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3 - 6 FEBRUARY 2003
Evidence heard
This
week the Inquiry heard from Lord Robert Armstrong, former Principal
Private Secretary to then Prime Minister Edward Heath and from the following
soldiers: INQ 7 (Captain -
Intelligence Officer 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 1803
(General Staff Officer Grade 3, Intelligence and Security 8th
Infantry Brigade HQ); INQ 221A (Captain 1st Battalion
Parachute Regiment); INQ 345 (Colour Sergeant - A Company 1 Para); INQ
462 (Coldstream Guards Battalion Intelligence Officer); INQ 133
(Second Lieutenant 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, 2 Company) and INQ
1997 (Gunner 22 Light Air Defence Regiment.)
A full transcript of the proceedings is
available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the
code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
1.
Soldier INQ7 – Captain 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Battalion
Intelligence Officer
INQ 7 had made a statement in 1972
[document B1295-0026] and one for the Inquiry on 15 March 2000 [B1282]
1.1
Magilligan Internment Camp 22 January 1972
INQ 7 was present at Magilligan
Internment Camp on 22 January 1972 with others from 1 Para.
INQ 7 could not recall what he was doing on 22 Jan 1972 nor did he recall
soldiers attacking marchers. He
denied using his baton to restrain soldiers as a photographer had alleged.
INQ 7 did not recall 1 Para C company
baton charging the crowd. When
shown a photograph of the charge [C1970-0005] he did not recall the charge
depicted. It was “certainly not
something I saw” but controlling stone throwing could be “untidy”
sometimes. He did not see the
events pictured in photograph C1970-0016 but commented that the soldiers
appeared to be “somewhat outnumbered.”
When asked if that justified soldiers wielding their rifles by the barrel
end as clubs as depicted he said it did not but “at least they are not firing
them”.
1.2
Bloody Sunday
1.2.1
Prior to 30 January 1972
Battalion
Orders Group Conference on 29 January 1972
INQ 7 was present at the Battalion
Orders Group Conference on 29 January 1972 at which the CO introduced the
proposed operation in outline, INQ 7 then dealt with topography and
intelligence. The reference to IRA use of army SLR rifles was based on incidents
of SLRs being stolen from soldiers which was why when on crowd control duties
soldiers had rifles tied to their wrists. INQ
7 had no recollection of any specific intelligence about any threat from the
NICRA march on 30 January 1972.
The possibility of shooting was not
referred to in INTSUM 101 (the weekly intelligence summary just before Bloody
Sunday) or discussed at the Battalion Orders Group.
However INQ 7 insisted there was a risk of gunfire and other INTSUMs
(Intelligence Summaries) referred to that capability. Shooting could take place at anytime and the noise of a March
was good cover.
Plan of Attack
INQ 7 marked on a plan of the city
streets arrows indicating the planned routes for deployment of Paratroopers of A
company, C company and Support Company [B1295-0027].
C Company were to go through barrier 14, down Chamberlain Street and
either up Eden Place or William Street. A
Company were to come down Lower Road and Williams Street to the east, Support
Company through barrier 12 down Little James Street.
There was also a platoon in a building on William Street.
They were not part of the original plan.
The waste area off Little James Street and Williams Street was the
planned arrest area.
Communications
The vehicle referred to as the GINPALACE
was the main Brigade communications Head Quarters.
There was also TAC HQ which replicated the main HQ communications, this
was smaller and further forward. The
GINPALACE was call sign Bravo Zero and had 2 C42 radios and a PYE radio.
1.2.2
The Day of the March
INQ 7’s role was to gather and
interpret information as it actually happened.
INQ 7 then reported to the CO and Battalion HQ.
His call sign was Bravo 93 and he had a C42 radio in his vehicle.
This was not connected to the Ulster Net.
Photographs
INQ 1970 was the Battalion photographer
on 30 Jan 1972. He did take
photographs but INQ 7 did not see these at the time, they were either taken to
Brigade HQ for processing or given to the Royal Military Police (RMP.)
INQ 7 may have seen the photographs sometime later but did not recall
what was in them. He did not know
what had happened to the 1000 or so photographs taken by the 10 army
photographers that day.
The First Shot
INQ 7 said he heard a high velocity
round strike the drain pipe to Presbyterian Church close to where he was
standing. It appeared to hit near
the roof and came from the Rossville flats area.
INQ 7 was in the vicinity of the church when that round was fired, not in
Little James Street. However
according to his 1972 statement he was in Little James Street from 15:45 hours.
He did not recall hearing 5 shots fired by soldiers from the Machine Gun
Platoon.
Order for
Paras to Go In
INQ 7’s only recollection of order for
Paras to go in was something on the Battalion net to move. He had no recollection of the BID150 order (serial 159 on
Brigade Log [W0000-0047] at 16.09) for “1 sub-unit of 1 Para. No running
battles” or the 16.10 message (on 1 Para log [W0000-0090] from “+” to
“9”) “move 3 now through K14, also C/S 1. No running battles.”
Nor did he recall any specific order for Support Company to go in through
barrier 12 although he did recall “chatter” on the Battalion Net about them
having difficulty getting through.
INQ 7 did not recall Support Company
going in in vehicles. INQ 7 did not
see their convoy go through barrier 12 because he did not get there until later.
He received an order to go to barrier 12 to find out what was happening.
He heard “a lot of chatter over Battalion Net” which now he could
only assume was the Support Group OC complaining about barriers not having been
moved.
