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25 - 28 FEBRUARY 2003
Evidence
heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following soldiers:
Soldier 154 (Rifleman, A Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal Green Jackets); INQ 25 (Corporal, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 2079 (Major, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 351(Rifleman, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 836 (Warrant Officer, Head Quarters Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); Soldier 123 (Private, Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, 11 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 1326 (Major, Commander 11 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 1324 (Lieutenant, 30 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers); INQ 1298 (11 Platoon C Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglican Regiment); Soldier 142 (Corporal, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 1877 (Colonel, Chief Operations Staff Officer, Head Quarters Northern Ireland); INQ 24 (Private, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 63 (Private, C Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglican Regiment); Soldier 128 (Captain, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 1002 (Rifleman, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ 441 (Sergeant, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 1791 (Sergeant, 42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); and INQ 480 (Gunner, 42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment).
Summary
of Evidence
Tuesday 25.2.03
Soldier 154, INQ 488, INQ 25, INQ 2079
Wednesday 26.2.03
INQ 351, INQ 836, Soldier 123, INQ 1326, INQ 1324, INQ 1298
Thursday 27.2.03
Soldier 142, INQ 1877, INQ 24, INQ 63
Friday 28.2.03
Soldier 128, INQ 1002, INQ 441, INQ 1791, INQ 480
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets
refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
The Inquiry continued hearing military evidence from soldiers present in Derry on Bloody Sunday including three Paratroopers (Paras). Most of this week’s witnesses were on operational duties either at barriers or stationed in buildings. Some of the witnesses were critical of the various aspects of the army operation. The evidence of Soldier 128, now a Colonel, was particularly forthright.
Soldier 154
Rifleman, A Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal
Green Jackets
Made statement to RMP on 4 February 1972 [B1929] and
Inquiry [B1933]
Soldier 154’s regiment, the Royal Green Jackets (RGJs), was resident in Derry in 1972. He had been at the Magilligan incident the week before Bloody Sunday but was not asked about this matter. He would have been at a briefing for 30 January 1972 but did not recall it. He had no specific orders; he was bodyguard to his company commander that day. He carried a radio and a Sterling sub-machine gun. He and the company commander went between the various A Company platoons in Strand Road, William Street and Magazine Street. They were at the William Street barrier (14) about 20 minutes before the march arrived.
Barrier 14
Soldier 154 followed his commander to the barrier where he told the marchers they could not come through. The march was very big. A riot developed and missiles started to fly. The soldiers on the barrier fired rubber bullets and CS gas. Kids used to collect the rubber bullets as mementos. Then the water cannon was brought up and it sprayed the crowd with dye.
Gunfire
Soldier 154 then heard the crack of one or two high velocity shots. There were two cracks but one may have been an echo. He shouted “live rounds” to warn others. The rioting was continuing at this stage. He had said in his statement to the Royal Military Police (RMP) made in 1972 that these shots were “probably SLR or .303” (rifle fire) but he now said he could not identify the weapon from the sound alone. He said in his statement to the Inquiry made 28 years later that he thought the shots had come from the direction of the Rossville Flats but conceded this was just a guess and he did not know where they had come from.
Paras Going In
Soldier 154 was aware of a conversation at the barrier between his commander and a major or colonel from the Parachute Regiment but did not know what was said. After that the Paras went through the barrier. By this time the riot had dissipated and there was a gap between the crowd and the barrier. Some of the Paras went up William Street, others turned left down Chamberlain Street. A couple of pigs (armoured vehicles) followed.
More Gunfire
At this point Soldier 154 heard more firing. He and his company commander moved forward to see what was happening. He advanced beyond his commander to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. As he returned to his commander further east in William Street he heard SLR fire. He also heard what he believed to be low velocity automatic fire amongst the SLR fire. At the same time some of the Paras were detaining arrestees against a wall at the junction of Chamberlain Street/ William Street.
Soldier 154 could not explain why he had not mentioned automatic fire in his earlier statement but said he probably was not asked. He only spent a few minutes with the RMP. He denied his account of machine gun fire came from discussions with Paras or anyone else.
Jackie Duddy
Soldier 154 saw people carrying an injured person up towards barrier 14. The people were searched. He did not take much notice. He concentrated on looking out for any threat.
INQ 488
Platoon Sergeant, C Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 25 August 2000
[C0488]
INQ 488 was on duty on 30 January 1972 as part of the reserve. It was his first time in Derry. He was briefed before and after they arrived at Foyle College car park in Derry. The briefing would usually be General to Colonel to Company Commander. The Company Commander would then brief the Platoon Sergeants, like himself, and he would then brief the platoon. He was told if the march “got out of hand” they were to go in to make arrests. The normal arrest procedure was for snatch squads to be deployed. These consisted of: some men with batons to pull people out; others with rubber bullet guns as back up; and a few more with rifles in case anyone came under fire. He did not know what other Paras were ordered to do but did know another company would be deployed on another flank.
