BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 67

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30 SEPTEMBER - 3 OCTOBER 2002

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

This week, Hugh Mooney completed his evidence, begun in Week 66.  The Tribunal also heard from Colonel Maurice Tugwell and INQ1873, who both worked in the Information Policy Unit at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland in 1972.  They both told the Tribunal that they were not engaged in psychological operations at the time of Bloody Sunday.

Major INQ1900 told the Inquiry that he had been in the operations room at 8 Brigade Headquarters when the order had been given for the Paras to commence the scoop-up operation.  It was his belief that the order recorded in the log to send only one company into the area was not an accurate record of the order given.

INQ2090’s evidence focused primarily on the type of radio communications available to the army at the time of Bloody Sunday.  It was his belief that there was a secure communication system in operation on the day.

Colin Overbury was one of the solicitors for the army at the Widgery Tribunal.  He was unable to shed any light on the discrepancies in individual soldiers’ various written accounts of the events of Bloody Sunday.

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

1.                                  Hugh mooney’s evidence (continued)

1.1                               questions on behalf of the families and wounded (continued)

1.1.1                            PsyOps Committee

Mr Mooney told the Tribunal that, having been shown documents relating to PsyOps policy committees, he now knew that such committees existed, but said that he had no recollection of ever attending them and was puzzled by the fact that his name appeared on documents stating that he was a member of the PsyOps Committee.  He was asked whether he knew of any reason why he would not have been invited to attend the meetings of a committee of which he was a member, to which he responded that they might have met infrequently or he might not have been in Northern Ireland when they met, given that he travelled to London on a regular basis.

1.1.2                          PsyOps activity

Given that it was Mr Mooney’s evidence that PsyOps had ceased in September 1971 with the formation of the Information Policy Unit, he was asked how this had come to pass so soon after the establishment of the PsyOps Committee in July 1971.  He said that he could not recall whether he had ever known that PsyOps had been formally established and added that PsyOps activity could cease without forcing the disbanding of the PsyOps Committee.

He said that he was puzzled by the fact that, in the documents, INQ1873 continued to be referred to as GSO1 Liaison (another term of PsyOps) until April 1972, stating that it was his belief that INQ1873 had been known as GSO1 IP (Information Policy) after the cessation of PsyOps activities in September 1971.

He was also shown a Ministry of Defence (MoD) document, dated 30^th November 1971, copied to a number of people, including Colonel Tugwell, which read:  “there is a Colonel GS Information Policy who is responsible… for co-ordinating the propaganda and counter-propaganda activities of the Public Relations organisation within HQNI [Army Headquarters Northern Ireland], as well as those of the GSO1 Liaison in the latter’s concern with Psychological Operations”.  He said that he had never seen the document before and that all he could say was that, after September 1971, he had no awareness of psychological operations.  He said that it was his firm conviction that PsyOps had ceased at this time, adding that that was his conviction prior to seeing the papers which he had been shown.

1.1.3                         Role of Information Policy in relation to Bloody Sunday

Mr Mooney said that Army Public Relations did virtually nothing in relation to Bloody Sunday.  He agreed that the PR presentation of the army’s version of events on and around Bloody Sunday had been assumed by Information Policy, the unit involved at least up until 1971 with PsyOps, but dismissed as ridiculous the suggestion that this was part of a deliberate plan on the part of the army. 

1.1.4                         Personal role in relation to Bloody Sunday

Mr Mooney said that he had been responsible for arranging the BBC’s interview with Colonel Tugwell which took place during the night of Bloody Sunday.  He said that, at that stage he had heard about the large number of casualties and the allegations that the Paras had run amok and had shot indiscriminately into a fleeing crowd.  It was his evidence that he had been unaware of what the Colonel would say in the interview, having gone home for his dinner, only returning to hear the actual interview itself.  He also said that he had not discussed the contents of the interview with the Colonel before or after the interview and had not enquired as to the Colonel’s sources, explaining that, as far as he had been concerned, the interview had been a full and excellent account of what the army thought had transpired.

He explained a passage in his statement to the Inquiry in which he described the broadcast interview as “a last minute, improvised, damage limitation exercise”, saying that there had been a tremendous amount of damage caused by the fact that the accusations against the army had gone without any reply.  He said that Army PR had not functioned and had totally failed to tell the people what had transpired from the army’s point of view.

1.1.5                        Role in Northern Ireland

Mr Mooney was shown the statement of Mr Barker, Head of the IRD at the time of Bloody Sunday, which read:  “Once Mr Mooney went to Belfast he passed completely from my operational control.  Operational responsibility passed to the Information Policy section once it was established”.  However, it was his own evidence that he had remained attached to the Information Research Department (IRD) throughout his time in Northern Ireland and was never under the operational responsibility of Information Policy. 

Counsel asked Mr Mooney to confirm that, although everyone above and around him at the time believed him to be involved in PsyOps and although he had been sent to Northern Ireland to engage in PsyOps or to advise the army on PsyOps, his evidence to the Tribunal was that he had no operational role in PsyOps during his time in Northern Ireland.  Mr Mooney responded that the Tribunal had not yet heard the evidence of everyone around him and reiterated that he was not involved in PsyOps at the time.

1.1.6                      Role of the intelligence services in Northern Ireland

Mr Mooney agreed that, apart from the UK Representative, the three prominent personalities in the UK Government Representative’s office were either from IRD (Mr Mooney and Mr Hill) or from MI6 (Mr Steele).  It was Counsel’s contention that the IRD, MI5, the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service had all been heavily involved in Information Policy and in the UK Representative’s office in Northern Ireland around the time of Bloody Sunday.  Mr Mooney responded that the UK Representative was a man of ambassadorial status, aided by a senior intelligence officer who assisted him in contacts with the local population, that Mr Hill acted as the equivalent to a counsellor in the Foreign Office and that he himself had acted as the first secretary, and that it was preposterous to characterise it as an MI5 or IRD intelligence set-up.

1.1.7                  Cine-film shot from helicopter on Bloody Sunday

Mr Mooney said that Information Policy’s decision to task an army cameraman (INQ2030) to film the march had been prompted by the difficulties in convincing people that the army’s estimates of the number of people attending the march were more accurate than those of the organisers.  He said that photographic evidence was largely incontrovertible and agreed that the any film footage would have helped in determining what exactly transpired, in case of any controversy.  However, he said that, to the best of his recollection, he had never actually seen the film footage taken on the day.

1.2                     questions on behalf of the soldiers

1.2.1                  PsyOps Committee

Mr Mooney said that the references in his 1972 reports to a ‘PsyOps Committee’ were in fact references to the Army PsyOps ‘working party’, which he formed with INQ1873.  He agreed with Counsel’s suggestion that calling the informal conversations he had in the office with INQ1873 a ‘working party’ was a way of making things sound more exciting for his boss.

1.2.2                  Role in Northern Ireland

Mr Mooney told the Tribunal that his role in relation to any PsyOps activity was to monitor what was going on and to report to the UK Representative, if necessary, and that to that end he would have spoken to INQ1873 and Colin Wallace concerning their activities.

2.                      Colonel Tugwell’s evidence

Colonel (now Brigadier) Tugwell was posted to Derry on 30^th August 1971, having been selected by General Carver, the Chief of the General Staff, to deal with the perceived crisis of confidence in Northern Ireland relating to Army Public Relations.  He assumed the role of Colonel General Staff (Information Policy) at HQNI.  He remained in Northern Ireland for 16 months.

2.1                                       questions on behalf of the tribunal

2.1.1                                   Information Policy Unit

Colonel Tugwell said that, although the intelligence community took a passing interest in the work of the IP unit, they did not carry out joint operations during his time in Northern Ireland.  He denied suggestions that IP was a separate unit, engaging in black propaganda for the Intelligence Services under the cover of Public Relations.  He also refuted Colin Wallace’s evidence that IP was in fact PsyOps, operating under a different name, adding that Colin Wallace had never worked for him, being strictly a PR operative.  He added that he was unaware at the time that INQ1873, who worked as his deputy, had been the head of the Army Psychological Operations branch at the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum, although he knew that he was a PsyOps specialist.

He told the Inquiry that the key objectives of IP were to present the army’s role to the public as sensible and effective, to discredit terrorism and terrorists, to analyse and counter hostile propaganda and to ensure that everybody responsible for determining military policy took into account its possible effects on public opinion.  He said that he could not recall any black propaganda or deliberately false information having been put out by IP during his time in Northern Ireland.

