BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 53

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4 - 8 MARCH 2002

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

This week, the Tribunal heard evidence from three reporters, one of whom was Michael Starke from the Aldershot News. He told the Tribunal that soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment were suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Patrick Clancy, a reporter for the Daily Telegraph, remained close to Barrier 14 throughout the day's events. John Barry was the editor for the Sunday Times Insight Team and responsible for the majority of the interviews conducted with individual Official and Provisional IRA members.

The Tribunal also heard evidence from Joseph O'Kane, a member of the North Derry Civil Rights Association (CRA) who witnessed the shooting of Barney McGuigan, and from Joseph Lynn who described the brutality inflicted on the arrestees taken to Fort George.

William Breslin, a co-founder of the Derry Labour Party, told the Tribunal that he had seen Martin McGuinness at Free Derry Corner at the time the shooting started and that he had searched Mr McGuinness's car and found no weapons.

Marian McMenamin testified that she had seen a civilian gunman on Rossville Street as the Paratroopers entered the Bogside.

Lawyers for the Tribunal announced that, due to ill health, Superintendent Frank Lagan would not be testifying at any stage before the Tribunal.

The appeal against the Judicial Review ruling concerning the screening of RUC witnesses was due to be heard in the Court of Appeal in Belfast on Friday 8th March. Lawyers for the families and wounded had put forward a motion opposing Lord Justice McCollum and Lord Justice Carswell hearing the appeal, on the grounds that the former represented five of the priests at the Widgery Tribunal, and that the latter had participated in the coroner's Inquest proceedings following Bloody Sunday. Due to an outstanding application for Legal Aid on behalf of Mary Doherty to cover the proceedings, the appeal was adjourned until Monday 15th April.

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Michael Starke was the chief reporter for the Aldershot News, based in Aldershot, in England, dubbed 'home of the British Army' and of the Parachute Regiment. He was not in Derry on Bloody Sunday.

1.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

1.1.1 Specialisation in military matters

The Aldershot News, for which he covered a wide variety of topics, including a number of stories relating to the army. Through his work for the paper, Mr Starke developed an interest in military matters, and following Bloody Sunday, he joined Soldier Magazine, which was the army's in-house magazine, used both for recruitment purposes and to provide general information regarding the army. He remained with Soldier Magazine from 1972 to 1980.

1.1.2 Editors Abroad Scheme

Whilst with the Aldershot News, Mr Starke took advantage of the Editors Abroad Scheme, as a result of which he made four or five visits to various airborne forces units serving in Northern Ireland. Through these visits, he got to know a large number of members of the Parachute Regiment.

His brief was to gain a general picture of military operations, as opposed to reporting on specific incidents. Although the visits were funded by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), he was instructed by his editor not to let this slant his reports in any way.

Mr Starke explained that, during such visits, he would be attached to one or more battalion sub-units and would accompany them on their operations.

1.1.3 Visit to 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment in December 1971

Under the Editors Abroad scheme, Mr Starke was asked to visit the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, stationed at Holywood Barracks near Belfast, in December 1971 in order to write an article for the Aldershot News. He had been told by the Officer in Command (OC) that the role of 1 Para was that of a support battalion which would be called to any incident that was going badly to assist the unit in difficulty. This meant that they were predominantly assigned to trouble spots.

Throughout the duration of his visit he was mainly assigned to Lieutenant N who was in charge of Support Company. During his stay he was present at a number of random vehicle searches. He recalled two incidents involving Lieutenant N which led to his later conclusions that the lieutenant was suffering from PTSD.

1.1.3.1 Order to ram car in central Belfast

Mr Starke and a photographer with the Aldershot News, Jeff Trolley, accompanied Lieutenant N on a sortie in central Belfast to conduct random car checks. The two colleagues were in the back of the Pig (armoured personnel carrier), and the driver of the vehicle (Soldier S) and Lieutenant N were in the front.

Mr Starke said that they had seen a Mercedes, containing two men. He had been told previously that the rule of thumb for the army was that a single person in a car was no threat, two men in a car was worth noting and three or more was suspicious. Mr Starke told the Tribunal that Lieutenant N had said that he did not like the look of the two men in the car and ordered his driver to follow them. The car turned right at traffic lights and Lieutenant N's voice reached 'hysteria pitch' as he ordered the driver to ram the vehicle. No attempt had been made to stop the vehicle in any other way.

Mr Starke said that it appeared that Lieutenant N was very troubled, and Soldier S initially questioned the instructions. However, he proceeded to ram the car and the soldiers went through the motions of a search of the vehicle and sent the men on their way.

Although Soldier S and Lieutenant N deny that the incident took place, Mr Starke was adamant that it had occurred during his December visit. Soldier S also suggested that a Mercedes could have out run a Pig. However, Mr Starke said that the driver of the car made no attempt to get away, as he had not even been told to stop.

1.1.3.2 Drinking ritual

The second incident that Mr Starke brought to the Tribunal's attention occurred in the officers' mess and concerned a drinking ritual involving setting drinks alight. Mr Starke said that it was important as it demonstrated Lieutenant N's detached and manic nature.

1.1.4 Instability caused by change in command

Mr Starke got the impression that there was some instability in the regiment, due to the change of command from Colonel Gray to Colonel Wilford five months previously. He said that Colonel Wilford was less personable than his predecessor and that the soldiers appeared to treat him with more reserve.

He said that the atmosphere in the officers' mess was stretched to breaking point and he later came to the conclusion that 1Para was vulnerable from a morale and command point of view, due to the recent change in command.

1.1.5 Soldiers suffering from PTSD

Mr Starke now believes that the some of the soldiers, including Lieutenant N, were suffering from PTSD. He said that he had discussed the matter with a consultant psychiatrist in the armed forces and that he had confirmed Mr Starke's views as a valid interpretation of what he had seen.

1.1.6 Paratroopers' membership of paramilitary organisations

Mr Starke wrote in his statement that he was aware of a number of former Paras who had become members of paramilitary organisations, although he was not aware of any particular Paras being members of such organisations at the time of Bloody Sunday.

1.1.7 Jimmy McGovern's film 'Bloody Sunday'

Mr Starke confirmed that he had been paid to do background research for Jimmy McGovern's recent film 'Bloody Sunday'. This research covered information such as military uniforms. He also provided information stemming from his December 1971 visit to the 1st Battalion Regiment regarding the behaviour of 'typical' Paratroopers.

1.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED

1.2.1 Lieutenant N

Mr Starke confirmed that, with the benefit of hindsight, it was now apparent to him that Lieutenant N had been exhibiting symptoms of PTSD. He said that Lieutenant N was withdrawn and introverted in a non-stressful situation, and exhibited greater aggression in stressful situations than would be deemed normal. He explained that these were classic symptoms of PTSD.

1.2.2 Order to ram car in central Belfast

Mr Starke said that Lieutenant N's actions on the day were abnormal in his belief, and he assumed that they would have appeared abnormal to others in the company of Lieutenant N. Indeed, Soldier S had queried the order to ram the Mercedes at the time.

1.2.3 Instability caused by change in command

Mr Starke agreed that, in times of changeover, especially when accompanied by a dramatic change of personality in the commanding officer, soldiers would typically look to experienced NCOs, such as Sergeant O, for direction.

1.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

1.3.1 Editors Abroad Scheme

Mr Starke confirmed that he had made a number of visits to various airborne units serving in Northern Ireland as part of the Editors Abroad Scheme, including 1 Para, 2 Para, 3 Para and the Royal Horse Artillery.

1.3.2 Visit to 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment in December 1971

Mr Starke was asked how he had come to make a mistake about the timing of his visit in his original statement to the Tribunal (in which he wrote that he had made the visit in January 1972). Mr Starke explained that he had realised his error when looking at dated photographs taken during his visit. However, since his evidence was primarily focused on his theory regarding PTSD, he did not feel that the error was significant as the time factor is insignificant in terms of PTSD. He denied having deliberately made the error for the purposes of sensationalism.

1.3.3 Colonel Wilford

In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Starke wrote of his meeting with Colonel Wilford during his visit to the Regiment in December 1971. He recalled being surprised at Colonel Wilford telling him that he had originally wanted to become a Church of England vicar, but that he had joined the Paras instead. It was pointed out to Mr Starke that Colonel Wilford is in fact Catholic. Mr Starke admitted to being surprised at this, and said that Colonel Wilford had perhaps said that he had originally wanted to be a man of the cloth.

