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3 - 6 MARCH 2003
Evidence
heard
This
week the Inquiry heard from the following soldiers: INQ
1253
(Lieutenant, King’s Own Royal Border Regiment); INQ 666 (Lance Corporal, Motor Transport
Section, 2nd Battalion, Royal Green Jackets); INQ
1495
(Captain, A Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ
1383
(Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Provost Marshall, Head Quarters Northern
Ireland); INQ
1224 (Guardsman, 1 Platoon, No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards); INQ 1282 (Private, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ
1115
(Lance Corporal, Signals Platoon, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ
1255
(Gunner, 42 Battery, Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 176 (Sergeant Major, Command Company,
2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ
1849
(Private, HQ Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ
739
(Corporal, HQ Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier
203
(Private, HQ Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ
18
(Corporal, Royal Military Police, 176 Provost Company) and INQ
1173
(Private, D Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment).
Summary of Evidence
Monday
3.03.03
INQ 1253, INQ 666, INQ 1495, INQ 1383, INQ 1224
Tuesday
4.03.03
INQ 176, INQ 1115, INQ 1282, INQ 1255, INQ 1849
Wednesday
5.03.03
INQ 739, Soldier 203, INQ18, INQ 1173
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the
code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
The Inquiry continued to heard from military witnesses including four more Paratroopers (Paras) and INQ 1383, the officer commanding the Royal Military Police in Northern Ireland at the time. The Inquiry did not sit on Thursday 6 March 2003.
INQ 1253
Lieutenant, King’s Own Royal Border Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 30 June 2000 [C1253]
In 1972 the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment (KORBR) were the Province Reserve Battalion and were deployed all over Northern Ireland at short notice. INQ 1253 was of the view that his regiment had been in Derry before 30 January 1972 but when shown the KORBR historical record [C1253-0004] he accepted it was probably correct and he was mistaken.
INQ 1253 was commanding the anti-tank
platoon and they were stationed as reserves in a car park.
They were never deployed. Fairly
soon after Bloody Sunday INQ 1253 had a conversation with UNK 365 who had been
responsible for guarding the mortuary where bodies of those killed were taken.
UNK 365 told him he had been shocked at the disrespectful manner with
which the Paras had treated the bodies. The
Paras bringing bodies in “almost dumped” them in the mortuary.
INQ 1253 recalled another conversation
he had had with a friend in the parachute regiment, Lieutenant 119.
He could not remember exactly when the conversation took place but
believed it was before the Widgery tribunal had taken place.
The impression INQ 1253 got from the conversation was that some of the
Paras were inexperienced and had been brought in from Head Quarters (HQ)
Company. That is to say they were cooks, bandsmen, etc. and not
seasoned frontline troops. Lieutenant
119 had told him these troops had been hyped up and “almost out of control.”
They were “reacting to their fear” and not under tight control.
INQ 1253 was under the impression
Lieutenant 119 had been talking about troops under his command and that he had
been commanding a platoon from HQ Company.
When told Lieutenant 119 was in fact commanding another unit that day,
not from HQ Company, INQ 1253 could not be certain exactly to whom his friend
had been referring. He thought he
was talking about HQ Company.
INQ 666
Lance Corporal, Motor Transport Section,
2nd Battalion, Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0666]
INQ 666 was stationed in Derry and familiar with the city. In his statement he explained although ammunition was checked in and out of the armoury it was not difficult to have a private supply from rounds collected at the firing range after exercises. He also explained rubber bullets were often doctored with razor blades inserted in the top. He also recounted an incident where a bored soldier at the city wall fired 2 shots at the Rossville Flats “for the hell of it.” Other soldiers on the walls then ‘returned fire’ thinking they had been shot at.
On 30 January 1972 INQ 666 was driving a
pig which formed part of barrier 14 in William Street. His pig was parked behind the barrier on the right.
The march was very big and the crowd started to throw pieces of rubble
and wood at barrier 14. The water cannon was called up and the crowd dispersed but
some returned when it was withdrawn. The
water cannon was deployed a second time and again the rioters dispersed.