He was shown a document, written by him in relation to the Military Information Policy Committee, for January to June 1972, which read:  “Black propaganda.  We have reservations about ‘black’ activities.  In so closely observed a situation as Northern Ireland, almost nothing remains secret for long.  This does not exclude isolated exercises for specific purposes, but it certainly excludes such activities unless authorised by the Military Information Policy Committee…  ‘Black’ activities are unlikely to benefit us except in rare, carefully controlled instances…  ”.  It was his evidence that no such ‘black’ activities had ever taken place, adding that he did not think that any PsyOps worthy of the name had ever been carried out in Northern Ireland. 

2.1.2                   Lead up to Bloody Sunday

2.1.2.1               Army plans

Colonel Tugwell told the Inquiry that he had not been involved in any way in the military planning for Bloody Sunday, but that he had attended General Tuzo’s meetings with General Ford and other senior officers, at which the army’s response to the planned civil rights march had been discussed.  He said that he had been aware that the military plan was to contain the march in the Bogside and the Creggan, with the possibility of a scoop-up operation in the event of rioting.  However, he had not seen the army operational order for the day.

He said that he could not recall any political fury concerning the lack of control by the Parachute Regiment over the marchers at Magilligan, as described by Colin Wallace, and said that there had been no directive issued by the MoD to prevent similar scenes of soldiers unable to control a crowd being broadcast on the television again.  He told the Tribunal that the operation planned for Bloody Sunday was not a PR-driven operation, but one undertaken for proper military and political purposes, and did not think that the need to prove that the army could be tough in Derry had been a driving force behind the planning for the operation.

Colonel Tugwell also told the Inquiry that he had not been aware of the suggestion made in General Ford’s memo that the time might have come to “shoot selected ringleaders amongst the DYH [Derry Young Hooligans] after clear warnings have been issued”, nor of any consideration being given to the use of less lethal bullets.

2.1.2.2              Intelligence concerning IRA plans

Colonel Tugwell said that, as a general rule, he did not see the HQNI intelligence summaries, although he did have access to them.  He said that he would have known what the possible threat was for marches such as the Bloody Sunday demonstration, namely that rioting would almost certainly ensue and that the IRA might position snipers to take advantage of the riot to attack soldiers, but that he was not aware of the specific threat anticipated on Bloody Sunday.  He said that neither he nor Colin Wallace would have had any access to specific army intelligence for the day.

He was shown the Information Policy Working Party review for the period from 30^th December, containing a section relating to Bloody Sunday, which read:  “The working party considered that the organisers of the civil rights march were determined to make it a big propaganda occasion…  In January ‘civil rights’ marches in defiance of the Government ban had little impact.  They had failed to lead to violent confrontations with the Security Forces and Protestant leaders had done no more than complain at the ban being flouted.  When intelligence indicated that the IRA planned to use the march as cover for their gunmen, consideration was given to various pre-emptive and protective measures in the propaganda field”.  Colonel Tugwell said that it was his personal opinion that the information pertaining to IRA plans contained within the review had almost certainly been written with the benefit of hindsight, reiterating that he did not believe that IP had received any specific intelligence concerning the march.

He was then shown the joint Army and RUC statement, issued on 28^th January in relation to the upcoming march.  It read:  “Experience this year has already shown that attempted marches often end in violence that must have been foreseen by the organisers, and clearly the responsibility for this violence and the consequences of it must rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of those who encourage people to break the law”.  He said that he could not explain how there had come to be a contradiction between IP’s information concerning violence on civil rights marches and the press statement issued prior to the march, but added that the army and RUC appeared to be attempting to cover themselves against any ‘damage to civilians’.

2.1.2.3               PR plan

It was Colin Wallace’s evidence that, as a consequence of the favourable intelligence reports received by IP, indicating that the IRA would not be present at the march, a PR plan was put into place to encourage journalists to attend the march in order to witness a successful army arrest operation.  Colonel Tugwell said that no such plan had been put in place.  He also dismissed as ridiculous Mr Wallace’s suggestion that rumours had been deliberately spread to the effect that the army might raid the Creggan, in an attempt to ensure that the IRA would not cover the march.

2.1.3                  Bloody Sunday

2.1.3.1               Role on Bloody Sunday

Colonel Tugwell said that the PR officer of 8 Brigade had been responsible for PR on the day, and that he himself had not been in charge in any way.  He explained that his role in Derry had been merely that of observer, as he had never previously seen a civil rights march in Northern Ireland.  General Ford had granted him permission to attend, and he travelled to Derry with the General, with whom he remained for most of the day.

Upon arrival in Derry, Colonel Tugwell and General Ford visited units and soldiers stationed on the periphery of the Bogside and the Creggan.  He said that General Ford had not sought to interfere with operations, but had been interested in deployment, the lay of the land and whether the soldiers understood their orders correctly.  However, he had could not recollect the conversations in any detail.

2.1.3.2              Barrier 14

Colonel Tugwell took some photographs of the march from the army observation post at the top of the Embassy Building, prior to positioning himself behind Barrier 14.  He recalled the water canon being deployed against rioters twice, having first had to retreat due to a CS gas bomb being thrown from the crowd.  He said that the water canon had served to disperse the rioters and that they had not re-engaged in rioting prior to the Paras’ entry into the Bogside.

2.1.3.3              Chamberlain Street

Colonel Tugwell entered the Bogside immediately behind the Paras and approached Chamberlain Street, where he saw a crowd of 10 to 20 civilians down the far end, near the Rossville Flats.  However, he suddenly became aware of the fact that he was the only soldier in the immediate vicinity and decided to get out of the area.  He said that, as he turned towards William Street, he heard a burst of automatic fire which appeared to come from the Rossville end of Chamberlain Street.  At the time, Colonel Tugwell thought that the sound had been that of eight rounds fired from a low-velocity Thompson sub-machine gun (TSMG).  He told the Tribunal that he could no longer be sure that the sound had in fact been that of a TSMG or indeed of low-velocity fire, but remained convinced that it had been automatic fire rather than high-velocity shots fired in rapid succession.

He also said that he was sure that the sound had not been that of Soldier N firing warning shots towards a crowd in Chamberlain Street, adding that those shots could have accounted for the muffled fire he heard subsequently, and confirmed that he had no recollection of hearing the large number of high velocity shots fired by the army in the Bogside on the day.

2.1.4              Information issued to the press

2.1.4.1           Initial press release

Colonel Tugwell and General Ford returned to 8 Brigade HQ after the end of the shooting, from where the Colonel telephoned a press statement through to HQNI, which began:  “this should be described casually as one of the chaps in Derry had just telephoned the following” and read “the military have suffered casualties from the severe stoning they underwent.  Military casualties number 5, of which none are serious.  Two of these have acid burns”.  The Colonel could no longer recall the exact source of his information, but believed that the statement had been co-written by him and by the major in charge of PR at 8 Brigade (who has yet to be located by the Tribunal).

2.1.4.2              Second press statement document

The Tribunal is in possession of a second press statement document, written later in the day than the previous one.  It read:  “soon after they [the Paras] deployed, at about 10 minutes past 4, they came under nail bomb attack and a fusillade of fire of 50 to 80 rounds from the area of Rossville Flats and Glenfada Flats.  Fire was returned at seen gunmen and nail bombers.  Subsequently, as the troops redeployed to get at the gunmen, the latter continued to fire.  In all, a total of well over 200 rounds were fired in the general direction of the soldiers.  Fire continued to be returned only at identified groups”.  The Colonel said that he was not the author of the document, believing it to have been written by the major in charge of PR at 8 Brigade, on the basis of information from operational reports from soldiers on the spot.

2.1.4.3              Interview with the BBC

Colonel Tugwell gave a radio interview to the BBC during the night of Bloody Sunday, in which he stated that four of those killed by the army were on the army wanted list and that two of the wounded detained at Altnagelvin had admitted to having been armed.  He said that he would have got the information contained within the interview from 1 Para and from the operations room at 8 Brigade, who in turn would have got their information from official, classified reports to the MoD and from intelligence sources. 

During the interview, the Colonel had also dismissed as “absolutely unjustified” allegations that the soldiers had fired indiscriminately at the crowd and had enumerated 25 individual shooting engagements, stating that the soldiers had only responded in 15 of those cases, having been able to identify a target.  It was Colonel Tugwell’s belief that this information would have come directly from 8 Brigade or 1 Para.  He also attributed to the latter an anecdote contained within the interview, describing how one unarmed soldier had had to defend himself with rubber bullets, having been confronted by a gunman who had fired two shots at him.