1.3.4 Instability caused by change in command

Mr Starke agreed that, instead of 'instability', the correct way of phrasing what he had meant was to say that the Battalion was having to come to terms with a different approach in the command structure. He said that, in his experience, there would always be a certain amount of disruption, as the new person would wish to impose his own type of command.

He came to this conclusion through his sorties with the different sub-units of Support Company and through his conversations with officers in the officers' mess. He told the Inquiry that the soldiers were possibly more open with him due to the fact that he was a reporter for their 'home' newspaper.

1.3.5 Order to ram car in central Belfast

Mr Starke said that Lieutenant N had made no attempt or given no order to stop the car prior to telling Soldier S to ram the vehicle. The Pig (armoured personnel carrier) in which he was travelling struck the back of the Mercedes. He said that the occupants of the vehicle appeared shaken but did not make a fuss and drove off after a cursory search of their vehicle.

1.3.6 Reporting on events witnessed

Mr Starke said that the Aldershot News was not a tabloid and therefore not interested in sensationalism. He said that, following visits to Northern Ireland, he would discuss all that he had witnessed with his editor. On this occasion, they had decided not to report on the two incidents Mr Starke referred to in his statement, as the general impression they wanted to get across was that this particular unit of the army appeared to be doing its job to the best of its abilities.

Mr Clancy was a reporter for the Daily Telegraph in London and was sent to Derry as back up for his colleague, Nigel Wade, who was covering the march. Nigel was to accompany the marchers and Mr Clancy was to stay with the army.

2.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

2.1.1 Experience of covering events in Northern Ireland

Mr Clancy said that, at the time of Bloody Sunday, he had two years experience of covering events in Northern Ireland, and had been in Belfast a few weeks previously covering disturbances that had occurred over the new year period. However, he had not covered marches or disturbances in Derry prior to Bloody Sunday.

2.1.2 Barrier 14

Mr Clancy went to Barrier 14 with Brian Cashinella from The Times approximately 30 minutes before the marchers arrived. Mr Clancy's statement to the Widgery Tribunal also mentioned that Martin Brennan of the Irish Independent, Thomas Prentice of the Daily Mail and Harry Arnold of The Sun were also present.

As the marchers arrived, he witnessed a scuffle between stewards and marchers, and then the army came under heavy stone throwing from the demonstrators, to which they responded with rubber bullets and water canon. His Widgery Statement also recorded his noticing CS gas smoke coming from under the canon which had clearly taken the soldiers by surprise as they did not appear to be wearing gas masks.

The crowd retreated, but approximately five minutes later, a smaller crowd reappeared, carrying a corrugated iron shield.

2.1.3 Warning by soldiers of snipers firing from the Rossville Flats

Whilst he was still behind the barrier, Mr Clancy remembered an army captain or officer pointing up to a rooftop on the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street and saying 'watch out' as he believed that there was a sniper on the roof. This was quite a while before Mr Clancy heard firing of any kind and he later discovered from army sources that nobody was ever discovered in the building.

Mr Clancy was told that his recollection matched that of Harry Arnold and Mr Cashinella, who have already testified before the Tribunal, although the latter two remember this warning coming after the soldiers had entered the Bogside.

He said that all of the soldiers he saw gave the impression that they were convinced that there were snipers in the area and that they were going to come under fire.

2.1.4 Soldiers entering the Bogside

Mr Clancy saw between six and eight Saracens going through the barrier. Some soldiers jumped out and followed the vehicles on foot. Mr Clancy decided to follow the Paratroopers to the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street. He believed that he saw at least one Saracen entering Chamberlain Street.

The soldiers on foot started to chase people down William Street and Chamberlain Street. He was not sure whether the people were still throwing missiles.

It was at this time that he thought he heard rifle fire for the first time and he recalled seeing a soldier fire one shot from Chamberlain Street in the direction of the Rossville Flats.

2.1.5 Father Daly

As Mr Clancy moved into Chamberlain Street, he saw a crouched figure crossing the street some distance in front of him waving a white handkerchief. He later found out that this was Father Daly.

2.1.6 Initial army press briefings

Mr Clancy confirmed Mr Jacobson's evidence that members of the press were told at approximately 4:30 that 20 rounds had been fired at the army from the Rossville Flats. He recalled that General Ford, Colonel Wilford and an army press officer had told the press that the first shots fired had been fired at the army, and that the army had returned fire with six live rounds and rubber bullets.

The press was also told that two bodies had been found by the army on the rubble barricade and that a further body, later said to be that of a little girl, had been found in the Rossville Flats in suspicious circumstances. The army spokesperson informed the press that the body had been there for at least two days. The latter information was provided by either General Ford, Colonel Wilford or the third officer in command.

2.1.7 Dead and injured taken across the border

Mr Clancy's original record of the day's events, which he telephoned to his office in London, spoke of unofficial reports of bodies and injured people having been taken across the border to County Donegal where the Irish Army had ambulances waiting. He told the Inquiry that he gleaned this information from colleagues in the press.

His 1972 article stated that the Irish Army had sent eight ambulances to Muff to take wounded people to Letterkenny Hospital. He clarified that he himself had not spoken to the Irish Army, but that this piece of information had almost certainly been added to his report by colleagues in London. He explained that if sub-editors on the paper came across something in another reputable press agency's report which was missing from their own reporter's article, it was common practice to insert this into the article if it added to the story in any way.

He confirmed that he had not heard the rumour directly from locals, but from other members of the press, who themselves almost certainly heard it from some other press agency.

2.1.8 IRA meetings

Mr Clancy also said that the information in his articles relating to both wings of the IRA had come from other press sources, almost certainly the Press Association. He himself had not spoken to anyone within the IRA.

2.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED

2.2.1 January 1972 article

Mr Clancy agreed that his article was a rushed response to try to make sense of the day's events for readers of the paper. He confirmed that the information contained within it had been gleaned from various journalistic sources, in addition to his own investigations. He also agreed that some of the information contained within it, such as the story about the body of a little girl, was later proven to be untrue.

2.2.2 Father Daly

Since any mention of seeing Father Daly was absent from Mr Clancy's original statement, he was asked whether he might have been mistaken in saying that he actually saw the priest. Mr Clancy responded that he had only found out that the figure he had seen carrying a handkerchief was Father Daly at a later stage and could not explain how he had come to leave this information out of his original statement.

2.2.3 Shot fired by soldier in Chamberlain Street

Mr Clancy recalled seeing a soldier go down on one knee, raise a rifle to his shoulder and fire in the direction of the Rossville Flats. This was one of the few shots he heard on the day. He explained that he stayed so close to Barrier 14 as he was aware that his colleague was in the Bogside and would have a better view of what was going on. He remained as close as possible to the army in order to gain additional information from them.

2.2.4 Initial army press briefings

Mr Clancy confirmed that General Ford, Colonel Wilford and a third army officer had addressed the press on Bloody Sunday itself and had told them that 20 rounds had been fired at the army and that the soldiers had returned six rounds.

2.2.5 Brigadier Thompson, military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph

Mr Clancy met up with Brigadier Thompson in the City Hotel on Bloody Sunday. He told the Inquiry that the Brigadier's first words to him had been "they shot well, did they not?" Mr Clancy responded that there were responsible allegations of indiscriminate shooting from the army. Brigadier Thompson's response was: "How could it have been indiscriminate? They got 13."

Mr Clancy told the Inquiry that Brigadier Thompson had spent the day at the army headquarters in Derry. He confirmed that the Brigadier had not told him that he had been in the Bogside at any time during the day.

2.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

2.3.1 Warnings by soldiers

Mr Clancy told the Inquiry that, as Support Company began arrests in the Bogside, he had been warned to get back. He believed that he was being warned about general danger, not live fire specifically. Earlier, as the soldiers had entered the Bogside, he had heard one soldier mention the word 'sniper' in the company of his colleagues and said that he got the impression that the soldiers believed that they were going into a situation where they would come under live fire.

2.3.2 Initial army press briefings

Mr Clancy confirmed that General Ford, Colonel Wilford and a third army officer were all present at Barrier 14 when the press was given a brief initial description of what had happened. He agreed that they had been very vague about the story of the little girl's body, but that they had been clear that two bodies had been found lying beside a heap of rubble (which he later found out was the rubble barricade).

2.3.3 Sharing of information amongst members of the press

Mr Clancy said that all information was being pooled amongst the members of the press at the City Hotel. Nobody was trying to scoop anyone else. He reiterated that he had not attended any IRA press briefings and said that this was almost certainly due to the fact that he was not well known in Derry and did not have sufficient contacts with the IRA.