Second Shot
INQ 7 said he was in Little James
Street, fairly close to barrier 12 when he heard a 2nd high velocity
shot. The soldiers of 22nd
Light Infantry were “alerted” by the shot.
The bullet went over their heads and behind them.
From the barrier he saw a vehicle ahead with its back doors open.
This was the pig (armoured vehicle) of the Officer Commanding Support
Company.
He could not explain why this shot was
referred to in his original 1972 statement as being “2 minutes before Support
Company moved in” when he claims not to have been at barrier 12 when they went
in, but still at the Presbyterian Church. It
was put to him he was lying but he insisted he was not and simply confused as to
his recollection. He said he did
not have his earlier statement when giving his statement in March 2000 to
Eversheds however it is referred to in paragraph 61 of that statement as being
attached.
INQ 7 was not conscious of hearing
Lieutenant N’s shots which hit a house in Chamberlain Street and he did not
believe these could have accounted for the second shot he heard near barrier 12.
Gun Battle
INQ 7 identified soldier 202 on photo
[B1295-0025] of the vehicle belonging to the commander of Support Group.
INQ 7 recalled hearing high and low velocity firing forward of the
armoured vehicle. INQ 7 agreed this
photograph depicted the scene when he approached the vehicle although there were
other people about out of shot. He
agreed no one in the photograph appears to be taking cover.
De-Briefing
INQ 7 did not recall a meeting of the
company commanders at 18:10 when a list of casualties, rounds fired and arrests
was made but such a meeting would have been necessary to give an account to
Brigade HQ. He did not take part in
gathering information on who had been shot.
He was not aware of Major Loden questioning soldiers but would have
expected it to have happened.
INQ 7’s 1972
Statement
INQ 7 believed he gave his 1972
statement to Captain Mike Jackson on 30 January 1972 even though it is typed and
has details such as a precise timing for the 2nd shot (“2 minutes
before Support Company went in.”) He
probably asked for sight of the communications log when making the statement to
get the timing. He was trying to do
lots of jobs at the time and was “quite knackered.”
It could have been typed up that evening. He did not mention the first shot at the church in this
statement. He said this might be
because there was so much going on, although he conceded very little was going
on at the church at the time of the shot; or that he just wanted to finish the
statement quickly because he had other things to do.
He did not report the shot to anyone
else when it happened, even though he was the Battalion Intelligence Officer and
it was, according to him, the first shot fired at soldiers. He did not check if anyone else had reported it.
However he denied it was a later fabrication and insisted he believed it
happened.
Risk of
Gunfire
Whilst there was no specific history of
the IRA using civil rights marches as cover to confront the army INQ 7 insisted
the possibility of shooting could not be discounted. The INTSUM of 25.1.72 did record a reduction in shooting
incidents but that did not mean they did not happen or would not happen in the
future. He agreed the INTSUMs did
not justify alarmism at the time but they did not preclude the possibility of
shooting. He was not aware of
intelligence suggesting the IRA would stay away from the march.
In answer to questions from Lord Saville
INQ 7 said there was an intelligence section to the operational order and that
that did not predict gunmen in the Rossville flats.
There was however always a risk of firing by snipers from high buildings
such as Rossville and the fact that it is not in one INTSUM does not mean there
was no risk. INQ 7 said they were
accustomed to receiving fire from a similar building, the Divis flats, in
Belfast.
Colonel
Wilford’s Briefing Notes
INQ 7 agreed with Mr. Macdonald QC that
the briefing Colonel Wilford’s notes [G0094-00562] appeared to suggest an
different operational plan to that described in INQ 7’s 2000 statement but it
was possible that plan was discussed on the ground that day with company
commanders communicating it by radio.
Discrepancies
INQ 7 accepted there was a contradiction between his earlier account of hearing the second shot when approaching barrier 12 “2 minutes before” the Paras went in and his current evidence of being at the Presbyterian Church when the Paras went in. His evidence that he was there when ordered by Colonel Wilford to move to barrier 12 and find out what was going on is further contradicted in his 1972 statement where he refers to having been in Little James Street for 25 minutes. He agreed the accounts were irreconcilable and suggested his 1972 statement might be incorrect. He insisted he was quite clear in his own mind there was a shot whilst he was at the church and another when near barrier 12.
It was put to him the one thing he was
anxious to stick to and to convey to the tribunal was that there were two shots
fired at the army. He insisted
there were two shots even though INQ 1326, commanding soldiers at barrier 12,
makes no reference to a shot or taking cover as he describes.
After Support
Company Moved In
INQ 7 said he had not mentioned shots in
the Rossville Street area after Support Company went in because it was not
necessary for him to record every sound of gunfire. If he had not recorded everything it was a failure of his
memory or recording. He agreed that
having spoken to Major Loden at the pig he must have asked what had happened and
the Major must have told him. However
he could not be certain he relayed the information to Colonel Wilford and could
not now remember what was said. This
despite the fact that Colonel Wilford had ordered him forward precisely to
report back what was going on. INQ
7 said Colonel Wilford might already have been advised by Major Loden.
INQ 7 said he became involved in dealing with arrestees even though he
had been told to report back to Colonel Wilford because the RMP were not there
to deal with them.
INQ 7 denied striking Father O’Keefe
who is pictured in B1295-0025 with INQ 7’s baton on his back.
He did not strike anyone with his baton that day and was not aware of any
soldier doing so.
