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11 - 15 MARCH 2002
This week, the Inquiry heard evidence from Major Adrian Stickley who helped to transcribe the tapes of army transmissions made by Mr James Porter on Bloody Sunday.
Sean Collins witnessed the shootings in the Rossville Flats car park from the balcony of his family flat in Block 3 of the Flats. He told the Inquiry that he saw soldiers shooting towards Jackie Duddy and Father Daly, and that he saw an army vehicle attempting to run down a middle-aged man.
John Taylor MP, now Lord Kilclooney, told the Inquiry of his roles and responsibilities as a member of the Northern Ireland Joint Security Committee at the time of Bloody Sunday. He underscored his belief that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, the Westminster Government, not Stormont, was responsible for the army in practical terms.
OTHER ISSUESLord Saville announced that the Tribunal would relocate to Westminster Central Hall, beginning proceedings in its new location on 2nd September 2002 in order to comply with the court ruling that the soldiers should not be compelled to testify in Derry.
In addition, Christopher Clarke QC announced that the Inquiry has yet to hear the evidence of approximately 70 to 100 civilian witnesses.
The Tribunal adjourned for the Easter Vacation. Proceedings will resume on Wednesday 24th April.
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Major Stickley served in the Royal Artillery Regiment from 1961 to 1977, but was never posted to Northern Ireland. His mother was a cousin of Gerald McKinney, killed on Bloody Sunday. He helped to transcribe the transmissions of army communications on Bloody Sunday, provided by Mr James Porter to British Irish Rights Watch.
1.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL
1.1.1 First conversation with Major INQ 1025 on 12 August 1992
When Major Stickley began work on the army transmission tapes, he paid a visit to the Royal Artillery Institution in Woolwich in order to read the Historical Report of the 22 Light Regiment of the Royal Artillery, which was involved in the army operations on Bloody Sunday, and to find out which officers had been involved on the day. While at the library, he was approached by a man known to the Inquiry as Major INQ 1025 who spoke with him about Bloody Sunday.
1.1.1.1 Captain 406
He told him that the man known to the Inquiry as Captain 406 had been the Operations Officer for the 22 Light Regiment on Bloody Sunday. Major Stickley had been a young officer with Captain 406 and later recognised his voice on the tapes as call sign Alpha.
1.1.1.2 Authorship of Historical Report
Major INQ 1025 also told him that he had written the Historical Report and that he had written it so that it was in line with the official army view of events on Bloody Sunday.
1.1.1.3 Colonel Ferguson
Major INQ 1025 told him that General Ford had castigated Colonel Ferguson early in the day for not sending in D Company of the First Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (1 Para) and that General Ford had wanted Colonel Ferguson to go in and 'sort them out', but that Colonel Ferguson had stood his ground as he had not received any orders to enter the Bogside from brigade headquarters.
He said that Colonel Ferguson had then sent him to find the Commanding Officer (CO) of D Company. He had found the command Pig (armoured personnel carrier) in Waterloo Place, but it transpired that this was the command for C Company, not D Company. He said that he had no idea up until that time that the whole of 1 Para was in force in Derry that day. It had been his belief that only one sub-unit of the battalion, D Company, was to be involved.
Major INQ 1025 said that the result of the confusion was that Colonel Ferguson never briefed D Company on the arrest operation.
1.1.1.4 Captain 028 operating undercover
Major INQ 1025 also told Major Stickley that the man known to the Inquiry as Captain 028 had been Battery Captain with 53 Battery in Derry on Bloody Sunday. He told him that Captain 028 had had a Daily Express pass and had pretended to be a pressman, spending a portion of the day on the other side of the army barriers. In his statement, Major Stickley said that Captain 028 had been acting as an undercover Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) on Bloody Sunday, although he could not remember whether this was something he had surmised or something that he had been told specifically by Major INQ 1025.
1.1.1.5 Level of rioting
Major INQ 1025 also told him that the hooligan element on Bloody Sunday had been judged no more severe than was usual for a Saturday afternoon at Aggro Corner (junction of William Street and Rossville Street).
1.1.2 Second conversation with Major INQ 1025
Major Stickley said that, when he called Major INQ 1025 a couple of days after meeting him in the library, his tone had changed and he appeared irritated and defensive. It was Major Stickley's belief that he had been reprimanded for speaking with him too freely on 12th August. On this occasion, Major INQ 1025 also denied that the whole of 1 Para had been in Derry, saying that B Company had remained in Belfast and also denied that he had said that the hooligan element was no greater than usual for Derry.
1.1.3 Conclusions reached about the events of Bloody Sunday
Major Stickley reached a number of conclusions about the events of Bloody Sunday, based on conversations, the recordings of army transmissions and the Historical Report. Counsel for the Tribunal took him through a number of these conclusions, asking him for further clarification where necessary.
1.1.3.1 Arrest force
According to Major Stickley, the Brigade Major and Brigade Headquarters would have held the erroneous belief on Bloody Sunday that D Company of 1 Para was the sub-unit that entered through Barrier 14 to conduct the scoop up operation. However, he agreed that he had drawn this conclusion through reading the Historical Report, which was written after the events, and that Brigade Headquarters might well have been better informed on the day.
Major Stickley also highlighted the fact that the arrest operation was originally assigned to a sub-unit (D Company, 1 Para) under the command of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment. There is no record of an order given to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment to stand down from this role on the day, and Major Stickley said that if D Company had been removed from the command of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment, an order should have been given to that effect.
Major Stickley believed that he learned that the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment had originally been assigned the role of arrest force from Major INQ 1025, as this information does not figure in the Historical Report. However, the Inquiry is in possession of the Brigade Operation Order for Bloody Sunday which might suggest that both the Brigade Headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, would have known all along that the arrest operation had been assigned to 1 Para and not to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment or any sub-unit under its command.
Due to the lack of clarity surrounding the issue, Counsel for the Inquiry said that they would take the matter up in more detail with the officers who were there on the day.
1.1.3.2 Order to remove army barriers
Major Stickley also highlighted the fact that no order was given to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment to remove the army barriers, only a 'request' made by 1 Para, which did not come through the appropriate channel (he explained that the army was operating a directed net on the day, whereby all signal communications should have gone through call sign 'Zero', which was the control station. However, all stations on the net could have heard all transmissions: the difference between a directed net and an undirected net being purely one of discipline as opposed to technology or equipment).