He believed that he had got the information regarding the IRA press briefings from John Cook of the Press Association. However, he said that Mr Cook had not told him that he had seen photographs of up to 20 bodies in a house in the Bogside.

He did not specifically recall a written statement from the IRA, but said that there was a clear attempt by the IRA to get the message through to journalists that no shots had been fired by them. The attempt to get this information through had intensified due to the evening news bulletins providing reports of gun battles in the area.

2.3.4 Altercation involving television reporter Martin Lewis

Mr Clancy recalled seeing Martin Lewis dealing with an irate group of people, minutes after the news broadcast on the evening of Bloody Sunday. He was told that the people who had accosted Mr Lewis were the O'Kane brothers. Mr Clarke recalled that the people seemed to have taken exception to the slant of the news report, and Mr Lewis was trying to explain why he had broadcast what he had. He said that Mr Lewis had managed to diffuse the situation.

2.3.5 Reporting on allegations concerning IRA gun fire

Mr Clancy agreed that, prior to Martin Lewis's news report, there had been general currency amongst journalists that the IRA had fired at the army, and that this theory gradually lost ground over the following weeks and months. Mr Clancy said it had begun to lose ground as the official numbers of dead and wounded began to emerge, coupled with the fact that there were no injuries on the army side.

He said that he had not at any time felt intimidated in any way about reporting the details that he had gathered concerning IRA gun fire.

2.3.6 IRA meetings

Mr Clancy said that, to the best of his recollection, the information concerning the IRA press briefings had come from the Press Association. He explained that the Press Association would be a key organisation for both the army and the IRA to speak to, as the Press Association would put out the information to all other parts of the media.

Mr O'Kane was a 26-year old teacher on Bloody Sunday. He was also a member of the North Derry Civil Rights Association (CRA). His brother, Finbar O'Kane, was Chairman of the organisation.

3.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

3.1.1 Stewarding of the march

It was Mr O'Kane's belief that the North Derry CRA did not provide any stewards for the march and had had little involvement in the march itself.

3.1.2 Damien Donaghy

Some time before the main shooting, Mr O'Kane saw a group of people around a young teenager who had been shot in the leg, whom he later found out to be Damien Donaghy. He did not see or hear the shot and assumed that it had been some kind of dreadful accident.

3.1.3 Start of the shooting

Mr O'Kane walked past the rubble barricade towards Free Derry Corner before the shooting started. He saw two or three young people at the barricade and thought that they had been throwing stones in the direction of William Street. As the shooting started he saw two of the young boys fall, but he did not know whether they had been shot or whether they had simply dived for cover. He subsequently saw a third young man fall.

He heard Bernadette Devlin shout to the crowd to get down on the ground as the shooting started from the direction of Rossville Street.

3.1.4 Barney McGuigan

Mr O'Kane took shelter near the telephone box at the gable end of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He saw Mr McGuigan going to the assistance of a young teenager who had been wounded and was calling out for help. Mr McGuigan advanced slowly with a handkerchief but did not go very far before he too was shot.

Mr Lynn was 18 on Bloody Sunday and had come to Derry from Strabane to take part in the march.

4.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

4.1.1 Entry of Paratroopers into the Bogside

Mr Lynn heard continuous fire as he ran down Rossville Street away from Barrier 14. He said that it sounded like a number of automatic rifles were being discharged at the same time from behind him. He also saw three Saracens driving down Rossville Street.

4.1.2 Derelict building on west of Rossville Street

Mr Lynn ran into a building on the west side of Rossville Street in an attempt to escape the gunfire. The inside of the building resembled a disused workshop of some description. He climbed up on top of a car inside the building and crouched on top of a wall.

He was followed into the building by a Paratrooper, recognisable as such by his distinct red beret and smock. The Para was white, had black camouflage markings on his face and was not wearing a gas mask. The soldier shouted at Mr Lynn to come down, to which Mr Lynn responded that he was unable to. The soldier then threatened to shoot Mr Lynn. He aimed his SLR (self-loading rifle) at him and fired a shot which passed through his hair. Once again, the soldier shouted at him to get down and fired a second shot.

4.1.3 Lance Corporal 229's evidence

Mr Lynn was told that it is Soldier 229's evidence that he went into the building and saw Mr Lynn in the rafters and ordered him to come down. Soldier 229 then says that he say Private L enter the building, shout at Mr Lynn to get down and fire one warning shot which hit the roof of the building.

Mr Lynn rejected Soldier 229's version of events on a number of counts. Firstly, he had not been in the rafters of the building, but on top of a wall. Secondly, he was adamant that only one soldier had entered the building after him. Thirdly, whereas Soldier 229 described the soldier firing as being in control, it was Mr Lynn's belief that the soldier in question was extremely agitated. Fourthly, there were two shots fired, not just one. And finally, Private L is black, whereas Mr Lynn was convinced that the man who fired at him was white.

4.1.4 Arrest

Mr Lynn jumped down from the wall on to the old car below. He landed on the roof of the car and slipped. The soldier pulled him off the car by the scruff of his neck, took him outside and spread him against a wall in Rossville Street. The soldier in question was the same height as Mr Lynn, give or take a couple of inches either way, and was well built.

As he was standing at the wall, he looked to his left and saw some soldiers on one knee in the firing position. He told the Inquiry that the soldiers appeared out of control and looked like they were enjoying themselves.

4.1.5 Running the gauntlet at Fort George

Mr Lynn was put in a lorry and taken to Fort George. He heard the people who had got out of the lorry ahead of him being hit with batons. He was pulled backwards out of the lorry by the elbows by two soldiers, but managed to land on his feet. A Paratrooper swung his baton at him, but Mr Lynn managed to dodge it.

He ran with everyone else towards an alleyway between rows of wire. He described a line of dogs and soldiers, some of whom were carrying large orange- or yellow-coloured tubes of hydraulic hose. As he ran the gauntlet between the dogs and the soldiers, Mr Lynn received a number or blows to his legs. He said that he could hear from the yelps that people had been bitten by the dogs, which were on very long leads, and he later saw one gentleman whose trouser leg had been torn and bitten by one of the dogs.

As he got to the end of the tunnel, a Para appeared and tried to hit him on the head with his baton. However, Mr Lynn managed to dodge the blow.

Mr Lynn was adamant that the soldiers in question were Paratroopers.

4.1.6 Lance Corporal 229

Mr Lynn and his fellow detainees were brought in to a room. A group of Paras came in and began to pick out the detainees as their arrestees. A small Para, known to the Inquiry as Soldier 229, said that he had arrested Mr Lynn. Mr Lynn said told him that this was not true as the soldier who had arrested him had been taller. Soldier 229's response was to punch him in the stomach, at which point Mr Lynn decided to agree that Soldier 229 had arrested him.

Mr Lynn told the Inquiry that he was absolutely certain that Soldier 229 was not the soldier who arrested him due to his height. Soldier 229 is considerably shorter than him, whereas the soldier who arrested him was approximately the same height as him. Mr Lynn told the Inquiry that a photograph taken of his arrest, which appeared in the republican newspaper An Phoblacht, would clearly show the height of the arresting soldier. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has not yet been able to trace the photograph.

Mr Lynn described being assaulted repeatedly by Soldier 229 as other Paras and plain clothes policemen looked on.

4.1.7 Dennis McLaughlin

Mr Lynn was standing near a young boy of 16 whom he later found out was Dennis McLaughlin. Mr McLaughlin passed out because of the heat of the heaters that the prisoners were pressed up against. Mr McLaughlin asked Soldier 229 for a glass of water and was told to open his mouth. Soldier 229 then proceeded to spit into Mr McLaughlin's mouth.

4.1.8 Processing at Fort George and complaints made to the army and RUC

Mr Lynn was then taken to the RUC on the other side of the room. He said that the officers appeared highly amused by what was happening to the detainees as they took his details. He asked them why Soldier 229 was being allowed to beat up prisoners. The RUC denied all knowledge of the incidents and told Mr Lynn that it would be better for him to let the matter go.

4.1.9 Arrest form

Mr Lynn's arrest form states that he had been throwing stones in Rossville Street. He categorically denied this allegation and added that, had he been throwing stones, he would have no hesitation in admitting to it. He reiterated that Soldier 229 was not his arresting officer, and that he had not seen him prior to his arrival at Fort George.

4.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

4.2.1 Derelict building on west of Rossville Street

Mr Lynn reiterated that he had climbed onto a wall inside the disused building in order to hide. Only one Paratrooper had entered the building after him. This Paratrooper was white and was not wearing a gas mask. The soldier had fired two shots at him, after which he jumped down from the wall onto an old car. He was pulled off the car and taken outside.

