BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 88

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7 - 10 APRIL 2003

Evidence heard  

This week the Inquiry heard from the following soldiers:

General Sir Mike Jackson (Captain, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 564 (Guardsman, 1^st Battalion Coldstream Guards); Colonel Wilford (Commanding Officer, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 112 (Private, Motor Platoon, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 1884 (Corporal, I Company, 2^nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets) and INQ 2037 (Regimental Sergeant Major, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment).

Summary of Evidence

Monday                07.04.03            General Jackson, INQ 564

Tuesday                 08.04.03            Interlocutory Applications

Wednesday         09.04.03            Colonel Wilford, Soldier 112

Thursday               10.04.03            Colonel Wilford, INQ 1884, INQ 2037

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.

INTRODUCTION

Colonel Wilford, commanding officer of 1 Para on 30 January 1972, began his evidence to the Inquiry two weeks ago and completed it on 10 April.  The whole of his evidence is dealt with at the beginning of this report.  The evidence of other soldiers, including General Sir Mike Jackson, now Chief of the General Staff, follows.  At the end of the report there is a summary of the Public Interest Immunity Applications regarding ‘Martin Ingram’ and others.

Lieutenant Colonel Derek Wilford

Commanding Officer 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statements to the Widgery Tribunal [B0984] and this Inquiry on 18 January 2001 [B1110-0017]

Army Career

Colonel Wilford’s army career began in 1951 as a National Service Officer in the Royal Leicestershire Regiment.  He was posted to the 5^th Battalion Malay Regiment in Malaya where he operated in Kedah, Pahang, Perak and Johore.  He also experienced Internal Security (IS) operations dealing with riots in Penang.  In 1954 he served as a regular officer in the Lincolnshire Regiment in Malaya and for a short time in Aden in 1957.  In 1959 he became Adjutant of the Regimental Depot of the Lincolnshire Regiment.  Between 1959 and 1963 he served with the SAS and also served with the United States Special Forces in 1962/3.  In 1966 he attended the Army Staff College at Camberley and in 1968 became Brigade Major of 2 Brigade.

He joined the 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment in 1969 as a company commander and went with them to Anguilla.  They were then posted to Northern Ireland in 1970.  It was whilst in Belfast that he developed ideas on training and deployment in internal security operations in built up areas. He said there was a group within the Ministry of Defence collating ideas on such matters at the time.  Later he was posted as Director of Staff at the Warminster School of Infantry.  On 21 July 1971 he became commanding officer of the 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 Para)

1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Colonel Wilford said he took over a good battalion and did not have to get rid of any poor soldiers, “although two got rid of themselves by their own criminal actions.”  1 Para were resident in Belfast and were generally deployed within the greater Belfast area (39 Brigade).  On the whole they did not act as policemen, they were more interventionist.  Barricades were erected in Belfast often as a political gesture but if allowed to remain they became a “focal point for disorder” and “allowed terrorists to take control.”  For this reason Brigadier Kitson had a policy of not allowing barricades or any suggestion of ‘no go’ areas.  Brigadier Kitson was a hands on commander and often on the streets.  1 Para was a fast response unit.  They confronted rioters with “great strength, mobility and flexibility.”  However Colonel Wilford disputed a suggestion from Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, that they had a reputation for going in “hard and fast.”

Hostility to Paras from other Regiments

Colonel Wilford was not aware of any hostility towards the paras from other units or any requests for them to be kept out of areas as recorded in Simon Hoggart’s Guardian article of 25 January 1972.

Magilligan

The first time the battalion was deployed outside 39 Brigade during Colonel Wilford’s command was on 22 January 1972.  C Company were deployed at Magilligan under Major 221A.  They were under the command of 8 Brigade for that operation.

Colonel Wilford did not attend the Magilligan operation but did become aware of complaints which were made.  His second in command, Major Nicholls, conducted an inquiry and found that soldiers of another regiment were responsible for the unnecessary violence.  He did not recall any record of the inquiry but did speak to a soldier about his actions.  That soldier was not disciplined.  Colonel Wilford’s view was that the press used Magilligan “as part of a process of demonising of 1 Para.”

Derry ‘No go’ Areas

1 Para had not been deployed in Derry before 30 January 1972.  Colonel Wilford said in evidence he had no thoughts about the ‘no go’ areas in Derry.  However in his statement he said he did not think much of the policy of tolerating ‘no go’ areas in Derry.  He said he had no idea of Brigadier Kitson’s view.

Colonel Wilford gave a TV Interview with Peter Taylor for the BBC’s Inside Story Special – Remember Bloody Sunday broadcast on 28 January 1992 [B1023-1029].  In this interview he said of the rioting in Derry his soldiers would never operate like Aunt Sallys (i.e. implying the tolerance of regular rioting by local regiments was a sign of weakness). 

Warning Order 24 January 1972

The first notice he had of the operation in Derry was when he received the warning order of 24 January 1972.  This was a verbal order from Brigadier Kitson to the effect that his battalion would be required in Derry during the next weekend.  Colonel Wilford would have told his company commanders they were required for an operation but would not have told them they were going to Derry until he received the 8 Brigade Operations Order on 27 January.

Brigade Operations Order 27 January 1972 [B1110-0119]

1 Para were to remain as the reserve for 8 Brigade and to be used for a scoop up arrest operation if it became necessary.  The decision whether or not to deploy them was for the 8 Brigade commander, Brigadier McLellan.  Colonel Wilford was tasked to devise a plan for the arrest operation should it be implemented.

Paragraph f of the order dealt with 1 Para’s role [B1110-0125].  Brigade envisaged a scoop up operation on two axes, one directed at William Street/Little Diamond and the other at William Street/Little James Street.  This suggested a horizontal operation along William Street between the Little Diamond and Little James Street.  Colonel Wilford said his view was that he would need a minimum of two companies deployed in a pincer movement, or hammer and anvil, to trap rioters.

Reconnaissance of Derry

Colonel Wilford carried out a reconnaissance (recce) of Derry by car and helicopter on Friday 28 January 1972.  His recollection was of Derry being very similar to Belfast with narrow streets and high rise blocks but it was much smaller.  The ground reconnaissance was with an intelligence officer (I.O.) from 8 Brigade.  The I.O. identified the Presbyterian Church and also showed him a derelict building as a possible Tac HQ (i.e. forward headquarters/observation post).

Colonel Wilford had no knowledge of the recce referred to by INQ 1495.  INQ 1495 said he had escorted para officers to the Presbyterian Church.  Colonel Wilford said no other paras officers did any reconnaissance in advance of 30 January 1972.

Brigade Co-ordinating Conference 28 January 1972

After the recce Colonel Wilford went to 8 Brigade HQ for the co-ordinating conference.  This went over what was in the Operation Order and any changes to it.  It was generally accepted the major trouble was likely to arise at barrier 14 in William Street.  Colonel Wilford had by this time made an assessment of the likely plan including a pincer movement operating in an area approximately 200 metres square.  He had to be flexible because he did not know where trouble would occur or how many rioters there would be.  He decided to deploy A Company on the right flank, C Company on the left and Support Company in the middle.  He planned to send in one company near to the GPO sorting office down to the corner of William Street and Little James Street with another company approaching the same location from barrier 14.  He would have discussed this with Brigadier McLellan before the conference rather than at it.

In the 1992 Peter Talyor interview Colonel Wilford said of the conference:  ‘I asked “what happens if there is shooting?” to which I got a very sparse reply.  It is my greatest regret that I didn’t pursue that question.’  However Colonel Wilford now says that conversation did not take place and that the position was “absolutely straightforward: the Yellow Card was in operation and that was sufficient.”  He could not explain why he had said what he did in the interview.  The comments were foolish and loose.

In a separate interview with Channel 4 in 1999 [X1.0035.003] Colonel Wilford said “at the briefing I was very disturbed because the soldiers and RUC in Derry were not at all happy about what we were being asked to do.  I just felt that there was a pacifist sort of attitude...”  However Colonel Wilford now says this was not what he thought at the time and that the comments represent impressions which had grown ridiculously out of proportion over time.  They are exaggerated.  He says he did not know that local commanders Colonel Roy Jackson, Colonel Welsh and Superintendent Lagan were all unhappy about the proposed operation. 

Colonel Wilford’s Briefing to 1 Para 29 January 1972

The battalion orders group consisted of the second in command (2ic), company commanders (A, C, D and Support Company), the Adjutant, the Intelligence, Transport, Signals and Medical Officers, the Quartermaster, Regimental Sergeant Major and probably the Provost Sergeant.

At the orders group (O Group) Colonel Wilford referred to the Brigade Operational Order and emphasised certain points including: their mission was to arrest the maximum number of rioters; if deployed they would have to move very fast; they may meet more resistance than they did in Belfast because the Derry rioters would “see it as an invasion of their territory.”