At this time INQ 666 was sitting in the pig with the door open.
This meant he could hear what was going on and other soldiers could
shelter from missiles behind the door.
Paras Going In
INQ 666 then saw the Paras jump over the
barrier and run into William Street. Some
jumped onto the front of the pig to get over the barrier.
He was surprised the Paras were used as the reserve “because they were
renowned for being gung-ho.” He
said some of the Paras were young, hot headed and wanted to prove themselves.
There was only a scattering of people in front of the barrier when the
Paras went in. At the time he thought, “go on boys, do the business and kick
the shit out of them” but he now regrets thinking that.
Some of the Paras took up firing positions on the corner of William
Street and Chamberlain Street. However
he did not hear or see these men fire.
Gunfire
About a minute after the Paras went over
barrier 14 INQ 666 heard gunfire for the first time that day. He heard sporadic SLR gunfire which continued for as much as
an hour. He had always been of the
opinion that the Paras “opened up first.”
He also heard rubber bullets fired but did not hear any explosions.
He did not believe accounts of Paras coming under fire first because he
did not hear any shots before the Paras went in.
When told of the gunfire from Paras in
the derelict building further up William Street 20 minutes before the Paras went
through barrier 14 INQ 666 presumed he did not hear this because of the noise of
the riot at his location.
INQ 1495
Captain, A Company,
1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1495]
INQ 1495 was commander of A Company of
the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment on 30 January 1972. About a week before Bloody Sunday INQ 1495 escorted a number
of officers from the Parachute Regiment around Derry. He could not remember which officers were there or their
ranks. They were on reconnaissance
for the Bloody Sunday march. With
him were his company sergeant major, two signallers and an armed escort.
In particular he showed them the walls
between the Presbyterian Church and William Street.
He explained they had a problem when trying to arrest rioters on the
weekly Saturday riots because snatch squads could not catch them before they
retreated from William Street into the Bogside. He had therefore been considering a plan to deploy a small
number of men over the wall next to the church to cut off rioters at the
junction of Rossville Street and William Street.
He did not remember discussing the arrest plan for Bloody Sunday.
On Bloody Sunday itself INQ 1495 was
patrolling the married quarters outside the city.
Later that evening there was a general feeling in the mess that “the
Paras had gone over the top.”
INQ 1383
Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Provost
Marshall, Head Quarters Northern Ireland
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 17
February 2003 [C1383]
Now a Brigadier in 1973 INQ 1383 was the Assistant Provost Marshall (APM) for Northern Ireland. He was the most senior officer in command of the Royal Military Police (RMP) and was also responsible for liaison with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).
When he arrived in Northern Ireland in
1971 he was concerned about the poor practise adopted by the military towards
evidence. In particular many people
arrested in riots were being acquitted because there was no continuity of
evidence proving who arrested whom. People
were passed on after arrest from the arresting soldier to other soldiers, the
RMP or RUC and no provision was made to prove association between arrestee and
arrestor. INQ 1383 brought in a
system where teams of RMP would photograph people arrested with the person who
arrested them at the place they were arrested.
He was also concerned to emphasise that
soldiers had to act within the law. He
explained in other peace-keeping situations he had served in elsewhere in the
world the approach was more military than policing.
However in Northern Ireland the army was just assisting the civil
authorities and had no special powers. Therefore
soldiers had to be made aware of the law and how to act within in.
To this end he wrote a document entitled “Powers of Arrest and
Subsequent Procedure” for all commanders and soldiers to read.
Bloody Sunday
INQ 1383 decided to attend the operation
in Derry on 30 January 1972 as an observer.
He flew to Derry in a helicopter with General Ford. He had visited Derry a number of times before.
He reported to Brigade where he spoke to Brigadier MacLellan and Colonel
Steele. Later he met his senior
investigator, Warrant Officer Wood, probably at barrier 12.
Paras Going In
He remembered seeing a number of
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) going through the barrier. He then followed on foot with WO Wood. They were both in plain clothes.
