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10 - 13 FEBRUARY 2003
Evidence
heard
This
week the Inquiry heard from: INQ 1919 (Private Machine Gun Platoon, Support Company, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 105 (Lance Corporal, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal
Green Jackets); INQ
131(Corporal, A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); Soldier
A (Corporal,
Machine Gun Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute
Regiment); INQ
1170 (Rifleman, B Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ
727 (Gunner,
42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 1874 (Private, Machine Gun Platoon,
Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier
120 (Riflemen,
A Company, 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets); INQ
906 (Corporal,
1 Company, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards); Soldier
151 (Rifleman,
A Company, Royal Green Jackets); INQ 754 (Bombardier, 42 Battery, 22nd
Light Air Defence Regiment) and Soldier 106 (Guinness Force, Support Company,
1st Battalion Parachute Regiment).
Summary
of Evidence
Monday 10.2.03
INQ 1919, Soldier 105 and Soldier 131
Tuesday 11.2.03
Soldier A
Wednesday 12.2.03
INQ 1170, INQ 1874, Soldier 120, INQ 906, Soldier 151
Thursday 13.2.03
INQ 754, Soldier 106 and INQ 727
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets
refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This
week saw the first evidence from a soldier known to have shot someone on Bloody
Sunday. Soldier A claimed to have
shot a nail bomber in the same area and at the same time bullets injured Damien
Donaghy and John Johnston. Soldier
A was a member of the Paras Support Company, machine gun platoon.
INQ 1919
Private Machine Gun Platoon, Support
Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to Inquiry on 28 August
2000 [C1919]
INQ 1919 believed he might have had as many as three or four briefings about the operation on 30 January 1972. He was not anticipating “major trouble.” His platoon was sent to a derelict building on William Street. He agreed the Paras felt they controlled Belfast but that in Derry local troops took ‘a lot of stick’ and could not do much about it. However they were just there to do a job, not to teach anyone a lesson.
Approaching the Derelict Building
INQ 1919 believed they reached the building from Great James Street by an alleyway and a flat roof, then climbing through a window and dropping into the building off a 15 foot wall. They were delayed getting into position because they got stuck and learned over the radio the march had already been halted before they reached their location. Some of the men were spotted as they crossed a flat roof and this caused some jeering from the crowd. At the same time the platoon radio operator, INQ 455, became entangled in the barbed wire at the top of the wall and fell off taking the wire with him. INQ 1919 spent some time trying to untangle and help INQ 455 who was not seriously injured.
Some missiles were thrown toward and into the building as INQ 1919 took up a position near a window on the ground floor looking out onto William Street. He kept out of sight but could hear CS gas and rubber bullets being fired nearby to the east. The gas drifted into the building causing some discomfort. Then he heard gunfire and explosions in the vicinity.
He could only see what was happening outside when he moved to peer out. When he looked he saw a small group of people, no more than fifteen, had approached the building. He then heard INQ 441, the platoon commander, Corporal A and Private B shouting. He heard mention of a nail bomb. Corporal A was higher up on a windowsill.
Firing From Derelict Building
INQ 1919 heard firing and turned to see Private B on one knee in a firing position. He could also see Corporal A above him on a windowsill. Corporal A immediately claimed a “hit.” INQ 1919 then caught a glimpse of a young man on the ground in front of him. There were a couple of people bent over the body (presumably that of Damien Donaghy). INQ 1919 was aware some people picked up rubber bullets as souvenirs and occasionally sought to entice soldiers into firing them in acts of bravado.
INQ 1919
agreed soldiers were trained to fire at a person’s trunk to kill and that 50
yards was a short distance for rifle fire.
He said one hit in five shots was not poor marksmanship if one took into
account the effects of tear gas.
Later INQ 455
was placed in an ambulance and the rest of the platoon got into the pigs
(armoured vehicles) and made their way to the Rossville Flats. They were held in the back of the pigs for a while and then
taken out to cover the flats looking down on the vehicles. At this point INQ 1919 spoke to Privates R and T of motor
platoon. They said there were 3
dead bodies in the back of the pig they were guarding. INQ 1919 did not see any civilians with guns or hear any
explosions or gunfire at the Rossville Flats.