Once they were ordered forward they travelled to behind barrier 14 in pigs. There they disembarked and could see there was a riot going on. INQ 488 and Major 221A, the company commander, asked the officer in charge of the barrier to open it to let them through however he refused. INQ 488 could not remember who this officer was but he was with the Royal Green Jackets (RGJ). Major 221A was not very happy. Seconds later Major 221A ordered C Company over the barrier.
Paras Going In
After going around the barrier INQ 488 slipped on ice formed as a result of water from the water cannon having frozen on the street. He got up and ran up William Street. His platoon was the lead platoon. He did not know if some of C Company went down Chamberlain Street. He then saw Support Company vehicles coming toward him and thought “Jammy bastards getting there first!” When he was about 20 yards from the junction with Rossville Street he heard what he thought to be incoming low velocity gunfire. He then heard Support Company returning fire with SLRs.
Whilst he was on the corner of William Street and Rossville Street he heard Major 221A order soldiers of Support Company only to fire at identified targets. He could not explain why his major was giving orders to Support Company but assumed their company commander, Major Loden, was elsewhere. INQ 488 and his platoon remained in William Street whilst Major 221A went off to get orders. None of C Company advanced beyond Rossville Street.
INQ 488 recalled seeing members of Guinness Force to the north on the waste ground south of Prince Arthur Street. He did not know how they got there.
INQ 25
Corporal, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0025]
INQ 25 had been in the Paras for nine years in 1972. He was on duty on 30 January 1972 as part of Guinness Force. He only carried a baton and his squad were to control arrestees taken from taken from other snatch squads who would actually arrest them.
Paras Going In
Guinness Force were deployed through a barrier in four tonne lorries. His unit debussed and assembled near a small block of flats to the right of some waste ground. He believed this was near Kells Walk. They had cover there and waited for prisoners to be brought back to them. From there he saw soldiers from Support Company jump out of their pigs and arrest people. He did not notice any shooting.
Arrestees
INQ 25 took one arrestee and led him back to the holding area at the gable end of a row of houses. Shortly afterwards he remembers standing with prisoners around the corner in William Street next to a taxicab office. He can be seen in photographs EP0005.0022 and EP0005.0021. He denied arrestees were mistreated, assaulted, threatened or abused.
Patrick O’Donnell
INQ 25 recalled an incident where a man in his forties went into the cab office and a soldier went after him and brought him out. The soldier hit the man over the head with a baton causing his head to split open. A priest then intervened saying the man had been shot. INQ 25 could see he was in pain but it was only when the man opened his coat he could see a wound under his armpit. At some stage INQ 7, the Regiment Intelligence Officer, showed up and it may have been he who decided the man could go. He was driven away in a car. INQ 7 took the line of arrestees off somewhere.
INQ 2079
Major, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal
Green Jackets
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 30 June 2000
INQ 2079 was the commander of A Company of the RGJs. His previous commander was killed by gunfire in Derry in 1971. The RGJs were resident in Derry on 30 January 1972. On that day his company was under the command of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment (LADR).
The situation in Derry was one in which the army could not operate in the Bogside or Creggan without a very large presence. Rioting was frequent and incidents of gunfire were not uncommon. His men carried out their orders to react to and contain the situation.
On 30 January 1972 INQ 2079 was aware the Paras were in reserve. He was happy that there was a reserve because they were often under manned in Derry. He knew the Paras were to do a scoop up operation. He felt the resident battalions might have been better for this job since they knew both the geography and history of the area.
INQ 2079 was in command at barrier 14 but some of his company were also deployed nearby on another barrier. He could not recall the briefing but knew the march was to be stopped from going to the Guildhall and this meant barrier 14 was likely to be a point of confrontation.
The Rioting
INQ 2079 went to the front of the barrier with Soldier 116 to speak to the crowd. He had a conversation with the marchers at the front but a riot quickly developed and the conversation became irrelevant. He was hit on the chin by a missile. There were no bombs of any description and he did not recall hearing gunfire before the Paras went in.
INQ 2079 ordered rubber bullets to be fired in volleys but these failed to disperse the crowd so he called in the water cannon which had some effect. Although the rioting was fairly heavy INQ 2079 never considered the situation to be out of control. At some point the rioters withdrew and he considered he and his men had done their job. They had held the line with what he believed to be minimum use of force.
Order to Open the Barrier
The next thing INQ 2079 remembered was someone asking if he was going to put snatch squads in. He did not know who asked this. He replied, “not unless I’m ordered to do so.” At some point he was ordered to open the barricade to let the Paras go through. He was told of Major 221A’s account of his refusing to move the barrier because of fear for his men’s safety but he did not remember or understand Major 221A’s account. There was never an ‘issue’ (i.e. argument) about moving the barrier but there was a brief delay since it took a few seconds to physically remove the barricade. There was no real danger in removing the barrier because the riot had abated by that time.
