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16 - 19 DECEMBER 2002
Evidence heard
This week, the Tribunal heard from two soldiers present on Bloody Sunday, INQ1025 and INQ145, and from Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith and Lord Carrington, Under-Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence respectively at the time of Bloody Sunday.
The Tribunal rose for the Christmas recess and will reconvene in London on 13th January.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. INQ1025’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, INQ1025 was a lieutenant with the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment (LAD) and held the post of assistant adjutant to the Commanding Officer, Colonel Ferguson. His duties were mainly administrative and included responsibility for compiling the historical report of the regiment’s tour of duty in Derry.
INQ1025 was with Colonel Ferguson for most of Bloody Sunday at both Barrier 14 and subsequently at the army observation post on top of the Embassy Ballroom. However, it was his evidence that he saw nothing of the key events of Bloody Sunday and heard no sounds of shooting or explosives.
Much of his evidence centred on conversations relating to his impressions of the day’s events he purportedly had with INQ2107 in the months following Bloody Sunday, recorded in the latter’s 1972 diaries.
1.1 Arrest operation planned for Bloody Sunday
In the operational orders issued prior to Bloody Sunday, 22 LAD appears to have been given the role of conducting an arrest operation, with the assistance of D Company of 1 Para, to be initiated at the command of Colonel Ferguson. INQ1025 confirmed that he had known, prior to Bloody Sunday, that Colonel Ferguson had drawn up a plan to this effect, involving the use of D Company. However, it was his evidence that he would not have been aware of the details of the plan, suggesting that the information contained in INQ2107’s diary relating to this must have come from another source.
INQ2107 records that Colonel Ferguson’s plan was to envelop the rioters by moving down Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street, cutting off their escape and pushing them back towards Barrier 14, but that the Paras had simply driven the rioters in front of them “instead of attempting to surround them, and as a result the yobs and the marchers became mixed again, hence their possibly shooting innocent victims”.
INQ2107’s diary also records, purportedly from
information gleaned from INQ1025, that at the height of the rioting at Barrier
14, General Ford had become ‘excited’ and had accused Colonel Ferguson of
being too soft with the rioters. Colonel
Ferguson had attempted to explain to General Ford that he was waiting for
separation between marchers and hooligans prior to launching any arrest
operation, but that he had been pressurised by the General into putting his own
arrest plan into operation. Colonel
Ferguson had therefore sent INQ1025 to find the Commanding Officer of D Company
in order to brief him on his arrest plan. However,
the diary goes on to say that the Colonel’s plan had been overtaken by events
on the ground, as before INQ1025 could locate D Company, he noticed a number of
Army vehicles containing C company of 1 Para who were preparing for action.
INQ1025 then allegedly told INQ2107 that C Company must have been called
up by General Ford, who also ordered Colonel Ferguson to release D Company back
to under the command of 1 Para at this time.
INQ1025 again reiterated that, although he is named as the source of this information in INQ2107’s diary, much of the information had not come from him. However, he acknowledged that he had known of the arrest operation planned by Colonel Ferguson which had not been launched on the day due to the lack of separation between marchers and rioters. He also added that his impression was that General Ford had been looking for a much tougher type of arrest operation than that planned by the Colonel.
He also confirmed that he had a vague recollection of being told shortly after Bloody Sunday that “the whole affair” had not so much been to teach the Bogsiders a lesson, but rather to show 8th Brigade and its units how the job should be done and that this was a view held by a number of officers in his regiment.
1.2 General Ford’s role on Bloody Sunday
INQ1025 agreed that, although he had been told after the events that General Ford’s role on Bloody Sunday was merely that of an observer, it was his impression at the time that General Ford had in fact ordered Brigadier MacLellan to launch the arrest operation. But he added that it was only a vague impression and he had no real evidence to support it.
INQ1025’s evidence did differ in one important respect from that of General Ford (c.f. Week 72, paragraph 1.8.2) in that he recalled the General speaking with Colonel Ferguson (‘suggesting’ that D Company be returned to the command of 1 Para) before the launch of the arrest operation rather than after it, leading to the suggestion that General Ford in fact played more than the role of observer on the day. However, he claimed to have no knowledge of the allegation made in INQ2107’s diary that at a briefing held prior to the Widgery Inquiry, Colonel Ferguson had been made “to change his story so that the suggestion to release D Company was made on the Embassy after the Paras went in, thereby supporting Ford’s story that he was present merely to observe and issued no order”.