In his notes [B1110-0141] prepared before the O Group Colonel Wilford identified two “concepts of battle.”  The first envisaged the march coming up Rossville Street, the second dealt with the march coming along William Street as it eventually did.  His plan for the latter was to deploy 2 companies from the Presbyterian Church and another down Strand Road via Waterloo Place to barrier 14.  The idea was to get in behind the rioters.  His notes go on to say he could not give a detailed tactical plan at that stage but that he would give his “concept of how the battle can go” once the companies were in their forming up positions (FUPs).  However no further orders were ever given at the FUPs.  Colonel Wilford said they were not necessary since the soldiers knew what to do in an arrest operation.  He denied there was ever any suggestion that the paras should seek to draw out or engage the IRA.

Orders were then passed down the chain of command from company commanders to platoon commanders to section commanders and private soldiers.

It was put to him by Christopher Clarke QC that troops coming over the wall next to the Presbyterian Church would be seen, as would those at barrier 14.  Consequently the crowd would run away, as it did at barrier 14, before the troops could get in behind them.  Colonel Wilford accepted that was possible. 

Machine Gun Platoon and Abbey Taxis/the Derelict Building

In his Diary of Operations [ED0049-0010] Major Loden, commanding Support Company, recorded that at 12:20 on 30 January 1972 he and Colonel Wilford decided they would deploy the machine gun platoon forward to the derelict building known to the Inquiry as Abbey Taxis.  Colonel Wilford said this was probably done to have a point of forward observation and the intention was probably to withdraw them before the arrest operation began.  However Major Loden might have been exploring other possible routes to deploy Support Company into William Street.  It had not been decided at that time what the machine gun platoon were to do from that position if the operation went ahead.

Deploying over the Wall of the Presbyterian Church

Major Loden’s diary also records the decision that deployment over the wall of the Presbyterian Church was not practical.  Colonel Wilford said it was always apparent that it would be difficult to get enough troops over the wall quickly enough but only when he knew the size of the crowd did he abandon the idea.  He then decided to deploy Support Company through barrier 12.  He said this decision was discussed with Major Loden at 13:00.  However even as late as 15:40, when the machine gun platoon were actually ordered forward to Abbey Taxis, Major Loden ordered the barbed wire to be cut on the wall next to the church, suggesting he at least had not yet abandoned that approach.  Major Loden’s evidence was that he did not know of the decision to deploy through barrier 12 until he received a warning order at16:00.  He then ordered his men to return to their vehicles and did not actually move until 16:13 because of the delay in getting back to the vehicles.  Colonel Wilford insisted he was told much earlier.  He denied there was any breakdown in communications or that failure to notify Major Loden of the change of plan represented a serious flaw in the operation.  He agreed however timing was of the essence for the pincer movement to be successful.  Colonel Wilford sought to explain the fact that Support Company were still cutting wire on the wall at 15:40 as Major Loden continuing to explore alternatives.  It did not in his view demonstrate Major Loden did not know they were going to deploy through barrier 12 in vehicles.  Of the decision to give Guinness Force a warning order at 15:40 to deploy through the Presbyterian Church Colonel Wilford said that was matter for Major Loden and the decision to deploy through barrier 12 did not exclude him deploying Guinness Force through the church.

Plan to Drive through the Wall

Sergeant O of motor platoon said Lieutenant N told him to drive his pig through the wall.  His vehicle had bars on the front known as ‘cow catchers.’  The plan was only abandoned because the drop on the other side was too great. Colonel Wilford said he was never aware of any plan to drive a pig through the wall.

Colonel Wilford could not recall any further conversation, i.e. after the co-ordinating conference on Friday, with Brigadier McLellan or Brigade staff regarding his plan but insisted he would have spoken about alternatives such as going through barrier 12 in vehicles.  Colonel Wilford agreed the sequence of events was: an original plan to deploy on foot via the Presbyterian Church; this was changed to deploying through barrier 12, still on foot; and finally to going through barrier 12 in vehicles.  He could not say when he finally decided to use the vehicles but agreed with Gerard Elias QC (counsel for Major Loden, Sergeant Major 202 Lewis and others) that the decision to deploy in vehicles inevitably meant the arrest operation would be conducted further south than he had originally envisaged and that this drew the paras into the open ground in front of the Rossville Flats.  He never gave a detailed tactical plan or concept of battle, as he had said he would do, but relied on his men’s experience of other arrest operations.

Deploying through Barrier 12 in Vehicles

Colonel Wilford agreed Brigadier McLellan was anxious to avoid innocent marchers being caught up in the arrest operation and that there should be clear separation between them and the rioters.  However he denied that the fact that Support Company drove straight down Rossville Street to the Rossville Flats created any danger.  He claimed he was “acting on the brigade commander’s orders and assumed therefore he was dealing with rioters.”  By this Colonel Wilford was saying the issue of separating rioters and marchers was for Brigade to consider.  However this contradicted his insistence that once launched the exact parameters of the arrest operation were for him to decide as the commander on the ground.  He said the reason he had not mentioned separation in any of his previous statements or evidence was because he was not asked.  He did not see any reason why he should have mentioned this to reassure people he only intended to arrest rioters.

In answer to questions from Lord Saville he said he was operating in an area 200 yards by 200 yards and did not need instructions as to how far to go.  He denied the decision to deploy Support Company in vehicles rather than on foot made any difference or that it was significantly different from the operation envisaged in the Brigade operational order.  However he accepted he did not know if Brigadier McLellan was told they were going to use vehicles, go through barrier 12, or exactly where they would go.  Nor did he know if the commander of C Company had been told of the decision to deploy in vehicles.  Colonel Wilford said of Brigadier McLellan’s order to deploy “it took him several times of asking to allow me to do the job.”  “He did not actually tell me not to go down Rossville Street so he was aware of the fact that I could and probably would go down Rossville Street.”

Arrests

Colonel Wilford agreed Support Company could not tell if people in Rossville Street or the waste ground were rioters unless they turned and fought or were covered in dye from the water cannon.  He said the arrest operation was a success in that about 45 people were arrested.  However he was not aware that 22 of those were arrested whilst sheltering at the gable end of Glenfada Park North and 13 more in 33 Chamberlain Street.  Colonel Wilford said there was a great delay in the operation being ordered making his plan to catch rioters in a pincer movement much more difficult.  He said he was never aware of complaints of violence and abuse made by those arrested in 33 Chamberlain Street.

Communications

Colonel Wilford had no direct contact with Brigade HQ on 30 January 1972.  His Pye Westminster radio connected to the Ulster Net was in his Land Rover, therefore when not in his vehicle he was dependent on relaying messages via the 1 Para HQ (known as the Gin Palace).  Prior to deployment Colonel Wilford was stationed in an observation post in a three story derelict building on Great James Street just east of the Presbyterian Church.  Serial 23 in the 1 Para battalion radio log [W0090] records a message from ‘b9’ at 15:16.  ‘B9’ was Colonel Wilford’s call sign.  This and other messages tend to suggest he was in the observation post at this time.  The message ordered Support Company forward to Queens Street and A Company to Princess Street.  It also appears to suggest C Company are to go to Princes Street with A Company.

First Gunfire

Colonel Wilford said he thought he did recall hearing the shot which apparently hit a drainpipe on the Presbyterian Church.  However he said he was not aware of the shots fired by Soldiers A and B at about 15:50 from Abbey Taxis until after the event.  He said he was surprised that their claim to have shot a nail bomber had not been reported to him.  Soldiers were trained to report ‘contact’ immediately.  He agreed Brigade were entitled to know Soldiers A and B claimed to have shot dead a nail bomber before launching the arrest operation.  However Colonel Wilford said he thought his communications on the day were adequate.

Preparing to Deploy

Colonel Wilford said whilst he was in the observation post he was receiving reports about the rioting at the barriers.  He believed these reports were coming to him from his company commanders who had observers at barriers 12 and 14.  The Porter Log (transcript of tapes of army communications) records a message from 1 Para HQ (call sign 65) to the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment (call sign 90) at 15:38 for them to prepare to lift barriers 12 and 14 [see W0123].  There is then a message from 1 Para HQ to Brigade (call sign 0) telling Brigade that Colonel Wilford has deployed his units “slightly forward … for any orders you may have.”  Colonel Wilford could not explain what this meant. 

Deploying One Sub Unit through Barrier 14

The next message from 1 Para HQ to Brigade [serial 343 at W0127] is timed at 15:55 and says:

“He (i.e. Colonel Wilford) would like to deploy one of his sub-units through barrier 14 around the back into the area William Street/Little James Street.  He reckons if he does this he will be able to pick up quite a number of yobbos.”