He could not be certain how the order to move the barrier had come through but he believed it was probably through his second in command via a radio link to brigade. General Ford was observing at the barricade around the time the Paras went in.
INQ 2079 did not move forward and could not see what happened after the Paras went in. He did hear gunfire but could not recall specifics. In his statement to the Inquiry he said of the Paras going in: “It was not a continuation of our situation, but the start of a new one.”
INQ 2079 was asked about a document titled Record of Incidents apparently compiled by him in February 1972 [G0114A-0743-0001]. He did not recall the document but agreed since it was signed “Major, officer commanding A Company” he must have written it. It contained a summary of events that occurred at the William Street, Waterloo Street and Castle Gate barriers.
INQ 351
Rifleman, A Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made
Statement to Inquiry on 28 June 2000 [C0351]
INQ 351 was at barrier 14 when the paras
went in. He heard shots after they
went in. It was all high velocity
gunfire. He believed the gunfire
was army fire because he thought it was SLR fire.
It could have been another high velocity weapon.
He did not hear nail bombs or petrol bombs.
At some point the Adjutant, INQ 573, and
a small group of men came up to the barrier and went forward. They included a friend, UNK 756, who was the platoon sergeant
for HQ Company. INQ 351 decided to
follow through the barrier after them. He
was a short distance behind these men. He could not be certain the officer was
INQ 573.
Excessive Firing
There was a Para about 50-70 yards ahead
of him firing “like a stupid plonker.”
He was firing from the shoulder towards the Rossville Flats. He fired perhaps 4 to 6 rounds; it may have been less or
more. The Para changed magazine and
fired at least one more shot. INQ
351 could not be sure where he was when he saw this or where the Para was.
In his statement he placed the Para at the end of a street.
All he could remember was that he could only see two blocks of the
Rossville Flats. Looking south, his
view of the third block to his right was obstructed by buildings.
He could not say which block the para was firing at.
He was not aware of any incoming fire.
He felt no need to take cover himself.
He thinks he said to UNK 756 “what a plonker.”
By this he meant the Para was firing an excessive number of rounds.
INQ 836
Warrant
Officer, Head Quarters Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made
Statement to the Inquiry on 13 March 2000 [C0836]
INQ 836 was part of the Light Air Defence Regiment (LADR) Intelligence Operations room staff. He did not receive any intelligence himself regarding the plans of the march organisers. He did not attend any intelligence briefing regarding the march. He was told that there was to be a march but not any detail. INQ 836 had a camera on 30 January 1972 and was in uniform. His section did not work undercover. Captain 21 was the officer in charge of the section.
INQ 836 was at barrier 12. He was there to see if there were any “known personalities” on the march. He was not expecting the IRA to be active that day. He understood it was a National Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march and had no reason to believe the IRA would be there. When looking for what he called “familiar faces” this did not just mean IRA. There were a large number of people of interest to the army.
INQ 836 recalled seeing the Paras coming back to barrier 12 with arrestees. He could not recall seeing them go in even though he believed he was at barrier 12 until returning to his office later in the day. He could not explain how he came to see the Paras return but not go in. He did not recall rioting at barrier 12 either and may have left and come back. It was possible he saw the Paras with arrestees somewhere other than at barrier 12.
Shot
at Barrier 12
INQ 836 described hearing a shot whilst he was standing behind barrier 12. He heard a noise and saw a mark on the wall to his left about 9 feet from ground level. He described it in his statement as low velocity and occurring whilst the march was passing, before any rioting had begun. He believed this to be the case because he was not equipped to be at the barrier during rioting since he was not wearing protective clothing such as a tin hat. He said there was no need to panic, although he said the bullet hit the wall within a few yards of his position. He did not tell any of the other soldiers on the barrier about the shot and could not recall reporting it. He said he believed at the time the bullet was fired from the area of the Rossville Flats.
INQ 836 was not aware of reports by
other soldiers at barrier 12 of hearing up to five shots. He was not aware of any order to withdraw for greater safety.
INQ 836 said the photographs he took
that day were dealt with in the normal way and would have been handed on to the
relieving regiment when the LADR left Northern Ireland.
INQ 836 identified himself in a
photograph (P0360). He is standing
in the middle, holding a camera.
Soldier 123
Private, Royal Electrical Mechanical
Engineers, 11 Battery, 22 LADR.
