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3 - 6 DECEMBER 2002
Evidence heard
This week the Tribunal heard the evidence of two senior ranking officials, Kelvin White and Arthur Hockaday, and of David Dewick, Assistant Secretary to the Widgery Tribunal and INQ598, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion of Coldstream Guards on Bloody Sunday.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. kelvin white’s evidence
Mr White was Head of the Republic of Ireland Department (RID) of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) at the time of Bloody Sunday, responsible for the British Government’s relations with the Republic of Ireland, such as pursuing extradition cases, dealing with internment, cratering border roads. He was the direct link within the FCO for the Irish Ambassador in England, Dr O’Sullivan. During the course of his evidence he also informed the Tribunal that he had served with the Parachute Regiment during his student days.
1.1
Attitude
of the British Government towards Northern Ireland
Mr White told the Tribunal that ministers at the time “abominated violence” and that he never saw the slightest sign of anybody in authority attempting to pursue a policy which was either legally or morally wrong. He did not believe that Whitehall and the FCO would have regarded the IRA and the citizens of the Bogside and Creggan as enemies “in any sweeping sense”, nor did he think that those testifying before the Widgery Inquiry that the Army had murdered people on the streets of Derry would have been deemed to be ‘the enemy’. Rather, it was his own opinion that they had been either honest but misguided or deliberately out to cause trouble. He explained that he had misused the term ‘enemies’ in his letter of 14th April to the British Ambassador in Dublin, John Peck, in which he stated: “Lord Widgery absolves us from the accusations our enemies made”, and that he should have used the expression ‘hostile critics’.
He did not think that his use of the expression in anyway lent weight to Counsel for the families and wounded’s contention that the British establishment of the time regarded the nationalist population of Derry as an ‘unscrupulous enemy’ whom the Army should deal with without being unduly squeamish about the methods they adopted. Rather, he said, the complete opposite was true: the British authorities were always meticulous in adhering to ‘the rule book’ and the letter of the law in their actions in Northern Ireland.
1.1.1
Deep interrogation techniques
Seamus Treacy QC challenged Mr White’s assertion that ministers abhorred violence of any kind by referring to the ‘deep interrogation techniques’ used against those interned, which included forcing detainees to stand for hours against a wall, leaning on their fingers, putting a hood over the detainees’ heads during questioning, subjecting them to white noise and depriving them of food and water. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently concluded in 1978 that the measures used amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, authorised by the British Government against its citizens.
Mr White was also shown the minutes from a meeting he attended in 1971 which demonstrate that the Government was fully aware that “the treatment of detainees would be held legally to constitute an assault” [as noted in the minutes]. However, Mr White persisted in denying Counsel’s contention that this indicated that British Government countenanced, in relation to the citizens of Northern Ireland, measures which breached people’s fundamental human rights, which would not have been deemed acceptable in any other part of the United Kingdom and that, far from ‘abominating violence’, ministers—including the Prime Minister, Edward Heath—were in fact sanctioning its use against Northern Ireland citizens. He said that he could recall the meeting vividly and that all present had ‘heaved a sigh of relief’ having been assured that spread-eagling detainees against the wall, hooding them and depriving them of food and water, etc., was in fact “quite alright” and “within the rule book”.
1.1.2
Shooting unarmed civilians
Mr White said that he had never heard ministers discussing or contemplating the shooting of unarmed civilians, adding that this would have been completely foreign to their way of thinking as it would have amounted to a legal offence. Furthermore, he echoed General Ford’s own words used to describe the General’s memo of January 1972 in which he put forward the suggestion of shooting unarmed rioters as a method for restoring law and order in the Bogside, saying that it was a ‘personal and confidential minute’ that would not have been taken seriously.
1.1.3
Encouraging disease as a method of breaking the no-go areas
A document written for Mr White in 1972 by a junior officer in the FCO, Adrian Thorpe [who is now the British Ambassador to Mexico] notes: “As you know, I have always been in favour of encouraging the no-go areas to rot from within; there is no reason why we should not encourage the breakdown of essential services and the spread of disease, et cetera”. Mr White said that the suggestion was not one that was countenanced at any stage by Whitehall. He could not recall having told Mr Thorpe that the suggestion would have been immoral, believing rather that he would have said something along the lines of “Forget it; do not be absurd… Stick to the Guinness wagons” (Mr White explained that it was an ‘old joke’ within the department that the no-go areas would not survive if Guinness wagons supplying the pubs were refused entry; indeed he made reference to the ‘joke’ on numerous occasions throughout the course of his evidence).