The analogy in his statement referring
to the operation being like a series of punches was to enable it to be explained
simply to troops. He refers to a
left and right hook and a punch down Rossville Street. INQ 7 agreed this suggested Support Company were intended to
go down Rossville Street.
INQ 7
did not prepare an intelligence summary because the RMP and Captain Jackson were
already taking statements.
INQ 1970’s photographs were handed to
the RMP but INQ 7 did see them later. He
did not see any photographs showing gunmen or bombs.
The photographs would probably have been retained and filed as that was
usual practise. They should have
been return after the Widgery tribunal but INQ 7 had no recollection of them.
They may have been passed on to the relieving unit.
INQ 7 denied destroying the photographs.
The Next Day
INQ 7 had no recollection of driving around Derry the next day with INQ 1970. Having been shown contact prints of INQ 1970’s photographs taken from the city wall looking down over Rossville flats towards the Presbyterian Church INQ 7 still could not remember being there. However he conceded he may have gone up on the walls but he considered driving around to be “pretty foolhardy.” When put to him that he might have gone up on the walls to consider whether the shot at the church had come from soldiers on the wall he said: “That’s an interesting thought. You mean blue on blue contact. I had not though of it that way.”
2.
INQ 1803 General Staff Officer Grade 3
Intelligence
and Security at 8th Infantry Brigade HQ (GSO 3 Int.)
Statement to
Inquiry – document C1803
2.1
Intelligence
INQ
1803 was part of a small intelligence section comprising himself, a Warrant
Officer, and three or four Corporals from Army Intelligence Corps. The unit maintained intelligence records for the 8 Brigade
area and carried out security inspections.
INQ 1803 was in constant contact with
major units to circulate and receive intelligence.
He also discussed intelligence with the Brigade Major, Military
Intelligence Officers (MIOs) attached to the Royal Ulster Constabulary Special
Branch (RUC SB) and members of the RUC SB.
It was his role to write the Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs.)
If he had information but no time to wait for the weekly INTSUM it would
usually be conveyed by telex in the form of an Intelligence Report (INTREP.)
Although information was discussed verbally it was usually written down
at some stage.
The majority of intelligence came from
RUC SB. DCI Sam Donnelly was his
main contact. He had met the
Director of Intelligence (known to the Inquiry as “David”) but David was not
his contact for the Security Service. He
received weekly HQNI INTSUMs and would include information from these in his own
Brigade INTSUMs where appropriate.
INTSUM
101 [G0072-0045]
INQ 1803 wrote INTSUM 101 on 26 January 1972. He could not recall his source for writing “It is believed that all civil rights groups, whether IRA Goulding or Brady aligned, will combine to attempt to cause maximum embarrassment to the Security Forces.” The INTSUM was compiled from several sources including the Republican press, army patrols’ conversations with people but mostly from RUC contacts and arrestees.
INQ 1803 did not recall specifically
seeking intelligence on IRA plans but probably did ask RUC SB via DCI Donnelly
or the MIO. He did not ask the
Security Service because he had no direct link with them. To do so he would have to go through the intelligence staff
at HQ NI. Intelligence generally
went up the chain rather than down.
Signal
from DI NI to RUC SB [G0081-0511]
He could not recall seeing the signal
from the Director of Intelligence (DINI) to David Johnston head of RUC SB on 27
January 1972 but may well have seen it.
INTSUM
102 [G0108-0653]
INQ 1803 wrote INTSUM 102 on 2 February 1972 after Bloody Sunday. He said in paragraph 14 the “intelligence assessment made before the march was confirmed by events - …… the IRA took advantage of the situation to attack the troops using snipers and nail bombers.” Some of his wording was similar to that used in the DINI Signal but the signal did not predict the IRA using snipers and nail bombs. He could not recall where this had come from but believed this was intelligence available before Bloody Sunday.
When he wrote that the pessimistic predictions proved correct INQ 1803 was reflecting the perceived opinion in Brigade HQ. INTSUM 102 was collated from all sources not just his Intelligence Section. He had no recollection of any reference to Thompson sub-machine gunfire and probably would have included it in INTSUM 102 had he known of it. INQ 1803 denied that his conclusions in INTSUM 102 were unjustified given the more optimistic view which had prevailed before the march.
Colonel
Steel’s Operational Order of 28 January 1972 [B1315]
INQ 1803 could not remember his discussions with Colonel Steel but he would have been present. There were daily morning meetings where INQ 1803 passed information to Colonel Steel. He could not specifically recall the Coordinating Conference of 28 Jan 1972 but intelligence would have been discussed as part of setting the scene. He did not recall Colonel Wilford saying “What happens if there is shooting?” or Colonel Ferguson saying “will the Yellow card apply or some other rule?” The meeting was run by the Brigade Major and the Brigadier. He had no recollection of Colonel Wilford being particularly quiet at the conference. He did not recall a major arrest operation being an essential ingredient of the operation. He recalled simply a determination to prevent the march reaching the city centre.
INQ 1803 concurred with General
Steel’s evidence to the Inquiry [Day 0266-0076] that his understanding before
the march was that shooting was the last thing on anyone’s mind and that the
march would be low key. This
concurred with INQ 1803’s view of the discussion at the Coordinating
Conference. However he did not
agree there was any indication that the IRA would stay away, only a hope, which
he understood to be what General Steel meant.
Recce
with Colonel Wilford
INQ 1803 drove Colonel Wilford around
Londonderry and his role was to brief the Colonel as to the situation in Derry.
