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24 - 27 MARCH 2003
Evidence
heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following soldiers:
Soldier B (Private,
Machine Gun Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute
Regiment); Colonel
Wilford (Commanding
Officer, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 1351(Guardsman, 1 Company, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); INQ
471 (Private,
8 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ
552 (Guardsman,
HQ Company, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); Captain Conder (Captain, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian
Regiment); INQ 573 (Captain,
Battalion Adjutant, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets) and INQ
1799 (Lance
Corporal, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment).
Summary of
Evidence
Monday
24.03.03
Soldier B
Tuesday
25.03.03
Colonel Wilford, INQ 1351, INQ 471
Wednesday
26.03.03
Colonel Wilford, INQ 552, Captain Conder
Thursday
27.03.03
Colonel Wilford, INQ 573, INQ 1799
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets
refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
The Inquiry continues to hear evidence from military witnesses present on Bloody Sunday. These include soldiers from regiments based in Derry at the time and members of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (the Paras). Soldier B, one of those who admits firing on Bloody Sunday, gave evidence on Monday. Also this week Colonel Wilford, commanding officer of 1 Para, began his evidence, this will be reported at the end of next week or once it has been completed.
Soldier B
Private, Machine Gun Platoon, Support Company, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the Royal Military Police on 31
January 1972 (B0021); to the Widgery Tribunal (B0025) and to this Inquiry
(B0043.0001)
Soldier B was a private in the machine gun platoon of Support Company. He could not remember much of what had happened on 30 January 1972. It was his first time in Derry. He could not recall any briefing or remember what his role was other than as back up to local units.
‘No Go’ Areas
The paras had cleared ‘no go’ areas in Belfast and there was talk amongst the soldiers of wanting to go in and do the same in Derry. However this was just talk on the day rather than any plan or orders. The soldiers wanted to regain control of the Bogside but this was not the purpose of the operation as he understood it. He remembered waiting in a cold pig (armoured vehicle) knowing they would not be allowed to go into the Rossville Flats and “finish the job.”
The Derelict Building/Abbey Taxis
Soldier B remembered being in a group of around 8 men moving along a wall to a derelict building next to some waste ground. There may have been more than 8 of them, they were all from his platoon. They had to walk in single file along a wall and then drop down into a building with no roof. Soldier A went in first and took up a position on the first floor. Soldier B and others then climbed down to the ground floor.
INQ 455 fell into the building when trying to climb down. Soldier B recalled being at a window looking west onto waste ground and William Street. INQ 455 was lying on the ground behind him being tended to by others. The platoon sergeant, INQ 441, was also there. Soldier B could not remember why they were sent into the building or what they were supposed to do.
There was a solid wall to the front, facing south onto William Street. Soldier B felt this was a blind spot and that they were vulnerable to a bomb being planted on the other side of that wall. He did not think they were in a good situation.
Missiles
Soldier B described in his statement stones being thrown towards the building by people in William Street. He also referred to petrol bombs and nail bombs but had no recollection of seeing or hearing these. He did remember seeing dust to his left but could not say what caused it. He believed at the time it was a nail bomb but he could not now remember. Baton rounds were fired from the building at the people throwing missiles.
There was CS gas drifting into the building causing his eyes to water so he had to put on his respirator. Wearing the respirator made it more difficult to aim his rifle because it got in the way, as did his flat jacket. However they were trained to shoot wearing respirators.
Soldier B firing
Soldier B said he had no memory of the incident when he fired three rounds. This was the first time he fired at anyone in Northern Ireland. He could not recall what had happened and had no mental picture of it. He did vaguely recall INQ 441 shouting “ceasefire!” In his earlier statements he claimed to have seen someone about to throw a nail bomb. There he described a man of medium height wearing a dark coloured windcheater. The man was standing by a corner less than 50 yards away. Soldier B’s attention was drawn to him because he was looking in his direction and talking to others in the crowd. In the statements Soldier B claimed he saw the man lighting a match against the wall and holding what he thought to be a nail bomb. However Soldier B could not remember the incident or explain why the man apparently did this in full view of armed soldiers when he could have hidden around the corner. The statements go on to describe Soldier B firing and missing the man before firing two more shots and seeing the man fall. The man was then dragged away by other civilians. Other members of the crowd then started shouting at the soldiers. Soldier B did not know when he first reported the shooting but it should have been reported over the radio to the company commander.
