BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 61

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10 - 14 JUNE 2002

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

This week the Tribunal heard from Sunday Times journalists Murray Sayle and Derek Humphrey who co-wrote an unpublished article concerning Bloody Sunday for the paper in February 1972.  Peter Taylor also gave evidence to the Tribunal concerning his 1972 programme concerning Bloody Sunday, and his research for subsequent programmes and books on the topic.

The Tribunal also heard the evidence of four RUC officers, William McGreeghan, John McVicker, Mr R. Penney and Alexander Malone, all of whom were screened from the families and wounded and the general public.  The latter two officers saw the body of Gerald Donaghy at the army medical post near Craigavon Bridge and testified that they had seen a nail bomb / nail bombs in his pockets. 

The Reverend James McClelland told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of the counterdemonstration planned by the Democratic Unionist Association (DUA) for Bloody Sunday, nor could he recall receiving any guarantees from the Government that the march would be halted.

John Radcliffe told the Inquiry that he had seen Martin McGuinness on the march when he joined it at Southway.

OTHER ISSUES

Christopher Clarke announced that Sir Edward Summers, a former member of the Tribunal, died earlier in the month.

During the questioning of William McGreeghan, it transpired that the former officer was working outside of the United Kingdom and had a full time residence outside of the jurisdiction, contrary to representations made by his legal team on his behalf in his application for screening.  Counsel for the families and wounded underscored the fact that residence in Northern Ireland had been one of the deciding factors in the granting of screening to RUC members by the Court of Appeal in Belfast.  They intend to pursue the matter further.

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

1.              Murray sayle’s evidence

Mr Sayle was working as a staff reporter for the Sunday Times at the time of Bloody Sunday.  Harold Evans, Editor, had called him on the eve of Bloody Sunday and instructed him to travel to Derry to research and write an article relating to the day’s events with his colleague Derek Humphrey.  The article was completed but never published.

1.1            questions on behalf of the tribunal

1.1.1         First army statements on Bloody Sunday

Mr Sayle concentrated on investigating the military background to the article, whereas his colleague Derek Humphrey was responsible for interviewing local people.

1.1.1.1      ‘Young men of military age wearing combat jackets’

He told the Inquiry that, in the initial army statements issued after the march, the phrase ‘young men of military age wearing combat jackets’ kept recurring.  The statements affirmed that such people had been shot by the soldiers.  It was his opinion, based on extensive experience serving as a war correspondent, that such press statements would often be drafted prior to the military operation and therefore provided an indication of what was meant to happen as opposed to what actually transpired on the day.

Mr Sayle told the Inquiry that the statement appeared to him to constitute a restriction placed on the army, i.e., that they were not to fire at anyone not answering the description of a ‘young men of military age, wearing combat jackets’.  He said that, in his experience, such restrictions could often be seen as permission to open fire, if a soldier believed his life was in danger, or was about to be put in danger.

1.1.1.2       Experience of such press statements

He explained that, on the first day of the Six Day War in Israel in June 1967, he was present in the briefing room of the military headquarters of the Israeli Army while statements, issued in English by the Egyptian High Command, were describing the army’s triumphant progress towards Tel Aviv.  He had asked General Dyer who was present why they were broadcasting this erroneous version of events and had been told that the statements had been drafted beforehand and represented what was supposed to have happened.

He also said that he had covered the Vietnam war and that whenever orders were being drafted for an up-coming military operation, there would always be some provision made concerning what they were going to tell the media after the event.  Although he had never had any experience of the British Army in combat, save for his experiences in Northern Ireland, he listed the different armies on which he had reported, including the Australian, American and Israeli armies, and said that there was a clear resemblance in terms of military procedures that was obviously transferable from one army to the next.

1.1.1.3       Basis for theory

Mr Sayle said that, after the initial army briefing, a number of questions had arisen such as why all of the dead were male, and why the proportion of dead to wounded (13 to 14 at that time) was so unusual, with such a high proportion of fatalities.

The theory that there had been an engagement between the army and civilians armed with machine-guns, pistols and nail bombs appeared totally incredible to them, as all of the dead and wounded had been on one side, with no army casualties.  They had seen no photographic evidence of armed civilians and the recordings they heard on the day appeared to have recorded only the sound of semi-automatic fire from the army

Since they had rejected the theory of a gun battle with the IRA, they therefore set about to uncover the military intention behind the army plan which had left 13 males dead and 14 wounded.

1.1.1.4           Restriction

Mr Sayle said that it was not his contention that the order issued to the soldiers had directed them to fire at anyone wearing a combat or Campari jacket.  Instead, he had interpreted the statement to mean that a restriction had been placed on the soldiers to the effect that they were not to fire at anybody who did not fit the general description of what an IRA man or IRA sympathiser would look like.

He said that he and Mr Humphrey had discovered fairly early in their research that none of those killed or wounded had been members of the IRA.  Given this finding, they posed the question of why they had been shot:  if it was not due to what they were doing, the reporters concluded that it must have been their physical description and location.  Coupling that with the statements concerning ‘youths wearing combat jackets’, they came to the conclusion that the military operation had been a planned ambush of armed IRA men, presumed to be on the march, and that the restriction had been issued in an attempt to ensure that nobody was shot indiscriminately. 

1.1.1.5          Rubble barricade

Mr Sayle explained his theory further in relation to the four men shot on the rubble barricade.  He said that, whoever drew up the military plan, clearly expected an armed engagement, and therefore the soldiers needed some way of distinguishing ordinary civilians from IRA members.

He said that, in a normal military situation with army versus army, the enemy army does not have to open fire first in order for the opposing side to recognise them as the ‘enemy’.  Similarly, he explained, those who had been shot on the barricade, all of whom had been wearing jackets and all of whom were male, had been shot in a line as part of an ingenious military operation constituting the defensive ‘closing of a box’ around the soldiers.  Ultimately they had been shot because their location and dress identified them as ‘the enemy’, despite the absence of gunfire from their direction.

1.1.1.6         Clothing of the wounded and deceased

Mr Clarke suggested to Mr Sayle that not all of the deceased and wounded had been wearing combat-style jackets.  He responded that, roughly speaking, their clothing had fitted the description, saying that none of them had been wearing three-piece suits for example.

1.1.2          Armed soldiers

It was Mr Sayle’s belief that two or three army sections had been equipped with semi-automatic rifles (he explained that a platoon comprises approximately two to three sections).  He said that these soldiers constituted the protective element of the operation, responsible for covering Support Company which had the role of snatch squad on the day.

1.1.3         Interviews with soldiers

Mr Sayle told the Inquiry that he had spoken with soldiers who were regularly stationed in Derry, including officers and NCOs of the Royal Green Jackets who told him that the operation had been ill conceived and totally unsuccessful.

He was unable to speak with members of the Parachute regiment, as they had left Derry on the evening of Bloody Sunday.  However he did not think that this had impeded his attempt to offer a valid theory concerning the events of the day.

1.1.4         Illegality of the march

Mr Sayle said that the military intention behind the operation could not have been to prevent an illegal march, for, if this was the case, the march would have been broken up and dispersed long before reaching William Street. 

It was his opinion that the initial emphasis by the army on the illegality of the march was designed in some way to exonerate them, should any civilian fatalities due to the military operation.

1.1.5         Interviews with IRA members

Although Derek Humphrey had primary responsibility for interviewing civilian and IRA witnesses, Mr Sayle attended interviews with approximately six IRA members.  He recalled being told that there had been no armed IRA members on the march, with the exception of an Official IRA (OIRA) man with a pistol. 

He said that, in his opinion, the Civil Rights movement had presented a political challenge to both wings of the IRA:  due to the widespread support for the Civil Rights movement within the nationalist community, the IRA needed to ‘show their faces’ at the march, to underscore their support for it, but could not risk an armed confrontation with the army, as they would have borne the blame for any injuries sustained as a result of such a confrontation.

It was his understanding that the initial decision made by both wings of the IRA was to attend the march, unarmed, so that their presence would be noted by the community.  However, the plan was changed when they heard of the arrival of the Paratroopers in Derry on the morning of Bloody Sunday, as they suspected that the Paras were going to conduct an arms sweep through the Creggan.

Mr Sayle believed that the initial decision to attend the march unarmed had reached Military Intelligence.  This belief was based on ‘off the record’ conversations with soldiers, along with the fact that there were numerous informers operating in the Bogside who would have reported the news to the army.

