|
|
13 - 17 MAY 2002
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
This week, the Tribunal heard evidence from Dr Carson and Professor Marshall, two pathologists who performed autopsies on the deceased at Altnagelvin Hospital on Bloody Sunday. Dr Carson returned to the Guildhall on Monday to answer questions from some of the families’ and soldiers’ representatives, having given the bulk of his evidence in Week 57.
The Tribunal also heard from six RUC officers, a number of whom gave their evidence screened from the public and from the families and wounded. Mr Hamilton and Mr David Edmonds were stationed on Magazine Street on Bloody Sunday. The latter told the Inquiry that he saw a photographer dip a civil rights banner in blood before placing it over one of the bodies and taking a photograph.
Samuel Simpson and Samuel Ballantine were both stationed at Barrier 14. They both told the Inquiry that they had heard automatic gunfire as the troops entered Chamberlain Street, although Samuel Simpson said that it was possible that he might have mistaken the sound of multiple rifle shots for automatic fire.
Frederick Emerson and
James Penney were stationed near the Diamond.
Both told the Inquiry that they had heard the sound of nail bombs and of
automatic fire.
OTHER ISSUES
Lord Saville allowed an application for screening made by Alexander Malone, an RUC officer. He will be screened from view from the families, the wounded and the public when he appears before the Inquiry.
However, Lord Saville rejected an application made by Madden & Finucane and by Barr & Company Solicitors to allow non-qualified members of their legal teams (including Catherine McKenna, former Observer for British Irish Rights Watch) to be present and to view the screened RUC witnesses, alongside qualified lawyers. Lord Saville said that he could see no reason why the highly qualified teams of Madden & Finucane and Barr & Co. would need help from unqualified lawyers when dealing with the testimony of screened witnesses.
A large number of the families and wounded walked out of the Guildhall on Wednesday to protest at the screening of RUC officers giving evidence.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1.
Dr Derek carson’s evidence
(continued from week 57)
1.1 questions on behalf of the families and wounded (continued)
1.1.1 Jim Wray
1.1.1.1 Clothes of the deceased
Dr Lockhart could not explain why, or in what circumstances, some of Jim Wray’s clothes had been removed prior to the autopsy, and could not recall who had given him Mr Wray’s clothes, which he had received separately from the body.
1.1.1.2 History section in autopsy report
The ‘History’ written as an introduction to his autopsy report recorded the suspicion that Jim Wray had been shot whilst attacking soldiers and went on to say that “petrol tests carried out on the hands of this man were consistent with him having used a firearm”. Dr Carson thought that he had got this information from the police. He told the Inquiry that he had never been made aware of the suggestion that Jim Wray had been lying wounded on the ground when he had been given a ‘coup de grace’ by a Para.
1.1.1.3 Wound to forehead
Jim Wray sustained a large gash to his forehead, above his left eyebrow, which Counsel suggested might have been caused by a bullet. Although he could not rule out this theory, Dr Carson told the Inquiry that he had not examined the wound for lead particles, as he believed the wound to have been caused by Mr Wray’s collapse onto a hard surface.
1.1.1.4 ‘Shored’ wound to left shoulder
Dr Carson agreed with the conclusions reached by Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan, the Tribunal’s experts, that the exit wound to Jim Wray’s shoulder displayed abrasions, which would have been caused either by tight clothing or by pressure against a firm surface.
1.1.1.5 Two gunshot wounds to body
Based on the inclination and nature of the two gunshot wounds sustained by Jim Wray, the Tribunal’s experts proposed three scenarios in which he could have been shot:
1. If Jim Wray was vertical when shot, the shots would have to have been fired from below upwards, as if by somebody lying on the ground
2. If the soldier was upright, rather than lying on the ground, Jim Wray would have to have been bending forwards, and the shots would have to have been fired from his right
3. If Jim Wray had been lying on the ground, the shots would have to have been fired from above to his right by somebody standing over him
Dr Carson broadly agreed with each of these propositions.
In his original autopsy report, Dr Carson inserted the additional information ‘fired from the same weapon, at the same time and position’. He said that he would not have based this information on additional information from the security forces, but from the fact that both entrance and exit wounds were close together.
1.1.2 Status within the Territorial Army
Dr Carson told the Inquiry that, at the time of conducting the autopsies, he was a colonel with the Territorial Army, “on the medical side”. He subsequently left the army, holding the rank of Colonel. However, he said that this had not influenced his reports in any way, and that he had not felt under pressure to uphold the army’s version of events.
1.2 questions on behalf of the soldiers
1.2.1 Lack of bias in autopsy reports
Dr Carson said that, throughout his 40-year career as a pathologist in Northern Ireland, he had never felt under pressure from republicans to bias his reports in any way.
1.2.2 High velocity bullet wounds
Dr Carson told the Tribunal that, throughout his working career, he had performed in excess of 1,000 autopsies on victims of the Troubles, dealing primarily with bomb and shooting victims. He said that it was generally possible to distinguish between high velocity and low velocity bullet wounds, the former causing a larger exit wound and greater internal disruption within the body. However, he added that the distinction was more difficult to make in soft-tissue injuries, or injuries to limbs as opposed to the torso.
Dr Carson was also asked for his opinion concerning the fragmentation of high velocity bullet rounds. Although it was not his particular area of expertise, Dr Carson agreed that he would expect a bullet fired through a body at a granite surface to disintegrate partially if not entirely.
1.2.3 Alteration of Jim Wray’s autopsy report
Dr Carson said that the normal practice would have been for his assistant to manually complete the autopsy forms. He would then review the notes made, making further clarifications where necessary. He said that there was nothing sinister behind any alterations made.
1.2.4 Hugh Gilmore’s autopsy report
Dr Carson agreed that, in general terms, a protrusion of abdominal contents through a wound did not necessarily indicate that the wound in question was the exit wound, as opposed to the entry wound, due to the phenomenon of temporary cavitation. This was, he felt, the case with Hugh Gilmore: the entry wound was the larger of the two, with extrusion of the abdominal organs, and the exit wound was much smaller.
Dr Carson went on to explain that the large size of the entry wound indicated that the bullet had been distorted in its flight path, perhaps by passing through Mr Gilmore’s arm prior to hitting his stomach. This tallied with his preferred theory that Mr Gilmore had only been hit with one bullet, which passed through both his arm and stomach, as opposed to two separate bullets. However, he was clear not to rule out the latter proposition.
