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4 - 8 FEBRUARY 2002
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
This week the Tribunal heard evidence from the first screened witness to give testimony before it. William Hunter, who was a Special Branch officer in the RUC on Bloody Sunday, told the Tribunal that he heard nail bombs and gunfire as the soldiers advanced into Rossville Street.
OTHER ISSUES
Due to a late application for screening on behalf of 20 named police officers, the Tribunal rose on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Thursday, Lord Saville granted the police officers’ application for screening.
The Inquiry has investigated claims made in the Observer newspaper by John Taylor MP, now Lord Kilclooney, who was Deputy Home Affairs Minister in the Stormont Government and member of the body in charge of security policy at the time of Bloody Sunday, concerning private papers he had seen regarding the official decision-making process in the days leading up to Bloody Sunday. It is satisfied that Lord Kilclooney was referring to documentation which the Tribunal has seen.
A full transcript of proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
1. William Hunter’s Evidence
Mr Hunter had served in the RUC for 10 years at the time of Bloody Sunday and had been a Special Branch officer for the latter two of those years, based in Belfast.
1.1 Questions on behalf of the Tribunal
1.1.1 Statement
Mr Roxburgh observed that the bulk of Mr Hunter’s statement to the Inquiry was drawn from the report he made to his superiors in 1972. Mr Hunter said that he refreshed his memory by reading his original statement to his superiors and now believed that he could recall everything contained within it.
1.1.2 1972 report
The Tribunal is in possession of a report made by Mr Hunter at the request of his Chief Inspector, date-stamped on 7th February 1972. Mr Hunter believed he probably wrote the report the day before it was stamped. He confirmed that this was the first record he made of his experiences on Bloody Sunday. He also told the Tribunal that, at the time of writing, he was aware of the huge public controversy caused by the events of Bloody Sunday and of the reports in the press saying that the soldiers had come under attack from sniper fire and nail bombs.
He was not put under any pressure to ensure that his statement did not contain anything that would be unhelpful to the soldiers’ case and could not remember conferring with his two colleagues concerning the contents of his report.
1.1.3 Knowledge of Derry
Although Mr Hunter was based in Belfast, he had made a number of trips to Derry before Bloody Sunday and was reasonably familiar with the geography of the city and its specific security situation, including the usual pattern of rioting that took place on its streets.
1.1.4 Experience of civil rights marches
Mr Hunter told the Inquiry that he had occasion to police numerous civil rights marches since 1958 but had never seen or heard IRA gunmen opening fire in the course of, or in the vicinity of, such a march. Mr Hunter said that he had heard in Belfast of IRA gunmen opening fire from behind a crowd of rioting youths but had never witnessed this himself. He could not remember being told that the IRA would exploit the Bloody Sunday march to open fire on the security forces.
1.1.5 Briefing prior to the Bloody Sunday march
Mr Hunter reported for duty in Derry at 2:00 pm on the afternoon of 30th January 1972, having driven to the city earlier in the day with two of his colleagues from the Belfast Special Branch, DC McGarvey and DC Fitzpatrick.
He and his colleagues were briefed by Detective Chief Inspector Donnelly and were put on duty in the Waterloo Place and William Street area for the day. His brief was to identify known troublemakers, prominent republican activists and terrorists who might have infiltrated the march, but he was not told to look out for any named individuals. If he had identified anyone carrying out illegal activities, he would have written a report about those persons or would have passed the information to his superiors at the debriefing after the march.
He was also told that the march to be held that day was illegal but was not informed of any debate as to whether or not the march should have been allowed through to the Guildhall.
Mr Hunter could not recall any record being made of the briefing.
1.1.6 IRA participation in civil rights marches
Mr Hunter was expecting known IRA members to take part in the Bloody Sunday march, mingling with the marchers. He believed he would have recognised them owing to his general knowledge of suspects but admitted that his knowledge of IRA members in Derry was limited.
Mr Hunter did not see anybody on the march who fitted the description of known troublemaker, prominent republican activist or terrorist.
1.1.7 Official notebook
Mr Hunter said that he was not carrying an official notebook on the day but almost certainly had a means of noting anything of interest that would have taken place. However, he did not make any notes on the day, the first written account of his experiences being his February 1972 report to his superiors.
1.1.8 Waterloo Place
Mr Hunter took up position at the junction of Waterloo Place, Waterloo Street and William Street at 2:30 pm on Bloody Sunday. The area had been kept clear of civilians with the exception of the media and two civilian observers, one of whom was Austin Currie MP. There were a number of high-ranking police and army officers in the area, including General Ford, whom he recalled having been there for most of the time Mr Hunter himself was present.
Mr Hunter described that a large number of marchers arrived at Barrier 14, further up the road, at approximately 3:40 pm. Stewards made an unsuccessful attempt to keep the marchers back, but approximately 40 to 60 marchers made a vigorous attempt to storm the army barrier.