Made Statement to the Inquiry [B1774]
and to the Royal Military Police in 1972 [B1771]
On 30 January 1972 Soldier 123 was on duty at the Embassy Ballroom rotating between the two roof top observation posts (OPs) and the main entrance. He rotated duty with Soldier 157 and INQ 1252. He could not recall how he moved from one OP at the back of the roof (OP Echo) and the one at the front/side (OP Foxtrot). However having been shown an aerial photograph with a ladder leading down to OP Foxtrot he agreed it was probable he climbed onto and crossed the flat roof between the two OPs. There was a radio at OP Echo which was probably on the LADR net (network).
Hearing
Gunfire
In his statement to the RMP in 1972 Soldier 123 described hearing gunfire whilst at OP Echo between 15:00 and 16:15. In his statement to the Inquiry he said he had left the OP and was on the stairs going down when he heard several single low velocity shots in rapid succession followed by 2 or 3 SLR shots. He could not now be sure of the sequence of events. At some point before he left OP Echo some senior officers arrived but he was now uncertain as to when he heard the gunfire. He was not aware of any shots being fire at the OP.
Paras
Shooting Civilians
In answer to questions from Arthur Harvey QC on behalf some of the families of victims Soldier 123 agreed he was stationed where he was to observe what happened. OP Echo had a commanding view of the Bogside and his duty was to observe and report significant events. He did not recall hearing the five SLR shots fired by Soldiers A and B, he would have reported them had he done so. Although he described in his original RMP statement seeing paras make arrests in Rossville Street he made no mention of, and could not now recall, seeing people shot in Rossville Street or the Rossville Flats’ car park. He did not recall seeing a priest and others attending the body of Jackie Duddy. Nor did he see Michael Bridge being shot or Peggy Deery being carried across the car park. He conceded he was the furthest forward of soldiers on the roof and had the best view of the area. Despite this the only evidence Soldier 123 had provided in his RMP statement and could now recall was that he had heard low velocity gunfire and that the army had returned fire with 2 or 3 shots from SLRs.
Soldier 123 did not see Michael Kelly being killed at around the same time, just after 16:10. Nor did he see three more boys shot dead in the area of the rubble barricade next to the Rossville Flats. He did not question his being relieved at this crucial moment (16:15) or suggest to the person relieving him he stay on to observe what was happening. He agreed senior officers on the roof, including Colonel Tugwell, would also have had a good view of what occurred. The officer he answered to at the OP that day was probably Sergeant 108.
INQ 1326
Major, Commander 11 Battery, 22nd
Light Air Defence Regiment
Made
Statement to the Inquiry [C1326]
INQ 1326 had been in Northern Ireland
for 3 or 4 months by 30 January 1972. On
the day he was in command of the barriers 12 and 13 in Little James Street and
Sackville Street. He is pictured to
the left of photograph P0360 wearing a cap, standing beneath a ‘one-way’
traffic sign.
INQ 1326 was aware there were army
snipers placed in the shirt factory to the left of barrier 12 but could not
recall others in the pet food shop to the right.
Stones and other missiles were thrown
during rioting at barrier 12 but there were no blast bombs or petrol bombs.
He ordered rubber bullets and CS gas to be fired to control the rioting.
He could not recall whether he saw at the time the brigade operational
order for Operation Forecast (i.e. Bloody Sunday) and was not aware of the
provision that CS gas was only to be used as a last resort if the barrier was
about to be overrun. He agreed
there was no point at which the barrier was likely to be overrun.
That aspect of the order was unusual.
He was aware the Paras were one of the reserve units that day but was
unaware they were opposed to use of CS gas.
He had no recollection of any incoming
gunfire at barrier 12. INQ 1851 had
said there was a shot which hit the wooden barrier and that the officer
commanding the barrier reported it over the radio.
INQ 1326 could not recall this but could not say it did not happen.
Paras
Going In
INQ 1326 was not expecting the order to
open the barrier and could not recall who gave it.
He could not say if it was a change to any original plan.
He just was not expecting it. His
men started to undo the barrier but before they could finish the Paras vehicles
came around the corner. The rioters
melted away and there was a short pause of around 10 seconds before the barrier
could be opened.
After the Paras went in INQ 1326 moved
forward with his signaller to the junction of William Street and Rossville
Street. He remained in William
Street. There he saw a Para officer with a signaller.
The Para signaller referred to sniper fire and then ran off into the
Bogside. INQ 1326 returned to
barrier 12 to ensure the safety of his men.
He took them back to Great James Street out of sight of any snipers in
the Bogside. Consequently he did
not see anything of what happened thereafter.
INQ 1324
Lieutenant, 30 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers
Made Statement to the Inquiry in May 2000 [C1324]
INQ 1324 was at barrier 14 and heard General Ford shout “Go Paras, go get em!” as the Paras went in. He then moved back towards Sackville Street and the Strand Road where he claimed he heard a Thompson sub-machine gun. He could not recall if he had ever previously heard a Thompson fired in an urban area. However he was certain it was a Thompson. It was probably 200-300 yards away and he did not feel under threat. There was no need to report it. It was the first firing he heard that day. He then heard 6 to 10 rounds of SLR fire. He then continued moving back towards the Guildhall. He said any further firing he might have heard merged into the background.