1.2.5 Jim Wray’s autopsy report
Dr Carson was not able to approve or refute the theory concerning Jim Wray that he had been issued a ‘coup de grace’, or ‘finished off’ by a soldier whilst on the ground. He said that he might have expected to find more bullet fragmentation in the wound, due to its impact against a hard surface, such as the kerbstone, but went on to say that the presentation of the wound would also have been consistent with such a theory. He had not requested the clothes to be examined for fragments, as he had not been aware of the exact circumstances of Mr Wray’s death, and this was not his particular remit.
2. Professor Thomas Marshall’s evidence
Professor Marshall was the State Pathologist for Northern Ireland from 1958 to 1989. He performed autopsies on the bodies of Barney McGuigan, Michael Kelly and Kevin McElhinney at Altnagelvin Hospital in Derry. Professor Marshall sought to make it clear that he had no independent recollection of the autopsies, but that his evidence was based on reviewing his original autopsy reports and reading the transcript of his oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal.
2.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
2.1.1 Experience in dealing with victims of gunshot wounds
Professor Marshall said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, he had very substantial experience in examining the bodies of people who had sustained gunshot wounds, experience amassed since the start of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. He had particular knowledge of wounding by high velocity weapons.
2.1.1 Contamination of clothing of the deceased
Professor Marshall could not recall whether special care had been taken when dealing with the clothing of the deceased to prevent cross-contamination. However, he could confirm that he would have used the same pair of gloves throughout any given autopsy procedure, thereby increasing the chances of cross-contamination of an individual’s clothing.
2.1.2 X-rays
Professor Marshall said that it was rare for x-rays to be taken as part of an autopsy procedure and that, at that time, mortuaries did not have dedicated x-ray facilities. In order to obtain an x-ray, he would have had to persuade somebody in the School of Radiography at Altnagelvin Hospital to take it for him. He explained that x-rays would usually only be taken if there was some doubt about whether a bullet remained lodged in a person’s body, and could therefore not explain why he had decided to take x-rays of the bodies of Barney McGuigan and Kevin McElhinney, given the fact that both bodies displayed clear exit wounds.
2.1.3 ‘History’ sections in the autopsy reports
Professor Marshall agreed that he had possibly written the ‘History’ sections appended to the autopsies, and said that he would almost certainly have got the information from the police file, submitted to the Coroner for inquest proceedings, and from witness statements. He added that, in murder cases, the ‘History’ section would not have formed part of the official report, but would have been kept on file for academic purposes. It would appear that Professor Marshall also wrote the histories for autopsies which he did not perform himself.
It was pointed out to him that the History in Michael Kelly’s case reported information gleaned from the Widgery Inquiry, stating that Mr Kelly had been shot by a soldier who claimed he had fired at somebody throwing a nail bomb. It went on to say that, despite the presence of lead particles on the right cuff of his sleeve, Lord Widgery had concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he had been firing a weapon or throwing a bomb. Professor Marshall agreed that he must have written at least that section after the Widgery proceedings, but added once again that it would have been purely for departmental purposes.
2.1.4 Michael Kelly’s autopsy report
The first autopsy performed on the day by Professor Marshall was that of Michael Kelly, which took place at approximately 7:00 pm on the evening of Bloody Sunday. Michael Kelly had been shot in the abdomen, and the bullet had lodged in his sacrum.
2.1.4.1 Angle of the shot
In his autopsy report, Professor Marshall put forward the opinion that the bullet might have come from a point above Michael Kelly, or, had he been bending forwards, from a point ahead of him, approximately 3’6’’ off the ground. However, he had not used a probe to assess the angle between the entry and exit wounds and told the Inquiry that this conclusion was approximate and tentative.
2.1.4.2 Entrance wound
Professor Marshall wrote that the entrance wound ‘was atypical and indicates that the bullet was not travelling nose-on when it struck. It had probably already passed through some object or been deflected by it’. He could no longer recall whether there had been any damage to the bullet recovered from Mr Kelly’s sacrum, but was informed by the Tribunal that both Dr McClean and Dr Martin, who observed the autopsy, did not note any damage to it. Professor Marshall believed that it was possible for a bullet to traverse something soft, such as the soft tissue of another body or somebody else’s clothing, without sustaining any damage. However, he was unable to answer whether it could have been deflected by hitting something harder, such as a brick, and yet show no sign of damage.
2.1.4.3 Bullet
He was sure that he would have been wearing gloves when handling the bullet retrieved from the body of Michael Kelly, but said that he would not have changed or washed his gloves before going on to perform his next autopsy of the day.
2.1.4.4 X-ray taken of Michael Kelly’s sacrum
Despite there being no reference to the x-ray taken of Michael Kelly in his autopsy reports, Professor Marshall was sure that he would have used the x-ray as a tool to assist him in the autopsy procedure, as he had taken the x-ray for the specific purpose of locating the bullet.
2.1.5 Kevin McElhinney’s autopsy report
This constituted the second autopsy performed by Professor Marshall, taking place at approximately 8:00 pm that evening. Dr McDermott and Dr McClean attended this autopsy as approved observers. Kevin McElhinney had been shot in the left buttock.
2.1.5.1 Entrance wound
Mr McElhinney had been killed by a bullet, entering his body through the left buttock, approximately two centimetres from the anus. The entrance wound was 3 millimetres in diameter. Professor Marshall had concluded, from the size of the entrance wound and from the scale of the internal injuries sustained by Mr McElhinney, that he had been shot by a high velocity bullet.
2.1.5.2 Four wounds on right hand side of body
Mr McElhinney sustained four wounds to the right hand side of his body, the lowest of which was the largest. Professor Marshall concluded that the bullet had fragmented in Mr McElhinney’s body. The bulk of the bullet had exited the body through the largest of the wounds, fracturing the 9th rib, and smaller fragments had emerged separately, causing the three other wounds.
However, the Tribunal’s experts disagree with this finding. It is their belief that the largest wound is not an exit wound, but rather a laceration, caused by the internal passage of the bullet. They identified the next wound up as being the real exit wound, the third wound up as a re-entry wound, and the fourth as a final exit wound. These conclusions were reached by examining the nature of the wounds themselves and the abrasions surrounding them. The experts were also led to these conclusions due to the presence of air or gas in the areas of the soft tissues to the left side of the chest, stating that this is typical of the ‘subcutaneous passage of a bullet’.
