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27 - 29 JANUARY 2003
Evidence heard
The week saw the culmination of Edward Heath’s testimony before the Inquiry, heard over the course
of Weeks 78 to 80, a summary of which is provided below.
The Tribunal also heard the evidence of three military witnesses, INQ10,
INQ22 and INQ2.
OTHER ISSUES
The Tribunal had been led to believe that all relevant
official documents and notes relating to the GEN 47 Cabinet committee (the
committee responsible for Northern Ireland) had been disclosed to it.
However, contrary to information previously given to the Tribunal, it
emerged that manuscript notes taken by Burke Trend during the course of these
meetings held in the lead up to Bloody Sunday were in existence and contained
some details not recorded in the typed notes previously supplied to the
Tribunal. Copies of these notes
were provided to the various legal teams on 21st January, the fourth
day of Mr Heath’s evidence.
The Tribunal did not sit on Thursday, to mark the 31st
anniversary of Bloody Sunday.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1.
edward heath’s evidence
Ted Heath (now Sir Edward), the Conservative British Prime
Minister at the time of Bloody Sunday, gave evidence to the Tribunal over the
course of nine days. His testimony
led to some heated exchanges on the floor, involving him, Counsel for the
families and wounded and Lord Saville.
Throughout his questioning by legal representatives for the
families and wounded, the former Prime Minister refused to answer in excess of
50 questions, on the basis that they were “imaginary”, “irrelevant”,
“disgraceful”, “silly”, “madness” or, most commonly
“hypothetical”, appearing to prefer to answer questions rephrased by Lord
Saville than those asked to him directly by Counsel for the families.
On only one occasion, on his sixth day of evidence, did Lord Saville
interject, requiring him to provide an answer to a question asked.
On other occasions, Lord Saville variously either “rightly or
wrongly” (Lord Saville’s words) allowed Mr Heath to refuse to respond, often
rebuking Mr Lavery for the nature or style of his questioning, rephrased Mr
Lavery’s questions in a manner the latter described as “unfair” or
“grossly oversimplified”, or indeed on one occasion, answered a question
himself on the former Prime Minister’s behalf.
Mr Lavery raised his disquiet with the Chairman regarding
the “latitude” given to Mr Heath in his refusal to answer questions, the
“insulting” and “offensive” way in which he had been treated by the
witness, resulting in no rebuke from the bench and, conversely, the unfair
manner in which he felt he himself had been reprimanded by Lord Saville.
1.1
questions on behalf of the tribunal
1.1.1
The
‘Queen’s enemies’
Mr Heath was asked about a policy proposed by Lord Hailsham,
the then Lord Chancellor, some time before Bloody Sunday advocating that
soldiers in Northern Ireland should be allowed to shoot anyone who obstructed
them or got in their way on the basis that they were therefore the ‘Queen’s
enemies’, regardless of whether or not they were posing an actual threat.
The proposed policy in question was first brought to light in a
television interview with General Carver, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).
It was the CGS’s later testimony that Mr Heath had subsequently put the
suggestion to him in a private meeting, but that he had refused to implement it,
given its illegality.
Mr Heath recalled the Lord Chancellor making the
suggestion, but dismissed it as a “Quintin-like outburst” of which nobody
had taken any notice. He claimed to
have no recollection of having put the suggestion to General Carver and was
adamant that his Government’s policy was one of minimum force in Northern
Ireland and that he would not have advocated or supported any unlawful action.
He also maintained that soldiers on the streets in Northern Ireland had
never been led to understand that they could proceed along the lines of Lord
Hailsham’s suggestion.
1.1.2
Ban
on marches
The initial ban on marches in Northern Ireland was
introduced in August 1971 as a ‘quid pro quo’ for internment without trial
and was directed primarily against unionist marches: Westminster agreed to Brian Faulkner’s (Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland) request to introduce internment, contrary to military opinion,
in order to save the Northern Ireland Government and prevent Direct Rule from
Westminster, but in return mandated that Faulkner impose a ban on marches “so
as to ease the strain on the Security Forces”.
However, having been totally against a ban on marches in
August, Brian Faulkner was very much in favour of its renewal in early 1972 (the
key marches in question now being NICRA marches) and, according to Mr Heath,
took steps to renew it without prior consultation with Westminster, a step Mr
Heath described as “interesting and impressive”.
1.1.3
Shooting unarmed rioters
Mr Heath told the Tribunal that he had not seen General
Ford’s memo of January 1972 in which he wrote that he was “coming to the
conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and
order is to shoot selected ringleaders of the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans) after
clear warnings have been issued”. It
was his evidence that he had never become aware that anyone within the Army was
entertaining any such notion and that it only came to his attention 30 years
later.
1.1.4
GEN
47 meeting of 27th January 1972
The forthcoming Bloody Sunday march and some proposals for
dealing with it were discussed at a GEN 47 (the Cabinet committee responsible
for Northern Ireland) meeting on 27th January, attended by Mr Heath.
He was asked to comment on a number of disclosed documents pertaining to
this meeting, its preparation and actions taken in follow-up to it, and on his
level of knowledge concerning plans to deal with the march.