When told civilian witnesses did not see a nail bomber but did see Damien Donaghy shot Soldier B said he could not comment because he could not remember the shooting. He denied he had panicked and shot Donaghy out of fear. He said he had been in similar situations in Belfast and had not fired.
(NB Soldier A fired two shots at the same time as Soldier B, purportedly at the same target.)
Statement to the Royal Military Police on 30 January 1972
Soldier B could not explain why his statement to the RMP that evening said he was on waste ground rather than in a building or why the plan attached to that statement appeared to place him outside the derelict building. This was incorrect. He remembered being inside a building. Soldier A’s statement to the RMP that evening contained identical errors as to his location.
Statement to the Widgery Tribunal
In his statement to the Widgery Tribunal Soldier B says he cocked his rifle as he took up his position at the window. He said this was because there had been stones thrown and he anticipated explosives. However he did not now have any recollection of hearing explosions.
The statement goes on to deal with machine gun platoon deploying forward from the derelict building but Soldier B said he had no recollection of this. The only other thing he remembered was sitting in a pig later on. He agreed they would all have discussed the day’s events in the vehicle before he gave his statement to the RMP that evening. He did not remember but probably did talk to Soldier A. He denied being pressurised into giving a matching account.
At the time the Widgery Tribunal was just a big game to him. They changed uniforms so that they would not be recognised when giving evidence.
Damien Donaghy and John
Johnston
Soldier B denied seeing anyone else shot but accepted that both Donaghy and Johnston would have been within his line of sight given where they were when they were shot. He agreed his earlier statement left no room for his having made a mistake as to whom he had shot. He was considered to be a good shot and had represented the whole battalion at shooting competitions. However he denied it would have been possible in the circumstances to have deliberately shot a target in the leg or shoulder, i.e. where Donaghy and Johnston were struck. He had subsequently heard that more than 13 people had been killed on Bloody Sunday and bodies had been spirited away across the border. He denied he shot Donaghy and Johnston to flush out the IRA and draw them into a gunfight.
INQ 1351
Guardsman, 1 Company, 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 21 April 2000
(C1351)
INQ 1351 was based in a factory on Bligh’s Lane in Derry. The factory was on a hill and it over looked the Bogside. On 30 January 1972 INQ 1351 was stationed with another soldier in a sanger (fortified observation post) on top of the factory. They had a good view over the Bogside but the view was obstructed in places by buildings. They had a pair of binoculars between them. INQ 1351 could not see the army barriers in William Street or Little James Street. His job was to observe and report back over the radio anything significant. He was in contact with the Company control room from where messages could be relayed to the Battalion and from there to Brigade HQ.
Gunfire
INQ 1351 saw the march and then saw pockets of people moving away. He assumed the march was starting to break up. At around 16:00 he heard a couple of high velocity shots. They were not fired towards his position and he could only give an approximate location as to where he thought these came from. They sounded as if they were fired somewhere in the region of the Rossville Flats. He did not think they could have come from the city walls but when told of the shots Lieutenant N fired up Eden Place toward Harvey Street he agreed this was the approximate location he thought they had come from. He then saw the people running. He reported hearing the shots over the radio.
Paras Going In
Seconds later he saw paras running from William Street down Rossville Street. He also saw soldiers running across the waste ground at the junction of Rossville Street and Eden Place. They were running toward the Rossville Flats. He did not see any army vehicles. He saw a couple of paras grab people on the waste ground.
Paras Firing Unaimed Shots
He also saw two soldiers each fire a single shot as they ran. They were close to each other near the junction of Eden Place/Rossville Street. Neither was an aimed shot in that neither para stopped running in order to take aim. They had their SLRs raised to the shoulder but were not sighting. The shots were fired horizontally in the direction they were running. He could see the SLRs and the puff of smoke from the rifles through the binoculars.
