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25 - 28 NOVEMBER 2002
Evidence heard
This week the Tribunal heard from
Colonel (now General Sir) Michael Steele who was the Brigade Major of 8th
Brigade and second in command to Brigadier MacLellan at the time of Bloody
Sunday. He was one of the longest
serving staff officers in Derry and was responsible for drafting the Operational
Order for the Army’s operation on Bloody Sunday and for running the Brigade
net during the day.
A full transcript of the proceedings
is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Michael
steele’s evidence
Colonel Steele described an escalation in paramilitary
activity and hooliganism in the six months leading up to Bloody Sunday and said
that the fatal shooting of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie in July 1971 in
hotly contested circumstances had served to turn the Catholic community against
the Army, leading to the erection of barricades in nationalist areas across the
City. This in turn was followed by
the adoption of a more ‘hard line’ military policy on the part of the Army,
as mandated by General Ford, moving away from the policy of ‘passive
containment’ instigated by Colonel Tuzo earlier in the year regarding active
operations in the Bogside and Creggan areas.
1
Questions on behalf of the Tribunal
1.1
Operational order
1.1.1
Halting the march
Colonel Steele was responsible for drawing up a draft
operational order for the NICRA march, originally planned for the weekend
preceding Bloody Sunday. This put
forward two solutions to policing the march, both of which put the RUC in the
vanguard of the operation with the reserve battalions being held at Drumahoe
factory rather than taking an active role in the operation.
The second of his solutions tallied with Chief Superintendent Frank
Lagan’s proposal for dealing with the march, i.e.,
that it be allowed to proceed unhindered and that arrests of ringleaders be made
on a subsequent occasion. He
initially told the Tribunal that he had favoured this latter proposal, believing
that it would create the least trouble in the City.
However, this is not substantiated in the documents and in the
operational orders, which make clear the Army’s position that the march was
not to be allowed to reach the Guildhall. Despite
the operational order stating that “marchers are to be halted at blocking
points and not to be allowed to proceed; there is to be no half measure of
allowing participants to trickle through the blocking points”, it was the
Colonel’s testimony that his meaning in drafting it was that the meeting would
still have been allowed to take place in Guildhall Square, even if the march
were halted prior to that.
1.1.2
Planned arrest operation
In fact, this operational order was not put into effect for
dealing with the NICRA march which was moved to 30th January 1972,
but was superseded by a further operational order, also drafted by the Colonel,
which gave the Army the primary role on the day and allotted 1 Para the role of
arresting force on the day, two changes mandated by General Ford.
It was his belief that General Ford had ordered the changes in the
operational order due to the numbers predicted to attend the march.
However, he said that both he and Brigadier MacLellan had viewed the
General’s plan to ‘scoop up’ and arrest 300 to 400 rioters as both
optimistic and unrealistic, given that no such number of rioters existed to be
arrested. Rather, they had
estimated the number of potential rioters at such a large-scale march to be in
the region of 100 to 150, but had not informed the General of their belief
regarding the unrealistic nature of his plan.
He dismissed the suggestion that
he and the Brigadier had felt unable to interfere in a plan devised by the
Commander of Land Forces, feeling obliged to continue with it despite its
apparent flaws, and felt unable to comment on the suggestion that a plan better
suited to the more realistic estimates of 25 to 50 arrestees would have been to
conduct traditional ‘snatch’ operations, rather than attempting a more
elaborate encircling or ‘scoop-up’ operation.
The Colonel told the Tribunal that General Ford had coined
the term ‘scoop-up’ operation in his directions concerning the Bloody Sunday
march but that there had been no detailed discussion as to how such a plan would
operate in practice. He also said
that he had had no concerns about the allocation of 1 Para for the task,
believing that they would do “a very good job” due to their training and
experience.
The operational order mandated that Brigadier MacLellan
would be solely responsible for deciding whether the arrest operation was
launched and also to what extent it was performed. It also specified that it should be a quick ‘in and out’
operation and that it was to be performed on foot. However, Colonel Steele said that this did not amount to a
prohibition against 1 Para using their vehicles should they so choose, merely a
recommendation. Indeed it was his
evidence that it was up to the Commanding Officer of 1 Para, Colonel Wilford, to
make whatever arrest plan he deemed appropriate from the guidance set out in the
operational order, a plan that was never discussed in detail with Brigade or
with any of the other officers commanding units on the day.