1.1.4.1
Arrest operation
Mr Heath claimed to have no recollection of the Magilligan
march or of the allegations made in its aftermath of excessive violence used by
1 Para. However, a brief prepared
for him for the GEN 47 meeting on 27th January by Burke Trend, the
Cabinet Secretary, advises that Mr Heath “may wish to question the Secretary
of State for Defence about recent suggestions in the press and on television
that the Army over-reacted against some civil rights demonstrations last weekend
and that, in particular, soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, by being
unnecessarily rough, have gratuitously provoked resentment among peaceful
elements of the Roman Catholic population”.
It was Mr Heath’s evidence that he had not raised any such concerns
with the Secretary of State for Defence as he “did not think it was
necessary”.
Minutes from the meeting itself
suggest that decisions made by the Cabinet committee concerning the Bloody
Sunday march were that the marchers were to be stopped from leaving the Bogside,
that criticism of the Security Forces for not entering the Bogside and Creggan
should be countered and that there should be maximum publicity for arrests and
subsequent prosecutions. Mr Heath
could not recall any detailed discussions concerning the proposed arrests but
said that he believed that they would be comparatively few in number.
He was adamant that the committee had not been informed of General
Ford’s plan to use the occasion to launch an arrest operation against the DYH,
envisaging up to several hundred arrests, nor that the Parachute Regiment was to
be used on the day.
He said that he would not have
expected to have been told of any planned arrest operation, given that it was,
he said, the Army’s function to decide how to handle the march.
He rejected the suggestion that he might have wanted to consider whether
it was appropriate to use the occasion of a large civil rights march to carry
out such a sizeable arrest operation.
1.1.4.2
Expectation of violence
It has always been Mr Heath’s version of events that he
was expecting the Bloody Sunday march to be a peaceful affair.
So unworried was he, he said, about it that during the tragic events of
the day he was meeting with his yacht crew at Chequers, “discussing plans for
the forthcoming sailing season”.
However, a memo of 28th January, sent by Donald
Maitland (the Downing Street Press Officer) to Stormont records:
“ministers would like the suggestion put to Mr Faulkner that a
statement be issued by the Northern Ireland Government before Sunday’s
march”. It continues that the
purpose of the statement was “to prepare public opinion here and in Northern
Ireland for violent scenes on TV following the march”.
Mr Heath had no recollection of the memo, adding that it did not
anticipate violence but merely suggested that it might
occur. He also said that he had no recollection of any discussions
at the GEN 47 meeting that the IRA would use the march as an opportunity to
shoot rioters.
Furthermore, minutes from the Joint Security Council (JSC)
meeting, held in Belfast on the same day as the GEN 47 meeting, state that
“the operation [on Bloody Sunday] might well develop into rioting or even a
shooting war”. Again, Mr Heath
said that he had never become aware of the view that the day’s events might
escalate into shooting.
Lastly, in a conversation with Jack Lynch, the then
Taoiseach, on the evening of Bloody Sunday, Mr Heath is recorded as having said:
“the people… who deliberately organised this march in circumstances
which we all know, in which the IRA were bound to intervene, carry a very heavy
responsibility for any damage which ensued”.
However, he denied that this prediction reflected his state of mind prior
to the march. Rather, he said,
he had been speaking from hindsight.
He rejected any suggestion that it was any part of his
planning or that of his Government that the Army should endeavour to engage with
the IRA during the course of the march or that the Army should use lethal force
outside the terms of the Yellow Card (the rules of engagement governing Northern
Ireland).
1.1.5
Meeting with Brian Faulkner on evening of 27th January
A third important event which took place on 27th
January, in addition to the GEN 47 and JSC meetings, was a meeting between Brian
Faulkner and Mr Heath at which the Bloody Sunday march was also discussed.
Minutes of the meeting record that “it would be important to make clear
that those parading were not genuine civil righters but were civil disobedients”. Mr Heath told the Tribunal that nothing further of any
significance was discussed regarding the forthcoming march, such as tactics to
be used, and that this was the last conversation he had with Mr Faulkner until
after the march on 30th January.
1.1.6
Establishing an Inquiry
1.1.6.1
Type of Inquiry
The minutes of the GEN 47 meeting held on 31st
January record discussions concerning the format of any legal inquiry to be held
into the events of Bloody Sunday. They
read: “In favour of an
investigation on the pattern of Sir Edmund Compton’s Inquiry [the Inquiry into
the deep interrogation techniques used against internees], it was suggested that
a finding would be obtained more quickly; it would not only vindicate the
Army’s reputation more rapidly, but would also reduce the inconvenience likely
to follow from the need to take evidence from soldiers who were due to leave
Northern Ireland shortly (as was the case with 1 Para).
The less formal the Inquiry, the less would be the potential effect upon
the Army’s morale of any feeling that it was called upon to give account to
the machinery of the law whenever it carried out a particularly
successful operation [emphasis added].
The more private the Inquiry, the less scope would it give for a
prolonged propaganda campaign by the Irish Republican Army”.
Despite the record of the minutes, Mr Heath said that it
was not the Army’s view that, despite the deaths and injuries inflicted, their
handling of the march had been particularly successful.
1.1.6.2
Meeting with Lord Widgery
On 31st January, Lord Widgery, the then Lord
Chief Justice, accepted the Government’s invitation to chair the Inquiry into
the events of the day. In a meeting
between Mr Heath and Lord Widgery that evening, the Prime Minister raised a
number of issues with the Lord Chief Justice, including the need for speed and
the possible risk to soldiers. It
was during this meeting that Mr Heath made his now infamous comment that “it
had to be remembered that we were in Northern Ireland fighting not only a
military war, but also a propaganda war”.