1.1.3.3 Entry of paratroopers into the Bogside
Major Stickley said that the Brigade Log recorded the Brigade Major giving the order for only one sub-unit of 1 Para to enter the Bogside, and that the Brigade Major had subsequently acted as if only one sub-unit had in fact entered the area. The Brigade Major subsequently claimed to have given the order for more than one sub-unit to enter the Bogside, but this supposed order does not appear in the army Brigade Log. Indeed, neither of the orders feature in the recordings or army transmissions made by Mr Porter on Bloody Sunday.
Furthermore, following his conversation with Brigadier MacClellan, it was Major Stickley's belief that the Brigade Major did not have the authority to give the order for more than one sub-unit to enter the Bogside. According to what Brigadier MacClellan had told him, the Brigade Commander had reserved the authority to send in troops for himself, and had intended to act only after he had received information from an observer in an army helicopter.
1.1.4 Telephone conversation with Brigadier MacClellan
Major Stickley spoke with Brigadier MacClellan by telephone in August 1997. He said that Brigadier MacClellan had been reluctant to speak, as he was afraid that what he said might be used as propaganda for Sinn Fein.
Brigadier MacClellan also made some comment to the effect of "when the Paras came in it was 70:30 rather than 30:70". Major Stickley understood this reference to '70:30' to mean that he had only intended to use one company from 1 Para for the arrest operation on Bloody Sunday, but that several companies had in fact gone in.
Major Stickley confirmed that this was merely his own interpretation of a cryptic comment made by Brigadier MacClellan. He had not sought to press the Brigadier on this, or other issues, as he was not accustomed to conducting interviews and was afraid that interviewees might hang up if pushed too much. It was therefore his general rule of thumb to let the interviewees do the talking.
1.1.5 Conversation with Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan
Major Stickley spoke with Chief Superintendent Lagan by telephone in October 1997. The latter told him that he had made himself a promise not to discuss the events of Bloody Sunday with the press. However, he did tell him that he was sure that Brigadier MacClellan had not given the orders for the Paras to enter the Bogside.
Major Stickley also asked him about a rumour he had heard a short while before about a plain-clothes marksman, positioned in Walker's Column on the Walls, being taken away by helicopter. However, Chief Superintendent Lagan had never heard the rumour, and it is Major Stickley's belief that it is very far-fetched.
1.1.6 Conversation with Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) 028
Major Stickley's notes of the conversation he had with Captain 028 in November 1997 record the fact that he had been very cagey and that he had said that he was not allowed to talk about the events. The Captain is also recorded as expressing frustration at the fact that people could not let the matter lie after 25 years.
1.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS
1.2.1 Army background
Major Stickley confirmed that he retired from the army as Major in 1977, that he had never commanded a gun regiment or a battery and that he had never served in Northern Ireland. Although he had never been a signals officer, he had attended signals courses and had become very familiar with army radios, having been a helicopter pilot.
1.2.2 Meeting with James Porter
Major Stickley confirmed that he had met Mr Porter at his house in October 1997, having previously received the tapes made by Mr Porter of the army transmissions on Bloody Sunday from British Irish Rights Watch.
Although Mr Porter told the Inquiry that Major Stickley had confirmed that the AR43 radio transmitter would have been the type of equipment used by the army on Bloody Sunday, Major Stickley denied having made such an assertion, as he himself was relatively unfamiliar with such equipment.
1.2.3 Directed net
Major Stickley reiterated that, to the best of his belief, the Brigade Net in use on Bloody Sunday was a directed net, meaning that all messages had to go through call sign 'Zero'. He told the Inquiry that he had come to this conclusion following his study of a signals manual which he requested from the Royal School of Signals in Blandford, England. He said that, although the different units obviously spoke to one another directly on the day, they should not have done so, as all communication should have gone through 'Zero'.
1.2.4 Telephone conversation Brigadier MacClellan
Major Stickley told the Inquiry that, during his telephone conversation with Brigadier MacClellan, the latter had told him that separation between the marchers and the rioters had not taken place. However, it is Brigadier MacClellan's evidence to the Inquiry that he only launched the arrest operation when he had been led to understand that separation had in fact taken place.
It was suggested to Major Stickley that the '70:30' reference made by Brigadier MacClellan did not mean that more Paras went into the Bogside than expected, but rather that it was a reference to the sectarian make-up of Derry and Belfast. Indeed, in his statement to the Inquiry, Brigadier MacClellan makes specific reference to the make-up of Derry which was 70 per cent Catholic and 30 per cent Protestant, the opposite of Belfast which, at the time, was 30 per cent Catholic and 70 per cent Protestant. However, Major Stickley did not feel that this was a valid interpretation of the comment as Brigadier MacClellan had been talking about the Paras at the time he made the reference to 70:30.
1.2.5 Conclusions reached about the events of Bloody Sunday
It is Major Stickley's belief that, on Bloody Sunday, General Ford pressurised Colonel Wilford to go into the Bogside to conduct an arrest operation which had not yet been authorised by the Brigade Commander.
2. SEAN COLLINS'S EVIDENCEMr Collins was 10 on Bloody Sunday and lived on the top floor of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats, from where he watched the Paras enter the car park.
2.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL
2.1.1 Sound of gunfire
Mr Collins heard two or three sharp cracks of gunfire as the march came into Rossville Street, after which people began to run.
2.1.2 Interview with Tony Parker
In 1992, Mr Collins was approached by an author named Tony Parker who was interested in speaking with people about the events of Bloody Sunday. He could not recall whether Tony Parker had used a tape-recorder, but believed that there were a significant number of inaccuracies in the final statement put together by the author.
2.1.3 Bald man being chased by Pig into Rossville Flats car park
As Mr Collins looked out of the bedroom window of his flat, he saw a bald man running across the waste ground in the direction of the Rossville Flats car park. The man was being chased by a Pig that appeared to be attempting to run him down. The man ran out of Mr Collins's line of sight, so he did not see what happened to him, but he saw the back end of the Pig stop to the back of the Chamberlain Street houses. He thought it might have crashed into them.
2.1.2 Milk bottle thrown from flats
Mr Collins noticed a second Pig appear around the northeast corner of Block 1 of the flats. The back door opened and two soldiers got out and stood between the Pig and Block 1. He then saw a milk bottle smash down near where the soldiers were standing. He thought that it was an empty bottle, and, on further questioning by Counsel for the Tribunal, said that in all the time he lived in the Rossville Flats, he had never seen bottles of acid being thrown down at soldiers, although did recall other incidents of empty bottles being thrown.