1.3. Observation post on the Embassy Ballroom
INQ1025 told the Inquiry that he and Colonel Ferguson had arrived on the top of the Embassy Ballroom from where they had a commanding view of the Bogside approximately 10 minutes after the Paras’ entry into the area. He said that by this stage the soldiers had ceased firing and he formed the impression that although something had obviously happened on the ground, it had been over for some time. Although General Ford places himself in the same location at the same time, INQ1025 had no recollection of seeing him at the observation post.
2. INQ145’s evidence
INQ145 was a soldier in 11 Battery, 22 LAD, stationed at Barrier 12 on Bloody Sunday. In his statement, he claimed to have fired, under orders, two gas canisters and one rubber bullet at the rioters at the barricade, changing this on the stand to two rubber bullets and one gas canister, and finally settling for one gas canister and one rubber bullet.
He also claimed that two petrol bombs had been thrown at the barrier as the march had passed by and that he had heard a further 10 to 20 nail and petrol bombs explode in the Bogside during the course of the day, the most intense period being a few minutes after the Paras entered the Bogside. He could not explain how Lieutenant INQ109, in charge of his platoon at the barrier, had managed to ‘miss’ hearing these explosions. He also claimed to have heard two gunshots from two old .303 rifles fired from the Rossville flats prior to the launch of the arrest operation.
INQ145 described being ordered to pull back the barrier to facilitate the paratroopers’ entry into the Bogside. He could not remember the convoy of 10 army vehicles which passed through his barrier, recalling only 12 soldiers entering the area on foot. It was his evidence that, at this stage, the bulk of the rioters had moved from the barrier but that in the 20 minutes after the Paras had entered the area, clearing hooligans from the waste ground at Little James Street, the rioters had returned and had begun stoning the troops at the barrier again. Counsel suggested it would have been impossible for the rioters to return given the fact that there was at this stage an entire battalion of the Parachute Regiment in between them and the barrier.
INQ145 signalled to the Tribunal that he was feeling unwell at this stage. His evidence was therefore delayed until future notice.
3. INQ119
INQ119 was a soldier with the Coldstream Guards deployed on a barrier in the Little James Street area (either Barrier 17, 9 or 11). He recalled the radio operator at the barrier shouting that civilian gunmen had been spotted and heard two shots ring out. Immediately upon hearing the shots, paratroopers went through his barrier on foot, following which he heard further shots, namely a few single shots fired from either a pistol or a rifle, followed by two or three bursts of automatic fire (although he acknowledged that the latter might have been the sound of rapid single shot fire) from the area of the Rossville Flats. He formed the opinion that a gun battle was taking place in the area.
4. Geoffrey Johnson-smith’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr Johnson-Smith (now Sir Geoffrey) was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army, with special responsibility for the UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment). He was asked about his knowledge of the military plan for Bloody Sunday and about the reaction of those within the MoD to the day’s events. He repeatedly stressed that he was merely a junior minister in the MoD at the time and therefore ‘out of the loop’ regarding key discussions held and decisions made at the time.
4.1 Perception of the situation in Northern Ireland
4.1.1 Northern Ireland in a state of war?
It was Mr Johnson-Smith’s evidence that the Army was not “involved in a war in Northern Ireland and this was very much understood by everyone” at the time and that he had never been made aware of any suggestion that the problems there could be solved by military means. Confronted with Lord Carver’s (the Chief of the General Staff) statement saying that the Prime Minister, Edward Heath “was influenced by his military background and wanted to solve problems by the use of military means” and with Mr Heath’s own statement that “Northern Ireland was in a state of war” he responded that he had never heard the Prime Minister express any such views and that questions on the topic would be best directed to Mr Heath himself.
He denied any knowledge of any clandestine activities on the part of the British Government in the Republic of Ireland at this time, but acknowledged that he had met with a Kenneth Littlejohn (who subsequently claimed that he had been recruited into the British Intelligence Service by Mr Johnson-Smith and that MI6 had both provided him with arms and explosives to carry out bank raids and attacks on police stations in the Irish Republic, knowing that these raids would be blamed on the IRA, and with a hit-list of leading Republicans they were to assassinate). Lord Saville disallowed further questioning on the topic on the grounds that the issues were not directly relevant to Bloody Sunday.
4.1.2 No-go areas
Mr Johnson-Smith said that the existence of no-go areas at the time of Bloody Sunday was perceived within the MoD as “something of a defeat” and that there was a hope around the time of Bloody Sunday that the existence of these no-go areas would be brought to an end. However, he told the Tribunal that he was not aware of any concrete political initiative to break the areas at the time of Bloody Sunday, adding that he would not necessarily have been informed if any such initiative had existed.
