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2 - 6 SEPTEMBER 2002
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The Tribunal resumed after the summer recess with the evidence of John Montgomery, a former Scenes of Crimes Officer (SOCO) for the RUC, who was responsible for taking hand swabs of the deceased in Altnagelvin mortuary. He confirmed that there were few procedures in place in 1972 for preventing cross-contamination of the bodies and clothing and that he had not taken any control samples on the day.
Herbert Donnelly and Dr John Martin both worked at the Department for Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS) at the time of Bloody Sunday and were responsible for analysing materials relating to the deceased. Dr Martin, the forensic scientist on whose findings Lord Widgery relied in a large part in coming to his conclusions, agreed that the forensic evidence he had provided to Lord Widgery was not scientifically defensible in light of the issue of cross-contamination, as submitted by Dr John Lloyd, expert to the Tribunal.
Raymond McCartney told the Inquiry that he had joined the Provisional IRA shortly after Bloody Sunday but that he had never become aware of their plans for the day.
Sisters Helen and Margaret Johnston saw the shooting of Kevin McElhinney as he crawled towards the door of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Margaret also said that she had attempted to tend to a young man who had sustained a bullet wound to his arm.
Jack McNally was Brian Faulkner’s Press Secretary at the time of Bloody Sunday. However, he could recall little about the run up to Bloody Sunday or about the day itself and said that he had not been involved in the drafting of any press statements issued by the Prime Minister.
OTHER ISSUES
Lord Saville granted an application for screening made by two RUC officers, Samson Trotter and Christopher Laird.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. john montgomery’s evidence
Mr Montgomery was an RUC Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO), based in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday.
1.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
1.1.1 Training
Mr Montgomery joined the Scenes of Crime division of the RUC in May 1971. For the following two months, he attended forensic training courses in Belfast, run by the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS) in Belfast. The training involved techniques for taking swabs from the bodies of people both alive and dead for the purpose of testing for Firearms Discharge Residue (FDR). He told the Inquiry that he had used these techniques when performing tests on the bodies of those killed on Bloody Sunday.
He said that, after the completion of the course, his taking of hand swabs had never been monitored or assessed, as it was assumed that he was performing the tests correctly.
1.1.2 Role and duties on Bloody Sunday
On Bloody Sunday, Mr Montgomery paraded for duty at Waterside Police Station in Derry, when he was instructed to be prepared to take swabs of people who might be detained at a detention centre near Ebrington Barracks.
1.1.3 Provision and storage of hand swabs
Mr Montgomery told the Tribunal that swabs were provided to the RUC by the DIFS, in batches of approximately 50 swabs. The swabs would then have been stored in a type of doctor’s case in his car.
1.1.4 Nail bombs on the person of Gerald Donaghy
Mr Montgomery recalled having been told that a car containing a dead boy had been driven to the Foyle Road army command post. Having heard this, he went directly to the command post where he reported to Sergeant McTeggart at approximately 6:30 pm.
1.1.4.1 Number of bombs on the body
It was his recollection that he had seen a number of nail bombs on the person of Gerald Donaghy and could not explain why, in his statement to the Tribunal, he had referred to ‘a nail bomb’ as opposed to several bombs.
1.1.4.2 Explosives from the nail bombs
Although it was Mr Montgomery’s initial belief that he had been given samples of the explosives used in the nail bombs (in accordance with usual practice at the time), having reacquainted himself with his statement of evidence made in 1972, Mr Montgomery agreed with Counsel that he had almost certainly only been provided with the nails from the bombs as opposed to all of their component parts.
1.1.5 Altnagelvin mortuary
Mr Montgomery accompanied the body of Gerald Donaghy in an ambulance to Altnagelvin Hospital, where he remained until approximately 11:00 pm. He described the mortuary as being in a state of pandemonium, with bodies lying on stretchers on the floor. His recollection was that the three duty pathologists, Dr Marshall, Dr Carson and Dr Press, arrived at the mortuary on the evening of Bloody Sunday, wanting to begin the autopsy procedures, but that they had been told to wait until the next day for another pathologist to arrive from London. However, he acknowledged that his memory concerning this might be faulty.
1.1.6 Autopsies
Mr Montgomery could not recall the exact procedures adopted on Bloody Sunday. However, he was able to provide an overview of the procedures in place in 1972.
1.1.6.1 Clothing of the deceased
He said that in 1972, procedures for dealing with clothing were not very sophisticated. He said that the body would first have been photographed and swabs taken from the hands. The clothing of the deceased would then have been removed by the pathologist, handed to the SOCO, item by item, and placed into separate plastic bags. All of these individual plastic bags would then have been put into a larger plastic bag, thereby grouping all of the clothing relating to an individual victim in one bag, together with any additional items that the pathologist might have given the SOCO for forensic examination.
1.1.6.2 Hand swabs taken
The SOCO would have taken swabs from three areas of the hand, namely the V of the hand between the thumb and first finger, the palm of the hand and the back of the hand. Although it was Mr Montgomery’s initial belief that the cotton or linen swabs were not treated with anything and that he had no access to any solutions or treatment for the swabs, he later agreed that had almost certainly been provided with diluted hydrochloric acid with which to moisten the swabs before they were applied. The swabs would then have been dried, placed in individual plastic bags and sent to the DIFS for examination.
1.1.6.3 Danger of cross-contamination
Mr Montgomery said that, as part of his training, he had been instructed to wear plastic gloves when taking swabs in order to prevent cross-contamination. He said that he would have changed his gloves at the beginning of each post mortem and perhaps more frequently. He told the Inquiry that this was the extent of the instructions he had received concerning the risk of cross-contamination.
He said that the swabs would have been kept in plastic bags in the CID office at Victoria Police Station prior to being sent to the DIFS. He confirmed that no precautions were taken at this time to prevent any possible cross-contamination. In addition, he said that there had been no procedure in place to prevent cross-contamination of the bodies by the mortuary attendant responsible for carrying the bodies into the autopsy room.
Mr Montgomery told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of control swabs being sent to the laboratory for analysis on Bloody Sunday, although agreed that he had been instructed as to the advisability of providing a control swab for this type of test.
1.1.7 Search of the car which had contained Gerald Donaghy
Although it was Mr Montgomery’s initial belief that he had searched the Ford Cortina car in which Gerald Donaghy had been transported prior to going to the hospital, his 1972 report would suggest that this search took place at Victoria RUC station after 11:00 pm that evening.
1.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounde
1.2.1 Scenes of Crimes Unit within the RUC
Mr Montgomery said that the role of SOCO had been developed in mid-1971 as the DIFS was overwhelmed with work and no longer able to attend scenes, take samples, preserve scenes and look for matters which might be of evidential value. He agreed that the taking of firearm swabs was but a small part of the work of a SOCO and that the bulk of the work was learnt by on-the-job training.
1.2.2 Possibility of cross-contamination
1.2.2.1 Contamination from the SOCO himself
Mr Montgomery said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, gloves were the only protective garments worn by SOCOs when performing swab examinations. He confirmed that he would have worn his own civilian clothing when performing the tests and that he had not been instructed in preventative measures to prevent contamination of the object or person being examined by his own clothing or hands.
Mr Montgomery agreed that, as an RUC officer, he would have been handling firearms in the course of his job and would have been in constant contact with other officers who would have fired such weapons. He also agreed that he would have been in constant contact with vehicles that would have been used by officers who would have discharged firearms and that he would have spent a lot of time in police stations which would have been contaminated with firearms and explosive residues. He reiterated that he had not received any guidance on how these factors might potentially affect any tests conducted nor how he could attempt to diminish the risk of such possible contamination.