A uniformed inspector addressed the marchers via loudspeaker and, as the water canon moved towards the barrier, a gas grenade was thrown from the crowd and exploded underneath the water canon. Mr Hunter could not recollect the army using CS gas at any stage during the day.
At approximately 4:00 pm, DC McGarvey was struck on the shin by a stone, causing a cut and some bruising.
1.1.9 Soldiers’ entry into the Bogside via Barrier 14
Mr Hunter said that at 4:00 pm, a snatch squad of unarmed paratroopers carrying batons, supported by soldiers with rifles, crossed the barrier in pursuit of rioters whom they followed along William Street and into Rossville Street.
1.1.10 Sound of blast bombs and of a Thompson machine-gun
Immediately after seeing the soldiers enter Rossville Street, Mr Hunter said that he heard the sound of between six and ten nail bombs exploding in the Rossville Street area, along with the distinct sound of a Thompson machine-gun emitting a short burst of gunfire. He said that this was immediately followed by sharp automatic fire from other weapons which continued, intermittently, for about five minutes.
1.1.11 Arrest operation
After hearing the sound of shooting, Mr Hunter moved up William Street and saw about 40 youths being escorted out of Rossville Street by snatch squads and lined up in Sackville Street. Mr Hunter later saw the arrestees at Fort George, where he spent 20 minutes ‘viewing’ the detainees. He recalled seeing both police officers and soldiers in the centre, but did not know which body was in charge at the centre. At no time did he see any of the detainees being ill treated.
1.1.12 Debriefing session
Prior to returning to Belfast, Mr Hunter attended a group debriefing session, at which Chief Inspector Donnelly was present, where he was informed that there had been a number of civilian casualties on the day.
Mr Hunter could not remember what contribution he made to the session and was unaware of any record having been made of the session.
1.2 Questions on behalf of the families and wounded
1.2.1 Police debriefing sessions
Mr Harvey questioned Mr Hunter as to the typical procedure adopted at debriefing sessions. Mr Hunter confirmed that the primary purpose of such a session would be to ascertain whether or not the operation had been a success in terms of its original objectives. This would involve an analysis of the day’s events, typically provided by a senior officer. Individual officers would then be asked to contribute further information to fill in any gaps in the senior officer’s account or to develop specific events mentioned.
Mr Hunter agreed that all of the 12 or more Special Branch officers present at the debriefing session on Bloody Sunday would have come away with a clear overview of the sequence of events, provided by the senior officer, and with a sense that the operation had gone terribly wrong.
Under further questioning, Mr Hunter said that it would be usual practice for a note-taker to be called in for the specific purpose of making a note of what was said during an important debriefing session. This note would be filed within the specific file relating to the incident and would be kept under secure conditions. Mr Hunter could not recall any note being taken of the debriefing session on Bloody Sunday, but agreed that, had one been taken, it would have been kept in the police records department at the RUC headquarters in Knock Road.
1.2.2 Role of the Special Branch on Bloody Sunday
Mr Harvey suggested that in 1972, after the introduction of the Diplock Courts, Special Branch officers did not go to court to give evidence, and that, therefore, the primary function of the Special Branch on Bloody Sunday was to collect information which could then have been passed on to other sections within the RUC. Mr Hunter said that he attended the march to gather intelligence with the possibility of taking further action if necessary.
Mr Hunter confirmed that he attended the march to identify people from the Castlereagh area of Belfast where he was based at the time of Bloody Sunday.
1.2.3 Interpretation of events
Mr Hunter agreed with Counsel that it would be unimaginable for him or for any police officer serving at that time in Northern Ireland to believe that 13 people could have been killed and 14 injured by the security forces without something having happened to justify their opening fire.
1.2.4 Recollection of army fire
From his position in the William Street / Waterloo Place area, Mr Hunter did not hear the five high velocity shots fired by soldiers, injuring two civilians, 20 minutes before the paratroopers entered the Bogside, nor did he hear the single shot returned from the direction of the junction of Rossville Street and William Street. He could not recall any baton rounds being fired immediately after the Paras advanced past Barrier 14.
Mr Hunter rejected the suggestion that he was not being frank about what he had seen and heard on the day, and could not explain why he had not heard single shots fired by the army prior to the paratroopers entering the Bogside via Barrier 14.
1.2.5 Arrival of the soldiers in Rossville Street
Mr Hunter was shown media and security service video footage of the day, depicting the entry of the soldiers into the Bogside via Barrier 14. The clips showed the bulk of the soldiers going down Chamberlain Street and some of them proceeding down William Street.