Professor Marshall did not agree with the Tribunal’s experts’ analysis of the x-ray. He also said that the fact that there were no fragments of bullet remaining within Mr McElhinney’s body did not lead him to doubt that the bullet had fragmented before exiting the body. He also offered the revised opinion that one or more of what he identified as the smaller exit wounds could have been caused by bone fragments exiting the body, as opposed to bullet fragments.
2.1.5.3 Clothing of the deceased
Professor Marshall confirmed that he had not examined Mr McElhinney’s clothing to assess whether damage to it was consistent with the view that he had formed of four fragments of bone or bullet exiting the body through the right hand side.
Counsel for the Tribunal put it to him that the holes identified in both Mr McElhinney’s coat and shirt would appear to be consistent with their experts’ assessment of the four wounds to the right hand side of the body. Professor Marshall responded that the bullet track they had identified appeared ‘devious’ to him.
2.1.5.4 Wound to left thigh
In his autopsy report, Professor Marshall had suggested that the wound to Mr McElhinney’s left thigh could have been caused by the same weapon as that which killed him. He clarified for the Tribunal that what he had meant was that it could have been fired from the same position as the bullet which had entered his left buttock.
2.1.6 Barney McGuigan’s autopsy report
The autopsy on Mr McGuigan’s body was the final autopsy performed by Professor Marshall on the evening of Bloody Sunday. It was observed by Dr McDermott and by Dr McClean. Mr McGuigan was killed by a gunshot wound to the head.
2.1.6.1 Clothing of the deceased
The autopsy report notes that a scarf, a piece of yellow towelling and shoes had been removed from the body when Professor Marshall came to perform the autopsy. The Tribunal is in possession of photographs showing the body of Mr McGuigan wearing these items of clothing, and also photographs where these have been removed, and believes that an army photographer took the first photograph in the mortuary. Professor Marshall confirmed that nobody should have tampered with the body in any way (i.e., by removing clothing) prior to the autopsy procedure.
2.1.6.2 X-ray of Mr McGuigan’s head
The bullet which killed Barney McGuigan caused severe damage to his skull and brain, causing his skull to fragment. Dr McClean, who assisted at the autopsy procedure, identified the fragments in the brain, visible on the x-ray, as pieces of metal, totalling approximately 40 in number. Professor Marshall initially disagreed with this finding, stating that the particles were almost certainly bone fragments. He added that, ‘had any metal fragments of any useful size been present in the skull, [he] would have extracted them during the course of [the] autopsy examination and mentioned them in [his] autopsy report’.
However, from looking at the metal fillings in Mr McGuigan’s teeth, it was apparent that the fragments in the skull were in fact metal as opposed to bone, a fact Professor Marshall acknowledged. Professor Marshall was therefore asked why he had not extracted the large piece of metal fragment visible on the X-ray. He responded that, when he had examined Mr McGuigan’s head and brain, the predominant feature had been bone fragments, and this was what he had recorded in his autopsy report. However, he went on to say that he would almost certainly have extracted the largest piece of metal and concluded that it was of little use. He would then have discarded it, without noting it in his report.
Although the presence of metal fragments would have lead to the conclusion that the bullet had fragmented, Professor Marshall did not note this conclusion, as he did not think that it would have aided the autopsy in anyway.
2.1.6.3 Type of bullet
Professor Marshall said that he had concluded that a high velocity bullet had struck and killed Barney McGuigan. He was sure that, throughout his career, he would have seen many fragmented bullets fired by the army. However, he said that he had never come across a case where he concluded that a bullet had been doctored (known colloquially as a dum-dum bullet), prior to being fired. In the case of Mr McGuigan, he said that it would be difficult to say whether the damage to the bullet had been caused by its impact with the skull or by the fact that it had been doctored.
2.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
2.2.1 Michael Kelly’s autopsy report
Professor Marshall clarified an earlier response given to Counsel for the Tribunal to the question of whether a bullet, such as that which killed Michael Kelly, would show some damage after impact with a hard surface. He reiterated that he was not an expert in these matters, but that common sense would tell him that it would show signs of damage if it hit something hard.
He also clarified that he had removed the sacrum from Michael Kelly’s body in order to x-ray it, and had then replaced it in the body.
2.2.2 Kevin McElhinney’s autopsy report
Professor Marshall said that, generally speaking, if a person were hit in the buttock, the wounded person would have been bending forwards, kneeling or crawling when the bullet struck them from behind.
He could not say whether it was an unusual occurrence for GPs such as Dr McDermott or Dr McClean to have been present at autopsy procedures and said that he was merely the Coroner’s pathologist: if the Coroner gave permission for somebody to attend, that was final.
2.2.3 ‘History’ section in Patrick Doherty’s autopsy report
Professor Marshall reiterated that he had possibly written the History section to Patrick Doherty’s autopsy report. He was told that it was Dr Carson’s testimony that they often got information from the police when conducting autopsies. He responded that, since the police were acting as Coroner’s officer under the Coroner’s Act, they had a duty to gather information and to submit it to the Coroner for his file. However, he repeated that the History section did not form an official part of the post mortem report.
2.2.4 Barney McGuigan’s autopsy report
2.2.4.1 No record of metal fragments in autopsy report
Professor Marshall was asked again why he had not taken pains to count the particles of metal visible on the x-ray, and why he had made no reference to them in his autopsy report. Dr McClean’s contemporaneous note of the autopsy records approximately 40 such particles and the Tribunal’s experts have counted 42 of the same. He reiterated that he had not made any note of them as he thought they bore little significance in the case, given the fact that the predominant appearance had been of a host of bone fragments. He took issue with the description by Counsel of a ‘large’ metal fragment visible above the deceased’s eyebrow, saying that it was ‘very small’.
2.2.4.2 Significance of metal fragments
Professor Marshall said that, at the time that he was conducting these autopsies, there was a ‘near war’ situation in Northern Ireland, with shootings every week. In such circumstances, the metallurgical investigation of the composition of bullets was a refinement that he did not undertake. He had felt it neither necessary nor possible to piece together the fragments to determine the nature of the bullet fired.
2.2.4.3 Recent non-identification of metal fragments
Professor Marshall was asked why, in his recent written statement to the Inquiry, he had dismissed Dr McClean’s theory that the particles visible on the x-ray were metal rather than bone. He responded that he now had the benefit of the light box provided by the Tribunal and could confirm that some of the fragments appeared to be metal. However, he stressed that his view remained that the particles in question were too small to be of any use in reaching any conclusions.