Counsel contended that the suggestion was illegal and immoral and, if pursued, would have resulted in death or serious injury to innocent civilians. Mr Treacy argued that, unless there was a climate in the various departments in Whitehall within which such a suggestion would have been deemed an acceptable option for dealing with the Bogside, the comment should have been stamped on immediately and its author rebuked. However, it was Mr White’s belief that the suggestion did not merit a rebuke as it would not have been taken seriously at any time. However, he claimed to have no recollection of the document itself or of any ensuing conversations.
1.2 GEN 47 cabinet meeting of 27th January 1972
Although he had no recollection of the meeting, it was Mr White’s belief that anything of particular significance would have been recorded in the minutes; therefore, since no reference to a planned arrest operation on Bloody Sunday or to the possibility that the IRA might use the march to attack the Army appeared in the minutes of the meeting, these matters could not have been discussed. He also believed that had the Army been privy to any reliable intelligence at the time to suggest that the IRA would attack the march or, conversely, that they planned to stay away, General Carver would or should have passed this on to the GEN 47 committee; and again, since this does not feature in the minutes, he believed that it could not have been discussed.
Equally he did not think that any suggestion of the Army using the march as an opportunity to draw the IRA into a gunfight would have been discussed, saying that this would not have been contemplated as everyone “was sensible enough to know that if you give an Irish man a bloody nose, you tend to get a bloody nose back”.
Given the anodyne nature of the minutes, he was asked how, following the meeting, ministers had come to instruct Brian Faulkner in a telegram dated 28th January 1972 to issue an unprecedented statement “to prepare public opinion here and in Northern Ireland for violent scenes on TV following the march”: Since the possibility of the IRA taking control of the march was not discussed at the GEN 47 cabinet committee nor the possibility of violence on an exceptional scale, how could the Prime Minister have understood that there was going to be unprecedented violence at the march unless it was planned and approved politically? Mr White dismissed the suggestion, adding that the Government would not have been so eager for the media to be present on the day had it been planning a bloody attack on the Bogside.
1.2
Precautions
taken to protect civilians on Bloody Sunday
Although the documents suggest that political and military thinking prior to Bloody Sunday held the potential occurrence of a shooting war on the day as almost certain, Mr White could not recall any specific discussions questioning whether the proposed strategy for dealing with the march contained protections for civilians in the context of a large march or questioning the wisdom of launching an arrest operation in such a context. However, he denied that ministers and decision makers had been prepared to countenance the shooting of innocent civilians as an acceptable risk or ‘par for the course’ on the day, reiterating his strong belief in ministers’ abhorrence of violence.
He dismissed as ‘absurd’ and ‘utter rubbish’ the suggestion that the British Government had decided to take a strong and dangerous course in dealing with the march, risking the loss of Catholic lives in order to appease Brian Faulkner and the Unionists and to encourage them to co-operate in a political solution. It was his belief that the events of Bloody Sunday could never have been perceived as aiding the political process. However, it would appear from a confidential document recording a Cabinet meeting of 3rd February 1972 that ministers had discussed just that, questioning whether “the tragic events of the previous weekend in Londonderry had provided an opportunity for a political initiative” or whether they had made such an initiative “impracticable for the time being”. Furthermore, Brian Faulkner himself is also recorded as having said, following Bloody Sunday, that “on the Unionist side, there was undoubtedly a new solidarity… In the longer term, it might be the case that the terrible events in Londonderry would be seen to have cleared the air”.
1.3 Guidance Telegram 31
A telegram compiled in the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday by Mr White’s department and the Guidance Information Policy Department for distribution to diplomatic posts abroad to inform them of the events in Derry exonerates the Army, stating categorically that the IRA opened fire first and provides the following analysis of the Bloody Sunday march: “The essential point to make is that informed comment prior to the march was to the effect that it would now be a sound tactic on the IRA’s part to bring about a bloody confrontation. The civil rights march was a deliberate attempt to provoke trouble and those who, knowing IRA policies, fell in with the plan for a march bear a heavy responsibility for the deaths that followed”.
Mr White denied that this represented a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government to present as fact things that could not have been known to the authorities but that were the subject of a public Inquiry in order to paint a picture of the events that would be favourable to the British Government.
1.4
Widgery
findings
In a letter of 14th April 1972 to the British Ambassador in Dublin, Mr White wrote: “there is some comfort for Dublin that Lord Widgery does not believe Soldier H [who claimed that 19 of his expended rounds had been fired at a window in Glenfada Park]. But privately I gather he is a rather thick sort of individual and not at all a trigger-happy killer. I suppose a cynic would say that, if he had any sense, he would have thrown away a magazine and made a statement to the effect that he had lost it and the 18 rounds therein. But we are stuck with him and his 19 unaccounted-for shots, and the Irish might make something of that”.
