ with a three-section code. The middle part of the code means the agent providing the report has not been fully tested as regards reliability. Officer B said this reliability assessment would be a corporate assessment agreed between the agent handlers, desk officers receiving the agent’s information and head office. The distribution of the report would be cleared first with the agent handling section.
Questioned by Mr. Macdonald QC Officer B agreed one of the comments repeated by Infliction in the debriefing is the fact that “no one knows” Mr. McGuinness fired on Bloody Sunday. Therefore, assuming the allegation had any validity, only Infliction, or Infliction and very few others, was aware of it. Consequently in disclosing the information to the Inquiry MI5 either: knew the allegation to be untrue; or, were more concerned to undermine Mr. McGuinness than prevent Infliction’s identity become known to him. However Phillip Sales QC objected on behalf of MI5 to the line of questioning on the basis that Officer B was not party to or responsible for the decision to disclose the information to the Inquiry. Mr. Macdonald QC asked Lord Saville if there was going to be a witness called who could answer this question but he was told there was not.
Officer B said his role was simply to debrief the agent and write up the intelligence.
David Shayler
Desk Officer, T2 section, MI5
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 28 January 2002
[KS0002.0001]
David Shayler joined the Security Service (SS) in November 1991. His first job was in security vetting and after 2 or 3 months he joined the counter-subversion branch (previously called F Branch). In August 1992 he joined T2A, the part of the Irish counter-terrorism branch dealing with Great Britain (as opposed to Northern Ireland). His STAR designation, i.e. desk code, was T2A/11. This involved IRA activity in North East England from Northumberland to South Yorkshire. He was a GD4 grade officer equivalent to civil service grade HEO/SEO. He left T2A in October 1994 to join the Libya Desk, G9A. He resigned from MI5 in October 1996.
David Shayler said he came across Infliction in 1993 whilst in T2A/11. His immediate superior at this time was Officer E. Whilst checking the DURBAR database for a target, whose name he cannot now remember, Mr. Shayler says he came across conflicting records. Two references said his target was low-level but a third said he was quite highly placed in the IRA. He therefore went to check the reliability of the source for the third reference, Infliction, with the agent handling section T8. An officer, again whose name he cannot remember, told him that Infliction was a “bullshitter.” The T8 officer told him Infliction was once considered reliable but there had been a case in which Infliction’s information had been proved incorrect by another source. According to Mr. Shayler the information from Infliction about his target post-dated this case. He therefore noted the Infliction information on his report about his target as being questioned or re-assessed.
Although he had never read Infliction’s file and was not generally concerned with him Mr. Shayler did, during his time in T2A/11, discuss Infliction with other officers. Infliction was not a frequent topic of conversation and Mr. Shayler said he could not remember to whom he had spoken. However he used to discuss this sort of information with T2 or T5 officers including: Officer F, Officer G, Officer H, Officer I, Officer J and Officer K. He spoke to Officer G a lot since they sat opposite each other and Officer F was a good friend.
When he saw the Guardian report about Infliction’s allegation about Mr. McGuinness he asked his girlfriend, Annie Machon, what she thought of Infliction. She is also an ex-MI5 officer. She said he was a bullshitter.
Infliction’s name also appeared twice in the prosecution papers when David Shayler was charged with unauthorised disclosure of information under the Official Secrets Act. The references concerned links between the IRA and Libya.
David Shayler said information Desk Officers received from agents was graded A to E. There were no objective criteria to define each particular grading and the process was highly subjective. Information tended not to be graded lower then C since to grade it D or E might reflect badly on the agent and result in comeback from management or the agent running section. There was also a Z grade for material which could not be graded. The agent handler was the person best placed to assess an agent’s reliability.
David Shayler believed serving officers were likely to plead memory loss or lie rather than admit a truth which might embarrass their superiors. To do so would severely curtail an officer’s career prospects. Mr. Shayler said he was surprised to hear his personal letter books (files containing an individual officer’s work) had been destroyed by MI5. He thought it strange since MI5 destroys almost nothing and in his case there had been a criminal prosecution.
Annie Machon
Former Security Service Officer, T5 Section, MI5
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 12 December 2002
[KM0012.0001]
Ms. Machon joined MI5 in January 1991. She was assigned to F Branch which dealt with counter-subversion. In August 1993 she was transferred to T5 which dealt with Irish terrorism outside of the United Kingdom. She ran the logistics desk, T5E, which monitored movements of arms and personnel. T5 worked closely with T1, T2 and T8. Between them these sections covered Irish terrorism all over the world.
In August 1995 she was re-posted to G3, collating briefing information for senior management and outside organisations. She also prepared threat assessments. She left MI5 in October 1996 for a job in management consultancy.
Ms. Machon said there was a general awareness within T Branch that Infliction’s information was suspect. During her induction week into T5E she went through the most important files with her predecessor, Officer N. Officer N told her it was well known that Infliction’s information was suspect. The reports she saw regarding Infliction had “reliability of agent being assessed” at the top. This note had been added at the top of the reports. This was unusual on reports from an old agent and she asked what this meant. She was told everyone in T branch knew Infliction was a bullshitter.