2.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
2.3.1 Barney McGuigan’s autopsy report
2.3.1.1 Head wounds caused by high velocity bullets
Professor Marshall said that, in the case of high velocity bullets, the size of the bullet was of little importance; it was the energy of the bullet, and the energy loss on impact that caused the damage. He said that in Mr McGuigan’s case, the bullet had ploughed through the base of the skull, and was thereby slowed down. In that slowing process it lost so much energy that Mr McGuigan’s head had blown up: the base of the skull was almost powdered and blown into the brain. He said that, under those circumstances, it was not surprising that some bits of metal would have come away from the bullet.
He said that he could not say whether the bullet that struck Mr McGuigan had been tampered with in any way, but stated categorically that the severe injuries sustained by Mr McGuigan could equally have been caused by a normal high velocity round. He said that, when a bullet ploughs through the base of the skull, it does not need to be tampered with, as it will explode automatically.
2.3.1.2 Usefulness of metal fragments
Professor Marshall reiterated his belief that the particles in Mr McGuigan’s head were too small to be of use. He dismissed the suggestion that he might have been able to piece the fragments together in order to analyse the striation marks and determine which firearm had fired the bullet.
3. David Edmonds’ evidence
Mr Edmonds joined the RUC in 1956 and was a serving member of the force at the time of Bloody Sunday, based in Dunmurray. He was part of a police group tasked with the job of patrolling the junction of Magazine Street Upper and Society Street, with the aim of keeping spectators back from the walls. Sergeant Hartop was in charge of the patrol, which included Mr Edmonds and Constables Conroy, McVicker, White, McGinty and Hamilton.
3.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
3.1.1 City Walls
Mr Edmonds was stationed near the Walker Monument and was responsible for patrolling the Walls and Magazine Street. His position was next to a small army base on the Walls, manned by the Royal Artillery Regiment, and he could hear what the soldiers were saying to one another.
3.1.2 Sound of gunfire
As the march entered William Street, Mr Edmonds heard the sound of automatic gunfire. He was confident that his police training had equipped him to distinguish the sound of automatic fire and did not think that he could have confused the sound with that of a helicopter flying overhead.
Immediately after the burst of automatic fire, Mr Edmonds heard five or six rifle shots, spaced out over a period of a few minutes. He told the Inquiry that the soldiers in the army base had not commented on the sound of gunfire.
He confirmed that this was the only gunfire he had heard on the day and that he had not heard the sound of blast bombs or nail bombs whilst stationed on the Walls.
3.1.3 Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore
Once the gunfire had subsided, Mr Edmonds looked over the Walls down into the Bogside, using army binoculars, and saw Bernadette Devlin standing on a platform at Free Derry Corner. He then turned his gaze towards the Rossville Flats, where he saw two bodies (those of Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore) lying at the southern end of Block 1. He said that he had concentrated on the two bodies, and had not focused on the rubble barricade or on Glenfada Park.
As he looked at the bodies, he saw an army Pig (armoured personnel carrier) approaching. A journalist then picked up a civil rights banner lying near by, wiped it in blood and laid it over one of the bodies for a photograph. Two priests then knelt down beside the body.
Mr Edmonds was shown a series of photographs which showed that it was a civilian, Hugh Kelly, who had covered the body of Hugh Gilmore with a banner. However, Mr Edmonds remained adamant that he had seen the photographer dip the banner in blood and place it over the body.
3.1.4 Soldier INQ 1043
Soldier INQ 1043 was stationed near the same army observation post on the Walls on Bloody Sunday. In his statement to the Inquiry, he says that he saw the crowd at Free Derry Corner part to clear a line of sight. He then heard the loud crack from an Armalite rifle and said that the bullet hit the Walls just below him. Soldier INQ 1043 goes on to say that an army sniper on the Walls shouted ‘smoke—sniper’, before returning fire down into the Bogside.
Mr Edmonds said that he heard no incoming fire at all on Bloody Sunday and that there had been no army fire from the area in which he had been stationed on the Walls. He added that, had a sniper fired towards the Walls, the officer in charge of the Royal Artillery would have informed him and his colleagues of it. As it was, the officer had not appeared in any way alarmed throughout the course of the day.
3.1.5 Mr Hamilton’s evidence
Mr Edmonds was also shown an extract from a statement made to the Inquiry by his colleague, Mr Hamilton, in which Mr Hamilton said that the army had advised RUC officers on the Walls to take cover as they thought a sniper was operating from the Rossville Flats. Once again, Mr Edmonds was clear that he had received no such warning and that, had such a warning been given to any of his colleagues, he would have expected it to have been passed on to him.
3.1.6 Incident report
Shortly after the day’s events, Mr Edmonds wrote an incident report, detailing what he had seen and heard on Bloody Sunday. He presumed that he would have been asked to do so by Sergeant Hartop, but said that he would not have run it by the Sergeant prior to submitting it.
3.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
3.2.1 Incident report
Mr Edmonds told the Inquiry that, to the best of his recollection, he had written the report the day after Bloody Sunday. He said that he would not have discussed the day’s events with his colleagues on the evening of Bloody Sunday as they travelled back together to Dunmurray Station.
3.2.2 Sound of gunfire
Despite the fact that, by the time the parade reached William Street, the army had fired at least five high velocity shots, Mr Edmonds remained adamant that the first shots he had heard had been automatic gunfire, as opposed to single shots fired in rapid succession. He also repeated that he did not hear any of the rounds of rubber bullets fired, nor the recognised 108 rounds of high velocity rounds fired by the army on the day.
3.2.3 Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore
Despite the photographic evidence to the contrary, Mr Edmonds remained adamant that he had seen a photographer dip a civil rights banner in blood, for purely propagandist purposes. He said that it was an image that stuck in his mind, as he could not believe that a photographer could have stooped so low.
3.2.4 City Walls
Mr Edmonds estimated that he had remained on the Walls for approximately thirty minutes to an hour after seeing the bodies of Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore. He said that, throughout his time on the Walls, he had heard ‘several soldiers’ saying that they could not find a target, i.e., somebody with a gun or nail bomb.
4. Samuel Simpson’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr Simpson was an RUC sergeant, based at Victoria Station in Derry. His evidence to the Tribunal focused primarily on his contemporaneous police report. He was screened from the families and wounded and from the public.