When questioned as to why he had felt the need to draw this
to Lord Widgery’s attention, Mr Heath responded that he “did not want him to
misunderstand what was going on”. He
said that he “was telling him that this propaganda war was going on the whole
time and would continue… because [he] did not want him to think [the
Government] was interfering in his operation”.
When asked how Lord Widgery could have thought that the Government was
interfering in the Inquiry, he responded merely that he had “thought there was
a possibility”. He denied that
the statement had been a warning to Lord Widgery that anything he said which
could be interpreted as critical of the Army could be used as propaganda against
it, adding that “the Lord Chief Justice’s independence and strengths were so
great and recognised”.
1.1.6.3
Influencing the proceedings of the Inquiry
A further memo dictated by Mr Heath records a number of
recommendations concerning the proceedings of the Inquiry which he requested be
“fed into the appropriate channel”, including a recommendation that the Army
be “given an opportunity to set out its own facts early on in the
proceedings”, so as to counter the negative effect of civilian witnesses’
“propaganda against the Army”.
He was asked whether it had ever crossed his mind that it
might be inappropriate for him as Prime Minister to seek to influence the method
of procedure of an independent judicial inquiry.
He responded: “anybody can put their points”.
1.2
questions on behalf of the families and wounded
1.2.1
Discrimination in Northern Ireland
In his autobiography, Mr Heath recounted that the
Protestant majority in Northern Ireland had discriminated shamelessly against
their fellow citizens for almost half a century prior to his time in office.
He agreed that, throughout this time, no British Government had
intervened to prevent the discrimination the discriminators were protected by
the convention in the House of Commons which prevented the affairs of Northern
Ireland being raised in the House. However,
he told the Tribunal, “this is what [he and his government] changed”, but
refused to offer any opinion on Counsel’s conjecture that the only reason the
British Government did intervene in Northern Ireland was because law and order
had broken down: without that,
Counsel suggested, the discriminatory regime would have been allowed to continue
for a further 1,000 years. He
rejected, however, the suggestion that the only real British interest in
Northern Ireland was the maintenance of order and that the British Government
preferred injustice to disorder. On
numerous occasions, the former Prime Minister referred to his pride in having
set up “the first all-party government in Northern Ireland” in November
1973, enabling “an equal democratic arrangement for everybody”.
He had not taken steps at this time to bring to account those who had
been responsible for such wide-scale discrimination over the previous years as
this, he said, was not his responsibility.
Mr Heath also rejected the contention that the Westminster
Government did not regard the citizens of Northern Ireland as their
fellow-citizens, leading them to treat them differently to citizens of Britain
in areas, including, crucially, law-enforcement.
1.2.2
Heath’s level of involvement in Northern Ireland
It was Mr Heath’s evidence to the Tribunal that, in
January 1973, his principal preoccupation as Prime Minister was the UK’s entry
into the EEC. He would only become
involved in matters pertaining to Northern Ireland if either of the two senior
ministers [Reginald Maudling, the Home Secretary, and Peter Carrington, the
Secretary of State for Defence] responsible for the region “wished to refer
important matters to [him]”. The
weekly killings and murders in the region were, he said, “problems of law and
order” with which his ministers could adequately deal.
They only brought “bigger” concerns to him—although he was unable
to provide the Tribunal of an example of what such a bigger concern might have
been.
Given that much of the former Prime Minister’s evidence
to the Tribunal suggested that he knew little of what was happening in Northern
Ireland regarding the security situation or what the state of play was in the
lead up to Bloody Sunday, Michael Lavery QC, Counsel for the families asked Mr
Heath whether he considered that he was fulfilling his duty to the people in
Northern Ireland who were being killed on a regular basis and whether he
considered his delegation of matters of life and death as appropriate.
Mr Heath condemned Mr Lavery’s “obscene… and offensive attitude and
language”, reiterating that he had “two splendid” ministers in charge of
the region and that he felt no need to interfere as they were dealing with
“the problem”.
Tony Gifford QC however, contended that Mr Heath was in
fact actively involved in matters pertaining to Northern Ireland in the lead up
to Bloody Sunday, particularly civil rights marches, “directing things from
the top”. He reminded the former
Prime Minister that he had chaired a total of 18 GEN 47 meetings between the
beginning of October 1971 and 27th January 1972, which, he suggested,
stood as testimony to the close interest Mr Heath was in fact paying to
anti-internment marches. He also
attempted to refresh Mr Heath’s memory by referring him to a number of
contemporaneous documents which, again, he suggested bore testimony to Mr
Heath’s leadership of affairs in Northern Ireland, including a memo written by
one of his private secretaries, stating: “the
Prime Minister… has noted that steps are to be taken to ensure that
prosecutions are brought against the identified ringleaders of the recent
anti-internment marches. The Prime
Minister considers it very important that this should be done, and to be seen to
be done, as speedily as possible. He
would be grateful for a report on progress”.
However, Mr Heath remained adamant that he had not been
paying any particular attention to civil rights marches, leaving such matters to
his two senior ministers. Furthermore,
he claimed to have no recollection of the Unionist community being increasingly
angered at the occurrence of civil rights marches.