There was an
ammunition check before they pulled out of the Bogside.
Other Shooting
There was further shooting but INQ 1919 could not remember if he had told his platoon commander or Major Loden about this. He agreed it was possible he could be confused after 30 years and that the gunfire referred to in his statement as having occurred before soldiers A and B fired could have occurred later. He could not be specific about the location or nature of this gunfire.
Explosions
INQ 1919 agreed the soldiers around him at the time would have influenced his memory of events and that he would be likely to give them the benefit of doubt regarding their actions. He did not personally see any explosions or the target A and B fired at. He agreed he may have anticipated nail or blast bombs and interpreted the sound of baton rounds as explosions. A baton round fired within a building would sound louder than were it fired out in the open.
INQ 105
Lance Corporal, A Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Made Statement to Inquiry in
2000 [B1710] and a statement to the Royal Military Police in 1972 [B1706].
INQ 105’s Battalion were based at
Ballykelly and often patrolled the city of Derry.
He was familiar with rioting in the city which was a regular occurrence.
On 30 January 1972 INQ 105 was manning barrier 14 in William Street.
INQ 105 originally made a statement to
the Royal Military Police (RMP) on 4 February 1972.
He agreed this was likely to be more accurate, having been made 28 years
earlier, than his recent statement to the Inquiry.
INQ 105 saw the march approach and
estimated there were about 10,000 marchers.
The mood was not angry then but became so after the march passed.
Stewards tried very hard to disperse troublemakers but without success.
Missile throwing then followed. He
and other soldiers fired rubber bullets directly at the crowd to try to
get them to disperse. CS
Gas and a water cannon were also used.
INQ 105 did not recollect hearing any
gunfire before the Paras went in. Nor
did he remember anyone shouting a warning about snipers.
Paras
Go In
INQ 105 estimated there were about 100
people in front of barrier 14 when the Paras went in.
The crowd ran off straight away. He
did not know the Paras were in Derry until he saw about 30 go through barrier
14. No vehicles went in.
There was a brief period of calm when all he could hear was the army
helicopter overhead. However
shortly afterwards the shooting started. This
appeared to be coming from the direction of the Rossville Flats.
The shots were individual deliberate shots.
The firing lasted about 10 to 15 minutes. Then civilians approached the
barrier and swore at them saying the Paras had killed people.
Later ambulances arrived and were allowed through the barrier.
INQ 105 saw an army ambulance, a
modified land rover, with a paratrooper and a body inside.
The back door was open and as it passed the barrier INQ 105 could make
out a soldier who was a Para on the lower bunk and a covered body on top.
There was blood seeping through the cover.
INQ 131
Corporal, A Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
He made a statement to the Inquiry on 16 May 2000 [B1813] and a statement to the RMP on 4 February 1972 [B1809]
INQ 131 had been in Northern
Ireland since early 1970 and his battalion was
resident in Derry. He was manning a
barricade in Waterloo Street (barrier 15.)
He was acting platoon sergeant on 30 January 1972.
Another sergeant in the Royal Green
Jackets (RGJ), INQ 114, had given evidence to the Inquiry of an extremely
unusual order not to fire under any circumstances [see B1739-0001]. INQ 131 was not aware of any such order.
First Shots
INQ 131 heard “3 or 4 gunshots….
come from somewhere on the north side of William Street” near to Stevenson’s
bakery. He thought they were pistol
shots. INQ 131 denied these
could have been the five SLR shots fired by soldiers A and B from a derelict
building in William Street.
Paras Go In
INQ 131 saw paratroopers kitted out as
snatch squads in the vicinity of Waterloo Street, Waterloo Place and William
Street. After they went in he heard
the sound of more shooting. He
thought this was from a Thompson sub-machine gun or pistols however he could not
be sure how many guns were fired. He
then thought he heard an AK47 rifle. He
heard bursts of shooting that sounded like a gun fight.