1.1.6          Interview with James Chapman

Mr Sayle and Mr Humphrey interviewed James Chapman, a trained military observer, living in the Bogside.  He told the Inquiry that the interview with Mr Chapman had convinced both journalists that their theory concerning the military operation was accurate.  Mr Chapman spoke to them concerning the speed and precision of the operation, which, according to Mr Sayle, demonstrated beyond doubt that it was a carefully pre-planned operation.

1.1.7          ‘Spiked’ article written for the Sunday Times

1.1.7.1       Plan to draw out the IRA

In the article of February 1972, Mr Sayle wrote that the army plan, worked out by Colonel Derek Wilson, had been to attack the rioters at the head of the march, in order to draw out the IRA.  He said that this was based on the military principle that, in order to bring the ‘enemy’ to battle, you attack something that, for prestige reasons, it will have to defend.

1.1.7.2       Entry of Paras into the Bogside

The article read:  “Saracens [armoured personnel carriers] took up rehearsed blocking positions along Rossville Street and next to the Rossville Flats.  Paratroopers, wearing combat and not anti-riot gear, jumped out and dropped into standard British Army firing positions, in spots clearly selected in advance for the purpose of the operation”.

Mr Sayle explained that this description was based on the interview with James Chapman as well as evidence drawn from a map made of the area by the Sunday Times team.  He said that the Paratroopers must have known exactly what they were to do, as no orders were overheard.  He said that they were clearly putting into practice a plan that had been carefully rehearsed on a model of some kind.

1.1.7.3       ‘Line’ of dead bodies

The article described how a number of Paras had first ‘cleared the barricade’ by opening fire on those standing at it, whilst others had run through the Little Diamond in order to link up with the Paras at the barricade, before opening fire in the Rossville Flats car park.  A further section had opened fire in Glenfada Park.

Mr Sayle said that the Sunday Times map showed that the majority of those killed and wounded had been shot in a clear line, resembling a traditional opposing enemy line.  Since, in his opinion, there had been no return fire from an opposing enemy line, he said that the shootings must have formed part of a prearranged plan.

1.1.7.4          Alana Burke

The article described Alana Burke being crushed, unintentionally, by a Saracen which raced into the Rossville Flats parking area.  It reported that the driver had realised that he was not in the spot allocated to him by the operational plan and had reversed the vehicle before leaving the car park, thereby crushing Ms Burke against a low retaining wall.

Mr Sayle was informed that Ms Burke had told the Tribunal that she had been crushed as the Saracen entered the car park, not when it was reversing out of the location.  He could not explain the discrepancy between her account and that reported in his article.

1.1.8          Meeting with Army Public Relations Officer (PRO)

In a memo to Harold Evans, dated 19^th February 1972, Mr Sayle described meeting a PRO from the 41^st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (although he agreed with Counsel that the PRO’s regiment might in fact have been the 22^nd Light Air Defence).  The Tribunal has identified the PRO in question as Soldier 028.  He had been put in contact with the Officer through a local Protestant journalist, who gave him the Officer’s name and telephone number.  Soldier 028 invited him for drinks at Drumahoe Barracks on 14^th February 1972.

1.1.8.1         Allegations of IRA fire

In the memo he wrote that Soldier 028 had told him that he had been present undercover at the march, wearing plain clothes and a wig, and had seen the IRA open fire with Thompson sub-machine guns (TSMG), killing people at the rubble barricade.  Soldier 028 had then ‘produced’ a boy of 14 who said he was from the Bogside and that he had also seen the IRA open fire with TSMGs and nail bombs.  Mr Sayle told the Inquiry that he had been taken aback by the presence of the young boy in the army barracks, but that Soldier 028 had told him that the young boy’s conscience had driven him to come and tell the true story of what had happened on the day.

Mr Sayle had formed the opinion that both the Officer and the boy had been lying.  This suspicion was fuelled by the fact that, prior to the boy telling his version of events, the Officer had told him that he had heard no evidence of nail bombs on the day.

1.1.8.2          Model of Derry

The memo then records that Soldier 028 had shown Mr Sayle a model of Derry, of approximately the size of a billiard table, which Soldier 028 said had been made in Germany.  Mr Sayle wrote that he had not been surprised by the existence of the model, as he had presumed that one had been used to plan the operation on Bloody Sunday.

He was shown a photograph of the model of Derry used at the Widgery Inquiry, and told the Inquiry that it looked similar to that shown to him by Soldier 028.

1.1.8.3          Omission of incident in statement to Inquiry

Mr Sayle said that when he made his initial statement to the Inquiry, he had forgotten about the existence of the memo.  He had not referred to it, as he had not been asked about it, given that his statement centred on the unpublished article.  The memo itself was written ten days after the unpublished article, with the purpose of urging caution in the paper regarding the reporting on Bloody Sunday.

However, he told the Inquiry that he still had a good recollection of the meeting and of his sense that the Officer had been lying.

1.1.8.4          Soldier 028’s statement to the Inquiry

Mr Sayle was read portions of Soldier 028’s statement to the Inquiry in which he says that he has no recollection of meeting the journalist, although does not deny that the meeting might have taken place.  However, he denies ever having worn a wig or having ‘produced’ a boy from the Bogside.

1.1.9             Captain of the Light Anti-Aircraft Defence Regiment

The memo also describes a conversation with an unnamed Captain of the Light Anti-Aircraft Defence Regiment, which took place on a rainy street corner.  It describes how Mr Sayle checked over the map and plan he had outlined with the soldier who agreed that he had got the plan right, but added: “the army cannot admit we were in the wrong, can we”.

Mr Sayle did not know who the soldier was, nor whether he had been in a position to know what the plan was, but he added that knowledge of the plan was almost certainly not confined to the Parachute Regiment, given the suggestion that shots had been fired by other regiments on the day.

1.1.10           Vincent Brown

Mr Sayle had no recollection of having spoken with Vincent Brown of the Sunday Press or of having given him the Sunday Times article.  However, he said that it was highly likely that he had spoken with him, given the fact that he was not a direct competitor in the journalistic field.  He also added that, if The Sunday Times was not going to publish the article, there would have been nothing to prevent him from giving it to a fellow journalist.

1.2              questions on behalf of the families and wounded

1.2.1           Memo of 19^th February 1972

In the memo, Mr Sayle wrote:  “we cannot get to the bottom of this without looking into the command structure of the whole army operation in Northern Ireland, with, let us make no mistake, a strong possibility that when we find out how the command set-up works and who authorises these operations, criminal charges may be appropriate”.  However, he never conducted such research, having left Northern Ireland 10 days after composing the memo.

1.3             questions on behalf of the soldiers

1.3.1          Clothing of the deceased and wounded

Mr Sayle told the Inquiry that, in relation to clothing, he and Derek Humphrey had obtained information concerning the dead from preliminary autopsy reports and information concerning the wounded from interviews with them directly.

He was shown a document compiled by solicitors for the soldiers, describing the clothing of the deceased and wounded, and was asked whether, on reviewing the document, he still maintained his position that the majority of the dead and wounded had been wearing combat jackets.  He responded that he had said that they were wearing ‘combat-style jackets’, and that the list confirmed his assumptions.

1.3.2          Ratio of dead to wounded

Mr Sayle reiterated his belief that the ratio of dead to wounded on Bloody Sunday was unusual, saying that the typical proportion was a third killed to two thirds wounded.  He said that the ratio on Bloody Sunday pointed to extremely accurate close range shooting with intent to kill.

1.3.3          Interviews with soldiers

Mr Sayle said that he did not know when conducting his interviews that the Royal Green Jackets had been the only resident battalion which did not deploy on Bloody Sunday, and that this had not motivated his approach to members of that regiment.

He could not recall hearing criticism of the Paras based on their lack of knowledge of the geography of the streets of Derry, and added that, with regard to Parachute Regiment operations, local knowledge was unimportant, as their operations were designed to be decisive and quick.  Furthermore, from his military experience and having seen the model of Derry, he was certain that the operation would have been planned for weeks prior to Bloody Sunday, using a model of the city.

He told the Inquiry that it was his belief that Colonel Wilford must have given the execute order, initiating the operation, since, as Colonel of the battalion, the execute order, or the decision not to execute, would have to have come from him.