4.2.2 Soldier 229's evidence

In addition to saying that it was Private L who fired the shots at Mr Lynn, Soldier 229's statement says that Mr Lynn was handed over to members of Guinness force. Mr Lynn said that this statement was untrue and that the tall soldier who had taken him from the building remained with him until he was put into the lorry and taken to Fort George.

4.2.3 Private L

In his statement to the Widgery Inquiry, Private L said that he had entered a derelict building and had heard some rubble falling from the ceiling. He and another soldier had shouted to the person to come down, and Private L had cocked his weapon. The person had ignored their first shouts, but came down after the third order was made. Mr Lynn said that, due to the discrepancies between the account and what actually happened, this must have been referring to another arrest.

Mr Lynn was then told by Mr Milne, acting for Private L, that Private L had arrested a man who had been hiding in the rafters of a building. However, a number of details do not correspond between the arrest of Mr Lynn and the arrest made by Private L: Private L had no recollection of being assisted by 229 or of firing any shots. It is also Private L's recollection that he arrested a man hiding in a house, not a workshop, next to a fireplace. Private L claims to have been wearing a helmet, whereas Mr Lynn recalls a soldier wearing a beret, and he is even shorter than Soldier 229. In addition, Private L recalled taking his arrestee to a Pig as opposed to a lorry. Furthermore, Private L is not white, and therefore was not wearing camouflage paint.

Mr Lynn was certain that the soldier who arrested him was white. He said that, in the 1970s, it would have been unusual to see a non-white person in Northern Ireland and that, had the soldier not been white, this would have stuck in his mind.

Mr Milne suggested that these factors indicated that either that Mr Lynn was wrong in the evidence he gave or that Private L was in no way involved in his arrest.

4.2.4 Arrest

Whilst Mr Lynn was standing spread-eagled against the wall, a soldier, whom he recognised as an officer due to his tie and well-spoken manner, approached him and asked him if he had been throwing stones. Mr Lynn had responded that he had not been and had shown the officer his hands which were not dirty.

4.2.5 Fort George

Mr Lynn told the Inquiry that the only soldiers he had seen at Fort George had been Paratroopers. He had not heard any of the detainees 'mouthing off' at the army or the RUC, as described in Soldier 229's statement.

4.2.6 Private 229

Mr Lynn confirmed that he had been picked out by Soldier 229 who had remained with him until he was handed over to the RUC. He also said that Soldier 229 was the only soldier who had assaulted him on the day, beating him and causing his hair to be singed by making him stand close to the heaters.

4.2.7 Dennis McLaughlin

Mr Lynn was also told that it was Mr McLaughlin's belief that the soldier who spat in his mouth was taller than him. Mr Lynn said that he was absolutely certain that it was Soldier 229 who spat in Mr McLaughlin's mouth, despite the fact that Soldier 229 would have been shorter than Mr McLaughlin.

On leaving Fort George, Mr Lynn encountered Mr McLaughlin and walked back to his parents' house. He told the Tribunal that he was glad of the encounter, for if he had not met him he would have had to make his own way back to Strabane that night. He believed that Mr McLaughlin was mistaken when he told the Tribunal that his mother had picked him up from Fort George.

Mr Barry was a member of the Sunday Times Insight Team from the mid 1960s, and subsequently became the Team's editor in the mid 1970s.

5.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

5.1.1 Role of the Sunday Times Insight Team

Mr Barry told the Tribunal that he, Mr Pringle, Mr Jacobson and Ms Janmohamed had gone to Derry shortly after Bloody Sunday and had set up office in the City Hotel. Their task was to reconstruct the circumstances that had led to 27 people being shot by the army.

5.1.2 Gathering evidence for the Insight article

5.1.2.1 Army evidence

He said that they had read the interviews conducted by Sunday Times reporters with army officials, including General Kitson and Colonel Tugwell, in the wake of Bloody Sunday and had concluded that they would get no official cooperation from the military. They therefore relied on their attendance at the Widgery Inquiry and on transcripts from these proceedings to obtain army evidence.

5.1.2.2 Civilian evidence

They therefore set out to reconstruct the day's events based on civilian testimony and to compare this with what the army would say at the Widgery Tribunal.

The Team began by sorting the photographs they received into chronological sequence, aided by photographers' contact sheets, and were able to reconstruct a general outline of the shootings that had occurred. They identified three key areas: the Rossville Flats car park, Glenfada Park and Abbey Park. They then obtained statements taken by NICRA and sorted these according to the three locations mentioned above, interviewed these witnesses and attempted to collate their accounts.

They also took the photographs around the Bogside, asking people to identify those in the pictures, thereby adding to their list of witnesses.

5.1.2.3 Tape recordings of army transmissions

The Insight Team used the tapes made by James Porter of army transmissions on Bloody Sunday in order to construct a time-line of the day's events.

5.1.2.4 IRA evidence

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that the gasworks in the Bogside served as a contact point for IRA members and the press.

5.1.3 Army photographs

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that the team had made unsuccessful attempts to view army film and photographs taken on Bloody Sunday, especially photographs that had been taken by army combat photographers who had entered the Bogside alongside the Paras. He believed that he was told of the existence of these photographs by army contacts.

However, he was told by a contact of colonel-level at Lisburn army headquarters that the order had come 'from high' that they be destroyed in the wake of Bloody Sunday.

5.1.4 Army video footage

Mr Barry said that the footage available at the time showed the beginning of the march until the demonstrators arrived at Barrier 14. They attempted to locate the footage taken later that day, once the troops had entered the Bogside and learnt from the MoD that footage had been sent to a repository in London or the Home Counties. However, upon telephoning the custodian of the repository, they discovered that the film held only showed the beginning of the march, so did not pursue their search any further.

5.1.5 Army sources

Although those directly involved in the events of Bloody Sunday proved unwilling to speak with the Team, Mr Barry had, over the course of the previous months, built up a number of contacts within the army, the police and the civil service. A number of these thought that events in Northern Ireland were spiralling out of control and were more than willing to speak to the Team. Mr Barry said that a number of senior army officers appeared troubled by the coercive role into which the army was being forced.

He said that the Insight Team began to hear stories circulating within the army about the background to and the events of Bloody Sunday and anecdotes about how the Widgery Tribunal was being managed, including the allegations of the destruction of photographs and film.

5.1.6 Rumour of fight in Parachute Regiment on eve of Bloody Sunday

Mr Barry was reluctant to expand on any of the rumours he had heard, but due to prompting from Counsel to the Inquiry, he related that one of the rumours he had heard was that there had been 'an almighty brawl' amongst the Paras on the night of Bloody Sunday. All the Paras who had shot were from one particular company, known to be the troublemakers of the battalion. He said that they were notorious for troublemaking and that there were a lot of discipline problems. The brawl was between those Paras who had shot and those who had not, and had to be sorted out by the Military Police.

He also said that another rumour was that nobody had realised on the day what was happening until it was far too late to stop it.

5.1.7 Dinner with the Parachute Regiment

Prior to completing the Insight article, Mr Barry was invited to dinner in the Paras officers' mess in Belfast. During the dinner, the Paratrooper officers acknowledged that the planned scoop-up operation had failed almost immediately, and Colonel Wilford had blamed this on a failure of reconnaissance by Major Ted Loden, Commander of Support Company who was not present at the dinner. Mr Barry said that it was apparent that Major Loden had been chosen as scapegoat for what had happened.

He said that Colonel Wilford appeared like a man in denial and that his officers had persuaded themselves that they were the victims as they had been pilloried by the press (whom they regarded to be hand in glove with the IRA). They were adamant that everyone shot had been a gunman or a bomber.

The officers argued that they had done the job they had been sent in to do, and used the expression 'cleaning house'.

He said that the dinner was less productive than he had hoped, as he found himself having to justify the role of the media. He recalled being asked by the Paras how far in advance he knew of IRA bombing plans, as they clearly believed that members of the media were agents of the IRA.

5.1.8 Inquiries about the role of the IRA on the day

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that it was his belief that nationalist sympathisers had 'a near genius' for not mentioning the presence of the IRA when giving their versions of events that took place in Northern Ireland. They therefore tried to approach both wings of the IRA directly in an attempt to ascertain what action they had taken on the day.

He said that both wings initially claimed that their members had observed a disciplined ceasefire until after the British Army had inflicted the bulk of the casualties, but that as people of the Bogside began to speak, a more complicated picture of events emerged.

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that the totality of evidence the team amassed led him to conclude that there had been no organised attack by either wing of the IRA upon the army. However, he said that it was also clear that there had been more shooting at the army by the IRA than they had admitted to in the immediate aftermath.