INQ 1324 was shown the Brigade radio log [W0049], which recorded machine gunfire 30 minutes later at 16:45. He had not made a statement about these events at the time but denied he could be mistaken as to the timing 30 years later. He placed the machine gun fire as occurring just after the Paras went through barrier 14.
INQ 1298
11 Platoon C Company, 1st
Battalion Royal Anglican Regiment
Statement to the Inquiry [C1298]
On 20 January 1972 INQ 1298 was manning
a barrier (24) at the junction of Foyle Road and Ferguson Street.
The barrier was close to the river and the ground rises towards the city
wall. He could not see the Bogside
from barrier 24.
Gunfire
INQ 1298 said he the first shots he
heard were automatic gunfire from a carbine.
This was from somewhere to the north west of his position. He heard two short bursts which were then drowned out by SLR
fire. The SLR fire began with a
single shot, then there was a pause and then “the shots began rolling in.”
It was all over very quickly, about 30 seconds.
He did not report what he had heard.
He described the events as momentous in his statement because he had
never heard so much gunfire.
In his statement INQ 1298 said he had
spoken to another soldier at barrier 24 who told him there a body was found in a
car with nail bombs. He thought
this had occurred before he heard any gunfire.
However the alleged discovery of nail bombs on the body of Gerald Donaghy
did not occur until much later. INQ
1298 denied he could have mistaken the automatic gunfire as coming from the
Bogside for gunfire recorded in the Porter Log [W0134 at 16:29] at the LADR Mex
garage base. INQ 1298 agreed he
should have heard any shots directed at the 22 LADR post at the Mex garage since
that was as close to his position as the Rossville Flats.
Soldier 142
Corporal, A Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to the RMP on 4.2.72
[B1869] and one to the Inquiry [B1872.001]
Soldier 142 said he had almost no
recollection of events on 30 January 1972 and relied heavily on the contents of
his original statement to the RMP. On
the day he was positioned behind barrier 14.
He was armed with a baton gun. He
remembered his company commander (INQ 2079) was hit on the head by a missile
during the rioting. Soldier 142
fired a number of baton rounds during the day.
Paras
Going In
He was not aware the Paras were in Derry
until he saw them forming up behind the barrier.
They ran in past his position. He
could not see them after they advanced about 50 yards up William Street towards
Rossville Street. At the same time
as the Paras disappeared from view he heard gunfire from the region of the
Rossville Flats. This was the first
gunfire he heard that day.
Gunfire
In his statement to the RMP he only
recorded hearing automatic fire but in his statement to the Inquiry he mentions
7.62mm and .303 rifle fire. He said
he heard different types of gunfire but could not recall any low velocity
rounds. He thought it was an
exchange of fire and remembers saying, “that isn’t ours”
(i.e. not army) in response to some of the gunfire.
INQ 1877
Colonel,
Chief Operations Staff Officer (GSO1 Ops), Head Quarters Northern Ireland
Made
Statement to the Inquiry on 17 June 2000 (C1877)
INQ 1877 was principal staff officer to General Ford. He was also responsible for providing operational staff support to the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Commander of Land Forces (CLF) and the Chief of Staff (COS).
Future
Military Policy for Londonderry [G0041.0263]
INQ 1877 could not recall seeing General Ford’s memo titled Future Military Policy for Londonderry but said he was probably involved in drafting it. He would have discussed the situation in Derry with General Ford who he saw most days although he could not remember specifically doing so. He said the Committee of 30 referred to in the document were probably people with influence in Derry.
General
Ford’s Memo of 7 January 1972 [G0048.0299]
INQ 1877 was referred to General
Ford’s comment paragraph 6:“I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum
force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected
leaders amongst the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans) after clear warnings have been
issued.” INQ 1877 said he was
quite clear he had never seen the document or ever discussed such a strategy.
Plan
for Bloody Sunday
INQ 1877 could not recall being at the
meeting at which operational order was discussed but accepted that he must have
been there if General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan said he was. The term “scoop up operation” did not ring a chord with
him. When he said in his statement
he found it “absolutely unbelievable” that there would have been a plan to
open fire first he meant he did not believe General Ford would act in that way.
Information
Policy
INQ 1877 said he did not recall what
Colonel Tugwell’s role was but agreed he knew at the time. When shown the Information Policy Working Party Review
[G0130-0858A] for the first quarter of 1972 he agreed it appeared he was part of
the working party and this was to ensure he would be aware of public relations
reactions to events. In relation to
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Review he could not recall what “pre-emptive and
protective measures in the propaganda field” were considered.