He did not think that the fact that he had only put his version of events to the army after the article deadline had passed, provided an unbalanced version of events, as suggested by Counsel.  He explained that his role had not been to adjudicate between two opposing parties, but to attempt to get to the bottom of what actually happened on the day.

1.3.4           Soldier 028

Mr Sayle was certain that the Captain with whom he had spoken on a ‘rainy street corner’ was not the same man as he had met at Drumahoe Barracks, i.e., Soldier 028

He reiterated that he had not mentioned the meeting in his first statement, as this had concentrated on the unpublished article written for The Sunday Times.  He had, however, dealt with the meeting in his second statement to the Inquiry, when he had been informed of the existence of the memo.

1.3.5          IRA gunfire

1.3.5.1       Soldier 028

Mr Sayle said that he had discounted Soldier 028’s account of hearing IRA fire partly on the basis that he had heard no such fire in the media recordings made on the day.  Furthermore, there existed no photographs of civilians armed with sub-machine guns and he had received no credible eyewitness statement of anyone having seen a civilian armed with a sub-machine gun. 

1.3.5.2      Scottish Chief Constable

Counsel asked him how he had come to disregard the evidence of a ‘Scottish Chief Constable’, described in his memo, who had heard the sound of automatic fire on the day.  He responded that it did not tally with the bulk of the evidence gathered and that, furthermore, he had seen a photograph of a Para carrying a Sterling machine-gun over his shoulder on Bloody Sunday, thereby destroying in his mind the theory that any automatic fire on the day was automatically attributable to the IRA.

1.3.5.3      Civilian eye-witness evidence

Mr Sayle told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of civilian eyewitnesses telling him that they had witnessed non-army gunfire on the day.  However, in response to questioning by Counsel, he acknowledged that there was a possibility that he might have discounted such information, since such accounts would have been in the minority and he would have believed them to be mistaken.

1.3.5.4       IRA evidence

Mr Sayle confirmed that he had heard about the OIRA member who fired a shot on Bloody Sunday from the IRA itself, of from his colleague Derek Humphrey, rather than from an eyewitness.  After hearing the story, they had attempted to trace witnesses to it, but were unsuccessful in their search.

1.3.6        John Johnston

Mr Sayle was asked how he had come to the conclusion, featured in the spiked Sunday Times article, that John Johnston had been shot as he went to help the wounded Damien Donaghy.  He responded that he had not invented it in order to add journalistic colour, but had that he or his colleague must have been told the story by somebody.  He confirmed that he had not read Mr Johnston’s statement prior to writing the article, as it had not been made until 22^nd February, ten days after the article was written.

1.3.7         Decision not to publish Sunday Times article

Counsel informed Mr Sayle that Bruce Page, a reporter with the Sunday Times Insight team, had told the Inquiry that the article had been spiked as it could not have been published as a piece of responsible journalism.  Mr Sayle refused to enter into a debate over Mr Page’s opinion of his article but informed the Tribunal that, as far as he understood, the article had been pulled due to the sub judice ruling by Lord Widgery, asking newspapers not to publish any information relating to Bloody Sunday which might harm the forthcoming inquiry.

1.3.8        indiscriminate shooting

Mr Sayle confirmed that the evidence he had uncovered in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday had led him to conclude that the Paras had not opened fire indiscriminately on the crowd, but that they had carried out a detailed plan which had been drawn up in advance.  He said that he would find it hard to believe that British Paratroopers would fire at anybody indiscriminately, as that would constitute a riot by the army.

1.4           Further information concerning model of derry

Following research conducted by the Inquiry team, Mr Clarke announced that they had received information relating to the model used at the Widgery Tribunal, stating that it had been made by the modelling section of the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), based at RAF Wyton in Huntingdonshire.  The Tribunal was also provided with a copy of the modelling branch ledger which indicates that the model was ordered by and delivered to the headquarters of the 8^th Infantry Brigade in Derry, having been completed on 7^th February 1972, after Bloody Sunday.

2.           Derek humphrey’s evidence

Mr Humphrey was a journalist with the Sunday Times at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He co-wrote the unpublished Sunday Times article with his colleague Murray Sayle.

2.1                 questions on behalf of the tribunal

2.1.1             Arrival in Derry

Mr Humphrey arrived in Derry on the evening of Bloody Sunday.  He had been in Derry on 29^th January, but had been told to return to London, as the Bloody Sunday march had not been considered to be of particular significance.

2.1.2       Civilian interviews

Mr Humprey took primary responsibility for interviewing civilian eyewitnesses, including a number of the wounded at Altnagelvin hospital.  He questioned these witnesses with regard to what they had seen on the day, where they had been standing and where the soldiers had been located when they opened fire.  He could not recall how many people he had interviewed, but said that he worked solidly on the article for four days.

2.1.2.1        Interview with James Chapman

Although Mr Humphrey believed that he almost certainly interviewed James Chapman for the purposes of the article, he did not believe that a typed statement taken from Mr Chapman by Sunday Times journalists was his work.  He explained that the Insight team was generally the only team to take signed statements from witnesses, as they were working to longer deadlines.

2.1.3          IRA interviews

Mr Humphrey had reported from Derry for approximately five years prior to Bloody Sunday and had built up an extensive contact list from both sides of the political divide.  He told the Inquiry that, based on the fifteen or so interviews conducted with members of both wings of the IRA, he had come to the conclusion that the IRA had not been armed on the march when the shooting started.  He said that he would have known, and still knew, a number of these individuals’ names, including that of a young woman, but declined to divulge them to the Inquiry.  He did not believe that he had interviewed either Martin McGuinness or Reg Tester.

Mr Humphrey told the Inquiry that he had found evidence of one shot, fired at the soldiers on the GPO sorting office roof by an OIRA man stationed in a derelict building on the north of William Street.  The man had spoken to him directly and had told him that he had fired his pistol in response to the army shooting of Damien Donaghy.  This was the only evidence of IRA shooting, early in the day, that he had been able to uncover.

He had also found out that one OIRA active service unit arrived in the Bogside shortly after the last army shots were fired and that they had discharged one shot.

Mr Humphrey agreed that he still knew the name of the head of the ‘Bogside Provisional Organisation’ on 30^th January 1972, who had been present on the march, but once again refused to divulge his source to the Inquiry.

2.1.4           Vincent Browne

Mr Humphrey told the Inquiry that he had never read the Vincent Browne article written for the Sunday News before now.  However, he said that it appeared to have been written with access to the Sunday Times article, albeit with a considerable amount of independent information.

2.1.5          Decision not to publish article

Mr Humphrey said that he had been angry when he found out that the article had not been published, and that he had confronted Harold Evans about it upon his return to London.  Mr Evans had told him that he was not going to risk prison to print the article, referencing Lord Widgery’s sub judice ruling by which he indicated that he would regard publication of any article on the topic as a handicap to the Inquiry and as contempt of court.

2.2          questions on behalf of the soldiers

2.2.1        Interviews of the wounded

Mr Humphrey confirmed that he had interviewed as many of the wounded at Altnagelvin as was fair and reasonable, with the assistance of Dr McClean who gave him more extensive details concerning the extent of their injuries. 

He also confirmed that Dr McClean had told him that some people had been shot twice and that some had also been shot whilst crawling away.  However, he agreed that none of the wounded had told him that they had been shot whilst running away.

2.2.2       Official IRA gunman

Mr Humphrey could not recall the name or rank of the OIRA man who told him that he had fired a pistol at the army, having seen Damien Donaghy being shot.  However, he recalled the man in question telling him that he had disobeyed orders by carrying a gun on the day.

He also confirmed that he had subsequently never learned of any other IRA activity from his contacts, nor that any IRA members had been killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday.

2.3         Further questions on behalf of the tribunal

2.3.1      IRA sources

Mr Humphrey clarified that he would not be willing to name two of his contacts in the IRA, namely the head of the Bogside Provisional IRA and a young female Provisional IRA member.  Lord Saville alerted him to the fact that he might be recalled and ordered to divulge their identities at a later date.

3.          peter taylor’s evidence

Mr Taylor was working for Thames Television at the time of Bloody Sunday and arrived in Derry on the eve of 30^th January 1972.  He conducted a number of interviews with civilians and soldiers for Thames Television’s ‘This Week’ programme, transmitted four days after Bloody Sunday.  He has written six books concerning the Troubles and also made a number of documentaries concerning Northern Ireland, including the BBC documentary ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’.

