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11 - 12 NOVEMBER 2002
Evidence heard
General Robert Ford’s evidence to the Tribunal culminated this week. The following represents a broad summary of his evidence, given over the course of Weeks 70, 71 and 72.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
General ford’s evidence
General Ford succeeded General Farrar-Hockley as Commander of Land Forces Northern Ireland (CLF) in July 1971, having previously acted as Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of the Defence Staff. As CLF, he was responsible for the day-to-day conduct of Army operations throughout Northern Ireland, acting as second in command to the General Officer Commanding (GOC), General Tuzo, to whom he was directly responsible. He was the originator of the military plan for Bloody Sunday and was present in Derry on the day in what he claimed was merely the role of observer. He has been knighted since Bloody Sunday. He claimed to have little to no independent memory of Bloody Sunday.
1. questions on behalf of the tribunal
1.1 Internment
General Ford told the Inquiry that the policy of internment without trial had been decided upon prior to his appointment as CLF, and that he had been instructed by the GOC to implement the military plan to carry it out on 10th August 1971. However, he said that he had become concerned about the security of the operation, due to what he perceived as an excessive number of people in Stormont and Whitehall with knowledge of the plan. He therefore decided to bring the date forward to 4:30am on 9th August, implementing what he termed a ‘plan within a plan’, putting out false rumours that Faulkner’s plea for internment had been rejected and that the additional troops amassing upon Derry were there to deal with the Apprentice Boys’ march on 11th August.
He thought that this campaign of misinformation had been directed by Colonel Tugwell and the Director of Intelligence, who had spread the false rumours through various sources. However, he did not think that any such ‘plan within a plan’ or cover plan had been used in relation to Bloody Sunday (c.f. Colin Wallace’s allegations in Week 65, paragraph 4.1.9.2, that the Army had put out false rumours that they would invade the Creggan on Bloody Sunday).
It was General Ford’s current view that, although he had been in favour of internment at the time, the extensive internment operation that took place was a wrong decision, due to the inaccuracy of intelligence information. Indeed, in an interview with journalist Desmond Hamill in 1984, he said that “[internment] was a major decision and in my opinion the totally wrong one. I backed it at the time because I thought it was the right way. Now I know I was dead wrong”.
1.2
Determining military policy in Northern Ireland
General Ford and General Tuzo met in private at least three times a week to discuss military policy and operational matters. He said that the GOC would keep him informed of everything that was being discussed at Stormont and at Whitehall and in meetings with the Joint Security Committee (JSC) and the RUC Chief Constable, relating to the security situation. He, in turn, would update the GOC on operational matters.
It was General Ford’s evidence that although decisions for operations were ostensibly made at the Director of Operations meetings (which included General Tuzo, General Ford, the UK Representative Howard Smith, the Chief Constable, the Director of Intelligence and the Head of the Special Branch, amongst others) these meetings would invariably be preceded by a private meeting between him and the GOC during the course of which they would come to an agreement on which stance to take and which course of action to recommend at the meeting.
1.3 Opinion of the RUC
It was General Ford’s opinion in 1971-1972 that if law and order was to be effectively maintained, the main burden would fall to the Army, as the morale of most members of the RUC was low, and senior officers were ‘professionally and physically tired’.
1.4 Military approach adopted in Derry
1.4.1 Low-key approach: August – November 1971
On 20th August 1971, the GOC and the UK Representative met in Derry with military and RUC personnel and with a group of prominent Catholic Derry citizens, who became known as the ‘Committee of 30’. Following these meetings, General Tuzo agreed that the Army would adopt a lower profile in the city, abandoning routine military patrolling in the Bogside and Creggan and ruling out all ‘offensive’ military initiatives, save in response to ‘aggression’ or for specific search and arrest operations, in the hope that moderate opinion in the city would prevail and that the rioting would stop. This trial was to last for a month, but, according to General Ford had, in actual fact, lasted for approximately three months.
General Ford said that the decision to adopt a lower military profile had been a unilateral one, made by General Tuzo, who had been persuaded of the validity and correctness of this approach by Chief Superintendent Lagan. He said that he had never agreed with the policy personally and that General Tuzo had come to regard it as the worst mistake he had ever made in his time in Northern Ireland, as he held it directly responsible for the destruction of the city centre and for the establishment of the Creggan and Bogside as no-go areas, outside the jurisdiction of the Security Forces.
1.4.2 New operational directive of October 1971
Given the perceived failure of the low-key military approach, General Ford issued a new operational directive for Derry on 26th October 1971, which represented a marked change in gear in terms of the military approach to be adopted in Derry, as mandated by the GEN 47 Whitehall Cabinet committee. The directive coincided with the appointment of Brigadier MacLellan as the new Commander of 8th Brigade in Derry (General Ford knew the Brigadier, having previously worked with him for Lord Mountbatten). It stipulated that the Army’s mission was to restore law and order and that 8th Brigade should progressively impose the Rule of Law on the Creggan and the Bogside, by “vigorously” countering “hooligan fringe activity”, continuing arrest operations, and resuming army patrols through “IRA-dominated areas”.
General Ford could no longer recall why he had felt it necessary to include within the directive the following instructions: “we should not hesitate to fire whenever events demand and the law permits. Nevertheless, we must not permit standards of conduct to deteriorate, whatever the provocation. We must ensure that fire discipline is good…” and did not know whether it had been designed to encourage soldiers to shoot more readily than they had done before.
