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17 - 21 JUNE 2002
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
This week, the Tribunal heard evidence from Jim O’Donnell who said that he had been shot at three times by a soldier as he ran along Frederick Street away from Glenfada Park.
Simon Winchester, a journalist for the Guardian, gave evidence concerning an article he had written prior to Bloody Sunday, alleging that other regiments in the British Army were concerned about the brutality of the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland.
The Tribunal also heard evidence relating to the nail bombs found on the person of Gerald Donaghy. Eugene McTeggart was an RUC officer on duty at the compound to which the car containing the body of Gerald Donaghy was driven. He said that he had seen one nail bomb on the body of the victim and had examined it manually to confirm what it was. Alan Hall was responsible for conducting tests on the clothes of the deceased and on components of the bombs found on Gerald Donaghy. He told the Tribunal that he had conducted his own personal tests to ascertain whether the bombs would have fitted into the victim’s pockets and had assured himself that they could have.
OTHER ISSUES
venue applications
The Tribunal heard a number of applications on behalf of individuals seeking to give their evidence in London.
The applications on behalf of Lord Crawford (Minister of State for Defence), Mr White (civil servant) and John Heritage (civil servant involved in the Widgery Inquiry) were all granted on medical grounds. That of Basil Hall (solicitor to the Widgery Inquiry) was granted on practical grounds, given that his evidence relates closely to that of Mr Heritage and the Widgery soldiers who are all to give their evidence in London.
Sir Arthur Hockaday’s application was rejected. Lord Saville ruled that, as a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office at the time of Bloody Sunday, Sir Arthur was an important witness to the Inquiry and that therefore, his personal inconvenience was outweighed by the need to conduct the Inquiry in Derry when possible.
Lord Saville has yet to rule on the applications made by Sir Edward Heath (British Prime Minister), Lord Carrington (Secretary of State for Defence), and Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith (Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence) to give evidence in London.
screening applications
The Tribunal also heard a number of applications relating to the screening of soldiers involved in the events of Bloody Sunday.
The Tribunal granted screening to Soldier B and Soldier J, stating that it had before it the most compelling evidence to support their application, evidence that, for reasons of security, had to remain confidential. The decision was based entirely upon the ‘closed’ or secret part of the application and no oral submissions were heard on the matter.
However, Lord Saville rejected the application for screening made on behalf of Soldier H and Soldier 104. He said that the Court of Appeal’s rulings granting anonymity and change of venue had been predicated on the basis that the soldiers would be giving their evidence in full view of the public and that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the risk to the soldiers would increase were they to give their evidence unscreened.
Lord Saville also refused an application made by Mr Lloyd-Jones, Counsel for some of the soldiers, requiring a review of the security assessments in relation to Soldier 027. The latter has been branded a ‘traitor’ on the website of the Parachute Regiment, due to the evidence he is to give to the Inquiry. Security assessments uphold his fears for his life from both former colleagues and republican paramilitaries. However, Lord Saville agreed to state publicly once again that he had no evidence before him to suggest that any of Mr Lloyd-Jones’s clients were behind any threats to Soldier 027.
The Tribunal did not have time to hear oral submissions relating to the screening application made on behalf of Soldier 027. However, on 27th June 2002, the Tribunal sent a letter to all interested parties stating that, due to a confidential matter that had arisen in relation to Soldier 027, it had made the decision to grant screening to the soldier.
The Tribunal rose for the summer recess and will reconvene in Derry on 2nd September 2002.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. jim o’donnell‘s evidence
Mr O’Donnell was 20 years old on Bloody Sunday and worked as an apprentice mechanic at Du Pont in Derry. He joined the march in Bishops Field.
1.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
1.1.1 Colombcille Court / Frederick Street
1.1.1.1 Three shots fired
As Mr O’Donnell followed the march down Rossville Street, he heard shots which appeared to come from behind him and people started running in panic. He ran towards Abbey Street, and came to a spot close to Colombcille Court, where he saw two armed soldiers running from Colombcille Court towards Glenfada Park. In an attempt to get away from the soldiers, he continued running up Frederick Street. He heard three shots ring out and hit a wall near to him. Mr O’Donnell was convinced that the shots had been aimed at him and that he had not heard any warning shout. He confirmed that he had been carrying nothing in his hands and that he had seen no other civilians in the area.
1.1.1.2 Soldier G
Mr O’Donnell spoke with reporters from the Sunday Times Insight Team shortly after Bloody Sunday. They identified the soldier who shot at Mr O’Donnell as Soldier G, an identification which the Tribunal agreed appeared correct, as Solder G was the only paratrooper to have admitted at the Widgery Tribunal to firing in the general direction in which Mr O’Donnell was sheltering. Soldier G is now deceased, but he told the Widgery Tribunal that he had fired two aimed shots at an armed civilian in the alleyway between Glenfada Park and Colombcille Court. Furthermore, he also confirmed in his written statement to the Widgery Tribunal that he had also fired in this area to provide cover for fellow soldiers crossing open ground.