As soon as the bottle hit the front of the Pig, both soldiers assumed the firing position and pointed their rifles up towards the upper floors of Block 1. As they did this, he heard the sound of at least two shots.
2.1.3 Jackie Duddy
Mr Collins then noticed a young man running southwest across the car park towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the flats. The man looked back and appeared to stumble slightly. Mr Collins then saw a third soldier at the other side of the Pig fire at least one shot towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2.
Mr Collins was then distracted by the sight of a group of people sheltering behind a low wall to the northeast of Block 2. He had a vague recollection of one man falling over the wall, but did not known whether he had lost his footing or whether he had been shot.
When he looked back to where the young man was running, all he could see was a body on the ground. He was sure that it was the body of the man he has seen running moments earlier, who was later identified to him as Jackie Duddy.
2.1.4 Father Daly
He then saw Father Daly, who was his family's priest, trying to run out from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 towards the body of Jackie Duddy. He had a recollection of him waving a handkerchief. However, each time he tried to move towards the body, the same soldier who had shot Jackie Duddy appeared to shoot at him. He described the soldier as being right-handed and heard or saw at least four shots fired in the direction of the priest.
Mr Collins now does not understand how the soldier did not hit Father Daly, if he was the target of the shots, but did not see any other likely targets in the area.
He recalled being very upset and angry at the prospect of the family priest being shot dead.
2.1.5 Account of shooting in statement made to Mr Tony Parker
In his statement to Mr Parker, Mr Collins is recorded as saying that he saw six soldiers get out of the Pig, assume the firing position and shoot steadily at the crowd. He told the Tribunal that this was not his recollection and that he had only seen the three soldiers previously mentioned.
2.1.6 Shooting at Mr Collins's family flat
Mr Collins recalled everybody in his flat ducking for cover as the same soldier who had fired at Jackie Duddy raised his rifle and appeared to point it at the flat. As he ducked for cover, he heard one shot, and assumed it had been fired towards the flat. However, as far as he recalled, no bullet mark was ever found near the flat which was on the top floor of Block 3.
2.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS
2.2.1 Snipers and bombers in the Rossville Flats
Mr Collins lived in Block 3 of the Rossville Flats for approximately four years before 1972 and four or five years after the events. He told the Inquiry that in all the time he lived in the flats, he had never seen or heard snipers firing from the Flats towards police or army targets. He also said that he had never seen or heard acid bombs or nail bombs being thrown from the flats.
When asked whether he could actually make the difference between a milk bottle filled with acid and an empty milk bottle, Mr Collins said that, as a child, he had thrown empty bottles off the balcony of the flats for fun, and associated the sound he heard on Bloody Sunday with that made by the empty milk bottles.
2.2.2 Knowledge of IRA weapons
He said that, as a child, he would pass an IRA checkpoint at the Bogside Inn on his way to school. The people manning the checkpoint had a carbine, a .303 rifle and a Thompson gun. However, he had never heard where these arms were stored.
2.2.3 Father Daly
Mr Collins confirmed that, as far as he could remember, the shots fired at Father Daly were fired at ground level. He reiterated that this is what subsequently led him to believe that the soldier could not have actually been targeting Father Daly, as he would have hit his target from such a short distance.
2.2.4 Shooting at Mr Collins's family flat
It was suggested to Mr Collins that the soldier he had seen aim his rifle at the family flat had only been looking down the sight of his rifle for potential danger. Although Mr Collins did not actually see the soldier shoot, as he had ducked down, he believed that the sound of the gun shot matched the action of the soldier aiming his rifle at his flat.
3. LORD KILCLOONEY'S EVIDENCELord Kilclooney is John Taylor, Ulster Unionist MP. At the Time of Bloody Sunday he was Unionist MP for South Tyrone and Minister of State at Home Affairs at the time of Bloody Sunday (not to be confused with Minister of State for Home Affairs, i.e., the Northern Ireland equivalent of Secretary of State).
3.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL
3.1.1 Roles and responsibilities at the time of Bloody Sunday
As Minister of State at Home Affairs, Lord Kilclooney was responsible for all Home Office matters relating to Northern Ireland, with the exception of security and policing. The latter areas fell under the responsibility of Brian Faulkner, who was both Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs in the Stormont Government.
However, as Cabinet minister within the Home Office, he was appointed to the Joint Security Committee (JSC) by Brian Faulkner, and as such was involved in policing and security issues.
Lord Kilclooney was appointed to the JSC for two reasons, the first being that the Prime Minister felt him to be a very able chairman, and it was to be his role to chair the meetings in the Prime Minister's absence. He said that the second reason for his appointment was constitutional: although the Northern Ireland Government, as opposed to Westminster, was responsible at that time for security in Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner was conscious of the moves by Westminster to take control of security and therefore wanted to maintain a Northern Ireland Government minister in the chair of the JSC.
3.1.2 Formulation of Stormont's security policy
3.1.2.1 Brian Faulkner
Lord Kilclooney said that, as both Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, Brian Faulkner had prime responsibility for security and policing matters.
3.1.2.2 Government Security Unit
He said that Brian Faulkner also had some form of security advisory committee at Stormont Castle, of which Mr Stout was a prominent member. This tallies with an undated document in the possession of the Inquiry, which describes a Government Security Unit (GSU), set up under the Security Advisor (Mr Stout), with the responsibility for police administration, information and security planning.
The GSU Unit formed part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, based in Stormont Castle. Lord Kilclooney explained that he was based in the Home Affairs Department in the Parliament buildings and, as such, was not aware of what was happening in the GSU.
3.1.2.3 Joint Security Committee
Mr Faulkner would also discuss security and policing issues at the weekly JSC meetings, which were attended by the General Officer Commanding the Army (GOC) and the Chief Constable of the RUC.
3.1.3 Intelligence reports
Lord Kilclooney said that, in terms of security documentation, all he had access to were the peripheral documents like minutes and agendas for the JSC meetings. He told the Inquiry that he was not privy to the Special Branch or army intelligence reports.
However, the Inquiry is in possession of a number of documents, indicating that regular Special Branch security assessments were provided to the JSC and were commented on during the course of the meetings. Mr Kilclooney could not confirm or deny whether such reports were in fact distributed prior to the JSC meetings.