It was General Ford’s testimony that this new approach to the security situation had not been put in place until November 1971.
1.5 Memo to General Ford following visit to Derry on 7th January 1972
General Ford made a visit to Derry on 7th January, during which he met senior Security Forces personnel and a group of Protestant business men, known as the Strand Traders’ Association (STA). Following this visit, he wrote his infamous memo to General Tuzo, in which he propounded the policy of shooting rioters. He was at pains to tell the Tribunal that the memo amounted to no more than a ‘personal and confidential’ memo to the GOC, whom he knew well, and was intended for ‘his eyes only’. It was also his evidence that he had no recollection of having written the memo (although he did not deny authorship) and that he did not even know whether he had ever passed it on to the GOC. The memo raises a number of key issues which are dealt with below.
1.5.1 Attitude towards senior Security Force personnel in Derry
The memo records: “I was disturbed by the attitude of both the Brigade Commander [Brigadier Tugwell] and the Battalion Commander [Colonel Ferguson], and also, of course, by Chief Superintendent Lagan”.
General Ford told the Tribunal that ‘disturbed’ had been too strong a word, and that he had been purely concerned by the lack of suggestions made by Brigadier Tugwell and Major Steele for breaking the military stalemate in the city. However, in relation to Chief Superintendent Lagan, he said that General Tuzo had a very low opinion of him, due to his strong support for the low-profile military policy adopted in Derry, and that he had never trusted him subsequently.
1.5.2 Meeting with the STA
General Ford claimed to have no recollection of his meeting with representatives of the STA, including Robert Ferris, which had come about at the behest of Brian Faulkner. However, he disputed Mr Ferris’ version of the meeting, which was that the STA had not expressed any view as to how the security situation should be managed, namely that the Rossville Flats should be cleared, the Creggan and Bogside occupied, nightly curfews imposed and shootings on sight introduced. General Ford said that he would not have attributed these suggestions to the STA had they not been made by them during the course of the meeting.
1.5.3 Recommendations for dealing with rioters
The memo paints a bleak picture of the activities of rioters, described as the Derry Young Hooligans (DYH), and the Army’s inability to deal with them effectively. It goes on to make two recommendations for dealing with them, namely the introduction of a policy of shooting them with live ammunition, linked to a second recommendation of introducing a different type of high-velocity bullet, described as ‘less lethal’ than that in use at the time.
In relation to the first recommendation, General Ford wrote: “I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ringleaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have been given”. He acknowledged that this would have meant a change in the Yellow Card, but did not agree that his suggestion was almost certainly unlawful, in that it would have allowed soldiers to open fire, even if their ‘target’ was not posing an immediate threat.
It was also his evidence that this suggestion had nothing to do with Bloody Sunday and would have had to be worked out at great length prior to being put in practice. However, a memo written by the General in the week following Bloody Sunday appears to suggest the contrary, in that he does appear to make some link between his earlier recommendations and the events of Bloody Sunday, stating: “I believe that we would have had the greatest of difficulty in containing the situation without shooting the crowd; and, indeed, I had prepared a paper on this subject in the preceding week with a view to possibly putting it to the MoD… The paper was based on the assumption that… it would be necessary to revert to the hard concept used in other counter-insurgency campaigns, of warning ringleaders that they would be shot, if necessary doing so”. However, General Ford disputed whether the paper referred to was his memo written immediately after 7th January (indeed the dates would appear to substantiate this view), suggesting instead that another paper dealing with the ‘disperse or we fire’ recommendation must have been written in the week preceding Bloody Sunday. However, no such paper has yet been disclosed to the Tribunal.
General Ford also denied that the suggestion of shooting unarmed rioters had any currency at HQNI (Army Headquarters Northern Ireland) at the time and claimed never to have seen a document prepared by Colonel Dalzell-Payne propounding an identical recommendation in relation to marches: “the only additional measures left for physical control is the use of firearms, i.e., ‘disperse or we fire’” (c.f. Week 38, paragraph 3.1.4.2).
The second recommendation for dealing with rioters involved the adaptation of high-velocity weapons to fire a smaller bullet than that used at the time, stating: “I believe we would be justified in using the 7.62-milimetre, but in view of the devastating effects of this weapon and the danger of rounds killing more than the person aimed at, I believe we must consider issuing rifles adapted to fire high-velocity .22 ammunition to sufficient members of the unit dealing with this problem, to enable ringleaders to be engaged with this less lethal ammunition”. It was his evidence that he had deemed the .22 bullet as being ‘less lethal’, causing incapacitation rather than death—although, as acknowledged in the memo, a .22 high-velocity bullet, fired by a soldier who was trained to ‘shoot to kill’ would be just as lethal as any other form of bullet.
The memo went on to state that “30 of these weapons [adjusted to fire .22 ammunition] have been sent to 8th Brigade this weekend for zeroing and familiarisation training. They, of course, will not be used operationally without authorisation”. Again, General Ford claimed to have no recollection of having included this information in the memo and could shed no light on what had subsequently happened to the rifles.
1.5.4 Plan for Bloody Sunday
The memo goes on to describe in broad outline the plan for dealing with the proposed civil rights march and, significantly, refers only to halting the march “as near to its starting point as practical” rather than to any arrest operation.
It also states that “it is the opinion of the senior commanders in Londonderry that, if the march takes place, however good the intentions of NICRA may be, the Derry Young Hooligans, backed up by gunmen, will undoubtedly take over control at an early stage”.