2.1.5              Sunday Independent article of 6^th February 1972

Colonel Tugwell said that before the end of the week following Bloody Sunday, the IRA and republicans changed their story concerning the day’s events, no longer upholding the view that the army shootings had been due to a breakdown in discipline, but rather claiming that the soldiers had fired in cold blood and on orders.  This had first come to light in an article by Joe MacAnthony in which the journalist alleged a conspiracy by General Ford, Colonel Tugwell and Colonel Wilford to wipe out the IRA in Derry by shooting all men of military age in the vicinity of the incidents.  The Colonel told the Tribunal that General Ford had requested to sue the paper on the grounds that the article was grossly libellous, but that permission had been denied by the army.

2.1.6              IRA confession

Colonel Tugwell said that, in summer 1972, INQ2241, who was Colonel GS Intelligence at HQNI, told him that an RUC interrogator’s report stated that a newly arrested IRA suspect had confessed to firing two magazines from an M1 Carbine from the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday.  The Colonel said that the Witness X materials confirmed this account.

2.1.7             BBC 24 Hours programme on the Widgery Tribunal

Colonel Tugwell was asked to comment on David Mill’s recollection of his interview with General Ford.  It was Mr Mill’s testimony that he had gained the impression that General Ford felt that the army had performed badly and that the best way to remedy the situation would be for soldiers to appear on the programme and to admit to honest mistakes that were understandable in the heat of the circumstances.  The Colonel said that he had never heard General Ford express such views.

The Colonel was also asked to provide further clarification concerning some elements of a letter sent to him by David Mills following the completion of the programme.  However, he could no longer recall receiving the letter and was unable to elucidate further.

2.2                  questions on behalf of the soldiers

2.2.1               Planted nail bombs

Colonel Tugwell said that Colonel Overbury had never said anything in his presence that would indicate that he accepted that the nail bombs found on the body of Gerald Donaghy had been planted.

2.2.2              Wanted list

Colonel Tugwell told the Tribunal that he had made the statement to the effect that four of the dead were on the security service’s wanted list in good faith, and that he had alerted Colin Overbury of his mistake as soon as he became aware of it.  The latter then drafted a statement to the Widgery Inquiry, indicating that a mistake had been made and withdrawing the suggestion that the four men named had been on the wanted list.

2.3                               questions on behalf of the families and wounded

2.3.1              Psychological Operations

Colonel Tugwell reiterated that he had not been involved in psychological operations and that the MoD document describing him as responsible for INQ1873 “in the latter’s concern with psychological operations” was wrong.  He said that he had no objection to psychological operations in principle, but that he did not believe that they were useful in the Northern Ireland context.  Counsel asked him why, if the IP Unit was not involved in PsyOps, did it need to employ INQ1873, the former head of psychological operations at the Joint Warfare Establishment.  He responded that INQ1873 was very well-informed and that he had been a good assistant.

He was asked why he had not complained to Channel 4 concerning their description of him as the head of PsyOps in a documentary in which he participated, to which he replied that, if he took that line, he would be spending his life complaining as it was now part of folklore that he had been involved in PsyOps and black propaganda.  He also explained his answer to one of the Channel 4 interviewers in which he stated “we did not have very much psychological operations”, stating that he had been referring to the ‘small bits of psychological warfare’ that INQ1873 had been involved in.  However, he remained adamant that the psychological operations to which the MoD admitted in relation to Colin Wallace’s case had only begun in 1973, after his own departure from the unit.

2.3.2              Document of 9^th November 1971

Counsel showed the Colonel a document written by him in late 1971, in which he described the Irish News, NICRA, the SDLP, RTE, the Association of Irish Priests and other organisations as being ‘front organisations’ for the IRA and republican sympathisers.  Colonel Tugwell said that, through research, the IP had found associations between the IRA and these types of groups, but that did not mean that he viewed the groups themselves or their members as being part of the IRA.  Furthermore, he said that he did not think that ordinary soldiers within the Parachute Regiment would have looked that deeply into the situation so as to view NICRA and civil rights marchers as part of an IRA front.

The document went on to say:  “the indigenous Irish, once convinced that their cause is just, possess a breath-taking ability to lie with absolute conviction, not just in support of something they believe to be true, but to put across a story they know very well to be untrue”.  In response to Counsel’s questions, Colonel Tugwell said that he hoped his views did not have a racist edge.

2.3.3              The IRA’s role on Bloody Sunday

Colonel Tugwell was shown the transcript of the interview he gave to Lena Ferguson of Channel 4, in which he stated:  “I would like to know a great deal more about Bloody Sunday.  I would like to know if it was set up.  I would like to know where the IRA actually was and why they were not defending the Bogside”.  He said that it had appeared to him, from the lack of casualties amongst 1 Para, that skilled, experienced IRA men had not been firing weapons at them, but said that this did not mean that he believed that the IRA had not been present or that they had not planned anything on the day.

2.3.4              First hand experience on Bloody Sunday

Colonel Tugwell confirmed that there had been no real pressure on Barrier 14 immediately prior to the Paras’ entry into the Bogside, the water canon having effectively dispersed the rioters.  He agreed that the crowd had withdrawn to such an extent as to make any snatch operation, based on the identification of rioters and their speedy arrest, very difficult.

Counsel informed him that there was no log of any automatic fire directed at the soldiers in any of the police or army logs on Bloody Sunday and that none of the film footage taken on the day had recorded the sound of such firing.  However, the Colonel said that the sound of the eight rounds from an automatic weapon remained firmly in his memory.  He explained the discrepancies between his current recollection of gunfire and that described in his interview with Channel 4 by stating that, during the informal interview, he might have confused his own recollection and information gleaned from conversations with his peers.

2.3.5              BBC interview given during the night of Bloody Sunday

In response to Counsel’s question as to why Mr Staughton, the Chief of Army PR, had not given the interview with the BBC on the night of Bloody Sunday, he said that he thought he had been personally chosen to give the interview as he carried an army rank and was therefore a more appropriate person to conduct the interview.  He denied Counsel’s suggestion that he had invented the information provided in the interview to the effect that four of the dead were on the wanted list (i.e. that they were wanted for internment or for questioning in relation to a criminal offence) in order to justify the army’s shooting, saying that he had made an honest mistake.

He said that neither General Ford nor any other senior army official had suggested to him, prior to the broadcast, that the operation had been a mistake or that any of the people shot had been hit by mistake by soldiers aiming at other, legitimate targets.

The Colonel reiterated that the statistics he quoted during the course of the interview concerning the number of shooting engagements and the number of times the army had opened fire had come from 8 Brigade, via the operations desk at HQNI and agreed that the determining of such information would have involved a detailed examination of the events by the person compiling the statistics.  He acknowledged that it would have been important for him to have known how many rounds had been discharged by the army on the day, in case the question had been put to him, but had no recollection of making any enquiries concerning this point.

2.3.6          Role on the Widgery Tribunal

Colonel Tugwell explained that, although his name appeared on documents suggesting that he was involved in the Widgery Tribunal, he had in fact gone on leave at the time.

2.3.7          Army film footage taken on Bloody Sunday

Colin Wallace told the Tribunal that the film footage taken on Bloody Sunday should have been taken back to HQNI for processing in the usual way, but that somebody or a more senior rank than colonel had intercepted INQ2030 (the cameraman) and had ordered him to hand over the film, in order for it to be taken to England for ‘security processing’.  Colonel Tugwell said that he did not believe Colin Wallace’s evidence and had no recollection of the latter having complained to him concerning the removal of the film.  However, he was told that the Inquiry also had evidence from Major General INQ2144, stating that he had indeed taken the film to England for ‘security processing’.  The Colonel said that he could shed no light on the meaning of the expression, but was sure that it would not have involved doctoring and thought that the film might have been taken to England due to the lack of processing facilities at HQNI.

2.3.8              Attitude of soldiers regarding the security situation in Derry

Colonel Tugwell was shown the draft copy of a book, written by a an officer from 1 Para and submitted to the Information Policy Unit after Bloody Sunday (c.f. Week 66, paragraph 2.2.8), which read:  “for over two years now, television audiences throughout the world had been treated weekly to films of young rioters viciously and successfully attacking British troops with a variety of weapons…  These indignities were inflicted apparently with impunity and, worse still, in front of the media, while the soldiers cowered behind their shields and so on, impotent and ineffective”.  The Colonel said that the work, assuming it was genuine, reflected the views of a young officer ‘with attitude’ and did not think that the views of the officer would have been typical of soldiers within the Parachute Regiment.  It was his belief that the officer’s suggestions of widespread anger and frustration were overblown.