1.2.2.2 Other possible sources of contamination
Mr Montgomery agreed with Counsel that part of a SOCO’s role nowadays was to attempt to present as complete a picture as possible of the history of the item under examination to determine whether the integrity of the exhibit could have been affected by its previous handling. However, he added that this was not part of a SOCO’s role in 1972. He also agreed that the fact that a number of bodies had been transported to the mortuary in army vehicles, thereby strongly increasing the possibility of contamination, would not have been treated as significant in 1972.
1.2.3 Nail bombs on the body of Gerald Donaghy
Counsel for the families and wounded returned to the question of whether Mr Montgomery had been handed the nail bombs found on the person of Gerald Donaghy or whether he had only received the nails from the bombs. His contemporaneous statement states: “I was informed by Detective Sergeant McTeggart that four nail bombs had been removed from the clothing of Gerald Donaghy and he handed these to me”. Mr Montgomery agreed that his statement appeared to indicate that he had been handed the entire bombs and that this version of events corresponded with his personal recollection.
Mr Montgomery also confirmed that he had not fingerprinted the bombs or components of the bombs.
2. herbert donnelly‘s evidence
Mr Donnelly was the Assistant Scientific Officer at the DIFS, working in the Firearms Laboratory at the time of Bloody Sunday
2.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
2.1.1 Roles and duties at the DIFS
Mr Donnelly said that his main role at the DIFS was the test firing of firearms and the examination of ammunition. However, he had also been asked to perform tests for lead residue on victims’ clothing on approximately two or three occasions prior to Bloody Sunday and had conducted these tests on the clothing of a number of those shot on Bloody Sunday.
2.1.2 Examination of clothing
2.1.2.1 Preparation procedures
Mr Donnelly described to the Tribunal the normal practices and procedures for dealing with clothing for examination by the DIFS. It was his belief that these procedures had been followed in dealing with the clothes of the Bloody Sunday dead.
He said that the examination of clothing was dealt with as a priority within the DIFS as there were insufficient facilities for storing clothing. Each item of clothing was received in its own paper or polythene bag and marked with the exhibit number and the DIFS case number. It was then passed to a scientific officer (Mr Donnelly himself in the case of the clothing of the Bloody Sunday deceased) for examination. He said that clothing examinations were conducted in a different laboratory to that used for firearms testing.
Mr Donnelly said that when examining clothing, he would put on a clean lab coat, wash down the examination bench with a chemical solution and perform a swab test on the bench to ensure that there was no lead on it. He would then cover the bench with a sheet of clean paper and put on a clean pair of disposable polythene gloves prior to opening the bag containing the item of clothing and placing in on the paper. He told the Tribunal that he followed this procedure for every individual item of clothing.
Mr Donnelly said that he would then examine the clothing, noting down the location and size of bullet holes, details of rips and areas of blood-staining.
2.1.2.2 Notes relating to the Bloody Sunday dead
The Tribunal is in possession of DIFS notes dating from 1972,relating to the examinations relating to the Bloody Sunday dead. Mr Clarke walked Mr Donnelly through the notes displaying his handwriting, asking for further clarification where necessary. These notes related to Michael Kelly, William Nash, John Young, Hugh Gilmore, James Wray and Gerald McKinney.
2.1.2.3 Control tests
Mr Donnelly said that two different control tests were performed for each item of clothing examined but that no record was made of the results of these tests.
2.1.2.4 Test procedure
Mr Donnelly could no longer recall in any detail the exact procedure adopted to test clothing for lead residue, having only performed the tests on a limited number of occasions.
2.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
2.2.1 Procedures for preventing cross-contamination
Mr Donnelly agreed with Counsel that he would rarely have been asked to undertake examinations of clothing due to the fact that, in the normal course of his work in the firearms department, he would have been heavily contaminated with firearms residue. He said that he wore a clean three-quarter length laboratory overall over his civilian clothing as a precaution against possible contamination. This overall would not have been changed during the course of the day. However, he would have changed gloves for each item of clothing he examined.
2.2.2 Control swabs
Mr Donnelly could not recall ever taking control swabs from his own person. However, he reiterated that he would swab the examination benches to test for lead residue prior to conducting each clothing examination, but that it was not the practice of the DIFS to keep any records of such control tests.
3. john martin’s evidence
Dr Martin was the Principal Scientific Officer employed by the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS) at the time of Bloody Sunday. From 1969 onwards, his work increasingly centred upon the examination and testing of firearms and analysis of FDRs. He gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry in 1972. Dr Martin began his evidence to the current Inquiry by stating that, in retrospect, “it would be unwise to interpret [his] findings as other than contamination”.
3.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
3.1.1 DIFS staff
Mr Martin provided information concerning the roles and functions of those engaged in forensic science within the DIFS. He said that Dr Howard, Director of the DIFS, was not actively involved in forensic examinations. Those involved in actual forensic tests were Dr Martin and Mr Beavis (both Principal Forensic Officers), Mr Hall (responsible for firearms work) and Mr Donnelly (Assistant Scientific Officer).
3.1.2 Forensic examinations performed at the DIFS
Dr Martin told the Inquiry that the police would have been primarily responsible for deciding which tests to conduct on the materials submitted to the laboratory. Tests were performed by Dr Martin on the clothes of the deceased, on hand swabs taken from them, on bullets removed from the bodies of Michael Kelly and Gerald Donaghy and on 29 army rifles submitted to the DIFS. Dr Martin recalled paratroopers personally delivering rifles to the laboratory on at least two occasions, but could not recall whether this occurred in relation to Bloody Sunday.
Dr Martin also performed forensic testing on further bullets supplied to him at a later stage.
3.1.3 Hand swab tests
3.1.3.1 Responsibility for taking hand swabs
Dr Martin explained that, prior to 1970, forensic scientists from the DIFS personally performed hand swab examinations on suspects. However, due to the increase in shooting incidents, this role was transferred to the RUC, specifically to Scenes of Crimes Officers. Dr Martin was responsible for organising the first training course for SOCOs which covered forensic science of a whole, including hand swabbing techniques. He said that he was certain that SOCOs would have been warned about the possibility of cross-contamination.
Dr Martin told the Tribunal that the hand swabs were taken by the SOCO (Mr Montgomery) in accordance with the technique outlined in a paper by scientist George Price. Six swabs were taken from each body, from the palm, back and web of the each hand, dried, placed in individual self-sealing bags and sent to the DIFS. Once the swabs had been received, they were sprayed with sodium rhodizonate solution and hydrochloric acid in order to test for the presence of lead. Dr Martin also used a microscope in order identify individual lead particles.
Although the sodium rhodizonate test was in widespread use throughout England and Wales at the time of Bloody Sunday, it was phased out a few months after Bloody Sunday due to its unreliability.
3.1.3.3 Control tests
Dr Martin said that the purpose of the sodium rhodizonate test was to discover whether any of the Bloody Sunday dead had been using firearms or had been close to those who were. Therefore, the potential significance of the test lay in the fact that some of the deceased had lead particles on their hands, a finding which could be of significance as lead is one of the residues of firearm discharge.
Mr Clarke contented that the absence of control tests performed by the SOCO at Altnagelvin mortuary fundamentally undermined the whole exercise of swab-taking, as it was not possible to determine whether the lead particles had been present on the victims’ hands or whether they had been involuntarily transferred onto the bodies by the SOCO performing the tests.