Colonel Wilford denied this was, as it appears to be, a request by him to deploy C Company alone into the William Street/Little James Street area.  Lord Saville said his interpretation of the radio message was a request for permission to deploy one company through barrier 14 and that was what appeared to be being suggested to Brigade.  Colonel Wilford could not explain the confusion but claimed the message was an interpretation by his men at the Gin Palace of his request to deploy 2 companies through barriers 12 and 14.  He insisted he always intended to deploy Support Company through barrier 12 to achieve a pincer movement.  Lord Saville asked how deploying Support Company through barrier 12 achieved this since at the time, according to the log, he was contemplating arrests at the junction of William Street/Little James Street.  Lord Saville said he could understand deploying C Company through barrier 14 around the back and trapping the rioters at the barriers but if Support Company went through barrier 12 the rioters at William Street/Little James Street would just run away south.

Lord Saville also said the message implied arrests would take place at or north of the William Street/Rossville Street junction not south into Rossville Street and the waste ground.  There did not appear to be any communication with C Company advising them of any plan to go south into Rossville Street or indeed that Support Company were coming through barrier 12 at all.  Lord Saville suggested this left the commander of C Company without any information as to how he was to effect a pincer movement or where to go but Colonel Wilford said the distances were very small and it didn’t take them long to join up.

There then follows a request from 1 Para HQ to the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment to confirm there is still rioting at barrier 14 because Brigade “do not appear to believe us.”  Colonel Wilford said this was his staff at the Gin Palace, acting as his mouthpiece, using their initiative because his request for the arrest operation to proceed had not been sanctioned.  He said they were acting independently and backing him up.  He agreed the optimum moment for the arrest operation did slip away and that he was anxious to go in.  However he denied putting pressure on Brigade.  There was a danger that the opportunity would slip away completely but this did not mean he or his HQ were putting pressure on Brigade.  He said he had no idea if Brigade would have launched the arrest operation without pressure from him.

Colonel Wilford says in his statement “eventually permission was given to launch the operation …” and at 16:02 the Log records 1 Para HQ calling the 22 LADR to asked them to lift barrier 14 “where our call signs will be coming through.” 

The Extent of the Permitted Operation

It was pointed out to Colonel Wilford that both the record of the order to deploy in the Brigade log book [W0047] and the serial in the 1 Para Log [W0127] refer to only one sub-unit and only barrier 14.  There is no mention of Support Company or barrier 12.  They also refer to a scoop up operation in the area of William Street and Little James Street. 

Christopher Clarke QC suggested this clearly indicated Brigade were agreeing to the earlier request for a limited operation involving one company in the region of William Street/Little James Street.  However Colonel Wilford sought to rely on the caveat to the order “no running battles down Rossville Street” as indicating Brigade knew of his intention to deploy through barrier 12 since it was “most unlikely” he would move into Rossville Street if only C Company deployed through barrier 14.  However Lord Saville commented that the earlier request for deployment through barrier 14 referred to going “around the back into William Street/Little James Street” and this suggested moving either via Macari’s Lane or Chamberlain Street onto the Rossville Street waste ground to Rossville Street and north to William Street.  This could explain Brigade’s reference to no running battles in Rossville Street.

Colonel Wilford insisted that Brigade knew of his intention to go through barrier 12 and denied that the logs suggested Brigade was under any other impression.  He said that the orders did not say he could not go through barrier 12 or that he could not go down Rossville Street.  He denied the change in plan to use barrier 12 rather than deploy on foot from the Presbyterian Church created any confusion at Brigade as to his intentions.  He denied he failed to properly understand the meaning of Brigade’s order not to conduct running battles down Rossville Street because of the discrepancy between him and Brigade over the extent of the arrest operation being authorised.   Colonel Wilford said he was unaware of Brigadier McLellan’s evidence to the Inquiry to the effect that he did not know that the paras would drive down Rossville Street.  Brigadier McLellan considered this to be a breach of his order. 

In his original statement [B1222] of 31 January 1972 Brigadier McLellan spoke of arresting rioters in the area of William Street and Rossville Street.  In his supplementary statement [B1226] of 1 March 1972 he refers to scooping up rioters at the barriers.  This accords with his order at 16:07 for an arrest operation in the area of William Street/Rossville Street but for “no running battles down Rossville Street.”  Colonel Wilford sought to rely on the use of the word ‘area’ to suggest there was never any intention to restrict the operation to the junction itself. 

Colonel Wilford denied Brigade were inadequately informed of the operation he was mounting, the particularisation of barrier 14 (as opposed to barrier 12 as well) was an error in the logs.  He also denied his failure to pass on the order “no running battles down Rossville Street” to his company commanders was an error.  He said it was simply advice not to get sucked in.  The company commanders knew not to get sucked in and they were not.  He denied there was not much of Rossville Street left having deployed Support Company as far as the Rossville Flats car park.  He also denied the entry in the 1 Para Log at 16:10 relaying Brigade’s order confirmed the order to deploy did not include Support Company .  He said the entry was confused.  He could not explain why Support Company was not mentioned.  He also denied the delay in lifting barrier 12 was because no one had told the soldiers there Support Company were coming through.  He said he was not told of any delay at the time.  He said he was not aware there was a problem.

A Company

Colonel Wilford said that A Company were deployed along William Street from Lower Road only later.  They were ordered forward at about the time he spoke to Major Loden at the Rossville Flats and Support Company reported coming under fire.  In his statement to the Widgery tribunal he refers to speaking to Loden then going north to find C Company at William Street/Rossville Street.  This is when he says he called A Company up to cover the right flank and secure the Little Diamond area.  At the same time he ordered C Company to make arrests.

Going In

Colonel Wilford disagreed with the evidence of Major Loden and Sergeant Major Lewis that the operation failed to get in behind and contain the rioters.  Sergeant Major Lewis said there was “not a proper controllable plan.” Instead they ended up chasing rioters and there was confusion.  This was not Colonel Wilford’s impression.  He said the operation was unsuccessful until, as he alleged, they came under fire.  He denied the fact that Lieutenant N and Sergeant O’s pigs drove straight down Rossville Street and onto the waste ground was a frontal assault on the crowd.  They were trying to get behind the rioters. 

Colonel Wilford said he did not think about the question of separation between the marchers and the rioters.  He said there was no need for the issue of separation to have been referred to at the O Group.  Michael Mansfield QC put it to him that he had changed his evidence on this issue in so far as his first answers to questions from Christopher Clarke QC suggested he was not aware of Brigadier McLellan being concerned to ensure separation.  However later he changed this to agreeing McLellan was very concerned to ensure there was separation.  He denied that at 15:55 he wanted to go in before the marchers had moved away. 

1 Para Misleading Brigade

Arthur Harvey QC identified a series of entries in the 1 Para HQ and Brigade Logs which suggested not only that Brigade did not know about or authorise the operation as it in fact occurred but that the 1 Para HQ deliberately misled Brigade as to what was going on.  Specifically at about 16:13 1 Para HQ told Brigade C Company had moved through barrier 14 to the junction of William Street/Rossville Street and that Support Company “has moved down south to the area of William Street.”  Brigade queried the message and 1 Para HQ repeated that C Company were at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street and that Support Company  “has moved down south through the church to the area of William Street directly south of the church.”  This was completely inaccurate since Support Company had driven through barrier 12 down Rossville Street.  Brigade immediately responded by saying that if C Company had not yet conducted a scoop up operation (i.e. in the area between barrier 14 and Rossville Street) they should withdraw. 

Colonel Wilford said he never received the order to withdraw.  He could not explain the misleading account given to Brigade or why Brigade had apparently ordered them to withdraw.  He rejected a suggestion from Lord Saville that 1 Para HQ might have misunderstood where Support Company had deployed.  Colonel Wilford said they were monitoring the battalion net and knew what was happening.  He denied there was any attempt to mislead Brigade.  Lord Saville described the transcript, which is a verbatim transcript of the Porter tapes of the actual radio messages, “totally baffling.”  [see serials 383 to 390 in the Porter Log:- W0129]

The same account is repeated in the Brigade Log where the order for C Company to return to its original location is noted at 16:13 [W0047].  Furthermore Brigade then reports to Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQNI) at 16:17 that the arrest operation has been aborted [W0028].