He was then shown the transcript from his interview with the BBC, conducted during the night of Bloody Sunday in which he also said that his blood had boiled watching the stoning of the Royal Anglian Regiment at Barrier 14.  He responded that the soldiers had behaved very well and had not been affected by his blood boiling, and he did not think that his response was the common one amongst members of the Parachute Regiment.

Colonel Tugwell agreed that there had been a growing feeling at HQNI that something had to be done militarily in Derry to bring it under the control of the security forces, but said that Bloody Sunday was not a wild response to a series of frustrations felt by the army at the time.  He said that the driving force behind what led to Bloody Sunday was the decision to have an illegal march in the city.

3.                  Major INQ1900’s evidence

On Bloody Sunday, Major INQ1900 (who currently holds the rank of General) was the Deputy Assistant Adjudant and Quartermaster General of 8^th Infantry Brigade, having held the position since December 1970.  As such, he was responsible for the supply of ammunition, amongst other duties.  On Bloody Sunday itself, he spent most of the day at Brigade Headquarters and in the Operations Room (where logs of radio communications were made).  He began his evidence stating that, since he had sworn to tell the truth, he wanted to add the caveat that the passage of time and his readings concerning Bloody Sunday might have influenced his recollection of the events of the time.

3.1              questions on behalf of the tribunal

3.1.1            Change in policy concerning the security situation in Derry

Major INQ1900 told the Inquiry that, upon assuming his appointment in Derry in December 1970, he had been briefed by his predecessor and the then Brigade Commander on the need for the army to be less physical and forceful in Derry than in other parts of Northern Ireland due to the sectarian make-up of the city.  However, he said that when Brigadier McClelland assumed control of the Brigade in October 1971 it became apparent that he had instructions to take a firmer line, a fact confirmed to him by the Brigadier himself.

He said that both of the resident battalions in Derry, namely the 1^st Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment and the 2^nd Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets had happily accepted the change in policy, adding that that Commanding Officer of the 1^st Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment, which had been stationed in Derry for approximately 20 months, had actively welcomed the change.

3.1.2              Co-ordinating conference held before the march

Major INQ1900 attended the co-ordinating conference held a few days prior to the Bloody Sunday march, when the operational order was discussed.  He himself was responsible for drafting the service support section of the operational order, dealing with accommodation, medical facilities for military casualties, fuel and ammunition. 

3.1.2.1              Arrest operation

He recalled that the role of 1 Para (the 1^st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment) as an arrest force was discussed at the meeting and said that, although the intention to arrest upwards of 300 people had been discussed, a large number of arrests had not in fact been envisaged as a possibility, due to the difficulties previously encountered by the Brigade in trying to arrest rioters in Derry.  He said that it was envisaged that the army would assume responsibility for any arrests and that the role of the police would be limited to ordering people at the barricades to disperse.

3.1.2.2           Plans concerning potential IRA activity on the march

Major INQ1900 told the Inquiry that it was his personal view at the time that NICRA would do all within their power to constrain any IRA activity in relation to the march.  He acknowledged that previous experience suggested that gunmen would exploit riots rather than largely peaceful demonstrations in order to attack the army, but said that hooligans would exploit the march and that their activities in turn could have been exploited by gunmen.

He said that no consideration had been given at the co-ordinating conference to the question of how the army would respond in the event of an attack by the IRA as such a response would have been governed by standard procedure.  Counsel asked whether the operation of standard procedure was not more difficult in situations such as civil rights marches where large numbers of innocent civilians would be in the area from where IRA shooting might originate.  He responded that he was sure that extra consideration would have been given to the situation but said that it would have been unnecessary to discuss it at the co-ordinating conference.

He could not recall any specific intelligence having been received concerning a potential attack on the Brandywell army post.

3.1.2.3              Mood of the conference

He said that, since the march was the first major event planned in the Brigade area since the arrival of Brigadier MacLellan and the change in policy, the Brigade saw the march as a major test of their professional ability and were anxious to get it right.  His recollection was that the mood of the meeting was that the army should successfully contain the march, using minimum force.  He rejected suggestions made in a draft Sunday Times article written shortly after Bloody Sunday, in which the mood at the co-ordinating conference was described as “one of complete determination” that a large operation should go through and that “even if it meant shooting, everyone wanted to show that 8 Brigade knew how to go after the hooligans”.

3.1.3              Order given to 1 Para to enter the Bogside

The log of army communications on Bloody Sunday records a request made at 3:55 pm:  “Would like to employ sub-unit through Barrier 14 to pick up yobbos in William Street / Little James”, followed, at 4:09 pm, by:  “Orders given to 1 Para for 1 sub-unit of 1 Para to do scoop-up on through Barrier 14”.

Lord Saville said that his own reading of the log was that a request had been made to send in only one company (sub-unit) of 1 Para, and that an order had been made to that effect, i.e., that authorisation was only given to one company of 1 Para to enter the Bogside, not to the two companies which actually went in.

Major INQ1900 said that Lord Saville did not have the military understanding to realise that the order so interpreted was nonsense and that such an understanding would not have been the way that the Commanding Officer or the Brigade Commander intended the arrest operation to be carried out.  It was his evidence that he had been in the Operations Room when the Brigade Major (Commander) had burst through the door saying that orders had been given for the scoop-up operation to commence and instructing INQ1901 (the Brigade Operations Officer) to record the order in the log. 

He said that he did not believe that the order was intended to confine 1 Para to sending in only one company into the Bogside, explaining that the order recorded would only have been a summary of the orders given and not a literal recording of the actual order given to the Commanding Officer of 1 Para.  Therefore, it was his belief that the order recorded was both an order to carry out the arrest operation as envisaged in the operational order for the day and a confirmation of the specific request to send one sub-unit through Barrier 14.  He said that as a professional soldier he took the view that the order recorded could not have been the sole order given as it did not make sense in the context of an arrest operation to send in only one company, since one company alone could not have got behind the hooligans. 

Given his evidence that it would not make sense for only one sub-unit to have been deployed through Barrier 14, he was asked why 1 Para would have made such a request in the first place.  He responded that he had not been at the scene and could not explain that any further.  Lord Saville also suggested to him that the request to deploy through Barrier 14 to “pick up yobbos in William Street / Little James Street” could have formed an encircling position, given the existence of a Barrier in Little James Street.

3.2                  questions on behalf of the soldiers

3.2.1              Change in policy concerning the security situation in Derry

Major INQ1900 said that, as part of his duties, he went to HQNI on a regular basis.  He told the Tribunal that, prior to the arrival of Brigadier MacLellan and the change in policy, the approach taken in Derry was being ridiculed by those in Belfast who felt that a much firmer form of action should be taken to deal with hooliganism.

3.2.2              Use of 1 Para as arrest force

Major INQ1900 said that it would not have been possible to assign the Parachute Regiment to any role other than that of arrest force, as they had only arrived in Derry at 11:00 am on the morning of Bloody Sunday.  He was asked whether there would have been any merit in assigning them the role of manning Barriers 14 and 12, as opposed to that of arresting rioters.  It was his opinion that since the purpose of the barriers was not only to prevent the march attaining the city centre but also to protect city centre from further destruction, it made sense for the barriers to be manned by the resident battalions who knew the city well and had been responsible for some time in protecting it from attack.

In light of his response, he was asked to comment on an army document dating from November 1971 which stated that “it is generally better to use reinforcing troops to man the baseline and use those soldiers with local knowledge of the area to carry out flanking movements”.  He agreed that, as a general rule, it was better to follow the strategy outlined in the document but said that the document was referring to reinforcing troops on emergency tours as opposed to reserve troops such as 1 Para, which were in fact a resident battalion and knew Northern Ireland well.

Major INQ1900 said that there was no discussion at the co-ordinating conference concerning how far into the Bogside the arresting force should go in order to get behind the rioters, but added that this could well have been discussed between the Brigade Major and the Commanding Officer of 1 Para.  He said that had it been suggested at the co-ordinating conference that the Paras would go as far into the Bogside as they did on Bloody Sunday, it would have struck him as surprising as it was not something that had been done previously to his knowledge.

3.2.3              Military ammunition

Major INQ1900 was asked whether the loss of a magazine containing live ammunition by a soldier would have been considered a serious matter.  He said that he could never recall anyone having lost a magazine of live ammunition but thought that if any soldier had lost such a magazine, they would have been court-martialled.

3.3                 questions on behalf of the families and wounded

3.3.1              BID 150 (equipment used for secure army communications)

Major INQ1900 said that he did not believe it possible that the Brigade would not have had a BID 150 on Bloody Sunday and thought that it would have been located on the Brigade Major’s desk on the day itself.  He agreed that the Parachute Regiment would have to have had a BID 150 at their temporary technical headquarters in Derry, if the system was to be relied upon on the day.