They did go to Aggro Corner but did not discuss the arrest plan so far as
he recalled. He recalled they did
go down William Street. There were just the two of them in a MoD mini.
They were both in uniform but wearing civilian jackets as disguise.
He assumed it was Colonel Wilford’s first visit to the area. The Colonel also flew over in a helicopter.
They did discuss using the Presbyterian Church as a holding area for some
units. They were together for about
one or two hours. He did not remember going up on the wall but may well have
done. They did not go further than
William Street into the Bogside Creggan area.
Army
Photography Operational Order for Bloody Sunday
INQ
1803 drafted an order [C1803-0043] concerning all army photographers under
Brigade control. INQ 1803 could not
remember seeing the photographs but they would normally have been available for
intelligence purposes. He has no
idea what happened to the photographs but suspects they fell within the
evidential umbrella of the Widgery Tribunal.
INQ 1803 agreed the order provided for film to be collected during the
day and that his staff may have done this.
Had there been any photos of prominent IRA people these might have stuck
in his mind but he did not recall seeing the photographs.
He did not have control of the photographs.
Intelligence
on those Arrested and Shot on Bloody Sunday
INQ 1803’s statement refers to
intelligence concerning those shot on 30 January 1972.
It states three of those shot had “minor records” on file.
INQ 1803 could not recall asking SB for information that night on those
shot but would have done so. He did
not know if he saw the SB reports written on 9 February 1972 [G0118B-0787.005]
or whether there had been earlier oral reports.
INQ
1803 could not comment on how a record concerning Hugh Leo Young,
arrested on Bloody Sunday, had changed. In
a statement to a DC McNulty Mr. Young described seeing a sniper at Pitt Street
in the evening however in INQ 1803’s version he is recorded as having seen a
fire fight between civilians and Paras earlier in the day.
INQ 1803 did not agree he knew by the
evening the victims were not IRA members.
He disagreed that alarm bells were ringing because innocent people had
been shot. He reported
they had traces on three victims. He
had some concern that they did not know the people shot and killed.
He denied being under pressure to exaggerate or fabricate evidence
against victims. The information
concerning civilians firing at the army would have come almost exclusively from
RUC SB. He believed the information
identifying arrestees as IRA volunteers [see G0108-0656] came from the RUC after
interviews.
3.
Lord Robert Armstrong
Former
Principle Private Secretary to Edward Heath PM
Lord
Armstrong was Edward Heath’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS) in 1972 and
would meet with the Prime Minister several times a day.
He saw all documents the PM saw including Cabinet minutes, Cabinet
Committee minutes and briefs of the Cabinet Secretary.
The PPS is the channel of communication between the PM and ministerial
colleagues.
Letter
of 30 September 1971
Lord Armstrong drafted a letter for the
PM on 30 September 1971 requesting a “full military appreciation of the
security situation in Northern Ireland, including an assessment of what measures
the army would propose, if they were instructed to bring terrorism to an end at
the earliest possible moment, without regard to the inconveniences for the
civilian population……” Lord Armstrong was not aware of the army ever being
instructed to carry out such a policy.
Lord
Armstrong denied, “inconveniences to the civilian population” was a
euphemism for military measures leading to deaths.
He agreed a factor in determining military action was the impact on
Catholic opinion. One of the
reasons for not going into the Bogside and Creggan at the time was to defuse the
situation and facilitate a possible political initiative.
GEN 47 Meeting
27 January 1972
Lord Armstrong was present at the GEN 47 Cabinet sub committee meeting at which the NICRA march was discussed. He did not recall any discussion of a possible shooting war and, although there had been confrontation in the past, understood from the tenor of the meeting that the march on 30 January would be a peaceful event. By “confrontation in the past” Lord Armstrong did not mean gun battles. He was not aware of any briefing to the PM by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) other than at the GEN 47. Nothing at the meeting led him to believe lethal force might be used. News of what happened came as a shock.
Lord Armstrong could not remember if he
knew of the problems with the Parachute Regiment at Magilligan on 22 January
1972 but since these were referred to in the briefing for the GEN 47 meeting
[GA0075CA-0462.005.4] he and the PM would have read about them.
Any action against the Paras was a question for army discipline not the
PM. The deployment of particular
units was also a question for army commanders.
The Under Secretary of State for Defence may have been aware of the
decision to deploy the Paras on Bloody Sunday [see KJ0003-0002] but Lord
Armstrong was not and he did not believe the PM knew in advance.
Lord
Armstrong had been told of a remark by Lord Hailsham that “those who resisted
the armed forces were enemies of the Queen” but did not know the
occasion when it was said. He
believed he had been told about it by the PM.
He was also aware Lord Hailsham had suggested at the GEN 47 that soldiers
were legally entitled to shoot anyone who obstructed them irrespective as to
whether or not they posed an immediate threat, but he did not think anyone had
taken the comment seriously.
Lord
Armstrong was not aware of the “private meeting” between the PM and Lord
Carver, CGS, referred to by Lord Carver in a letter dated 1 August 1996 [KH
0004-0026]. Lord Carver said the PM
had repeated Hailsham’s remark causing him to assert he did not agree and that
he was bound by his own judgement as to what constituted lawful use of force and
not the Lord Chancellor’s view. Lord
Armstrong was not aware of any instruction to the army to shoot enemies of the
Queen. He had not seen the July
1994 Channel Four documentary entitled Britain’s Last Colony but
commented that the significance of Lord Hailsham’s remarks was exaggerated in
Lord Carver’s interview with Martin Dillon [transcript X1-0033-0011].