5.1.9 Story of pistol at rubble barricade

The Insight article told of a pistol being fired from the rubble barricade, a story corroborated in Soldier U and Soldier P's evidence. He could not recall what other corroboration he had received for the story.

5.1.10 Nail bombs thrown on the day

The Insight Team had concluded that the organised territorial defence and massive fire alleged by the army had not occurred. The Team found no independent evidence, from civilians or members of the media, that any nail bombs had been thrown at all.

5.1.11 Clearing a line of fire

A number of different typed records of interviews with individuals make reference to 'clearing a line of fire', i.e., civilians would be told to lie down or get out of the way to clear the way for return fire. Mr Barry was unable to recall any further detail about these references.

5.1.12 OIRA (Official IRA) 1 interview transcript

Mr Barry said that he had no independent recollection of the typed record of an interview with a man known to the Inquiry as OIRA 1. He said that it would have been normal practice to tape-record interviews with people, although he did not believe that he had used a tape-recorder in this particular case.

The typed record of the statement said that OIRA 1 was with OIRA 2 for the beginning of the march, and they had checked out the army's positions and had identified a potential counter-sniping position in Columbcille Court. It recorded OIRA 1 as saying that, after hearing that Damien Donaghy and John Johnson had been shot, he had taken a .303 rifle from a car and had taken aim at the soldiers identified as having shot the men. He was tackled on the stairwell by three Provos (Provisional IRA members) who told him to leave the area.

The statement also records an account of one OIRA member firing two rounds from a .22 rifle from the northwest corner of Glenfada Park.

5.1.13 Veracity of the Ivan Cooper interview transcript

Mr Barry was told that it was Ivan Cooper MP's testimony that he had not spoken to the Insight Team and that he found the supposed transcript of an interview with him 'poisonous and disturbing'. Ivan Cooper said that the manner in which the statement was written smacked of a British Intelligence document and that it was, for the most part, factually inaccurate.

Mr Barry had no independent recollection of interviewing Ivan Cooper, but believed that this interview had taken place after the publication of the Insight article. He recalled having been particularly interested in speaking with Ivan Cooper in order to find out about how and why the march had been called and denied that any British authority of any description had anything to do with the compilation of the document.

He said that the interview would have been tape-recorded, due to the length of the transcript and the fact that large parts of it appear in quotation marks, suggesting direct speech.

5.1.14 Contents of the Ivan Cooper interview transcript

5.1.14.1 Plot to kill C S Lagan

The typed record of the interview provides an account of an alleged plot to shoot Chief Superintendent Lagan, a month prior to Bloody Sunday, as he took his child to St Columb's college. Ivan Cooper had got wind of the plot and persuaded the IRA not to kill him. He also told Chief Superintendent Lagan not to take his child to school again.

5.1.14.2 Guns in Glenfada Park

The interview record states that, according to Ivan Cooper, Martin McGuinness, George McEvoy and another were in a house in William Street, with the plan to fire through the doorway at soldiers occupying some houses on the other side of William Street. However, when the troops moved in, the three of them were trapped, and Martin McGuinness panicked, thinking that they were going to be caught. However, George McEvoy told them to dismantle the Thompson guns they had and to put them up their jumpers. They did so and ran off with the crowd.

Mr Barry said that the interview record itself suggested that this story was related to Ivan Cooper by George McEvoy.

5.1.14.3 Provisional IRA (PIRA) plot to ambush army

The typed record of the interview records that the PIRA had made preparations to ambush the army at Barrier 14 after the march had dispersed. However, he had never got any independent corroboration for the allegation.

5.1.14.4 Pistol at rubble barricade

Ivan Cooper is recorded as telling Mr Barry that George McEvoy was also carrying a pistol in a holster. As he ran over the rubble barricade, he dropped it and was shot three times by a Para as he bent to pick it up, the final shot going through the heel of his shoe. He was not hurt, and picked up the pistol and ran off.

The typed transcript bears a manuscript note indicating that Mr Barry was sceptical of the story, saying that it reeked of 'minimum approach'. Mr Barry was unable to elaborate on the reasons for his scepticism or on the meaning of the note. However, he said that he had a vague recollection of being told the same story by somebody other than Ivan Cooper.

5.1.14.5 PIRA cars in Meenan Park

Ivan Cooper is reported as saying that he saw three cars enter the Meenan Park area, packed with Provos: a Triumph 1300, which he said had been stolen by Jim Downs and used in the shooting of two police officers shortly before Bloody Sunday, a blue Vauxhall and a blue Avenger. The cars reportedly drove towards Glenfada Park.

The interview note contains a statement made by Mr Barry at the time saying that he believed that Ivan Cooper was 'flannelling' and just did not want to say that he had seen lots of men filing past him with guns in Meenan Park. Mr Barry now believes that his scepticism of Ivan Cooper's story was based on other witness evidence which suggested that the PIRA had parked further away from the Bogside and had entered the area on foot.

5.1.15 Vinny Coyle interview transcript

The interview transcript indicates that Mr Barry did not believe that Vinny Coyle was being frank and that he believed he knew of an IRA plan to open fire from the Glenfada Park area.

5.1.16 Billy Gillespie interview transcript

Based on the typed record of an interview with a man called Mr Bedell, it would appear that he was the source for the account in the Insight article of a gunman firing from the fifth floor of the Rossville flats. Mr Barry could not recall whether he had received any corroboration of this story.

5.1.17 Bernadette Devlin interview transcript

Mr Barry had no clear independent recollection of having interviewed Bernadette Devlin and did not think that the transcript was written in his usual style. However, he did believe that he must have interviewed her, as his colleagues from the Insight Team testified that they had not.

Bernadette Devlin has no memory of an interview with the Sunday Times and believes that the note came from the British Army press office. She said that it reads as a note about her, as opposed to a note of an interview with her, and referred to a number of matters, of which Bloody Sunday was just one. She explained that much of the detail was untrue or inaccurate and some references confuse events that occurred at different times, some occurring considerably later than Bloody Sunday.

She said that the person or persons who had written the note might have gathered information about her from various sources, and that journalists might well have been present when she was participating in discussions on the topics referenced in the note. However, she added that she was always wary about talking with journalists and was careful of what she said in their presence.

Despite Bernadette Devlin's testimony, Mr Barry was convinced that the document is a record of an interview and denied that any note of his would ever have had anything to do with the British Army press office.

5.1.18 PIRA 11 interview transcript

The man known to the Inquiry as PIRA 11 told Mr Barry that there had been some dissention between the younger and older members of the PIRA regarding the decision to be unarmed at the march. However, he was adamant that the PIRA had not opened fire. He is recorded as saying that three or four Officials (members of the OIRA) might have opened fire, and that there might have been additional fire from 'freelancers', i.e., gunmen who were not members of either wing of the IRA.

5.1.19 Kevin McCorry interview transcript

5.1.19.1 Veracity of the transcript

Mr McCorry, who was the 'national organiser' for NICRA, has no recollection of having taken part in an interview with a reporter and has told the Tribunal that the notes appear to be a mixture of 'what appears to be direct speech, some analysis by the person who made them and psycho-babble'. He said that much of the detail was inaccurate and that the statement put words into his mouth that he himself would never have used. He also added that he found some of the material offensive.

Mr Barry had no independent recollection of the interview but said that it would not have been his practice to put words into people's mouths.

5.1.19.2 Contents of the transcript

The transcript records Mr McCorry as having said that the organisers of the march were very unprepared. He had therefore approached the Ex-Serviceman's Association and the Creggan Police (whom Mr Barry assumed to be a vigilante group) to provide stewards for the march. Mr McCorry also said that the Officials had agreed to provide stewards.

Mr McCorry is also recorded as saying that the lorry leading the march should not have turned the corner into Rossville Street until a large enough number of stewards had arrived to prevent people going down to Barrier 14.

Mr Barry said that he remembered that Mr McCorry had been very emotional and that he had blamed himself for the tragedy on the day.

5.1.20 Conference to discuss Brigade operation order on Bloody Sunday

The Insight Team article discussed the security conference which took place before Bloody Sunday to discuss security plans for the day. The draft article recorded that Colonel Wilford had said little during the conference, leading the source of the information to conclude that he had received a private briefing prior to the general meeting.

The draft article also stated that the mood of the conference was that the arrest operation should go through at all costs. The risk of firing was discussed and clearly accepted as everyone present wanted to show that 8 Brigade knew how to deal with hooligans.

Mr Barry told the Tribunal that it was his belief that this information had come to the Team from Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan.