Dr Martin said that the omission of control tests did ‘slightly’ undermine the whole exercise, but added that, taken in the context of the other potential sources of contamination of which he was now aware, such as the handling of the bodies prior to their arrival in the mortuary, any potential for contamination through the SOCO paled into insignificance. However, he also agreed that he had not raised the possibility of contamination in his reports to the Widgery Tribunal or in his evidence before it.
3.1.4 Tests performed on clothing of the deceased
Dr Martin said that he and Alan Hall were the only people involved in the testing of clothing of the Bloody Sunday dead for lead residue. He was adamant that the testing of clothing was not done in the firearms laboratory, but in an area of the paint and glass laboratory which had been cleaned and tested for lead residue.
It was Dr Martin’s recollection that Alan Hall first performed testing on the clothing using a ‘sniffer’ device (c.f. Week 62). Dr Martin, assisted by Mr Donnelly, then tested each item of clothing by dampening pieces of filter paper with hydrochloric acid and pressing it against the garments of each of the deceased.
3.1.5 Tests performed on army guns
3.1.5.1 Muzzle discharge tests
Dr Martin tested the 29 SLR rifles submitted by the army for muzzle discharge at an open air range near Belfast, by firing the guns from varying distances at a piece of white cloth in order to examine the level and pattern of discharge.
3.1.5.2 Possible contamination of the deceased from army guns
Based on these tests, Dr Martin concluded that the lead particles found on the deceased could not have been caused by muzzle discharge from army rifles. He thereby eliminated army shooting as a possible cause of contamination of the clothing and hands of the deceased, albeit with the proviso that, had an army bullet fragmented on impact, the deceased could have been contaminated by lead particles emanating from that fragmentation.
Dr Martin agreed that at the Widgery Inquiry he had greatly underplayed the potential significance of fragmenting bullets in causing contamination, without actually having conducted any scientific tests into the matter. He also accepted, with hindsight, that there was a very real possibility that fragmenting bullets could have been the source of particles on the hands and clothing of the deceased.
3.1.5.3 Range from which the Bloody Sunday dead were shot
Based on the same tests, Dr Martin had also come to the conclusion that a large number of the Bloody Sunday dead had been shot from a range of over 30 feet (since he found no clear pattern of muzzle discharge on their hands or clothing). However, he now agreed with the findings of the Tribunal’s experts that there was no scientific way of determining the range of the shots, save to say that they were probably fired from a distance of more than one metre.
3.1.6 Significance of lead particles
3.1.6.1 Small number of particles found
In 1972, Dr Martin had concluded that a finding of one lead particle on the hand, coupled with more than three particles on the clothing was a significant finding, leading to a strong suspicion that the deceased was either using a firearm, handling a recently fired gun or standing close to somebody who was using a firearm.
Mr Clarke asked him how he had come to draw such strong conclusions from such a small number of lead particles. He responded that the DIFS had been asked to decide whether there was any evidence to support the conclusion that firing had taken place in the crowd and that therefore the presence of any lead particles might have suggested that there had been firing. He said that, in usual circumstances, he would not have attached such importance to small numbers of particles but that, in this instance, he had been asked to address the possibility that the deceased might have been standing at some distance from the gun fired and therefore only got the tail-end of the contamination.
3.1.6.2 Evidential purpose of findings
Dr Martin agreed that he had been placing more significance on the findings than he would have done in any other case, but that he and his colleagues had never thought that their lead tests would be used entirely on its own as evidence of somebody having fired a weapon. He said that the big surprise at the Widgery Inquiry was that there was such little other evidence of people having fired guns and that therefore the test was left sitting on its own as evidence.
Dr Martin said that he thought that one of the Widgery Tribunal’s solicitors had told the DIFS that they were looking for some sort of corroboration to suggest that there had been civilian firing on the day. He agreed with Counsel that he had been presented with the suggestion that the deceased had been either using or handling firearms or had been in close proximity to others who were and that he had been invited to produce any evidence that might give some support to that proposition. He also agreed that such a method of proceeding was entirely the wrong way of proceeding from a scientific point of view.
3.1.6.3 Conclusions reached and evidence before Widgery
Dr Martin was read a passage from a report written by Dr Lloyd, one of the Tribunal’s experts which states: “that it could ever be accepted that the presence on the hands of a single microscopic particle—virtually dust-sized—of a common substance such as lead was significant of firearms residue, and accepted as a positive finding if more than three particles were present on the clothing, is extraordinary”. He responded that he could see Dr Lloyd’s point but that they were extraordinary times and that he and his team were making extraordinary decisions.
He was also read a passage from his own contemporaneous report (which he also repeated in evidence to Lord Widgery) which stated: “there is therefore a strong suspicion that those persons with lead on their hands and clothing were exposed to discharge gases from firearms. These could have resulted from: a) firing a weapon; b) handling a weapon which had been recently fired; c) standing close to someone firing a weapon”. He now agreed that the facts did not support his conclusion of a ‘strong suspicion’.
3.1.7 Impartiality of findings
Dr Martin told the Inquiry that he had been under no pressure to produce evidence that favoured the conclusion that some of the victims had been associated with firearm use. He also denied the suggestion that he might have been subconsciously affected by the prevailing wisdom within the establishment at the time that some or all of the deceased had been engaged in firing at the army.
3.1.8 Overarching analysis of findings
3.1.8.1 Quantity and location of particles
In his report, Dr Lloyd points out that, in the cases of Kevin McElhinney, Jim Wray, John Young and William Nash, the number of lead particles on the victims’ trousers exceeded the number of particles found on their jackets. Dr Lloyd concluded that these results were more readily explained on the assumption that the sources of the particles was not the deceased firing a gun seeing as, in usual circumstances, the deposition of residue is greater at its point of origin and becomes more and more faint as the distance from its point of origin increases.
However, in his evidence to Lord Widgery, Dr Martin had said the exact opposite, stating that the hands were nearer the source than the clothing. In response to Counsel’s question as to how he had come to say the exact opposite of what was correct to Lord Widgery, he responded that he could no longer remember and that he had perhaps been confused.
3.1.8.2 Particles found on hands
Counsel pointed out to Dr Lloyd that no lead particles had been found on the web of the right hand of any of the victims and suggested that this would be highly unusual if any of the deceased had actually been firing guns.
3.1.9 Analysis of findings in relation to individual victims
Counsel then walked Dr Martin through his findings in relation to a number of the individual victims he had examined, contrasting his findings with those of the Tribunal’s experts.
3.1.9.1 Michael Kelly and Michael McDaid
Counsel also asked Dr Martin about his findings in relation to Michael Kelly and Michael McDaid which concluded that both of the victims’ results were consistent with the use of or proximity to a firearm. The former was found to have one large lead spot on his left web and the latter had one on the back of his right hand. There is also evidence before the Tribunal that Michael Kelly was right-handed whereas Michael McDaid was left-handed. Dr Martin agreed that to have reached the conclusion, on the basis of one spot on the ‘wrong hand’ that there was a strong suspicion that they had both been involved in the use of firearms or had been close to those who were was pushing interpretation to the limit.
3.1.9.2 Michael Kelly
In relation to Michael Kelly, Dr Martin had concluded that “the nature and distribution of lead particles on the swabs and jacket is similar to that produced by exposure to discharge gases from firearms”. Under cross-examination at the Widgery Tribunal, he had been asked to interpret the absence of lead on the right hand as compared to the “high levels detected on the right cuff”. He had agreed with Counsel to the Tribunal that the findings were consistent with Michael Kelly having worn a glove when handling a weapon or standing by somebody who was, and could not think at the time of any possible alternative explanation.