Mr White told the Inquiry that Soldier H’s character and mental faculties had come under discussion at a Cabinet Office meeting sometime before the publication of Lord Widgery’s report, but could not recall who exactly had been present to impart the information. In relation to the ‘lost magazine’ theory, Mr White explained that he thought that a more streetwise, but dishonest, soldier would have covered up the evidence of his excessive shooting by saying that he had merely lost a magazine, a story which he thought would have facilitated the British Ambassador’s dealings with the Irish Government. It was also his evidence that he had heard a rumour in 1972 that this version might actually have been the true account of the incident.
2. david dewick’s evidence
Mr Dewick was the Assistant Secretary to the Tribunal team on the Widgery Inquiry. He was asked to provide further information to the Inquiry concerning the fate of the materials before Lord Widgery, including video footage of the day, i.e., where and when they were filed and stored at the conclusion of the Inquiry.
Mr Dewick was given—he presumed by somebody within the MoD—a copy of the Army helicopter film footage of Bloody Sunday which he stored in a cupboard in his office at the Home Office for safekeeping, prior to submitting it to the Public Records Office. He agreed that he had been led to believe that it was the original of the film, of 200 feet in length. However, the video which the Tribunal has retrieved is in fact a copy rather than the original negative, of only 134 feet in length. Counsel for the families suggested that this indicated that the Army had in fact retained the original of the film, or negative, in their possession. However Mr Dewick was unable to shed any further light on the matter.
3. arthur hockaday’s evidence
Mr Hockaday (now Sir Arthur) became Deputy Head of the Defence and Overseas division of the Cabinet Secretariat in January 1972, having previously served as a high-ranking civil servant within the MoD. He told the Tribunal that he had little recollection of events, meetings or discussions leading up to Bloody Sunday so his evidence focussed primarily on the general policy at the time towards Northern Ireland and his specific role in the aftermath of the day’s events.
3.1 Prior sanction for the events of Bloody Sunday?
Mr Hockaday denied any suggestion that the operation in Derry on Bloody Sunday was a conspiracy designed to teach the population of Derry and the IRA a lesson. To do so, he said, would have frustrated the pending political initiative planned for early 1972, designed to redress some of the discrimination experienced by the nationalist population, and the Army and the Government were both convinced that the problems in Northern Ireland could not be solved by military means alone. He also denied the suggestion that the Army operation on Bloody Sunday was expressly designed to satisfy unionist public opinion in advance of any political initiative by demonstrating that the Government would act forcefully against nationalists defying the ban on marches.
He agreed that he had been surprised to see the telegram, issued in the name of the Prime Minister before Bloody Sunday, requesting that an unprecedented special statement be issued “to prepare public opinion here and in Northern Ireland for violent scenes on TV following the march”. He could recall no discussions that indicated that violence of the scale indicated in the report was expected either within the MoD or the GEN 47 Cabinet Committee, saying that indications were that the march would be ‘comparatively peaceful’. However, he added that the telegram was a long way short of indicating that soldiers would be shooting at unarmed civilians and assumed that the author of the memo might have over-exaggerated the Prime Minister’s suggestion that rioting was inevitable on the day.
Mr Hockaday told the Tribunal that the prevailing culture within the establishment was one of respect for the law and for the doctrine of minimum force, although he acknowledged having been involved in the decision to introduce the ‘deep interrogation’ techniques used on those interned which were subsequently condemned as “inhumane and degrading treatment” by the European Court of Human Rights. He rejected Counsel’s suggestion that the introduction of these techniques demonstrated a propensity on the part of the British Government to use measures which violated people’s fundamental rights and their willingness to either sanction or ‘turn a blind eye’ to tactics and operations which violated the rights of the citizens of Northern Ireland, including the right to life. Contrary to Counsel’s suggestion he said that Northern Ireland was viewed as an integral part of the United Kingdom rather than as a colony and therefore the same application of the Rule of Law was enforced. He did not believe that anybody in Government at the time would have perceived it as a colony and had never heard the term ‘bogwog’ used to refer to its citizens.
He did not think that the body of written evidence before the Tribunal suggesting that there was in fact a culture in high Government circles which would have been prepared to countenance the shooting at unarmed civilians belied in any way his evidence that the prevailing culture was one of respect for the law and for the doctrine of minimum force. Furthermore, despite written evidence to the contrary, he did not believe that the highest echelons of the Government or military held the view that NICRA and the IRA were to all intents and purposes one and the same, but acknowledged that any such failure to distinguish between the two organisations could have had dangerous consequences.