It was not practice to exclude matters from minutes which might be
embarrassing. The fact that Lord
Hailsham’s remarks do not appear in any documents may simply be because they
were a joke or made at meetings that were not minuted.
Joint Security
Committee Meeting on 27 January 1972
The minutes of JSC meeting in Northern
Ireland [G0076-0465] recorded that the march on 30 January might escalate into a
shooting war. Lord Armstrong had
not seen these minutes and did not believe the PM had seen them. No reference had been made at the GEN 47 meeting, the same
day, to the possibility of a shooting war.
Lord Armstrong could not comment as to whether the PM should have been
advised if this was the view of the Chief of the General Staff.
It was a matter for the army how they briefed the PM.
Lord Carver may not have considered a shooting war very likely.
PM’s
Meeting with Brian Fualkner on 27 January 1972
Lord Armstrong drafted a note
[G0081-0507] of the PM’s meeting with Northern Ireland PM Brian Faulkner which
took place on the evening of 27 January 1972.
He believed the meeting focused on the possibility for a political
initiative to end the crisis.
Lord Armstrong confirmed the British
Government had reluctantly agreed to internment at the request of Mr. Faulkner
and that it had made a ban on marches a condition of its agreement.
PM’s Telex
from Chequers on 28 January 1972 [OS0004-0194]
Lord Armstrong had not seen the telegram
the PM had sent from Chequers on Friday 28 January but he agreed it did indicate
the PM had had a discussion about Northern Ireland with Sir Burke Trend
that Friday. The telex talked of
bringing back the British Ambassador in Dublin, John Beck, and the
Government’s representative in Northern Ireland, Howard Smith. Lord Armstrong presumed the reason for recalling
representatives was to discuss the scope for a political initiative. This was how he interpreted “a rapidly developing situation
both north and south of the border.” He did not agree the situation in Derry
was a threat to such developments.
GEN 47 Meeting
31 January 1972
This
meeting discussed setting up an inquiry into Bloody Sunday under the 1921 Act
and the Lord Chancellor was tasked to find a very senior judge who might lead
it. The meeting met first at 11:30
am then again later at 5:15 pm therefore Lord Widgery could not have been
approach before about 5:30 pm. The
PM did not ask Lord Carver why he had not been told the Paras were going to be
used, he was more concerned with speaking to the Irish PM and dealing with what
was to be done. Lord Armstrong took
Lord Carver’s comment in his statement that “he was relieved there were so
few casualties” to mean he was relived so few died not that he had been
expecting a gun battle.
Meeting
between Lord Widgery, Edward Heath PM and the Lord Chancellor
The
meeting occurred at 7:20 pm on Monday 31 January 1972 and Lord Armstrong made
notes [G0105-0636]. He believed the
PM reminded Lord Widgery that they were fighting both a military and propaganda
war in Northern Ireland because the Lord Chief Justice (LCJ) may have been
unfamiliar with the situation in Northern Ireland.
It was not intended to influence the outcome of the inquiry.
The army would have an interest in clearing its name but there was no
attempt to tell Widgery what to find. Lord
Armstrong saw nothing inappropriate in the meeting.
The LCJ would not have allowed anyone to ‘mark his card.’
Lord Armstrong knew the LCJ and was impressed with his determination to
maintain judicial independence. Lord
Armstrong could not say if a finding that soldiers had committed murder would
damage army morale.
Action Taken
Against Soldiers
Lord
Armstrong was not aware of any action taken against any soldiers after Bloody
Sunday. The Widgery Tribunal had
been set up to establish truth and what should be done. He had not enquired as to what happened to Soldier H or
Colonel Wilford, both criticised by Widgery.
It was a matter for military discipline and possibly the Secretary of
State for Defence. The failure to
enquire did not mean the government condoned what happened.
4.
INQ 221A
Major 1st
Battalion Parachute Regiment.
Statement to
Inquiry dated 17 March 2000 [B2168-0001].
In 1971 INQ 221A was a Captain but
appointed to the temporary rank of Major and took command of C Company.
4.1
Magilligan Internment Camp 22 January 1972
INQ 221A was in command of C Company at
Magilligan on 22 January 1972. That
day the company were reserve for the Royal Green Jackets (RGJ) and under command
of the RGJ CO Lieutenant Colonel Welsh. The
plan was to permit a demonstration at the point where marchers de-bussed but to
prevent them from crossing a barbed wire fence on the beach.
He and his men were in the sand dunes about 150 metres from the wire.
The RGJs were further forward at the wire. The Paratroopers were ordered forward when the marchers moved
down the beach passed the RGJs. INQ
221A stayed with his command vehicle at the sand dunes to maintain communication
with Brigade. He was too far away
to see the detail of what happened.
He could not recall a baton charge but understood it had taken place. He referred in his statement to “malicious allegations” being made about the conduct of his men that day and by this he meant a suggestion that two of his soldiers had kicked a man lying on the beach. He had been summonsed to see a senior General at HQ Northern Ireland where he had been shown a video of television coverage. He told the General, who may or may not have been General Ford, that the soldiers concerned were not Paras because they appeared to be wearing DPM (Deformed Pattern Material) trousers which his men had not worn. He was never informed of the outcome of the inquiry. In evidence, having been shown the video of Magilligan, INQ 221A commented that he did not believe his men wore visors on their helmets and this was a further indication the men kicking the man on the ground were not from 1 Para. However having then been shown the video of Bloody Sunday where men of his Company were clearly wearing visors he accepted there was a likelihood that they could have been his men.