Since the purpose of using a BID 150 militarily was to keep things secret, he was asked why insecure methods were also used which would have effectively negated the benefits of the secure system, i.e., the Paras using the Brigade net (which was insecure) to request Barrier 14 to be lifted in order for them to be able to enter the Bogside.  He responded that the BID 150 was an expensive piece of equipment and that the provision of them to lower elements of the chain of command would have been considered an unjustified financial expenditure.

3.3.2              Order given to 1 Para to enter the Bogside

Major INQ1900 was shown the operational order for Bloody Sunday which read:  “The scoop-up operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William Street / Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street / Little James Street.  It is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot”.

Richard Harvey suggested that, if the arrest operation was to be conducted on foot, in accordance with the operational order, there was never any question of getting in behind rioters, but rather the idea was to launch a snatch operation to arrest persons at the junction of William Street, Rossville Street, Little James Street.  It was further suggested that, on the face of it, the request made to “deploy one sub-unit through Barrier 14 to pick up yobbos in William Street / Little James Street” was a request to carry out one of the two axes set out in the operational order and that the order as logged was not nonsense in military terms but presented a pattern that was logical and consistent with the operational order.  Major INQ1900 responded that he had given his interpretation as to what he believed had happened and could say no more than that.

3.3.3            Use of 1 Para as arrest force

Major INQ1900 said that the events of Bloody Sunday had not led him to conclude that it had been unwise to choose the Paratroopers who had little topographical knowledge of Derry to conduct the arrest operation rather than the resident battalions who knew the streets and the enclaves of the Bogside.

He was told that General Ford, in an interview given some time after Bloody Sunday, had expressed the view that it was perhaps a failure on the part of the people of Derry to understand the psychology of the Paras that had in part contributed to the events of Bloody Sunday.  He was also told that Brigadier MacLellan had expressed the view that had the local regiments been used, the events of Bloody Sunday would not have transpired.  Major INQ1900 disagreed with both statements, saying that Counsel was attempting to paint the Parachute Regiment as a regiment outside the normal control, training and discipline of the rest of the British Army.  He said that, whilst the Parachute Regiment demanded a greater level of fitness and ability, they were disciplined, controlled and trained in the same way as other infantry regiments and that he was surprised to hear that General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan had made such statements.

3.3.4              Change in policy concerning the security situation in Derry

Major INQ1900 denied Counsel’s suggestion that the initial, different approach of the army in Derry as contrasted with Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland was dictated primarily by the lack of reinforcements for the army.  He said that the driving force behind 8 Brigade’s approach up until the change in policy had been influenced by the sectarian split of the city which was predominantly Catholic and, as such, entirely different to other major areas of Northern Ireland.

He was told that, in his statement to the Inquiry, Brigadier MacLellan indicated that he had requested three extra battalions for Derry as he believed that that was what would be necessary to enable the army to act in the same way as in Belfast.  Major INQ1900 said that he had never heard the Brigadier suggest that he needed another three battalions and felt that he would have discussed it with him had it been the case.  He added that the simple, logical problem of accommodating the three extra battalions would have been unworkable.

3.3.5              Expectations concerning IRA use of the march

Major INQ1900 was told by Counsel that, since the imposition of the ban on marches which was put in place six months prior to Bloody Sunday, no civil rights march had been used by the IRA to fire upon soldiers, and was asked whether he would have expected those responsible for deciding how to respond to a civil rights march to have regard to previous experiences of marches in Northern Ireland in general and in Derry in particular.  He responded that he would have expected those responsible to take previous experience into account, but added that he had no responsibility in that area and would not have been consulted.  It was his testimony that the Brigade Commander and Brigade Major would have been responsible for assessing the situation, in response to any intelligence received, and that the Commander of Land Forces or the Brigadier of General Staff would also have been involved if the event was of significant import.

3.3.6              Requisitioning of buildings for the use of army snipers

Major INQ1900 told the Inquiry that he was responsible for the legal requirements concerning the requisitioning of buildings for the use of army snipers at the time of Bloody Sunday and said that he had requisitioned the Embassy building for Bloody Sunday itself.

3.4                 questions on behalf of nicra

3.4.1              Arrest powers of the army

Major INQ1900 said that he was not aware that there was a challenge in the Courts concerning the power of the Armed Forces to make arrests in Northern Ireland at the time of Bloody Sunday, brought by John Hume MP against an officer from 8 Brigade.  He was equally unaware that the High Court had found that the Armed Forces did not have any legal powers of arrest at the time.

3.5              Further questions on behalf of the soldiers

3.5.1          Use of the army SLR in a civil setting

Major INQ1900 recalled a series of personal conversations with the Commanding Officer of the Royal Anglian Regiment some time before Bloody Sunday during which they discussed the problems associated with using high velocity SLRs (Self Loading Rifles) and with the range of 7.62 bullets.  He said that the Commanding Officer had been concerned with the fact that the 7.62 could traverse its target, causing further death and damage.  He told the Inquiry that the matter had been referred to HQNI and to the MoD and that research had been done into a possible substitute bullet.

He was shown a document which records that rifles converted to fire .22 bullets (of a lower velocity than 7.62 bullets) had been released for issue to units for Bloody Sunday.  However, it was his testimony that none of them had ever been used operationally.

3.5.2          The Yellow Card

He was told that the Commanding Officer referred to above had told the Tribunal in his statement that, in retrospect, he regarded the Yellow Card as being too restrictive when operating against bombers and stone-throwers.  Major INQ1900 said that the Commanding Officer had not expressed such a view at the time and that everybody accepted that the Yellow Card was law.  He said that the Yellow Card was a document that had been approved politically and that he had never heard anybody suggesting that it should be amended, adding that it was governing the army’s attempt to restore law and order in their own country and it therefore had to be done within the confines of the law.

3.5.3          Use of 1 Para as arrest force

Major INQ1900 reiterated his conviction that those who drew up the operational order had been right to use 1 Para for the arrest operation.  He agreed that, although it had been suggested that there was no particular reason why the Paras could not have been used to man the temporary barriers erected on the day, in fact the individual barriers had been manned by soldiers from the particular battalion under the responsibility of which the tactical area in question fell.

3.6                  further questions on behalf of the tribunal

3.6.1              Requisitioning of buildings for army sniper use

Major INQ1900 explained that, when requisitioning a building for army sniper use, he had to present a document signed by one of the Northern Ireland Ministers to the owner of the building concerned.  He said that the Embassy building was the only building requisitioned on Bloody Sunday, but added that there were some property owners who did not require the document in order to allow the army to use their property and that there were no legal requirements in relation to the city Walls or derelict buildings.  He also said that there were no buildings in the vicinity of the city Walls or of Barrier 14 in William Street which were used regularly for positioning marksmen.

3.6.2            BID 150 equipment

He was shown a document written on 20^th December 1971 by Colonel Ramsbotham, the Military Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff (Lord Carver), which read:  “the need for secure radio; the requirement in actual terms to make the Brigade command net secure is for 4… BID 150 equipments.  CGS [Chief of the General Staff] accepted the case and would like to know the chances of these equipments being made available”.  Major INQ1900 said that this request was merely a request for more BID 150 units and did not indicate that the Brigade was not already in possession of one.  It was his evidence that six BID 150s would have been needed to render the Brigade net secure and that, therefore, the request for four would indicate that they already had two in place.

4.                  inq1873’s evidence

Lieutenant Colonel INQ1873 worked at HQNI at the time of Bloody Sunday, having been posted there between October 1970 and June 1972.  His personal diaries from the time of Bloody Sunday have been submitted to the Inquiry.

4.1              questions on behalf of the Tribunal

4.1.1            Role in Northern Ireland

Colonel INQ1873 told the Inquiry that his role at HQNI was purely an advisory one, advising the GOC (General Officer Commanding, General Tuzo), the CLF (Commander of Land Forces, General Ford), the staff and army units in Northern Ireland.  He said that it concerned Information Policy, relations with the community and ways to improve the public image of the army which sometimes received adverse publicity for its actions.  On official documents, he is known as GSO1 PsyOps.

He said that Information Policy (IP), by definition, could include psychological operations (PsyOps) and, in his statement to the Inquiry, he wrote that there was a principle whereby psychological operations may not be conducted against one’s own people and that that that principle was adhered to in the army’s operations and activities in Northern Ireland in all the time he was there, until June 1972.  However, it was Colonel INQ1873’s evidence to the Tribunal that the statement he had made should now be modified upon reflection, in that some forms of low-level psychological operations had in fact been permitted in Northern Ireland, and that he had been engaged, for example, in writing anonymous letters to newspapers and forging documents.