4.2 Prior knowledge of the military operation planned for Bloody Sunday
Having written in his statement to the Inquiry that he “would have been aware of the decision to use the Parachute Regiment to assist in handling the civil rights march” on Bloody Sunday, he then told the Tribunal that he was in fact not aware of this decision until after the day’s events. He was adamant that he had not spoken to anyone prior to changing his evidence in this regard but that his lack of certainty on the matter was due to his attempts to recall events of more than thirty years ago. However, he was sure that he would not have been made privy to the operational plans for the day.
4.3 Opinion concerning the events of Bloody Sunday
In the House of Commons on 17th February, Mr Johnson-Smith said in response to a question concerning the Parachute Regiment that it “has upheld the very fine traditions of the British Army in Northern Ireland”. He confirmed that he had always been impressed by the Army’s discipline and restraint in Northern Ireland, demonstrated by its actions on the ground, and that this admiration extended to the actions of the Paras on Bloody Sunday, given the pressures under which they were put on the day. He said that he felt both then and now that it would be unfair to criticise the use of the Parachute Regiment after the event and that he had never heard any concern expressed within the MoD about the way in which the Paras handled the march on Bloody Sunday.
However, in a broadcast interview in 1992, Mr Johnson-Smith expounded the view that the tragedy of Bloody Sunday had been caused, at least in part, by a lack of self-restraint on the part of the soldiers. He told the Tribunal that he had been expressing a personal view rather than that of the MoD and reiterated that there were no discussions to this effect at the time.
5. Peter carrington
Lord Carrington was the Secretary of State for Defence in Edward Heath’s government, and as such was the political head of the armed forces at the time of Bloody Sunday. As such he attended Cabinet committees and the GEN 47 Committee, focussing specifically on Northern Ireland. He is the most senior politician to testify before the Tribunal to date.
He told the Tribunal that he had little to no recollection of events and meetings leading up to Bloody Sunday.
5.1 A military solution to the troubles in Northern Ireland?
He denied the twin suggestions that there was a view within the British Cabinet at the time that Northern Ireland was in a ‘state of war’ and that the problems in the region could be solved by military means. However, this is precisely the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister in a televised interview and that attributed to the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, by General Carver in his statement to the Inquiry in which he wrote that the Prime Minister “was influenced by his military background and wanted to solve problems by the use of military means”. Nevertheless, Lord Carrington remained adamant that Edward Heath hoped for a political solution and that the British Government in no way regarded a state of war existing between them and their perceived enemies in Northern Ireland.
5.2 The Queen’s enemies and a new military policy
Lord Carrington told the Tribunal that the view that soldiers could shoot at anyone obstructing them in the course of their duty in Northern Ireland, even if they were not posing a threat to them on the simple basis that they were the Queen’s enemies enjoyed no currency in the Government or Cabinet at the time of Bloody Sunday. He could not recollect Lord Hailsham, the then Lord Chancellor, having expressed this view during a GEN 47 Cabinet committee sometime in 1971 as alleged by Lord Carver, adding that the Yellow Card (the rules of engagement) was the “Bible by which we worked”.
He also denied the suggestion that the appointment of General Ford as Commander of Land Forces (CLF) in July 1971 reflected a change in military policy and the desire to get tougher with the citizens of Northern Ireland.
Despite documents before the Tribunal which appear to envisage the possibility of shooting “unarmed civilians”, Lord Carrington remained adamant that the Government would never have contemplated this as a possibility. He also denied any knowledge of a military appreciation prepared by General Ford in December 1971 in which he describes a potential strategy for the destruction of the no-go zones in Derry, stating: “the risk of casualties is high and apart from gunmen or bombers, so-called unarmed rioters, possibly teenagers, are certain to be shot in the initial phases. Much will be made of the invasion of Derry and the slaughter of the innocent”. He was sure that, had he seen the document containing such suggestions, it would have remained in his mind.
5.3 Arrest operation planned for Bloody Sunday
It was Lord Carrington’s evidence that the GEN 47 Cabinet Committee discussed the possibility of the Army arresting ‘a few hooligans’ on the fringes of the Bloody Sunday march (a decision which he agreed was linked to the need to satisfy unionist opinion) but was not aware of any specific arrest operation planned for the day until after the event, saying that he had been misquoted in press reports dealing with the issue. Equally he could shed no light on Lord Balniel’s (Lord Carrington’s junior minister) statement, made during the course of a very lengthy address by the minister to the House of Commons, providing the Army’s version of the events of Bloody Sunday and recorded initially in Hansard as “the arrest operation was discussed by the Joint Security Committee after decisions had been taken here [in Whitehall]”. Furthermore, he could not elucidate on why Lord Balniel had felt it necessary to alter Hansard’s record, changing the sequence of events disassociating Cabinet ministers with the decision to perform an arrest operation. He agreed that Lord Balniel would not have made the statement without his approval and that of the Prime Minister but could not recall the reasons for his having been mandated to do so. He presumed that it was an attempt by the Government “to put some objectivity into the accusations made against the Army on Bloody Sunday” and denied that the speech, described by Counsel for the families and wounded as a completely one-sided account, was an attempt by the Government to ‘get in a pre-emptive strike’ ahead of the Widgery Inquiry which would publicise the Government and the Army’s case and advance its case in the ‘propaganda war’ about the events in which it felt itself to be engaged.