Christopher Clarke, QC for the Inquiry, questioned this conclusion on three fronts: firstly, in the entire history of the ban on marches to date, no civil rights march had ever been used by armed gunmen; secondly, the IRA was unlikely to use the march as cover, as so doing would have alienated the community through emasculating the effect of a civil rights march and endangering the lives of people who might be sympathetic towards them; thirdly, Mr Clarke posited that General Ford might have overreacted to the fears of the STA, overestimating the threat that the hooligans presented.
General Ford responded that he had merely been quoting the opinion of the senior Army commanders in Derry at the time (having declined to enquire as to the view of the RUC, due to his inherent distrust of Chief Superintendent Lagan), rather than any personal view on the situation.
1.5.5 Memo before Widgery
The Tribunal is in possession of the three draft statements made by General Ford for the Widgery Inquiry. It would appear that, whilst reference to the memo appears in the second draft statement, suggesting that it was appended to the document, all reference to the memo was removed from the final statement given to Lord Widgery. General Ford was unable to explain the redaction.
1.6
Initial plan for Bloody Sunday
General Ford’s aforementioned memo also noted that he had ordered Brigadier MacLellan to draw up an operational plan for dealing with the Derry civil rights march (which was originally planned for the weekend of 16th January). The plan drawn up by the Brigadier envisaged that the RUC should take the primary role in dealing with the march, with the assistance of local Army units, and that two companies of the Province reserve (39th Brigade) should be held in reserve at Drumahoe Barracks, to be deployed only in the event of a “very large and angry reaction to the stopping of the march”.
The plan as drawn up by Brigadier MacLellan was rejected by General Ford and a dramatic change in approach put in place, putting the Army in the lead role and anticipating between 300 and 400 arrests by 1 Para. He could no longer recall his reasons for rejecting the plan outright, but presumed that the large number of people expected on the march, coupled with the intelligence received that rioting would take place, necessitated the Army’s taking control of the operation. However, it would appear that, at the time of conceptualising his plan, General Ford had as yet received no clear intelligence that serious disturbances would take place.
1.7 Arrest operation plan
General Ford was responsible for providing the outline plan for military action on Bloody Sunday. The decisions both to conduct an arrest operation and to employ 1 Para as the arresting force were decisions ‘imposed’ by General Ford on Brigadier Kitson. However, the actual drafting of the plan and operational responsibility for it fell to Brigadier MacLellan.
1.7.1 Decision to mount an arrest operation
General Ford agreed that the march planned for Bloody Sunday had provided the Army with an opportunity ‘not to be missed’ for arresting large numbers of hooligans which he felt would not only have led to a reduction in violence, through getting the rioters off the streets, but would also have allayed the anxieties of Protestants in Derry, such as the STA. In his interview with Mr Hamill he attributed extraordinary importance to the military operation planned for Bloody Sunday, saying: “what was happening in Londonderry that day was crucial to the future of that part of Northern Ireland… for all sorts of reasons. I, of course, was determined to have a success”.
1.7.2 Decision to use 1 Para for the arrest operation
It was General Ford’s decision to use 1 Para as the arresting force on Bloody Sunday, a decision for which he consulted none of the local commanding officers. He was asked to explain the basis for this decision, especially in light of the Standing Operational Procedures for Internal Security Duties in Northern Ireland, current at the time, which stated that reinforcing troops should man the baseline, and that local regiments, with knowledge of the area, should carry out flanking movements, such as arrest operations.
It was his initial evidence that he had come to the decision that local troops should man the Army barriers, rather than conducting the arrest operation, as they knew the local population and would have been able to identify midwives and doctors on their daily business who needed to get through the barriers and allow them through. He said that he had used this strategy previously in Palestine, which allowed for minimum disruption to the local population. However, as pointed out by Mr Clarke, all of the documents dealing with the operation suggest that nobody was to be allowed through the barriers, whatever their role, thereby suggesting that this reason did not stand up to scrutiny.
General Ford’s second reason for having given 1 Para the role of arresting force, as opposed to that of manning the barriers, was that, had they been manning the barriers, the Paras would have had to arrive in Derry at least two days prior to the day in order to familiarise themselves with the situation on the ground. As it was, 1 Para had never conducted an operation in Derry and was entirely unfamiliar with the area of the Bogside, although it was General Ford’s “hope” that section commanders would have had the opportunity of observing the area from an observation post on the morning of the march in order to gain an understanding of the geographical layout. He did not agree that this lack of familiarisation had a negative impact on the military operation although he acknowledged that it might have left “some room for errors and problems”.
He denied that the ‘fiercesome’ reputation of 1 Para had been a significant factor in his decision to use it as the arresting force and also denied having become aware of disquiet amongst local units at the choice of 1 Para for the operation (indeed, Colonel Jackson, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Anglians has written in his statement to the Inquiry that he had discussed his concern with Brigadier MacLellan and “was so unhappy about the situation after the co-ordinating meeting” that he contemplated contacting HQNI to express his disquiet).
1.7.3 Lawfulness of the Army’s role in the arrest operation
Three weeks before Bloody Sunday, John Hume MP brought a case before the High Court in Belfast, claiming that the Parliament of Northern Ireland and its ministers had no power to confer powers of arrest on the Army under the Special Powers Act. The High Court eventually ruled (three weeks after Bloody Sunday) that they had no such power, that the Army had no powers of arrest under that Act and that, therefore, they had been acting unlawfully in carrying out arrests. Emergency legislation was passed in Westminster on the evening of the ruling, validating retrospectively the Army’s actions to date, including their role on Bloody Sunday, and conferring powers of arrest upon them for the future.