5.1.21 Sunday Times archive

Mr Barry said that some of the material from the Insight Team's investigation had been used for an exhibition at the National Portrait Gallery, celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Sunday Times. However, aside from that, he was unable to shed any light on the possible whereabouts of missing material from the files.

5.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED

5.2.1 Insight article

Mr Barry said that the input from army sources into the article came primarily from transcripts of the Widgery Tribunal, along with supporting materials presented at the Tribunal and limited army sources.

He agreed that the key thrust of the article was to determine why and how the decision was made to stop the march, who made the decision to send in the Paratroopers and why that decision was made, what order was given to the Paras and how that order was communicated and what happened when the Paras entered the Bogside. Coupled with that, the Insight Team attempted to ascertain why the Paras fired and what role the PIRA and OIRA played on the day.

5.2.2 Decision to stop the march

The Insight article described a meeting on 24th January between Brigadier MacLellan and Superintendent Frank Lagan concerning the approach that should be taken on Bloody Sunday. Both men reached a consensus on how the event should be dealt with and were described as advocating a cautious response to the march, highlighting the limitations of force as a policy instrument in a place such as Derry. Mr Barry believed he gleaned this information directly from Superintendent Lagan and from army brigade staff, close to MacLellan.

However, the article went on to state that this consensus was futile as Brigadier Kitson had already summoned Colonel Wilford and told him to prepare the Parachute Regiment for duty in Derry on 30th January. These orders reportedly came directly from General Ford. Lagan and MacLellan's meeting came too late as the decision to block the march and make arrests had been made at a much earlier stage and at a much higher level.

Mr Barry believed that this information had come directly from the Widgery Tribunal transcripts.

The Insight Team had also reported Lord Balniel, deputy to Lord Carrington, as saying in the House of Commons that the arrest operation had been discussed by the Joint Security Council. The article went on to make the presumption that Whitehall Cabinet ministers had cleared the arrest operation as only ministers could take the 'calculated risk' with civilian lives inherent in the plan.

5.2.3 Government sources

Mr Barry told the Tribunal that he had had access to civil servants in the Stormont Government, but had not been able to penetrate the higher echelons of the British Government. He said that this lack of information from the Government led him to believe that the Insight Team had failed in some way in the article they produced. It also deterred him from the idea of writing a book on the topic of Bloody Sunday.

5.2.4 Gun fire on Bloody Sunday

Mr Barry agreed that the Insight Team had concluded that there had been firing from the OIRA, with perhaps some shooting from the PIRA that had not been 100 per cent confirmed. This had led the Team to conclude that the army's response was out of all proportion. He could not recall whether the Team had reached any conclusions as to who fired first out of the army and the IRA, but said that in his view, this question was less important than the proportionality of the response from the army.

5.2.5 Innocence of the dead and wounded

5.2.5.1 Barney McGuigan

Mr Barry said that the Insight Team's investigations had led them to believe that none of the dead or wounded had been active in firing against the army on the day, although he added that there were some problems with the case of Barney McGuigan who was found to have considerable powder residue on his hands, suggesting that he had fired a weapon. However, due to the strong evidence from witnesses who had seen Mr McGuigan going to the aid of a wounded man, carrying a white handkerchief, the Team had concluded that he had not been firing a weapon.

5.2.5.2 Gerald Donaghy

In the 'Hindsight on Insight' document sent to the Team following the publication of the Insight article, the author of the letter asked the Team what they made of the allegations that Gerald Donaghy had been carrying nail bombs. In his response to the document, Mr Barry said that the Team had reached the tentative conclusion that Gerald Donaghy had been carrying one nail bomb. However, he could no longer recall on what basis he had reached that conclusion, and had no recollection of any independent documentary evidence that would suggest that Gerald Donaghy had been carrying a nail bomb.

5.2.6 Gun at rubble barricade / shooting of Alexander Nash

The Insight article reported the evidence of Soldiers P and U, stating that they had fired at a gunman at the rubble barricade. The gun had then been taken by civilians into the doorway of the Rossville Flats and it had been a bullet from this gun which had wounded Alexander Nash in the arm. This was supported by forensic evidence presented to the Widgery Tribunal, which suggested that the bullet that wounded Mr Nash could have been fired from a low-velocity weapon.

Mr Barry was told that, in their original statements made on the eve of Bloody Sunday, the soldiers had not mentioned a gun being fired from the Rossville Flats, hitting Mr Nash, and was asked whether, on the basis of this, he could now conclude that this portion of the article had been factually inaccurate. Mr Barry said that he had not seen the original statements made by the Paras to the Military Police on the eve of Bloody Sunday so could not comment on the matter.

Mr Harvey told the Tribunal that this line of questioning was an attempt to draw to Mr Barry's attention the fact that the consistency he was referring to in the Insight Team's article might not in fact be justified.

5.2.7 OIRA 1 interview transcript

OIRA 1 is recorded as saying that one OIRA gunman had fired at the advancing soldiers from the Columbcille Court area, an allegation that featured in the Insight article. Mr Barry could not recall whether the Team had received any corroboration for this story, but said that he would almost certainly have placed more weight on such an allegation coming from a self-confessed member of the OIRA than from a civilian.

5.2.8 Insight on Ulster book by Mr Barry

Mr Barry co-wrote a book based on articles which appeared in the Sunday Times in November 1971 and on the research that had gone into these articles. The book was published in 1972, around the time of Bloody Sunday. In the book, Mr Barry stated that the British Army was increasingly being used as 'a blunt instrument of oppression', and predicted that worse violence would inevitably occur.

The book went on to raise the prospect of a potential massacre in Northern Ireland saying: "Ulster has no My Lai nor yet… an Amritsar incident" (My Lai is a village in Vietnam where American troops opened fire on unarmed civilians in 1968, killing over 300 civilians, including women and children. Amritsar is a city in India where the British Army opened fire on a group of unarmed men, women and children, taking part in a Sikh festival. Approximately 400 were killed and over 1,200 injured.)

Mr Barry said that this sense of foreboding was based on the fact that the army was increasingly being used, as opposed to politics, as a means of dealing with civil unrest. He went on to say that it was also based on the fact that the army was increasingly resorting to violence against rioters as a form of summary retribution, and journalists on the ground feared that this would inevitably lead to the use of live fire, and therefore to bloodshed.

5.2.9 General Kitson's book

Mr Barry was asked by General Kitson to review one of his books relating to military procedures. Mr Barry could not recall why he had been asked to perform the task, but presumed that it was due to his own experience of covering wars in the world.

5.2.10 Dinner with the Parachute Regiment

Mr Barry confirmed that it was the view of the officers that the Parachute Regiment had achieved the purpose for which it has been sent in, despite the failure of the arrest operation. The officers seemed very confident that they had succeeded in dealing a heavy blow to the local IRA, i.e., the bombers and riflemen they claimed they had been combating.

He believed that the expression 'cleaning house' used by the Paras at the dinner meant 'cleaning up a mess'.

5.2.11 Northern Ireland Civil Service contacts

Mr Barry spoke with a number of civil servants in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, and the Insight Team article recorded these civil servants as saying that any major operation in Free Derry would have to have been a political decision. The article also stated that the civil servants were very worried about the occurrences on Bloody Sunday. Lord Gifford read out the following names to Mr Barry, asking him to confirm whether any of them were his sources: Kenneth Bloomfield, Robert Ramsay, Thomas Cromey, David Gilliland, Jack McNally and Maurice Harris. Mr Barry confirmed that he had spoken with one or more of the named civil servants.

As Mr Barry was unwilling to disclose his sources, he was asked to approach them directly and to enquire as to which one(s) of them had pointed him to Westminster as the source of authorisation for the operation.

5.2.12 Reference to Amritsar by Anthony Yarnold

The Tribunal is in possession of a document, compiled by a member of the Insight Team, which records Colonel Anthony Yarnold, based at Lisburn, making reference to Amritsar 36 hours before the events of Bloody Sunday.

5.2.13 Scepticism towards civilian witnesses

A number of the interview transcripts made by Mr Barry include comments indicating a belief that the witness in question was trying to mislead him or to cover up IRA activity. Mr Barry said that he had approached the investigation with a heightened awareness of the dangers of being misled by civilian witnesses.

He agreed that, as the investigation proceeded, his scepticism borne out of the fear of being misinformed had been overborne by the mass of witnesses of different characters whom he interviewed, and that he had been able to reply to the 'Hindsight on Insight' document that, even though some of the civilian witnesses might have colluded, 250 did not.