4.1 questions on behalf of the Tribunal
4.1.1 Role on Bloody Sunday
Mr Simpson and his colleagues from Victoria Station, Sergeant Falkingham and Constables Moore, Johnson, Kirk and Ballantine, were detailed for duty on William Street by Chief Inspector Ming. Mr Simpson was the officer in charge of the party stationed at Barrier 14 with the brief of identifying those taking part in the illegal parade and taking care of any prisoners arrested by the army. He could not recall being told that the army planned to conduct an arrest operation on the day.
He said that they were not told to focus on any particular type of person (e.g., organisers or stewards), but were merely told to identify people they knew taking part in the march. He presumed that this information would have been used for prosecution purposes, given the illegal status of the march. As it transpired, he did not see anybody he recognised, but thought that some of his colleagues did recognise people, as they had been stationed in Derry for longer than him. In actual fact, it was pointed out to Mr Simpson that none of his colleagues had made any note in their contemporaneous reports of people they recognised.
After the main events of the day, Mr Simpson and his party were withdrawn from William Street and returned to Victoria Station for reserve duty. They were later detailed for mobile patrol duty in the Victoria Street area which ended at midnight.
4.1.2 Barrier 14
Mr Simpson said that, as the crowd approached Barrier 14, missiles had been thrown at Inspector Junkan who was addressing the crowd through a loudspeaker. The army responded with water canon. It was also Mr Simpson’s belief that CS gas had been thrown by the demonstrators, as no order had been given to put on gas masks. This belief had been corroborated by the army when they told him later on the day that one or two canisters had been thrown by the crowd.
4.1.3 Sound of gunfire
Mr Simpson wrote in his contemporaneous report that he had heard a long burst of a machine-gun, followed by several single shots, shortly after the paratroopers entered Chamberlain Street. Despite the fact that he no longer had any independent recollection of having heard these noises, and despite the fact that video footage of the day does not record the sound of machine gun fire, Mr Simpson was adamant that he would not have recorded it in his report had it not been accurate. However, he acknowledged that he might have mistaken the sound of rapid rifle fire with that of an automatic weapon.
Later in the day, when he and his colleagues had felt it safe to venture into Rossville Street, Mr Simpson heard two high velocity shots, fired towards the paratroopers. He had heard no sound of gunfire in the time between the first burst of what he had thought was automatic fire and these shots, and thought that this might have been due to the presence of a helicopter hovering above his position. These two shots were also the last gunfire sounds he heard on the day, and he made no record on the day of having heard nail bombs or blast bombs at all.
4.1.4 Police report
Mr Simpson wrote a police report o 5th February 1972, detailing what he had seen and heard on Bloody Sunday. He told the Inquiry that, although it was not established procedure to write such reports following civil disturbances, it was not out of the ordinary.
He said that he would have known by that stage of the number of civilian casualties and also would have been aware of the allegations being made against the army. He could not recall either conducting or receiving a debriefing and could not recall whether he would have discussed the day’s events with his colleagues prior to writing his report.
4.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
4.2.1 Sound of gunfire
4.2.1.1 Limited amount of gunfire heard
Mr Simpson agreed that the gunfire he had heard on the day, i.e., one burst of automatic gunfire, directed at the army, and seven high velocity shots, that might have come from the army, could not account for 13 dead and 14 wounded civilians. However, he was adamant that he had recorded all that he had heard on the day, and that he had not discussed the matter with his colleagues to ensure a uniform version of events.
He agreed that up until the point when he heard the burst of automatic machine-gun fire, the sound of the helicopter had not been impeding his ability to hear what was going on. However, he had not heard the five high velocity shots fired by the army across William Street, prior to the army’s entry into the Bogside.
4.2.1.2 Sound of machine-gun fire
Mr Simpson was told that Soldier INQ 160 had informed the Inquiry that, although he had initially said that he had heard machine-gun fire, this was not true. Soldier INQ 160 said that the suggestion of machine-gun fire had been received like a process of osmosis among the soldiers: since it was unbelievable that the army might have fired without justification, it became part of the common mythology within the security forces that they had been fired upon first. Mr Simpson responded that he recorded in his report what he had himself heard on the day, rather than anything that he might have gleaned from conversations with colleagues.
4.2.1.3 Two shots fired towards the army
Towards the end of the afternoon, when Mr Simpson had moved into Rossville Street, he heard two gunshots, fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats at the army. Counsel told him that Soldier F corroborated this evidence, in that he also heard two shots fired at him from the Rossville Flats. However, Soldier F also said that he returned fire. Mr Simpson had no recollection hearing the eight shots fired by Soldier F or the one shot fired by Soldier G at this stage in the day, but agreed that the helicopter would not have been impeding his hearing at this point.
4.2.2 Army helicopter
Mr Simpson’s police report records: ‘I saw a group of paratroopers run into Chamberlain Street and shortly after this I heard a long burst of machine-gun fire and several single shots. At this time an army helicopter came over our position and hovered around. This drowned all other noises in the area’. Counsel suggested that if the army helicopter had come over his position at the same time as the troops entered Chamberlain Street, he could not have heard the sound of fire. Mr Simpson responded that what he had meant by ‘at this time’ was in fact ‘shortly after’.
Mr Simpson also told the Inquiry that he did not believe that he could have confused the sound of the helicopter with that of machine-gun fire.
4.2.3 Experience of civil rights marches
Mr Simpson said that he had policed a few civil rights marches prior to Bloody Sunday and that he had no recollection of ever hearing gunfire directed at the army or police on such marches prior to Bloody Sunday.
5. Samuel Ballantine’s evidence
Mr Ballantine was a serving member of the RUC, based at Victoria Station at the time of Bloody Sunday. He was briefed for duty around lunchtime on Bloody Sunday with Sergeants Simpson and Falkingham and Constables Moore, Johnston and Kirk, and was stationed at Barrier 14 with the order to identify people taking part in the march.
5.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
5.1.1 Police report
Mr Ballantine’s report is dated 9th February 1972 and represents the last report written by officers based at Victoria police station. He said that it constituted the first written record of his recollection of the events of the day, although added that he would have made a note of his duties on the day in his notebook. He could not remember being given any instruction as to what he should put in his report, and did not think that he would have discussed the day’s events with his colleagues prior to writing his report, stating that it would not have been usual for him to have had informal discussions with his fellow officers.