However, despite this case being before the courts, the policy instruction for the Bloody Sunday march, approved by both the GOC and the Chief Constable on 19th January, stipulated that the Army would conduct arrests under the Special Powers Act on the day. General Ford was asked whether it had crossed anybody’s mind that it might be, at the least, inadvisable for the Army to conduct a large number of arrests under the Act at the very time at which the legitimacy of its so doing was being contested in the High Court. He responded that he had no recollection of any discussions on the topic at the time.
1.7.4 Decision to launch the arrest operation
Although it is the evidence of the senior Army commanders that the arrest operation was merely a contingency plan, it would appear from the manner in which the operational order is drafted that it was in fact almost a foregone conclusion if rioting of any scale were to take place, i.e., that the arrest operation would be launched if rioting took place at any time during the afternoon, even if it had ceased and those responsible had dispersed at the time of its launching. Indeed, Lord Widgery reached the conclusion that, had the arrest operation not taken place, the rest of the afternoon might well have passed off peacefully, given that the rioting appeared to have died down at the time of launching the operation. General Ford denied that the arrest operation was inevitable once any rioting had occurred, saying that it was a matter of judgment on Brigadier MacLellan’s part whether or not the operation went ahead. He also added that, just because people had ceased rioting, that did not mean that they could or should not be arrested for what they had been doing at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
General Ford took issue with Lord Widgery’s findings that the day could have passed off with out serious incident had the large-scale arrest operation not been launched, saying that such a conclusion fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the Derry Young Hooligans and “their intention to cause as much damage as possible to the city”. He was adamant that, even though the rioting might have abated prior to the paratroopers being sent in, the rioters would have returned after the speeches, accompanied by marchers, to attack the soldiers and the commercial centre. He said that he had foreseen rioting going on for two or three nights following the march, with rioters and others uniting to storm the barriers later in the afternoon, even if they had been successfully repelled at an earlier stage. However, he had no recollection of having shared this view with Brigadier MacLellan at any stage.
1.7.5 Importance of separation
Although the operational order and other documents drafted before the day’s events make no mention of separation between marchers and rioters as being a prerequisite for the launching of the arrest operation, it is General Ford’s evidence—and that of Brigadier MacLellan—that separation was in fact the key factor in the decision to launch the operation and that no arrests would have been made had separation not occurred. The actual occurrence of separation was, on General Ford’s evidence, entirely a matter for Brigadier MacLellan who himself was reliant on Colonel Welsh’s birdseye view from an Army helicopter.
Christopher Clarke QC suggested that even if separation had been achieved at the time the Paras entered the Bogside, the effect of their driving down Rossville Street at 20 or 30 miles an hour, up to the rubble barricade and into the Rossville Flats car park (a fact not planned for in the operational order) would destroy any existing separation between marchers and rioters which was, on General Ford’s evidence, the key to launching the operation in the first place, and would place the troops in amongst innocent marchers who had no involvement in rioting. Mr Clarke further posited that the manner in which the operational plan was in fact executed was entirely inconsistent with, and ran contrary to, the very basis on which it was predicated. General Ford felt unable to comment on the suggestions made, saying that they related to the detail of the operation which he was not responsible for drafting.
General Ford acknowledged that the Army had anticipated that the arrest operation of the scale envisaged “might well” lead the IRA to shoot at the Army, but did not agree that it followed that the operation should not have been launched in the first place, in order to protect the lives of innocent civilians. Separation, he felt, was an adequate measure to protect the marchers from being caught up in any confrontation. He said that the Army accepted the potential risk of youths who had merely been throwing stones being shot in the cross-fire, as to seek to avoid that risk entirely would have led the Army to do nothing.
Mr Clarke also suggested that separation was an almost futile safeguard for protecting the lives of innocent marchers, given the Army’s use of SLR rifles, firing high-velocity bullets which could kill people from a distance of up to a mile. However, General Ford rejected the suggestion that firing such weapons in the vicinity of thousands of marchers amounted to an unacceptable risk.
1.8 ‘Active’ role on Bloody Sunday
Refuting allegations made in the Irish Government dossier on Bloody Sunday and by other parties, that he was the true acting commander of the key British Army units deployed on Bloody Sunday, it was General Ford’s evidence that he had played the role of mere observer, leaving all operational responsibility and direction to Brigadier MacLellan. However, it is a point of contention that he might have intervened in the direction of the operation at two stages during the afternoon described below.
1.8.1 Decision to launch arrest operation
General Ford watched the progression of the march down William Street from the Army observation post on the Embassy Ballroom. He then took up position behind Barrier 14 where he witnessed the rioting and the deployment of the water cannon.
In 1984, both General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan told Mr Hamill in separate interviews that, at this stage, General Ford had sent a message to Brigadier MacLellan over the Army Secure Net, pressurising him to launch the arrest operation. However, it was General Ford’s evidence to the Tribunal that he had been mistaken in this recollection and that he had in fact not made contact with the Brigadier at this stage. He was unable to explain how the Brigadier had come to make an identical mistake.