INQ 221A was of the view that the Paras
always abided by the rules of minimum force and he had no memory of any incident
of brutality involving them. He
subsequently met at Sandhurst Captain INQ 573 but was not aware he had been
present at Magilligan. He could not
comment on INQ 573’s description of events at Magilligan where he referred to
“an awful lot of unnecessary violence by the Paras” since he was at the sand
dunes and could not see. He was not
aware of any complaints at all that day and INQ 573’s description of a
Regimental inquiry into the incident was the first he had heard of it.
Colonel Wilford had given evidence to the Widgery Tribunal of an inquiry he had conducted into Magilligan. When told of this INQ 221A accepted that must have happened and that he would have been involved in it but he had no recollection. He agreed the use of rifle butts as clubs was not appropriate and that the soldier pictured holding his rifle in this way (in C1970-0015 taken by Parachute Battalion Photographer INQ 1970) was a member of his company. However he had never seen the photograph before and the matter had never been brought to his attention. He stood by his description of the Paras (in paragraph 33 of his statement) as being “well regarded by all sectors of the community for our professionalism and impartiality.”
INQ 221A agreed the firing of baton
rounds at point blank range, as could be seen on the video, was not acceptable
and that use of baton rounds was not appropriate on a beach since they are
supposed o be fired into the ground and spring up.
4.2
Bloody Sunday
Battalion
Orders Group Briefing
INQ 221A
agreed the reference in Colonel Wilford’s notes [ED 0049-0005] to arresting
the maximum number of rioters accorded with his recollection of the instructions
in advance of Bloody Sunday. His
recollection was that at that time normal arrest procedure would not include
telling a person why they were being arrested or under what power.
C
Company Briefing
INQ 221A did
not recall briefing the company as a whole on this occasion but may have done
so. He could not recall details of
his briefing to his men but if as INQ 1799 recalled it was a “heavy weight
briefing” it may have been because of what had happened the week before at
Magilligan.
Shots
Fired Before the Paras Went in
Whilst
at the Foyle College car park INQ 221A recalled hearing a report over the radio
that shots had been fired at the army. This
must have been reported over the Battalion Net because he did not have access to
the Brigade Net and since the shots were not fired at his Company it would not
have been on the Company Net. He
would have expected the report to be recorded on the Brigade log and probably
the log of the unit shot at.
Deployment of
Paras
INQ 221A could not recall the order to deploy but believes it was his decision to go in on foot. He thought the order to deploy probably came over the Battalion Net whilst they were in Waterloo Place. He recalled a final order over the radio: “Call sign 3, move now through barrier 14” and also hearing “Call sign 5 move now into area through barrier 12.” He could not recall any order in respect of A Company. He said he did not recall an order not to conduct running battles and this was not an expression he would understand. He assumed the reference on the Para Battalion radio Log [W0090] to “no running battles” was probably shorthand for the Log.
INQ 221A agreed his recollection was that no petrol or nail bombs had been thrown in the vicinity of barrier 14 before his Company was deployed. He claimed the RGJ officer commanding barrier 14 was reluctant to open the barrier, to allow him to deploy vehicles, because this meant exposing his men to “the ferocity of the rioters.” This caused some delay to C Company’s deployment and eventually they jumped over the barrier. However in a brief statement he made in 1972 [B2166] he records the decision to go in on foot as having been made at 15:45 hours, 25 minutes before the order to go in at 16:10. INQ 221A still maintain he had argued with the RGJ officer because he wanted his men deployed tactically rather than in single file.
After
Deployment of Paras
INQ 221A sent one platoon of his men to
chase and disperse rioters west along William Street and south into Chamberlain
Street. He did not see Father Daly,
as pictured on the BBC video, waving a bloodied handkerchief escorting people
carrying the body of Jackie Duddy up Chamberlain Street.
INQ 221A moved west from Chamberlain Street down Eden Place onto the
waste ground to make contact with Support Company.
At the waste ground INQ 221A was
surprised to see members of Support Company in defensive positions and
established from someone in their motor platoon that they had come under fire
from the Rossville Flats. He
therefore ordered his men to remain in the area of Chamberlain Street, High
Street and Harvey Street.
Gunfire
INQ 221A wished to amend his statement
made for the Inquiry to delete any reference to hearing shots fired.
Paragraph 30 of his statement reflected the contents of his 1972
statement which was correct to the best of his knowledge at that time however he
could not now recall any shooting. In
answer to a question about his reference to low velocity handgun shooting, which
did not appear in the 1972 statement, INQ 221A said “regrettably these words
were put into my mouth when this statement was formulated.
… I am not happy with that particular paragraph.”
Lieutenant N
firing into Eden Place
INQ 221A knew Lieutenant N, who was commanding the motor platoon, but did not recall having seen him on the waste ground. Lieutenant N’s evidence was that he fired three rounds over the heads of the crowd approaching the waste ground down Eden Place, i.e. the direction from which INQ 221A had come. INQ 221A said he was not there when that happened.
Sightings of
Gunmen
INQ 221A could not recall debriefing his
men but presumes he would have done so. None
of his men were involved in any shooting. No
sightings of gunmen were reported to him and they should have been had his men
seen any. He had no knowledge of
INQ 1799’s account [C1799] of seeing a civilian in the crowd pointing a hand
gun at him or of having heard automatic fire from a Thompson machine gun.