The Porter transcript continues with a message at 16:18 from the 22 LADR at barrier 14 that Support Company have driven into Rossville Street.  Brigade then ask 1 Para HQ to confirm where Support Company are.  They reply, “Wait. William Street/Rossville Street. Await confirmation.”  Brigade then says to 1 Para HQ “you were given instructions some time ago to move bravo 3 (C Company) from the area of William Street/Rossville Street back to its original location.  Is this now complete?”  To which they respond saying, “the two sub-units moved in, got involved in a fire fight… shots appearing to have come from the area of the Rossville Flats.  The two sub-units have now gone secure in that area…. Two civilians are lying wounded or dead… who shot them we don’t know.”  1 Para HQ then tell Brigade that 30 arrests have been made and the two civilians are dead.  This is recorded in the Brigade log as being from C Company suggesting by 16:27, when the entry is made, Brigade still think Support Company are in William Street and that it is C Company who are engaged in a gunfight.  Colonel Wilford said this was an absurd interpretation but Lord Saville said that was what the logs appeared to indicate and he was being asked if he had any explanation.  Colonel Wilford replied that Brigade should have been able to work out that Support Company had gone further and were not sitting at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street.  He said they did not need all this detailed information to be made available.

Even at 16:54 Brigade are still asking 1 Para to confirm Support Company’s location and the reply is “William Street/Kells Walk.” [Porter serials 542 to 544 at W138/9].  Nowhere was there any mention of Support Company going through barrier 12 or driving down Rossville Street to the Rossville Flats.  However Colonel Wilford denied there was any breakdown in communications.  He insisted Brigade knew he intended to use barrier 12 and 14 as “jumping off points.”

Arthur Harvey QC suggested Colonel Wilford had deployed Support Company first without orders and then deployed A and C companies in support.  Colonel Wilford said this was wrong and that C Company and Support Company were deployed at the same time with A Company being ordered forward later.

Nail Bombs

When giving evidence to Lord Widgery in 1972 Colonel Wilford claimed to have heard two ”crumps” which he took to be gelignite bombs.  He said he heard these whilst moving down Little James Street towards William Street after Support Company.  However he had not made any mention at all of bombs or crumps in his original statement to the RMP or his supplementary statement taken for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal.  He could not explain why he failed to mention them.  He said he did not report them when he heard them because he “didn’t find the need.”  Everything was happening quickly.

Gunfire

Colonel Wilford had given various differing accounts of hearing gunfire as the paras went into the Bogside.  Originally, i.e. in his first statement in 1972, he referred to hearing incoming fire from an M1 Carbine whilst still in the observation post.  In his supplementary statement for the Widgery tribunal he said these shots were fired as he turned the corner of Great James Street and Little James Street on his way to barrier 12.  His evidence to this Inquiry was that he did not leave his observation post until Support Company began driving down Little James Street.

He also claims to have been personally fired upon, again by an M1, as he ran over the waste ground to catch up with Major Loden.  There were 2 or 3 shots.  He took cover at a low wall at the south end of Kells Walk.  These are the only two examples of incoming fire in Colonel Wilford’s accounts.  However during cross examination at the Widgery Tribunal Colonel Wilford said “I do not know how many rounds were fired by these people, but it must have been in excess of a couple of hundred and these were going on the whole time…”  He now says it would be a misreading to interpret that evidence as him suggesting he heard 200 bangs.

In an ITN interview just after Bloody Sunday Colonel Wilford said the paras had come under fire from “Thompson sub-machine guns, .. M1 Carbines … and pistols.”  He said a man with a Thompson fired indiscriminate bursts of 15 to 25 rounds which hit the ground in front of Major Loden causing them to dive for cover before returning fire.  Colonel Wilford said he did not see this and his information must have come from Major Loden.

In 1997 in an interview with Channel 4 (Secret History: Bloody Sunday) Colonel Wilford accepted paras might have mistaken army fire from the city walls for IRA gunfire on Bloody Sunday.  However he does not now believe they were confused, they engaged identified targets.

Civilian Gunmen

At the request of Colonel Tugwell and General Ford Colonel Wilford was interviewed by ITN’s Gerald Seymour on the evening on 30 January 1972.  In that interview Colonel Wilford said that three gunmen had been shot.  Colonel Wilford now assumes he got this information from Major Loden.  In an interview for the BBC’s World at One immediately after Bloody Sunday Colonel Wilford said he saw a gunman with an M1 on the balcony of a flat.  He now says this is incorrect.  Someone had fired at him with an M1 and someone else had told him they had seen a gunman with an M1 on a balcony of the Rossville Flats.  He had “joined up the two.”

There is a radio message recorded in the 1 Para Log [W0090] at 16:45 which reads “Sniper in flats, Kells Walk.  No casualties.”  However Colonel Wilford and other paras were at Kells Walk.  He was unable to explain the message.

Photographs of Colonel Wilford

Colonel Wilford is captured in two photographs crouching behind the wall at the south end of Kells Walk with soldiers in front of him and to his side.  One photograph taken by Mr. Morris of the Daily Mail [EP0002.0008] shows Soldier L standing in a firing position with other soldiers to his right and Colonel Wilford crouching behind in the middle.  The other photograph, taken by an RUC officer PC Brown, [EP004.0038] shows the same scene but with what appear to be civilians in the foreground.

There are also photographs of Colonel Wilford standing with a group of soldiers at the north end of Rossville Street [EP0004.0042] and running south down Rossville Street towards the Rossville Flats [EP0004-0043].  It was clear from the sequence of the photographs that he was in fact at Kells Walk before he is pictured at the top of Rossville Street and then running down it.  The photographs show that whenever he followed Support Company down Rossville Street, taking cover at Kells Walk, he then moved back north to the top of the street before again going south.  The photograph of Colonel Wilford running south toward the Rossville Flats also depicts two Land Rovers amongst the Support Company vehicles near the end of Block 1.  These Land Rovers are RMP vehicles which would have followed in later to deal with prisoners.

Soldier L Firing

Soldier L is pictured in the Kells Walk photographs.  He is standing on the left with his rifle raised in the aimed position.  Colonel Wilford gave evidence to Lord Widgery saying that as he arrived at the wall Soldier L fired a shot towards a man at the rubble barricade.  He asked what L was firing at and L said he was shooting at a gunman behind the rubble.  In his evidence to Lord Widgery Colonel Wilford claimed to have seen someone where L indicated.  This was the only shot of over 100 rounds fired by Support Company that Colonel Wilford claims to have witnessed.  He did not recall telling Soldier L to fire.  Soldier L’s evidence was that Colonel Wilford or a sergeant who was also there said “In your own time commence firing if you have a target.”  Colonel Wilford could not recall saying this but agreed it was the sort of language he would expect. He denied he said it.  Soldier L continues by describing shooting a man crawling on the ground behind the rubble barricade.  This must be the shot Colonel Wilford says he witnessed but he says he did not see this and it did not happen whilst he was there.

Soldier H Firing

Colonel Wilford had given an interview to the Daily Mail in 1999 during their campaign to secure anonymity for soldiers.  There Colonel Wilford said he had seen Soldier H firing and that the 19 rounds he had fired at a window in Glenfada Park were justified because he was trying to ensure a gunman kept his head down.  Colonel Wilford accepted this was wrong and he had not seen Soldier H fire at all.  However he said he still believed Soldier H had been justified in firing and that he was unfairly castigated by Lord Widgery.  Michael Mansfield QC asked how it was he could possibly forget he had not seen Soldier H fire when he claimed he had only ever seen one shot fired the whole day.  He put it to Colonel Wilford he had deliberately lied to the Daily Mail in order to ensure the campaign to secure anonymity for soldiers was successful.  Colonel Wilford just said he got it wrong.

Firing in Glenfada Park

It appeared from his evidence at the Widgery tribunal that Colonel Wilford had said he heard gunfire in Glenfada Park whilst he was at the Kells Walk wall.  However he now says he thinks that is wrong and that it was later, whilst he was with Major Loden near Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, that he heard shooting in Glenfada Park.  He did not go to Glenfada Park to investigate, he said that was a matter for Major Loden as commander of Support Company.  It was put to him that had he gone to Glenfada Park he might have prevented Paddy Doherty and 4 others being killed.  He said there was nothing to stop him going there but it was not necessary.  He did not mention hearing firing in Glenfada Park in either of his two original statements.

Soldier G Firing

Soldier 027 had given evidence to the Inquiry saying he was with Colonel Wilford, Major Loden and Sergeant Major 202 Lewis when Soldier G fired a shot into Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.  He says Sergeant Major 202 Lewis immediately said “that’s enough, that’s enough.”  This was the last shot Soldier 027 heard.  Colonel Wilford said he did not see or hear what was described.  Soldier 027 also says that Colonel Wilford and Sergeant Major 202 Lewis had a conversation about Soldiers F and G, both of whom had been in Glenfada Park.  Colonel Wilford is alleged to have said they should be “packed off to the SAS.”  Colonel Wilford said he was pretty sure he did not have this conversation and would not have said this.