However, Dr Martin now agreed that the particles could have come from a fragmented bullet or from another contaminated person.
Dr Lloyd has concluded that the ‘glove theory’ is a possible explanation, but that “in view of the flawed and unspecific testing, the explanation is of doubtful credibility”. He also stated that “it is improbable that this distribution of particles could have been produced by Kelly’s proximity to a person who was discharging a gun”.
Dr Martin was able to identify the gun with which Michael Kelly was shot from the 29 army rifles provided to him in 1972.
3.1.9.3 Michael McDaid, William Nash and John Young
Dr Lloyd has concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the use of a firearm by Michael McDaid, William Nash or John Young or any role as bystander. Dr Martin agreed that the lead particles found on the bodies of the three young men were explicable on the basis of their having been transported to the mortuary in an army vehicle.
3.1.9.4 Gerald Donaghy
Dr Martin said that he had probably heard before his appearance at the Widgery Tribunal of the allegation that the bombs on the person of Gerald Donaghy had been planted. He agreed that the fact that the victim had been shot through a pocket which supposedly contained a nail bomb without damaging it would be a finding that might cast doubt on whether the bomb had been there when he had been shot and said that he could recall his colleague Mr Hall having raised the issue with him. However, he said that he had not seen Mr Hall conducting an experiment to see whether the nail bombs would have fitted into the victim’s pockets.
In response to Counsel’s question as to why this matter had never been raised by him or by Mr Hall in their evidence to Lord Widgery he responded that the issue of the nail bomb was entirely within Mr Hall’s domain.
3.1.9.5 Barney McGuigan
Dr Martin said that he would now agree with Dr Lloyd’s conclusions in relation to Barney McGuigan that “the relatively substantial contamination of McGuigan’s hand swabs might be taken as evidence of his involvement with a firearm. But in view of the extent of contamination of the clothing and the scarf, no realistic assessment can be made of the relative probabilities of the events that could have given rise to the contamination”.
Dr Martin was also asked to comment on his findings relating to a scarf which accompanied the body of Barney McGuigan when he arrived at the mortuary and which was submitted to the DIFS as having been his scarf (although Counsel also told Mr Martin that it was clear from evidence before the Tribunal that it was not Mr McGuigan’s own scarf). Dr Martin had concluded that the distribution of lead particles on the scarf suggested that it had been used to wrap up a revolver that had been fired several times. He said that that was the only explanation which he could think of at the time but that he now acknowledged that the scarf could merely have been in close proximity to a discharge, although it would have to be very close to the discharge in order to achieve such levels of contamination.
3.1.10 Cross-contamination
Dr Martin said that, when he had written his report and given evidence to Lord Widgery, he had been under the impression that only 20 to 30 shots had been fired on the day and that the bodies had been transferred to the mortuary in clean conditions. He said that he had been presented with a completely different situation at the Widgery Tribunal but that he had never been asked to review his findings in light of these circumstances (namely that in excess of 100 bullets had been fired, increasing the levels of gunshot residue in the air, and that a number of the bodies had been transferred in army vehicles). He said that, had he been asked at that time to go back and fully review his findings, he might have come to different conclusions.
Counsel suggested that he had been alerted to the number of bullets fired and to the unclean conditions by Mr Hill, Counsel for the families and wounded at the Widgery Tribunal, during a meeting which took place at the Europa Hotel in Belfast before the commencement of the Widgery proceedings. Dr Martin responded that he had not believed Mr Hill as he thought that he was putting hypothetical situations to him in order to change his mind as to what had happened.
He said that he had thought that his cross-examination at Widgery would clear matters up but that it had obviously not served to do so.
3.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
3.2.1 Conclusions reached
Dr Martin confirmed that he had been asked to consider by some member of the Widgery Tribunal whether any of the deceased had been in the vicinity of others who had fired. He also said that he had been surprised by his use of the expression ‘strong suspicion’ when he had reacquainted himself with his 1972 report for the Widgery Inquiry.
He agreed that the absence of control testing weakened the findings of the forensic tests and said that, if there was contamination it would have been devastating to the interpretation of the findings.
3.2.2 Number of rifles submitted to the DIFS by the army
Dr Martin was shown the note of a meeting which took place at the DIFS on 14th February 1972, which Dr Martin attended along with Mr Monroe from the Treasury Solicitors Department. The document states that the DIFS had already received 22 of the 31 rifles which the army were to submit for testing. In fact, only 29 rifles were ever submitted for testing. Counsel asked Dr Martin why he had not requested the missing three rifles from the army, particularly in light of the fact that he had been unable to match the bullet recovered from the wounded Joseph Mahon with those 29 rifles submitted to him.
Dr Martin said that he might never have known that the DIFS had not received all of the intended rifles and that he was not directly involved in the reception of weapons. He added that the analysis performed on the bullet retrieved from Joseph Mahon took place on 4th April, after the Widgery Tribunal had been wound up, and as such was of no further interest to that Tribunal. He said that he had been asked to analyse the bullet for police purposes only and that it was more the job of the police to chase the other two rifles if they knew that the DIFS should have received 31 rifles in total.
3.2.3 Damaged rifle
In his statement to the Inquiry, Soldier O has written in relation to his rifle: “I actually smashed the plastic stock of my rifle on his head to subdue my prisoner and the plastic stock shattered. This meant that when I later fired my rifle I had to hold it in a different way and so the first shot was not as accurate as it would otherwise have been”. Dr Martin had no recollection of any receiving a damaged rifle for testing, nor could he recall any rifle having been awkward to hold for the purpose of his test firing. However, he added that he himself possibly did not fire all of the weapons in question.
3.2.4 Supplementary statement
Dr Martin told the Inquiry that he had composed the document entitled “I think contamination is the major issue” on the eve of his appearance before the current Tribunal. In the statement he wrote that, when he first prepared his report for the Widgery Inquiry, he had been under the impression that only 20 or 30 shots had been fired on Bloody Sunday. He said that he must have got that impression from talking to police officers, but had no memory of this.
In the supplementary statement, Dr Martin also said that he had been working under the mistaken impression that the bodies had been transferred to the mortuary in clean conditions. He said that the RUC would usually have taken some form of precaution to ensure that the bodies were not contaminated en-route.
Counsel for the families asked Dr Martin why he had never given any indication in his testimony to Lord Widgery that his sudden discovery that in excess of 100 bullets had been fired on the day might cause a complete change or reversal in relation to his evidence that there was a ‘strong suspicion’ that the deceased had been involved in handling weapons or that they had been standing near those who had fired such weapons. Dr Martin responded that he had been restricted by what questions he was asked.
Counsel suggested that, if Dr Martin’s evidence to Lord Widgery was not scientifically defensible and if he was aware or should have been aware of that in 1972, he either fell short of his duty to the Tribunal as a scientist or fabricated the results to ‘suit another purpose’. Lord Saville intervened, stating that Dr Martin had repeatedly denied bending his findings to suit the purpose of other parties and that the matter could not be taken any further.
3.2.5 1972 suggestion that the deceased had been handling weapons
Richard Harvey, Counsel for the family of James Wray, told Dr Martin that his clients had had to live for 30 years with his testimony to the Widgery Tribunal that James Wray had been handling a weapon on Bloody Sunday. In light of that, Mr Harvey asked Dr Martin whether there was anything he would like to say to the Wray family about the 30 years they had had to endure, living with that memory.
Mr McEvoy, Counsel for Dr Martin, intervened, stating that it was not an appropriate question to put to his client. Lord Saville agreed with Mr McEvoy and did not allow the question, although he said that he understood why the question had been asked.