3.1          questions on behalf of the tribunal

3.1.1        Thames Television’s ‘This Week’ programme entitled ‘Two Sides of a Story’

Mr Taylor began interviewing civilians on 31^st January, by going to the Bogside and knocking on doors in the hope that people would speak to him.  He estimated having spoken to approximately six to twelve people, including Jack Chapman.

3.1.2        BBC’s ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’ programme

After the This Week programme, Mr Taylor did not examine the topic of Bloody Sunday until he came to do research for the documentary ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’, 20 years later.  He explained how he had concentrated on obtaining the army’s version of events, whilst Steve Hewlett, the programme’s producer, concentrated on the evidence of civilians who had been present on Bloody Sunday.  Mr Taylor also interviewed a number of IRA sources.

3.1.2.1       Army sources

Mr Taylor interviewed a number of soldiers, some of whom have been identified by the Tribunal as General Ford, Colonel Wilford, Colonel Welsh, CSM (Company Sergeant Major) 202, Sergeant O and Captain Michael Jackson.

One of his military sources gave him information which led to the passage of the broadcast which stated:  ‘the army also had a secret plan, ordered at the highest level by General Robert Ford, again acting on political instructions.  Derry’s hooligans were to be taught a lesson and the Paras had been imported to do the teaching’.  He would not confirm whether or not the source for this information was General Ford, but clarified that he had understood the expression ‘teach a lesson’ to mean ‘go in hard and conduct a scoop up operation’.  He also said that, to the best of his recollection, he had been told that the political direction to carry out the secret plan had come from London, and that the secret plan had been to conduct a scoop up operation.

3.1.2.2       IRA sources

He also spoke with sources within the Provisional IRA (PIRA) who told him that the IRA had agreed to remove its weapons from the Bogside.  Whilst he refused to disclose the identity of his sources to the Tribunal, he confirmed that he had more than one source for the information and was convinced that it was accurate due to the fact that it also tallied with evidence received from civilian sources.

He was also told that, after the shooting had started, a car containing PIRA men had driven down from the Creggan to the Bogside at approximately 5:00 pm.  However, he did not know whether they had fired any shots.  He was also unable to recollect whether he had been given this information by PIRA or OIRA sources.

The information he gleaned concerning the OIRA was that the majority of their weapons had been removed from the Bogside, but that some had been retained for defensive purposes.

Mr Taylor told the Inquiry that he was satisfied that his sources were sufficiently high up in both wings of the IRA to know exactly what orders had been issued on the day.

3.1.2.3         Confidentiality pledge

When conducting interviews with army and civilian sources, Mr Taylor gave the individuals concerned a pledge of confidentiality, promising not to release their names.  However, five of his army sources have since come forward to the Inquiry, stating that they release him from any duty of confidentiality.  The five individuals concerned are General Ford, Colonel Wilford and Colonel Welsh, CSM 202 and Sergeant O. 

Despite having been released from his duty of confidentiality, Mr Taylor refused to identify for the Tribunal the information contained in his notebooks relating specifically to these five individuals, as he believed that they had been pressurised into waiving their confidentiality by their legal teams.  He also said that when he had previously been informed of his sources’ waiver of their confidentiality, he had contacted them directly and the majority had not been aware of the waiver of confidentiality made on their part by their legal representatives.  He added that he had also spoken with them prior to giving his current evidence and informed them that he intended to stand by his pledge of confidentiality, and that they had told him that they respected the position he was taking.

He told the Inquiry that he regarded his duty of confidentiality as absolute, but added that the individuals themselves could identify the sections of his notebooks relating to them if they so wished.  He added that, in this case, is understanding of the principle of confidentiality was that something said in confidence remained in confidence, even if the original source no longer required it to remain in confidence.

Mr Taylor also refused to disclose the identities of the IRA members he interviewed, but estimated their numbers at approximately three from each wing.

3.1.3           ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’ notebooks

Mr Taylor has supplied redacted copies of his notebooks to the Inquiry.  Counsel took him through selected passages in the notebooks, asking for further clarification.

3.1.3.1         Group of eight young men

Mr Taylor was asked about references in his notebook to a group of eight young men, six of whom had served prison sentences for activities connected to the IRA after Bloody Sunday.  Two of the men in question were brothers, Denis and Conal, and the former appeared in the BBC documentary.  He explained that he had focused on this story as it was good material for the programme in that it featured eight young men who had gone on the march together.  One of them, Gerald Donaghy, had been shot dead and the others had witnessed the shootings of James Wray and Jackie Duddy.  Six of the young men subsequently joined the IRA as a result of Bloody Sunday and served time in prison.  In response to Counsel’s question as to what the young men had actually done on Bloody Sunday, Mr Taylor responded that they had merely run away and tried to stay alive.

3.1.3.2        Interview with army source #2 (Mr Taylor’s numbering)

The records of an interview with one of the military sources indicate that the source did not think that the IRA would take part in the march, but that he had nevertheless not been surprised when he heard the first incoming shot.  The source referred to the political pressure being put on the Security Services by the Stormont Government to deal with the march effectively.  The source also described a difference of opinion at command level concerning the timing of the Paratroopers’ entry into the Bogside.  Mr Taylor’s understanding was that General Ford got frustrated on the day, as he had wanted the Paras to enter the Bogside sooner than they had.

3.1.3.3        Interview with Captain Michael Jackson (army source #3)

Captain Jackson has identified sections in Mr Taylor’s notebooks which he believes were notes taken during his interview.  Mr Taylor refused to indicate whether or not he had identified the correct pages, but agreed to explain sections of the notes further where necessary and possible.

Captain Jackson told Mr Taylor that Colonel Wilford had made it clear to him that the Paras were about to ‘do something quite dangerous’.  Wilford purportedly went on to say that he wanted the Paras to be the first to enter Derry which had been ruled by the IRA for too long, but that he expected a violent reaction.

Captain Jackson had denied the suggestion that the troops had run amok, saying that they had handled the operation as directed by Colonel Wilford.

3.1.3.4        Dr McClean

Mr Taylor’s notes also reflect a conversation with Dr McClean, during which Dr McClean told him that he had gone to the Rocking Chair pub prior to the march to get information about the IRA’s plans for the day and had been told that the IRA was not going to be active during the march.  It was Mr Taylor’s belief that Dr McClean was one of the people who had prevailed upon the IRA to remove their weapons from the Bogside, due to the sensitivity of the march.

3.1.3.5         Interview with army source #4

Mr Taylor’s second military source told him that he had given the Company Commander instructions at Barrier 14, stating: ‘make sure you are seen to suffer before you do anything’.  The source also said that the reputation of the British Army was of paramount importance and that it was essential to keep the name of the army as clean as a whistle.  It was Mr Taylor’s belief that this sentiment related to the atmosphere prior to Bloody Sunday, as opposed to the military reaction to it.

3.1.3.6         Interview with CSM 202 (army source #5)

The Tribunal has identified a section of the notebooks as almost certainly relating to the interview with CSM 202.  The latter appears to have told Mr Taylor that he had seen a soldier aiming his gun at the Rossville Flats, where he had seen people with pistols.  The source also questioned the soldiers who were shooting towards the rubble barricade, and they had told him that they had identified gunmen.  The source had also seen two rounds hit the ground, but had been unable to determine whether they had been IRA or army shots.

The source had spoken later to Major Loden and raised his concern over the possible lack of control on the ground.

3.1.3.7       Interview with fourth army source

The Tribunal suggested that the fourth army source was Sergeant O, but one again, Mr Taylor refused to confirm the supposition.  The source in question described the shooting he had done himself, which including firing and hitting one person in a car park.  It also appeared from the notes that the source had spoken to Colonel Wilford, amidst the shooting, and that he and Colonel Wilford had indicated to one another that everything was under control.  The source also identified a particular Para whom he had seen shoot and hit somebody on the barricade.

3.1.3.8       Interview with Colonel Wilford

Colonel Wilford, who had never sought any confidentiality from Mr Taylor, told him that there had been no plan in place to deal with possible IRA shooting.

3.2             questions on behalf of the families and wounded

3.2.1          BBC’s ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’

Mr Taylor took over the project from another journalist, Denis Blakeway, but did not use any of the original journalist’s research, preferring to start anew himself.