Soldier F/Patrick Doherty

In answer to questions from Eilis McDermott QC representing the family of Patrick Doherty Colonel Wilford said he was unaware of the circumstances of Mr. Doherty’s death.  He did not cause any inquiry to be instigated as a result of Lord Widgery’s finding that Soldier F, who shot Mr. Doherty in the back, was mistaken in thinking he had a pistol.  As far as Colonel Wilford was concerned any action against Soldier F was a matter for Lord Widgery.  He was not aware of any suggestion that F had breached the Yellow Card.  Of his use of the words battlefield and enemy to describe Rossville Street and marchers Colonel Wilford said these were “just words.”

Colonel Wilford denied a suggestion from Arthur Harvey QC that by the time he arrived in the Bogside the shooting was almost over.  It was put to him he arrived only to see Soldier L kill someone on the rubble barricade at the very end.  The suggestion was based on the fact that Colonel Wilford had claimed to have seen arrestees lined up at the wire fence of the GPO as he went forward.  In fact these people had been arrested in Glenfada Park and eventually brought up to the wire fence.  If he had seen these people he must have been very late in moving forward.  Colonel Wilford said he no longer had any memory of who he saw at the wire fence or where they had come from.

Collection of Bodies

Colonel Wilford said he had a vague recollection of witnessing three bodies at the rubble barricade being loaded onto a pig.  At the time, after the shooting had stopped, he knew there were five dead, 2 on the rubble barricade and three in Glenfada Park. 

Meeting General Ford

Colonel Wilford then met General Ford at the Rossville Street/William Street junction.  General Ford said he was told by Colonel Wilford that three shots had been fired at the paras but Colonel Wilford said this was a mistake and that he had told Ford they were fired upon on three occasions.  Colonel Wilford says General Ford then asked him what he was going to do.  Colonel Wilford had previously described this as “remarkable” given Ford was a 2 star general and he only a Lieutenant Colonel.  He then says he withdrew his men on his own initiative not under instruction from Brigade.  His order withdrawing the paras is recorded at 17:15 [W0091].

At 17:23 there is message from Brigade to Brigadier McLellan saying Colonel Wilford is at Brigade and on his way to Victoria Barracks to meet McLellan  [serial 594 – W0141].  There is also a reference to Colonel Wilford being at Victoria Barracks at 17:56 [serial 240 on the Brigade log – W0052] but he did not recall being at Victoria Barracks at all and was not at Ebrington Barracks (8^th Brigade HQ) until later.

Controlling the Bogside

In the 1992 BBC Inside Story interview with Peter Taylor Colonel Wilford is recorded saying: 

“I owned the Bogside in military terms.  I occupied it.  At that stage of course there was no order.  There was nothing in the operation order as to if this situation arose, what would we do with it – would we exploit it or not? …. In fact I’d already started thinning my soldiers out anyway because that’s a normal operation of war, to create a reserve.”

Colonel Wilford made very similar comments in two other television interviews in 1997 and 1999.  However in evidence to this Inquiry he said this was an inaccurate reflection long after the event.  He had no recollection of it being like that at all.  This was not what he felt at the time but in answer to a question from Lord Saville he said he could not recall what he did think at the end of the operation.

Colonel Wilford denied a suggestion from Lord Gifford QC that there was ever any plan to dominate the Bogside.  The fact that he did control it within 30 minutes of the operation going ahead was not intended.  He denied General Kitson had any involvement in the operation or that they ever discussed it.

Colonel Wilford denied there was an attempt to deploy as many paras as possible in operational roles on Bloody Sunday.  Guinness Force were there to make up numbers.  He was unaware Sergeant O went straight to Derry from Cyprus where he was on a training exercise.

Channel 4 News Interviews 1997-1998

In an interview with Alex Thompson Colonel Wilford said of the operation “We were put into an arrest operation which I do not think had been thought out fully, the implications of which had not been thoroughly thought out.  … it smacked of ‘it’s time we taught these people a lesson,’ and that is what it smacked of.”  However Colonel Wilford said this was “the rhetoric of 20/30 years of irritation and anger and frustration.”  In 1997 he said of the decision to use the paras “…it was ill-conceived … I do not think Londonderry knew how Belfast worked, and certainly did not understand how my battalion worked.  And I do not think they fully understood the reputation of my battalion.”  

He also said in 1997: “ I really controlled the Bogside; we occupied it.  And I stood there wondering what to do next.“They were offered an opportunity to take over the Bogside and regain control of it, and they decided not to take that opportunity because there had been the shooting.  I think they lost their nerve frankly.”  Colonel Wilford now says these were rather foolish and ill-considered views.

Civilians not shot by Paras

In an unbroadcast interview with ITN on 2 February 1972 (other interviews of paras were broadcast in This Week) Colonel Wilford suggested only 5 people were killed by the paras and that he was “under the impression from information … from 8 Brigade that other regiments were stating that they had killed persons.”  Colonel Wilford now says this was “rather loose talk at the time.”

Debriefing

Colonel Wilford said he could not remember the debriefing but there would have been one.  He could not remember if he was present at the forming up position when Major Loden compiled a list of who fired at what.  He said he had never seen the list of 15 engagements written by Major Loden [B2283-0020].  However Colonel Wilford had referred to this being having been done in both his original statement and in his evidence to Lord Widgery.  He said he assumed it had been done, he was not there and had not seen the list.

What He Did Not See

Colonel Wilford did not see any of the circumstances which lead to the deaths save for the shot he saw Soldier L fire.  However he does not believe any of his soldiers were guilty of doing anything wrong.  He believed they had behaved admirably.  The Loden list records that Support Company fired 103 rounds between 16:17 and 16:35.  Michael Mansfield QC put it to Colonel Wilford that if he had followed Support Company into the Bogside as he claimed he did he could not have failed to have witnessed some if not most of the firing.  Colonel Wilford claimed he only saw the one shot fired by Soldier L.  He could not explain how he came to miss his soldiers firing over 100 rounds.  He did not know when he first became aware of the extent of the firing but did not consider it to be excessive.  He said he did not himself enquire as to how Support Company managed to fire so many rounds at only 13 (killed) or 27 (total shot) targets.

Colonel Wilford was shown the ‘shot plot’ plan showing where the shots were fired from and where they were aimed.  This shows are large concentration of firing from the wall at the south end of Kells Walk.  Colonel Wilford insisted he was at the wall but only saw one shot fired.  He did not see the other shots.  

Nothing Could Have Been Done Better

Colonel Wilford denied the operation could have been planned better.  He did not think the reconnaissance could have been better even though there was the change of plan regarding the Presbyterian Church wall.  He denied he could have briefed his commanders better.  A detailed tactical plan was neither possible nor necessary.  He denied the delay in opening barrier 12 had anything to do with a breakdown in communications.  He denied the operation was flawed but remarkably admitted he had never sought to identify any flaws in the 30 years since it happened.  In answer to questions from Arthur Harvey QC he said he had no idea if he could have done anything better since he had not considered it.

Colonel Wilford agreed soldiers were not permitted to fire over people’s heads because it might confuse and lead others to wonder what was being fired at.  However he denied fire control was a problem.  He said shooting, once started, could be controlled “most easily.”  {NB evidence of Colonel/Soldier 128 in Week 83}

No Innocents

Colonel Wilford stood by his comments that there was no such thing as an innocent in a riot.  He said if you joined a demonstration you put yourself in danger if the crowd became violent.

Colonel Wilford denied he had a problem accepting that those killed on Bloody Sunday were innocent.  He said he was not aware of the circumstances of the deaths and therefore could not concede the dead were innocent.  Michael Mansfield QC asked him if now, in what could be his last opportunity to do so, he would accept the dead were innocent civilians.  Colonel Wilford replied “No one has proved to me this is so.”

General Sir Mike Jackson

Formerly Captain, Adjutant, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statement to the Inquiry on 20 March 2000 [CJ0001.0001]

General Jackson is now the Chief of the General Staff.  In 1972 he was a captain and the Adjutant for the 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment.  He attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1962/3 and joined the Intelligence Corps in December 1963.  He joined the Parachute Regiment on a permanent basis in 1970.  He became Adjutant for 1 Para in spring 1971 shortly before Colonel Wilford became the commanding officer.  He was also the battalion press officer and acted as Operations Officer.

Operation Hailstorm 17 July 1971

1 Para were deployed in Derry on 17 July 1971 as part of Operation Hailstorm.  That operation was never implemented for reasons not known to General Jackson.  It was abandoned after they had waited in position for a couple of hours.  The plan was to arrest “Provisionals, associates and hooligans” and if necessary it was intended to provoke a confrontation to facilitate the arrests.  The Operational Order for Hailstorm [G0003.0024] said: “in the event of no spontaneous attacks it may be necessary … to offer targets or to arrange circumstances which will lure mobs and gunmen into the target area.”