Although Mr O’Donnell could no longer recall seeing the soldier who fired at him, the Insight article describes him as saying that he saw a soldier enter the alleyway between Colombcille Court and Glenfada Park.
1.1.1.3 Lance Corporal 003
Mr O’Donnell was shown the 1972 statement made by Lance Corporal 003 to the Royal Military Police, in which he wrote that he had seen one member of Support Company adopting the kneeling position and firing several rounds in the direction of Colombcille Court. Lance Corporal 003 said that he heard the sound of automatic fire, possibly from a Thompson sub-machine gun (TSMG), coming from the direction of Colombcille Court.
Mr O’Donnell told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of hearing any low-velocity gunfire on Bloody Sunday.
1.1.1.4 Bullet holes
The Tribunal is in possession of a number of photographs taken by Mr O’Donnell shortly after Bloody Sunday, depicting three bullet holes in the wall by which he was sheltering. Mr O’Donnell had also taken the Insight Team journalists to the spot to show them the holes.
1.2 questions on behalf of the soldiers
1.2.1 Helicopter
Mr O’Donnell told the Inquiry that, after he had dived for cover, he noticed a helicopter hovering fairly low overhead. He recalled seeing a soldier in the helicopter and believed that the latter had aimed his weapon at him. However, he was informed by Counsel that no servicemen in the two helicopters being used on the day had been armed and that, furthermore, the helicopters had not descended to a height of less than 500 feet.
2. simon hoggart‘s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr Hoggart was staff reporter for The Guardian, based in Belfast. He worked for Simon Winchester who was the Chief Correspondent for The Guardian in Northern Ireland, eventually taking over from him shortly after Bloody Sunday
2.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
2.1.1 Experience of marches
Since 1968, Mr Hoggart had extensive experience covering marches and riots in Belfast, Derry and elsewhere in Northern Ireland. He said that he had never heard of or seen a march being used as cover for gunmen, but said that he had sometimes heard gunfire during riots.
2.1.2 Reporting on the Troubles
He told the Inquiry that, in the three years prior to Bloody Sunday, he had written and contributed to a large number of articles concerning army operations and behaviour. He said that, when dealing with a specific event concerning the army, he would almost invariably be presented with two competing and conflicting versions of events from civilian witnesses and from the army.
In order to uncover the army’s version of events, he would typically approach the press officer of the unit concerned. He explained that the level of information obtained would depend on the character of the press officer in question and how well he knew him from previous incidents. He told the Inquiry that, over the years, he became more wary of the army’s versions of events because, in the case of fatal shootings, the army would be dependent on the squaddie’s version of events, and the squaddie would be aware of the serious repercussions for himself in terms of imprisonment and loss of job were he to admit to shooting somebody innocent.
He also told the Tribunal that the commanding officers of the regiments often saw it as their responsibility to talk to the press if an important occurrence took place in an area under their control. He said that, over time, he came to recognise those officers who were evasive and those that spoke honestly. He also built up a relationship with certain members of the army over the course of his reporting on the Troubles who would speak to him both on and off the record about their experiences.
2.1.3 “The Brutal Soldiery” Guardian article of 25th January 1972
In his article entitled “The Brutal Soldiery”, published shortly after the Magilligan march, Mr Hoggart had highlighted the unease felt within some quarters of the army concerning the behaviour of the Parachute Regiment. He told the Tribunal that he had not been at the march himself, but that the article was derived from other reports and military, journalistic and civilian sources.
He explained that shortly before Magilligan he had begun to hear that some units felt that the Paratroopers were acting with unnecessary force in a civil setting. He had first become aware of such criticism approximately ten days prior to publishing the article when he had spoken to a press officer from an infantry unit (whose name he could no longer recall) over lunch. The officer had told him that several infantry units were angry because they felt they had built up good relations with civilians in their areas, only for the relations to be destroyed when Paratroopers had been sent in as back up and had behaved with unnecessary roughness.
The article reported that at least two British Army units had made informal requests to Brigade Headquarters for the Parachute Regiment to be kept out of their areas and went on to quote an army captain as saying: ‘they are frankly disliked by many officers here who regard some of their men as little better than thugs in uniform… They seem to think that they can get away with whatever they like’. However, the article also presented the view of soldiers who stated that they had met with nothing but cooperation from the Paratroopers and had appreciated their assistance.
Mr Holland stressed that he would have interviewed the military personnel in question on a very informal basis and would always have given his sources a pledge of confidentiality.
Mr Hoggart said that he was personally aware of an incident in Andersontown when a woman had been shot in the face with a rubber bullet by a Para for playing rebel songs during an army search of the area. This was the only evidence of brutality on the part of the Parachute Regiment that he had seen for himself.
2.1.4 Ministry of Defence (MoD) memo of 26th January 1972
Mr Hoggart was shown an internal MoD memo relating to him and to Simon Winchester. The memo from Colonel Payne (Directorate of Military Operations) to Colonel Ramsbothem (Military Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff) raised concern over the two journalists’ line of questioning concerning the Parachute Regiment. It said that they had been attempting to trick soldiers into answering questions concerning the regiment, disguising the questions amidst general conversation.