5.1.2 Barrier 14
In his police report, Mr Ballantine described the mood of the crowd at Barrier 14 as being ‘vicious’ and that the army had been under ‘serious pressure’. He said that the difference between this and other riots that he had policed was the sheer volume of people and of missiles being thrown.
He saw the water canon being deployed against the rioters, but had no recollection of CS gas in the air. Prior to the troops’ entry into the Bogside, the only shots he had heard were rubber bullets. He could not recall any orders being given to the Paras to enter the Bogside, nor could he recall seeing or hearing the army personnel carriers which entered the area through Barrier 12.
5.1.3 Sound of gunfire
5.1.3.1 Automatic fire
As the troops entered Chamberlain Street, Mr Ballantine heard a burst of automatic fire, which constituted the first sound of gunfire that he heard on the day. He did not see the Paras’ reaction to the gunfire as they had moved out of sight at this stage.
Since he had only ever heard the sound of a machine-gun under training conditions, it was put to him that he might mistaken the sound of numerous rifles being fired at the same time for that of a machine-gun. Mr Ballantine dismissed this suggestion.
5.1.3.2 Two high velocity shots
As Mr Ballantine moved to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, he heard two high velocity shots. Although he could not tell from which direction they had been fired, he assumed that they were civilian fire as he took cover behind an army lorry with Sergeant Simpson.
5.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
5.2.1 Police report
Mr Ballantine told the Inquiry that, to the best of his recollection, he would have made his report from brief notes made in his notebook on the evening of Bloody Sunday or shortly thereafter. He rejected the suggestion that he might have also included information gleaned from his colleagues, or even that he would have discussed the matter with them.
It was put to Mr Ballantine that, despite army and video evidence which would appear to cast doubt on his version of events, he had produced a very similar report to that of Sergeant Simpson, in terms of chronology of events and indeed the nature and number of shots heard. He responded that, since they had been together, it would be natural for them to have seen and heard the same things. He denied the suggestion that police officers ever conferred to ensure that they produced corroborating reports.
5.2.2 Sound of gunfire
5.2.2.1 Limited amount of gunfire heard
Mr Ballantine agreed that the gunfire he had heard on the day could not account for 27 persons either killed or injured. He had not heard any of the 108 rounds fired by the army, nor had he heard the 51 rubber bullets fired by the army on the waste ground between Eden Place and William Street.
5.2.2.2 Automatic gunfire
Since the video recordings of the day do not record the sound of machine-gun fire as the troops enter Chamberlain Street, Counsel suggested to Mr Ballantine that he must have been mistaken in his recollection. He was also told that, very shortly after the troops had entered the Bogside, Soldier N had fired three shots from the direction of Eden Place across Chamberlain Street, and was asked whether he could have mistaken these shots for the sound of a burst of machine-gun fire. Mr Ballantine did not think that he had been mistaken in his recollection.
He agreed with Counsel that, as a police officer, he would hold as unthinkable that suggestion that the security forces could have shot 27 civilians, killing 13 of them, without good reason. It was therefore put to him that he would have automatically construed the first gunfire he heard as civilian fire, as he would not have believed that the army would have fired first. Mr Ballantine responded that he was clear that he had heard machine-gun fire shortly after the troops entered the Bogside. However, he also agreed that the troops in Rossville Street (who do not indicate having heard machine-gun fire at this time) would have been in a better position to determine whether or not there had been automatic fire at this stage in the day.
5.2.2.3 Two high velocity shots
Approximately 10 to 15 minutes after hearing the automatic fire (time gauged by Counsel, due to Mr Ballantine’s record of having seen 15 to 20 prisoners being escorted into Little James Street prior to hearing the shots), Mr Ballantine moved to the junction of Rossville Street and William Street, he heard two high velocity rounds.
Mr Ballantine was played a portion of a video which shows the arrestees being escorted by the army and records a series of between five and eight shots. He was also told of Soldier F’s evidence, in which he admits to having fired at least seven shots at this particular time. Counsel said that, despite there being no evidence of an isolated two shots being fired at this stage, Mr Ballantine, Sergeant Simpson and Constable Falkingham had all recorded hearing only two shots. Mr Ballantine again denied that this would have resulted from consultations or discussions between him and his colleagues as to what had happened on the day, and said that he had recorded two shots because he had heard only two shots.
6. James penney’s evidence
Mr Penney joined the RUC in 1967 and was based in Downpatrick, County Down, at the time of Bloody Sunday.
6.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
6.1.1 Experience of civil rights marches
Mr Penney had policed parades prior to Bloody Sunday, both in Derry and elsewhere in Northern Ireland. He had never experienced civil rights marches being used as a cover for the IRA, but added that this suggestion was put forward in the media of the day and by William Craig, the Minister of Home Affairs. However, on Counsel’s suggestion, Mr Penney went on to say that William Craig and the media had merely said that the civil rights parades were full of republicans.
6.1.2 Abiding memory of Bloody Sunday
Mr Penney told the Inquiry that his recollections of the events of Bloody Sunday were no longer very clear, and that his abiding memory of the day was that a colleague had been taken ill and had died two weeks later from a heart attack.
6.1.3 Role on Bloody Sunday
Mr Penney had been detailed for duty in the Diamond, along with one inspector, four sergeants and 24 constables. His brief was to keep rival factions apart on the day. He was stationed at the corner of Shipquay Street and the Diamond.
6.1.4 Sound of nail bombs
In his contemporaneous police report, Mr Penney describes hearing the march approaching what he presumed to be one of the army barriers and people shouting at the top of their voices. Shortly after, he reports hearing the sound of three nail bombs exploding. Mr Penney no longer has any recollection of hearing these bombs and agreed that he may have mistaken the sound for that of a rubber bullet or CS gas gun.
He then heard the army respond with CS gas, followed by rubber bullets.
6.1.5 Sound of gunfire
6.1.5.1 Automatic gunfire
Shortly after, Mr Penney heard two or three bursts from a Thompson machine-gun, followed by two single shots from the same weapon. He told the Inquiry that he was sure that it had been a Thompson machine-gun due to the sound and pitch of the shots, and that he would not have mistaken the sound for that of several SLR (self loading rifle) shots or helicopter blades. He had assumed at the time that the IRA had ambushed an army vehicle in the Bogside, but was unsure whether or not the troops had entered the area at that stage.