1.1.3
Secure communications
Although the operational order makes no mention of a secure
net, it was Colonel Steele’s evidence that the order to launch the arrest
operation was to be communicated from Brigade HQ to 1 Para via the BID 150
encryption device. He explained the
absence of any reference to secure communications by saying that this particular
tactic had only been agreed by him and Brigadier MacLellan after the operation
order had been distributed to all concerned parties.
1.2
Expectations of violence
On 28th January 1972, a co-ordinating conference
was held at Brigade HQ, attended by Brigadier MacLellan, the Colonel, staff
officers and the commanding officers of the units to be deployed to confirm and
discuss the details of the planned operation.
Although the inevitability of hooligan activity was discussed, he could
not recall having seen or been told of the contents of a signal purportedly sent
by the Director of Intelligence to Brigade HQ on 27th January which
related that intelligence suggested that the marchers would be “armed with
sticks and stones” and that the “IRA will use the crowd as cover”.
He expressed surprise at the document saying that it ran contrary to all
other intelligence that they had received to the effect that the marchers would
be orderly and peaceful.
He told the Tribunal that no contingency plans to be put
into operation in the event of hostile fire, such as withdrawal of the troops,
were discussed nor was there any discussion of or consideration given to the
risk that innocent civilians might get caught in crossfire, since the
possibility of there being a firefight was “the last thing in [their]
minds”.
1.3
Separation
1.3.1
Importance of separation
Although both Brigadier MacLellan
and Colonel Steele were both at pains to emphasise the fundamental importance of
separation between marchers and hooligans in determining whether to launch the
arrest operation, no mention of separation appears in either the operational
order or the note of the co-ordinating conference. As Bilal Rawat, Counsel for the Inquiry, indicated, this
appears extraordinary given the importance placed upon the concept in the
aftermath of the operation. Although
the Colonel could offer no real explanation as to the absence of reference to
separation in the key documents preceding the march, he was adamant that the
Brigadier had mentioned it at the co-ordinating conference and had tasked
Colonel Welsh at this meeting with the specific role of ascertaining the
occurrence of separation from a helicopter on the day.
However, Colonel Welsh himself has written in his statement to the
Inquiry that he was not informed of his role until Bloody Sunday itself, which
Counsel suggested indicated that separation was never the key factor as
maintained by Colonel Steele.
1.3.2
Colonel Wilford’s understanding of the need for separation
Counsel for the families and wounded contended that, to
date, Colonel Wilford had never indicated that separation was a vital ingredient
to the launch of the operation planned by him and that requests made by the
Colonel on the day indicated both a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature
of the operation envisaged by Brigade HQ and an ignorance of the need for
separation. Colonel Steele
responded that Colonel Wilford had been made well aware of the importance of
separation at the co-ordinating conference held prior to Bloody Sunday.
1.3.3
Achievement of separation
Brigadier MacLellan has told the Tribunal that he had come
to the conclusion that adequate separation had been achieved on the day not only
from the messages on the Army communications network but also on the opinion of
Colonel Steele who had confirmed to him that separation had been achieved, a
confirmation that the Brigadier had assumed was based on a final check made by
Colonel Steele with Colonel Welsh in the helicopter.
Indeed, Brigadier MacLellan told the Widgery Inquiry that he and Colonel
Steele had in fact made one final check with Colonel Welsh who had confirmed
that the tail end of the march had passed the Rossville Flats.
This account, as demonstrated by the logs on the day, is not correct, no
such communication having ever taken place, and Colonel Steele said that the
Brigadier must have been confused on this issue when giving his evidence.
Colonel Steele confirmed that he had advised the Brigadier
that separation had been achieved, but had not checked this with the helicopter.