3.2.2          James Chapman

Mr Taylor told the Inquiry that Mr Chapman had been very courageous to speak out at Widgery and to explain his version of events.  He said that, based on his knowledge of events and of the prevailing atmosphere at the time, Mr Chapman’s fears as to the potential consequences of speaking out, particularly in relation to the possibility of losing his job as a civil servant, were well founded.

3.2.3         Secret IRA burials

He said that, based on his knowledge of and connections with the IRA, he found the suggestion that IRA members might have been buried secretly following Bloody Sunday inconceivable.

3.2.4         Captain Michael Jackson

Although, in his statement to the Inquiry, Captain (now General) Jackson wrote that he had been interviewed by Mr Taylor in 1972, it was Mr Taylor’s recollection that he had not participated in any of the contemporaneous interviews with military personnel, as he had been responsible for interviewing civilian witnesses.

3.2.5        ‘Secret plan’ to conduct scoop-up operation

Mr Taylor reiterated that the ‘secret plan’ for Bloody Sunday of which his sources had spoken had been to conduct a scoop-up operation on the day, as opposed to anything along the lines outlined in General Ford’s memo in which he suggested shooting selected leaders of the Derry Young Hooligans (DYH).  He said that his sources for this information had been Colonel Wilford and other more senior officers.  Although none of his sources had ever told him that the orders had been to kill people, he said that they thought that there was a strong possibility that hooligans, backed by gunmen, would take control, and therefore that there might be a risk to civilian lives.

He said that military sources more high-ranking than Colonel Wilford had told him that the plan had been given political approval from Westminster, by the Cabinet Sub-Committee dealing with Northern Ireland which was Sub-Committee GEN47.

3.3              questions on behalf of the soldiers

Mr Glasgow began by acknowledging, on the instructions of a number of his clients, the research Mr Taylor had done into the Troubles and his neutral stance to such matters.

3.3.1           IRA field hospitals

Mr Taylor told the Tribunal that he had never heard of the existence of IRA field hospitals used to treat those injured during rioting or shootings.

3.3.2          Civilian fire from the Rossville Flats

Mr Taylor’s notebooks record a civilian source as saying that he had seen somebody firing a carbine from the fifth floor of the Rossville Flats, and that three shots had been fired from the army in response.  Mr Taylor said that this had been broadly consistent with Sergeant O’s account of having seen a gunman in the flats.

3.3.3          Reputation of the Parachute Regiment

Mr Taylor said that, in his experience, soldiers from other regiments did not regard the Paras as unsuitable for the scoop-up operation.  One of his military sources (who was not a Para) told him that the Paras were well suited to the operation as they were ‘pretty good at handling youths… very good battalion, well disciplined, very experienced, very well-trained, very good at handling crowds’.

Mr Taylor also said that the army was concerned about letting small units of soldiers deal with hostile crowds, due to their vulnerability to snipers who might have been operating behind the rioters.

3.3.4        CSM 202

Mr Taylor told the Inquiry that he had contacted all of his army sources following the broadcast of ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’ and had asked them their opinion of the programme.  He said that CSM 202 had been happy about the programme and had told him that he had been commended by some of his colleagues in the Parachute Regiment for giving the interview.  CSM 202 had made no complaint at that stage about the way in which his interview had been edited for the purposes of the programme.  It was Mr Taylor’s belief that CSM 202 had subsequently come under considerable pressure from some of his peers for breaking ranks and that this had led him to criticise the editing of his interview. 

One particular section in dispute related to CSM 202’s statement that he had seen no gunmen, nail bombers or weapons on Bloody Sunday, a statement he had made early in the interview.  In the broadcast, these assertions had been juxtaposed to CSM 202’s argument with Soldier H concerning the amount of rounds the latter had expended.

Mr Taylor refuted the suggestion that CSM 202’s words had been misrepresented in any way.  He said that some subtleties and qualifications might have been omitted due to the constraints of piecing together a television programme, but that this had not lead to any inaccuracies or misrepresentation.

Mr Taylor agreed that CSM 202 had relieved him of his duty of confidentiality and that he had been the only military source to take issue with his stance of continuing refusal to name his sources, in the face of their waiver of confidentiality.

3.4          further questions on behalf of the tribunal

3.4.1       Civilian fire from the Rossville Flats

Mr Taylor clarified that he had had gleaned the information concerning civilian fire from the Rossville Flats from a secondary source, either from evidence given at the Widgery Tribunal or from the Sunday Times Insight Team’s book.  He did not personally interview the source of the information.

3.5          Disclosure of sources

Given that there was still some prospect of uncovering the identity of Mr Taylor’s IRA and military sources through the continued progress of the Inquiry, Lord Saville said that he would not order Mr Taylor to disclose their identities at the present time.  However, he alerted Mr Taylor to the possibility that the situation might have to be reassessed in the future.

4.          william mcGreeghan’s evidence

Mr McGreeghan joined the RUC in 1960.  He transferred to Victoria Street Police Station in November 1970, at which time he held the rank of sergeant.  He gave his evidence to the Tribunal, screened from the view of the families and wounded and of the general public.

4.1        questions on behalf of the Tribunal

4.1.1      Role and duties on Bloody Sunday

Mr McGreeghan was the senior sergeant detailed for duty at Barrier 13 in Sackville Street, along with Constables Cunningham, Cromie, Johnston and Richardson, all of whom were based at Victoria Police Station.

4.1.2      1972 police report

Mr McGreeghan wrote a police report on 5^th February 1972, detailing what he had witnessed on Bloody Sunday.  He acknowledged that it would not have been usual to be asked to write such a report. 

4.1.2.1       Similarities in reports

Although he was the senior officer in charge of his party on Bloody Sunday, he told the Inquiry that he would not have seen the constables’ reports prior to their submission to the Inspector.  Counsel for the Inquiry, underscoring the fact that they were not suggesting any impropriety on Mr McGreeghan’s behalf, pointed out the similarities between his report and that of Constable Semple, and asked whether he would have discussed the content of his report with any other officer.  He responded that, although he might have discussed the day’s events with his colleagues in the immediate aftermath, he had not discussed the content of his report with anyone and, furthermore, had not seen Constable Semple’s report until it was shown to him by the Tribunal.

4.1.2.2        Accuracy in timings in report

Mr McGreeghan was asked to explain how the timings in his reports were so accurate, given the fact that he had not made any records of timings in the notebook he carried on the day.  He told the Inquiry that he would almost certainly have contacted the RUC Communications Centre to check the timings of the sequence of events when writing his report.

4.1.3         Barrier 12

He described how the army and RUC had come under attack by rioters at Barrier 12 in Little James Street and said that the army had responded with rubber bullets.  He had then seen army vehicles driving across Little James Street into William Street, but could not recall the speed at which they were driving.

4.1.4          Sound of gunfire

4.1.4.1       Sound of Thompson sub-machine gun

In his 1972 report, Mr McGreeghan described hearing two distinct bursts of gunfire, of approximately 20 to 25 rounds each, as the last army vehicle passed the junction of Sackville Street and Little James Street.  He wrote that the sound was like the typical rate of a TSMG.  Although he could no longer recall hearing this, he was certain that his contemporaneous report would have been accurate.

Given the fact that he had not heard the fifty or more rubber bullets fired by the army in the Bogside at the time, he was asked whether he might have confused the sound of rubber bullets being discharged with that of a TSMG.  Mr McGreeghan thought this most unlikely.

4.1.4.2         Sound of high velocity fire

Although he could no longer recall the sound which he had identified as being similar to a TSMG, Mr McGreeghan did still had a clear memory of hearing high velocity shots, fired seemingly in response to the earlier two bursts of gunfire.

4.1.4.3        Reporting sound of gunfire

As the most senior officer in his party, Mr McGreeghan said that he would have almost certainly been equipped with some form of radio communication, although had no distinct recollection of this.  He also agreed that the sound of a TSMG would have been something he would have reported back to base, unless one of his colleagues had already done so.  He could offer no explanation as to why no RUC officer had reported hearing a sound similar to that of a TSMG on Bloody Sunday.

4.1.5          Altnagelvin mortuary

4.1.5.1       Role and duties

At approximately 5:00 pm, Mr McGreeghan was sent to Altnagelvin Hospital to assist police already at the hospital and to secure the morgue.  He was also instructed to prevent interference with bodies brought to the hospital, and explained that there was a concern that people might attempt to remove the dead and injured from the hospital and bring them over the border to Donegal.  However, he agreed that neither he nor his colleagues had ever had any direct knowledge of injured or dead persons being taken from Altnagelvin to Donegal.