There followed a lot of gunfire and baton rounds. He did not hear any automatic fire. He thought he heard an explosion that might have been a nail bomb but it could have been a rubber bullet gun. The gunfire lasted about 10-15 minutes.
He was not asked about what he had seen or called to the Widgery Tribunal.
INQ 471
Private, 8 Platoon, C Company, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 22 January 2001
(C0471)
INQ 471 was Lieutenant 026’s (also known as Soldier 26) radio operator. However on 30 January 1972 INQ 471 was acting as a rifleman. His platoon was deployed at barrier 14 in William Street. They arrived at the barrier in pigs and debussed. They were carrying batons and rubber bullet guns because they were to operate as snatch squads. They were to disperse the crowd and arrest rioters. His section commander was INQ 1334.
Going In
Eventually they were given the order to go through the barrier. After going through INQ 471 turned left down Chamberlain Street.
Gunfire
Whilst standing on a corner in Chamberlain Street he heard high velocity shots. He only had a baton with him and, after hearing gunfire, had to retrieve his SLR from the pig. He thought the pig followed the platoon into Chamberlain Street. They then made their way down Chamberlain Street in pairs covering each other. There were a lot of shots being fired. He knew it was 1 Para firing but did not see anyone fire. The firing was intense but not rapid. It went on for less than half an hour. Then an order to ceasefire was given. At the time INQ 471 was not aware Support Company were on the waste ground to his right.
When told of the shots Lieutenant N fired across Chamberlain Street down Eden Place INQ 471 agreed he could have heard these shots.
Jackie Duddy
INQ 471 was in Chamberlain Street when Father Daly led those carrying Jackie Duddy up it. He remembered Father Daly waving a white handkerchief and the fact that firing was still going on at this stage. INQ 1334 wanted to check the body for weapons.
Arrests
After a while they were told to make arrests. The shooting had stopped by this point and INQ 471 put his SLR back in the pig. He came back up Chamberlain Street and then made his way via Eden Place onto the waste ground and then south to the Rossville Flats car park. Prisoners were rounded up and threatened with batons if they did not cooperate. As far as he was aware prisoners were handed to the RUC who would decide whether or not they had a record. INQ 471 was not aware of any system for reporting to the RUC what a particular prisoner was supposed to have done. They just rounded them up and handed them on. He did not go into any houses.
INQ 471 identified INQ 1334 as the soldier on the right in photograph P0501. He also identified Lieutenant 026, Soldier 003, INQ 437, INQ 1334 and INQ 12 on Video 1.
Unofficial Ammunition
INQ 471 admitted to carrying spare ammunition. Many soldiers did this. They collected ammunition when at the firing range and hid it on their person. They did this because they felt they had insufficient ammunition allocated to them. He also said 9mm bullets were filed flat to make dum dums. Plastic bullets were also doctored. SLR ammunition, 7.62mm, was not doctored because it was so powerful there was no point.
INQ 552
Guardsman, HQ Company, 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 22 January 2000
[C0552]
INQ 552 was stationed at Fort George. He was working in the officers’ mess on 30 January 1972. At times he came outside and could hear the noise of the crowd in the distance. It was like a football crowd. He also heard sporadic gunfire but could not describe it or where it had come from.
Treatment of Prisoners
Whilst he was outside having a smoke INQ 552 witnessed three or four 3 tonne trucks arrive with prisoners. He was with a colleague who he believed was INQ 1179. There was a lot of commotion because the civilians refused to get out of the trucks. He saw about a dozen paras arrive separately in other vehicles. The paras forced the civilians out of the trucks by hitting them with batons. There were also several guard dogs present and some of these were lifted into the trucks to force the prisoners out. The dogs were going berserk. There was a lot of shouting and swearing. People were dragged and kicked out of the lorries. Some of them had blood on their faces. He watched for about 15 minutes. He did not see prisoners run between two lines of soldiers.