General Jackson did not see the operational order at the time and was not aware of a plan to draw the IRA into a fight.  Nor did he recall “provocative searches” as described in the order as being part of the plan.  In an interview with a journalist called Brian Moynaghan on 4 February 1972 General Jackson was quoted as saying the paras wanted to sweep through the Derry ‘No Go’ areas on Bloody Sunday to make up for the failure of the operation in July 1971.  He accepted it was true to say that there was contempt felt for the fact that there were ‘no go’ areas in the province.  He said there was a feeling that Derry was getting out of control and that this feeling was not just in 1 Para but in military, political and media circles generally.

Magilligan 22 January 1972

C Company of 1 Para were deployed at Magilligan under the command of a local regiment.  There was a regimental inquiry within 1 Para about the alleged excessive violence used.  One soldier was “put in front of the commanding officer” to be disciplined but General Jackson was not aware of the nature of any punishment.

General Jackson did not know how 1 Para came to be deployed in Derry on 30 January 1972 but presumed 8 Brigade had requested reinforcements.  He could not recall what was done by way of reconnaissance but thought Colonel Wilford and the company commanders went to Derry in advance. 

Brigade Operational Order of 27 January 1972 [G0095.0562]

As adjutant General Jackson was the custodian of classified documents for the battalion.  He would therefore have received the operational order from 8 Brigade but would have passed it straight to Colonel Wilford.  He did not attend the Co-ordinating Conference in Derry on 28 January 1972. 

General Jackson travelled to Derry in the Gin Palace, 1 Paras’ mobile HQ and communications vehicle.  He attended a briefing given by Colonel Wilford on the Saturday.  Three companies were to be used to conduct an arrest operation with A and C Companies on the flanks and Support Company in the middle.  ‘Aggro Corner,’ i.e. the junction of William Street/Little James Street, was the focus of the operation.  However this did not mean exclusively this area.  Guinness Force were kept in reserve.

The planned arrest operation was the sort of thing they had done many times before in Belfast.  The idea was to get in behind the rioters to stop them running away.  General Jackson described it as “putting a cork in the bottle.”

In Belfast they also used a tactic of driving pigs into the middle of a crowd and debussing.  This was a very effective way of dispersing rioters.  The aim on Bloody Sunday was to arrest rather than disperse the rioters.  Since the army did not go into the ‘no go’ areas they expected the IRA to react to their turf being invaded.  They could not rule out that they might be shot at at any time.

General Jackson said the arrest operation was not used as an opportunity to teach the IRA a lesson.  There was a sense of frustration that time and again they had seen soldiers standing in a row being attacked without arresting the perpetrators.  The arrest operation was an opportunity to do this.

Bloody Sunday

General Jackson’s first recollection of the day is of being in an observation post (OP) with Colonel Wilford on the second floor of a building looking south towards the waste ground and Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.  Colonel Wilford had asked him to come with him to the observation post.  He was part of the tactical HQ on the day.  He remembered that a shot hit the drainpipe on the Presbyterian Church but could not now recall if he had seen or heard this himself or heard it reported over the radio.  His recollection was that they could not see the church from the OP.  He thought the shot happened before the crowd reached the barricades.  In any event it led them to believe “someone out there had a weapon.”  He recalled having a limited view of the rioting.  He thought the OP was very close to Little James Street. There were groans in the OP when CS gas was used because this meant they would have to use respirators.

Colonel Wilford Impatient to Go In

General Jackson said he remembered Colonel Wilford becoming impatient.  He wanted to move and commence the operation but was being held back and told to wait.  General Jackson referred to a lot of “upping and downing” on the radio by which he meant Colonel Wilford pressing for permission to go because he was confident the rioters and marchers had separated.  Colonel Wilford was anxious not to lose the moment.  General Jackson interpreted the message from 1 Para HQ to the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment “can you tell brigade because they don’t seem to believe us” (referring to the rioting at barrier 14) as Colonel Wilford getting the Gin Palace to back up his request to go.

One sub-Unit

At 15:55 Colonel Wilford is recorded as requesting permission to deploy C Company alone through barrier 14 and at 16:09 the Brigade log records Brigadier McLellan’s order for “one-sub-unit” to be deployed through barrier 14.  General Jackson was of the view that the references in the radio logs to one sub-unit should not be interpreted too literally.  The logs were written up from notes made at the time.  They are not necessarily a verbatim account of what was said.  He said the reference to one sub-unit alone was not consistent with the fact that it was a battalion operation and had always been planned as such.  The concept had always been to use 3 companies.

Similarly he said the order to deploy C and A Companies, recorded in the 1 Para log [W0090] should not be understood to exclude Support Company.  His recollection was that Colonel Wilford ordered all three companies to move at 16:12.

No Running Battle Down Rossville Street

General Jackson did not interpret the order for ‘no running battle down Rossville Street’ to mean they should not deploy down Rossville Street.  It was just saying they should not get dragged further south toward Free Derry Corner.  If Brigadier McLellan had meant “do not go down Rossville Street” he would have said so explicitly.  Answering questions from Mr. Toohey he said the only sensible interpretation of this instruction was for them no to go too deep into the Bogside.

Moving Forward

Once the order to deploy was given General Jackson saw Support Company setting off towards the Rossville Flats in their vehicles.  He said almost immediately the soldiers of Support Company started moving as if they were being shot at.  After a short while he left the building with Colonel Wilford.  They ran to Rossville Street and the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.  General Jackson claims he had a firm impression he was being shot at as he ran across the waste ground.  Once at the Rossville Flats Colonel Wilford spoke to Major Loden and General Jackson thinks he spoke to Company Sergeant Major Lewis.  General Jackson said Major Loden made it clear he had been shot at.  He then lost Colonel Wilford for a while.

Did not witness shooting

General Jackson says he did not see any soldier firing any of the 103 rounds fired by Support Company.  Neither did he see any of the 27 people shot. He did however see three bodies in a pig.  Everything calmed down and Colonel Wilford was working out what to do.  He could not recall if it was Colonel Wilford’s decision to pull back or if he was ordered to do so. 

At some point he saw some arrested people with INQ 7.  He thinks this was when he was crossing the waste ground.  The next thing he remembers is being back at the Drumahoe factory where they had assembled.  There were a lot of Military Police around and General Jackson was involved in ensuring all the soldiers who fired made statements.  He has no memory of a debriefing at Ebrington Barracks and doubts that he would have attended it if it happened.  He would have dealt with press inquiries in his capacity as press officer but cannot recall doing so.

As adjutant he also dealt with some of the administrative arrangements for the Widgery Tribunal.  He arranged lists of witnesses and helicopter flights to Coleraine.  He also prepared, with the soldiers who fired, large charts showing the positions from which they fired and the locations they fired at.  These were done on large scale maps, one for each soldier.  They were bigger than the example of the plan shown to him attached to the statement of Soldier A [B0003].

INQ 564

Guardsman, Support Company, 1^st Battalion Coldstream Guards

Made Statement to Inquiry on 29 March 1999 [C0564]

INQ 564 was based in Derry in January 1972.  He could not recall any special briefing for Bloody Sunday or anything which suggested the march would be unlike others he had experienced.

On 30 January 1972 INQ 564 was with three others patrolling the section of the city wall between Butchers Gate and the Charlie observation post.  This area of the wall is just to the south east of the Rossville Flats.  Their role was to observe.

He saw the march, which was very large.  He heard the noise of the crowd but did not hear rioting, shooting or explosions.  He then saw the paras deploy into the Bogside.  At this point he did hear high velocity gunfire.  He did not see any civilian gunmen, any soldiers firing or anyone shot. He saw the crowd running in all directions trying to get out of the Rossville Flats car park.

INQ 564 heard about the deaths later.  He had recorded in his statement that his company sergeant major, INQ 1707, had shouted afterwards “13-0” and that they painted this on the back of some of the pigs but he said in evidence that this did not happen.

Soldier 112

Private, Motor Platoon, Support Company, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statements to this Inquiry on 12 June 2000 [B1732.0001] and the Royal Military Police on 4 February 1972 [B1730]

Soldier 112 began his evidence by volunteering the fact that he is an alcoholic and has been for some time.  This he said had affected his memory.

Normally when operating in snatch squads they were paired in two man teams.  However on 30 January 1972 he was not paired with anyone.  He had never been to Derry before.  He knew Soldier Q and they were friends.  Soldier 112 thought he travelled in Sergeant O’s pig with Soldier R, Soldier Q, Soldier U, Soldier T, Soldier 013, INQ 1579 and INQ 1918.  Lieutenant N was in another pig with the rest of motor platoon. 

Presbyterian Church

When they got into the city Soldier 112 was told to deploy onto the small flat roof of the boiler house adjacent to the Presbyterian Church.  Another soldier, P or Q, was with him to provide cover.  Soldier 112 had a baton gun and was told to disperse about 50 rioters on the waste ground in front of him.  He fired about 8 to 10 baton rounds directly at individuals involved in rioting.  He hit several.  He was not trained to fire at the ground but at the torso. 