He was informed by Mr Clarke QC, that the Tribunal had been unable to discover any primary intelligence material suggesting that the IRA intended to take advantage of the march on Bloody Sunday. Lord Kilclooney could not recall any specific intelligence report, but said that there was the strong belief within the JSC that the IRA would take advantage of the march.
3.1.4 Composition of the Joint Security Committee
At the time of Bloody Sunday, the JSC was composed of Brian Faulkner, John Taylor (Lord Kilclooney), Oliver Wright (the UK Representative sent over by Westminster), Ken Bloomfield, Graham Shillington (RUC Chief Constable), Mr Black, Tom Cromey, David Gilliland and General Tuzo (GOC).
3.1.5 Role of the Joint Security Committee
Lord Kilclooney was unable to provide an accurate definition of the JSC's remit, but described its function as the exchange of ideas and views between politicians and the RUC Chief Constable, supported by the GOC.
3.1.5.1 Responsibility for operational matters
He said that the JSC did not make decisions in relation to the role of the army or the police. Any such operational matters were entirely left to the GOC and the RUC Chief Constable. He further clarified that the RUC was the primary security force, and that the decision to bring in the army to help with any given situation would have been one for the Chief Constable.
He also added that any decision to launch an arrest operation would be entirely the responsibility of the RUC or the army, and said that, on Bloody Sunday, the decision to launch the arrest operation would almost certainly have emanated from the army on the ground. It would also have been for the RUC to exercise their own judgement as to whether people arrested at any particular march should be detained or let go. Lord Kilclooney reiterated that such topics would not have been one for the JSC to discuss.
3.1.5.2 Responsibility for strategy matters
Lord Kilclooney agreed with the description of the role of the JSC and of both the Westminster and Stormont governments in relation to the army, as provided by Brian Faulkner in his first address to the JSC as Prime Minister in which he stated that: "the method of achieving objectives should rightly be the prerogative of the GOC, but the definition of his objectives, the constraints within which they should be achieved and the target time for completion are surely political decisions and as such should involve both governments."
However, he added that there was always the underlying understanding in the JSC that, at the end of the day, the army was answerable to Westminster, which therefore retained overall control. Although the JSC would seek as much influence as possible, the GOC was answerable to London. He also said that it was his personal impression at the time that he, and other Northern Ireland politicians and the RUC, were not being given the full picture of what was going on by the army or by Westminster.
3.1.6 Speech of 25th June 1971
The Inquiry is in possession of a political summary compiled by the British Home Office, which refers to a speech made by Lord Kilclooney at the unfurling of a new Orange banner in West Tyrone. Lord Kilclooney is reported as saying that "if the present strength of the British Army and UDR fail to defeat the IRA militarily, the Northern Ireland Government would take further and appropriate action to ensure victory."
Lord Kilclooney agreed that his speech was reported accurately and said that there was a great sense of unease amongst the people of Northern Ireland, based on the belief that the security policies were not working and that there was a need for a greater number of military personnel on the ground in order to defeat the IRA.
He said that his speech had not been calling for a new form of security force, but for an increase in the number of security personnel under the control of the Northern Ireland Government. The refusal by Westminster to increase the security presence in Northern Ireland had been the key driving factor behind the resignation of Major Chichester-Clark, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister who preceded Brian Faulkner.
3.1.7 Introduction of internment in August 1971
Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that he had been on his holidays when internment had been introduced in 1971, and had no idea before he left that it was going to be introduced at all. Although he and the general Unionist community had been calling for the introduction of internment, it was not a matter for the Government of Northern Ireland, and ministers would therefore never have discussed when to introduce it. He said that it would have been entirely a matter for Brian Faulkner as Minister for Home Affairs, who would have taken the decision personally and privately.
Lord Kilclooney dismissed as totally inaccurate a British Home Office political summary, recording Mr Faulkner as saying that it was for the JSC to recommend internment.
Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that internment had not proved as effective as it might have been due to its reliance on poor intelligence and due to the fact that many people had anticipated the introduction of interment and had escaped across the border. He said that the inadequacy of the intelligence available was further compounded by the fact that the RUC Special Branch and the army did not share intelligence, and that the army was very suspicious of the RUC's intelligence information.
Lord Kilclooney also admitted that the reaction against internment was greater than he had expected.
3.1.8 Pressure on the army to use greater force
Although it was Lord Kilclooney's belief that the Northern Ireland Cabinet rarely, if ever, discussed security issues, the Inquiry is in possession of minutes of meetings between Northern Ireland ministers and the GOC. In these meetings, the ministers appear to be pressing the army to fight back against law-breakers with greater force.
Lord Kilclooney said that there was a lot of criticism of the army for allowing the existence of no-go areas in Northern Ireland, and that ministers were unhappy with the army's decision to maintain the status quo.
3.1.8.1 'Shoot to kill'
An RTE radio interview of July 1971 reported Lord Kilclooney as saying: "as for the shooting in Derry, it may be necessary for the Security Forces to take an even firmer line with rioters. I would defend without hesitation the action taken by the army authorities in Derry against subversives during the past week or so when it was necessary to shoot to kill. I feel that it may be necessary to shoot even more in the forthcoming months in Northern Ireland."
Lord Kilclooney was reminded that his interview, reported verbatim in a number of contemporaneous press reports, had taken place in the same month of the shooting dead, in contested circumstances, of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie. However, he vigorously denied that he was in any way advocating a 'shoot to kill' policy and explained that what he had meant was that, as the IRA became more active, using more firearms and threatening the lives of army personnel, it would be necessary for the army to shoot back.
3.1.8.2 No-go areas in Derry
From the minutes of the JSC meeting of 2nd September 1971, it appears that the GOC had taken the decision not to enter the Bogside and Creggan by force. The GOC did not agree that the areas were actual no-go areas, as the army could and would enter the areas whenever necessary. However, the GOC had met with community leaders and 'moderates' in the area and agreed upon a new tactic of lowering the military profile in these areas in the hope that moderate opinion would prevail and that the situation would ameliorate. It was the GOC's opinion that the time was not ripe to increase military offensives in the area.
Lord Kilclooney said that both he and the Prime Minister had disagreed with the GOC's tactical decision, and he had made a speech at approximately this time advocating a 'third force' for Northern Ireland.