General Ford encouraged C Company of 1 Para as they passed through Barrier 14, saying “Go on 1 Para, go and get them”, words which were picked up by a media microphone in the vicinity. He then followed the troops through to the junction of Chamberlain Street and William Street, where he said he heard a long burst of high-velocity single shots, from the direction of the Rossville Flats, followed almost immediately by the sound of two explosions.
1.8.2 Reassignment of D Company
Upon hearing the sound of gunfire, General Ford returned to the observation post on the Embassy Ballroom. On his way, he met Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, the Commanding Officer of 22 Light Air Defence Regiment, and ‘advised’ him to return D Company 1 Para to under the command of 1 Para. He later spoke to Brigade HQ to confirm that this had been carried out. He was adamant that this conversation had taken place after the launch of the arrest operation rather than before it.
1.9 Events observed on Bloody Sunday
It was General Ford’s evidence that he had reached the Embassy Ballroom at approximately 4:20 pm (by which stage the majority of civilian deaths and injuries had been inflicted). He described seeing approximately one platoon in firing positions at the end of Chamberlain Street near the Rossville Flats, one company of paratroopers moving along Rossville Street into positions overlooking Glenfada Park and the Rossville Flats and further troops “rounding up suspects” in Rossville Street. He said that he was unaware at this stage as to what had gone on in the Bogside and had not heard any signal traffic over the radio.
1.10 Media interviews on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday
At approximately 4:35, the General returned to William Street where he saw 20 detainees sitting on the ground prior to being transported to Fort George holding centre. He spoke to Colonel Wilford at this stage who “confirmed [his] view that his [the Colonel’s] troops had been fired upon first and had returned fire”. General Ford supported this view in media interviews during the afternoon, denying the journalists’ allegations that the British Army had opened fire indiscriminately and unprovoked. He also told the media that only two people had been killed and that 1 Para had fired only three rounds on the day (as opposed to the actual 108 plus fired), after 10 to 20 rounds had been fired at them from the Rossville Flats. He thought that he had got the information from his Aide de Camp and from Colonel Wilford but could not explain how it had come to be—in the words of Mr Clarke—“so wildly out”.
1.11 Immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday
General Ford spent approximately one hour that afternoon in discussions with Brigadier MacLellan and telephone calls with the GOC and the MoD, though he could no longer recall the nature or content of these discussions. He then returned to HQNI where he called a meeting, but again was unable to recollect what was discussed.
2. questions on behalf of the soldiers
Gerard Elias QC, acting for a number of former soldiers present on Bloody Sunday, contended that there were substantial and significant flaws in both the planning and the execution of the operation. He sought to explore with General Ford whether he accepted responsibility for any such flaws or whether he felt that blame should be apportioned to others for their errors in this regard.
2.1 Reasoning behind the decision to mount an arrest operation
It was General Ford’s view in January 1972 that the physical and commercial heart of Derry was in danger of being destroyed by the Derry Young Hooligans, unless something were done to stop them. He denied that he had viewed the NICRA march in Derry as the perfect opportunity to mount an arrest operation against the DYH, reiterating that the primary aim of the military operation planned for the day was to stop the march from reaching the Guildhall. The arrest operation was merely a contingency plan, to be put in place if violence was offered against the Security Forces. However, he acknowledged that, given the Army’s expectations of disturbances on the day and the large numbers of troops available to conduct such an operation, there was a high likelihood that the arrest operation would go ahead.
He also acknowledged, as he had told Desmond Hamill in his interview, that there “was a lot of pressure from Stormont to take tough action and [he] agreed with that” and that he had come to the conclusion in December 1971 that the time had come to show the DYH that their actions would no longer be allowed to continue.
However, he denied that his selection of 1 Para as the arresting force for the day reflected the desire to take a ‘tougher stance’ with the DYH, reiterating that he had chosen them as perfectly suited to a quick scoop-up operation.
2.2 Flaws in the planning of the operation
2.2.1 Lack of consultation with Brigade
Mr Elias contended that the first flaw in the planning of the operation was a lack of real consultation with Brigade HQ and those in Derry as to the wisdom of conducting an arrest operation and how such an operation should be carried out, due to General Ford’s extreme disappointment (outlined in his January memo) and lack of confidence in Brigadier MacLellan and Major Steele. Indeed, in the Brigadier’s statement to the Inquiry, he affirms that the General had dictated that there would be an arrest operation, using 1 Para, and that these two issues were not a matter for debate.
General Ford agreed that there had been little consultation, but did not believe that this represented an inadequacy or flaw in the planning of the operation. Furthermore, he described as ‘conceited and pompous’ a statement made by Colonel Jackson that, as the longest serving Commanding Officer in Derry at the time, he should have been consulted if anything unusual had been planned for Bloody Sunday. According to General Ford, the Colonel—as a mere Battalion Commander—should not have expected to be consulted about a plan coming down from HQNI.
2.2.2 Paras not appraised of the Derry situation
Mr Elias put forward as a second flaw that 1 Para were not appraised of the Derry situation, of the differences between Derry and Belfast in terms of military policy, of the geography of the Bogside and of the tactics of the DYH. It was the General’s evidence that he had no contact with 1 Para at all and that any such appraisal should have come from Brigadier MacLellan, but he remained unaware as to whether any such information had ever been passed on to the paratroopers. Despite the fact that he had personally ordered the use of 1 Para on the day, he did not believe that he should have borne any responsibility in ensuring that they were appraised of the situation on the ground.