It was his testimony that, as a general rule, no material containing untrue material had been disseminated by the IP unit and that even low-level psychological operations had ceased when Colonel Tugwell took over the IP Unit in July 1971.

4.1.2                  PsyOps in Northern Ireland

 4.1.2.1              PsyOps expertise

In April 1968, Colonel INQ1873 was sent to the United States military base at Fort Bragg in North Carolina to attend a four-month course at the special warfare school.  He then spent two years as an instructor at the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum in Wiltshire, and went directly from there to Northern Ireland.

He also told the Tribunal that, in July 1970, prior to being posted to HQNI, he visited the Joint Warfare Establishment in order to report on possible ways in which military psychological activities might be employed in Northern Ireland.  When asked by Counsel whether in 1970 active consideration was being given by the Security Services to putting a PsyOps unit in Northern Ireland, he responded that he had been tasked with finding out about using PsyOps in Northern Ireland but that he had not necessarily carried out this task.  However, he agreed that, when posted to Northern Ireland, he had been tasked to fulfil a role in the field of PsyOps.

4.1.2.2              PsyOps Committee

Upon his arrival in Northern Ireland, Colonel INQ1873 continued to recommend the establishment of a PsyOps committee, based on the model usually set up in a counter-insurgency situation.  This is documented in a report written by him in July 1971.  However, he said that his recommendation had, to his knowledge, never been approved or implemented.  He was asked why he had continued to recommend the establishing of such a committee in July 1971 if, as maintained in his evidence, PsyOps had ceased in July of the same year upon the arrival of Colonel Tugwell.  He responded that, at the time of writing the document, he had been unaware of the appointment of Colonel Tugwell.

He confirmed that he and Hugh Mooney had formed an informal type of working party to consider PsyOps matters, in that they shared an office and discussed matters relating to IP generally, including PsyOps.

4.1.3              Intelligence relating to Bloody Sunday

Colonel INQ1873 confirmed that saw all HQNI intelligence summaries as a matter of routine.  He said that he could not recall ever receiving specific intelligence in respect of any civil liberties march which indicated that the IRA would be present or would use the march as cover.  In addition, he said that he had never been made aware of the contents of a signal, sent to Brigadier MacLellan by the Director of Intelligence, known to the Inquiry as ‘David’, which cites a source as saying that the IRA would use the Bloody Sunday march as cover.  Equally, he could not recall any suggestion ever being made within IP that ringleaders at riots might have to be shot in order for the army to regain control of the security situation.

One of his diary entries from 1^st April 1972 reads:  “when intelligence indicated that the IRA planned to use the march as cover for their gunmen, consideration was given to various pre-emptive and protective measures in the propaganda field”.  He said that a lot of his diary had been written with hindsight and that this entry was incorrect.  He could not explain how he had come to write it in his diary and reiterated that he was aware of no intelligence that indicated that the IRA would use the march as cover.

4.1.4                 1972 diary entries

Counsel took Colonel INQ1873 through relevant diary entries made in 1972, asking for further clarification where necessary.  The issues below reflect the substantial points raised.

4.1.4.1              Disagreements between the army battalions

Diary entries on the 22^nd and 25^th of January appear to reflect disagreements between the various battalions resident in Northern Ireland, stating:  “8 Brigade seem incapable of getting any operation right and there seems to have been antagonism between the Royal Green Jackets and the Paras.  At any rate, the result was that 1 Para cut up rough and might well have put all the work of the Information services back seriously…  Simon Winchester’s article in the Guardian this morning [an article, in fact written by Simon Hoggart, which alleged that other some army units were requesting that the Paras be kept out of their areas due to their rough and “brutal” manner].  Incidentally, the C of I [Court of Inquiry] has revealed some of the behind the scenes disagreements between 8^th and 39^th Brigade”.

Colonel INQ1873 could not recall any further detail regarding the antagonism between different regiments and said that he was not aware of any requests having been made for the Parachute Regiment to be kept out of various areas.  He was able to elucidate on his comment concerning the work of the Information services, saying that the fact that the Paras had behaved badly with members of the crowd might have had an impact on the work conducted by IP to improve the relations between the army and the civilian population.

4.1.4.2              Bloody Sunday

The diary entry for Bloody Sunday reads:  “A very significant and tragic day…  Already the opposition are talking of Britain’s Sharpeville.  One wonders if the truth will ever be sorted out.  Undoubtedly there was an IRA plan for the hooligans to promote trouble.  This succeeded and, as 1 Para went in, the gunmen opened up, even to the extent of firing into their own people”.  Colonel INQ1873 said that the diary entry reflected his belief based on hindsight and that he must have got the information concerning the IRA from the Operations Room on the evening of Bloody Sunday.

4.1.4.3              Interpretation of the events of Bloody Sunday

The diary entry for 31^st January 1972 states that “so far as one can judge, the IRA did fire first”, and goes on to report that INQ1383, a friend of the Colonel, told him that he had heard the distinct sound of a Thompson sub-machine gun.  He confirmed that the conclusions to which he had come had been based on information provided to him by others.

The diary entry for 13^th February records:  “the morning passed, reading the papers and listening to Colin Wallace’s account of some of the deliberate fabrications that have been made by the Catholics in Derry over the shootings of 30^th January”.  Colonel INQ1873 could no longer recall what those fabrications were.

4.2                  questions on behalf of the families and wounded

4.2.1               Role in PsyOps prior to July 1971

Counsel asked Colonel INQ1873 whether he accepted that when he wrote in his statement to the Inquiry that he was not involved in any kind of PsyOps activity in Northern Ireland, he was being, at the very least, economical with the truth.  He responded that he had been, unintentionally.  He accepted that he was the main PsyOps operator in Northern Ireland and that he was responsible for PsyOps in the region, under the direction of the CLF.  He was therefore asked, if it was his actual job, how he could have forgotten that he did engage in PsyOps in Northern Ireland, to which he responded that the level of PsyOps in which he was engaged was of a very low level and did not amount to any form of campaign.  He confirmed that his titles were ‘PsyOps Staff Officer’ and ‘GSO1 Liaison’.

It was his evidence that his only activities in relation to PsyOps in Northern Ireland in 1971 had been to write approximately six anonymous letters to Northern Irish newspapers and instruct soldiers wearing Beatles wigs to conduct a graffiti mission, spraying ‘give peace a chance’ on walls (the operation had to be aborted at an early stage due to the arrival of the RUC on the scene).

The Colonel also confirmed that, prior to being posted to Northern Ireland, he was the head of PsyOps at Old Sarum, which consisted of him and his assistant.

4.2.2              Proposal to set up PsyOps Working Committee

Colonel INQ1873 said that his reports of July 1970 and 1971 recommending the establishment of a PsyOps Committee and the appointment of a dedicated PsyOps staff officer were merely a recommendation and did not mean that he had anticipated that the Committee and staff officer would actually be put in place.  He told the Tribunal that there was a meeting held in July 1971 to discuss his proposals which, to the best of his recollection, had been attended by the CLF, the Army Chief of Staff, the UK Representative and himself, amongst others.  He was asked why no minutes relating to the meeting had been produced.  Although he agreed that he would probably have been the person tasked with taking minutes at such a meeting, he said that no record had been taken of the meeting as there was no need for such a record. 

He told the Tribunal that he could not recall any disagreement at the meeting, but it had merely been decided that the recommendations should not be acted upon as there was no need for PsyOps in Northern Ireland.  He agreed that he had been ordered by the CLF, in agreement with the GOC, to investigate the setting up of a PsyOps operation and that a meeting had been held within six weeks of the GOC stating on record that he was examining the whole subject, but remained adamant that no such committee had ever been set up.

The Colonel was asked that, given the fact that official instructions were in place never to use the term PsyOps due to its sinister connotations, the PsyOps committee was actually set up, but called the Military Information Policy Committee instead.  He responded that the Military Information Policy Committee could have evolved from it.

4.2.3          Role in PsyOps post July 1971

Colonel INQ1873 reiterated that PsyOps activities ceased in July 1971 and said that an MoD document dated 30^th November 1971, which refers to him in relation to PsyOps, was misleading.  However, he said that his post had been kept in place in case a situation developed in the future when it might be necessary to consider the use of further PsyOps.