He therefore felt unable to comment on whether this was putting increased
pressure on either Whitehall or Stormont to deal with them robustly or whether
his government was concerned that this rising dissatisfaction within the
Unionist community, inflamed by civil rights marches, would destroy the
possibility of introducing the political settlement to which the Government was
working at the time.
1.2.3
Prior
knowledge of the Bloody Sunday operation
1.2.3.1
Policy considerations
In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Heath wrote that “the
general policy [regarding marches] agreed with the Northern Ireland Government,
was that marches and demonstrations in defiance of the ban should be constrained
by the security forces, with a view to avoiding flash points and situations in
which marches and demonstrations led to violent clashes between loyalists and
nationalists or situations which put innocent members of the civilian population
at risk. Within that policy,
responsibility for initiating and conducting operations rested with the chief
constable and the GOC, subject to consultation as seemed to them appropriate
with the authorities in Belfast and London”.
He was unable to tell the Inquiry when the ‘general
policy’ had been agreed and was indeed unwilling to comment on whether the
Westminster and Stormont Governments had in fact agreed any such policy.
However, he did agree that, subject to this policy, security forces were
only to constrain demonstrations in a manner that would not endanger innocent
civilians or they would be in breach of policy.
Michael Mansfield QC contended that therefore, since the three senior
military figures involved in Northern Ireland, General Carver, General Tuzo and
General Ford, all knew that the operation on Bloody Sunday would run a serious
risk of endangering the lives of innocent civilians, they would have had to
obtain permission from both Whitehall and Stormont to act outside of the policy
guidelines.
However, Mr Heath remained adamant that his advisors had
not warned him of the possibility of the Bloody Sunday march leading to
significant trouble, either in the form of serious rioting or shooting from the
IRA. Nor had he, he said, been
informed of the Army’s plans for the day, stating:
“we had no control over the military whatsoever and I did not know who
was in the military there, neither did other senior members”. He also added that he “had no complaint” about the level
of information given to him prior to the march.
He could not explain how, on his evidence, General Carver
could have sat through a GEN 47 meeting regarding the forthcoming march and
allowed him to form the opinion that there was no expectation of serious trouble
on the day, when the General himself anticipated up to 30 deaths.
However, he disagreed with David Ramsbotham’s (assistant to General
Carver) evidence to the Inquiry that he, as Prime Minister, would have been
fully informed of the risks of a gun battle anticipated by the military planners
of the operation (c.f. Week 70).
The former Prime Minister repeatedly refused to comment on
whether he would have allowed the operation on Bloody Sunday to proceed, given
the prevailing opinion that it might well result in shooting and therefore in
risk to innocent civilians, had he been informed of this opinion.
He would not, he said, answer hypothetical questions.
Counsel therefore put to him an extract from an interview given by
General Ford in 1983, relating to Operation Motorman (the operation to clear the
no-go areas in Derry in July 1972, during which two 15-year olds, Seamus Bradley
and Danny Hegarty were shot dead by the Army), in which the General claimed that
Mr Heath had been prepared to accept as many as 100 casualties as a result of
the operation. Mr Heath claimed to
have no recollection of the discussion and refused to give any indication of the
level of casualties he would have deemed ‘politically acceptable’ as a
result of any military operation.
1.2.3.2
No indication of
surprise at events of Bloody Sunday
Mr Mansfield contended that at no stage following Bloody
Sunday had the former Prime Minister expressed horror or surprise at the events
of the day, either in public or private, in his conversations with Jack Lynch,
his dealings with the GEN 47 committee, etc., as he had always been fully aware
of the risks involved in the operation. Again,
Mr Heath denied that his statements to the Taoiseach on the evening of Bloody
Sunday that “the IRA were bound to intervene” and that “a march of this
kind will lead… to gunmen intervening” bore testimony to the fact that he
was aware that there was a serious risk of violence and of gunmen intervening on
the day and maintained he had never been appraised of any such risk.
Furthermore, in the manuscript minutes of the GEN 47
committee meeting of 31st January recently provided to the Tribunal,
General Carver is recorded as having said:
“only shooting into crowds was directed against hooligans” (a
statement which was not recorded in the official typed-up version of the
minutes), at which, again, Mr Heath expressed no recorded surprise or concern.
He could not explain why this had not been recorded in the official
minutes or disclosed, or why he himself had not admonished General Carver for
behaviour on the part of his troops outside the remit of the Yellow Card.
Lastly, at no stage in the statements made by Mr Heath’s
ministers in the House of Commons or in statements made in the House of Lords
did anybody make the case now being put by Mr Heath to the Inquiry that he and
his ministers did not have any knowledge of the planned arrest operation for
Bloody Sunday, that there was no plan to enter the Bogside and that the day was
supposed to have been ‘low key’. Counsel
contended that this was a further indication that Mr Heath was in fact well
aware of the risks involved, but that he had now changed his account of events
before the current Inquiry to claim no knowledge of the operation and to absolve
himself of any responsibility. Although
he could not offer any clear explanation as to why the 1972 Government line and
his current evidence were different, he rejected any suggestion that he had
attempted or was currently trying to mislead.