Nor could he recall what was taken by way of “precautionary
measures.”
INQ 24
Private, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 1 July 2000 [C0024]
INQ 24 was in the signals platoon of Guinness Force. On 30 January 1972 he was a radio operator for an officer but he said he could not know remember which officer. He was carrying am A41 radio and a Sterling machine gun (SMG). He was asked if he knew Captain 200 but he could not recall the name.
Paras Going In
His platoon were driven into the Bogside in soft skinned Bedford lorries. They debussed and he followed his officer across some waste ground. They took cover near a derelict vehicle. He said he could not hear gunfire because he was wearing headphones. He did not see what was going on because he was just following the officer. He did not remember seeing any arrests being made. Nor did he recall any orders or messages that came over the radio.
INQ 24 and his officer went over to join other soldiers gathered at the northern end wall of block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He did not recall seeing Major Loden there. He did recall seeing a body at the rubble barricade and a priest waving a white flag trying to reach it. A soldier told the priest to stay where he was. INQ 24 then crossed Rossville Street to some buildings before crossing back again. He did not remember seeing any more bodies.
When he crossed back to the Rossville Flats INQ 24 heard someone say “only fire at hard targets.” He understood this to mean a target that might fire back. He could not remember who said this but it did not come over the radio.
In answer to questions from Mr. Toohey INQ 24 said he could not remember hearing any gunfire or seeing any other soldiers other than those he described at the end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
After withdrawing on foot INQ 24 sat in a pig in William Street near the corner with Little James Street. He saw blood on the floor of the pig.
Answering questions from Mr. McCartney on behalf of some of the families INQ 24 denied having any conflict between telling the truth and defending the Parachute Regiment. He accepted he knew INQ 127. INQ 127 had given evidence that there were only two radios with Guinness Force that day and that he, INQ 127, had one of them. Since INQ 127 was not with Captain 200 it followed INQ 24 must have been. However INQ 24 could not explain how he failed to see any of the events described by Captain 200. He could not explain how he failed to hear all the SLR gunfire around him yet he did hear someone say only fire at identified targets. He denied he was not being frank and truthful with the Inquiry.
When questioned by Richard Harvey on behalf of the family of James Wray INQ 24 denied any knowledge of telling Captain 200 about three bodies in Glenfada Park.
INQ 63
Private, C Company, 1st Battalion Royal
Anglican Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0063]
The 1st Battalion Royal Anglican Regiment were resident in Derry on 30 January 1972 and were about to complete a two-year tour of duty in Northern Ireland.
On the day INQ 63 was the driver and bodyguard to the commander of C Company. He recorded his position as being in the area around Sackville Street and Little James Street with the rest of his company. However C Company were in fact manning barriers much further south at Ferguson Street and Corporation Street. INQ 63 could not recall where he was but believes he saw the Paras going in. However the Paras were nowhere near where his company were stationed. In the circumstances Lord Saville was of the view INQ 63 was unable to assist the Inquiry.
Soldier 128
Captain, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 20 March 2000
[B1802.0001] and to the Royal Military Police in 1972 [B1799]
Now a colonel, Soldier 128 was a captain in 1972 and was the 2nd Battalion RGJs Operations Officer on 30 January 1972. He was also at Magilligan on 22nd January 1972.
Magilligan March 22 January 1972
Soldier 128 said he had a patchy memory of events at Magilligan. He recalled an incident when some youths crossed or attempted to cross the barbed wire on the beach. They were baton charged by the Paras. He was concerned about some soldiers using undue force. He could not remember distinct incidents except one of a soldier hitting a member of the crowd with a baton. He did recall there had been talk of an inquiry but thought it was overtaken by events the following week. His commanding officer may have spoken to the officer commanding the Paras.
Before Bloody Sunday
Soldier 128 said there was a policy at the time to restore law and order to Derry and the RUC Divisional Commander, Superintendent Lagan, had “drilled into us” the necessity not to provoke unnecessary violence. Soldier 128 explained whilst this might seem obvious the army was performing a policing function and minimum force was not necessarily obvious to soldiers. The situation in Derry was volatile and it was sometimes necessary to “cool it” and withdraw.
Soldier 128 also explained that there was irritation at the situation in Derry amongst politicians particularly at the existence of ‘no go areas.’ There was debate in the press and Parliament about the unfortunate, if not unacceptable situation.
Bloody Sunday
On 30 January 1972 Soldier 128 was deployed as a sniper under the command of A Company. He could not be sure exactly who he was with but it may have been INQ 460. They were deployed above barrier 14 to protect those manning the barrier. He had an SLR.
Soldier 128 thought he had been in the projection room of a burnt out cinema overlooking William Street and this was confirmed when he was shown an enhanced photograph [E0016-0004] showing him looking out of a slit in the old cinema.