3.2 Use of 1 Para
Mr Hockaday could not recall whether or not he had prior knowledge of the decision to use 1 Para as the arresting force on the day but said that, had he still been in his previous position within the MoD, he would have expected to have known of their deployment (which led to the suggestion that his successor, Mr Stephens, would therefore have been informed of the decision prior to 30th January). It was his evidence that had he been informed of the decision he would have questioned the wisdom in using 1 Para due to the perceived problem with the 1 Para aired substantially in the press prior to Bloody Sunday. Nevertheless, he disagreed with the view of Colonel Roy Jackson, Commanding Officer of the Royal Anglians, based in Derry, that the use of 1 Para reflected a change in military policy in Derry. He also felt unable to comment on whether Lord Carrington and the Prime Minister would have been aware of the perceptions of 1 Para at the time.
3.3 Widgery Inquiry
He said that he and his colleagues within the Government had certainly hoped that Lord Widgery would not conclude that the soldiers were guilty of indiscriminate behaviour and he recalled being comforted by Lord Widgery’s military background, which would enable him to understand the issues involved in soldiering in Northern Ireland. However, he denied any sentiment or feeling within the Government that Lord Widgery’s background would lead him to favour the soldiers’ case unduly.
4. inq598’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, INQ598 was the Lieutenant Colonel commanding the First Battalion of the Coldstream Guards, based at Fort George.
4.1 Army perceptions of support for the IRA in the local community
INQ598 told the Inquiry that the IRA often got girls to carry weapons from the scene of an incident or used babies’ prams to conceal arms. However, he could not recall any incidents where this had ever happened and acknowledged that it might have been supposition or folklore on the Army’s part.
4.2 Prior knowledge of the military operation planned for Bloody Sunday
INQ598 received a copy of the Brigade Order prior to Bloody Sunday and attended Brigadier MacLellan’s coordinating conference held in relation to the march, at which the possibility of a scoop-up operation was discussed. He said that whilst the arrest operation was only going to be undertaken in the event of serious misbehaviour on the part of the ‘Derry Young Hooligans’, the expectation was that rioting would in fact take place, offering the Army the opportunity of carrying out a scoop-up operation. However, the details of the arrest operation were not discussed in any detail.
He could not recall any concern being expressed by anybody at the coordinating conference or privately about the use of 1 Para as the arresting force, nor could he recall any discussions about the allegations of brutality made against 1 Para following their deployment at Magilligan the previous week.
He said that he had been aware at the time of Chief Superintendent Lagan’s belief that the march should be allowed to proceed unhindered but could not recollect how he had come to know this.
4.3 Arrest operation plan
INQ598 agreed with Counsel for
the families’ contention that the arrest operation detailed in 1 Para’s
operational order for the day represented a mere frontal attack on the hooligans
rather than an imaginative plan to ensnare them, as had been attempted to some
extent on previous occasions by the resident battalions in Derry (a tactic known
as the ‘Derry hook’)..
However, he felt unable to comment on the quality of the plan. He could not, for example, offer any judgement as to whether 1Para’s plan to send 200 men over a narrow wall near the Presbyterian Church, necessitating their cutting the barbed wire on top of it, whilst still attempting to maintain an element of surprise against the Derry Young Hooligans who purportedly adopted sophisticated tactics and had numerous lookouts, showed a serious level of bad planning. He was also unable to comment as to whether the plan was so badly orchestrated due to its failure to take into account the experience and knowledge of the resident battalions at the coordinating conference.
4.4 Events at Fort George
Those arrested on Bloody Sunday were taken to Fort George detention camp for questioning and charging. There are strong allegations from both detainees and soldiers that the detainees were brutalised by members of the Parachute Regiment during their detention. One of the soldiers to have made such an allegation was INQ179, Major in the Coldstream Guards, who claims that he was so disturbed by the brutality that he wrote a report on the matter and submitted it to INQ598. This is corroborated in the evidence of INQ1779, who was INQ598’s 2nd in command at the time of Bloody Sunday and who also recalls the soldier making the complaint and discussing the matter with INQ598. INQ598 claimed to have no recollection of the soldier making such a complaint, but believed that had he would have discussed the matter with his colleagues and, if he felt it to be serious, would have reported the matter to Brigade HQ.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Tuesday 3rd: Paragraph 1
Wednesday 4th: Paragraph 2
Thursday 5th: Paragraph 3
Friday 6th: Paragraph 4
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