3.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
3.3.1 Matching of bullets to individual army rifles
In 1972, Dr Martin identified the guns from which the bullets that killed Michael Kelly and Gerald Donaghy had been fired. He said that he was entirely satisfied that he had found the correct match on both occasions.
3.3.2 James Wray
Dr Martin agreed that with Counsel that, had James Wray been executed on the ground by a soldier firing into his back from two feet, he would have expected to find in excess of the 100 particles that were found on the victim’s jacket.
3.4 Further questions on behalf of the families and wounded
3.4.1 Matching of bullets to individual army rifles
Barry Macdonald QC asked Peter Clarke QC to state whether he was disputing Dr Martin’s findings that the two bullets in question matched the guns that he had identified, explaining that he needed to know whether it was an issue before the Tribunal, in order to address with appropriate witnesses.
Lord Saville said that he did not want to enter into a debate about the matter at the current time. He said that if it was an issue, in the sense that it was going to be put to Dr Martin, Counsel for the soldiers should have put in the form of an allegation a long time previously, and if it was going to be suggested to any of the experts, it should equally have been addressed long ago.
4. John Lloyd’s evidence
Dr Lloyd is one of the Tribunal’s experts. He has produced a number of reports for the Inquiry concerning bullet discharge residues, lead particles from fragmenting bullets and Quarrex explosive, together with Mr Callaghan, a second expert instructed by the Tribunal.
4.1 questions on behalf of the Tribunal
4.1.1 Significance of lead particles found on the deceased
Dr Lloyd told the Tribunal that it was extraordinary that a single microscopic particle of lead could ever have been held to be significant evidence of firearms residue. He said that he had never come across any other occasion on which the presence of a single particle on a person’s hand, accompanied by three or more particles on their clothing, had been accepted as a positive finding, leading to the suspicion of contact with a firearm
Dr Lloyd said that in the present day, the finding of lead particles alone on a person would be entirely disregarded as evidence of contact with a firearm, except under very special circumstances. In order to establish some form of link with a firearm, there would need to be evidence of particles which contained a combination of the elements of a primer composition, such as lead, barium and antimony.
4.1.2 Control tests
Dr Lloyd told the Tribunal that results without control samples were not scientifically acceptable in 2002 and had not been in 1972. He said that control swabs should have been taken from the hands of the SOCO conducting the experiments, from the swabbing material and from Dr Martin and his colleagues. He also said that samples should have been taken of the distribution of lead on the ordinary person with no contact with firearms.
He said that the absence of control testing nullified any evidential value that Dr Martin’s results would have had and that Dr Martin’s findings would be entirely rejected nowadays in a court of law.
4.1.3 Possible origin of lead particles on the victims
Dr Lloyd outlined the possible sources of contamination of the deceased’s hands and clothing. It was his opinion that, although the possibility that any one of the particles detected on the victims could have emanated from the breach of a gun could not be excluded, the probabilities were not in favour of such a conclusion and suggested other sources of contamination.
4.1.3.1 Firing or handling a gun
Dr Lloyd’s expert opinion was that the distribution of particles on the deceased did not support the assumption that they had been using firearms and furthermore, suggested that they had not. It was his opinion that the heavy contamination of a number of the deceased’s trousers (as opposed to their hands or jackets) led to the assumption that the source of the particles was other than their having fired a gun, as if they had fired a gun, the majority of the particles would not be on a part of clothing furthest from the hand.
4.1.3.2 Close proximity to somebody firing a gun
Dr Lloyd also confirmed that, in his view, the results were not compatible with the view that they were close bystanders to somebody else who had fired a gun, due to the manner of the distribution of the particles on the clothing. He said that, had they been standing next to somebody firing a gun, the bulk of contamination would have been on their jackets not their trousers.
4.1.3.3 Transfer of particles from clothing to hands
Dr Lloyd posited that there was a likelihood that the deceased’s hand could have become contaminated through contact with their own clothing.
4.1.3.4 Army rifle fire
Dr Lloyd said that Dr Martin had been wrong in concluding that the particles could not have been due to SLR (self loading rifle) fire from the army, explaining that there was no scientific way of ruling this out.
4.1.3.5 Fragmenting bullets
He also said that there was a strong possibility that the lead particles had emanated from army bullets fragmenting upon impact with a hard surface or object. He explained that this contamination could have resulted from airborne particles or from particles that had settled on the ground on which the deceased later fell (stating in the latter case that it would be “difficult to avoid the conclusion that anybody under those circumstances could not have become contaminated”). He also added that the lead particles would have been redistributed by footwear, resulting in the possible transfer of particles to army vehicles or to the floor of the mortuary on which a number of bodies were left.
4.1.3.6 Rifle fired into the Saracen containing the bodies of three victims
In her evidence to the Tribunal, Alice Doherty (née Long) said that a rifle had been fired by the army into the Army Personnel Carrier (APC) which contained the bodies of Michael McDaid, William Nash and John Young. Dr Lloyd said that there was nothing in the tests conducted on these victims to corroborate Mrs Doherty’s statement, but added that, on the balance of probabilities, there was nothing to falsify her statement either.
4.1.4 Individual victims
4.1.4.1 Gerald Donaghy
Dr Lloyd agreed with Dr Martin’s 1972 conclusion that the distribution of particles in the case of Gerald Donaghy was not attributable to the use of a firearm. He said that, on the basis of the lead particles found in the victim’s right pocket one could speculate that a gun had been placed in there, or that the nail bomb in his pocket could have caused the contamination. However, he added that it was impossible to state any specific origin for the particles based simply on Dr Martin’s results.
In relation to the bomb found in the pocket through which Gerald Donaghy had been shot, Dr Lloyd said that he would have expected that some damage to the bomb caused by the bullet would have been evident to Mr Hall who examined it and to Soldier 127 who took it from his pocket, had the bomb actually been in place when Gerald was shot. However, he accepted that the precise position of the bomb in the pocket would be an important point in determining whether or not the bomb would have been damaged or not.
He also commented on the test that Mr Hall says that he performed in relation to the bombs, namely to put them into the pockets of Gerald Donaghy’s jeans to ascertain whether or not they would fit. He said that whilst a typical pair of unworn jeans might accommodate bombs of the dimensions noted, they would have been much less readily accommodated when the jeans were being worn.
Dr Lloyd also noted that it had been recorded that the nail bombs carried tobacco fragments that corresponded to tobacco fragments found in the victim’s pockets. He said that if Gerald Donaghy was not a smoker and did not have contact with tobacco, the fact that tobacco had been found could be taken as evidence that it had been transferred there along with the bomb. However, if he had been a smoker, the tobacco would not have been of any evidential significance.
4.1.4.2 Michael Kelly
Of the 29 particles found on Michael Kelly’s jacket, 20 were found on the right cuff and none on his hand. Dr Lloyd accepted as one possible explanation the theory put forward at the Widgery Inquiry and accepted by Dr Martin that the deceased could have been wearing a glove when firing a gun. However, he qualified this statement by saying that, in view of the flawed and unspecific testing conducted by Dr Martin, the explanation was of doubtful credibility, especially in light of so many other alternative and more plausible explanations.
Dr Lloyd also concluded that it was improbable that the distribution of particles in Michael Kelly’s case could have been produced by his proximity to a civilian firing a gun.