This included SLR fire.
Father Daly and Jackie Duddy
INQ 131 then described an incident where
two teenage boys carried what he believed to be a tailor’s dummy and placed it
in front of the barrier. A man
dressed like a priest then knelt over the dummy and appeared to be praying.
INQ 131 believed this to be a charade.
He did not believe the man was a real priest.
He believed he and his men were being set up.
INQ 131 was shown photographs of people
carrying the body of Jackie Duddy towards the barrier and of Father Daly
kneeling over the body. INQ 131
insisted this was not what he had seen since there were too many people present
and he did not recognise the people. Eventually
however he conceded there were not two incidents of bodies lying in front of his
barrier and that having seen the photographs perhaps it had been a real body and
a real priest. He could not explain
why to this day he believed the incident was a charade when he had said in his
1972 statement “I looked more closely and saw it was a body.”
He denied his reluctance to accept what he saw was the dead body of a
young man indicated his mental attitude towards the situation in Derry.
“Soldier X”
INQ 131 denied being the soldier X who
was interviewed by a Praxis journalist in 1991.
The Inquiry had yet to identify soldier X but understood he was a member
of the RGJs who had a brother also in the RGJs and both were serving in Derry on
30 January 1972. INQ 131 confirmed
he and his brother were both serving with the RGJs in Derry on Bloody Sunday.
He was also at Magilligan on 22 January 1972 but could not recall if his
brother had been there. His brother
died in the early 1980s. Soldier X
had served in Aden, Malaya Europe and South America.
INQ 131 had served in Malaya, Germany, Norway and Central America but
never Aden. He had never been in
the Parachute Regiment. He left
Ireland in March or April 1972 and never returned.
He was on duty as part of the security for the Widgery Tribunal.
Soldier A
Corporal, Machine Gun Platoon, Support
Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Soldier A has made several
statements:
to the Inquiry
to the Widgery Tribunal
to Colonel Overbury
and to the RMP.
Soldier A had never been to Derry before
January 1972. He had been in Northern
Ireland for 22 months.
His only recollection of any briefing was that they were sent to
Londonderry as cover for a large march in case the IRA hijacked it.
They were to conduct an arrest operation if the march “became rowdy.”
Soldier A agreed it was possible the decision to deploy his platoon to the
derelict building was only taken on the morning of 30 January 1972.
Approaching the Derelict Building in William Street
Initially machine gun platoon parked up
by a church (the Presbyterian Church in Great James Street).
Getting into the derelict building was difficult because they had to
climb over walls and partly demolished buildings.
At one stage the radio operator, INQ 455, fell down a 6 foot drop and had
to be pulled back up. Soldier A
could not recall the level at which they had entered the building but he took up
a position on the first floor at a window overlooking William Street.
He thinks he was standing on a concrete floor. He can’t remember a ceiling and the roof was off.
First Shot
Although not recorded in his statement
to the RMP made on 31.1.03, Soldier A said he was aware of a shot being fired
near to the church before his platoon moved into position.
Nail Bombs
Soldier A had heard nail bombs before in
Belfast. The sound they made varied
according to the amount of explosive used.
He said he saw two objects that appeared to be nail bombs pass in front
of the window from right to left. He
also heard explosions. He could not
now remember, but accepted, if he had said in 1972 that baton rounds had been
fired by his platoon, then that must be accurate.
He did not think he could have confused the sound of baton rounds or CS
gas being fired for an explosion. He
shouted to the platoon “nail bombs.” The
rest of the platoon were below him on the ground floor. This was not a request for orders but a warning to others.
He did not check that anyone had reported the threat from nail bombs to
the rest of the company or Brigade.
Man Soldier A Shot
Soldier A then claimed to have seen a
man close to the corner of the Nook Bar strike a large match against the wall
and attempt to light what he believed to be a nail bomb.
The man had fair hair and was wearing a blue cardigan and a blue
windcheater. Soldier A said he
still had a picture of the incident in his mind when giving evidence to the
Inquiry. The man came from around
the corner and went back. He came
away again but within touching distance of the wall and then struck the match.