INQ 1799 also refers to having been with INQ 221A on the waste ground
when he heard gunfire from Rossville Flats and sighted a gunman with an M1
carbine. He took aim but was told
not to shoot by INQ 221A. INQ 221A
had no recollection of the incident or being with INQ 1799 but said it may well
have happened and he had forgotten about it.
He personally may not have seen the gunman but agreed the sighting of a
gunmen was very important and should have been reported to him.
Arrests
by C Company
INQ
221A records his men made 22 arrests although he did not witness the actual
arrests. He was not aware that his
Company was recorded as having only arrested13 people, these all in one incident
by only three soldiers. He did not
know that these people were arrested in a house in Chamberlain Street where
injured people were being sheltered. He
was not aware of a complaint [JB0012-0001] by George Nelis, one of those
arrested, to the effect that INQ 12, a private in C Company, had threatened to
shoot him and boasted of having shot four people in Belfast.
Widgery
Tribunal
INQ
221A did not recall ever having seen the version of his 1972 statement entitled
“Notes by o/c C Company 1 Para” in which the diary of operations had been
deleted. He did not know how this
document had come to be produced or Annexed to a report dated 5 February 1972
[CO0001-0112] prepared by Colonel Overbury.
He did not recall any discussion as to whether he should give evidence to
the Widgery Tribunal. He left the
Battalion in February 1972 to take up a position at Sandhurst.
5.
INQ 345
Colour
Sergeant with A Company 1 Para
Statement to
the Inquiry [C0345]
The
Colour Sergeants role was to furnish supplies, particularly tea.
INQ 345 did not have a radio, the Company would know where he was
stationed and come to him for supplies.
Location
INQ 345 was unable to identify where he was stationed on any map but it was close to a barrier with a pig parked behind it to the left. The barrier was manned by artillery soldiers possibly of the Light Air Defence Regiment (LADR.) His Company were stationed around a corner to his left and he could not see them. He was with the Colour Sergeant of C Company and the Quarter Master. He recalled seeing the march go past and then “yobbos” starting to throw stones and bricks. He did not recall any petrol or nail bombs. Nor did he remember the army firing plastic bullets or CS gas. In fact he was “peeved” at the failure of the artillery soldiers to respond to the rioting.
When shown the locations of the two
barriers (12 and 13) manned by the LADR INQ 345 said he was not at either of
those locations. In fact he was
unable to agree with any of the suggested locations identified to him by counsel
or the Tribunal.
Before the
Paras went in
INQ 345 said he heard a sharp crack which he took to be a high velocity round. It hit the brick wall behind him and to his right. It seemed to have come from somewhere back behind the march. A second high velocity shot came a minute later. This was lower and seemed to fly down the middle of the road. At this point INQ 345 saw his commanding officer (CO) “going completely mad … shouting into a radio.” The only words he could recall were “this is the third time I’ve asked him.” He assumed this meant the third time he requested permission for the Paras to go in. He thought this was Colonel Wilford. There was another officer, probably a captain, present who INQ 345 believed to be from 1 Para Intelligence. He did not know if any order was received but remembers the CO still very agitated and then Paras running past him toward the barrier. He believed these men were from Support Company.
After the
Paras went in
INQ 345 saw the Paras chase the rioters who ran off in the direction from which the parade had come. Then some vehicles, possibly four, followed through the barrier. He returned to his land rover further from the barrier. There he heard a couple of explosions come from his right. He did hear the odd shot but “basically everything went very quite and flat.” He did not know what happened. Each soldier had an SLR rifle and two magazines each containing twenty rounds. It was the platoon sergeant’s responsibility to check ammunition in and out. INQ 345 was aware it was possible to get extra ammunition but he did not believe any in his Company had any.
6.
INQ 462
Coldstream
Guards Battalion Intelligence Officer
INQ
462 was part of an Intelligence Section of about 4 or 5 men.
They gathered intelligence and liased with other intelligence units.
They did not run agents but did receive information through contacts in
Derry and elsewhere. They also
produced nightly and weekly intelligence reports.
INQ
462 was on duty in uniform on Bloody Sunday and was tasked to photograph members
of the crowd. He was ordered to be
in uniform; he usually operated in plain clothes, and he suspected this was for
his own safety. He did take
photographs but never saw them or even knew if they came out.
The film was sent to Brigade HQ.
INQ 462 said his time in Northern Ireland was “part of my life that I have tried to forget.” He could not recall the names of IRA members he knew at the time, although Martin McGuiness was known to him. He could not recall having much to report after Bloody Sunday. He described the IRA at the time as having “an awful lot of loose cannons” but could not recall anyone specifically to whom this applied.
7.
INQ 133
Second
Lieutenant 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, 2 Company.
Statement to
the Inquiry on 7 February 2000 [C0133]
INQ 133 was the commander of 6 platoon.
Orders and
Briefings
A Battalion warning order was probably
received on the Thursday 27 January 1972. He was aware of considerable concern
about the Bloody Sunday march and potential mass civil disobedience.
He said, “there was a good deal of concern that matters should be
handled in such a way as to avoid a violent confrontation.”
It was expected that the march would be very large.
A more detailed briefing given by the Company Commander UNK 282 would have occurred on the Saturday or Sunday morning. The plan was to stop the march reaching the city centre and to contain it within the Bogside. The Battalion was familiar with the area and the Rossville Flats were a source of danger since they provided good cover for snipers. However INQ 133 did not think the IRA were expected to be on the march.