He made no provision to ensure the soldiers ahead of him knew who he was
but “hoped they would not regard me as being in the opposition.”
As he advanced he was just observing what was going on.
It was not his job to interfere.
Gunfire
INQ 1383 said he heard a single gunshot
as he went forward towards the junction of Rossville Street and William Street.
He believed the shot to be ‘incoming’ and took cover.
He could not explain where he took cover and it was pointed out to him
there was nowhere to take cover south of barrier 12.
He said he might have lain on the ground.
He thinks WO Wood was still with him.
He then advanced further towards
Rossville Street and heard “FN fire” (i.e. army SLR fire) and what may have
been pistol or baton rounds. In his
statement to the Inquiry INQ 1383 said he thought on reflection the later were
baton rather than pistol rounds. Questioned
by Mr. Elias QC on behalf of some of the soldiers INQ 1383’s attention was
drawn to the diary of INQ 1873. INQ
1873 had recorded that INQ 1383 had told him he had heard a Tommy gun on Bloody
Sunday. INQ 1383 said he thought
this was how he had described the low velocity rounds he had heard. He had no reason to dispute that he had told INQ 1873 he had
heard a Tommy gun.
Gunman
INQ 1383 then claims to have seen a man
with a pistol emerge from behind a wall and retreat again. It was only a fleeting glance.
He placed himself at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street
and the gunman at Kell’s Walk. However
he also said he was not standing in the open but again it was pointed out to him
that there was very little cover in the area where he said he was.
He said he could not remember exactly where he was.
There was a lot of activity going on.
The only description he could give for the gunman was that he might have
been wearing a light coloured coat. He
did not make any note of the incident but mentioned it to General Ford when he
saw him about 30 minutes later. General
Ford said he should do a television interview but INQ 1383 thought there was
“no merit” in doing so. He
explained this by saying there were so many more people who had seen more than
he had. “At the time there seemed
to be so much evidence available.”
Taking Statements
INQ 1383 wrote the Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for his regiment and these included procedures for when
statements should be taken. The
procedure for actually taking statements was a matter of basic RMP training and
contained in the training manual.
INQ 1383 gave verbal instructions on the day to WO Wood and the RMP company commander regarding the evidence which should be obtained about the shootings. He could not remember specifics but the crux of his instructions was for them to concentrate on who fired, how many rounds, at what and then for all the information to be consolidated in a general plan. He had seen no reason to vary the SOPs, for example to ensure those who fired were cautioned when giving statements, because he did not at that time know the circumstances of the shootings. Even though there were civilians allegations of murder they followed standard procedure until the got an idea of what happened. He gave no specific order as to the nature or extent of the interviews.
The evidence of WO Wood was put to INQ 1383; in particular WO Wood said “In the circumstances …. The SIB (Special Investigations Bureau of the RMP) actions could not be said to constitute a full and exhaustive investigation. We amplified the detail in the initial contact reports and offered the evidence to the RUC.” [Woods statement: CW0001.0001] INQ 1383 insisted it was all out of his hands. INQ 1383 said he “really did not know” if the investigation had been exhaustive. INQ 1383 said it was part of the role of an SIB investigation to establish any criminal responsibility. The whole purpose was to get at the truth.
Evidence before the Widgery
Tribunal
INQ 1383 could not remember attending a meeting on 2 February 1972 of the Northern Ireland Tribunal team at HQNI but agreed if he were recorded as being present [note: G0114B.0743.0003] then he probably was. Where he is recorded as being responsible for provision of evidence to the tribunal this did not mean he had any personal involvement, merely that his staff were responsible. INQ 1383 did see the completed plan of who fired from where and at what but did not know what happened to it. He presumed it was handed to the Widgery Tribunal.
INQ 1383 said he had never seen any of the army photographs of Bloody Sunday and he did not know what had happened to them. He said he had no part in the Widgery inquiry. His deputy had responsibility for the evidence.