A diary entry from January 1972 records contact made with the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum.  Colonel INQ1873 explained that he had gone back to Old Sarum to deliver some lectures on case studies that were familiar to him, which did not concern Northern Ireland.  He was therefore asked why, if he was still so senior in PsyOps that he was giving instruction and being consulted about PsyOps courses at Old Sarum, his talents were being wasted in a post in Northern Ireland where he was not involved in any PsyOps.  He said that he had other duties in Northern Ireland and reiterated that there were no PsyOps activities to his knowledge in January or February 1972.

Counsel asked INQ1873 why he was so anxious to distance himself from PsyOps and suggested that the reason might be that he was in fact engaged in PsyOps in and around the time of Bloody Sunday but was not prepared to give any details as to what he had been doing.  He responded that Counsel would need to give him chapter and verse, based on others’ evidence.

4.2.4                 Psychological operations directed against “one’s own people”

Colonel INQ1873 confirmed what he had said in his statement, i.e., that he would not have engaged in a campaign of psychological warfare in Northern Ireland, due to the principle that PsyOps “may not be conducted against one’s own people”.  Barry Macdonald QC suggested that he had not in fact regarded the people of Northern Ireland as his own people, and referred him to sections of his diaries which, he contended, expressed a racist attitude towards the Irish.  These read:  “we all doubt whether the Chief Justice Tribunal [the Widgery Inquiry] will be equal to the mendacious Irish” and “the Irish at their worst, violent cold-blooded killers”.  Colonel INQ1873 responded that his diary was a personal document that he wrote very often late at night and denied the suggestion that the views expressed were indicative of the private views shared generally by people involved in the army in Northern Ireland.

4.2.5                  Intelligence relating to Bloody Sunday

Colonel INQ1873 confirmed that neither he nor a number of officers at HQNI had expected IRA shooting on Bloody Sunday and that he had never received any intelligence after the event to the effect that the IRA had been engaged in shooting.  He also reiterated that he had no knowledge of any informant within the Bogside who had given intelligence concerning the IRA plans for the day or of any information of the IRA drilling in the Bogside in preparation for an attack on the army.

4.2.6                Reaction to Bloody Sunday

He said that the Army Public Relations Staff and the Press Office had been very busy after Bloody Sunday but that the IP staff had not been any busier than usual.  He acknowledged that there were a lot of allegations that he would have regarded as propaganda emanating from the Bogside at the time and said that IP would have been giving a lot of thought as to how best to counteract it.  He said that there was a general effort over a period of time following Bloody Sunday to correct some of the adverse propaganda and, although his name does not feature in connection with any of it, he said that it did not mean that he was doing nothing.

4.3              questions on behalf of the soldiers

4.3.1           Reports concerning the establishing of PsyOps in Northern Ireland

4.3.1.1              Report of July 1970

Colonel INQ1873 was asked to comment on the report he sent to HQNI, following his visit to the Joint Warfare Establishment in July 1970, approximately a year before he was posted to Northern Ireland, in which he makes the recommendation for a PsyOps staff officer to be posted at HQNI.  He confirmed that his recommendation was for an officer, already in place at HQNI, to attend the course but to return to HQNI to perform their usual role, with the added benefit of having some knowledge of PsyOps.  He said that he had been envisaging that the officer in question would be very much a part-time PsyOps officer, who would be on call if and when required.

He also agreed that he had been anticipating a restricted use of PsyOps in Northern Ireland, focused on countering propaganda attacking the image of the Security Forces, countering rumours and providing a high quality information service, and that these roles would have been performed by the part-time PsyOps officer.

4.3.1.2             Memo of July 1971

He was shown once again his memo of July 1971 discussing the proposed terms of reference for the Psychological Operations Committee, and reiterated that, according to his recollection, the committee never sat.

4.4                                   Arrival of Colonel Tugwell

Colonel INQ1873 agreed that, upon his arrival in Northern Ireland in August 1971, Colonel Tugwell had taken over the management of IP, including any psychological operations managed thereunder, insofar as they existed, and that the control of PsyOps had passed out of his hands.

5.                 INQ2090’S EVIDENCE

Lieutenant Colonel INQ2090 was a lieutenant of the 8^th Infantry Brigade and Signal Squadron, based in Ebrington Barracks at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He contributed to an explanatory note relating to communications networks used by the army in 1972, which was prepared for the Tribunal by the MoD.  He and a colleague, INQ2091, also gave a presentation to the Tribunal in July 1999 about the operation of radio nets at the time of Bloody Sunday.

5.1              questions on behalf of the tribunal

5.1.1           ‘Insecure’ army radio systems

INQ2090 told the Inquiry that, in 1972, the usual method of communication during a military operation would have been voice radio and said that there were two different types of radio in use at the time of Bloody Sunday, radios manufactured by Pye, which were part of the Ulsternet network, and older Larkspur radios, which were part of the Guardnet network (a network was a grouping of radio stations which were all equipped with radios tuned to the same frequency, enabling communication between all stations within range, tuned to that frequency; a network would have had a control station, usually located at the main Brigade headquarters, and subordinate stations which could be another building or a soldier with a radio pack).

He explained that, in January 1972, there was a mismatch of two types of radio systems in use:  the Pye system (Ulsternet) was more modern and portable and was used for communications from Brigade to battalion level, and also for communications with army helicopters.  Conversely, the Larkspur radios (Guardnet) were big and heavy and designed to be fitted in armoured vehicles and not suitable for use in built-up areas; they were the method of communication at battalion level or between battalion and company.  INQ2090 also added that the Guardnet would be used as a backup system, in case of problems with the Ulsternet.

Both of these networks were insecure, in that anyone with the appropriate equipment could listen into army transmissions conducted over them.

5.1.2              Radio links to HQNI

INQ2090 said that the link from Brigade headquarters to units operating in Derry on the Ulsternet was transmitted through a relay station on Sherrifs Mountain, where he himself was stationed on Bloody Sunday.  Another relay station, situated at Slieve Callion, enabled HQNI to listen into communications and to monitor what was happening in Derry.  However, he said that this was not used by HQNI to communicate with Brigade headquarters as it was not secure.

5.1.3             Secure army radio system

INQ2090 told the Inquiry that a top secret secure net had been established in Derry before the time of Bloody Sunday, using an adapted Larkspur radio and BID 150 cryptographic equipment.  He said that the weight of the BID 150 was such that it could only be transported by two people and had to be held at a static headquarters or mounted in a Land Rover.  Also, due to the secrecy surrounding it, it had to be physically manned at all times.

INQ2090 said that he had a clear recollection of there being a BID 150 system available at 8 Brigade in Derry on Bloody Sunday.  It was his belief that one would have remained at Brigade HQ under the command of the Brigade Major (either in the radio room at or in a Land Rover parked within the secure compound outside the Brigade HQ building, manned by somebody from Signal Squadron, Alpha Troop (which he was commanding at the time)) and that there would have been approximately four others in amongst the different battalions in operation on the day.

5.1.4          Logs of army radio communications

INQ2090 said that, during a military operation, two separate logs would have been maintained at Brigade HQ, the operations log and the radio room log, the primary purpose of the latter being to ensure that communication systems were operating properly.

5.2              questions on behalf of the families and wounded

5.2.1           Logs of army radio communications

INQ2090 agreed that one of the functions of log-keeping was to enable those in operational control of the events on the ground to provide accurate information to all others who might be required to take action.  He also agreed that it was absolutely essential for any order given relating to action on the ground to be recorded and understood as recorded.

He also agreed with Counsel’s comment that the BID 150 was demanding in terms of the requirements needed to operate it, in the sense that it needed to be permanently manned, even if it received only one message throughout the course of the day and said that, if it had received only one message over the course of a day, he would have expected it to be accurately recorded in a log.

5.2.2              Secure army radio system

INQ2090 was shown a document dated November 1971, issued by Brigadier MacLellan and the Brigade Major, in which the insecurity of army communications is discussed and a solution proposed, namely the use of a manual encryptor device (the fixed cursor SILDEX) with the Pye radios.  He agreed that, had 8 Brigade been in possession of a BID 150 device at the time of the writing of the memo, he would have expected there to have been some reference to it in the document.  He was also shown the document discussing “the need for secure radio” (c.f. paragraph 3.6.2), dated 20^th December 1971.

INQ2090 said that he had no recollection of BID 150 equipment being delivered to 8 Brigade between late December 1971 and 30^th January 1972, and said that, from his own knowledge and recollection, he could not confirm whether they actually had a BID 150 in Derry at the end of January 1972.

He told the Inquiry that the BID 150 was battery powered and that, if stationed in an army vehicle, it would have been recharged by the vehicle engine.  He agreed that there was a danger of the battery draining if the engine was switched off whilst the BID 150 was operational and that it had proved difficult to keep the equipment charged in tactical situations.