4.1.4.3 Michael McDaid
In the case of Michael McDaid, Dr Lloyd said that the result of his hand swab could have been due to contamination from his own clothing and did not support the use of a firearm by the victim or a role as bystander to somebody firing a gun. He also added that the results pertaining to Michael McDaid’s clothing were explicable solely due to the fact that he had been transferred to the mortuary in an APC which was likely to have been “heavily and continuously contaminated with firearms residue”. However, he acknowledged that that was not the only possible explanation.
4.1.4.4 Kevin McElhinney
In Kevin McElhinney’s case, Dr Lloyd agreed with Dr Martin’s conclusion that the particles on his clothing could have derived from a fragmenting bullet and that those on his hands could have come from his own clothing. He also said that the suggestion that the victim had probably been shot whilst he was face down, crawling towards the Rossville Flats on a surface that would have been contaminated with bullet fragmentation debris, would equally account for the particles found on his clothing.
4.1.4.5 Barney McGuigan
Dr Lloyd said that the heavy contamination of the scarf which accompanied the body of Mr McGuigan could have resulted from its having been used to wrap a firearm. He said that the high degree of contamination could equally have resulted from its coming into contact with a ground or floor area that had been heavily contaminated by fragmentation debris.
4.1.4.6 James Wray and John Young
In Jim Wray’s case, over 100 particles were detected on his trousers and jacket, whereas only one was found on his hands. Dr Lloyd said that this distribution was not consistent with his use of a firearm or with his role as a bystander. He added that the exact same point arose in the case of John Young.
4.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
4.2.1 James Wray
Dr Lloyd was asked to comment on the allegation made by Joseph Mahon that Jim Wray had been shot from close range whilst lying wounded on the ground. He said that it was not possible to rule out that some of the lead particles found on the back of Jim Wray’s jacket may have been due to discharge from a firearm from the distance demonstrated by Mr Mahon.
4.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
4.3.1 Distribution of lead particles
Dr Lloyd said that the number of lead particles found on clothing, hands or the ground as a result of fragmentation or disintegration of a bullet would be vastly greater than that resulting from muzzle or breach discharge. He also said that the particles resulting from fragmentation or disintegration were far larger in size than muzzle residue.
4.3.2 Source of lead particles
Dr Lloyd agreed that he felt extremely uneasy about placing any reliance on Dr Martin’s finding, due to the fact that he only tested for lead, that no control tests were performed and that he had interpreted his results in terms of suspicions that the deceased had been involved with firearms.
4.3.2.1 Role as bystander
When asked by Counsel why he had come to the conclusion that the victims had not been standing by gunmen when they had been shot, he explained that if a person was standing near to a discharging weapon, the discharge that would be likely to contaminate them would be thrown out laterally from the weapon at the height at which the weapon was held (thereby landing on the top half of a person as opposed to on their trousers).
Counsel then suggested that the gunman in question might have been using rioters as cover and might have been firing at ground level whilst people around them were standing and that, therefore, the majority of the gunshot residue would have landed on the bystander’s trousers. Dr Lloyd responded that he could not entirely exclude Counsel’s suggestion but that it would have to take into account the fact that the size of the particles suggested that they were due to bullet fragmentation rather than primary residue (from a gun).
He said that he could not exclude the possibility that some of the particles had been deposited as a consequence of a victim being a bystander but that he thought that there were far greater probabilities in relation to the source of the particles.
4.3.2 James Wray
Dr Lloyd reiterated that he did not think that the findings of the particles in relation to James Wray were indicative of bystander involvement. He said that in his experience, the number of particles on clothing of a bystander would be in the region of 10 or 20, nowhere near the 60 found on James Wray’s clothing.
Counsel asked Dr Lloyd to comment once again on the allegation concerning the execution of James Wray. Peter Clarke said that James Wray had been shot against a granite kerbstone and that the bullet had never been found. He asked Dr Lloyd whether, had the bullet disintegrated on impact, he would have expected to find severe deposits around the tear in James Wray’s jacket, caused by the bullet. Dr Lloyd agreed that, in the scenario presented by Counsel, he would expect substantial lead deposits in the area.
4.3.3 Michael Kelly, Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash
Dr Lloyd said that it was impossible to positively identify the source of the particles found on the young men shot at the rubble barricade. He added that there was every possibility that the residue found on their bodies was due to bullet fragmentation.
Counsel suggested that the particles found on the bodies of the young men could in fact have resulted from their standing close by to a civilian gunman (in positing this theory, Peter Clarke reminded Dr Lloyd that Michael Kelly had not been transferred to Altnagelvin in an APC yet still his clothing had very high lead readings). Dr Lloyd agreed that this was a possibility but said that it should be balanced against other possibilities. He also added that one had to be cautious in attempting to compare results between the different victims. He said that, looked at in isolation, the results of the tests performed on those who were shot at the barricade were not inconsistent with a role as bystander to a gunman but said that he did not agree that the results should be looked at in isolation, but rather in light of all the other surrounding circumstances.
5.
Raymond mcCARTNEY’S
EVIDENCE
Mr McCartney was 17 on Bloody Sunday.
5.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
5.1.1 Provisional IRA membership
Mr McCartney, who joined the Provisional IRA (PIRA) shortly after Bloody Sunday, told the Inquiry that the day’s events played a contributing role in his decision to join the IRA. However, on the day itself, he said that he had not been a member of any paramilitary organisation and had not been aware of any plans that the PIRA might have had regarding the march. He said that he had never subsequently found out what those plans had been, nor did he find out what role individual members of the IRA had played on the day. He also confirmed that he had never discussed the day’s events with Martin McGuinness.
On 15th February 1973, Mr McCartney was convicted of possessing ammunition without holding a firearm certificate and sentenced to six months imprisonment. On 12th January 1979, he was convicted of the murder of Jeffrey Agate and Patrick McNulty and of membership of the PIRA, for which he was sentenced respectively to life imprisonment and five year’s imprisonment to run concurrently. His 1979 cases have been referred to the Criminal Cases Review Commission.
5.1.2 Barrier 14
On Bloody Sunday, Mr McCartney split from the main body of the march, going along William Street towards Barrier 14. When he reached the junction of Chamberlain Street and William Street, he heard a number of live shots and assumed that they had been fired by the army from behind Barrier 14. However, he agreed that he might have been mistaken as to the direction from which the shots had come.
5.1.3 Rossville Flats
Mr McCartney moved along to Bradley’s Corner (the junction of Rossville Street and William Street) and had been standing at this spot for approximately 10 to 15 minutes when he saw a number of people who had been rioting at Barrier 14 running in his direction. He too began to run and reached the Rossville Flats car park. At this stage, he heard live fire, which appeared to be coming from all around him. It was his recollection that the sound of gunfire was that of single shots fired in rapid succession as opposed to automatic fire.
5.1.4 St Columb’s Wells
He made his was through the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 of the flats into the walkway behind Joseph Place where a group of older people were ushering people from Joseph Place towards St Columb’s Wells. Mr McCartney crossed to St Columb’s Wells where he remained for approximately 20 minutes. He remembered seeing a car being driven away south along St Columb’s Wells and was told by people in the vicinity that there was an injured person in the vehicle. However, the injured person had never been identified to him.
5.1.5 James Wray
Mr McCartney then made his way to his aunt’s house where he later found out that his cousin James Wray had been shot dead.
5.1.6 Experience of riots
He told the Tribunal that he had never taken part in rioting prior to Bloody Sunday, although had been present when rioting was going on. He had never seen a riot used as a cover for gunmen, nor had he ever heard orders shouted to rioters to get out of the way.