INQ 133 expected the majority of
marchers to be peaceful but for there to be a hooligan element. He believed the briefing included a plan for snatch squads to
arrest ringleaders. Snatch squads
had been operated in various ways but generally unsuccessfully and by the time
of Bloody Sunday they were decreasing due to their lack of success and the
dangers involved.
There was some resentment at the use of the Parachute Regiment since they unjustifiably considered other battalions to be too soft. INQ 133 thinks he was told there would be a platoon of Paras behind his barrier but only to make up numbers or as part of a Brigade Plan in the event of “serious drama.”
Before the
Paras Went In
INQ 133’s platoon erected a barrier
(9) in Francis Street out of range of stone throwing from the march route in
William Street. He drew a diagram
[C0133-0008] of the area as part of the briefing to his platoon. The Paras were about 50 yards behind the barrier.
INQ 133 recalled a conversation with the Para officer in command about
how quickly the barrier could be moved if they were to go through.
He was not expecting them to go in but it may have been part of a
contingency plan.
The march past from right to left in
William Street. Later he heard the
sounds of rioting, missiles being thrown, plastic bullets and CS gas being
fired. It was all quite customary
and no cause for concern. He also
heard low velocity shots and blast bombs. His
radio operator then told him the observation post on the city wall had come
under fire. Later he heard a
Thompson sub-machine fire two short bursts.
He believed the first shots were low velocity but could not say where they came from. He was not certain as to the chronology but believed the rioting preceded the first shots. He did not think he had confused the sound of rubber bullets or CS gas being fired for blast bombs. He did not know if gas grenades, as opposed to gas canisters, exploded. The Thompson firing was later, probably after the Paras went in. His memory of specific incidents was blurred and he was recalling what he heard and the opinions or conversations around him. The height of activity was around the time the Paras went in. The low velocity shots and blasts were before he heard SLR firing. When he heard SLR firing he was pleased “our boys were fighting back.” The SLR firing was enough to make him think, “somebody was being given a fairly hard time.”
Later as the march dispersed he recalled being confronted by a priest who screamed they were “murdering bastards” and that they had shot twenty-four people. This was not Father Daly. None of his men fired any shots or plastic bullets that day.
8.
INQ 1997
Gunner
22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Statement
to Inquiry [C1997]
INQ
1997 was briefed that his section were to man a barrier.
H did not know or concern himself with other operational details.
The barrier was in Sackville Street (barrier 13) which they approached
from the LADR base in the Strand. There
were two pigs at the barrier.
Rioting
and Gunfire
INQ
1997 described the crowd as angry and aggressive from the outset.
Once the missile throwing started he and the others at the barrier took
cover behind the open doors of the pigs. He
did not recall any nail or petrol bombs being thrown.
At some point, he could not recall when, INQ 1997 heard a pistol shot
come from the back of the crowd. He
believed the crowd moved, separating and ducking, before the shot was fired as
if someone had told them to do so. He
did not see a gunman. Shortly
afterwards he heard a high velocity shot, although not SLR, from about the same
position behind the march.
INQ
1997 revised his estimate of distance from which the gunfire had come from
800-1000 yards in his statement to only 300-500 yards.
He conceded even this may be wrong because it was very hard to judge
distance. However the shots came
from the rear of the crowd. The
second shot hit a brick wall behind the barrier to his left.
Soldier Z returned fire with a single shot.
INQ 1997 did not see a gunman and never discussed with Soldier Z who he
had shot at. When told Soldier
Z’s evidence was that he fired much later, 16:50 hours according to the log
(i.e. 40 minutes after the Paras went in,) INQ 1997 said it was very difficult
to judge the time lapse between the shots he heard.
It was thirty years ago. He
had made no statement at the time. He
did not recall rubber bullets or CS gas being fired.
Paras
Going In
INQ
1997 they were ordered to dismantle the barrier and several pigs then drove down
Sackville Street and turned left (south). Some
men may also have gone in on foot. He
did not know who was in the pigs. Only
later did he know it was the Paras. INQ 1997 was sure he was at barrier 13 in Sackville Street
even though Major INQ 1326 said the Paras went through barrier 12 in Little
James Street.
As
the pigs went in the crowd scattered. He
then advanced with others but they were called back to the barrier.
He then heard shots of different calibres but could not say what they
were or where they came from. There
were low velocity pistol shots and high velocity shots.
There may have been automatic fire.
In his statement INQ 1997 said he heard 5- 10 shots at this time but said
in evidence “if the truth be told you could add a zero to that estimate.”
That
Night
Later
INQ 1997 was sent out with about 4 others on patrol. He did not know what had happened earlier but heard rumours
people had been shot. The
atmosphere was very tense and there were very few people around. He was instructed to stop and question anyone coming out of
the Bogside. He did stop a man who
was abusive but INQ 1997 said “it was understandable really.”
The man took a swing at him and was arrested.
He was taken to Strand Road Police Station and later received a six month
prison sentence.
He
said it was a dreadful day that he will always remember.
Summary
of Evidence this week
Monday 3rd February 2003 –
INQ 7
Tuesday 4th February 2003 -
INQ 1803
Wednesday 5th February 2003 -
Lord Armstrong and INQ 221A
Thursday
6 February 2003 – INQ 345, INQ 462, INQ 133 and INQ 1997
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