2.2.3 Lack of safeguards against civilian casualties
The operational order for Bloody Sunday contained no contingency plan covering what should happen in the event of IRA fire, including, for example, the Paras withdrawing from the area. In an interview with Channel 4, Colonel Wilford described having raised such a concern at the briefing meeting held prior to the day, which was dismissed. Mr Elias suggested that there should have been a detailed provision for withdrawal if civilians were put at risk during the course of the operation. General Ford said that he would like to think that he had discussed such contingencies with Brigadier MacLellan, but had no recollection of having done so.
However, he did not regard the lack of a clear contingency plan for the Paras to withdraw from the arrest operation if IRA shooting occurred (given that any return fire would put civilians at significant risk) as a significant flaw in the planning of the operation. For the third time during the course of his evidence, General Ford reiterated his belief that only ‘stupid’ bystanders would have been caught up in any such action as all others would have left at the first sign of trouble.
2.2.4 Lack of operational clarity
The plan as envisaged by General Ford at the time of Bloody Sunday was for the Paras to conduct a ‘scoop up’ operation of the DYH, by forming a stop line close to William Street that would have trapped rioters between the soldiers and Barriers 12 and 14. He acknowledged that, given the sensitivity of the situation and the large numbers of people present, the troops should have been clearly briefed as to the need for separation and the location of the stop lines. However, he did not think that the fact that these provisions did not feature in written form in the operational order represented a flaw of any kind.
2.3 Flaws in the execution of the operation
2.3.1 Use of vehicles
The operational plan did not envisage the use of vehicles, stating “it is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot”. One of the benefits of conducting the operation on foot was that it provided the soldiers with a greater element of surprise, enabling them to get behind the rioters rapidly. Indeed, a large number of civilians have told the Inquiry that the revving of the Army engines alerted them at some distance to the fact that the soldiers were entering the Bogside, thereby destroying any element of surprise the soldiers could have benefited from in executing the operation.
Furthermore, the use of vehicles represented a ‘frontal approach’ which had failed on numerous previous occasions in Derry, rather than the ‘scoop-up’ as envisaged by General Ford, whereby troops would get behind the rioters in order to trap them between soldiers and the barricades. Mr Elias contended that the use of vehicles, causing any rioters who were left at the barriers to disperse, ran entirely counter to the General’s concept of the operation and effectively destroyed the operation as planned.
2.3.2 Lack of containment
In his statement to the Inquiry, Sergeant Major Louis (INQ202) has written: “On Bloody Sunday, the rioters were not contained… In the event, there was no sealing off of the area and this lack of containment meant that the rioters were not prevented from running away so soldiers ended up chasing them. The result on the day was that people were all over the place and there was a situation of confusion”. General Ford agreed that, if this was a correct description of what occurred on Bloody Sunday, it indicated that “there was something lacking in the orders which were given” but stopped short of agreeing that the plan had totally failed in its execution.
2.4 Responsibility for flaws
General Ford said that he accepted full responsibility for the use of 1 Para as the arresting force but did not accept any responsibility for the lack of detailed orders given to the troops. However, he agreed with the sentiment expressed by Sergeant Major Louis that “there is nothing to be proud of in soldiering terms about what happened on Bloody Sunday”.
3 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
3.1 Position of the Army vis à vis the RUC in 1972
Counsel contended that, legally, Chief Superintendent Lagan should have been the person in charge of the operation on Bloody Sunday and should have held responsibility for the organisational planning behind it, but that he had been supplanted by an unlawful arrangement between the Chief Constable of the RUC and the GOC which effectively subordinated the RUC to the Army on the day as on previous occasions in Northern Ireland as a whole. Counsel also alleged that General Ford was aware of the unlawfulness of the situation at the time, given his statement to Desmond Hamill in 1984 that “this was absolutely wrong. The army should never have been in charge. Never”.
3.2 Purpose of the military operation planned for Bloody Sunday
Despite having, according to Counsel, twice stated in his interview with Desmond Hamill that the purpose of the operation was to “teach a lesson” to the hooligans, General Ford denied that this was 1 Para’s job on Bloody Sunday. However, he acknowledged that he had seen the occasion of the march as offering the potential to deal a ‘significant blow’ to the DYH. In light of that, Tony Gifford QC suggested that there must have been a fallback plan for the Army in the event of the failure of the scoop-up operation, arguing that, had the Army’s attempts to envelop the marchers failed, it would have amounted to the ‘opposite of a significant blow’ against the DYH and would in fact have been ‘a significant blow’ against the Army in favour of the rioters, making the Army look stupid and ineffective. He contended that if the soldiers proved unable to arrest rioters, the Army’s backup plan involved opening fire at them. General Ford dismissed these contentions as ‘totally untrue’.
General Ford equally denied Counsel’s suggestion that the actions of 1 Para on Bloody Sunday were designed to serve as a warning to the population of the Bogside not to support the IRA. The suggestion was predicated on the evidence of a journalist, Mr Verrier, who has told the Tribunal that General Tuzo, addressing a press conference in London four days before Bloody Sunday, said: “I have to tell you that it will shortly be necessary to warn the Catholic population of Londonderry of the dangers of continuing to support the Provisional IRA”. General Ford acknowledged that he perceived the residents of the Bogside and Creggan as supportive of the hooligans, who in turn were supporting the IRA, but denied any knowledge of a warning being issued to the population.