4.1.5.2        Scene at the mortuary

Mr McGreeghan said that, due to the volume of bodies and the small size of the mortuary, some of the bodies had been placed on the floor of the chapel of rest and of the technician’s area, adjacent to the mortuary.  He also said that he had no recollection of any discussion concerning contamination of the bodies prior to the post-mortems.

4.1.5.3       Access to mortuary

He recalled both uniformed and CID officers being present but could not remember who had specific responsibility for controlling access to the mortuary, however he added that police from the Waterside Police Station would have got to the hospital first and would presumably have taken charge.  All of the police officers would have been armed, but he could not see anybody carrying a sten gun or rifle.

He also told the Inquiry that there had been soldiers in the grounds of Altnagelvin when he had arrived, but that he could not recall seeing any in the mortuary itself.

4.2              questions on behalf of the families and wounded

4.2.1           William Nash

Mr Mansfield QC raised the issue of a passage contained within Mr McGreeghan’s statement, in which he described overhearing Charles Nash, the victim’s brother, saying, over the body of his brother:  “God bless you Willie, you did it for Ireland”.  He raised concern at any inferences that could be drawn from this purported statement on behalf of his client.  Lord Saville did not think that the passage was relevant and therefore did not allow any questions relating to it from any of the parties.

4.2.2          1972 police report

Mr McGreeghan could not recall making any notes concerning what he had witnessed on Bloody Sunday between the day itself and the 5^th February when he wrote his report.  He agreed that, whilst at Sackville Street, the events unfolding had little significance for him as the police were not directly involved in the action, but that the significance of what he had seen and heard had become more apparent to him at the mortuary, as unlawful deaths of civilians or attempted murder of soldiers would have been a police matter. 

4.2.3         Current country of residence

Mr McGreeghan was asked whether he lived in Northern Ireland at present, a question which Lord Saville initially indicated was not an issue for the Tribunal.  However, Mr Treacy said that there were two bases to the question.  The first was that, if Mr McGreeghan did not reside in Northern Ireland, it would mean that the application for screening had been acceded to and obtained on an improper basis.  Mr Treacy said that it had been indicated to the Court that all those applying for screening resided in Northern Ireland and that this element had been important to the ruling on screening in which Lord Justice Nicholson had said that he would have regarded the decision to screen witnesses living outside Northern Ireland as irrational. 

The second basis was that the response to the question would relate to the current and general credibility of the witness.

Lord Saville allowed the question on the second basis.

Mr McGreeghan responded that he had an address in Northern Ireland and that his home was in Northern Ireland.  However, he admitted to working full-time outside the United Kingdom and to having a residence outside Northern Ireland which facilitated his working abroad.

4.3           questions on behalf of the ruc

4.3.1        Permanent residence

Mr McGreeghan agreed with Counsel that his work was likely to end in the near future and that he would return to Northern Ireland at that time.

5.            John mcVICKER’S EVIDENCE

Mr McVicker was an RUC officer stationed at Dunmurray at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He was present in Derry on the day, along with Sergeant Hartop and Constables McKinty and Edmonds.  He was screened from the public and from the families and wounded when giving his evidence.

5.1          questions on behalf of the tribunal

5.1.1       Role on Bloody Sunday

Mr McVicker was briefed to cover the city Walls and spent the afternoon patrolling Magazine Street Upper, from the level of the Walker Monument to the junction of Magazine Street Upper and Butcher Street.

5.1.2       Sound of gunfire

He heard the sound of rubber bullets, followed by gunfire, and automatically assumed that the rubber bullets had been fired by the army in an attempt to control the crowd and that paramilitaries had opened fire on the army.  He could not recall why he had come to that conclusion.  He also clarified that, at that time, he would have been unable to differentiate between high velocity and low velocity fire.

He had no recollection of soldiers firing from the Walls, and told the Inquiry that he was 100 percent certain that no soldier had fired from the section of the Walls above where he was patrolling, as he would have seen them from his position.

He also told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of hearing the sound of nail bombs exploding on the day.

5.1.3         Inspector Junkin

Although in Inspector Junkin’s statement to the Inquiry, he says that his hat had been knocked off by a stone, it was Mr McVicker’s recollection that he had been told on the day that Inspector Junkin had been wounded.

6.               R. Penney’s evidence

Mr Penney joined the RUC in 1958 and was appointed to the Photography Branch in 1964.  He was based at RUC Headquarters in Knock at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He was screened when giving his evidence.

6.1            questions on behalf of the Tribunal

6.1.1          Role on Bloody Sunday

Mr Penney was sent to Derry on 30^th January 1972 to photograph the civil rights march, along with Constables Simpson and Brown.  He was briefed at Ebrington Barracks by Chief Inspector Donnelly.  His role was to film the march and any rioting that might ensue.

He explained that he had a cine-camera, whilst his colleagues had still cameras.  He said that photographs and films were typically used to identify participants on the march and rioters, and that, therefore, he would have attempted to film as much of the march as possible.

6.1.2              Barrier 14

Mr Penney was stationed behind Barrier 14, in civilian clothes.  He described seeing the riot develop and the army responding with water canon.  He also recalled seeing a CS gas canister exploding underneath the water canon, and assumed that it had been thrown by the crowd.

It was his current recollection that the water canon had little effect as the crowd merely retreated momentarily before returning, although, in his contemporaneous police report, he wrote that the rioters had retreated into Chamberlain Street following the second fire of the water canon and that the areas of Chamberlain Street and William Street had remained deserted for several minutes prior to the Paras’ entry into the Bogside.  He told the Inquiry that his 1972 report was likely to be the more accurate of the two accounts.

He saw the soldiers entering William Street through Barrier 14 and recalled that those in the snatch squad were armed only with batons, whereas the ‘other’ soldiers present were armed with SLRs (self-loading rifles).

6.1.3       William Street

Mr Penney went through Barrier 14 shortly after the soldiers, and saw seven to eight civilians lined up against a wall.  He told the Inquiry that he had become separated from his colleagues by this stage.

6.1.4       Rossville Street

As he entered Rossville Street, he met a man from the Knights of Malta who, thinking that he was a member of the press, told him that there were three people dead in a Pig (armoured personnel carrier) further down the street.  As he made his way towards the Pig, he saw two priests, one of whom he recognised as Father Mulvey, walking towards the army vehicle.  He said that both priests had been allowed into the Pig by the soldier guarding the vehicle.

Mr Penney told the Inquiry that he had looked into the Pig and seen the bodies, but that he had not turned on his camera, as the cine film would not have worked inside the vehicle and he did not deem it to be of particular significance to the police.

6.1.5         Gerald Donaghy

Later in the afternoon, Mr Penney was told that a photographer was required at a car park near Craigavon Bridge.  When he and his colleague Mr Simpson arrived, he was told by an ATO that he was to photograph a car parked in the area, but that the ATO was first going to check it for booby traps.  This check lasted upwards of 20 minutes.  Mr Penney watched throughout the procedure and saw nobody apart from the ATO approach the car.

He was then called over and saw the body of a young man (Gerald Donaghy) in the back seat, with a nail bomb protruding from the pocket of his jacket.  He then saw three other nail bombs in the young man’s clothing.  He directed PC Simpson to take photographs.

Although the photographs in the Tribunal’s possession only show one nail bomb on the person of Gerald Donaghy, Mr Penney said that he had a clear recollection of seeing four nail bombs, and of seeing a photograph showing those four nail bombs.

6.1.6        Paucity of film footage

In total, Mr Penney took approximately seven and a half minutes of cine film footage, all of which depicted the initial riot at Barrier 14.  He told the Inquiry that he had stopped filming because, as far as he was concerned, there was nothing else to film after this.  He said that the film was sent to Kodak to be processed on Monday 31^st January, and that it would almost certainly have been sent to CID.

The Tribunal has not been able to locate this footage.

6.1.7      1972 police report

Mr Penney wrote a statement on 16^th February 1972, which he presumed was for the purposes of the investigating officers in Derry.  In the report, he described hearing explosions as the Paras entered the Bogside and, although he could not be sure, thought that the sound was similar to that of rubber bullets.

He told the Inquiry that he would not necessarily have been able to distinguish between the sound of rubber bullets and that of nail bombs, but that he would have expected to have been alerted by colleagues if they had heard nail bombs in the vicinity.

