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4 - 6 NOVEMBER 2002
Evidence heard
This week, the Tribunal heard from a number of former military personnel, including INQ2030 who was responsible for taking cine film footage of the Bloody Sunday march, and INQ2105, the personal assistant to Colonel Dalzell-Payne of MO4. General Ford also continued to give his evidence, which will be dealt with in Week 72.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. inq2030’s evidence
INQ2030 was the army photographer directed by Colin Wallace to take cine-film footage of the march from a helicopter on Bloody Sunday. He was asked to explain the paucity of footage available and the reasons why it failed to record any of the controversial events of the day.
1.1 Film footage
The written order relating to the filming of the march on Bloody Sunday records that INQ2030’s directive was to “provide maximum coverage of the NICRA march and all associated incidents”. Given this express order, and the fact that the helicopter was in the air for a minimum of two hours on the day, the shortness of the film (which lasts a mere three minutes and forty three seconds) and its failure to record any of the live shooting by the Army remains a matter of some conjecture.
INQ2030 said that he had little recollection of the day’s events and was unable to provide any clear explanation for the film’s failings. However, he was reluctant to accept the suggestion that the film might have been deliberately cut to edit photographic evidence of the Army’s actions. His preferred explanations for the visible changes in focus on the film and the film’s omissions were sudden changes in the hovering altitude of the helicopter or mechanical problems with the camera.
The footage follows the Army Saracens as they enter the Bogside and shows soldiers debussing from the vehicles, immediately discharging two rubber bullets. The focus then shifts immediately to a completely different area in the Bogside. Counsel for the families posited that logic dictated that, having followed the Army vehicles’ progress into the Bogside, he would have continued filming the scene of action, as mandated in his orders for the day, and that the film had subsequently been cut. Counsel also suggested that, even had he not filmed the Army’s actions on the ground, he would have been aware of the shooting and would have seen people falling to the ground. However, he had no recollection of having witnessed any of the controversial events of the day.
Counsel said that there were two possible explanations for the film’s omissions: either he had failed comprehensively in his task of “providing maximum coverage of the NICRA march and all associated incidents” or the film had been cut. INQ2030 responded that he could not help as to which option was the valid explanation.
1.2 Final destination of film
The Army orders for the day indicate that INQ2030 should have returned his film or films to HQNI following the day’s events. This is supported by Colin Wallace’s evidence. The latter told the Tribunal that INQ2030, who was directly answerable to him on the day, had been under express instructions to return the film to HQNI, but that INQ2030 had been issued with a counter order by a senior ranking Army official who had instructed him to send the footage to London directly.
INQ2030 said he had no recollection of having been given any such counter order and added that, contrary to Colin Wallace’s evidence (c.f. Week 66, paragraph 2) and to the suggestions made in the contemporaneous Army orders, HQNI was not equipped at the time for developing cine-film. Therefore, sending the film to London for processing was, according to INQ2030, an entirely normal procedure, not a ‘highly irregular’ occurrence, as described by Colin Wallace. However, he acknowledged that cine-film footage would not usually have been personally couriered by a Major General, as happened in this case.
1.3 Separation between the crowd and the marchers
It is the Army’s case that the arrest operation would not have been ordered had separation between the march and the rioters not occurred. Much has been made of the role of those in the helicopters in this respect, as they were supposedly to have been instrumental in informing Brigadier MacLellan on the occurrence of separation between the two factions. However, it was INQ2030’s evidence that, not only had he not been aware of any separation between the two elements of the crowd, he was also not even aware of any rioting at Barriers 12 and 14, and did not see any nail or petrol bomb explosions on the day.
2. INQ3’s evidence
INQ3 held the rank of Major in the Special Investigations Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police (RMP), based at HQNI (Army Headquarters Northern Ireland) in Lisburn, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel INQ1383. He was responsible for assigning ciphers to the military witnesses from whom statements were taken following Bloody Sunday and for redacting all of the statements, substituting letters for names throughout. He could shed no light on why the ciphers “I” and “W” were ‘missing’ or had not been used by him in 1972 in assigning ciphers to the soldiers.