Ms. Machon understood from Officer N that T8 were at that time conducting a re-appraisal of files containing information from Infliction. The purpose was to assess Infliction’s information. Officer N told her one of the reasons for doubting Infliction was that he always seemed to know something about everything. This was unusual since agents tended to provide information on discrete issues only. Officer N had been at T5 for two years. He was not involved in running Infliction and would not have known his identity. Ms. Machon said all T Branch sub-sections were aware of the need to treat Infliction’s information with caution. She described Infliction as notorious.
Ms. Machon agreed at the time there was generally a lot of reviewing of old information for new leads. This was because MI5 had just taken over from the Metropolitan Police primacy in dealing with IRA operations in Great Britain. However the review of Infliction she was told of concerned his reliability. She believed Officer A also accepted Infliction was a bullshitter. She said that any serving officer would be pressurised to follow the party line and not admit to doubts about Infliction’s reliability.
Later when David Shayler asked her about Infliction, having read the Guardian report, she immediately thought of the word “bullshitter.”
Officer E
Senior Manager, MI5
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 20 March 2002
[KE0001.0001]
Officer E joined MI5 in 1981. She is now part of the senior management group. In 1993 she was David Shayler’s line manager in T2. She was T2’s group leader.
As group leader Officer E had access to intelligence from agents and other sources. She analysed rather than gathered intelligence and as such would not have known agents’ identities. Agents were referred to by code names or numbers to protect their identity.
Officer E was aware there was an agent referred to as Infliction providing intelligence on Irish Republican matters. She said she has never read Infliction’s files and cannot remember if she ever saw his reporting. Her first posting on Irish matters was at T2. She was one of two or three group leaders focusing on British terrorism. She also had knowledge of Irish intelligence through subsequent postings. She said she had a recollection that Infliction’s reporting was considered by others to be of mixed reliability. She said this impression was based on comments by others rather than reading any documents herself.
Officer E said the best person to judge an agent’s reliability was the agent’s handler. The handler not only met and questioned the agent but also had access to ‘customer comments’, i.e. the views expressed by those in receipt of the agent’s information. She denied Infliction was notorious within T Branch. She denied she would lie to protect MI5. She said she was unable to expand upon her comment in her statement that she gained the impression others were of the view Infliction’s reporting was of mixed reliability. She did not know from whom she gained the impression or what had been said.
Officer E said she was unable to trace the target to whom David Shayler referred. All his letter books (all original type-written information produced by him) had been destroyed. She said she did not know when this was done.
She said it was standard practise to destroy letter books after a certain period, she did not know how long. Letter books were copies of all documents created by an officer. These documents would all be filed on the appropriate files. The purpose of the letter books was to allow an officer to locate work they had done without having to call back a file.
Officer E admitted to Mr. Macdonald QC that last week she had read the statements of the other MI5 officers giving evidence to the Inquiry. This was agreed with counsel to MI5 and counsel to the Inquiry so that any questioning would not surprise her. Ms. McGahey, counsel to the Inquiry, said this was general practise with Inquiry witnesses. Officer E had also seen the detailed synopses of questions counsel for the families proposed to ask.
Officer F
Middle Management, MI5
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 27 March 2002
[KF0001.0001]
Officer F joined MI5 in 1991. He was in T2 from early 1993 to early 1996. He worked with David Shayler in T2. They worked in the same room, but on different casework, for about a year. Officer F was then moved to a different section of T2 in a different room after which he saw Mr. Shayler less frequently. They were good friends.
Officer F said he saw one or two reports from Infliction and these had been graded useful intelligence. The standard terms for describing intelligence by recipients were: extremely useful, very useful, useful, limited use, no value or impossible to estimate at present. The grades refer to the usefulness of the material to the recipient, not the reliability of the information or agent.
Officer F said he had no recollection of discussing Infliction with David Shayler and said the first time he heard the name was during the newspaper publicity concerning Bloody Sunday. He has checked Infliction’s code number and he was familiar with this but denied ever discussing the agent with David Shayler or anyone else. He also denied ever hearing anyone else discuss Infliction. He had never heard an agent described as notorious.
Officer G
Middle Management, MI5
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 27 March 2002
[KG0001.0001]
Officer G joined MI5 in 1990. He became aware of Infliction from conversations with colleagues whilst a desk officer in T5. He saw some of Infliction’s reporting over the next seven years as he continued to work in various aspects of Irish terrorism. He has not read Infliction’s personal file or the totality of his reporting. He worked opposite David Shayler for about six months.
Officer G said the Infliction reports he read were either accurate or unverifiable. He saw less than ten such reports. Earlier recipients had already graded the reports he saw. He said he could not remember the grading the agent handler had given the reports because he could be confusing Infliction with another agent who also had a codename rather than a code number. However when questioned by Mr. Macdonald QC Officer G said he could not remember the grading of either agent. It was put to him therefore it was untrue to say the reason he could not recall Infliction’s grading was because he confused him with the other agent. Officer G said he could not remember Infliction’s grading. He said he had no recollection of anyone describing Infliction as a bullshitter.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