Soldier A said he saw a spluttering flame.
The man was alone.
Soldier A claimed the man brought his
hands together as if to light the nail bomb.
Soldier A took aim and fired missing the man. He did not see where the first shot landed.
He fired again and the man fell backwards to the ground.
He did not see where he hit the man.
He was shooting at the man’s trunk and shooting to kill.
He was not aware at the time that anyone else in the platoon had fired.
He later learnt Soldier B also fired at the same time.
Two people then dragged the man away.
He did not ‘claim a hit’ at that time but later told the platoon
commander. Soldier A was not aware of any gunfire directed at the
building in which he was positioned.
Shooting of Damien Donaghy
Soldier A was told a boy named Damien
Donaghy had been shot in the leg when moving to pick up a rubber bullet near to
the Nook Bar. This was very close
to the place where Soldier A claimed to have shot a nail bomber. Soldier A denied he could have shot Damien Donaghy mistaking
him for a nail bomber. He denied he
was panicked into firing. Soldier A
said the man he shot was alone but he did not specifically look for others
nearby. He claimed not to have seen
Damien Donaghy shot.
Shooting of John Johnston
Soldier A was told John Johnston, a 59
year old man, was also shot in roughly the same area immediately after Damien
Donaghy was shot. Mr. Johnston was
hit twice, once in the leg and again in the shoulder.
The shoulder wound may have been from a bullet that had ricocheted.
Soldier A said he was unaware of anyone else being hit.
He did not see and could not explain Mr. Johnston being shot.
Shot Toward Columbcille Court
A BBC camera crew and another witness had given evidence that a shot was fired from north of William Street toward a building where onlookers had taken Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Soldier A said he knew nothing of this shot.
Deployment from the Derelict Building
Soldier A could not recall how he and
the rest of his platoon got out of the building they were in. The next thing he recalled was being inside a pig near to the
Rossville Flats. He did not know if
they had been driven to the Rossville Flats or met the pigs after walking there
from their position in William Street. At
some point he identified himself to his platoon commander as having fired his
weapon but an ammunition check was probably not made until they returned to
camp. He could not recall but he
would have given an account of the shooting to his platoon commander and
possibly the company commander.
Statement to RMP on 31 January 1972 [B0001]
Soldier A made his first statement to
RMP Warrant Officer J. Wood at 1:00 am the next morning.
This was inaccurate in recording him as having fired from a position on
“waste ground to the south west of Tanners Row.” The reference to the man he shot being “in an alleyway
directly opposite my position” was also wrong, as was his description of
“moving over rooftops.” He did not know how he had timed moving from Great
James Street at 15:30 in the statement since he did not have access to the radio
log. Nor could he explain the
reference to Tanners’ Row since he did not know this road or have access to a
map. He was never in Tanners’ Row
or the waste ground to the south west of it.
Soldier A’s position and that of the
“bomber” marked on a map [B0003] attached to the statement were also
incorrect. Soldier A denied marking
these positions or ever having seen the map.
He denied collaborating with Soldier B to construct an agreed account
even though identical wording appeared in Soldier B’s statement regarding
moving over rooftops. He was with
Soldier B when waiting to give his statement to the RMP.
He could not explain why he had not said in the statement he was inside a
derelict building. He assumed the
reason the map attached to Soldier B’s statement had identical marks was
because it was the same map with the A changed to a B.
Statement to Colonel Overbury on 17 February 1972 [B0005]
Soldier A understood the reason for his
making a further statement to Colonel Overbury was to clarify matters in his
earlier statement. His second
statement refers to him being “in a courtyard behind a derelict building”
not inside a derelict building. He
could not explain this other than to say he and Colonel Overbury were “mixed
up.” Soldier A insisted he was
standing inside a derelict building. It
was put to him that the inference of his second statement was that he and others
in his platoon were in a vulnerable position.