1.2.4
Risk
to civilian lives inherent in military action in the Bogside
Mr Heath was referred to a number of documents which,
Counsel contended, demonstrated that both political and military thinking in
1971 was that any military action in the Bogside would lead to rioting,
gunfights and civilian deaths. These
documents described “the slaughter of the innocents”, “inconveniences to
the civilian population” (which, Counsel suggested, was a euphemism for
deaths), “political penalties”, etc., which would result from any such
action, and Mr Heath was asked to comment on what exactly he had understood both
the expressions and the prevailing opinion on the matter to be.
Mr Heath was unwilling to speculate on past documents.
However, he suggested that the “political penalties” envisaged by
Westminster as a potential consequence of “the defeat of the gunmen using
military means” (described in the minutes of an October 1971 GEN 47 meeting)
were the alienation of both the Catholic community and the Dublin Government.
It was put to him that it was not the “defeat of gunmen” to which the
broad majority of Catholics at the time and the Irish Government would have been
opposed, but rather the means by which it was achieved:
the Irish Government and the Catholics would object to the use of
military means which caused the deaths of innocent people.
Mr Heath dismissed this line of reasoning but refused to explain any
further what he had meant by his suggestion that the defeat of gunmen would
alienate Dublin and the nationalists, saying that it was something that “you
[Mr Lavery / the Inquiry?] must find out for yourself”.
1.2.5
Lord
Hailsham’s proposal
Mr Heath reiterated that he and his Government had ignored
Lord Hailsham’s suggestion that people in Northern Ireland could be shot
simply on the basis that they were “the Queen’s enemies”, believing it to
be “wrong”. However, he was
unwilling to explain in what respects he had deemed the suggestion to be
“wrong” or to accept Counsel’s suggestion that it was wrong because it
amounted to suggesting that civilians be murdered by the Security Forces on the
streets of Northern Ireland.
Furthermore, it was Mr Heath’s evidence that neither he
nor any of his senior Government officials were aware that rioters on the
streets of Derry aided the IRA by facilitating their attacks on soldiers (by,
for example, opening up to give the sniper a clear line of fire at the
soldiers). He agreed that it was
surprising that it had never been brought to his notice, but was unwilling to
accept the suggestion that it was a tactic current at the time.
Mr Heath also told the Tribunal that he did not know that General Ford
perceived the vast majority of population of the Bogside and the Creggan as
backing and protecting the IRA, nor that General Tuzo regarded NICRA as the
“active ally of the IRA”.
Mr Lavery contended that, if indeed NICRA, those residents
from the Bogside and the Creggan marching on Bloody Sunday, and the rioters were
perceived as assisting the IRA, then they would have come under the definition
of the “giving aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies” (words from the
Treason Act, relied upon by Lord Hailsham when making his suggestion).
Again, despite the numerous documents emanating from political and
military sources indicating that this was indeed the line of thinking at the
time, Mr Heath was adamant that he had never been made aware that the population
or the hooligans were deemed to be actively supportive of the IRA.
Given Mr Heath’s evidence that he found Lord Hailsham’s
suggestion objectionable and “wrong in every respect”, he was asked why he
did not exclude him from the Cabinet for his objectionable views.
He responded merely that everyone knew Lord Hailsham’s “nature” and
that “he was good in other spheres” so they were prepared to overlook it.
The suggestion, he said, would never have had any bearing on the
subsequent actions of the British military in Northern Ireland.
Everybody had merely “laughed” at dear old Quinton and his
“fancies”.
1.2.6
Unlawful actions on behalf of the Security Forces
Counsel contended that, contrary to Mr Heath’s evidence
that the Government and Army were at the time observing the Rule of Law and the
doctrine of minimum force in Northern Ireland, the prevailing opinion was rather
that the region was in a state of war and that they were therefore prepared to
counter the ‘unsqueamish’ tactics of their perceived enemy by adopting
‘unsqueamish’ tactics of their own, such as the use of deep interrogation
techniques, in the interests of expediency and of winning the ‘war’.
This, Counsel continued, sent a message to the troops on the ground that
they could act with impunity and be protected regardless of the legality or
illegality of their actions.
1.2.6.1
The Yellow Card
Mr Lavery sought to ascertain from Mr Heath what signals
his attitude towards Northern Ireland was sending to the people responsible for
the day-to-day maintenance of law and order in the region, suggesting that
though either wilful blindness or indifference, he had led those on the ground
to understand that they would not be held to account for their policies or
actions. Lord Saville intervened,
rephrasing the question to Mr Heath by asking whether he either acquiesced in or
actively promoted the use by the Security Services in Northern Ireland of force
outside the Yellow Card, to which the former Prime Minister answered
‘never’.
Mr Lavery pursued his line of questioning, pointing out to
Mr Heath that, following the publication of the Widgery Report which highlighted
incidences of excessive force outside the remit of the Yellow Card, he had not
taken action to ensure that the perpetrators were brought to book for their
actions. This, Counsel contended,
flew in the face of Mr Heath’s evidence that he was anxious to ensure that the
Yellow Card was observed and would countenance no breach of it:
his inaction was indicative of his indifference as to whether or not the
Yellow Card was breached. The
contention was dismissed as an “entirely fallacious statement” by Mr Heath,
who said that the Prime Minister was “not responsible for taking action about
what happens in Her Majesty’s forces”, this despite the British
constitutional position which places the Government in control of the Army.