The General also denied that there had been any other form of covert plan or ‘plan within a plan’ for Bloody Sunday, rejecting Tony Gifford’s second contention that the Director of Intelligence had deliberately put out false security information, hyping up predictions of IRA actions, in order to create fear in the mind of Brigadier MacLellan that the march would be exceptionally violent. He said he was speaking on oath and would therefore tell the truth about the existence of any covert plan had such a plan existed.
3.3 Separation between marchers and rioters
3.3.1 Separation as a key element in the plan
General Ford was once again asked to comment on the fact that the notion of separation—which he claimed to be the key factor in the decision to launch the arrest operation—appeared in none of the documents concerning the operation drawn up prior to the march. Furthermore the document drafted by General Ford for the Widgery Inquiry, designed to provide information as to the background and detailed planning involved in the operation, makes no mention of separation at all. Rather it appears to ‘lump’ both marchers and rioters together, listing as a direction given to Brigadier MacLellan “the requirement for identifying and if possible arresting those marching illegally and the possible arrest of any hooligan element”, suggesting that the arrest force was designed to scoop up anybody in the vicinity, whether illegal marchers or hooligans. Furthermore, on the evening of Bloody Sunday, in an interview to be broadcast to the world, General Ford told the BBC that the reason for launching the arrest operation was quite simply that “it was decided that we could not tolerate it [the rioting] any longer”, making no reference to separation.
The General explained the absence of any reference to separation in key documents by saying that it was such an obvious factor within the plan that it could be missed out. He also denied that the operational order for the day, stipulating that participants and key leaders of the march be arrested on the spot, ran counter to the essential element of separation.
He felt unable to comment on whether the Paras, stationed as they were in vehicles behind the barriers, would have been able to identify people rioting, but did acknowledge that Army practice at the time was to arrest people in the vicinity of a riot, effectively leaving it to the courts to determine whether or not the arrestees had in fact been rioting. However, he denied that this amounted to unlawful behaviour on the part of the soldiers involved.
3.3.2 Existence of separation on the day
Arthur Harvey QC contended that nothing in the communications between Brigade HQ and Colonel Wilford and the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment (at the key barriers) and Colonel Welsh (in the helicopter) indicated that separation had occurred at the time the arrest operation was launched—indeed the communications would tend to suggest none of those allegedly being relied upon to report on separation were actually aware that separation was a key element—or any element—of the plan. In fact, the communications indicate that, far from separation having been achieved, those who had been involved in rioting against the Army were actually running into the midst of marchers.
Based on the absence of reference to separation in any documents and General Ford’s own inability to recall any discussions on the topic prior to Bloody Sunday, Mr Harvey proposed that the concept of separation had been thought up after the fact as a simple explanation to counter the allegations that the Army had opened fire into a fleeing crowd—an explanation relied upon by ministers when explaining the Army’s actions in the House of Commons. However, General Ford rejected these suggestions, saying that there had been no cover-up ‘at his level’.
He was also unable to comment on whether it was grossly improper and contrary to the notion of separation for Support Company to have driven down Rossville Street and to have disbursed rubber bullets into a fleeing crowd.
3.4 Differences between the planned operation and the executed operation
The operational plan for Bloody Sunday envisaged Support Company coming past the Presbyterian Street to the junction of William Street and Little James Street and C Company going through Barrier 14, effectively getting behind those rioting at Barriers 12 and 14 and cutting off their escape. This plan in itself, Mr Harvey contended, was flawed in that it did not allow for troops to get behind rioters who would have been able to make good their escape via numerous unblocked routes. However, what actually happened on the day was that, rather than coming through the church and enflanking the rioters at the barriers, Support Company performed a straightforward frontal assault with armoured vehicles coming straight through Barrier 12, driving into a fleeing crowd—actions which were radically different to the operational plan and which, Counsel contended, represented a last-ditch attempt to get Support Company into the Bogside when their plan had radically broken down (primarily due to a high wall blocking their planned route from the Presbyterian Church).
General Ford doubted whether he had become aware of the fact that the plan as executed was radically different to what had been contemplated in the Brigade operational order and in 1 Para’s orders, saying that “[his] job was always to look ahead, not to look back. Others looked back”. Looking at the documents with hindsight, the General agreed that the use of Army vehicles did amount to a substantial difference between the plan as devised by him and that put in practice on the day but, although this current evidence runs directly contrary to that given by him to Lord Widgery, said that he had not been attempting to hide anything at the time. Rather, he posited, his statement to Lord Widgery was probably based on an imperfect understanding of the arrest operation as planned and implemented.
General Ford suggested that the changes between the operational order and what actually transpired on the day could have been brought about by unforeseeable circumstances on the ground: this interpretation would hold the activities of the hooligans on the day as so radically different to those envisaged that the plan as devised was inadequate to deal with the situation.
3.5 Live fire on Bloody Sunday
3.5.1 Misinterpreting friendly fire
Given that Support Company went down Rossville Street through Barrier 12 in vehicles prior to C Company’s entry on foot into the area, without C Company’s knowledge, Mr Harvey suggested that C Company might have mistaken shots fired by Support Company for incoming, hostile fire. Although General Ford acknowledged that in some situations it might be difficult to distinguish between friendly and hostile fire when troops are launched from different directions without proper coordination, he felt that 1 Para was so experienced as to rule this out as a possibility.