It refers to soldiers being in a confined space, surrounded by high walls
on three sides but exposed to nail bombers in William Street by a low wall to
the east. No such location appeared
in any of the photographs available to the inquiry but a small white square
could be seen on one of the army maps. It
was suggested that Soldier A’s location had been invented to suggest greater
danger and therefore more legitimacy to his firing.
He agreed if in such a vulnerable position under attack from nail bombs
he would have a duty to shoot. He
denied his account was tailored by Soldier B or others.
Statement to Widgery Tribunal [B0009]
In a third statement made for the
purposes of the Widgery Tribunal Soldier A for the first time states he was in a
derelict building on William Street. He
could not explain why he had not said this in his previous statements.
In this statement he says he was on the first floor near a window.
He agreed he did not mention here, in his evidence to the Widgery
Tribunal or in his previous two statements hearing a shot near the Presbyterian
Church prior to being deployed from Great James Street.
However he insisted he was aware of a shot having been fired.
Firing another Soldier’s Rifle
Soldier A was certain he fired his own
rifle and not that belonging to INQ 624 as that soldier records.
He fired only two rounds. He
did not fire two weapons.
Shooting Rioters
Soldier A denied other regiments were
regarded as Aunt Sallies because they took abuse and rioting. He said the Paras would put up with such things if ordered to
do so. He denied shooting John
Johnston and Damien Donaghy in retaliation for rioting.
He did not accept he shot innocent people. However he accepted it was possible his first shot could have
hit someone other than the nail bomber he claimed to have shot.
INQ
1170
Rifleman, B Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Statement to Inquiry [C1170]
INQ 1170 had been stationed in
Londonderry for five or six months. On
30 January 1972 he was at barrier 14 in William Street behind two pigs.
He was a first aid man for other soldiers who might be injured at the
barrier.
He described the customary rioting and
missile throwing after the march went by and then the Paras being sent in
through the barrier. They were
operating as a snatch squad which he found surprising since his battalion would
often do this and he wondered why they were not used on this occasion.
He found it surprising the Paras were there at all.
He did not hear any gunfire before the Paras went in.
After the Paras Went In
The crowd of about 100 people scattered
as soon as the Paras went through the barrier.
About a minute later he heard a hollow noise like a short bark which he
took to be a pistol shot. The sound
was muffled by the surrounding buildings and he could not tell where it had come
from. He could not be certain that
it was a pistol. It could have been
an SLR shot. He then heard two or
three high velocity cracks from SLRs. There
was then further sporadic SLR fire lasting about 20 minutes.
He could not tell where the shots had come from.
He did not hear any explosions and could not recall any rubber bullets
being fired after the Paras went in.
At some point during the firing he
recalled seeing a paratrooper standing on a street corner ahead of him.
He was in William Street but INQ 1170 could not be sure exactly where.
He thought he was close to Quinn’s fish shop but it could have been the
corner of Chamberlain Street. He
saw the Para holding his SLR in a firing position and fire a single round away
from the direction of the barrier. He
saw the gun recoil but did not recall hearing the shot. INQ1170 thought the shot was fired in the direction of Little
James Street but was not entirely sure. It
was possible what he took to be recoil could just have been the Para pulling the
rifle sharply into his shoulder.
Later after he was stood down he became
aware that several people had been shot. His
first thought and that of others in his regiment was that the Paras “must have
gone overboard” for so many to have been shot.
INQ 1874
Private, Machine Gun Platoon, Support
Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Statement to Inquiry dated 7 March 2000 [C1874] and 23
August 2002 [C1874-0007]
INQ 1874 was unhappy with the wording of
some parts of his statement to the Inquiry.
He felt some it did not make sense or reflect how he is now or was in
1972.
The Derelict Building
INQ 1874 was deployed with others in his
platoon to a derelict building without windows or a roof. They had to climb over walls to get there and one soldier,
possibly INQ 455, was injured in a fall. They
were position on the ground floor looking down a wide street.
The whole platoon of 20 to 30 men was there.
He did not hear or see the march.
There were civilians throwing stones.