INQ 1383 denied the role of the RMP was to protect the army or obtain information to defend the army. INQ 1383 insisted their role was to get at the truth. He said he did not know if there was a failure on Bloody Sunday to adopt his procedures for linking arrestees to arrestors. He did not see anything go wrong that day himself but agreed on the face of it the procedure adopted for arrestees was unsatisfactory. He insisted he was too busy to check on such matters.
INQ 1224
Guardsman, 1 Platoon, No. 1 Company, 1st
Battalion Coldstream Guards
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1224]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 1224 was stationed as a guard at Fort George outside the city centre. Fort George was the place to which prisoners were to be brought for processing.
Gunfire
He said he heard shots in the background. He could not say where the shots were, how far away or what type of weapon had fired. There were single shots and there were continuous bursts. The latter could have been automatic fire but could have been single shots close together. He could not tell if the shots were high or low velocity.
Treatment of Prisoners
Whilst outside the building INQ 1224 saw a lorry arrive containing some paras and people who had been arrested. The paras manhandled the people out of the lorry who were then made to run towards the building between two lines of paratroopers. The paras were shouting at the prisoners and they were shouting back. When they could not move because those in front had stopped the prisoners were hit with batons. They were not taps; they were whacks which could cause nasty bruising. One was hit with a rifle butt. The prisoners stopped because there were two very aggressive Alsatians guarding the building. Some fell over those in front; others were knocked to the ground. Some of the prisoners had dried blood on them indicating they had been assaulted before they arrived.
Once inside the building the prisoners were spread eagled against the wall and were whacked again if they did not spread their hands or legs fast enough. One prisoner appeared to have a broken arm. He could not move it when instructed to do so by a para. The para hit the injured arm with his baton. Generally the people were hit on the arms and legs but sometimes they were hit on the head. INQ 1224 was shocked by the paras’ treatment of the prisoners. He had not witnessed violence like it before. It was systematic.
At some point INQ 1224 went into one of the smaller interrogation rooms. This was where prisoners were photographed and processed. Whilst in the processing room his colonel (INQ 598) came in. He remembered clearly an argument between the colonel and a para officer. The colonel “did his nut” over the way the prisoners were being treated. He was surprised to see an argument between officers and especially to see anyone argue with a colonel. The colonel was insisting the prisoners be allowed to sit down. The para was complaining about soft treatment. INQ 1224’s recollection was that as a result of the argument chairs were brought. He insisted “words were said” even when told INQ 598’s evidence was that there was no argument about his suggesting prisoners be allowed to sit down.
INQ 1282
Private, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 5 July 1999 [C1282]
INQ 1282 could not remember where he was on 30 January 1972 but he was behind a barrier through which the paras had run. He also recalled seeing a very senior officer, possibly a general saying, “go on lads!” or words to that effect. (This suggests INQ 1282 was at barrier 14 in William Street.)
Gunfire
About 5 minutes after the paras went in he heard high velocity 7.62mm gunfire. It was the first gunfire he had heard that day. He could not be sure as to the exact timing. The gunfire came from where the paras had run around the corner in front of him. He then heard a Thompson machine gun and an Armalite rifle before more SLR fire. The shooting was sporadic.
INQ 1282 said after thirty years and at his age, 55, he could not be certain all his recollections were his and not influenced by what he had heard on the television or read in the press. He could not be absolutely certain he had correctly identified three different weapons being fired. He thought at one point they were all being fired simultaneously.
INQ 1115
Lance Corporal, Signals Platoon, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made a Statement to the Inquiry in 1999 [C1115]
INQ 1115 was responsible for charging batteries for communications and maintaining communications vehicles such as the Gin Palace (1 Paras’ Tactical HQ). On 30 January 1972 he was attached to Guinness Force and stationed in the Gin Palace. He was not a radio operator on the day. He had never been to Derry before and only had a vague recollection of his location as having been in a car park.
Order to Deploy Paras
INQ 1115 recalled hearing an order from Brigade for the paras to deploy and thinks he heard Colonel Wilford relay the order over the radio to Support Company. He recalls the words “Go, go, go” but cannot be certain if he heard these over the radio or Colonel Wilford say them into the radio. He could not now be sure whether or not Colonel Wilford was at the Gin Palace. However in his statement he said Colonel Wilford was inside the Gin Palace and Major Loden outside. From the sound of his voice Colonel Wilford was impatient to go in.