3.1.9 Lord Kilclooney's call for a 'third force'
Lord Kilclooney addressed his constituency saying that "a third force" had his support and that he was gratified that "young men loyal to the Crown were preparing a register of names who would be available to serve Ulster if called upon by the legal and properly constituted authority." Lord Kilclooney explained that there was a growing feeling that the army was not protecting the people of Northern Ireland adequately, and that, if London would not provide adequate manpower to deal with the IRA, it would be necessary for the Northern Ireland Government to provide increased manpower itself.
He said that he in no way intended his speech to prompt any loyalist backlash against the IRA, saying that this was exactly what his speech was trying to avoid.
3.1.10 Appropriate means and authority to deal with stone-throwers
At the same time, Lord Kilclooney is recorded as saying that it was regrettable that the authorities had not yet given the troops the "appropriate means and authority to deal effectively with incidents such as stone throwing."
Lord Kilclooney denied that this was a veiled suggestion that the Yellow Card should be wholly revised or discarded and said that he had meant that the army should have been allowed to arrest people who were throwing stones. When it was pointed out that the army already had this power at the time he made the speech, Lord Kilclooney said that, whilst this might have been the case, the army was not being given the full encouragement by those in charge to arrest people.
Lord Kilclooney did not place any significance in the fact that his comments had created an outcry, saying that the Irish nationalist press often blew things out of proportion and that there were always a lot of outcries in Northern Ireland politics, referring to the current outcry concerning David Trimble's reference to the Republic of Ireland as a "pathetic, mono-cultural, mono-ethnic, sectarian state".
3.1.11 Prioritisation of trouble areas in Northern Ireland
The Inquiry is in possession of a written record of discussions between the English and Northern Irish Prime Ministers and other British ministers regarding the security situation in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State for Defence (Lord Carrington) is recorded as agreeing to provide a further three battalions to Northern Ireland. The prioritisation of tasks was to deal first with Belfast, second with the border areas, and thirdly with Derry.
Although he was not present at the meeting, Lord Kilclooney explained that Derry would have been placed last in the order of priorities as it was the most difficult situation, not because it was the easiest to deal with.
3.1.12 Strategy for Derry in December 1971
A memo of a discussion between the GOC, senior army officers and the UK Home Secretary, Reginald Maulding, records that the army felt they had to choose between two opposing strategies. The first was to accept that the Creggan and Bogside were no-go areas for the army and the second was to mount a major operation, which would take ten days, require seven battalions and which would involve shooting at unarmed civilians. The army was in favour of maintaining the status quo, a decision supported by the UK Home Secretary.
Lord Kilclooney confirmed that he had not had access to this information at the time, and that he had never heard speak of shooting unarmed civilians.
3.1.13 NICRA
Lord Kilclooney did not consider NICRA to be a genuine civil rights organisation and believed that it had been infiltrated by what he termed the republican movement and that it was being used as a front for the IRA. These beliefs were based on information provided to the JSC and also on his knowledge that two places on NICRA's executive committee were reserved for members of the Official Republican movement. He had also seen Thomas MacGiola, whom he identified as an Official IRA member, taking part in a NICRA march in Dungannon.
Lord Kilclooney agreed to attempt to locate the specific JSC meeting minutes suggesting that the IRA had infiltrated NICRA and were using the marches as cover for their activities.
3.1.14 Marches used as cover for IRA
Although Lord Kilclooney had seen no arms on the march he witnessed at Dungannon, and although he could not recall specific incidents of the IRA using marches as cover, he said that it was the accepted view of the Northern Ireland Government that IRA gunmen did use the marches as cover. He did not agree that this accepted view could have been based on a false premise, as it emanated from advice from the security services in Northern Ireland. However, he continued that, as a minister, he would have accepted the view of the intelligence agencies and would not have inquired as to whether or not it might have been faulty.
He was also told that, according to the evidence of Dr Robert Ramsey, private secretary to Brian Faulkner at the time of Bloody Sunday, the Prime Minister had received an informal warning from a personal friend in the police force, to the effect that the IRA was planning a 'spectacular' under the cloak of the march. Lord Kilclooney said he had not heard of this specific warning, but added that everybody was expecting the IRA to be involved.
3.1.15 Derry-based Strand Traders Association
3.1.15.1 Meeting with the Northern Ireland Government
The Strand Traders Association (STA) was a group of commercial people, based predominantly in the William Street area of Derry. They met with representatives of the Northern Ireland Government to express their concern over the level of violent activity in the William Street area an the damage that this was doing to business interests in the area. Although Lord Kilclooney did not meet with them personally and had no recollection of their meeting with the Government, details of this meeting appear in the minutes of the JSC meeting of 6th January 1972.
3.1.15.2 Meeting with the GOC
Following the meeting between the STA and representatives from the Government, the GOC undertook to discuss the situation in Derry with the STA. The Inquiry is in possession of a memo by General Ford, summarising his discussions with the group. It records that the STA wanted, as a minimum, the Rossville Flats to be cleared and the Bogside and Creggan occupied by the army. They also wanted curfews and shootings on sight introduced.
General Ford went on to say: "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders amongst the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans) after clear warnings have been issued."
Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that he had never heard the suggestion that the DYH should be shot, and that the suggestion had never been approved or implemented.
3.1.15.3 Subsequent JSC meeting of 13 January 1972
The minutes of the JSC meeting immediately following the meetings with the STA state that "the GOC indicated that following a meeting with businessmen in Londonderry, certain measures were in mind with a view to putting down the troublesome hooligan element there. It was a very difficult situation to solve within the law."
Lord Kilclooney could shed no light on the 'certain measures in mind', and added that, from his personal knowledge of the GOC, General Tuzo, he was convinced that he would not have done anything outside the law. He said that there was no discussion at the JSC meeting of General Ford's suggestion to shoot selected ringleaders, even after a warning, as to do so would have been outside the parameters of the Yellow Card.
3.1.16 Airgram from US Consul in Belfast to US Department of State
The Tribunal is also in possession of an airgram sent from the US Consul on 18th January 1972. It describes a meeting between the reporting officer and representatives from the Stormont Government, and says that: "to 'keep Westminster at bay', the (Northern Ireland) Government is 'hoping for a major military victory in the near future' ".
Lord Kilclooney was not present at the meeting, but said that there was no particular military victory in people's minds at that time.
3.1.17 'No trouble' anticipated for Bloody Sunday march
The Inquiry showed Lord Kilclooney a Special Branch security assessment which contained the following text: "NICRA-sponsored anti-internment march from Creggan to Guildhall Square at 2:30 pm. No trouble anticipated." Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that he found this assessment incomprehensible, and could only surmise that it must have referred to the decision by Ian Paisley to call off the loyalist counter-demonstration that he had planned for the Guildhall Square.