He also said he heard explosions and assumed people were throwing nail
bombs. He did not see any nail
bombs thrown. He did not know how
many were thrown. It could have
been as few as two. Had he seen
anyone throwing a nail bomb he would have shot them.
He also said there was gunfire directed
toward the building he was in. This
was high velocity and seemed to be passing overhead.
He felt vulnerable and under threat but did not panic.
None of his platoon was injured. He
also heard gunfire from within the building but did not see anyone firing.
It came from his side and slightly behind. He knew Soldiers A and B but could not recall B being in the
building. INQ 1874 did not see a
gun or anything that looked like a gun. He
did not fire his weapon. He did not
think rubber bullets were fired from within the building.
Soldier 120
Riflemen, A Company, 2nd
Battalion Royal Green Jackets
Statement to Inquiry dated 26 march 2000
[B1755] and to the RMP [B1753]
Soldier 120 could not specifically
remember 30 January 1972. His
regiment was based in Londonderry and riots occurred almost daily.
Intelligence Officer
Soldier 120 was at a barrier in Waterloo Street. At some point during the riot a civilian approached the barrier and flashed an identity card. He had an air of authority about him and Soldier 120 let him through the barrier. He assumed he was in intelligence or the RUC. He thought he was “one of us” as opposed to a rioter.
INQ 906
Corporal, 1 Company, 1st
Battalion Coldstream Guards.
Statement to Inquiry [C0906]
INQ 906 was on his second tour of duty in Northern Ireland. He was a sniper but on 30 January 1972 was carrying an ordinary SLR, not his sniper rifle. He did not recall being at a barrier. He thought he was in Lone Moor Road but since that was the road the march came up he agreed he must have been mistaken.
Explosions
and Gunfire
INQ 906 heard what he took to be rioting
after the march had passed his position. He
then thought he heard two explosions which he took to be nail bombs.
The sound came from the end of William Street/Strand Road area.
The explosions were about 30 seconds apart.
He agreed the sounds could have been volleys of rubber bullets being
fired but he believed they were nail bombs.
INQ 906 also said he heard automatic
fire about 30 seconds after the explosions.
This he believed to be from a machine gun or an armalite. He heard 6 to 8 rounds in a single burst.
Seconds later he heard a second burst of 5 or 6 rounds.
These were single shots in quick succession.
This he believed came from an armalite rifle.
From his training he believed he could identify the gunfire as 5.56 mm
ammunition.
30 to 40 seconds after this gunfire he
heard at least 20-25 rounds of SLR fire which he took to be the army returning
fire.
He did not report what he had heard
because he did not think it of any consequence.
Soldier 151
Rifleman, A Company, Royal Green Jackets
Statement to Inquiry on 17 July 2000 [B1921] and the
RMP in 1972 [B1919]
Soldier 151 could not recall any
briefing for 30 January 1972 but was aware there was to be a march. He was coming towards the end of his only tour of duty in
Northern Ireland and was familiar with rioting in Derry.
He was concerned about snipers because a number of men from the RGJs had
been killed in the weeks and months before.
He had some memory of being at the
Observation Post on the Embassy Ballroom but was certain he remembered being at
a barrier in William Street when the march approach.
He assumed therefore he was at the ballroom earlier and ordered down to
the barrier before the march got there. He
agreed it was possible he was in another observation post (OP) and that he had
assumed this was the one on top of the ballroom.
However he could not remember the OP referred to in his original
statement. He was not above
McCool’s Newsagent. He did recall
seeing the beginning of the march from above and believes this was from the
ballroom OP.
At the barrier the stewards could not
stop “yobbos” from attacking the barricade with missiles. There was a lot of stone throwing but he did not feel
threatened. He had been in a lot of
riots during his time in Londonderry. He
saw the Paras go in through the barrier. He was surprised because until then he did not know the Paras
were in Derry. They went in
as snatch squads and were followed by one or more vehicles. The crowd immediately ran off.
He did not recall hearing any shooting.
Later he was directed to go to
Butcher’s Gate on the city walls.