Eilís McDermott QC asked Mr Heath why Soldier F,
responsible for shooting her client, Patrick Doherty, had never been prosecuted
for his unlawful actions on Bloody Sunday, as determined in the Widgery report,
and why Mr Heath had not referred the matter to the Attorney General for further
action. He responded that it was
not up to him to refer the matter to the Attorney General as “that is done by
the whole machine”. However, he
could no longer recollect whether the “whole machine” had done this on this
occasion, nor whether this was one case in which it was ruled that the Attorney
General should not initiate proceedings.
Again, it was suggested that, if it was indeed Mr Heath’s
position in 1972 that politicians would not call the Army to account for its
actions as this would be interfering in its business, he was sending a very
dangerous message to the Army commanders on the ground that they could act with
impunity. The suggestion was
dismissed by Mr Heath who claimed that the Army was perfectly capable of
disciplining itself.
1.2.6.2
Shooting ringleaders of the DYH
Mr Heath, like all other witnesses before him, save the
actual author of the document, told the Tribunal that he had never seen General
Ford’s memo suggesting that unarmed rioters be shot, nor had he ever been made
aware of its contents until recently. He
refused to answer Counsel’s question as to whether or not he would have
accepted the suggestion, dismissing it as an “imaginary question” and
accusing Mr Lavery of “wasting everyone’s time” and of being incapable of
asking sensible questions. He also
felt unable to comment on why General Ford was not expelled from the Army for
making a suggestion which Counsel suggested was tantamount to murder, saying
that he was not responsible for discipline in the British Army.
Mr Lavery countered by suggesting that if those responsible for security
in Northern Ireland were aware of the Prime Minister’s lack of interest in
such matters, they would have had considerable latitude to make such outrageous
proposals without fear of sanction or retribution from their political masters.
1.2.6.3
Deep interrogation techniques
Mr Lavery also put to Mr Heath the issue of the deep
interrogation techniques used against internees, abandoned following a British
Inquiry into the techniques and subsequently declared to amount to ‘inhuman
and degrading treatment’ by the European Court of Human Rights.
This was, he suggested, a further example of a willingness of the British
Government not only to disregard the law in their dealings in Northern Ireland,
which they would not have countenanced in any part of Great Britain, but also to
protect those engaged in wrongdoing against citizens of Northern Ireland.
Indeed, a letter sent from the MoD to Mr Heath’s private secretary at
the time, said that in any possible criminal proceedings against those involved
in performing deep interrogation techniques, “the Crown” would stand by the
perpetrators. It also went so far
as to advocate the introduction of an Act of indemnity to protect those
perpetrators from prosecution for their criminal offences.
Mr Heath denied any knowledge of the matter or ever having seen the
document in question, whilst also denying that it was sending any message that
the Government was willing to condone criminal behaviour on the part of its
forces in Northern Ireland.
1.2.6.4
Unlawful acts perpetrated by soldiers
Mr Lavery suggested that Mr Heath’s Government’s
attitude and constant concern and regard for the morale of soldiers operating in
Northern Ireland would have led the soldiers to understand that their chances of
being prosecuted with the full vigour of the law if they acted unlawfully were
slim, and that this was, if not encouraging, then at least not discouraging
soldiers from acting unlawfully. This
was vehemently denied by the former Prime Minister, as was the contention that
it was in the interest of the British Government--both following Bloody Sunday
and in other cases—to ensure that its soldiers were not convicted of murder
for actions taken in Northern Ireland, as this would have constituted bad
publicity for the Government. He
also denied that the philosophy of the British Army both then and more currently
was to pay lip service to the observance of the law within their ranks but in
practice to ensure that soldiers were not prosecuted for unlawful actions and to
ensure that any penalty resulting from prosecution would be mitigated.
In a similar vein, he felt unable to comment on an opinion
expressed by the then Chief of the General Staff, General Carver, following
discussions with the Attorney General that “there was little danger of a
soldier being prosecuted anyway” for his actions on Bloody Sunday, and claimed
to have been totally ignorant of the procedure in place in 1972 in Northern
Ireland, excluding the police from investigating incidents involving the Army,
this being left exclusively to the Army itself, under the guise of the Royal
Military Police.
1.2.7
Meeting with Lord Widgery
Mr Heath denied the suggestion that the British Government
had a partisan interest in the outcome of the Widgery Inquiry and that it was in
his interest to ensure that the Inquiry did not turn into a propaganda tool for
the IRA. He also rejected the
suggestion that there had been any attempts to prevent the truth of what
happened on Bloody Sunday from coming to light on the grounds that this would
have been damaging both to his Government and to the soldiers involved.
Given his denials, he was asked to comment on the following
exchange made during a GEN 47 meeting on 28th February between Mr
Heath and the Attorney General:
“Mr Heath: ‘How
is Widgery going?’
AG: ‘According
to plan. Army Counsel, alert to do
justice to our case.’”
It was his evidence that ‘plan’ referred simply and
strictly to the timetable of the Inquiry and denied the suggestion that the use
of the expression ‘our case’ was a clear demonstration that the British
Government regarded the Army’s case as its own.