After a few minutes a high velocity round struck a cast iron drainpipe behind him.  He believed the shot was fired at him.  He stayed on the roof and continued to fire baton rounds at the rioters.  CS gas drifted across from William Street and he had to put on his gas mask.  Lieutenant N climbed up the ladder at about this point.  He waved a rifle and said, “did you fire one of these?” to which he replied, “No sir.  One was fired at us.”  He was ordered to remain for a further 5 minutes before he was ordered down. 

Soldier 112 remembered hearing a lot of bangs but these may have just been baton rounds being fired.  They sound similar to blast bombs or nail bombs.  After coming off the roof the next thing he remembers is waiting in the pig at barrier 12.  There was an argument at the barrier because it had not been moved. 

Going In

They then drove in and debussed on some waste ground.  Soldier 112 thought the pig swung around to the left and ended up facing north.  When he got out he had his back to the Rossville Flats.  The crowd was running towards the Rossville Flats and had to come past them to get there.  They were panicking and running in all directions.  On viewing the film from the army helicopter Soldier 112 agreed the pig (which is in fact Lieutenant N’s vehicle) which can be seen to swing around and end up at the end of Eden Place was probably the vehicle he was in.  He agreed the crowd scattered in all directions as can be seen on the video.

Arrest

He did not recall where the others in his platoon went.  He was standing on the waste ground but did not mention coming under fire.  He fired baton rounds at groups of people in the crowd who he said were rioting.  They were throwing stones and bottles at the pig.  He also arrested a youngish man who he hit with his baton gun and took to the pig.  He later identified this man at the holding centre as Mr. McAteer.  However Mr. McAteer denied Soldier 112 arrested him on the waste ground.  His evidence was that he was arrested in Glenfada Park North.  Soldier 112 denied making up an account of arresting Mr. McAteer but agreed he could have been mistaken when he identified Mr. McAteer as the person he arrested. 

Soldier 112 is also recorded as having witnessed the arrest of Charles Canning by Soldier U.  However he denied any recollection of the arrest.

Gunfire

At this time Soldier 112 heard a lot of gunfire.  He thought it was both high velocity and low velocity gunfire but agreed that with all the noise and echoes he may have been mistaken about the low velocity gunfire.  However he thought he heard low velocity automatic fire.  This was identified in his statement to the RMP in 1972 as coming from a Thompson sub-machine gun.  Soldier 112 thought it could have come from a Thompson but he did not say this.  It may have been suggested to him by the officer taking the statement because it was known to be a weapon used by the IRA.

Patrick McDaid

Soldier 112 moved to the end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats from where he did not see the nail bombs which Soldier Q and Soldier F alleged exploded in the Rossville Flats car park and Rossville Street close to his position.  Nor did he see Q shoot an alleged nail bomber or the body dragged away even though Q says he was with 112.  Soldier 112 denied firing a baton round across the Rossville Flats car park which injured Patrick McDaid.  The bullet was apparently modified judging by Mr. McDaid’s injuries.  Soldier 112 denied ever having seen or even hearing of anyone modifying baton rounds.

Soldiers Firing

Soldier 112 denied seeing any soldier fire or seeing any civilians shot.  He did see soldiers in firing positions but insisted he did not witness any of the 103 rounds fired by Support Company.  He went to the end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats but did not see Sergeant O firing from the Rossville Flats car park towards Block 3.  Nor did he see Soldier S firing 12 shots at the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 or the gunmen S alleged he fired at.  He did see a body at the rubble barricade.  He also saw a man who appeared to have been wounded walking on the other side of the barricade.

Soldier 112 had said in his statement to the Inquiry that he thought he had seen a hand holding a pistol protruding from a window in Block 1 but he had not mentioned this in his original statement in 1972 and admitted he might have been mistaken about this.

Collection of Bodies

He was then ordered to collect a body from the rubble barricade.  He drove in a pig and collected three bodies in total.  He could not remember where the other two were.  They may all have been at the barricade.  They were all placed in the pig.  They were not thrown in.  They then drove and parked up somewhere before taking the bodies to the mortuary at Altnagelvin hospital. 

William and Alexander Nash

Soldier 112 referred to seeing an elderly man apparently injured behind the rubble barricade.  Kieran Mallon representing the Nash family advised Soldier 112 this was Alexander Nash and that his 19 year old son William was also shot dead at the barricade.  Mr. Mallon asked why in his 1972 statement Soldier 112 referred to regrouping “10 minutes later” after detailing his move to the end of Block 1.  This meant there was a crucial 10 minute gap in the statement.  Soldier 112 had therefore specifically omitted any reference to what happened at the rubble barricade in the crucial minutes when people were killed there.  Soldier 112 denied this was because he had witnessed the killings.  Although he was very close to it Soldier 112 denied being aware of gunfire directed at the barricade.  He said he could not recall what happened at this time.

INQ 1884

Corporal, I Company, 2^nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets

Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1884]

INQ 1884 was based at Ballykelly in Derry in 1972.  INQ 1884 described the situation in Derry as very difficult for the soldiers.  They were constantly busy and were often dealing with confrontations.  However he said his battalion were very disciplined and well run.  His view was that the Parachute Regiment did nothing different to other regiments only they were not so well controlled by their commanders.

On 30 January 1972 INQ 1884 was deployed from the Strand Road police station to barrier 14.  When the riot developed he remembered firing CS gas and having to wear his respirator.  At some point they got the order to open the barrier and the paras went in.  He saw them run through the barrier followed by pigs.  The crowd ran away.  As soon as they went in INQ 1884 heard gunfire.  INQ 1884 was then relieved at the barrier and went to the Craigavon Bridge.  Whilst at the bridge he manned a check point.  An ambulance was stopped at the check point and someone said to hold it there for a quarter of an hour “and see if he bails out” referring to the civilian casualty inside.  The man, whom INQ 1884 never saw, died.  

That night they returned to Ballykelly.  INQ 1884 said there was a large hanger at the end of the Ballykelly airfield and that the Paras were brought to this hanger on a number of occasions before the Widgery tribunal.  He heard from a friend whose brother was a Para that they were being briefed on their evidence for Widgery.  INQ 1884 acted as an escort during the Widgery Tribunal.  He escorted Paras to and from the inquiry.  When they travelled to the inquiry the Paras wore green berets and combat jackets to make them look like Green Jackets.  At court they put on their own jackets and red berets.  During the Tribunal there were frequent meetings of Paras and members of the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) in the hanger.

INQ 1884’s view of Bloody Sunday was that there may have been the odd civilian gunman but that the paras lost control and no one got a grip on them.

The Praxis Interview [C1884-0012 to 0064]

In 1991 two journalists, Tony Stark and John Goddard, together with an ex-Para, Neil Davis, conducted a series of interviews for a Channel 4 Secret History programme.  INQ 1884 was interviewed but he did not recall the names of the journalists.  He had been put in touch with the journalists as a result of meeting various people earlier during the course of the miners’ strike in 1984/5.  The interview took place in a pub.  He could not recall now all that was recorded in the transcript but he did not believe he had made any of it up.

He said in the interview Bloody Sunday was like the gunfight at the OK Corral only no one was shooting back.  He agreed with Christopher Clarke QC he had not actually seen any shooting.  He only heard it.  He also described the debriefing process at Ballykelly where the Paras were “programmed what to say” at the Widgery Tribunal.  He accepted he had no personal knowledge of the debriefings, he only heard about them through a friend in the RGJs whose brother was in the Paras.

INQ 1884 believed many of the soldiers who did most of the firing on Bloody Sunday were very young, 18-21.  However the soldiers who gave evidence to Widgery were generally older.  He understood that older, more experienced soldiers admitted to firing more rounds than they had actually fired to avoid the younger soldiers having to give evidence.

He went on to explain how rubber bullets were modified.  A nail was inserted into the bottom of the bullet so that it stuck through when it compressed on impact.  They also collected high velocity gunpowder from cartridges at the firing ranges and inserted this into the rubber bullet cartridges to make them go further and faster.  They also put U2 batteries into the rubber bullets.

INQ 2037

Regimental Sergeant Major, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statement to the Inquiry on 30 March 2000 [C2037]

INQ 2037 was the most senior NCO (non commissioned officer) in 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment.  His role was to deal with discipline, administration, arrests and overall ammunition checks.