1972 Statement to the RMP
Soldier 151 made a statement to the RMP
in 1972 shortly after 30 January 1972. In
this statement Soldier 151 referred to hearing and seeing a nail bomb explode
from his position on top of the Embassy Ballroom.
He now believes this to be untrue and that he did not see or hear any
nail bombs at all on 30 January 1972. He
could not explain how the reference to a nail bomb came to be in his statement
but said “maybe the RMPs were putting words in my mouth.”
He described being intimidated and feeling uncomfortable at the RMP
interview. He did not know why he
had been chosen to be interviewed.
In answer to questioning Soldier 151
said: “bearing in mind a lot of people had been shot that day, I suppose I was
scared having to give evidence... by the time we had given this statement it was
known amongst us that … some people had been shot dead and it looked like an
accident … no firearms was found … I was scared of what I was going to
say.” He said it was possible the
RMP told him to say he heard a nail bomb. He
went on “they was looking for something to justify what happened later on that
day … I did not see any nail bomb being thrown … and I most certainly did
not see any shot fired … I was glad to get out of there.”
His statement recording him seeing a shot fired from Glenfada Park and
hit a building in William Street.
Soldier 151 explained that had he heard
a nail bomb whilst on the ballroom roof that would mean the riot had started
much earlier than it did. The
statement recorded the time as 12:30, three hours before the march arrived in
William Street. He had signed the
statement but did not believe he read it before doing so.
He did not agree the statement recorded what he had said at the time and
he had now forgotten. Answering
questions from Mr. Arthur Harvey QC Soldier 151 agreed his RMP statement was
made in the context of the army being damaged because of lack of evidence to
justify what the Paras did that day. He
said “we knew we had done something dreadfully wrong.”
INQ 754
Bombardier, 42 Battery, 22nd
Light Air Defence Regiment
Statement to Inquiry [C0754]
INQ 754 was on his first tour of duty in
Northern
Ireland. His
Battery were based in Londonderry in the Mex Garage and had responsibility for
the Craigavon Bridge.
Army Film Crew
On 30 January 1972 INQ 754 and another
soldier were ordered to accompany a two-man army film crew. They were just told to go with two men who had a cine camera
and to look after them. He could
not recall to which unit the men belonged.
INQ 754 could not remember where they
were operating but they were on about the third floor of a large derelict
building. The building may have
been on the south side of William Street. The
cine crew filmed the march from a window. The
march passed from left to right directly below the building.
Gunfire
INQ 754 says he heard gunfire which
seemed to come from directly behind his position.
It was high velocity fire and came in two bursts.
First a short burst followed by a more intense burst.
There were at least 10 to 20 shots in total.
He believed it to be an exchange of fire because the first burst appeared
to coming in his direction and the second away.
He saw the people below run.
After about an hour he considered it
safe to withdraw and escorted the film crew out of the building.
He did not remember where they were going but parted company with them at
the Embassy Ballroom.
Body in Car
INQ 754 then walked to the LADR compound
at the Craigavon Bridge. There he
met soldiers who told him there was a body with nail bombs strapped to it in a
car. He saw a Volkswagen Beetle
with a body of a young man slumped across the back seat.
He was obviously dead and had a bullet wound to his neck.
His jeans were pulled down to his knees and there were two nail bombs
strapped to his legs with masking tap.
INQ 754 was told the only thing roughly
fitting his description was the disputed evidence of a body (that of Gerald
Donaghy) in a Cortina. The RUC and
army claimed to have found four nail bombs in pockets.
INQ 754 insisted it was not a Cortina he saw and when shown a photograph
[C0745-0006] he denied that was the body he saw. He could not remember any of the other soldiers present or
any discussion he might have had with them.
Soldier 106
Guinness Force, Support Company, 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment
Statement to Inquiry [B1713] and to the
RMP in 1972
Soldier 106 was part of Guinness Force,
a platoon made up of the Head Quarters Company of the Parachute Regiment, i.e.
soldiers who also had other functions such as cocks, carpenters, clerks, etc.