After the march past a “ferocious” riot quickly developed immediately at barrier 14. Soldier 128 observed the riot from his position and although the rioting was intense there was no danger of the crowd breaking through the barrier. Rubber bullets were fired from the barrier. At one point his colleague was spotted and some of the crowd then attacked the corrugated iron sheeting below them. Soldier 128 became very frightened since he knew they could not escape by any other route. He radioed the company commander twice but was told both times the situation was under control. The water cannon was then deployed and this was very successful in dispersing most of the crowd.
The Paras Going In
Shortly after the water cannon was deployed Soldier 128 and his colleague left the cinema and came down to the barrier. There were hardly any people in William Street by that stage. He could not be certain whether the Paras started to go in before he got down to street level but he certainly saw the last of them cross the barrier. He saw General Ford at the barrier. His immediate feeling was that it was too late to send in snatch squads because the rioters had gone. He said of the operation: “It seemed to be a pointless exercise the Paras going into the Bogside and I thought it would be a seriously stupid and dangerous thing to do. It was not a tactic that made any sense to me.”
Soldier 128 explained it was too late for an arrest operation and it was ill advised to send soldiers unfamiliar with the area to follow the crowd into the Bogside. It was a very dangerous and tactically difficult area. He did not believe his own regiment would ever have followed such a course. They only went into the Bogside on planned arrest operations with the RUC. Snatch squads were no longer used because they were ineffective and even when they had been used they did not go beyond Aggro Corner because experience had shown that there was a danger of the security forces being drawn into the range of snipers.
Soldier 128 saw the last Para drop to one knee, shout ‘gunman’ and appear to take aim at the army observation post on the Embassy Ballroom. Soldier 128 thought he was about to fire. He shouted “No!” two or three times as he ran towards the Para. He slipped on ice formed by water from the water cannon freezing on the street and the Para ran on. He had the distinct impression the Para had mistaken soldiers on the Ballroom for civilian gunmen.
He then heard protracted gunfire which sounded like SLR fire. He did not hear any explosion. He was aware a large number of rounds had been fired and “immediately feared the worst.” Soldier 128 went on to explain how it is extremely difficult to control fire once it starts. The natural reaction of a soldier hearing gunfire is to start shooting. It is very difficult to control fire with training because fear takes over. He immediately thought the number of rounds being fired suggested the firing was not under control. Fire control was a recognised problem and generally required direct intervention.
INQ 1002
Rifleman, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal
Green Jackets
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 6 July 1999 [C1002]
INQ 1002 was familiar with Derry and had experienced many riots in the city. On 30 January 1972 he was on duty at barrier 14 in William Street. He thinks he was stationed at the Embassy Ballroom roof in the morning but was at barrier 14 by the time the march arrived.
INQ 1002 was able to provide two photographs to the Inquiry. The battalion photographer who he did not know had approached him a couple of weeks after Bloody Sunday. The photographer said, “I’ve got a photograph of you” and gave him a copy. This photograph [C1002.0005] shows INQ 1002 at barrier 14 to the right of a pig. INQ 1002 asked if he could have another photograph [C1002.0006] which is a general view of the barrier.
The marchers arrived at barrier 14 and quickly moved on. Others then began stoning the soldiers at the barrier. INQ 1002 did not recall and explosions or petrol bombs. After some time he was asked to go around the corner and call up the water cannon. The rioters dispersed as the water cannon was fired into the crowd.
Paras Going In
Just as the crowd dispersed soldiers who INQ 1002 now knows to have been Paras came running up Williams Street from Waterloo Place. The Paras rushed through the barrier and jumped over it before it could be dismantled. He suddenly heard a lot of shooting. He was certain there was no shooting before the Paras went in. The rioters had gone by this time and it was relatively quiet.
INQ 1002 remembered seeing a Para standing in a firing position in the middle of the road at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. This he thought very strange because that was a very exposed and dangerous area. It suggested to him the Para had no idea of the area. He was surprised the Paras went down Rossville Street because there was a danger of snipers.
The shooting he heard was all the same type of fire and it seemed to go on a long time. Later back at barracks they talked about what had happened. INQ 1002 said in his statement: “No one could believe it… As far as we were concerned, the situation was under control. My feeling at the time was that the paras had lost it and had just gone crazy and fired indiscriminately.” In evidence he added: “Someone lost control of what happened… I always thought someone fired and everyone else did.”
INQ 441
Sergeant, Support Company, 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0441]
INQ 441 was a platoon sergeant in charge of the machine gun platoon of Support Company. Major Loden briefed him and the other platoon sergeants. They then briefed the platoons. He could not recall what he said to his platoon. He had never been to Derry before. There were about 16 men in the machine gun platoon that day.