INQ3 said that it was usual practice for soldiers to close ranks when questioned about their involvement in suspicious incidents, due to unit loyalty which extended throughout all levels of the Army, a suggestion supported in a memo describing General Tuzo as saying that “commanding officers appear to feel it incumbent upon them to stand up for their subordinates in all circumstances and at all costs”. Counsel suggested that this closure of ranks, coupled with the policy in place at the time to exclude the RUC from the process of interviewing military witnesses, effectively served to protect soldiers’ behaviour from scrutiny and to ultimately protect the military from prosecution.
3. INQ2105’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, INQ2105 worked for MO4, the branch of the MoD (Ministry of Defence) responsible for matters pertaining to Northern Ireland and reported to Colonel Dalzell-Payne. He had previously served in Northern Ireland for nine years, including two years in Eglington, near Derry.
3.1 ‘Robust’ military action
INQ2105 told the Tribunal that he had been made aware of the decision to deploy 1 Para as the arresting force on Bloody Sunday approximately one week before the event, a decision which prompted his being sent to Derry to act as observer on the day.
In his statement to the Inquiry, he wrote that he had been concerned that the march might go ‘badly wrong’, due to the more ‘robust’ attitude taken to law-breaking by Belfast regiments as compared to those stationed in Derry, and that he had discussed these fears with Colonel Dalzell-Payne. He explained however that his apprehension had not been that the Paras would act with brutality towards the marchers, but rather that their more ‘robust’ military approach would lead to widespread rioting. Indeed, he said he had been unaware of the allegations of brutality against the Paratroopers, made following the march at Magilligan the previous week.
It was also his evidence that he had not seen the paper pertaining to marches written by the Colonel shortly before Bloody Sunday, which states that ‘firmer [military] measures’ were to be put in place for dealing with the march (c.f. Week 68, paragraph 3.1.4), and was unable to explain what these measures might have been. He also denied the suggestion that the decision to send him as observer on the day (something that the MoD had never done previously) was prompted by the fact that the Army were to take a stronger line than they had done in the past. Rather, it was his evidence that MO4 had decided to send an observer due to the sheer scale of the march.
3.2 Role on Bloody Sunday
INQ2105 spent most of the afternoon of Bloody Sunday in the operations room at 8th Brigade headquarters, where he was able to monitor Army communications. At approximately 3:30 or 4:00 pm, a senior Army official (whom he initially identified to the Tribunal as Brigadier MacLellan) offered to take him on a tour of the various Army units’ positions in the city, given the belief at headquarters at that time that the march had passed off peacefully. When they stopped at a position manned by the Royal Green Jackets near Waterloo Place (almost certainly Barrier 14), INQ2105 spoke with INQ1028 whom he knew, who told him that there had been some ‘aggro’ at the barrier, but that the crowd had moved on. Reports then came over the radio that the Paras had been fired upon, following which the convoy decided to return to headquarters. INQ2105 said that he had not heard any shots himself, but had seen groups of civilians being frisked by Paratroopers.
Upon his return to headquarters, he contacted Colonel Dalzell-Payne who told him to bring back as much documentation as was available concerning the events of the day. It was his evidence that he had been given a marked map of the area and a document showing the sequence of events, prepared by either Major Steele or Brigadier MacLellan, within an hour of his return to headquarters and that he subsequently handed these over to the Colonel when he arrived back at Whitehall at approximately 11:00 pm. However, neither Major Steele nor Brigadier MacLellan make any reference to such documents in their statements, and Colonel Dalzell-Payne has told the Inquiry that he has no recollection of receiving any such documents.
4. INQ1831’s evidence
INQ1831 was a Sergeant Major with the SIB at the time of Bloody Sunday. He was away from the city on the day itself and was only minimally involved in the statement-taking process, having taken only one supplementary statement from one of the soldiers involved, namely Soldier P.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Monday 4th: Paragraphs 1 and 2
Tuesday 5th: Paragraph 3
Wednesday 6th: Paragraph 4
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