Perception of Derry

INQ 2037 said soldiers within 1 Para were horrified by the way soldiers in Derry would cower behind barriers being stoned and petrol bombed.  They would never allow this to happen.  They were in control in Belfast.  INQ 1334 had said in his statement he felt very emotional about the description in a newspaper article of the soldiers in Derry as “Beaten Dogs.”  He objected to the existence of ‘no go’ areas.  INQ 2037 agreed the comments of INQ 1334 were a fair reflection of what soldiers within 1 Para felt about Derry.  They did not understand why the regiments in Derry were not allowed do “do their job,” i.e. take control of the ‘no go’ areas.  He accepted the Paras were not much liked by other regiments and there were complaints made by senior officers that they used excessive violence.  They would go in and “crunch” a crowd with force and then get out again.

Briefing for 30 January 1972

He was of the view that the consensus at the Battalion O Group briefing was that there were likely to be a lot of high profile people in the crowd and therefore there was little likelihood of any IRA shooting. 

On arrival in Derry INQ 2037 conducted a reconnaissance of the route from the city centre to Fort George where the prisoners were to be taken.  He took two Land Rovers with about eight men including UNK 419, INQ 1786 and the Provost Sergeant, INQ 301.

Then INQ 2037 waited with the Gin Palace which he thought was stationed in Great James Street.  INQ 2033 was manning the radio.  INQ 2037 was then ordered forward to the barrier.  He thought he was at barrier 12 in Little James Street but also thought the Paras at that barrier went in on foot (as C Company did through barrier 14 in William Street).  On reflection INQ 2037 thought perhaps his memory of seeing Paras going in on foot had come from watching the television pictures which he had seen since they day itself.   His nephew, Soldier 005, was driving one of the Support Company pigs.

Gunfire

INQ 2037 heard a lot of gunfire and assumed there was a gun battle but he did not actually see anyone fire.  He moved forward to Aggro Corner with the 4 tonne lorries to collect prisoners.  INQ 2037 had been surprised by the amount of shooting.   He discussed the fact that there was a lot of firing with INQ 301.  He had not heard as much gunfire before.  With the echoes it was difficult to distinguish high and low velocity gunfire.  He did not hear any automatic fire.  He agreed all the firing he heard could have been SLR fire.

INQ 2037 drove his Land Rover south to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to find out what all the shooting was about.  He spoke to Company Sergeant Major Lewis who told him there was still gunfire in Glenfada Park.  INQ 2037 told him he should go and find out what was going on.  He did not see Major Loden.  Whilst he was at Block 1 there was no apparent danger.  He also spoke to his nephew who was sitting in a pig.  Also in the pig was Lieutenant N.  INQ 2037 asked his nephew if he was alright and he said he was but “he’s not” referring to N.  At first INQ 2037 thought N was frightened and he felt he should have been out commanding his platoon.  He asked N if he was OK but he did not answer and just sat facing forward.  He appeared to be in shock.  INQ 2037 subsequently discovered N had fired over the heads of a crowd, which was against the Yellow card rules, and INQ 2037 assumed he must have been ordered to sit in the pig.  However he was not specifically told this.  Lieutenant N went down in his estimation as a result of Bloody Sunday and INQ 2037 no longer considered him a good officer.  He was never told Lieutenant N may have shot a woman in the Rossville Flats car park.

INQ 2037 saw bodies behind the rubble barricade being attended to by civilians.  He then returned to dealing with prisoners at Aggro Corner.  Soldiers started coming back with prisoners.  He was milling about and remembers seeing General Ford.  The crowd had scattered when the paras went in and only about 30 to 40 people were arrested.  He agreed he would have expected to have been told in advance if anything like 300 arrests were expected.

He and his men then escorted the 4 tonne lorries with prisoners to Fort George.  When they got there a man in a sports jacket jumped out of the vehicle and tried to run away.  He was grabbed by a young lance corporal.  The man said he was a priest.  INQ 2037 was shown an arrest photograph of an arrestee with Soldier F.  He agreed this could have been the man who said he was a priest.  INQ 2037 claimed he did not see any mistreatment of prisoners at Fort George.  He agreed however the guard dogs, which were not being handled by paras, were allowed to get too close and he himself was nearly bitten.

Investigation

INQ 2037 did not recall any investigation or anything out of the ordinary.  The RMP would have taken statements from those who fired but INQ 2037 was not asked to do anything in particular.  He said it was only when they got back to Belfast that information about what had happened started to filter through. 

Thames Television Interviews

INQ 2037 said in his statement that Sergeant O and INQ 1446 (also known as INQ 441) had said they shot people and had done most of the firing.  This was incorrect.  What he meant to say was that Sergeant O admitted shooting three targets but INQ 1446 only said a soldier he was with shot a nail bomber.  In fact INQ 2037 claimed he never discussed what happened with INQ 1446. He only knew about the shooting of the alleged nail bomber because INQ 1446 spoke of it in the This Week TV interview on 4 February 1972 at which INQ 2037 was also present.  The interview took place in the bar at Palace Barracks in Belfast.  Also at the interview were INQ 301, UNK 309, INQ 763, UNK 159 and Soldier 002.

Soldier H

INQ 2037 referred to Soldier H as “a first class idiot” for firing 19 rounds at a window.  This was unnecessary and excessive.  “He should have been jailed for what he did.”

INQ 2037 also accepted soldiers did obtain extra ammunition from the firing ranges and they were not searched as they should have been.  He also said Guinness Force was a makeshift platoon of “cooks and bottle washers.”  He was aware rubber bullets were doctored with pennies inserted into them.

Public Interest Immunity and Anonymity Application

MI5 and the Ministry of Defence

On Tuesday the Inquiry heard several applications on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Police Force for Northern Ireland Special Branch (formerly RUC SB).  Those applications concerned Public Interest Immunity (PII) Certificates signed by the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for Defence.  The agencies variously sought immunity from disclosure in relation to documentation and oral evidence.

The Certificate signed by the Home Secretary sought to avoid documents being made public by the Inquiry on the grounds of national security and protection of sources.  The Certificate itself was confidential and would not be made public.  It asserted that disclosure of certain types of documents or information from witnesses’ oral evidence had to be kept secret so as not to endanger the lives of informers or expose the methods of the Security Service.

The Security Service also applied for anonymity for two informers known to the Inquiry as Observers C and D.  Both are claimed to be sources for the information contained in a memorandum dated 27 January 1972 from the Director of Intelligence Northern Ireland (the ‘David’ Signal).  It is also asserted that both are now dead.  Nevertheless it is claimed disclosure of their identities would be harmful to the public interest.

The Security Service also sought anonymity for two of its own officers, known only as H and M, and that when giving evidence they be screened from the public.  ‘David’ the former Director of Intelligence for Northern Ireland and H applied to give evidence by video link.  It had already been agreed David would remain anonymous and that he would be screened but it emerged he and H have declined to come to the Inquiry to give evidence.  Neither is now a serving officer and as private citizens now resident abroad they cannot be compelled to do so.

The Certificate signed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland related to Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee documents regarding intelligence on the IRA.

The application on behalf of the MoD concerned the former Military Intelligence officer known by the pseudonym ‘Martin Ingram.’  The MoD sought to limit the evidence Ingram be allowed to give on the grounds of national security and this application was backed by a PII Certificate signed by the Secretary of State for Defence.  Those representing Ingram himself sought anonymity and screening when he gives his evidence.

Christopher Clarke QC explained to and on behalf of the Inquiry that in so far as the applications concerned risk to the lives of witnesses or informers Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life, bound the Inquiry to protect life.  The test was not one of a real and immediate threat (as per the decision in Osman) but that outlined by Lord Woolfe in his judgment in the anonymity hearing before the Court of Appeal: i.e. once it is accepted that the fear claimed is based on reasonable grounds then there must be a compelling reason to name/disclose.  Therefore if material came within the ambit of Article 2 there was a valid claim for PII.  The claims to prevent disclosure in order to protect the confidence of informers or so as not to prejudice the operation of the Security Services fell within the standard PII test: 1) is the information relevant to the Inquiry; 2) is there a risk of real harm and 3) does the public interest in disclosure outweigh the public interest against disclosure.

Mr. Clarke QC identified practical problems which were likely to arise when intelligence witnesses give evidence to the Inquiry.  In particular interested parties will not be permitted to know what matters have been deemed beyond disclosure and may ask questions relating to these matters.  The breadth of the restrictions raised in the Certificate signed by the Defence Secretary in relation to Martin Ingram made it very difficult to weigh the various considerations.  Indeed the statement of Mr. Ingram already within the public domain in part goes beyond these broad exclusions.  Mr. Clarke was anxious a method be found to reconcile the interests of the various parties before the witness comes to give evidence.  He suggested that in relation to each intelligence witness (Julian, Observers A and B, David Shayler, Annie Machon, Intelligence Officers E, F, G, H and M, Mr. Ingram and David) the parties each submit a detailed synopsis of the information they are looking for so that difficulties can be identified in advance.

Mr. Clarke also addressed the criticisms which had been made in relation