On the way to Derry INQ 441’s pig stopped to pick up Soldier O who had just returned to the barracks from Cyprus. He briefed Soldier O who was part of the Motor Platoon. When they arrived Major Loden took the platoon commanders on a reconnaissance of the area. His platoon were to cover the right flank by entering William Street via a derelict building. The plan was to meet up in Rossville Street. INQ 441 did not recall the Presbyterian Church. He did recall there was a plan to scale a wall and that the plan changed.
The Derelict Building/Abbey Taxis
INQ 441 said the platoon entered the derelict building at the middle floor level from the wall to the north. INQ 455 fell and was injured when they were dropping down into the building. INQ 441 was attending INQ 455 when Soldiers A and B fired from inside the building. He and INQ 455 were outside the building at this time.
Shooting by Soldiers A and B
Although he said in his statement “I now know Corporal A and Private B fired at nail bombers” INQ 441 agreed this was only based upon what they had told him. He did not hear any nail bombs. He said he would have told them to ceasefire when he saw them even though they had already done so. He agreed ‘contact,’ such as the threat of nail bombs, and A and B firing should have been reported immediately to the company commander.
INQ 441 said it was probable soldiers who fired would ‘compare notes’ before giving statements to the RMP. He himself could not remember making any report about the incident and could not explain why he had not.
Once all the men were at ground level the platoon then came out of the derelict building onto the waste ground. They chased “stragglers” in William Street. INQ 441 arrested a man in the bookmakers for throwing stones. He then handed the man to members of Guinness Force. He remembered hearing high velocity gunfire close to the Rossville Flats almost as soon as he entered William Street.
Accounting for Ammunition
INQ 441 made his way south down Rossville Street to Major Loden’s vehicle. By the time he reached it the gunfire was continuing but there was no incoming fire. Major Loden then gave an order to cease-fire. The company sergeant major then called for an ammunition check. INQ 441 said he was aware some of his men had experienced ‘hard extractions’ i.e. where two bullets enter the breech and one is expelled without being fired. He said he knew this because he heard the ‘ping’ as the round hit the floor even though he said he was outside the building. Soldiers A and B, the only ones who admitted firing, had not said anything about this but INQ 441 believed he heard it. The rounds should have been collected and accounted for.
It was put to INQ 441 by counsel to the Inquiry that the 1 Para regimental sergeant major (INQ 2037) had said Soldier O and INQ 1446 had admitted doing most of the firing that day. INQ 1446 is the code given to the name INQ 2037 used in his statement. That name is the same as INQ 441. INQ 441 said he did not himself fire at all on Bloody Sunday.
He did see an RMP officer and gave a statement at some point but could not remember if he ever signed it. He was not called to the Widgery tribunal so put the matter out of his mind. He and other Para sergeants also gave an interview to World In Action.
INQ 1791
Sergeant, 42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 15 July 2000 [C1791]
INQ 1791 was commanding a section of troops guarding some shops in an alleyway off Little James Street. Before the march two engineers came to blow off some padlocks on some gates. INQ 1791 understood this was because it might be necessary for soldiers to gain access through those gates to Little James Street.
At some point he saw Paras with prisoners spread-eagled near to the GPO sorting office. There were two or three Paras guarding the prisoners against a fence. Later one of his men, INQ 1255, shot himself in the foot. The incident was reported to the Battery.
INQ 480
Gunner, 42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry [C0480]
INQ 480 was stationed in Harrison’s garage in William Street on 30 January 1972. He was unhappy with the briefing he got before being deployed because he did not feel he had been given enough detail about what was planned. He understood his group may have been required to enter William Street to herd rioters but this did not happen.
On the way to his position INQ 480 saw Paras in the area of Sackville Street. He was unhappy about the Paras being deployed in Derry because he knew the situation was sensitive and he did not think the Paras aggressive approach was likely to help. He thought they were likely to “spark off an incident.”
Gunfire
At some point INQ 480 heard the sound of 2 or 3 high velocity rounds come from behind him and to his left. He could not pinpoint the direction of the shots. He agreed these could have been the shots fired by Soldiers A and B from the derelict building. He waited for the ‘contact’ report on the radio and then heard a number of what he believed to be SLR shots. The firing was sporadic and in bursts. He did not hear any nail bombs and thinks he would have done so if any had exploded in William Street or Rossville Street. He did not hear a Thompson sub machine gun firing and specifically discussed this with others that evening. They decided what they had heard was not a Thompson.
Later they were told to return to barracks and made their way east along William Street then north into Little James Street. Near the corner of Sackville Street and Little James Street he saw Paras pushing people into pigs and Saracens.
No Conspiracy
INQ 480 did not think there was a conspiracy on Bloody Sunday because squaddies like him would have become aware of it. However he was of the view that the decision to use the Paras was “very stupid” because “the Paras are only trained to do one thing and that is to attack.”
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