6.1.8      Widgery Tribunal

It was Mr Penney’s belief that he had given oral testimony before the Widgery Tribunal.  However, Counsel pointed out to him that he did not figure in the transcripts of the proceedings and could not therefore have given evidence before it.  Mr Penney was thrown by this information, as he had a clear recollection of giving his evidence and of being cross-examined by a Mr Foot.  He was informed that Mr Foot was not a legal representative at the Widgery Tribunal and that, therefore, he must be mistaken in his recollection.

6.2         questions on behalf of the families and wounded

6.2.1      1972 police report

In view of the clarity of Mr Penney’s contemporaneous police report, he was asked whether he had used his cinefilm or Constables Simpson and Brown’s photographs when composing it.  He could not recall referring to the film or to photographs and said that the sequencing of events was so accurate as the events of the day had impressed themselves on his memory.

6.2.2        Constables Brown and Simpson

It was Mr Penney’s belief that he had left Constables Simpson and Brown at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street and had proceeded into the Bogside alone.  However, he was told by Counsel that the two constables had given accounts which directly paralleled the events he described in his statement, e.g., seeing people arrested at the corner of William Street, hearing somebody tell Mr Penney that there were three dead bodies in the back of an army vehicle and seeing Father Mulvey go the army vehicle.  Despite this, Mr Penney had no recollection of being with his two colleagues.

6.2.3        Rossville Street

According to Constables Simpson and Brown, they and Mr Penney remained in the vicinity of the junction Rossville Street and William Street for approximately 20 minutes prior to moving up Rossville Street, by which stage the shooting had finished.  Mr Penney responded that he had not even been aware at the time of shooting occurring at all.

6.2.4        Photographs and footage made on the day

Mr Penney explained that he had not taken any footage of the bodies in the army vehicle as his equipment would not have worked, given the poor quality of the light, and because it did not appear to be a matter of importance to the police.  He was asked why his colleagues would not have taken photographs of the bodies, given the fact that they had taken photographs of an ambulance in the vicinity and of the two priests walking towards the vehicle.  He was unable to explain why they would not.

He explained that the film had been sent away to Kodak for processing, and would almost certainly have been returned to the photography branch at police headquarters, prior to being sent to the CID in Derry in order for them to identify any people on the march whom they should prosecute.

6.2.5        Gerald Donaghy

Despite the statement of Warrant Office Wood in which he describes the body of Gerald Donaghy as being in an upright position in the back of the car, Mr Penney was certain that he had only ever seen the body lying flat in the back of the car.  He could not recall whether anybody other than Constable Simpson had taken photographs of the body, but said that the army often took their own photographs.

He was told by Counsel that Mr Wood also told the Tribunal that he took Polaroid photographs of the bombs in the top pockets of Gerald Donaghy’s jacket, but did not take any pictures of those in his jeans as there had been nothing to see.  Mr Penney responded that he had never seen any pictures taken by Mr Wood.  However, he had a recollection of seeing a photograph in which four nail bombs were visible, as opposed to the photograph in the possession of the Inquiry in which only one appears to be visible.

He could not recall being told prior to approaching the car that there were nail bombs on the body.

6.2.6         Witness statement

Mr Penney said that it was possible that he had written an additional witness statement relating to Gerald Donaghy at the time, following the usual crime scene procedures.

7.              alexander malone’s evidence

Mr Malone was an RUC officer based at Belleek, Co. Fermanagh, with Sergeant Keyes at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He had previously served in Derry for a period of three years.  He gave his evidence screened from the view of the families and wounded and from the public.

7.1            questions on behalf of the tribunal

7.1.1          Role and duties on Bloody Sunday

Mr Malone was on duty in the car park of the Masonic Hall, near the city Walls, with Constables Cawley, Carson, McVeigh and Scott, where he remained until approximately 3:25 pm.  During that time, he did not hear any gunfire.

He then moved to the junction of Bishop Street and Barrack Street with his colleagues.  At approximately 4:15 pm, he heard the sound of gunfire from the direction of the Bogside.  In his contemporaneous police report, he described the gunfire as being automatic, although he could no longer recall this detail.  He added that, at the time, he would have been able to distinguish between the sound of automatic fire and that of a number of weapons fired in quick succession, but that he would not have been able to distinguish between high and low velocity fire.

7.1.2           Barrier 20

At approximately 4:30 pm, Mr Malone saw two cars trying to pass through Barrier 20.  The cars were stopped and a scuffle ensued between the civilians and the soldiers manning the barrier.  Soldiers then got into the cars and drove them towards his position.  The first car was a blue Ford Cortina, driven by a Corporal of the Royal Anglian Regiment (known as INQ 104), containing the wounded Joseph Friel.  The second was a white Ford Cortina, which he later found out to have contained Gerald Donaghy.

He was instructed by Sergeant Keyes to accompany the soldier in the first car to the army medical post at the Craigavon Bridge, in order to provide directions.  He told the Inquiry that the journey would have taken less than five minutes and that he could not recall the details of any conversation they might have had en route.  He presumed that, if anything unusual had been said by Joseph Friel or by the officer, he would have recorded it in his police report.

7.1.3          Medical post

Mr Malone had little recollection of being at the army post, but did remember both military and police personnel being present.  He told the Inquiry that Joseph Friel had received medical treatment for his injury.

He also recalled seeing the body of a young man, which he later found out to be Gerald Donaghy, with a package in his right hand trouser pocket.  He could not remember whether he had noticed the package of his own accord or whether it had been pointed out to him.  Although he wrote in his 1972 police report that it was a nail bomb, he told the Inquiry that this was a mere presumption on his part; although the package had strongly resembled a nail bomb, he had not seen it dismantled.

Mr Malone left the army medical post at approximately 5:00 pm.

7.2              questions on behalf of the families and wounded

7.2.1           Barrier 20

Mr Malone told the Inquiry that he had no recollection of the drivers in the cars attempting to ram the barricade.  He also could not recall seeing a soldier fire a rubber bullet into the back of one of the cars.

8.              James mcclelland’s evidence

Reverend James McClelland was the Vice President of the Derry DUA at the time of Bloody Sunday, having gone to Derry in 1971 to take up a position as the Free Presbyterian Church minister for the city.  Prior to this, he had no active involvement in politics.

8.1            questions on behalf of the tribunal

8.1.1         DUA and DUP (Democratic Unionist Party)

Mr McClelland was elected Vice President of the Derry DUA, which had a committee of four members including Mrs Anna Hay and Gordon Heggarty.  He was unsure of the numbers of full members of the association, but told the Inquiry that between 12 and 20 people regularly attended the meetings.

He said that, in theory, the local DUAs were independent from the central DUP but that, in practice, no decisions were taken at a local level without at least some input, if not the authority of, Ian Paisley.

He recalled that he and Gordon Heggarty were responsible for producing press statements, and that he himself would have approved all statements prior to their release.

8.1.2      Ban on marches and parades

Mr McClelland told the Inquiry that he no longer had any recollection of the ban on marches and parades in place in 1972, nor of the fact that the Bloody Sunday march had been illegal.  However, he agreed with Ian Paisley’s evidence that the policy of the DUP in relation to marches, namely that it was opposed to a blanket ban on all parades as this interfered with traditional parades, but held that, if there was a ban, it should be rigorously enforced against civil rights marches.

8.1.3      DUA counterdemonstration planned for Bloody Sunday

8.1.3.1      Decision to hold counterdemonstration

Mr McClelland also said that he had no recollection of any DUA counterdemonstration planned for Bloody Sunday.  He was read an extract from a newspaper article which appeared the week before the march, in which he was quoted directly.  The article was entitled “‘We will halt civil rights march, say Derry Paisleyites” and read:  “The City of Derry and Foyle DUA, in a statement during the week, said that if the Stormont Government does not take the necessary steps to halt next Sunday’s civil rights march in Derry, ‘we are determined to take these steps ourselves’”.  Mr McClelland said that he did not challenge the authenticity of the article, but could not recall anything in relation to the counterdemonstration.

He would not comment on Counsel’s suggestion that one of the purposes of holding a counterdemonstration would have been to compel the authorities to halt the march.

He also said that, if any counterdemonstration were being organised, Ian Paisley would have known about it or would have been involved, but could not recall having any contact with him about it.