Counsel also suggested that there was no real reason for Mr
Heath to have met Lord Widgery in person, if not for the purpose of reminding
him where his “duty” and allegiance lay, given that the Lord Chief Justice
had already accepted the invitation to chair the Inquiry into the events of
Bloody Sunday. Lord Saville having
first put forward an explanation for the meeting on Mr Heath’s behalf, the
former Prime Minister himself answered that Lord Widgery had wanted to raise a
number of questions with him prior to taking up the appointment.
However, as indicated by Counsel, it would appear from the minutes of the
meeting that the Lord Chief Justice did not in fact raise any such questions.
Mr Heath further explained his reference to a propaganda
war by saying that he had only raised it out of courtesy towards Lord Widgery,
so that he was fully appraised of the situation, rather than in any attempt to
steer the Lord Chief Justice in his proceedings and findings.
1.2.8
Apology to the Bloody Sunday victims and their families
Mr Heath told the Inquiry that, on the evening of Bloody
Sunday, whilst dining with his sailing crew, he heard that there had been
“this ghastly outbreak and people murdered” (though he later changed his
phrasing, suggesting that he should have said ‘lost their lives’ instead of
‘murdered’ as this was not his understanding at the time).
However, he later went on to agree that he had been told on the day that
there had been “innocent casualties” and that “the numbers grew as the
night went on”. When questioned
further on this statement, he refused to be drawn into what exactly he
believed—both in 1972 and currently--to have transpired on the day, stating
merely that he had formed no opinion or judgement on the issue.
He had never, he said, asked himself the question as to how the elite
regiment of the British Army had managed to shoot 13 innocent people on Bloody
Sunday, under his Government.
He said that his expression of regret at the events of the
day in 1972 amounted to an apology to the families and the victims, and
therefore he had no need to make any further apology to them.
He accepted no responsibility for the deaths and was reluctant to even
acknowledge that the British Government was constitutionally responsible for the
British Army.
1.3.
questions on behalf of edward heath
Counsel for Edward Heath, sought to place on record that
the serious allegations made against Mr Heath by Counsel for the families and
wounded were “invariably false and should not have been made”.
He submitted that the allegations and contentions were “specious
nonsense”, resulting from Counsels’ “grabbing at soundbites” from
documents, which could be “flatly contradicted by a common sense reading of
the central documents, … by an elementary knowledge of how government works
and … by the fact that [Mr Heath] had the clearest possible personal and
Governmental interest and motives to avoid” Bloody Sunday.
Mr Lavery rejected Counsel’s contentions.
2.
INQ10’s evidence
INQ10 was the Commanding Officer of
A Company, 1 Para on Bloody Sunday, none of whose members, according to
contemporaneous Army documents, opened fire on the day or performed any arrests.
It was his evidence that he had little recollection of the lead-up to the
Army operation on Bloody Sunday or of the operation itself, so his evidence
focused mainly on general Army practices in Northern Ireland at the time.
Information he provided relating to Bloody Sunday itself was almost
exclusively based on his 1972 statement to the Widgery Inquiry and diary of
operations.
2.1
Preparations for the Army operation on Bloody Sunday
Although INQ10 could not recall
being given specific intelligence relating to the march, he recalled being told
that it seemed likely that NICRA would lose control of the march to the IRA and
to hooligans. He was therefore
expecting three categories of people on the day:
marchers, gunmen and rioters. However,
based on previous experience he did not feel there to be much risk to innocent
civilians in the case of soldiers returning fire at gunmen for two reasons:
firstly, it was his evidence that the moment any serious violent activity
started, such as rioting or shooting, the peaceful elements of a crowd would
disperse; secondly, he said that gunmen tended to fire from positions away from
marchers, taking them out of the direct line of the crowd.
Nevertheless, he said that the possibility of a risk to innocent
civilians was “definitely appreciated” in Northern Ireland: this had lead to
the development of the Yellow Card to the point where it was restricted to
firing only at identified gunmen.
He told the Inquiry that he could
not recall the specific briefing held prior to the march and had no independent
recollection of the orders given to him for the operation.
Therefore, he could not confirm or reject the evidence of one of the
lance corporals in 2nd Platoon of A Company of the 1st
Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (1 Para), who has told the Inquiry that
Colonel Wilford had briefed his company, saying that they “were being sent
there [to Derry] for a specific task, which was to return fire if we were fired
upon”. However, his one clear
recollection of the day was that he and the other company commanders had gone on
a ‘recce’ in Derry prior to 30th January to familiarise
themselves with the geographical layout of the area (which, if true—and
Counsel for the families suggested he was mistaken—would have meant that this
trip to Derry would have to have taken place sometime on 29th
January, after 10:30 am, when he received his orders).
2.2
Snatch squads
A Company’s mission on Bloody Sunday was to arrest people
involved in riotous behaviour, deploying through Barrier 11 and using snatch
squads, which INQ10 described as typically consisting of groups of two to four
soldiers, lightly clad, wearing helmets and carrying only batons, covered by
others with baton guns and rifles. Snatch
squads, he said, would identify the ring-leaders prior to moving in, and then
deploy on foot to a limited distance of no more than 20 metres, to ensure that
control was not lost and the soldiers in question remained covered at all times.
3.
INQ22’s evidence
INQ22 was a Lieutenant with the
Coldstream Guards at the time of Bloody Sunday. Since 1972, he had been involved in a major road accident
during which he sustained serious injuries.