6.1.5.2 High velocity gunfire
Mr Penney then heard the sound of high velocity gunfire, which he presumed came from the army, followed by sporadic gunfire, lasting throughout the evening until approximately 5:30 pm. He was surprised when told by Counsel for the Inquiry that at least 103 live rounds and 50 rubber bullets had been fired by the army during the course of the afternoon, and said he would have put the figure a lot lower from his recollection.
6.1.6 Police report
Mr Penney believed that he had been asked to write his report by the Police Inspector at Downpatrick, and confirmed that it had been based on memory as opposed to any notes made on the day. He said that the force sent to Derry on Bloody Sunday had been a disparate one, made up from stations all over County Down, so he could not have conferred with his colleagues prior to writing his report.
The only other officer from his station present was Sergeant Walker, whose report also records hearing a Thompson machine-gun. However, Mr Penney told the Inquiry that neither of them would have seen the other’s report.
6.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
6.2.1 Sound of gunfire
6.2.1.1 Automatic gunfire
In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Penney said that, when he heard the sound of a Thompson submachine-gun (TSMG), he initially thought that a police or army vehicle had been ambushed, as the TSMG was a weapon used by the IRA at the time.
6.2.1.2 Limited amount of gunfire heard
Mr Penney told the Inquiry that he had been shocked to find out on 31st January 1972 that 13 people had been killed and 14 injured, as he did not think that the shooting he had heard would have accounted for such a high number of casualties. He also added that it had never occurred to him that the firing had been directly connected with the march.
6.2.1.3 Sporadic gunfire
After hearing the initial bursts from a TSMG, Mr Penney heard sporadic gunfire until approximately 5:30 pm, involving a TSMG and higher velocity weapons. He did not hear the bulk of the army shooting which took place over a short period of 10 to 15 minutes.
6.2.2 Police report
Mr Penney agreed that his statement indicated that the army had first come under fire and that their response had been proportionate and proper, but denied having written his report to justify army claims about the day’s events.
Firstly, Mr Penney’s report had described the sound of three nail bombs being thrown, followed by CS gas and rubber bullet fire from the army. Counsel said that film footage from Barrier 14 demonstrated that no such nail bombs had been thrown and suggested that Mr Penney’s statement was an attempt to present a justification for the army’s use of CS gas and rubber bullets. In light of the film footage, Mr Penney agreed that he might have been mistaken in attributing the noise to nail bombs.
Secondly, the first shots recorded by Mr Penney in his report were those of a TSMG, followed by high velocity fire, which he presumed came from the army. Counsel suggested once again that this was an attempt to describe the army fire as reasonable and justified, and told Mr Penney that there was ample evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that there had been high velocity gunfire earlier in the day. Mr Penney was sure that he had not heard these shots.
Mr Penney denied having had any agenda when writing the report, and also denied any suggestion that his memory might have been faulty at the time.
6.2.3 Radio communications
To the best of Mr Penney’s recollection, the sergeant in his section would have had a pocketfone (high frequency radios, worn in a strap over the shoulder) and at least four other officers, including the four sergeants would have been equipped with Pye Bantams (a different type of radio). He said that, as a matter of routine procedure, all transmissions from the police, both through Pye Bantam and pocketfones, would have been taped.
Mr Mansfield told Mr Penney that the Tribunal has a transcript of the RUC communications on the day, and that there were no reports from any RUC party of nail bombs or machine-gun fire. Mr Penney agreed that the sound of nail bombs and of a machine-gun would have been important matters which he would have expected to be transmitted back to headquarters, but suggested that this matter be taken up with those had actually been in possession of a radio, as he had not been.
6.3 questions on behalf of the soldiers
6.3.1 Police report
Mr Penney said that he had not seen anything on the day that he would have needed to report back to his sergeant, and that all that he could include in his police report was what he had heard. He said that, over the course of the Troubles, he had policed over 1,000 marches, and that the sound of nail bombs and machine-guns would have been highly unusual and would have stuck in his mind as such.
6.3.2 Officer Samuel McGonigle’s police report
Mr Penney was read out the evidence of Mr McGonigle, an officer who had been positioned approximately 200 yards from Mr Penney on Bloody Sunday. Mr McGonigle’s report also mentioned the sound of three explosions, followed by two long bursts of automatic fire, and Mr Penney agreed that he appeared to be talking about the same events that he himself had recorded in his police report.
6.4 further questions on behalf of the inquiry
6.4.1 RUC operational order for Bloody Sunday
Mr Penney was able to clarify some of the details contained within the RUC operational order for Bloody Sunday, especially with regard to the different RUC divisions on duty.
He explained that:
· J Division was from near Lurgan and Portadown
· L Division was from Fermanagh
· N Division was from Derry
· O Division was from Tyrone
· P Division was from Antrim
· R Division was from near Lisburn
· S Division was RUC headquarters
He added that these divisions had since been changed.
Mr Penney was also able to explain that SPG stood for Special Patrol Group, a group of officers trained in riot control.
7. Frederick Emerson’s evidence
Mr Emerson was part of G Division of the RUC and was stationed in Bangor at the time of Bloody Sunday. His unit was based at the observation post on Butcher Street, at the junction with the Diamond. He gave his evidence to the Inquiry, screened from the view of the families and wounded and of the public.
7.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
7.1.1 Riot at Butcher’s Gate
Mr Emerson was not aware of any riot at Butcher’s Gate, involving several hundred people, as described by Constable Hamilton, an officer positioned in Upper Magazine Street.
7.1.2 Sound of blast bombs
Mr Emerson told the Inquiry that he had distinctly heard the sound of blast bombs from the direction of the Rossville Flats at some stage of the afternoon, over a period of three or four minutes. However, he acknowledged that he might have mistaken the sound for that of CS gas or rubber bullet guns, as he could not actually see what was happening.
7.1.3 Sound of gunfire
7.1.3.1 Automatic gunfire
In his contemporaneous police report, Mr Emerson recorded hearing a burst of automatic gunfire at approximately 4:00 pm, followed by a further burst of automatic fire, this time from a TSMG, at approximately 4:20 pm, from the top of the Rossville Flats. However, he did not recall the first burst of fire in his statement to the Inquiry.
7.1.3.2 High velocity fire
After the second burst of fire, Mr Emerson heard some sharp cracks which he said could have come from an SLR (self-loading rifle). To the best of his recollection, this constituted the entirety of the gunfire he had heard on the day, saying that his position in Butcher Street, coupled with the noise of the helicopters, might have prevented him from hearing anything else.