Mr Hoggart rejected the suggestion that he had been doing anything untoward and said that he would have told the soldiers in question that their comments were off the record, thereby making it clear that he was writing an article on the topic.
The memo also recorded a conversation that allegedly took place between Mr Hoggart and a press officer in Lisburn, during which the journalist had explained what he had found out concerning the attitude towards the Paras and the press officer had told him that it was not true. Mr Hoggart told the Inquiry that the memo reflected either a complete lack of knowledge of how reporters operate or an attempt by some army official to cover his back. He could not recall the conversation, so could not confirm whether or not the press officer in question was Colonel Anthony Yarnold.
The memo went on to say that Simon Winchester had criticised the article and to suggest that Mr Hoggart was ‘professionally vulnerable’ given his position as mere deputy.
2.1.5 Second MoD document
A passage from the second MoD document on the topic read: “Winchester rang 25th January to SO1. He tacitly disowned the article and agreed that Hoggart’s conduct had been somewhat unethical. This tactic, which we imagine was agreed between the two Simons, makes it difficult to hammer Winchester… We are disappointed in Hoggart, who we believe was the fall guy in this incident”.
Mr Hoggart said that the memo was ludicrous and that Winchester would not have criticised the article as he had obviously decided that it was competently and adequately researched, given that he allowed it into the paper. It was his belief that the army and MoD must have got very anxious and angry over the publication of the article and had therefore sought to undermine him in some way.
2.1.6 Newsletter article of 26 January 1972
Mr Hoggart was read a section of the article entitled “Paras’ CO Defends Magilligan Action” which was published in the Belfast Newsletter in response to the Guardian article. It read: “a spokesman at army headquarters scotched the [Guardian article’s] allegations: ‘we have received no requests, informal or otherwise, to keep the Parachute Regiment out of any area. This article would appear to be absolute nonsense’”.
He responded that he was not surprised that the British Army had officially denied the allegations.
2.1.7 Aldershot News article of 28th January 1972
An article, written by Michael Starke for the Aldershot News, referred to the Guardian article and said that the Adjutant of 1 Para, Captain Michael Jackson had dismissed it as being designed to be divisive. Mr Hoggart could not recall whether he had had any contact with Captain Jackson and denied that his article had been designed to be divisive.
He said that the culture of The Guardian was one of absolute accuracy. He said that the editor of the paper, Alistair Hetherington, had set up the first post-Nazi German paper directly after the war and hated the notion of the press as propaganda. Furthermore, the deputy editor on the paper, John Cole, was a unionist from Ballymena. He explained that whenever he wrote an article which was going to be controversial, particularly, from John Cole’s point of view, if it was going to reflect favourably on the nationalist community, he was given a thorough grilling and had to be 100 per cent certain of every one of his sources.
He said that the article would not have appeared without thorough investigation by people in London, people who had no axe to grind with the British Army.
2.1.8 Sunday Telegraph article of 23rd April 1972
Mr Hoggart was shown an article written by Mr T.E. Utley in which the journalist describes what he termed ‘the strategy of the civil rights movement… to keep up a sustained, efficiently directed propaganda campaign, not only against internment, but also against the army as such. The most vulnerable targets for that campaign were the paratroopers’. The article went on to say that Richard Cox, defence correspondent for the Daily Telegraph had ‘alerted his readers to the next phase in this propaganda chain. He reported that Irish journalists were seeing to entrap officers of other regiments into admitting that the use of the Paras in Ulster had been disastrously counterproductive’. It then mentioned Mr Hoggart’s article, but said that he had acted ‘no doubt in good faith’ in reporting the ‘alleged opinion of a number of army officers in Belfast’.
Mr Hoggart vehemently denied ever having been caught up, consciously or unconsciously in a propaganda campaign directed against the Paratroopers. He said that the notion that Irish journalists could entrap British Army officers into saying things they did not believe to be true was absurd and was sure that he himself had been told the genuine opinions of those officers with whom he had spoken.
He added that, whilst he admired Mr Utley, the latter was what he called an ‘old-fashioned unionist’ who had a clear view of what he believed was happening or should be happening in Northern Ireland and that this ‘clear view’ often clouded his interpretation of facts on the ground.
2.1.9 ‘The Knocking Game’ army handout
In his statement to the Inquiry, Colonel Tugwell describes a hand-out called ‘The Knocking Game, a Case Study in Propaganda’, written by Colonel Tugwell with input from the press officers of 1 and 2 Para. It described the alleged anti-Para campaign waged at many levels, and named Simon Winchester and Mr Hoggart as being part of that campaign. The hand-out set out a number of the quotations from the Guardian article alongside a rebuttal of the allegations by General Ford, and featured a contribution from a Times article stating: ‘the Guardian article must have given satisfaction to the republican propaganda service who had long been trying to sell their wares to the British public’.