They were trained like any other soldier.
There were about 35 men in the composite platoon.
Soldier 106 was a section commander with 4 or 5 men under his command. He did not recall any briefing before they were deployed on
the streets on Londonderry.
Deployment
Soldier 106 was with the rest of Support
Company in Great James Street close to the Presbyterian Church.
The pigs and 4 tonne lorries parked up and he remembered standing against
the wall of the church. Whilst they
were waiting sentries were posted next to the church on the small flat roof and
the 14 foot wall. They were the
only ones who could see William Street and the march.
Soldier 106 understood the original plan was to go over the wall into
William Street but on the day it was decided the drop the other side was too
great. He did not recall being told
he was part of an arrest operation. He
was just there as cover.
First Shot
Whilst waiting Soldier 106 heard a shot
hit the drain pipe on the church about 15 feet above him. The pipe shattered. He
was with Soldier K who had a sniper scope on his rifle.
Looking through the scope Soldier 106 said he saw 3 men on the roof of
the Rossville Flats, the direction from which the shot had come.
He did not see a weapon. The
shot could have come from another tall building.
Going In
Guinness Force were ordered into their
vehicles, 2 soft skinned 4 tonne lorries, at the same time as the rest of
Support Company. Before getting in
the vehicles Soldier 106 was briefed he and his men were to cover the left flank
when they deployed. They drove
through barrier 12 and debussed in Rossville Street.
There was firing going on when he got out and he immediately took up a
defensive position and orientated himself.
He and his men then moved across waste ground to the rear of houses
facing Chamberlain Street. They
then moved south along that line of houses toward the Rossville Flats car park.
At this time he heard a mixture of shots
which were hard to describe.
He saw soldiers near a pig helping
civilians into the back of the vehicle. He
did not see any soldier shooting. Eventually
when they were close to the Rossville Flats car park he received an order to
pull back. He returned to Kells
Walk where he could see soldiers assembling.
Whilst retreating he said he heard 2 or 3 shots from the Rossville Flats
go over his head. He could not say
how long the operation lasted. It
could have been 5-10 minutes, or longer, or shorter.
He did not recall the platoon having
been split into two groups and that he was in the group commanded by Captain SA
8.
Weapons and Ammunition Check
Weapons were made safe before they got
back in the vehicles. This was done
by removing the magazine, checking the chamber, replacing the magazine and
applying the safety catch. An
ammunition check would not have been done until back at camp.
Soldier 106 said he had no memory of a
debriefing by the platoon commander or Major Loden, the company commander.
He may have been debriefed by the company sergeant major.
He claimed not to have discussed who fired with any soldier and never to
have become aware of who fired at what.
He agreed whoever debriefed
the men who fired must have spoken to him to establish if he or any
men in his section had fired but he did not recall this.
He did not know how Major Loden came to write up accounts of who fired at
what and from where. He could not
recall the debriefing. He agreed he
did know Soldiers K and M but of whom admitting firing.
He was with K at the Presbyterian Church.
He did not think either M or K were in his section.
INQ 727
Gunner, 42 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence
Regiment
Statement to Inquiry [C0727]
INQ 727 was deployed with three others
in a derelict building on William Street
on 30 January 1972. He agreed this
was probably Harrison’s Garage which was opposite the derelict tyre factory.
INQ 727 said he heard 2 to 3 seconds of
automatic fire followed by high velocity fire.
He took the later to be the army returning fire.
At the time of the gunfire Williams Street was almost deserted at his
position. He thought the automatic
fire was coming towards him although not directed at his position.
He could not identify the weapon. The
high velocity fire was very soon after the automatic fire.
He was not aware there was a platoon of
Paras in a building about 80 yards to his left.
He did not recall hearing the 5 shots fired by Paras from machine gun
platoon. He could not say if what
he thought to be automatic fire was in fact Soldiers A and B firing
simultaneously.
He had not spoken to anyone from Channel 4 TV or any other journalist. He was not one of the soldiers feature in interviews broadcast in 1997.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