7.1.4 Experience of civil rights marches
In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Emerson wrote that he had not been surprised to hear IRA fire, as it was not the first time that the security forces would have been fired upon at a march. However, under cross-examination, he admitted that he was not aware of any occurrence prior to Bloody Sunday when the security forces had come under fire during a civil rights march.
7.1.5 Body on Rossville Street
At some stage in the afternoon, before hearing the burst from a TSMG, Mr Emerson went to use the toilet at the church hall, near the Walker Monument. On the way back, he looked over the Walls and saw a body lying in Rossville Street. He could no longer recall the exact position of the body.
7.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
7.2.1 Police report
7.2.1.1 Timing of the report
Mr Emerson’s police report is undated, but it was his belief that he had made at least a handwritten note of his experiences upon his return to his station on the eve of Bloody Sunday. However, it would appear from the statement made by Inspector Davidson, the senior officer in Mr Emerson’s party, that his division in fact remained on duty in the Diamond until 10:00 pm that evening, meaning that they would have arrived back in Bangor at midnight at the earliest. Since his patrol in the Diamond had in fact been uneventful, Counsel queried whether he would have written his report that evening in the station, or whether in fact he would have waited until instructed to do so by a senior officer, in light of the establishment of the Widgery Inquiry.
He responded that, to the best of his belief, he wrote the report that evening, as he was due to attend a course for two weeks, beginning the next day, and would have been anxious to write his report before departing.
7.2.1.2 Conformity in reports
Mr Emerson did not believe that he would have discussed the day’s events with his colleague, Sergeant Laird, on their return to Bangor. However, Counsel pointed out to him the striking similarities between his report and that of Sergeant Laird (both reports give an approximate time of 4:00 pm for the first burst of automatic fire, both are non-specific in terms of what they meant by ‘automatic fire’, and both men appear to have gone to the church hall at approximately the same time).
7.2.2 Sound of gunfire
He could no longer recall why he had not given any further details about the first burst of automatic fire he had heard, but presumed that it had also been from a TSMG, and he agreed that he had merely guessed its provenance as being from the top of the Rossville Flats.
He said that the few high velocity shots he had heard could have been army fire, but confirmed that he had not heard anywhere near 103 high velocity shots during the afternoon.
He agreed that the sound of gunfire recorded in his contemporaneous report would tend to suggest that the army had only fired after the two bursts of automatic gunfire, justifying the army’s actions on the day, but added that he had not been seeking to justify any version of events, but merely to record the events as he had perceived them on the day.
8. Mr Hamilton’s evidence
At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr Hamilton was an RUC constable based at Lisburn Road Station in Belfast, and was drafted into Derry to police the march. He had never been to Derry before.
8.1 questions on behalf of the tribunal
8.1.1 Magazine Street Upper
Mr Hamilton was positioned near an army observation post on Magazine Street Upper, parallel to the city Walls. He was close enough so as to be able to overhear the soldiers’ conversations.
8.1.2 Sound of a nail bomb
At approximately 2:30 pm, he overheard the soldiers saying that the march had begun and was heading towards the Brandywell. Shortly after this, he heard the sound of a nail bomb exploding. He was sure that he had not mistaken the sound for that of a CS gas or rubber bullet gun.
8.1.3 Disturbance at Butcher’s Gate
Mr Hamilton saw a number of people break away from the bulk of the march, and run towards Butcher’s Gate, throwing stones and missiles at the security forces.
8.1.4 Sound of gunfire
Shortly before he overheard reports of a crowd attacking Barrier 14, Mr Hamilton heard the sound of firing from an automatic weapon, followed by several single shots from what he described as a ‘different kind of weapon’. He could not recall the soldiers in the observation post reacting to these sounds in any way.
As the crowd began to attack Barrier 14, Mr Hamilton and his fellow RUC officers were advised by the army to take cover, as a gunman was believed to be operating from the top floor of the Rossville Flats. He therefore returned to street level on Magazine Street Upper.
Whilst he was at street level, he heard sporadic bursts of automatic fire and the sound of rubber bullets being fired, and was told that the Paras were trying to disperse the crowd. He told the Inquiry that he did not know who was shooting, but was sure that it was automatic fire and not single SLR shots, fired in rapid succession.
8.1.5 Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore
After the shooting had died down, Mr Hamilton went back on to the Walls, and looked over them, down into the Bogside. He saw the bodies of two people, lying on the ground at the corner of the Rossville Flats. He identified a photograph of Barney McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore’s bodies as resembling the scene he had witnessed.
8.1.6 Police report
On 10th February 1972, Mr Hamilton wrote a report of what he had seen and heard on the day, at the request of the station sergeant in Lisburn Road.
8.2 questions on behalf of the families and wounded
8.2.1 Police report
Mr Hamilton confirmed that he had written his police report from memory on 10th February, as he had not made any notes on the day nor written a manuscript version of the report prior to typing it up. He agreed that he had not taken any particular note of the time of different occurrences on the day, as nothing momentous had happened in his immediate area, and he had been unaware, at the time, that so many people had been killed and injured.
He said that he had received no debriefing and had not conferred with anyone prior to writing his report.
8.2.2 Sound of gunfire
Mr Hamilton had twice looked over the city Walls, towards the beginning of the march. The first time, he had seen the march at the top of the Bogside on Lone Moor Road, and the second time, he had seen a group of a few hundred people walking down Rossville Street, towards Barrier 14, some of whom broke away and began stoning the security forces at Butcher’s Gate (this could not have been the main march, as the route of the march took it up Rossville Street, away from Barrier 14).
As the crowd was making its way towards Barrier 14, past the Rossville Flats, Mr Hamilton heard the sound of firing from an automatic weapon and some single shots. He was not sure whether it was high velocity or low velocity fire, but was sure that it was not the sound of several semi-automatic weapons being discharged at the same time. This occurred at the same time as the riot at Barrier 14.
8.2.3 Sergeant Hartop’s police report
Sergeant Hartop was the officer in charge of Mr Hamilton’s group. Since his report is markedly devoid of any references to nail bomb explosions or automatic fire and since Mr Hartop told the Inquiry that he had heard neither, Counsel suggested to Mr Hamilton that he had been mistaken in his recollection. He responded that he had not been mistaken in any way, and had not spoken about the events with any other RUC source prior to writing his report.
SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS
Monday 13th: Inquiry did not sit
Tuesday 14th: Paragraphs 1 and 2
Wednesday 15th: Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5
Thursday 16th: Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