6.              colin overbury’s evidence

Colonel Overbury was one of the lawyers representing the Army at the Widgery Inquiry.  Before Bloody Sunday he had served in Cyprus and Hong Kong and had been a prosecutor at Court Martials.  In late 1971 he had been appointed Assistant Director of Army Legal Services.

6.1              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

6.1.1          The army legal team

Colonel Overbury said that his position during the Widgery Inquiry had been to advise the army generally and to supply counsel with what they wanted.  He said that he had not acted in the role of instructing solicitor and that Counsel for the army were not given instructions. 

6.1.2          ‘Cross checking’ statements

Colonel Overbury was shown a report drafted by the Director of Personal Services, INQ 2144 about the Widgery Inquiry, which read:  “I said that my assumption was that this had been a thoroughly well conducted military operation and that we had nothing whatsoever to hide or be ashamed of.  If, however, any soldier had accidentally discharged his weapon during the fracas, this must be reported at once to Lieutenant Colonel Overbury.  We did not want any such incident, if it had occurred, coming to light for the first time during the course of the Tribunal.  Senior officers would have to be questioned and re-questioned.  This was something that they must accept.  They must not assume that their original account was not believed, but it would be the duty of Lieutenant Colonel Overbury to cross check statements.  He must have every co-operation at all levels”.

Colonel Overbury said that there was no further explanation of what the duty to ‘crosscheck’ statements would involve.

6.1.3          ‘Security processing’

The same document said that the film taken from the helicopter at the height of the engagement was brought back to the UK for ‘security-processing.’  Colonel Overbury said that he did not understand what the term ‘security processing’ meant.  The document states that one copy of the film was sent back to Northern Ireland and Colonel Overbury said that he supposed it would have been sent to his team.

6.1.4              Firers’ statements

Colonel Overbury said that each of the soldiers who had fired live ammunition on Bloody Sunday (the Firers) made a statement to the Royal Military Police (RMP) within hours of returning to barracks.  Each Firer had to give an account of how and why he came to fire each shot. 

Once the Widgery Tribunal was announced, a branch of the RMP known as the Special Investigations Branch (SIB) was asked to carry out a full investigation and interviewed many of the soldiers again.  Some of the Firers were interviewed several times, and all or most of them re-interviewed by the Tribunal staff before they finally gave their evidence on oath to the Tribunal.

Colonel Overbury took the soldiers statements to the Widgery Tribunal.  He said that counsel for the families were not given copies of the soldiers’ statements and that the civilian statements were not circulated to the Army.

6.1.5              Oral evidence

Colonel Overbury said that the Army team did not have any say in deciding which Army witnesses should be called to give evidence at Widgery.

6.1.6              General Ford’s statement

Colonel Overbury said that he could provide no explanation for a note, taken by the person responsible for interviewing General Ford on 2^nd March 1972, which read:  “CLF does not want to make any reference to JSC.  The whole of paragraph 17 should be omitted”.

6.1.7              Protecting the Firers against self-incrimination

Colonel Overbury was shown the minutes of a meeting between the Attorney General, Director of Army Legal Services, Director of Personnel Services, the Treasury Solicitor and Counsel for the Army.  The minutes record Counsel’s advice that statements made under compulsion (i.e.: if the soldiers were ordered to make statements) could not be subsequently used as evidence against them.  The minutes continue:  “…the position of military witnesses could be safeguarded if it could be shown that they had been ordered to testify.  DPS Army and DALS are taking steps to ensure that their position is formally protected in this way”.

Colonel Overbury said that he had been authorised by the GOC to give these orders to the Firers and that he had informed them that any statements they made or evidence they gave could not and would not be used in any subsequent proceedings arising out of their actions, so that they had nothing to fear from telling the truth.

6.1.8            Soldier V’s evidence and the legal caution

Colonel Overbury was asked about notes made by John Heritage (a member of the Widgery Tribunal’ s legal team) during an interview with Soldier V.  During the interview Soldier V said that he had shot somebody who had thrown a bottle which had not exploded and that he could not say whether the man had had anything in his hands at the time he was shot.  The notes indicate that Major Bailey intervened following this admission, asking to discuss Soldier V’s position with Colonel Overbury prior to continuing the interview.  

Colonel Overbury told the Inquiry that he could not say whether it would be correct to assume that the only reason for adjourning Soldier V’s interview was to stop him from making further admissions.  It was his belief that the interview had been adjourned due to the issue of the legal caution, explaining that it had been agreed beforehand that soldiers would not be cautioned and that the order that they should speak would protect them against self-incrimination.  Colonel Overbury said that it would create problems if a caution were given to Soldier V.

Colonel Overbury said that he asked Mr Heritage to stop the interview with Soldier V because he wanted to discuss the matter with Mr Gibbens, senior Counsel for the Army.   He said that a caution would cast doubt on whether the order for the soldiers to speak would still protect them against self-incrimination and needed advice on the significance of a caution being given to Soldier V.  Lord Saville pointed out that there was nothing about seeking advice on a caution on the typewritten notes of the interview.

Colonel Overbury said that he did not want a caution to be administered because he felt that it might invalidate or affect the orders which had previously been given to give a statement.

6.1.9              Soldier V’s Widgery statement

Colonel Overbury agreed that there was a marked difference between Soldier V’s Widgery statement and the initial account given to Mr Heritage.  In his Widgery statement, Soldier V said that he fired one aimed shot at a man who was holding a bottle with a lit fuse in it.  He also agreed that somebody from the Army legal team, possibly Major Bailey, would have been present when Soldier V gave his account to the Widgery team.

6.1.10            The 16^th February interviews and Soldier F’s 19^th February statement

Colonel Overbury took a statement from Soldier F on 19^th February 1972, but had not learnt that Soldier F’s had been responsible for killing Michael Kelly until 28^th February 1972. 

Mr Clarke said that in the 19^th February statement taken by Colonel Overbury, Soldier F recalled shooting somebody at the rubble barricade and firing at a man with a pistol to the south of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.  Neither of these incidents had been recorded in his previous statements.  In his oral evidence at the Widgery Inquiry, Soldier F said that seeing the aerial photographs had reminded him of these shootings.

Colonel Overbury was shown a handwritten note on one of Soldier F’s statements, which said:  “many discrepancies from this original statement.  Can you spin it out until 1pm”.  He said that he did not have any recollection of somebody realising there were grave inconsistencies between the original statement and the 19^th February statement and trying to ensure that Soldier F’s evidence did not finish until after lunch break so that a decision could be made about what should be put in evidence about those differences.

6.1.11              Gerald Donaghy

Colonel Overbury was involved in David Mill’s BBC 24 Hours programme concerning the Widgery Inquiry and a contemporaneous letter from Mr Mills to Colonel Tugwell suggests that Colonel Overbury tacitly accepted that bombs had been planted on Gerald Donaghy.  Colonel Overbury said that he had not tacitly accepted this and he did not have information to the effect that Gerald Donaghy had been seen with a nail bomb earlier in the afternoon.

6.1.12            Army photographs

In his report on the workings of the Widgery Tribunal, Colonel Overbury wrote that “well over 1,000 copies of photographs were produced on demand for the use of the Tribunal and Counsel for the Army”.  Colonel Overbury said that he could not now say whether this was 1,000 separate images or 1,000 copies of a considerably lesser number of images and said that he could provide no clarification as to whether a large amount of Army photographs did not reach the Widgery Tribunal.

6.1.13            ‘Wanted List’

Colonel Tugwell was interviewed on radio in the early hours of 31^st January 1972, when he claimed that four of the deceased were on the Wanted List.  In his BSI evidence Colonel Tugwell said that he had learnt the information from Colonel Overbury.  Colonel Overbury said that he had no specific recollection of giving Colonel Tugwell the list of four names, nor could he recall the source of any such information.

6.2                 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

6.2.1              Standard Operational Procedure for statement taking

Colonel Overbury agreed that the statements would have been taken in accordance with Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs), drawn up by the army.

Colonel Overbury said that, prior to going to Northern Ireland to work on the Widgery Inquiry, he had not been shown the brief for investigators which informed statement takers that they were not supposed to approach the Widgery Inquiry as if they were investigating crimes, but simply as evidence gatherers. 

He was shown a report that he had compiled after taking the statements, in which he wrote:  “individual soldiers were required to undergo interview and make statements so often that their memory and/or morale was affected…  “there is considerable advantage, it is thought, in having soldiers interviewed collectively after their first statements”.  However, it was his evidence that the soldiers had not been interviewed collectively.

Colonel Overbury said that he was not surprised that soldiers had given statements that did not always precisely