Captain Conder
Captain, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian
Regiment
Made Statements to the Inquiry on 20 April 2000
[CC001] and in 1998 [CC0001-0019]
Captain Conder was the battalion intelligence officer and also public relations officer. He worked closely with Colonel Jackson, the battalion commanding officer, and would liase with the press. He had a photographer. He was based at the command post at the Craigavon bridge.
Intelligence Role
Captain Conder said he had no specific orders on 30 January 1972 but visited the various Royal Anglian positions and listened to the radio reports at the command post. His primary function on the day was press liaison. In neither of his statements to the Inquiry had he mentioned that he was the battalion intelligence officer. He said this was because he was not asked and on the day he was engaged in public relations. He denied he had only raised it in evidence because others, including Colonel Jackson, had already disclosed his role in intelligence.
Whereabouts of Photographs
Colonel Jackson’s notes of his oral orders on 29 January 1972 [G-0096-0581] record that Captain Conder, as Intelligence Officer, was responsible for collection of film from photographers and was to dispatch it to Brigade HQ. Captain Conder said he did not think his photographer or any other photographer under command of the Royal Anglians took any photographs on Bloody Sunday.
At the command post Captain Conder could listen to the battalion and brigade radio networks. Whilst there General Ford visited and was briefed by Colonel Jackson.
Gunfire
Captain Conder did not actually hear any shooting himself but heard reports of gunfire over the radio. These included two shots fired at the Mex garage manned by the Light Air Defence Regiment. This was recorded at 15:30, i.e. before the paras were deployed. Later, once the paras had gone in, he heard confused reports of the “fire fight.” As the reports came in from the various company observation posts (OPs) Colonel Jackson ordered him forward to the OP on the city wall to report back what was happening.
Mystery Car and Body
Captain Conder left the command post with his photographer INQ 1199 and one or two other soldiers. The command post was in a car park next to the bridge. There was a barrier at the entrance to the car park and a roadblock on the lower deck of the bridge. As he reached the barrier Captain Conder claimed to see a car driving at speed toward the roadblock. The driver slammed on the breaks 20 yards from the roadblock, jumped out and ran away. He was unable to describe the driver. Inside the car was the body of a man.
Gerard Donaghy
Captain Conder insisted his memory was not consistent with the body being that of Gerard Donaghy or the car being the white Cortina with a red flash in which Donaghy died. The body he saw was not dressed in denim and the car did not have a stripe down the side.
Nail Bombs
Captain Conder claimed he could see what he thought to be nail bombs in the man’s jacket pockets. He called to the officer commanding the roadblock to take charge of the vehicle whilst he went back to the command post to report what he had seen. However there was no record of the incident he described. He said he did not move the body or touch it in any way other than to check for a pulse because he did not want to disturb any evidence. However he could not explain why he did not ask the photographer who was with him to take any photographs.
As he returned to the command post Captain Conder met a Times journalist, John Charteris. He decided to show him the body as an independent witness. However Mr. Charteris’ account of how and where he saw a car and body differed from that given by Captain Conder. Whilst Captain Conder said the car had not moved, Mr. Charteris said he was taken first to an ambulance and then to a car in the car park. Mr. Charteris also said he was told the driver of the car had been arrested. Captain Conder insisted he did not tell him this. Captain Conder said he did not recall having met Mr. Charteris earlier in the day and inviting him back to the command post. He said he was not aware Mr. Charteris had an army background.
Captain Conder denied he had a particular agenda other than to get at the truth but did agree he believed that not all the people shot dead on Bloody Sunday were entirely innocent. Indeed he had written to his MP in those terms. He said he only invited Mr. Charteris to view the body to provide independent corroboration. He said he did this because he was “fairly certain allegations of plant would be made.” He did not know why he was not called to give evidence to Lord Widgery but did not believe this had anything to do with a desire to conceal his role on the day. Captain Conder also claimed that he was unaware of the dispute regarding the alleged finding of nail bombs on the body of Gerard Donaghy.