Gunfire
INQ 1115 did not hear any gunfire before the paras went in but after the order to deploy he heard what he believed to be low velocity gunfire. It could have been automatic fire from a Thompson machine gun. He could not be certain. He then heard SLR fire. He could not say how long the gunfire lasted or how many shots he had heard.
INQ 1255
Gunner, 42 Battery, Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1225]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 1255 was in a building off Little James Street and he was deployed with a section to prevent anyone reaching the main road close to their position. Early in the day they built a barricade across the alley with bits of old fencing and rubble. At that time someone mentioned some gates with a padlock on them and it was decided to blow off the padlock in case they needed back up later in the day.
INQ 1255 was deployed in the building, he did not see the gate or the lock being blow off. His sergeant, INQ 1791, had taken his rifle when escorting the bomb disposal team to the gates. At some point INQ 1255 was resting his rifle on his boot when he shot himself in the foot. He had no idea the rifle was cocked. His foot was injured but the bullet missed the bones. He was taken to Altnagelvin hospital but before he left it was agreed amongst them he should report the incident as having occurred as he fell down a flight of stairs. He was subsequently fined £35 for the negligent discharge of his rifle after a hearing before the company commander. He said in his statement “everybody seemed to know what had happened” implying the officers accepted the story knowing it to be untrue possibly because they had sympathy for him, knowing it was an accident, and because otherwise the sergeant may have been in trouble.
INQ 176
Sergeant Major, Command Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made a Statement to the Inquiry [C0176]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 176 was accompanying the battalion’s Methodist padre, UNK 694. They first went to the Craigavon bridge and then to barrier 14 in William Street. They drove from the bridge to Waterloo Place and walked to the barrier from there.
Gunfire
INQ 176 said he heard gunfire at 2.50 pm believing either he or UNK 694 checked their watch at that time. However when told the paras did not deploy until 16:10 he agreed it must have been 3.50 pm that he heard the gunfire because it was only about 15 minutes before they went in. He said he heard 20-30 rounds from a Thompson machine gun. The firing was to his right, not directed at his position. No one took cover.
He heard more gunfire less than 10 minutes after the paras went in through the barrier. He thought he heard SLRs, a Thompson and small arms. He definitely heard SLRs but may have assumed the lower velocity sounds were a Thompson. He heard about 20 SLR rounds.
When told there was SLR gunfire from paras in the derelict building in William Street before the other paras went through the barriers INQ 176 accepted he might have been mistaken about the Thompson. He was sure the first shots he heard had been about fifteen minutes before the paras went through the barrier. He agreed, since he based everything on the timing and sequence of events, if there had been SLR fire around that time then “in all honesty that gunfire reverberating through the streets and echoing could have given me a false impression of what I heard.”
Paras Going In
INQ 176 did not see any rioting. He also only saw about 8-10 paras. He said it was impossible a whole company could have gone past him. Since he did not see the riot, baton guns being fired, the water cannon or the whole of 1 Para’s C Company it was suggested to him that he could not have been at barrier 14 in William Street. INQ 176 said it was the soldiers he remembered not the barrier. They were there to be with soldiers from A Company Royal Green Jackets, in particular he remembered the commanding officer, INQ 2079, and UNK 437 and INQ 183. He accepted that had there been a major riot at the barrier he must have seen it and therefore he may have been at another barrier manned by A Company in Waterloo Place or Castle Gate.
INQ 1849
Private, HQ Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1849]
INQ 1849 was the weapons technician for all the weapons of 1 Para. He had never heard of anyone altering the firing mechanism on an SLR to make it fire automatically. The SLR had a big kick when it fired and it would be very difficult to hold if it were made to fire all the rounds in a magazine at once.
He was deployed to Derry on 30 January 1972 but was never briefed. He did not know he was going until he was woken very early that morning. He was not acting as a weapons technician that day. His section was never deployed. He did not even get out of the pig other than to stretch his legs.