5.2.14 Sunday Times archive

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that he had never been aware that the Sunday Times had an archive. He was therefore unable to assist in the attempt to discover what had happened to the missing part of the Insight Team's archived materials relating to Bloody Sunday, as it was his belief that the paper destroyed all such materials without ever storing them or archiving them.

5.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF NICRA

5.3.1 Kevin McCorry interview transcript

The interview transcript includes a statement, made by Mr Barry, that 'NICRA is, to put it politely, close to the Officials'. He agreed that this was a view that he brought with him to the interview, but was unable to explain how he came to adopt that view.

5.4 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICIAL IRA MEMBERS

5.4.1 Gathering evidence

Mr Barry agreed that those interviews which were taped would be more accurate than those that took place in a pub and were not taped. He agreed that mistakes could be made by the interviewer or the interviewee, and that this misinformation would not be recognised as such unless it was disproved by subsequent evidence. It could therefore arise that misinformation or inaccuracies remained within the bulk of information collated.

5.4.2 Veracity of OIRA 1 interview transcript

It was pointed out to Mr Barry that, unlike other interview transcripts, the transcript of the supposed interview with OIRA 1 bore no date at the top of the page. It was also devoid of any written notations or corrections and was at no point called an interview in the text of the document.

Based on a number of editorial comments contained within the body of the transcripts, coupled with the lack of markings and dates, it was suggested to Mr Barry that the document was not in fact an interview transcript, but rather some kind of editorial document, created as an aide-memoire relating to Official activity on the day. This supposition was compounded by the fact that there appeared to be a number of factual inaccuracies within the body of the document.

It was also put to Mr Barry that OIRA 1 believes that he met him over a drink in the Bogside Inn, and that his comments were limited to his activities in Columbcille Court and the fact that thereafter, he put one weapon into a car in Glenfada Park.

Mr Barry said that it did not appear to him now as an aide-memoire, but that, since he had no independent recollection of the interview, it would be up to the Tribunal to form its own judgment about the document in question and about the evidence of OIRA 1.

5.5 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

5.5.1 Insight's access to sources in Derry

Mr Barry refuted the suggestion that the Insight Team had easier access to IRA sources than most journalists, although he believed that the Team was less distrusted in the Bogside than fellow journalists. He added that the Team also had very good army contacts.

5.5.2 Clearing a line of fire

Mr Barry was asked about references made to 'clearing a line of fire', in particular such a reference made in the transcript of an interview with Vinny Coyle. He responded that the Team had never been sure that the order to clear a line of fire had actually come from the IRA itself.

5.5.3 Ivan Cooper interview transcript

Mr Barry agreed that neither he nor Ivan Cooper would have ever expected the note of their meeting to become public, and that Mr Cooper may have been saying things that he would not have wanted to have been made public.

Mr Glasgow said that one issue that Ivan Cooper certainly would not have wanted to have been made public was the fact that he had seen a car used in the murder of two police officers three days prior to Bloody Sunday which he should have reported to Chief Superintendent Lagan.

5.5.4 Army log of radio transmissions

Mr Barry told the Inquiry that it was his belief at the time that there was a missing log which had been recorded on the day but which had never materialised.

5.5.5 IRA evidence

Mr Barry said that, to the best of his recollection, the Team had gained initial information directly from each wing of the IRA regarding their activities on Bloody Sunday. They had then gone back to the same contacts within the IRA, armed with further information gained from civilian witnesses regarding IRA gunmen, and had received a fuller and more candid version of what shots had been fired on the day.

Mr Barry said that he had not learned the identity of the individual gunmen and that he had made a point of not learning their identities so as to protect himself from being suspected of informing the security services.

He also told the Inquiry that journalist Eamonn McCann had been instrumental in introducing the Team to large numbers of people in the community, including perhaps IRA figures.

5.5.6 Shooting from the Rossville Flats

It is now Mr Barry's recollection that he heard more than one account of the Paras being met my gunfire from the Rossville Flats as they entered the Bogside, although he sought to underline the fact that he was not sure whether his memory was accurate.

5.5.7 Photographs of Father Daly's gunman / OIRA 4

It was Mr Barry's belief that the most dramatic photograph of Father Daly's gunman had been used in the Sunday Times exhibition in the National Portrait Gallery in London. He could shed no light on its disappearance but suspected that it might have been lost in the clear up of the exhibition.

5.5.8 Dinner with the Parachute Regiment

Mr Barry was informed that the Paras represented by Mr Glasgow had no recollection of his being invited to dinner in the officers' mess. His belief was that he met with them after the Insight Team's investigations had been completed, but before the publication of the article.

Despite Major Loden's and Colonel Wilford's evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that they had agreed on the reconnaissance efforts, Mr Barry was clear in his recollection that, during the dinner, Colonel Wilford had blamed the failure of the arrest operation on Major Loden.

5.5.9 Dead and injured taken across the border

The record of an interview taken with Eamonn Gallagher states that he heard people saying that they should take somebody to Carndonagh Hospital. Mr Barry could shed no light on the incident, as he no longer recalled it, but believed that the Insight Team would have followed up on the lead at the time.

5.6 FURTHER QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

5.6.1 OIRA 1 interview transcript

Mr Barry agreed that he would not have used expressions such as 'he said' if he had been compiling some form of aide-memoire, leading him to believe that it was the transcript of an actual conversation as opposed to an editorial compilation of material. However, he added that the interview had a very different style to his usual interview notes and appeared a lot less clear, leading him to conclude that it was not a normal interview.

Mr Breslin was a schoolteacher at the time of Bloody Sunday. He co-founded the Derry Labour Party in 1965, with Ivan Cooper and Dermie McClenaghan, and acted as Press Officer for the party throughout his involvement with the party.

6.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

6.1.1 Derry Labour Party

Mr Breslin told the Tribunal that the Derry Labour Party had been founded in 1965 in an attempt to tackle social injustices that were rife in Derry at the time, affecting both the nationalist and loyalist working class people of Derry.

The party had approximately 40 members in 1965, consisting of trade unionists, teachers and businessmen. These numbers increased steadily and, by 1968, the party had to divide into two branches as they could not find venues large enough to host meetings with all party members. A number of the party members were also elected to the Citizens Action Committee (CAC).

Mr Breslin said that, after the Stormont elections in 1969, the CAC became largely ineffective, so he suggested that Ivan Cooper, John Hume and Claude Wilson should stand as candidates in the local elections. Ivan Cooper and John Hume were both elected. However, Mr Breslin said that the manner in which the election was approached missed the opportunity to cross the sectarian divide. Issues such as poor housing, unemployment and low pay were issues affecting both Catholics and Protestants and he felt that the civil rights movement could have enabled a move away from sectarianism.

He said that the Battle of the Bogside proved to be a death knell for the Labour Party, along with many other parties: many people dropped out of politics or stopped voting, and the party lost a number of people to the communist ideology of the Official Republican movement.

6.1.2 Knowledge of the Official Republican movement

Mr Breslin explained that what he termed the Official Republican movement (Official Sinn Fein) was a political movement, distinct from, although not unconnected to the military branch. He said that he sometimes met with representatives from the Official Republican movement to discuss social issues, such as punishment for crimes. These meetings usually took place in a shop behind the Bogside Inn.

He explained that, at this time, the police did not have access to the Bogside for policing purposes. Therefore, the community had to deal with criminality themselves. Mr Breslin said that the Labour Party approached Official Sinn Fein in an attempt to establish other forms of punishment other than so called punishment beatings. They wanted to establish some form of punishment that would expose the criminals and deter others in the community but that would also give the accused the right to defend themselves and would not involve violence of any description.

6.1.2.1 OIRA 3

Mr Breslin said in his statement that he had had a good working relationship with a man now known to the Inquiry as OIRA 3, who was the Commanding Officer for the North-West Brigade of the OIRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. Mr Breslin said that he had never been aware of the fact that OIRA 3 was a member of the OIRA and thought that he had only been involved in the political side of the movement.

6.1.2.2 Malachy McGurran

Mr Breslin was asked if he knew whether or not the late Malachy McGurran had been a member or the OIRA. He replied that he thought he had been a prominent member of the political side of the Official Republican movement.

6.1.3 Emergence of the Provisional Republican movement

Mr Breslin said that a number of people defected from the Official movement to the Provisional movement, predominantly because of the Officials' policy regarding defensive action against the army, as opposed to the offensive policy of the Provisionals.

He said that he did not know how many people were in the Provisional movement in 1972, but would estimate their numbers at fewer than 100 members.