Mr Hoggart said that Mr Cashinella, one of The Times’ correspondents at Bloody Sunday had apologised to him on the evening of Bloody Sunday for what The Times had written about his article. He did acknowledge that there was an enormous amount of propaganda at the time, saying that every single event that occurred in Northern Ireland was converted into propaganda by one side or the other. He explained that that was why it was essential for journalists to investigate everything thoroughly in order to get to the truth behind the propaganda.
He gave the example of the woman, blinded by a rubber bullet fired into her face by a Para: he asked whether it was propaganda to report that or whether it was proper professional reporting, allowing the readers to make a judgment based on the facts that the journalist was able to establish. He said that he had always been surprised by the way that every time a fact or event was described which was inconvenient to either side, it would be dismissed as propaganda and the journalist would be assumed to be a helpless tool in the hands of brilliant propagandists.
2.1.10 Guardian article concerning Bloody Sunday of 1st February 1972
Mr Hoggart travelled to Derry briefly on 31st January 1972 in order to conduct research for his article entitled “Bogsiders Insist that Soldiers Shot First” which appeared in The Guardian on 1st February 1972.
His article was to focus on the evidence of civilian eyewitnesses, and as such he spoke with a number of eyewitnesses and relatives of the deceased. He could no longer recall the names of his sources.
2.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
2.2.1 Reporting on the Troubles
Mr Hoggart confirmed that, over the years, he had come to be wary of the army’s version of a given event, due the fact that it was often based predominantly on the account of the squaddie concerned, who knew that he would face serious consequences were he to admit to having broken the law. He said reporters had to bear in mind, when receiving the official incident report from the army, that the squaddie might have distorted the truth to protect himself.
He told the Inquiry that he had been aware of a number of occasions when a soldier’s account conflicted with other evidence. He also said that he had been equally wary of civilians’ evidence, due to their keenness to exonerate victims of any wrongdoing. However, it was his opinion that the British Army found it difficult to accept that British reporters were not accepting their version of events uncritically.
2.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
2.3.1 “The Brutal Soldiery” Guardian article
Mr Hoggart told the Inquiry that he had had lunch with the officer who had told him that units had requested not to work with the Paras approximately 10 days before the events on Magilligan Strand. He said that the behaviour of the Parachute Regiment at Magilligan had given a certain impetus to the article, but that he would have published the article regardless, as all of his research had been completed prior to the events which unfolded at Magilligan.
He explained his research methodology in terms of calling military personnel whom he knew, telling them what he had heard about requests not to work with the Paras and asking what they felt about the information. He said that some of his contacts had clearly said that they had made the same request, others had said that they found the Paras rough but had not made any request, and others had said that they thought they were doing a good job. He said that he had quoted all sides to the story in order to give a balanced picture in his article.
Counsel for the soldiers questioned Mr Hoggart concerning the number of sources in the article who had been critical of the Parachute Regiment. According to Counsel’s interpretation of the article, there appeared to be only one source whose commanding officer had made a request not to work with the Paras, and one who believed the Paras to be rough but whose commanding officer had not made any request. Mr Hoggart responded that he had spoken to two officers whose units had made the request, and that he had also spoken with one if not two sources who criticised the Paras, although their unit had not put in any request.
2.3.2 Guardian article concerning Bloody Sunday of 1st February 1972
Mr Elias read out a portion of Mr Hoggart’s article in which he wrote: ‘every single Bogsider, and every person who took part in Sunday’s march, says that there were not shots at the army, no nail bombs…’ Mr Elias took issue with the statement, and asked whether The Guardian’s policy of absolute accuracy applied to this section of his article.
Mr Hoggart responded that he clearly had not interviewed every single person in the Bogside, but that he had spoken to a number of eyewitnesses and local residents. He also gleaned a lot of information from fellow journalists with whom he exchanged notes and statements. He confirmed that he would have included any information concerning civilian gunmen had he received such information from any of his sources.
Counsel also questioned him concerning a meeting of the relatives of the deceased which took place in the Bogside which he described in his article, stating: ‘the meeting of relatives was tense and bitter… They applauded loudly the most militant sentiments’. He could not recall who had been addressing the group and making militant statements.
2.4 further questions on behalf of the tribunal
2.4.1 Army sources in “The Brutal Soldiery” article
Counsel for the Tribunal suggested to Mr Hoggart that he only had one source for both of the quotes in the article concerning a soldier whose commanding officer had requested not to work with the Parachute Regiment. This suggestion was based on the fact that both quotations speak of having built up relations with the local community for a period of four weeks. Mr Hoggart said that he would be surprised if both quotations had been from the same source, but accepted that it was a possibility.
3. Eugene mcteggart’s evidence
Mr McTeggart was a Detective Sergeant with the RUC, based at Victoria Station at the time of Bloody Sunday. He gave his evidence in full view of the families and wounded and of the public.