However, it was pointed out to Lord Kilclooney that, at the time the assessment was written, the loyalist counter-demonstration had not yet been called, let alone cancelled. He could shed no further light on the comment, as it was his belief that an illegal march would necessarily have provoked trouble of some form.
3.1.18 IRA assurances not to be armed on Bloody Sunday march
Lord Kilclooney said that neither he nor the JSC had heard any evidence to the effect that the IRA had given assurances that they would not be armed on the march. He added that the JSC would have assumed that the IRA would be present, as NICRA had been infiltrated to such an extent by the IRA.
However, Lord Kilclooney also said that he had not seen any specific intelligence relating to the role the IRA might adopt on the day.
3.1.19 March on Magilligan Strand
Despite the in-depth news coverage at the time of the march, Lord Kilclooney had no recollection of the march on Magilligan Strand and no longer recalled that the Paras had been sent in to deal with the marchers.
3.1.20 Tactics to deal with Bloody Sunday march
Lord Kilclooney could not recall whether he had been aware, prior to Bloody Sunday, that the army would conduct a major scoop-operation, in which up to 100 people would be arrested. However, he was sure that he would not have known that the Parachute Regiment would be deployed on the day and said that he would not have seen the operational order given to the troops.
He was shown a memo compiled by a senior official in the MoD on 26 January 1972 stating that: "the choice of tactics for actually dealing with the march is essentially a matter for the JSC, which is due to meet as usual on Thursday morning, 27th January. The MoD and the Home Office are in touch respectively with the GOC and the UK Rep about the line they will be taking at that meeting".
Lord Kilclooney said that the senior officer was mistaken in saying that the tactics for dealing with the march were a matter for the JSC. The JSC would have advised that the march should be stopped, but it would have been left to the security services to determine how they would go about doing that.
3.1.21 Counter-demonstration planned for Bloody Sunday by the DUA
Contemporaneous press cuttings regarding the planned counter-demonstration by the Democratic Unionist Association (DUA) describe the Reverend McClelland as saying that he had received assurances from the government that the march would be halted by force if necessary. Lord Kilclooney could not shed any light on what was meant by the expression 'halted by force' as he had not participated in the meeting in any way and had not been aware of any meeting between the DUA and government representatives.
3.1.22 Press release issued by Brian Faulkner on Bloody Sunday
It would appear from the press release issued by the Northern Ireland Prime Minister in the wake of Bloody Sunday, stating that "the Government knew that the IRA would use such marches wherever possible as a cover for their attacks on the population at large", that the Northern Ireland Government's perception was that the IRA had used the Bloody Sunday march to attack the army. Lord Kilclooney confirmed that this was indeed the perception of the Government.
3.1.23 JSC meeting of 3rd February 1972
Lord Kilclooney could not recall the JSC ever receiving a written report concerning the events of Bloody Sunday, but did say that they had received advice from the security forces that they had come under attack and had returned fire.
3.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED
3.2.1 The civil rights movement
Lord Kilclooney said that it was his belief at the time and is still his belief that the civil rights movement was a new means of attempting to overthrow Northern Ireland and forcing it into a united Ireland: it was seen by him and other unionists as a nationalist plot to overthrow the state. He said that most people on any NICRA march would have been people who wanted a united Ireland, although added that a minority of those involved would have had a genuine concern for civil rights. He said that it was a campaign in which republicans had a leading role.
3.2.2 Contemporaneous criticisms of security policy
3.2.2.1 Disbanding of the B Specials
Lord Kilclooney agreed that he had been opposed to the disbanding of the RUC Special Constabulary (B Specials), which had been called for by Westminster almost in exchange for the deployment of the army in the streets of Northern Ireland. He said that the people of Northern Ireland, both Catholic and unionist, increasingly felt that the security policy was inadequate and that there was a need for a larger security force within Northern Ireland.
3.2.2.2 Advocating a tougher line with rioters
The Inquiry is in possession of the transcript of an interview with John Taylor in 1971. It reads: "we are going to shoot it out with them, it is as simple as that. Women who have been in the forefront of riots will not escape retribution in future… Up to now we have been very gentle in restraining our treatment of women in riots, but there is a stage when you have to become a little more ruthless with them. They will have to be seized by the snatch squads like every one else."
Lord Kilclooney said that he was not advocating shooting at rioters: what his statement was saying was that you had to shoot back at armed terrorists and that you had to snatch people who were breaking the law, namely the ban on parades. He did not agree that this was militant language, but merely factual language.
He said that, although it was his belief that IRA snipers used the cover of riots to target policemen and soldiers, security force officers could not legitimately fire at rioters, as they were not attempting to kill anyone.
3.2.2.3 Hesitancy of the army
Lord Kilclooney was also shown an interview conducted with him by the Belfast Telegraph in March 1971, in which he criticised the army for its hesitancy in dealing with the IRA, specifically in entering certain areas, lifting IRA members and prosecuting them. Lord Kilclooney said that the army's reluctance to conduct such arrest operations was partly due to a lack of manpower and partly due to a possible adverse reaction by 'Sinn Fein supporters', although he had never actually raised this issue directly with contacts in the army or at JSC meetings.
However, a further interview with Lord Kilclooney in the Irish Press in March 1971, suggests that the hesitancy was not due to a lack of manpower, but to a disagreement between Stormont and Westminster on security issues: the latter not wanting to move against the no-go areas in West Belfast, and the former's desire to weed out the IRA.
In this article, Lord Kilclooney is reported as saying that, in the final analysis, it would be up to Stormont to decide whether or not to move against the no-go areas. However, he now clarified that, although Stormont retained the constitutional responsibility for security at that time, in practice, the army was taking its instructions from Westminster.
3.2.2.4 Need to protect the constitutional status of Northern Ireland
In the same Irish Press article, Lord Kilclooney is reported as saying that "if there was a constitutional crisis which affected the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, one would be prepared to go to the hilt" to protect its status. He explained that he had meant that he would have used every democratic facility to influence the British Government to do everything possible to underline Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom.