He was adamant that a contemporaneous press report had seriously misrepresented him, stating as it did that he had been aware prior to Bloody Sunday that 1 Para would be deployed as the arresting force on the day and denied Counsel for the families and wounded’s suggestion that he and his former colleagues within the Cabinet were now seeking to distance themselves from any knowledge to that effect. He said that the Cabinet had only been informed of and approved the outlines of the plan for the day and, despite the looming sense of crisis in the region, had never sought to inquire as to the detail of the operation. It was, he said, not the job of politicians to interfere in the detail of military plans.
5.4 Expectations of violence
Lord Carrington said that he had never been made aware of the purported opinion of senior commanders in Derry prior to the march, as described by General Ford in his evidence before Lord Widgery that “however good the intentions of NICRA might be, the hooligan element backed up by the gunmen would undoubtedly take over control at an early stage”. He told the Tribunal that this had never been discussed at Cabinet level and said that he had no recollection of being informed by General Carver of a serious and substantial risk of a shooting war erupting, as maintained by Sir David Ramsbotham during the course of his evidence to the current Inquiry. Furthermore, he claimed to have no recollection of the UK Government’s contacts at the Joint Security Committee meeting of 27th January having alerted him or the Cabinet to the fact that this serious possibility had been discussed.
He denied the suggestion that any plan existed to the effect that the Army should endeavour to engage with the IRA on Bloody Sunday. He expressed surprise at Lord Carver’s statement he had “heaved a sigh of relief that so few had been killed”, having been led to believe from the “rather lurid picture that had been painted beforehand of what might happen” that such an even greater number of casualties might be expected on the day.
He also denied the suggestion that the “major military victory” hoped for by the Stormont Government in order to “keep Westminster at bay”, referred to by the American consul in Belfast in a document written in January following discussions with Stormont officials, was a reference to the planned operation for Bloody Sunday but could not help the Tribunal with what it could in fact have been referring to.
He dismissed as “fantasy” Counsel’s synopsis that the British Cabinet had in fact been informed of the tactics to be employed to deal with the march, knew that the Parachute Regiment would be involved, knew that the situation might develop into a shooting war and yet did nothing to prevent it, merely grooming public opinion for the outcome that transpired by instructing Brian Faulkner to issue a statement on 28th January warning that violence was to be expected on the day.
He also vehemently refuted the allegation that he had taken the decision to approve the arrest operation for Bloody Sunday in the knowledge that there was likely to be a substantial loss of life as a result but had bargained the danger of Catholic loss of life against the price of Protestant dissatisfaction, saying that it was a ‘disgraceful accusation’ made of him.
5.5 Establishment of the Widgery Inquiry
Contemporaneous documentation suggests that there was some debate on 31st January as to which type of legal inquiry should be set up to investigate the events of Bloody Sunday. A cabinet committee document of this date reads: “the less formal the Inquiry, the less would be the potential effect upon the Army’s morale of any feeling that it was called upon to give account to the machinery of the law whenever it carried out a particularly successful operation. The more private the Inquiry, the less scope would it give for a prolonged propaganda campaign by the IRA”. Despite the words of the document, Lord Carrington denied that the feeling at the time was that Bloody Sunday had been “a particularly successful operation”, saying that the opinion was that it was “fairly disastrous”.
5.6 Opinion concerning the events of Bloody Sunday
Lord Carrington said that he had never been unduly perturbed by the fact that there were no injuries sustained by soldiers on Bloody Sunday, despite the large number of civilians killed and wounded and the Army’s account of a fire fight.
In light of his evidence that the events of Bloody Sunday as they transpired had not been sanctioned at the highest levels, he was asked, as the then political head of the Army, how one of the most experienced and highly disciplined regiments of the British Army had succeeded in killing and wounding 27 innocent people. He said that he had no view to offer on the subject, that being the function of the Widgery and the Saville Inquiries: it was up to them to decide who was to blame in the matter
SUMMARY
OF PROCEEDINGS
Monday 16th: Paragraph 1
Tuesday 17th: Paragraphs 2 and 3
Wednesday 18th: Paragraph 4
Thursday 19th: Paragraph 5
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