When queried as to how he could have come to this conclusion based on the
lack of specific information from units on the ground and from the helicopter as
to the number of people in Rossville Street, he explained that he had never
assumed that Rossville Street was clear, it being a main thoroughfare through
the Bogside. Rather, he had
understood that there were approximately 500 marchers at Free Derry Corner and
approximately 150 hooligans at Aggro corner and had concluded that there was
adequate separation between these two points, but, in his own words, those in
between these two points “were not allowed for”:
His understanding of the scoop-up operation was that innocent people
might well have been arrested by soldiers targeting the hooligans, but that this
was a sad fact of such operations.
1.4
BID 150 secure communications device
Colonel Steele was adamant that two BID 150 encryption
devices were in use on Bloody Sunday, one located at Brigade HQ and one at 1
Para’s tactical HQ on the day and it was his evidence that only two signals on
the day had been communicated from HQ using the BID 150 device, namely the order
to 1 Para to commence the arrest operation and an earlier signal refusing 1
Para’s request to send one company through Barrier 14 to arrest rioters in
that vicinity (for the latter of which there is no written evidence, it not
having been logged in the Brigade log on the day).
The specific function of the devices was, he said, to enable the arrest
operation to be ordered with an ‘element of surprise’.
However, he acknowledged that this ‘element of surprise’ would have
been seriously undermined as the order received by 1 Para’s tactical HQ would
have to have been transmitted to Colonel Wilford and to the troops involved over
insecure communication networks. He
also acknowledged that he had been put out by 1 Para’s use of insecure means
to transmit their initial request to push through Barrier 14 to arrest rioters,
agreeing that this too would have compromised the secrecy of the operation.
1.5
Order to launch arrest operation
Colonel Steele admitted that the evidence he had given to
Lord Widgery concerning the order to launch the arrest operation had been
inaccurate on more than one count. It
was his current evidence that he could no longer recall the exact words of the
order he transmitted to 1 Para to commence the arrest operation (an order
conveyed with Brigadier MacLellan standing by his side), but was adamant that
the order as recorded in the log on the day was inaccurate and represented
merely a ‘gist’ of the orders given. The
log in fact records:
1.5.1
Limitation placed on numbers of sub-units involved
Although the order as recorded gives permission for only
one sub-unit (C Company) to conduct an arrest operation, Colonel Steele was
adamant that he had not limited the operation to one sub-unit and that he had a
clear recollection of having said “one of the sub-units” as opposed to
“one sub-unit to go through Barrier 14”.
Lord Saville suggested that, on the face of it, the order
given appeared to mirror Colonel Wilford’s earlier request to send one
sub-unit through Barrier 14 to arrest rioters in William Street and Little James
Street, and that this in turn suggested that Brigadier MacLellan had merely
agreed with the earlier request put forward by Colonel Wilford to conduct a
limited arrest operation, once he was satisfied that separation had been
achieved. Colonel Steele denied
that this was the case, reiterating that the order he had given had not been
limited to one sub-unit. He
accepted that Barrier 14 and the sub-unit at that location were the only barrier
and sub-unit expressly mentioned in the order, but explained this by saying that
he had known from Colonel Wilford’s earlier request that a company in this
location was prepared and ready to go.
1.5.2
Geographical limitation
Although Colonel Steele denied that any limitation had been
placed on Colonel Wilford in terms of the number of sub-units to be used in the
operation, he acknowledged that a limitation not to conduct a running battle
down Rossville Street had been included in the order. He was reluctant to agree
that 1 Para had disobeyed his order by chasing rioters down Rossville Street.
He agreed with Lord Saville’s surmise that the injunction
not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street was designed to protect
those marchers in the Rossville Street area in respect of whom Brigade had no
information of any rioting behaviour and that he had not expected the Paras to
go any significant distance down Rossville Street. However, he did not believe that driving Army vehicles as far
down Rossville Street as the rubble barricade (approximately half way down the
street) was in fact a breach of the order.
Had he his time again, he would, he said, have expressly stated, “no
running battle down Rossville Street / Eden Place”.
1.6
Order to withdraw
At 14:13 pm, an order was given by Colonel Steele to 1
Para, stating: “if you have not
conducted any scoop-up then you should withdraw your call sign [C Company] back
to its original position for any further operation”.