3.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
3.1.1 Role and duties on Bloody Sunday
Mr McTeggart and his colleague DC Neilly were stationed at an army checkpoint near Craigavon Bridge. Both officers were in civilian clothing and were stationed in a Portakabin with the role of interviewing anyone that might be arrested on firearms or explosives charges. He recalled a number of uniformed army and RUC personnel being present in the compound.
3.1.2 Arrival of three cars in the compound
He told the Inquiry that, at approximately 4:00 pm, a military policeman went over to the Portakabin and told him that three cars had arrived in the compound earlier in the day, containing injured people. Mr McTeggart did not know how long the cars had been in the compound before he saw them, but estimated that it would have been a substantial period of time, given that the injured passengers had already been transferred to Altnagelvin.
3.1.3 Police report of 3rd February 1972
Mr McTeggart told the Tribunal that on 31st January 1972, the Detective Inspector of the CID based at Victoria Police Station had told all detectives on duty on Bloody Sunday that they were to prepare a report concerning their duties on the day and any incident which they had witnessed.
In the report, Mr McTeggart named the civilians whom he believed had driven the cars containing the injured people into the compound. He accepted that what actually happened was that the cars had been stopped at Barrier 20 in Barrack Street and soldiers had driven the cars, containing only the injured parties, to the compound near Craigavon Bridge. The original civilian drivers only arrived at the compound a considerable time after the cars.
3.1.4 Bombs on the person of Gerald Donaghy
Mr McTeggart had been told that the army medical officer had examined the body of Gerald Donaghy in the white Cortina and had pronounced him dead. He told the Tribunal that he then knew that he would have to prepare a file concerning the death for the Coroner so had taken his time making a note of the circumstances in which he had seen the body; this involved a sketch of the body and a description of it as lying on the back seat of the car.
3.1.4.1 Discovery of the nail bomb
In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr McTeggart said that he had then stepped inside the back of the car to check over the body and had noticed an object sticking out of the right hand trouser pocket. He said that, had he not inspected the body so carefully, he might not have noticed the bomb. He told the Inquiry that the object was covered with cream-coloured masking tape through which the tips of nails were visible, although he did not see a fuse. He had touched the object to clarify to himself that it was a nail bomb and had also felt the tips of the nails against the masking tape. As soon as he had realised what the object was, he moved away from the car and ensured that the civilians in the area did the same, as he did not think it safe for anyone to be in close proximity to an unexploded nail bomb.
However, in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal, Mr McTeggart wrote that he had been alerted to the presence of the nail bomb by a female constable, prior to noticing it himself. He was asked by Counsel why he would have gone over to the car rather than calling for an explosives officer to deal with the bomb. He responded that, since he knew that he would be called upon to give evidence in the Coroner’s Court, he needed to examine the body and the pocket in order to be in a position to provide accurate evidence.
3.1.4.2 Civilians in the vicinity
Mr McTeggart identified the civilians who had been standing near the car as Raymond Rogan and Leo Young. He said that they had been watching whilst he inspected the body to confirm the presence of a nail bomb. He was asked by Counsel how he had come to allow civilians to be in the near vicinity, knowing, prior to conducting his own examination, that there was a nail bomb in the car. He responded that the civilians were some distance from the car and that, as soon as he realised that it was a nail bomb, he had directed them away from the car into the Portakabin.
3.1.4.3 Army technical officer
Mr McTeggart told the Inquiry that he had spoken about the bomb to Inspector Dixon who was in charge of the RUC personnel at the compound. The latter had called an Army Technical Officer (ATO) to deal with the bomb. However, Mr McTeggart was informed by Counsel that, although an ATO had examined the car, this had taken place at the Foyle Road car park on the other side of Craigavon Bridge rather than in the compound where Mr McTeggart was on duty. Mr McTeggart said that he did not see the subsequent examination of the car and did not know where it had taken place.
3.1.4.4 Nail bomb components
Some time later, Mr McTeggart was informed that the ATO had found three more bombs in other pockets on the body. The ATO gave him the tape and nails from the nail bombs, which he then passed on to Constable Montgomery who was a Scenes of Crimes Officer. He said that the explosive had been removed from the bombs by this time. He was shown a photograph which has been identified as depicting four plastic bags containing the components of the bombs found on Gerald Donaghy. Mr McTeggart did not recognise the bags as those that he had been given on the day, stating that he had been handed only one bag. Furthermore, although he wrote in his contemporaneous police report that ‘these [the four bombs] were defused and I [Mr McTeggart] retained the remainder of each bomb’, he was now sure that he had not been handed the explosives or detonators.
He could not explain why the ATO had given him the components of the bombs rather than giving them directly to the Scenes of Crime Officer.
3.1.5 Interviews with Raymond Rogan and Leo Young
Mr McTeggart and Constable Neilly interviewed Mr Rogan and Mr Young who were the original driver and passenger in the car containing Gerald Donaghy. He said that he had then received a message saying that Constable McNulty of the Special Branch wanted to interview them at Victoria Police Station, but was not informed why.