Missing Bodies
Captain Conder also said there were rumours from the RUC Special Branch that several bodies of IRA men shot dead on Bloody Sunday had been spirited across the border and buried there. He could not say who in Special Branch had told him this. He had told his MP seven IRA men had been killed and buried in the Republic. None of the Special Branch documents available to the Inquiry supported this.
INQ 573
Captain, Battalion Adjutant, 2nd Battalion
Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to Inquiry on 7 April 2000 [C0573]
INQ 573 was the battalion adjutant (i.e. assistant to the commanding officer) for the 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets (RGJs). He was based at Ballykelly barracks.
Magilligan March 22 January
1972
INQ 573 was deployed with his battalion at Magilligan for the march on the internment camp a week before Bloody Sunday. The battalion was a company short so C Company of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment were attached to them on that day. INQ 573 understood this was because the paras were the Province Reserve however in fact they were General Kitson’s reserve for 39 Brigade (i.e. they were deployed outside their normal area).
The army’s role was to prevent the marchers reaching the internment camp via the beach. A line of barbed wire marked the point beyond which the march was not to be allowed to go. It was only a token obstacle and could have been pulled aside or surmounted had the marchers been determined enough. The RGJs were deployed on the opposite side of the wire to the marchers. The paras were held in reserve. INQ 573 was at the RGJ’s battalion Tac HQ (field command post) in the sand dunes over looking the beach.
From his position in the dunes INQ 573 could see what was happening on the beach. At one point there was a danger the RGJs could be outflanked by the marchers walking around the wire. The tide had gone out further than expected and the wire did not extend far enough. Consequently someone, he could not remember who, gave the order for the paras to be deployed to fill the gap.
Unnecessary Violence from Paras
The paras charged at the crowd and INQ 573 was very angry at the unnecessary violence they used toward marchers. In particular he witnessed two paras, one was an NCO (non commissioned officer), striking with batons and man and woman who were on the ground. There were TV cameras filming what was happening. INQ 573 spoke to INQ 1502, who was either the RGJs operations officer or a company commander, and asked if he should go down and intervene. INQ 1502 agreed and INQ 573 went forward to try and calm things down.
He ran down to the beach carrying his baton. He physically stopped the paras who were assaulting the people on the ground and prodded one of them with his baton. He was extremely angry. He told the man to get a grip of himself and to report to his company commander. He spoke to others who were also using unnecessary force. He intended to speak to their company commander, Major 221A, but was unable to find him. He wanted to tell him to get a grip of his men because they were out of control.
Photographs [OS0001-0285,
OS0001-0291, OS0001-0294, OS0001-0297]
Some photographs of the incident were subsequently published in one of the Derry newspapers. In one of these it appears as if INQ 573 is himself about to strike a man on the ground with his baton. This was taken as he intervened. The whole event was publicised on national television on the six o’clock news.
Inquiry
There was an inquiry into what happened. INQ 573 thought it was a regimental inquiry within the Parachute Regiment. He flew by helicopter to Holywood barracks to give evidence before a board comprising of three para officers. He was amazed to find the inquiry focused not on violence by the paras but on why he had struck a para NCO. He was resentful that the inquiry appeared to be seeking to justify the paras behaviour and criticising him for intervening. He was never told of the outcome.
INQ 573 did speak to his commanding officer Colonel Welsh about the incident. However he was not aware of Colonel Welsh having raised the matter of the paras’ violence at Magilligan with Sir David Ramsbottom, assistant to General Carver, Chief of the General Staff.
INQ 1799
Lance Corporal, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 21 June 2000 [C1799]
INQ 1799 was a lance corporal in 7 platoon, C Company but was promoted to corporal in February 1972. He thought he was present at Magilligan on 22 January 1972 but his memory of being landed on the beach by helicopter and then attacked by a man carrying a piece of drift wood did not fit with the facts. He now says these must have been two separate incidents.
Briefing for Bloody Sunday
INQ 1799 said there was a heavyweight briefing given by the company commander, Major 221A. The whole company was briefed together which was unusual. The Intelligence Officer, INQ 7, was there. The adjutant may also have been there. INQ 1799 came away from the briefing with the impression that it was “serious business” and that they were not going just to act as reinforcements. He understood they might be required to go into the ‘no go’ areas and that they may be up against a difficult situation. INQ 1799 asked the Colour Sergeant if they would have access to additional weaponry but he could not recall the response.