Having been reluctant to acknowledge, in both his evidence to Lord
Widgery and in his statement to the current Inquiry, that this was in fact an
order (saying rather that it was merely a suggestion), he agreed that it was in
fact an order, but added that he had placed 1 Para in a difficult position by
making it at such an early stage.
Again, significantly, in this order, the Colonel referred
only to Support Company and not to the other sub-units he earlier told the
Tribunal that he had authorised to deploy.
He explained that “in the heat of the moment” he had referred only to
this sub-unit, whereas in fact he should have referred to all three.
However, he did acknowledge that the order was predicated on the
understanding that the arrest operation would be a quick “in and out”
operation and that, at this stage, Brigade was acting under the mistaken belief
that 1 Para had gone no further into the Bogside than Aggro Corner (the junction
of William Street and Little James Street).
1.7
Lack of or misleading information provided to Brigade HQ
Brigadier MacLellan’s stated aim in selecting Brigade HQ
(which was at a substantial distance from the Bogside) as the most appropriate
place from whence to direct the operation was that it would afford him the best
access to communications, thereby enabling him to have the clearest picture of
events unfolding on the ground. However,
in actual fact on the day, Brigade HQ was supplied with such inaccurate
information, or information was withheld or not communicated to them to such an
extent that they had no knowledge of the key events of the day until
substantially after they had transpired.
1.7.1
Shootings of Damien Doherty and John Johnson
Colonel Steele confirmed that Brigade HQ did not know,
before the arrest operation was launched, that two members of Support Company
had shot two civilians in William Street (one of whom later died from his
injuries). He agreed that the fact
that this was not reported to Brigade HQ and was not mentioned in any way on the
battalion net was extraordinary. He
also agreed that, had Brigade HQ been aware of the shootings, they might have
reconsidered the decision regarding whether or not to launch an arrest operation
on the day.
1.7.2
Location and deployment of Support Company
Brigade HQ received what Counsel for the Inquiry described
as a ‘puzzling’ message stating that Support Company had deployed through
the Presbyterian Church (on foot). Although
this was in fact the original plan devised by Colonel Wilford for the day,
Support Company in fact entered the Bogside in vehicles through Barrier 12.
Counsel for the families and wounded further pursued the issue,
highlighting the fact that, had Support Company been acting under orders on the
day, they would have received the order to drive through Barrier 12 from the
selfsame people who later erroneously informed Brigade HQ that they had entered,
on foot, past the Presbyterian Church.
Even more significant is the fact that Brigade was informed
that Support Company, responsible for the bulk of the military shooting on the
day, was in the area of William Street, whereas in fact the convoy of vehicles
had sped half way down Rossville Street.
It was the Colonel’s evidence that he had only found out
that Support Company had gone as far into the Bogside as the Rossville Flats
sometime later in the evening, as there was no communication to Brigade HQ
during the day to suggest that this had taken place. He was, he agreed, surprised at the news, but was extremely
reluctant to agree with Brigadier MacLellan’s view that Support Company had
gone much further down Rossville Street than expected.
He said that he had always envisaged that the arrest operation would take
place in the Eden Place waste ground (off Rossville Street) as opposed to in the
Aggro Corner and Little James Street areas, as suggested by the operational
order. It was his evidence that
this view had been based on the understanding that rioters would run away and
that there had been no call to include it in the operational order, given that
the arrest operation was the province of Colonel Wilford rather than Brigade HQ.
1.7.3
Army fire
Colonel Steele confirmed that 1 Para had not informed
Brigade HQ that they were engaged in what they deemed to be a gun battle until
after the key events of the afternoon were over, a fact at which he expressed
his extreme disappointment.
One of the first indications
Brigade HQ had of the fact that soldiers had shot civilians was a report to
Brigade from 1 Para, claiming to be dealing with two bodies in Chamberlain
Street (in actual fact the bodies referred to were those of two of the young men
shot at the rubble barricade on Rossville Street).
Counsel for the families and wounded contended that this demonstrated
that the paratroopers did not in fact know where they were, a suggestion on
which the Brigadier felt unable to comment.
1.8
Perception of the day’s events
The Colonel denied that the Army
operation on Bloody Sunday was extraordinarily badly executed, saying that “1
Para did the best they could under the circumstances”.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