3.1.6 Destruction of contemporaneous notes and notebooks
Mr McTeggart told the Inquiry that he had retained his notebooks pertaining to Bloody Sunday, including the sketch of the body of Gerald Donaghy, until approximately late 1997, early 1998, at which time he had burnt them. He said that the current Inquiry had not been set up at that stage, but that he had had a heart attack and thought that it would be unfair to leave the notebooks behind him if he were to die, given that they contained names and addresses.
3.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
3.2.1 Description of the nail bomb
Mr McTeggart confirmed that he had no memory of seeing a fuse in the nail bomb, but that he had seen the bumps and points of nails sticking out from the masking tape. He agreed that bomb depicted in the photograph of Gerald Donaghy shown to him by the Tribunal did not correspond with his recollection. He explained that he had examined the body from the other side of the car to that from which the photograph was taken and that this might explain the differences between what he recalled seeing and what the photograph showed.
3.2.2 Contemporaneous notes and notebooks
Mr McTeggart could not recall exactly when he destroyed his notes but reiterated that the Inquiry had not yet been set up. He said that he had kept the notebooks for 26 years due to his belief that there might be another inquiry into Bloody Sunday, following the sense of dissatisfaction with the Widgery Tribunal. He said that he had no ulterior motive behind destroying them and agreed to check the date of his heart attack to ascertain when exactly he had burnt them.
He said that, despite his belief that there might be a new Inquiry and despite the fact that he deemed his notes to be of key importance, he had not wanted to hand them over to the police as they were his property and it was up to him to look after them.
Mr McTeggart could not explain why he had not made any reference to his notes and sketches relating to the body of Gerald Donaghy in his contemporaneous police reports or in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal.
3.2.3 ‘Planted’ bombs
Mr McTeggart said that he would have become aware of the allegation that the bombs had been planted on the body of Gerald Donaghy within ten days of Bloody Sunday. In response to a question put by Counsel, he responded that the Security Forces would have had an opportunity to plant the bombs on Gerald Donaghy, if they were bad enough to do so. He also said that, if the bombs were planted, it would have to have been with the complicity of somebody higher up in the army than a private in order for them to have had access to explosives.
He agreed that normal procedure would dictate that a sample of the explosives would be sent to the Northern Ireland forensic laboratory to enable the scientists to trace the source and origin of the explosive materials, but reiterated that he had never been handed the explosives or the detonators.
3.2.4 Interviews with Raymond Rogan and Leo Young
Mr McTeggart was told by Counsel that his former colleague, Inspector Dixon, had told the Inquiry that it would have been inconceivable for the driver and passenger of a car containing a person carrying nail bombs not to have been questioned about this fact during the course of their police interview. Furthermore, Counsel pointed out that Mr McTeggart’s designated role on the day was to deal with any persons detained by the Army or RUC on charges connected with firearms and explosives. However, the statements taken from the two individuals concerned do not reference nail bombs at any stage.
He denied the suggestion that he had not questioned them concerning the nail bombs due to the fact that he was aware that the bombs had been planted and said that he had not mentioned the nail bombs to them, as he had not suspected them of having been involved with anything seditious on the day. He said that Mr Rogan and Mr Young had given him ‘very, very truthful and accurate statements’ and that he had no reason to question them about explosives.
However, in his police report written on 1st February 1972, Mr McTeggart stated: “it will be noticed that there are some slight discrepancies between the stories of both witnesses. This could be as the result of the excited state of the witnesses at the time or that they were both only prepared to state what suited them”. Counsel put it to him that this suggested that he had not trusted Mr Rogan and Mr Young as much as he now said. He responded that it was clear from reading the statements that the men had been trying to be helpful.
3.2.5 Discovery of the nail bomb
Counsel asked him to explain the discrepancies between two of his contemporaneous police reports concerning the discovery of the bomb. In his report dated 3rd February, his description of finding the nail bomb suggests that he was the first to find it. However, in his subsequent report on 9th February, he wrote that he had been alerted to its existence prior to examining the car by a female police constable. Similarly, the first report does not mention a covering on the body whereas the second one describes a blanket covering the top half of Gerald Donaghy, masking the presence of the bomb.
He responded that the second report was more detailed than the first.
3.2.6 Jim Wray
Mr McTeggart was also the officer in charge of the case of James Wray. In his report concerning the victim, he described the body as being clothed in the mortuary on the evening of Bloody Sunday. He could not explain how the clothing had come to be removed prior to the autopsy.
3.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
3.3.1 Altnagelvin hospital
Mr McTeggart had served as a police officer for nearly 20 years at the time of Bloody Sunday. He told the Tribunal that he had found his experiences at the hospital so distressing that he nearly left the Police Service as a result of them. He did not see any of the bodies being treated with disrespect, nor did he see any police officers or soldiers taunting the families of the dead and wounded. However, he did recall a young woman punching his colleague Constable McCormack in the face. He had gone over to Constable McCormack directly after the incident and the constable had sympathised with the young woman saying: ‘how would you feel if it was your brother lying on the table’.