5.2 Questions on behalf of the soldiers
5.2.1 Discussions concerning Bloody Sunday
Mr McCartney told the Inquiry that since he had joined the IRA, he might have discussed the events of Bloody Sunday with fellow members of the PIRA, but that he had never discussed any plans the PIRA might have had for the day. He also said that he had only found out about the shooting of ‘Red’ Mickey Doherty during the course of the proceedings of the current Inquiry.
5.2.2 Gerald Donaghy
Mr McCartney said that he only became aware of Gerald Donaghy’s membership of na Fianna Éireann (the youth wing of the IRA) when the latter’s name appeared on the IRA Roll of Honour some time after Bloody Sunday. He said that Gerald Donaghy’s inclusion on the Role of Honour did not mean that he had died on ‘active service’ but merely that he had been a member of na Fianna when he had died.
5.2.3 Membership of the PIRA
Mr McCartney refused to divulge the name of the senior republican whom he had consulted regarding his decision to join the IRA, stating that it was not relevant to the Inquiry’s search for the truth concerning what happened on Bloody Sunday. He said that he had not discussed his decision to join the IRA with anybody else and that his family had been unaware of his membership until the date of his first arrest.
He told the Inquiry that he had never thought about joining the IRA prior to Bloody Sunday. He said that he had joined the Provisional wing of the IRA as opposed to the Official wing, as he believed the PIRA to be the better organisation in terms of being able to create change in Northern Ireland. He said that he was not able to explain in any greater detail why he had chosen the Provisional wing, as his decision had not been based on any specific reasoning.
5.2.4 Disclosing the identity of PIRA member
Mr McCartney agreed that he had joined the IRA within a few months of Bloody Sunday and that he would have been aware of the hierarchy within the IRA at the time he joined. However, he would not divulge the names of fellow members of the IRA, stating that any such information would not relate directly to Bloody Sunday and would therefore be irrelevant to the Inquiry. He also said that he had not seen Martin McGuinness on Bloody Sunday.
5.2.5 Sunday Times News Review of May 2001
Mr McCartney was asked about an article which appeared in the Sunday Times, stating “there are persistent rumours that other former senior IRA figures have been ‘visited’ recently in an attempt to prevent them giving their own version of events [to the Inquiry]. The visits were from IRA men of such reputation that, as one man put it, it is the next best thing to sending round the grim reaper”. He told the Inquiry that he knew nothing about any such warnings and that he had never been warned against giving evidence in any way, shape or form.
5.3 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
Séamus Treacy QC, Counsel for the families sought to raise a concern arising from the cross-examination of Mr McCartney by Peter Clarke, Counsel for the Soldiers. Mr Treacy said that Mr Clarke’s question asking the witness whether he had “any idea that Gerald Donaghy has been cited as dying for the Republican cause on active service” contained an assertion of fact, despite the fact that there is no material before the Tribunal to support that assertion. Lord Saville responded that the Tribunal regarded answers, rather than questions, as providing evidence.
5.4 further questions on behalf of the tribunal
5.4.1 Tírghrá
Mr McCartney explained that the publication entitled ‘Tírghrá’ is a book containing a one-page obituary for republicans who are named on the IRA Roll of Honour, whether they died on active service, of natural causes or as a direct result of army or loyalist paramilitary action. He said that the selection criterion used for putting somebody on the role of honour was that they were a member of the IRA, na Fianna Éireann, Cumann na mBan or Sinn Féin at the time of his / her death.
5.4.2 IRA witnesses
Mr McCartney reiterated that he was not aware of any IRA witness being told to stay away from the Inquiry, as suggested in Liam Clarke’s Sunday Times article, and added that it was his belief that any article written by Liam Clarke should be treated with scepticism. He said that he would call upon everybody, including PIRA members, who had any knowledge of Bloody Sunday to come forward and aid the Tribunal in discovering the truth.
5.4.3 Disclosure of names of former PIRA members
Lord Saville warned Mr McCartney that he might be summoned to appear in front of the Tribunal once again and ordered to disclose the names of fellow members of the PIRA. He also warned him that the penalty for refusing to answer a question put to him by the Inquiry under those circumstances could be serious.
6. Helen Johnston’s evidence
Helen Johnston attended the Bloody Sunday march with her sister, Margaret (see Paragraph 7).
6.1 questions on behalf of the Tribunal
6.1.1 Entry of the army into the Bogside
Helen Johnston told the Inquiry that, as she followed the march to the junction of Rossville Street and William Street, she and her sister had seen the rioting at Barrier 14 and had decided to go home. However, as they attempted to make their way from the area along Rossville Street, they heard the sound of Saracens (army vehicles) and everybody started to run. She said that, as she ran down Rossville Street, she had seen a Saracen stop on the waste ground near the Rossville Flats. She saw a large group of young men throwing stones at the soldiers who got out of the vehicle.
6.1.2 Rubble barricade
Ms Johnston took shelter by a wall overlooking the rubble barricade where she saw a number of people on the barricade throwing stones at the soldiers. When she looked back at the barricade after having turned away, she saw three of the young men lying on the ground at the barricade. It was her belief that the three young men lying at the barricade had been throwing stones, but she said that none of them had any other type of weapon, such as a stick or rod of metal. At first, she thought that they were merely taking shelter and did not realise that they had been shot.
She also saw an older man, whom she later found out to have been Alexander Nash, walking towards the barricade, waving a white handkerchief. She then saw him fall to the ground.
From her position, she could see approximately six soldiers on the waste ground between the Rossville Flats and William Street, one of whom had adopted the firing position. Although she could hear shooting, she did not see any soldier fire.
6.1.3 Entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats
As Ms Johnston looked across the road, she saw two young men crawling on their stomachs towards the doorway of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. She said that there was no possibility that either of them could have been carrying a weapon of any description. She said that, as the second boy reached the mid-way point between the barricade and the door to Block 1, she had seen his body jerk twice and she thought he had been shot. At the time this happened, the boy was crawling flat on the floor with his hands outstretched in front of him. Once again, she had not seen any soldier actually fire a weapon at this time, although she could hear shots. People then came out of the Rossville Flats and dragged the boy’s body out of the line of fire.
6.1.4 Glenfada Park North
She told the Inquiry that, shortly after seeing the young man being shot, a soldier suddenly appeared behind her as she crouched down behind a wall. The soldier shouted at her and others around her to put their hands on their heads and walk up in the direction of William Street. She said that the soldier had kicked her as she walked and had hit her sister on the head with his rifle. However, when they were all lined up against a wall, both Helen Jackson and her sister Margaret were told they could go.
As she and her sister walked back to where they had been, she saw two young men lying on the ground. Dr Swords arrived on the scene and got people to bring one of the young men, who was wearing denim jeans and a jacket, into a house nearby.
6.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
6.2.1 Rubble barricade
Helen Johnston said that the stone throwing had stopped as soon as the Saracens entered the Bogside. She said that she could not say that she had seen the three boys lying on the barricade throwing stones prior to their being shot.
6.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
6.3.1 Glenfada Park North
Ms Johnston told the Inquiry that she had not seen any cars being driven out of Glenfada Park North. She also said that she had not seen any soldier shoot at a Knight of Malta in the time she was in the car park of Glenfada Park North, nor had she heard any form of shooting after her initial arrest
7. Margaret johnston’s evidence
Margaret Johnston was working as a staff nurse at Gransha Hospital at the time of Bloody Sunday. She attended the march with her sister Helen who gave evidence to the Tribunal immediately before her.
7.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
7.1.1 Alexander Nash
Margaret Johnston saw Alex Nash lying on the ground near the rubble barricade upon which two bodies were lying face down. She said that Alex Nash appeared very anguished and did not seem able to get up off the ground.