The article quoted Lord Kilclooney saying that "it has taken one quarter of the British Army to maintain peace in Belfast where the IRA are operating in small areas. If direct rule was introduced, the revolutionary action would be so extreme that not even the whole of the British Army could control it." Lord Kilclooney denied that this was a veiled threat to the British Government that unionists would revolt if direct rule were imposed and said that he was speaking of an IRA revolt.
3.2.2.5 Resignation threats
Lord Kilclooney agreed that he had threatened to resign on a number of occasions due to his opposition to the army policy of containment of IRA terrorism as opposed to bringing such activities to a complete end.
3.2.3 'Shoot to kill'
3.2.3.1 July 1971 interview with Lord Kilclooney
Lord Kilclooney was further questioned about his July 1971 interview in which he defended the actions of the army over the past week during which they had shot to kill and had stated that it would be necessary for the army to shoot more over the coming months.
He could not recall whether the incidences of shooting to kill had related to the deaths of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie, who had been shot by the army in the week preceding the interview, and could not remember these deaths. He was informed that they were controversial deaths and that the local community had claimed that both men had been unarmed when they were shot. Indeed, the SDLP declined to participate further in the Stormont Government due to the Government's refusal to hold an inquiry into the deaths.
Lord Kilclooney's comments had provoked outrage at the time, as they had been interpreted as meaning that it would be necessary for the army to shoot more unarmed people. However, he rejected this interpretation of his comments and said that he always stated clearly his belief that the security forces should only ever operate within the constraints of the Yellow Card.
3.2.3.2 April 1971 meeting
Lord Kilclooney was also read information provided by Lord Carver to Mr Pringle and Mr Jacobson, members of the Sunday Times Insight Team for their book Those Are Real Bullets, Aren't They? The extract describes a meeting between Brian Faulkner and representatives from the London Government, including Lord Carver and Lord Halisham, the then Lord Chancellor. It describes Lord Carver resisting calls for soldiers to engage in activities that would put them outside the law and records Lord Halisham's suggestion that anyone obstructing the Armed Forces in the course of their duty was ipso facto an enemy of the Crown, and could justifiably be shot dead, whether or not soldiers were under attack themselves. Crucially, Lord Carver intimated that Brian Faulkner had seized upon Lord Halisham's suggestion.
Lord Kilclooney reiterated that he had never heard any view discussed within the JSC or the government that rioters should be shot.
3.2.4 Yellow Card
Lord Kilclooney was shown the minutes of a meeting held at Stormont on 12th March 1971, which he attended, along with the GOC. The minutes read that the Prime Minister "thought that the statement that the army would not hesitate to open fire when attacked by petrol bombers, which had been made at Westminster the previous evening by Mr Ian Gilmore, Minister of State for Defence, was a step in the right direction." The minute went on to suggest that the army had been operating under such a policy for some time.
Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that he was very surprised by these comments, as they clearly were advocating action that would be in contravention of the Yellow Card. He said that he had never advocated that soldiers should go beyond the boundaries of the Yellow Card and had never heard soldiers or officials within the army bemoaning the fact that they were too constrained by the Yellow Card.
He also said he had not heard of suggestions that the Yellow Card could in fact be obviated, without stepping outside the Law. He personally had always been happy with the Yellow Card and considered its tight restrictions to be justified.
3.2.5 Re-establishing the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland
Lord Kilclooney could no longer remember the exact Government strategy for dealing with the established no-go areas in Derry. However, he said that the plan would be, firstly, to move out the terrorists from the given area so that it would be safe for the police to move in, and secondly, to dismantle the barricades.
Lord Kilclooney had only a vague memory of the Falls Road curfew in June 1970, when a 48-hour curfew was imposed by the army and four civilians were shot dead and did not agree that it was the first attempt that the army had made at re-establishing the rule of law in no-go areas on Northern Ireland.
Lord Kilclooney also had no recollection of Operation Motorman which took place in July 1972, which brought about the entry of the army into all no-go areas, the installation of military observation posts and the introduction of regular army patrols. He said that his lack of knowledge of the operation was partially due to the fact that he had been in hospital in February 1972 following an attempt on his life, and also due to the introduction of direct rule, which meant that security matters were no longer part of his brief.
3.2.6 Contact with Brian Faulkner
Lord Kilclooney stated that he had little opportunity to discuss security matters directly with Brian Faulkner. He only met the Prime Minister twice per week, once at the JSC meeting and once at the Cabinet meeting. Aside from those meetings, he had little contact with the Prime Minister.
3.2.7 JSC discussions concerning the Bloody Sunday march
Lord Kilclooney said that, although the JSC did not discuss the strategy to be adopted by the army for dealing with the march, they were aware that it was likely to be one of the most serious disturbances seen in Northern Ireland following a civil rights march, due to the large numbers of marchers expected and to the counter-demonstration planned by Ian Paisley. They were also told that the IRA would take advantage of the march.
He said that the march constituted an act of defiance of the law of the land in the hope that it would bring about a breakdown in law and order and hopefully the abolition of the Northern Ireland Parliament. As such, it would have to be dealt with with the utmost firmness, and the decision was taken to stop the march.
Lord Kilclooney said that on such occasions, Stormont hoped and trusted that unarmed civilians would not be injured. However, in this instance, the army was working under a line of command from London, and Stormont and the JSC had very little input into the strategy adopted.
3.2.8 Counter-demonstration planned for Bloody Sunday by the DUA
Lord Kilclooney reiterated that he was not aware of any approach made by the Stormont Government to the DUA, nor of any deal done in order to get the group to call off their counter-demonstration. It was his belief that the DUA had called off the demonstration, having been made to understand the extent of the burden they would be placing on the security forces.
3.2.9 Lord Kilclooney's call for a 'third force'
He also repeated that, by the expression 'third force' he had been calling for more manpower or for a third force within the context of the legal authority of the land. He said that the young men he spoke about signing up to a register for a potential 'third force' did not sign up to the UDR as the process was far too slow. He explained that there were some difficulties to do with the length of time taken by the army to consider applications. It was assumed that, should some form of 'third force' be established under the remit of the RUC, the application and acceptance procedure would be a lot speedier.
3.2.10 Meeting between the British and Northern Ireland Prime Ministers
The Tribunal is in possession of the report of a meeting between Edward Heath and Brian Faulkner on 4th February 1972. Mr Faulkner is quoted as saying: "in the longer term, it might be the case that the terrible events in Londonderry would be seen to have cleared the air, once the initial hysteria had subsided."