3.4 further questions on behalf of the tribunal
3.4.1 Raymond Rogan and Leo Young
Mr McTeggart was informed by Counsel that, according to an army incident report, Mr Rogan and Mr Young did not arrive at the Craigavon Bridge compound until approximately 5:30. Other evidence suggests that the ATO had been called to dismantle the bombs well before 5:25. Despite that, Mr McTeggart remained convinced that the two men had been near the car when he uncovered the nail bomb.
3.4.2 ‘Planted’ nail bombs
Mr McTeggart told the Inquiry that he had not taken part in or been aware of any discussions concerning the planting of nail bombs at the Craigavon Bridge compound.
4. Alan hall’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr Hall was a senior scientific officer and head of the Explosives Unit of the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS). He was responsible for conducting tests on the clothes of the deceased and submitted a DIFS report in relation to each of the deceased to the Widgery Tribunal. He gave evidence concerning general forensic practices at the time in addition to information relating to the events of Bloody Sunday.
4.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
4.1.1 Receipt of clothing
Mr Hall could not recall the exact circumstances in which the clothing of the deceased was received by his unit, but said that Walter Hill, an RUC officer who worked with the DIFS as Liaison Officer, had acknowledged receipt of the clothing. Part of Mr Hill’s job was to ensure that all items of evidence were properly received by the department and stored in safe custody and to ensure that all material was properly packaged and labelled.
4.1.2 Cross-contamination of clothing
Mr Hall said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, the awareness concerning cross-contamination was growing, but that he was unable to confirm exactly what practices were in place at the time. However, he attempted to describe what would typically have happened to clothing received.
Mr Hall said that clothing received from Scenes of Crimes officers would generally arrive packaged in plastic bags, with one item of clothing per bag. However, in some incidences, all of the clothing relating to one victim would be in the same bag. He could not recall whether the practice of inserting pieces of papers between folds of the clothing was in practice at the time of Bloody Sunday.
Protective gloves would have been worn by every person who came into contact with the clothing and would have been changed after the clothing of each subject had been examined. Again, he could not recall whether the practice of changing gloves for the examination of each separate item of clothing was in place on Bloody Sunday.
4.1.3 Examination of the clothing
Mr Hall said that his understanding at the time was that the primary reason for the clothing being submitted to the department was to test for the presence of firearm discharge residue (FDR), although examination for explosives residue was also required. He undertook the explosives tests whilst the FDR tests were undertaken by Dr Martin.
The examinations involved a number of tests, including sniffer tests and swabbing. He explained that the sniffer test was a preliminary test performed when looking for explosives residue. However, he said that the positive result to a sniffer test was nothing more than an indication that further tests were required, as substances containing halogen, such as cleaning fluids, weed killer and tobacco, also gave off vapours to which sniffers would respond.
Following a positive result from the sniffer, swabs were taken to determine whether the substance detected was a nitrate ester, consistent with nitroglycerine, an explosive component. However, he explained that even a positive result to this test (known as a TLC test) would not necessarily indicate the presence of explosive residues as nitrate esters were used medicinally as well as for explosives purposes.
Although a substantial amount of Mr Hall’s records were destroyed in a fire in 1976, a number of reports pertaining to each of the deceased survived. Counsel walked Mr Hall through a number of these reports, asking for further clarification where necessary.
The reports suggested that, although a number of the victims’ items of clothing tested positive to the sniffer test, only Gerald Donaghy’s jacket returned a positive result from the TLC test. In William McKinney’s case, the tests were hampered to some extent by the fact that certain items of his clothing had been washed by staff at Altnagelvin, prior to being submitted for forensic testing.
4.1.4 Gerald Donaghy’s clothing
Mr Hall confirmed that he had been informed, prior to conducting the tests, that a nail bomb had been found in both side pockets of Gerald Donaghy’s jacket and in both trouser pockets. However, the laboratory tests only detected the presence of a substance consistent with nitroglycerine in the right side pocket of the victim’s jacket. In his contemporaneous report, Mr Hall had concluded that the absence of explosive residues in the pockets of the clothing was not inconsistent with the presence of bombs, explaining that explosive residues were almost impossible to detect after a time lapse of three days.
4.1.5 Nail bombs found on Gerald Donaghy’s body
Mr Hall could not recall seeing any damage to any of the nail bombs that would have been consistent with it having been hit by a bullet. He was sure that, had such damage been evident, he or his assistants would have noted it in their report.
4.1.5.1 Tests conducted on the bombs
His report indicated that, contrary to normal practice, the laboratory had not received the bomb detonators or any samples from the explosive core of the nail bombs. He said that the decision of whether to submit a sample of the explosive for testing would be made by the EOD officer, based on the latter’s assessment of the safety of doing so. Mr Hall could not recall ever being aware of an incident in which the RUC had been given an explosive sample by an EOD officer but had decided not to submit it for examination.
Mr Hall’s report also indicated that a number of fragments of a nitroglycerine-based high explosive had been observed adhering to the inside surface of the masking tape that was wrapped around the bombs. He could not recall any forensic analysis being undertaken to attempt to further characterise the type of explosive observed and his report does not record the results of any such tests. However, he thought it highly unlikely that he and his assistants would not have attempted to further identify the fragments.