Whilst they were in Waterloo Place, before being deployed to barrier 14, INQ 1799 was acting as radio operator in Major 221A’s pig. The company commander must have been on walkabout with his radio operator. Colonel Maurice Tugwell got into the pig with a senior journalist whose name he cannot remember. He was then ordered forward to barrier 14.
Barrier 14
When he got to the barrier there was a riot going on. Stones and other missiles were being thrown but he did not remember any petrol or nail bombs. INQ 1799 said he remembered seeing Colonel Wilford at barrier 14 but he was never there. INQ 1799 said it must have been another senior officer.
Going In
The crowd had begun to withdraw before they were ordered in. INQ 1799 then heard the order “go, go, go!” This was the only order given; he knew it meant they were to go in as snatch squads to arrest rioters. INQ 1799 said he was one of the first through the barrier and ran very fast toward the crowd. He was with INQ 444 and INQ 1783.
INQ 1799 said in his statement that he turned left into Chamberlain Street but when he was told 7 platoon advanced straight up William Street he accepted he was probably wrong. He closed on the crowd to within about 5 feet and then claimed to see a gunman in the crowd. He said he saw a man with an automatic pistol and that this was pointed it in his general direction. INQ 1799 dived for cover into a doorway. He could not remember calling “gunman” to alert his colleagues.
INQ 1799 located the gunman on a map attached to his statement [C1799-0010]. However he placed the gunman in Chamberlain Street and now accepted he was probably never in Chamberlain Street. Furthermore neither INQ 444 or INQ 1783, nor anyone else, saw the gunman or INQ 1799 dive for cover. INQ 1799 accepted INQ 444 must have been very close to him at the time.
INQ 1799 also claims to have heard two bursts of gunfire from a Thompson sub machine gun at this time. He could not tell where the shots came from but he felt they were close.
At the time INQ 1799 had both a rubber bullet gun and an SLR. The SLR was slung over his shoulder. He switched weapons to carry the SLR but since the baton gun did not have a sling he had to hold it. He could not use his SLR with one hand so he had to return to the pig to deposit the baton gun. He could not remember where the pig was but it would have followed them in.
Waste Ground
INQ 1799 could not remember where he was after leaving the pig but did recall being on open ground. With the aid of aerial photographs and a map he surmised he probably turned the corner into Rossville Street from William Street and went around the back of the houses on the south side of William Street. He said he was taking cover behind a large bolder. Major 221A and his signaller joined him at this location.
More Gunfire
INQ 1799 said he then heard more gunfire. It was fairly intense. He claims it included slow automatic fire from a Bren gun or LMG (light machine gun). He also heard SLR fire.
Gunman
INQ 1799 claims to have seen another gunman, this time with an M1 carbine rifle, behind a low wall in front of the Rossville Flats. However having originally placed himself at the end of Chamberlain Street when he saw this he now said he was on the waste ground behind William Street. Consequently he could not have seen the gunman in the position he had marked on his map, i.e. just in front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats where there was a low wall. He now thought the gunman must have been just north of the end of Block 1 of the flats however there was no wall there and his account was of seeing a gunman behind a wall. Furthermore Support Company had deployed in vehicles straight up Rossville Street and driven onto the waste ground in front of his position. By the time he had run up William Street, dived for cover, gone back to his pig and rounded the corner Support Company must have been all over the waste ground. Indeed Major Loden’s pig and other Support Company vehicles advance to precisely the position where INQ 1799 now placed the gunman.
Debriefing
INQ 1799 said he reported the gunmen he had seen to Lieutenant INQ 1267 or UNK 221 but was never asked to make a statement or give evidence to the Widgery Tribunal.
INQ 1799 identified himself on Video 1 in three locations: on the waste ground crouched behind a vehicle; crouching in Eden Place and standing in a doorway in Eden Place.
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