INQ 739
Corporal, HQ Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 17 June 2000
INQ 739 said that by 1972 the Bogside was a ‘no go’ area and the Paras considered it unacceptable for there to be ‘no go’ areas. They knew it would probably be their job to go in and sort out the ‘no go’ areas. They had done this in other areas.
Yellow Card
In his statement INQ 739 said the Yellow Card was considered to be a bit of a joke. By this he did not mean it was ignored but that soldiers thought it placed unfair restrictions on their ability to fire. Specifically they had to issue warnings in most circumstances and were not permitted to shoot at nail bombers.
INQ 739 was shown the versions of the Yellow Card issued in January 1971 and November 1971 where the rules of engagement were changed to permit the shooting of nail bombers without any warning if there was an immediate risk to life. INQ 739 was unaware of the change. This was perhaps because he was in HQ Company.
On 30 January 1972 INQ 739 was briefed he was to be part of Guinness Force as a small team to arrest rioters. He did not think there was a full tactical briefing. They were just there to support Support Company. He did recall there was a plan to drive an armoured pig through a wall at the Presbyterian Church but they could not get the pig to the wall because of pillars blocking the way.
INQ 739 was one of four men from Guinness Force who joined 4 others from Support Company and two officers on a recce over the wall to find another route to William Street. He remembered one of the officers cut his hand badly on some barbed wire. Once on the wall he heard a shot that sounded like it had come from a Mauser rifle. It was high velocity and sounded deeper than an AK47. He had never heard a Lee Enfield .303 rifle so could not say if it could have been a .303. The shot hit the drainpipe of the church and came from the direction of the Rossville Flats.
Going In
They were then briefed that they were to go in in support of Support Company and rendezvous at the Rossville Flats. INQ 739 went in in a 4 tonne lorry. The lorry stopped in Rossville Street at the waste ground near Eden Place. He got out of the vehicle and laid on the ground whilst putting on his gas mask. He got CS gas in his eyes which made them very sore. He then moved to his left across the waste ground and south to the Rossville Flats.
Gunfire
He heard a single burst of what he believed to be automatic fire from an AK47. He had an impression of bullets hitting the ground in front of him but could not say if he actually saw the bullets strike. He took cover at a wrecked vehicle and whilst there the commander of C Company and two others arrived. The commander asked him where C Company’s sergeant major had gone and he indicated toward the Rossville Flats. They all then went off toward the Rossville Flats. He then heard a further burst of what he described as AK47 fire.
Before he got to the Rossville Flats he heard at least two rounds of SLR fire. After perhaps a minute he heard more SLR fire. Once at the flats Colonel Wilford directed Guinness Force to drop back because there were too many of them in one place. INQ 739 crossed Rossville Street and entered an area of smaller streets and modern buildings. The shooting continued. He described it as a mixture of SLR and AK47 fire.
About 5-10 minutes after pulling back from the Rossville Flats he saw a priest with a white handkerchief and several people carrying a body. He says he took a glance to ensure they posed no threat and saw an army medic attend to them. When told the commander of Guinness Force saw a similar seen close to Abbey Park INQ 739 said he thought what he had seen was north of Colmbcille Court.
INQ 739 denied he had any conflict between telling the truth and loyalty to the paras. He did not report the gunfire he heard to his commanding officer. He said this was because lots of others would also have heard it. He was told his commanding officer, Captain 200, had organised a weapons demonstration for the Widgery tribunal and of all the weapons tested neither the Mauser sniper rifle nor the AK47 were amongst them. Further none of the intelligence available at the time suggested the IRA had either AK47s or Mauser rifles at that time. Nor did any of the statements provided to the Royal Military Police (RMP) in 1972 refer to AK47 gunfire. In light of that INQ 739 said it might have been a weapon that sounded like an AK47 that he heard.
INQ 739 did not see anyone fire a weapon, did not see any rubber bullets fired and did not see anyone arrested. He denied this was because he was hiding matters out of loyalty to the regiment.