Lord Kilclooney rejected Counsel's interpretation of this comment as implying that the events of Bloody Sunday had been anticipated and were not unwelcome.
He said that, as it transpired, Brian Faulkner was mistaken in his prediction. Far from clearing the air, he said that Bloody Sunday was a victory for nationalism, and, for this reason, on the night of the deaths, nationalists were drinking and celebrating because of what had happened because they knew it would bring about the downfall of the Stormont Government. Lord Kilclooney told the Inquiry that he could provide them with a tape to substantiate these allegations.
3.2.11 Opinion concerning Bloody Sunday
Lord Kilclooney said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, he accepted the word of the army as to why the shootings had occurred, but it was his private belief that it was bad for the Northern Ireland Government that people had been killed on the streets in this way and that it would end in direct rule from London.
He said that, as a minister in government, he had to rely on the advice given to him by the security forces. It was therefore his belief at the time and is still his belief that the 13 people killed on Bloody Sunday were gunmen and bombers.
Counsel suggested to him that, had the people who were killed actually been gunmen and bombers, Bloody Sunday would have in fact represented a considerable defeat over the IRA, as opposed to a setback for the Stormont Government. However, Lord Kilclooney responded that the propaganda message presented in the press was that the people had been unarmed, and it was this propaganda message that people tended to believe.
3.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF NICRA
3.3.1 Army powers under the Special Powers Act
Annexed to the minutes of the JSC meeting of 13th January 1972 is a document entitled 'Measures to control marches, modification of existing procedures', which suggests a number of policy changes to the methods used by the security forces for dealing with banned marches, for the approval of the JSC.
The document states that any arrest operation would normally be conducted by the RUC under the Public Order Act, but that the army would participate if there was any violence (arresting under the Special Powers Act).
Lord Kilclooney was asked whether he had been aware, at the time of approving this policy document, of a case being taken to the High Court by John Hume MP, concerning his arrest and conviction for unlawful assembly, and whether he was aware that his conviction had been quashed, after Bloody Sunday, on the grounds that the armed forces had no power to arrest anybody under the Special Powers Act regulations.
Although Lord Kilclooney had no recollection of this particular case, he assumed that the Home Affairs Office must have taken legal advice when compiling the modified procedures for dealing with marches.
3.3.2 Familiarity with practices for policing banned marches
Lord Kilclooney denied that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, he was familiar with the methods of policing banned marches and of the problems associated therewith. He explained that the JSC only sat for one hour per week, which made him more of an observer in matters of security than an expert.
3.3.3 NICRA
Lord Kilclooney reiterated his belief that NICRA was an organisation infiltrated by Irish republicanism, as demonstrated by its reservation of two places on its executive committee for members of the Official Republican movement, and used as a cover for paramilitaries. Since the Inquiry had not yet heard of the allegation regarding the executive committee places, Lord Kilclooney was asked to supply the Tribunal with the document from where he had gleaned this information.
Counsel also read an extract from the report of the Cameron Commission, set up by the Northern Ireland Government in 1969. The report said that it would be "a grave political and social error to regard the civil rights movement as narrowly sectarian or subversively political." Lord Kilclooney disagreed strongly with this assessment of NICRA, stating that the organisation was 99 per cent pro united Ireland.
3.4 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS
3.4.1 Control over security matters
Lord Kilclooney said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, the army was, in practice, answerable to Westminster. However, the Brian Faulkner felt that it was vital for Stormont to keep overall constitutional responsibility for policing and security, as to concede this to the Westminster Government would have been to deny the Stormont Government of its democratic mandate and its viability.
3.4.2 Dealing with rioters
He was shown documents indicating that Brian Faulkner, in conjunction with General Tuzo and Westminster, was looking at better ways of dealing with riots other than rubber bullets. Alternatives, that would 'engage' ringleaders, without causing loss of life were recommended.
Lord Kilclooney had not seen these documents prior to 2002, and was unable to recall whether Brian Faulkner had discussed these matters with colleagues in the Department of Home Affairs or with the JSC. However, he said that the army had always made it clear that unarmed civilians should not be harmed in any way. This was why he had said in his statement that he was horrified by the suggestion to use a small high velocity weapon, designed for jungle fighting in cities, in Northern Ireland, as this could clearly lead to the killing of unarmed civilians.
In effect, these weapons had never been introduced, but to do so would have required authorisation from the MoD or the GOC.
3.4.3 JSC meeting prior to Bloody Sunday
The minutes of the meeting show the army warning the JSC that the operation to block the Bloody Sunday march 'might well develop into a riot and even a shooting war'. Lord Kilclooney confirmed that this would not have been a surprise prediction, as Derry was effectively the IRA's back yard and the community was supportive of IRA activities. He said that any initiative to begin shooting would have been taken by the paramilitaries, not by the army.
3.4.4 Intelligence concerning presence of IRA on Bloody Sunday march
Lord Kilclooney could not recall hearing about the allegations relating to Martin McGuinness distributing nail bombs at the start of the march, and subsequently retrieving the bulk of them, although he had heard more general intelligence that nail bombs had been used against the army.
3.4.5 NICRA
Lord Kilclooney was shown a Special Branch security assessment, stating that two Official Republican members of the NICRA Executive, Malachy McGurran and William McMillan, were on the run in the Republic of Ireland in January 1972. Although Lord Kilclooney was unable to say whether this was the document which prompted him to believe that two places on the executive body were reserved for Sinn Fein, he told the Inquiry that this document was clear proof of the infiltration of NICRA by republicans.
3.4.6 Decision to halt the Bloody Sunday march
Lord Kilclooney said that the only option open to the security forces was to halt the illegal march, as to allow it to continue would have been unfair, given the continuing ban on all marches, including Orange parades. He said that he had felt that the handling of this march was the last chance for the Stormont Government to prove itself, as a failure to deal adequately with the march would have inevitably led to Direct Rule.
If the British Government took control of law and order, including both the army and the RUC, this would lead to the end of the devolved Stormont Government and therefore to the constitutional guarantee under the 1949 Act that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom.
3.4.7 Size of the RUC in 1972
Lord Kilclooney estimated that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, the RUC comprised approximately 6,000 officers, who were facing over 1,000 IRA members throughout Northern Ireland.
SCHEDULE OF PROCEEDINGS
Wednesday 13th: Paragraphs 1 - 2
Thursday 14th: Paragraphs 3.1 - 3.2
Friday 15th: Paragraphs 3.3 - 3.4
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