He subsequently underwent brain surgery, resulting in some loss of memory
and severe visual impairment. His
evidence to the Tribunal centred primarily on a letter written to his parents
shortly after Bloody Sunday in which he laid out his understanding of the
day’s events, based primarily on second-hand information gleaned about the day
from colleagues.
3.1
Gunfire heard
At the time of writing his
letter, INQ22 believed those killed to have been members of the IRA and felt
that the Paras had been entirely justified in opening fire, as they had first
been fired upon. In the letter, he
stated categorically that the first shots he heard on the day “were not from
any British Army weapon”, that these had been followed by the sound of Army
SLRs (self-loading rifles), giving the impression of “a battle raging”.
In his statement to the Inquiry,
INQ22 further qualified the first shots, describing them as one high-velocity
shot from a non-Army weapon, followed by a burst from a Thompson sub-machine
gun. However, given the lack of
detail in the letter and his subsequent misfortune, he acknowledged that he
could not be entirely certain as to the accuracy of his later recollection.
3.2
Analysing the events of Bloody Sunday
In his letter, INQ22 wrote:
“at first, when we heard that only five had been killed I was well
pleased, but on the full figure being released I was disgusted and sad”.
He explained to the Tribunal that he had been ‘disgusted and sad’
that the British Army had been put into a position of having to inflict so many
casualties in the interests of performing their duty and defending themselves
and others.
The letter also contained the
suggestion that the IRA operated “under the guise of civil rights
supporters”, a sentiment which INQ22 thought had been current at the time, and
the belief that, even those waving white flags in Army operations were not to be
trusted, stating: “Allegations
that the Army fired at [people] waving flags of peace:
these may well be correct. For
in a land where trust does not exist, how would they know if the man was just
waving the white flag as a means of picking up a weapon.
Granted there were people dying on the street, but you do not hear of the
man who had been four days dead and thrown out just for the occasion”.
Finally, INQ22’s letter
deplored the inability to get to the truth of any situation in Northern Ireland,
reading: “the civilian populace
is biased one way or the other, and sadly there are some soldiers who would
deliberately kill”. He said that
this had never happened in his own battalion and his only explanation for having
written it was that he must have been very stressed at the time.
4.
INQ 2’s evidence
INQ2 was General Ford’s Aide de
Camp (ADC) at the time of Bloody Sunday. It
was his evidence that the General rarely discussed security policy issues with
him and that he only had minimal access to security and intelligence
information, which meant that he was unable to cast any light on what the
intelligence assessments were in the lead-up to the Bloody Sunday march.
He did recall, however, the General telling him that there was a
potential for violence on the march, both in the form of rioting and shooting.
It was also his evidence that he only found out about the General’s
plans to conduct an arrest operation on the day and to deploy 1 Para as the
arresting force upon reading Brigadier MacLellan’s operational order.
His evidence therefore centred primarily on his recollections of Bloody
Sunday itself, which were in large part assisted by contemporaneous documents,
in particular General Ford’s diary of movements prepared shortly after 30th
January.
4.1
Operational Order for Bloody Sunday
Having been informed by General
Ford that he planned to go to Derry on 30th January, INQ2 drew up his
own operational order dealing with matters pertaining to the General’s travel
and protection.
The Operational Order read:
“The Catholics of the Bogside and Creggan areas of Londonderry are
proposing to march illegally... to Shipquay Place in the centre of Londonderry
and hold a vast anti-internment rally / meeting.
They want to succeed and thereby show the weaknesses of the security
forces… CLF has decreed that the
marches must be stopped at all costs”.
INQ2 explained away the last
sentence, saying that it was too strong and demonstrated the “exuberance of a
young officer” rather than the General’s own feeling on the matter.
What, he said, he should have written was:
“CLF has decided that the marches should be stopped”.
4.2
General Ford’s diary
INQ2 and his colleague, INQ1832,
compiled a diary of General Ford’s movements on Bloody Sunday, written in the
first person as if dictated by General Ford.
Much of INQ2’s evidence about Bloody Sunday itself was based on this
diary rather than personal recollection. Contrary
to INQ1832’s testimony, it was INQ2’s evidence that the General would have
also contributed to the diary of movements himself.
4.3
Gunfire heard on the day
INQ2 told the Tribunal that he
still had a clear recollection of the shots he heard on the day, the first being
a number of high velocity shots, interspersed with a burst of automatic fire,
emanating from the approximate direction of Glenfada Park or the Rossville
Flats, followed by the sound of two small explosions.
He could not recollect why he had failed to record hearing automatic fire
or explosions in the contemporaneous diary of Bloody Sunday, suggesting perhaps
that he had had a difference of opinion with the General over whether or not
there had been automatic fire. However,
he agreed that at this stage neither he nor General Ford had any idea that
Support Company, 1 Para, had already entered the Bogside.
INQ2 could also offer no
explanation as to why neither he nor General Ford had heard the significant
amount of live fire and baton rounds fired by the Army during the afternoon,
given that at no stage were they any further than 100 to 200 yards from the
Paras opening fire.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Paragraph 1:
14th, 15th, 20th, 21st, 22nd,
27th, 28th and 29th January
Paragraphs 2 &3:
Monday 27th January
Paragraph 4:
Tuesday 28th January
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