Soldier 203
Private, HQ Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 21 May 2000
[B2114.0001] and a Statement to the RMP in 1972 [B2110]
Soldier 203 was the arms store man for HQ Company. He said it was easy to tell if a weapon had been fired both because you could smell it and there was a carbon deposit inside the gun. He was responsible for cleaning weapons so would know. In other companies soldiers cleaned their own weapons but in HQ Company many soldiers were of a senior rank and he was therefore specially tasked to clean the weapons. Each rifle was numbered and stored in its own position in the rack. Each weapon was assigned to a particular soldier. The weapons would all be returned to the armoury and placed in the racks. He would then go through them and clean them during the course of the week.
He was never briefed about the operation on 30 January 1972. It was not unusual for him not to be briefed since he worked alone in an isolated location. He had not been in HQ Company for long and knew the soldiers in the rifle companies better than he did those in HQ Company. He knew Sergeant O.
They were deployed at the Presbyterian Church. Sergeant O was on the roof of the church. He encouraged Soldier 203 and others to climb onto the roof to have a look at where they were going to be deployed. Whilst on the roof he heard a shot hit the other side of the building. Consequently he did not look over the apex but kept his head down. He thought he climbed up from a pig.
Going In
Later when ordered to go in Soldier 203 had no idea what he was supposed to do. He was not briefed at all. He and about a section went in on foot behind the lorries. He had no idea who was in charge. At times he tagged along with Guinness Force and at other times with Support Company.
Once in Rossville Street there were a lot of soldiers to his right so he decided to go to the left. He kept moving toward the Rossville Flats. He first took cover behind Support Company’s vehicles. He then moved to behind a burnt out van at the corner of Eden Place leading to Chamberlain Street. He then moved to behind a pig before being called away to a wall to his right.
Gunfire
He described hearing small arms fire followed by high velocity fire. He agreed rubber bullets sounded similar to hand guns but they were more tubular.
He thought he returned straight to barracks but has been shown he did not get back until the Tuesday. This was when he began checking the weapons. He did check and clean the gas regulators but did not adjust them. He recorded the ammunition returned and if there was less than had been issued he would record how many rounds were short.
INQ 18
Corporal, Royal Military Police, 176 Provost Company.
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0018] and one to the RMP on 2 May 1972 [C0018-0010]
INQ 18 was based in Derry. On 30 January 1972 he had to collect two military personnel from the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast. He could not recall who they were. He did not get back to Derry until about 18:00. He dropped off his passengers and was then ordered to go to Fort George.
Prisoners Holding Centre
At Fort George INQ 18 was directed to a large hanger. The RMP were there to photograph and process the people who had been arrested that day. It was very unusual to have so many people arrested in one operation. Inside the hanger there were some small rooms where people were questioned and two pens holding prisoners. The pens were made of barbed wire. He had drawn a diagram of the layout [C0018-0009].
The normal procedure was for a Polaroid photograph to be taken of a prisoner with the soldier who had arrested them and then both their names would be written on it. In this case INQ 18 could not remember if the arresting soldiers were present. They may have remained on the street to deal with the situation.
INQ 18 had no recollection of prisoners having to ‘run the gauntlet’ outside but he did have a vague recollection of guard dogs being used to frighten them. He had heard rumours soldiers struck prisoners with batons. He knew it did happen.
At one point INQ 18 pushed back a man trying to climb out of one of the pens. Later he saw the same man in one of the smaller rooms drinking tea with a major or captain of Provost Company. INQ 18 went in to deliver a message and overheard the man say he was an undercover SAS captain. He had a bloody nose which may have come from when INQ 18 pushed him back into the pen.
When asked to explain why there was no reference to any violence or brutality in his 1972 statement INQ 18 just said it was a standard army format statement which proved he was there and what he did. He probably wrote it personally. It did not include detail.
INQ 1173
Private, D Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C1173]
INQ 1173 had said in his statement that he was present on Bloody Sunday but having been shown documents he realised he was not.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