8.1.3.2        Decision to call off counterdemonstration

Mr McClelland was read a passage from the Sunday News on 30^th January which quoted him as saying:  “we were approached by the Government and given assurances that the civil rights march will be halted—by force if necessary.  We believe wholesale riot and bloodshed could be the result of the civil rights activities tomorrow and we would be held responsible if our rally takes place.”  He reiterated that he had no recollection of the counterdemonstration or of any contact with the Government at any time about a march.

He was also read a section from Hansard, recording a debate in the House of Commons at which Commander Anderson said:  “a counterdemonstration was arranged for that day.  I went to the people concerned and I am glad to say that they had a sense of responsibility”.  Again, Mr McClelland said that he had no recollection of any approach by Commander Anderson, and added that he had only ever met him once on a different occasion.  He also suggested that Commander Anderson might have met another member of the DUP, but could not offer any suggestion as to whom this might have been.

8.1.3.3          Telephone call from Desmond Boal

Mr McClelland had a memory of receiving a call from Desmond Boal QC, an MP at Stormont and close friend of Ian Paisley, in which Mr Boal persuaded him that a proposed DUA protest should not go ahead.  Although he was not entirely sure whether this call related to Bloody Sunday, it was his belief that it probably did, as the Bloody Sunday march was the only confrontational march he could recall at the time.

8.1.4           Decision to give evidence to the Inquiry

Mr McClelland told the Inquiry that he had been contacted by Ian Paisley the night before he gave his evidence to the Tribunal and had been asked by him whether he would be providing a witness statement.  Mr McClelland had responded that he would not, as he had received legal advice advising against it.  He added that he had persuaded his lawyer that he should attend the Inquiry in order to provide whatever assistance he could.

8.2             questions on behalf of the families and wounded

8.2.1          DUA and DUP

Mr McClelland agreed that, in 1971, the DUP was a young party that tended to appeal to those who were disaffected from mainstream unionism due to its perceived failure to deal with the security situation.  He also agreed that the central organisation through the party’s executive and Ian Paisley was exceptionally strong, and that Dr Paisley would have been aware of anything of significance planned by the individual DUAs, particularly if it was to draw media attention.

8.2.2        Ban on parades

He agreed that one of the most outstanding matters of controversy in 1971 and 1972 was the banning of parades, due to its impact upon Orange parades, which were held as sacrosanct by unionists and Orangemen.  He felt unable to comment on whether the civil rights march planned for Bloody Sunday held particular significance for his organisation and for loyalists in general, but agreed that the sentiments attributed to him in the Derry Journal on 28^th January 1972 would have reflected his thinking at the time.  This article quoted him as saying:  “we call on the Loyalists of Londonderry for their support at this time.  The Queen’s writ must run in every part of the city and the law must be administered fairly to all sections of the community”.

Mr McClelland explained that the thinking was that if the Government was going to ban all parades, they had to stop the Bloody Sunday one, and agreed that one of the purposes of issuing the press statement would have been to put pressure on the Government to halt the march.  He also agreed that members of the DUP and other sections of the loyalist community would have regarded the civil rights movement as a front for sedition, and the ensuing rioting as an attempt to undermine the structures of the State.

8.2.3          Counterdemonstration planned for Bloody Sunday

8.2.3.1        Decision to hold counterdemonstration

Mr McClelland could not comment on whether the counterdemonstration called for Bloody Sunday had been called a ‘prayer meeting’ in order to get around the Sabbatarianism, prevalent in the DUP on the day, and added that he would have deemed such a strategy to be devious and would not have condoned it.

Although he reiterated that he had no recollection of any counterdemonstration planned, he agreed that, if one had been organised, he, Anna Hay and Gordon Heggarty would have been at the heart of it.

8.2.3.2          Decision to call off counterdemonstration

Mr McClelland also accepted that, if the Government had made an approach to the organisers of the counterdemonstration, the people they would have approached would equally have been himself, Anna Hay and Gordon Heggarty.  Similarly, he agreed that the counterdemonstration could only have been called off by the same individuals.  However, he thought it possible for the Government or Commander Anderson to have approached one of the other committee members, and for him not to have been informed.

He agreed that his statement to the press made shortly before Bloody Sunday, in which he suggested that the Government would halt the march by force and in which he raised the strong probability of ‘wholesale riot and bloodshed’, had turned out to be fairly prophetic.  However, he reiterated that he could not recall having got this information from any Government representative.

8.2.3.3          Telephone call from Desmond Boal

Mr McClelland was informed that Desmond Boal was a DUP MP in 1972 and chairman of the party.  He agreed that, if Mr Boal had called him in relation to the Bloody Sunday march, this would indicate that the DUP was well aware of the significance of the decision to hold a counterdemonstration at the time.

However, he added that, as a relatively new arrival in Derry, and because of his inexperience in the political sphere, he would not have known of the significance of the Bloody Sunday march or of that of any planned counterdemonstration.

8.2.4            Political views

Mr McClelland rejected any inference that he might be lying to the Inquiry, out of embarrassment over the nature of the hard-line views he had held at the time of Bloody Sunday.  However, he agreed that views of a much more extreme nature would have been expressed in 1972, and would have been found to be much more acceptable to many otherwise rational people than they would be today.

8.2.5          Decision to give evidence to the Inquiry

Mr McClelland agreed that, having been shown the press clippings by the Inquiry solicitors at the time of giving his statement, he would have been aware that the Tribunal wanted to question him in relation to the counterdemonstration.

Counsel suggested to him that there would have been no need for legal advice or for the delay in giving evidence if the reality of the situation was that he could not remember anything in relation to the counterdemonstration.

Mr McClelland was also asked whether he had discussed the matter with Dr Paisley when the latter called him the day before he was due to give evidence.  He responded that he could not recall exactly what was discussed.

9.              john radcliffe’s evidence

9.1            questions on behalf of the tribunal

9.1.1         Martin McGuinness and Mickey McNaught

Mr Radcliffe joined the march at Southway, having attended a funeral earlier in the day.  He estimated that he was approximately a half to a third way back from the front of the march, slightly in front of Martin McGuinness and Mickey McNaught.  He explained that he knew both of the men well, as they were from the same area of town.  To the best of his recollection, the two men were still behind him as the march entered William Street.

9.1.2         Gunshots

Mr Radcliffe made his way to Free Derry Corner and listened to the speeches.  As Lord Brockway was about to address the crowd, he heard three or four shots, which he said came from the city Walls.  He looked up towards the Walls but could see no soldiers.

He and Mr McLaughlin began to run towards Lisfannon Park and saw two armoured cars on the Free Derry Corner side of the rubble barricade, facing up towards William Street.  They appeared to have come from the direction of the Old Bog Road.  Six or seven soldiers got out of one of the vehicles and began shouting orders.  He then heard a burst of gunfire from a semi-automatic weapon.  Mr Radcliffe was told by Counsel that, according to evidence amassed, the first armoured cars to enter the Bogside would have stopped on the other side of the barricade.  However, he remained adamant that he was correct in his recollection.

He told the Inquiry that some of the soldiers ran towards Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, and others towards Glenfada Park North.  Meanwhile, he saw a number of people with their hands in the air.

Mr Radcliffe told the Inquiry that all of the shots he heard on the day appeared to be army fire.

9.1.3          Bogside Inn

Mr Radcliffe and Mr McLaughlin ran to the courtyard behind the Bogside Inn, during which time they heard sporadic shooting.  However, whilst in the courtyard, he heard no further shots from the city Walls.  He saw nobody whom he recognised as being a member of the IRA and told the Inquiry that nobody was armed.

9.1.4        Two bodies

Mr Radcliffe and Mr McLaughlin left the courtyard on at least one occasion to investigate what was happening.  He recalled walking to a position south of Free Derry Corner and seeing two bodies, one of which he later found out was that of Barney McGuigan.  The other body was lying on the other side of Rossville Street.  He could no longer recall any details about it.

He had a recollection of there being soldiers in the close vicinity, standing near the rubber barricade and looking towards Free Derry Corner, but could not recall seeing any ambulances.

9.2            questions on behalf of the families and wounded

9.2.1         Mickey McNaught

Mr Radcliffe was informed by Counsel that Mickey McNaught was interned in August 1971, and therefore could not have been on the march.  He responded that, to the best of his recollection, he had seen him on the march.  However, he acknowledged that he had not make any statement in 1972 to the Civil Rights Association or any other records that might have assisted him when making his current statement.

9.2.2