7.1.2 Arrest
She described being arrested by two soldiers who rounded up a number of people in Glenfada Park North, including her and her sister Helen. She said that one of the soldiers, who was short, kicked Helen in the back. He appeared to be in a psyched-up state and was shouting contradictory orders. She said that he could in no way have perceived her and her sister to be a threat of any kind but expected total subservience from all those whom he had arrested. She told the Inquiry that, after seeing him kick her sister, she had got in between him and Helen and he had hit her hard on the back of her head with the butt of his rifle.
She could not recall actually being told that she was free to go but said that it seemed like she and Helen were an embarrassment to the soldiers as they had only wanted to arrest men. She and Helen left the line up and made their way back to where they had been.
7.1.3 Three young men
Margaret Johnston said that she saw the bodies of two young men, one of whom she recognised as Gerard McKinney, and a further young man who was wounded but still alive. Dr Swords, whom she knew, asked some people to carry the wounded young man (Gerald Donaghy) into a nearby house. She could not recall precisely what had happened to the two bodies, but recalled seeing an ambulance from Altnagelvin Hospital in the area at some time that afternoon. Ms Johnston was not able to confirm exactly where she saw these bodies, but believed it to have been in the area of Glenfada Park and Abbey Park.
7.1.4 Young man with wound to his arm
At some time in the afternoon, Margaret Johnston saw a young man in his early twenties, wearing a green jumper, standing on the pavement near Glenfada Park. He appeared to have been shot in the upper arm. She had attempted to help him but he did not really want her to touch him as the wound was painful. She told the Inquiry that, from her cursory examination, the wound appeared to have been caused by a gunshot. She said that there had been no exit wound, but she could not help the Inquiry as to whether there was a bullet lodged in the young man’s arm or whether he had merely been hit by the glancing blow of a bullet. She never found out the young man’s name.
8.
Jack mcNALLY
Mr McNally was Brian Faulkner’s Press Secretary at the time of Bloody Sunday, having held the post since the Prime Minister’s election in March 1971.
8.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
8.1.1 Press releases
Mr McNally told the Inquiry that his role did not encompass the drafting of press releases for Brian Faulkner or his department and that he was never consulted about the contents of any press release. He said that Kenneth Bloomfield and Robert Ramsay were primarily responsible for drafting statements, and that he thought it unlikely that Brian Faulkner would ever have drafted his own statements for the press. He said that he would have thought that the Prime Minister would have been consulted about the terms of any press release issued under his name but could not confirm that this had happened on all occasions.
Mr McNally said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, he had no contact with members of army or RUC intelligence officers, or with the Security Service based in London. He said that he had never been aware of any attempt made by the intelligence services to influence the terms of press releases issued by Stormont.
Although Mr McNally had a close working relationship with Brian Faulkner, seeing him most days of the working week, he could not recall ever discussing the contents of press releases with the Prime Minister.
8.1.2 Memo sent by Donald Maitland to Clifford Hill
The Inquiry is in possession of a memo sent by Donald Maitland, Press Officer in Edward Heath’s office, to Clifford Hill, suggesting that Brian Faulkner issue a press statement before the Bloody Sunday march and dictating the terms of that statement. After listing the issues that the statement should deal with, the memo continued: “the purpose of this statement would be a) to prepare public opinion here [in England] and in Northern Ireland for violent scenes on TV following the march; b) to explain that the security forces’ counter measures will take place at points of the army’s choosing; c) to explain in advance why CS gas may not be used”.
Mr McNally said that he had never seen the document before and that he was unaware of any suggestion made to the effect that the Stormont Government should issue a statement to prepare public opinion for violent scenes on the television. He said that he was now aware that a statement to this effect had in fact been issued by the RUC and the army, but that he had not known this at the time. He also added that he was not aware of any liaison between Stormont and the Security Forces concerning the way in which the march should be handled in the media.
8.1.3 Press release drafted on the evening of Bloody Sunday
Mr McNally said that, although he had been on duty on Bloody Sunday, he could not recall who drafted the press release issued by Brian Faulkner that evening. The press release stated “today we have again seen riot and death on the streets of Londonderry—a city on which perhaps more than any other area the IRA has sought to impose its will. Their activities have already resulted in the deaths of many soldiers, policemen and civilians in that city. Indeed, today a gallant army officer died four months after being shot in the Bogside; yesterday we saw the funerals of two young policemen who were brutally murdered in the Bogside area. Now, in one day more deaths are caused in a meaningless and futile terrorist exercise. Those who organised this march must bear a terrible responsibility for having urged people to lawlessness and for having provided the IRA with the opportunity of again bringing death to our streets”.
He told the Tribunal that he did not know who had attributed the deaths to the IRA nor did he recall anybody in Stormont ever attributing responsibility for the deaths to the organisers of the march. Indeed, he had no recollection of ever having discussed Bloody Sunday with the Prime Minister. He thought that the press release would have been drafted that night at the Government Information Service, where a Government Information Officer would have been on duty. However, he said that he did not think that the Information Officer would have actually drafted the statement.
8.1.4 Commander Anderson’s press release
Commander Anderson was the Senior Parliamentary Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Department at the time of Bloody Sunday and issued a statement on 2nd February 1972 concerning Bloody Sunday. Although the copy of Mr Anderson’s press release shown to Mr McNally by the Tribunal had Mr McNally’s name at the top, he could not remember ever having seen it nor did he know who would have drafted it.
8.1.5 Joint Security Committee meetings
Mr McNally told the Inquiry that he only attended JSC meetings on an occasional basis, and was often called out of the meeting to take urgent telephone calls. He was asked to comment on David Gilliland’s evidence to the Tribunal. Mr Gilliland, who was Mr McNally’s predecessor in the role of press officer, has told the Inquiry that the GOC, the Chief Constable of the RUC and Brian Faulkner would meet before the main JSC meetings and that the JSC merely served to rubber stamp decisions made in these earlier, smaller meetings. Mr McNally said that he had never witnessed this happening and that he had not formed this impression from the JSC meetings he attended.
He could not recall ever attending meetings in which the upcoming NICRA march was discussed nor could he recall any discussion about the security situation in Derry. He could not recall any anxieties being expressed about the possible use of Paratroopers on the day and could not remember anyone having had any concerns about the security plans to be put in place for the march.
8.1.6 JSC meeting of 20th January 1972
Mr McNally is listed as one of the attendees at the JSC meeting of 20th January 1972, the minutes of which describe the GOC as having said that “the army were dealing with the problem as best they could employing a variety of tactics within the constraints of the law”. He could not recall what those tactics were, nor could he remember ever hearing people express concern about the overly stringent constraints placed on the army by the law.
8.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
8.2.1 Contact with the press
Mr McNally agreed that, having served as a press officer within the Stormont Government for seven years prior to Bloody Sunday, he would have been familiar with Northern Ireland journalists dealing with political affairs. He said that he would get calls from some local journalists and would give them whatever information was available at the time. Although these communications were above-board and official, he would have expected the journalists to protect him as their source.
8.2.2 Brian Faulkner’s meeting with Edward Heath
He said that he had no knowledge of the last minute meeting between the two prime ministers allegedly scheduled for a couple of days before Bloody Sunday and that he had not been the source for John Wallace, correspondent for the Belfast Telegraph, who broke the story concerning the meeting on 27th January 1972.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Monday 2nd: Paragraphs 1 and 2
Tuesday 3rd: Paragraph 3
Wednesday 4th: Paragraphs 4
Thursday 5th: Paragraphs 5 to 8
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