6.1.3.1 Provisional meeting in Derry

Mr Breslin recounted how he had attended an open meeting organised by Provisional Sinn Fein in Derry and chaired by Sean Keenan. Daithí O'Connell, from Dublin, was put forward as the political leader of Provisional Sinn Fein and was in Derry to explain the political ideals and philosophy of the emerging movement. However, Mr Breslin was not allowed to ask the question he had gone to ask at the meeting, as he was known as someone who opposed the philosophy of the movement.

6.1.3.2 Martin McGuinness

Mr Breslin explained that, just as he met with representatives of Official Sinn Fein to discuss certain social issues, he had also met with Martin McGuinness of Provisional Sinn Fein to discuss similar issues. He recalled that one of those meetings had taken place in a disused shop in the Rossville Flats.

6.1.4 IRA promise to be unarmed on the march

Mr Breslin said that it was common currency in Derry that both wings of the IRA had said that here would be no guns on the march. This was known from the Thursday or the Friday before the march and everybody was aware of it. Mr Breslin said that it would have been impossible for the police and the army not to have known of the IRA pledge, as they would have had intelligence agents in the area who would have heard people discussing the pledge.

He went on to say that nobody in Derry would have been stupid enough to go on such a large march if they thought that there was a possibility that they might be caught in crossfire between the army and the IRA. Everybody was certain that there was going to be no shooting.

6.1.5 Stewards on the march

Mr Breslin said that many of the stewards on the march had been involved with the CAC demonstrations in 1968 and 1969 and had a great deal of experience stewarding such events. He said that the stewards had done their best to prevent people from going to Barrier 14, and had succeeded in deterring a large number, but that they had been outnumbered.

He said that the determination to get past the stewards to throw stones at the army was borne out of the events which had occurred at Magilligan the previous week when stewards had kept the march orderly but the Paratroopers had attacked the marchers nevertheless. He further stated that the majority of people who had gone to barrier 14 were not civil rights people, but people who were only on the march to confront the soldiers, for fun.

6.1.6 Shooting from army towards Free Derry Corner

Mr Breslin made his way to Free Derry Corner, to hear the speakers. As Bernadette Devlin was about to introduce the first speaker, shooting started from behind the crowd, coming from the direction of Rossville Street. He dropped to the ground with the rest of the crowd and realised that the bullets were coming from the army as he saw three bullets hit Free Derry Corner, a few feet above the head of Lord Brockway, who was standing on the lorry platform, about to address the crowd.

He got the impression that the bullets had been fired from a high position, such as the Walls, the GPO sorting office or the electricity substation at the bottom of William Street. He had seen soldiers on the roof of the electricity building earlier in the march.

Everybody remained on the ground for a couple of minutes.

6.1.7 Martin McGuinness

When Mr Breslin stood up, he saw Martin McGuinness yards away from him. Martin McGuinness was obviously getting up from the ground (he also thought that he had seen him with Joe McCallion of Provisional Sinn Fein at an earlier stage in the day).

Mr Breslin told the Inquiry that the so called 'Infliction' documents could not be true: it would have been physically impossible for Martin McGuinness to have been in the Rossville Flats, shooting at the army, at the alleged time and place, and then to have made his way to the middle of the crowd at Free Derry Corner where he was when the army opened fire.

As soon as there was a lull in the shooting, somebody in the crowd asked Mr McGuinness what was going on. He replied that the Provos had kept their word that there would be no guns on the march. Somebody then said: "what about the cars?" Mr Breslin said that people were so angry that they were refusing to believe that the Provisionals had left their guns in the Creggan and thought that they would be stashed in cars nearby.

Martin McGuinness looked over and saw Mr Breslin and asked him to go and verify that there were no guns in his car. He explained that he had almost certainly been chosen, as everyone knew that he was against the Provos and totally condemned their campaign, and that he was no friend of Martin McGuinness's.

Mr McGuinness led him, and a number of other people from the crowd who followed to see for themselves, to his silver Ford Cortina or Grenada estate car, parked in the car park behind the Bogside Inn. Mr Breslin searched the car thoroughly, looking between the seats, in the boot and under the spare wheel, but he found no guns or weapons.

Martin McGuinness then got into the car with Joe McCallion and Mr Breslin walked off while the two were talking to one another inside the car.

6.1.8 Father Daly's gunman / OIRA 4

Mr Breslin walked up to Nell McCafferty's house in Beechwood Street, where he learnt on the radio that five people were dead. The army spokesperson said that all of the dead were IRA gunmen. When Mr Breslin repeated that there were five dead, an Official who had come into the house said that it was the best thing that had ever happened. The Official explained that what he meant was that the army had gone too far and would not get away with it. Mr Breslin has identified this man as Father Daly's gunman (known to the Inquiry as OIRA 4).

6.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICIAL IRA MEMBERS

6.2.1 Father Daly's gunman / OIRA 4

Mr O'Donovan told Mr Breslin that Nell McCafferty had made no mention in her statement of OIRA 4 saying that the five deaths were the best thing that could have happened. Mr Breslin said that, despite this, he was certain that it had been said.

6.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

6.3.1 Father Daly's gunman / OIRA 4

Mr Breslin said that he had been able to identify the man known as Father Daly's gunman from a photograph that appeared shortly after Bloody Sunday, but that he was not so easily identifiable from the Tribunal's copy of this picture.

6.3.2 Eversheds statement

Mr Breslin was asked why it had taken him so long to sign his Eversheds statement. He explained that the draft version of his statement provided by Eversheds contained a number of grave inaccuracies and he had had to rewrite his statement. He also said that he was concerned that details from his statement had been leaked by Eversheds to Liam Clarke and Kathy Johnson for the purposes of their book Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government.

He confirmed that the delay had nothing to do with the fact that Martin McGuinness had signed his statement only one month prior to Mr Breslin and said that he had not spoken to Martin McGuinness in 25 years.

6.3.3 Martin McGuinness

Mr Breslin reiterated that it would have been impossible for Martin McGuinness to have been at the Rossville Flats at the time the army shooting started, as he had seen him within minutes of the army opening fire.

6.3.4 Convictions on the basis of police say-so

Mr Breslin agreed that he held in contempt any conviction of a person based on RUC or Garda say-so. He explained that if a police force does not provide evidence to support their case, then their accusation remains an accusation and is not proven in any way, and therefore Mr Breslin would not believe it.

6.3.5 IRA say-so

Counsel accused Mr Breslin of suffering from double standards, in that he did not trust the police's say-so, yet thought that the RUC should have trusted the word of the IRA on Bloody Sunday that there would be no guns on the march.

Mr Breslin said that the government in recent years had accepted the word of the IRA on a number of occasions. However, he said that the most important fact of the IRA's pledge on Bloody Sunday was that it was not made to the police or to the army but to the community and to community leaders. They would have run the risk of antagonising the entire community if they had lied.

6.4 FURTHER QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

6.4.1 Clarke and Johnson's book concerning Martin McGuinness

Mr Clarke told Mr Breslin that he was described as an interviewee in Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government. Mr Breslin was extremely taken aback by this and confirmed that he had not had any contact with either or them and most certainly had never spoken to either of them in person or by telephone.

Ms McMenamin attended the march with her mother.

7.1 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

7.1.1 Gunman on Rossville Street

Ms McMenamin was standing at the junction of Little James Street and William Street as the army entered the Bogside. As she ran with the crowd down Rossville Street, she saw a man with a gun near a pram ramp at either Kells Walk or Columbcille Court.

7.2 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED

7.2.1 Gunman on Rossville Street

Mr Harvey told Ms McMenamin that Father O'Gara, when giving evidence to the Widgery Tribunal, said that he had seen a young man, wearing a three-quarter length coat, armed with a handgun coming from Kells Walk and that the man had shot the gun over a low wall three times. Ms McMenamin said that she did not hear any shots. She also said that the army did not appear to react in any way to the man's presence.

7.3 QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

7.3.1 Gunman on Rossville Street

Ms McMenamin said that, at the time she saw the gunmen, the crowd was being pursued by foot soldiers who were approximately a few yards away from the crowd.

She said that six other people had possibly seen the gunman but she had never spoken about it with anybody, including her mother. She said that she had decided to come forward with the information as she felt that it was time that everybody told the truth about what happened on the day so as to provide some closure on the incident. She had never mentioned it before as she felt it would be disloyal to the innocent people killed on the day.

SCHEDULE OF PROCEEDINGS

Monday 4th: Paragraphs 1 to 3
Tuesday 5th: Paragraphs 4 to 5.1
Wednesday 6th: Paragraphs 5.2 to 7

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