4.1.5.2 Nature of the explosives used in the bombs
The Tribunal is in possession of an army intelligence summary, dated 2nd February 1972, which states that the lack of explosive attacks by the Provisional IRA at the time might have been due to a shortage of explosives and / or detonators. This supposition is supported by reference to the bombs found on the body of Gerald Donaghy which the report identifies as being made with Quarrex, an explosive it describes as uncommon in Northern Ireland and inefficient for use in nail bombs.
Mr Hall said that, given the fact that the nail bombs only reached his department on 2nd February, the same date as the aforementioned report, and given his recollection that he did not receive any explosive samples, the explosive material must have been identified by another body. He added that the army had no facilities of its own for identifying the nature of explosives, apart from the labelling on the charge itself.
He confirmed that Quarrex was not the common type of explosive used by paramilitary organisations at the time, but said that it was used occasionally.
4.1.5.3 Bullet hole in jacket pocket
Mr Hall told the Inquiry that he had placed one of the bombs into Gerald Donaghy’s pockets in order to ascertain whether a bullet could have passed through the pocket without striking the nail bomb. He had concluded that it would have been possible, as long as the nail bomb was placed deep into the pocket rather than sticking out.
4.1.5.4 Bombs in trouser pockets
Mr Hall also said that he had been concerned to establish whether the bombs found in Mr Donaghy’s jeans could in fact have fitted into the pockets. He had therefore placed the bombs into the pockets and had satisfied himself that they did fit. He disagreed with Counsel’s suggestion that this test would only have been reliable if conducted with somebody wearing the jeans. He also added that this test was what he called ‘one of those needless pieces of work’. He said that he had already been reliably informed that the devices had been found in the pockets so it was ultimately unnecessary for him to ascertain whether they fitted. However, personal curiosity had led him to conduct the test whereby he had concluded that the bombs would have fitted into the pockets.
4.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
4.2.1 Jackie Duddy
Mr Hall noted the presence of a GPO fuse (a particular type of electrical fuse designed by the Post Office for use in its telecommunication circuits) in a green parka jacket, received as part of Mr Duddy’s clothing. He pointed out that these fuses were sometimes used in paramilitary bombs to indicate whether a bomb was live or not. However, he did not record the presence of the fuse in his final report concerning the victim as he did not consider it relevant, given the absence of any other suspicious findings from the tests performed.
Counsel showed Mr Hall a number of photographs taken on Bloody Sunday of Jackie Duddy which indicate that the victim was not wearing a parka jacket when he was shot. The Tribunal is also in possession of a 1972 statement made by Mr Barber, a telecommunications engineer, who said that he took off his jacket and placed it under Jackie Duddy’s head. Mr Hall agreed that Mr Barber’s job would offer an obvious explanation for the presence of the fuse.
4.2.2 Bombs found on the person of Gerald Donaghy
4.2.2.1 Explosive materials not submitted for forensic testing
Mr Hall told the Inquiry that, in over 95 per cent of cases, the laboratory would have received samples of the explosive materials used in paramilitary devices in order to enable them to identify the type of explosive used and its origin or source. He speculated that the reason he had not received such samples in this case might have been that the army felt it necessary to destroy the explosive elements of the bombs for safety reasons.
However, after being read sections of the statements made by both the ATO and Mr Montgomery, the Scenes of Crime Officer, who were responsible for dealing with the bombs found on the person of Gerald Donaghy, he agreed that his speculation was almost certainly erroneous as neither indicated any particular safety concern relating to the explosive material. Mr Hall could not offer any further explanation as to why the explosives had not found their way to his laboratory.
4.2.2.2 Position of nail bombs
Mr Hall was questioned further about the informal tests that he told the Tribunal he had carried out to ascertain whether the nail bombs would have fitted into Mr Donaghy’s pockets and whether a bullet could have passed through his jacket pocket without causing damage to the nail bomb within it. He agreed that his statement to the current inquiry was the first time he had ever mentioned carrying out these additional tests, and could not explain why he had not referred to them in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal, given the acute controversy surrounding the presence of the nail bombs.
He also told the Tribunal that he did not believe that the fact that the ATO had cut open the pockets of the victim’s jeans in any way affected his ability to conclude that the jeans could have accommodated the bombs allegedly found in them.
4.2.3 Nature of typical nail bombs
Mr Hall said that, when a nail bomb similar to that found on the person of Gerald Donaghy exploded, any person or edifice within a 20 foot radius of the bomb would have been in jeopardy. He said that, were a nail bomb to be thrown in a built-up area, he would expect to find some visible signs of the explosion. He said the traces would equally remain in the case of petrol and acid bombs, but not necessarily in the case of blast bombs.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Tuesday 18th: Paragraph 1
Wednesday 19th: Paragraph 2 and 3
Thursday 20th: Paragraph 4
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