However, as Mr Harvey pointed out, the evidence—known to the General as early as 2nd February 1972—suggests that Lieutenant N fired a burst of warning shots (in contravention of the Yellow Card) in the Rossville Flats car park immediately before the other paratroopers opened fire. This, Counsel suggested, could have been the high velocity fire heard by General Ford as he followed C Company into the Bogside and subsequently attributed to the IRA. Equally, C Company could have mistaken these shots for hostile fire, given that Support Company’s presence in the area was unknown to them at this stage.
3.5.2 IRA gunfire
The General agreed that he had not anticipated a gun battle of any significance involving the IRA in the area of the planned scoop-up operation, namely William Street and Rossville Street, but had deployed a large number of soldiers in the ‘anti-sniper role’ covering this area to deal with any such eventuality. However, despite this huge deployment of snipers on the walls and at the barricades, not one of them were able to identify a target during the course of the alleged gun battle that lasted seven minutes, during which soldiers claimed the IRA was out in the open for the first time ever in Derry. General Ford was unable to comment on this, but added that he believed the paratroopers’ version of events.
3.6 Attitude towards the DYH
General Ford acknowledged that he regarded the Derry Young Hooligans “in his heart” as the ‘Queen’s enemies’, but denied that he had gone to Barrier 14 on Bloody Sunday in order to ‘egg on’ the Paras. He said that, regardless of his views or of the personal views of the soldiers involved on Bloody Sunday, they would have abided by the rules of engagement laid down in the Yellow Card and would not have allowed their actions to be coloured by their personal opinions. He could not explain why the Chief of the General Staff, General Carver, had felt the need to write a document to the GOC concerning a civil rights march planned for Newry five days after Bloody Sunday underscoring the necessity of adherence to the rules of the Yellow Card, stating in particular that “fire is not to be opened for the purpose of preventing a march from continuing”.
3.7 Perceived success of the operation
In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, General Ford visited 1 Para and is recorded as having said “that they were in good form but undoubtedly very upset by the repercussions of what they had regarded at the time as an outstandingly successful military operation”. He could not recall whether he had shared the view of the paratroopers as to the ‘outstanding success’ of the operation, but said that the Paras were in a good position to judge its success given their involvement in it. He denied that the taped record of a conversation between military personnel on Bloody Sunday, describing him as having said that the Bloody Sunday operation was “the best thing he had seen for a long time” was an accurate description of his feelings on the day.
In total, approximately fifty people were arrested on Bloody Sunday. Thirty of them had been hiding in a house where the wounded Mickey Bridge and Peggy Deery had been taken; the rest had been cowering behind a wall, having witnessed people being killed and wounded around them by the paratroopers. Those who had been arrested, Mr Harvey told the General, were those who had not been killed because they chose not to run away but to hide behind a wall; they had done nothing wrong, but were merely caught in the middle of a ‘killing field’. On the basis of this, General Ford was asked once again whether he viewed the operation as an ‘outstanding success’. He responded that he had hoped for more than fifty arrests and could not comment on whether or not the paratroopers had arrested the appropriate people.
3.8 Events witnessed on the day
The list of ‘engagements’ drawn up by Major Loden prior to 6:10 pm on Bloody Sunday was radioed through to 8th Brigade whilst General Ford was at Brigade HQ. The list, which formed the basis of all subsequent Army and political explanations of the day’s events, details all shooting incidents on the day, placing them as having happened between 16:20 and 16:35, during which time General Ford was on the Embassy Ballroom overlooking Rossville Street and the Bogside. Counsel queried how he had managed to ‘miss’ all of the relevant action, given that he had a clear view of the area at the critical time. The General thought that he might have been at the back of the building at the time the listed incidents took place.
3.9 Attempt to uncover the truth behind the events of Bloody Sunday
Michael Mansfield QC suggested that from an early stage the General had been uninterested in finding out the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday, hence his failure to seek any form of explanation for the tragedy from Colonel Wilford or Major Loden. He suggested that the plan masterminded by the General necessarily entailed a serious risk that innocent civilians would be killed on the day for it would be impossible to understand otherwise how the Army had never sought or managed to discover how so many highly-trained, disciplined and focused troops had managed to hit so many unarmed civilians.
The General responded that, as Commander of the operation, the role of investigating what had happened fell to Brigadier MacLellan not to him. He denied that the lack of notes and indeed his lack of recollection concerning the meeting held at HQNI on the evening of Bloody Sunday were due to the fact that the meeting was not called in order to discover the truth but rather to concoct a story to put to the world justifying the Army’s actions.
He also denied the suggestion that he had never taken the slightest interest in the victims, saying that he had been saddened by the number of casualties, but it was his view that the Paras had acted properly on the day and he accepted the findings of the Widgery Tribunal concerning the victims. This belief led him to deem premature Tony Blair’s statement in the House of Commons that those killed on Bloody Sunday were innocent victims not gunmen or bombers.
3.10 Lack of disciplinary action taken against soldiers involved
General Ford said that it was not his role or duty to investigate further Lieutenant N’s illegal firing on the day or Lord Widgery’s conclusion that the Paras’ fire was in some circumstances ‘reckless’: disciplinary matters were entirely a matter for the GOC and the Chief of Staff. He presumed that he would have been concerned by Lord Widgery’s conclusions but could not recall having discussed his concern with the GOC.
Counsel suggested that the reason why no disciplinary action was taken against any of the soldiers involved on Bloody Sunday was that the Paras had in fact done what they had been ordered to do, namely shoot unarmed civilians. General Ford felt unable to respond to this allegation.
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