Mr Harvey therefore suggested to Mr Hunter that he was mistaken when he said that he saw the soldiers pursue the rioters down William Street into Rossville Street, as the soldiers who were originally behind Barrier 14 did not go immediately to Rossville Street. Mr Hunter responded that there was a lot of confusion at the time. He could not see Rossville Street from where he was positioned but thought that this was the direction in which the soldiers were running. He had to stay behind the troops as he was in civilian dress that day and could have been arrested himself.
He had not been aware that, by the time the soldiers at Barrier 14 entered the Bogside, other soldiers had already passed through Barrier 12 and moved up Little James Street. Counsel informed him that these were the first soldiers to enter Rossville Street.
1.2.6 Sound of blast bombs and of a Thompson machine-gun
Mr Hunter was also shown recordings made by the army helicopter camera (the heli-tele) of the army vehicles entering Rossville Street and of soldiers getting out of those vehicles and firing baton rounds. The tape then shows a number of arrests. Mr Harvey informed Mr Hunter that, by the time the arrests took place, the army had discharged three high-velocity shots in the Bogside, possibly wounding Peggy Deery and Mickey Bridge, and killing Jackie Duddy. The recordings did not show any blast bombs being thrown and did not record the sound of a machine-gun.
Mr Hunter confirmed once again for the Tribunal that the first shots he heard were those fired by a Thompson machine-gun. He stated that he was not trying to mislead the Tribunal in any way and was confident that his 1972 report and subsequent statement to the Inquiry were an accurate recollection of what happened on the day.
Mr Hunter did not write down that he had heard a Thompson machine-gun and did not use a police radio to log the shooting as he assumed that others had also heard it. He did not agree with the suggestion that, since the machine-gun shooting did not appear on any radio log on the day, it had not occurred.
He was also adamant that he had heard the sound of nail-bombs, despite Counsel’s affirmation that none were photographed or recovered on the day. Mr Hunter did not see any nail-bombs himself on the day.
1.2.7 Arrest operation
Mr Hunter told the Tribunal that, prior to Bloody Sunday, he had never seen paratroopers involved in an arrest operation during a riot. However, he had previously observed army snatch squads, armed with riot shields and wearing helmets and visors, making arrests. He agreed that snatch squads usually operated in distinct groups, pursuing one individual whom they identified to one another, as opposed to chasing a crowd down a street.
He also agreed that the Paras could not have identified any rioter in particular, given the fact that they were in army vehicles stationed in Waterloo Place at the time of the rioting. He believed that they were trying to disperse the crowd which was at the barrier.
Mr Harvey said that the army was renowned for arresting people without any proof that they had actually been involved in rioting, and pointed to Mr Hunter’s earlier testimony that he himself would have been concerned that he might be arrested if he had gone in front of the troops. Mr Hunter responded that the army would assume that people in the vicinity were involved in rioting.
1.2.8 Fort George
At Fort George, DC McGarvey pointed out Fr Terence O’Keefe to Mr Hunter and told him that he was a known republican.
1.2.9 1972 report
Mr Hunter prepared his 1972 report of the events of Bloody Sunday at the personal request of the Chief Inspector in Castlereagh, Mr Kyle, who was in charge of his department. This was the first report about a civil rights march that Mr Hunter had ever been asked to write. He could not recall whether DC McGarvey had been with him when he had written it and said that, despite the similarities between his and Mr McGarvey’s reports, they had not colluded to prepare similar reports.
The Widgery Inquiry had been announced at the time Mr Hunter wrote his report. However, he did not believe that he had been asked to write it specifically for the purpose of the Inquiry: if that had been the case, he would have written a statement of evidence as opposed to a report.
Mr Hunter confirmed that, at the time of writing his report, he would have been aware from press reports that the most significant and important factor in the events of Bloody Sunday was whether the soldiers were justified in what they did.
1.3 further questions on behalf of the tribunal
1.3.1 Sound of machine-gun fire
Mr Hunter had no clear recollection of hearing a helicopter in the air and did not believe that he had confused the sound of helicopter blades with that of a Thompson machine-gun.
2. Application for screening on behalf of 20 named RUC officers
The Tribunal heard a late application for screening on behalf of 19 named RUC officers. A number of these had originally been scheduled to give unscreened evidence to the Tribunal this week, but their lawyers had submitted their application for screening on Monday. The witnesses asked that they be allowed to give evidence from behind a screen.
An open part to their application was circulated to all the lawyers and a closed part was provided uniquely to the members of the Tribunal for security reasons.
2.1 initial response by tribunal lawyers
Mr Clarke made some initial responses to the application made by the police officers’ lawyers. He explained that the purpose of these initial responses were not to invite any adverse inferences regarding the application, but merely to clarify for the record some of the issues raised within the application.
2.1.1 Disclosure of the officers’ names
Mr Clarke explained that, in their application of 6th February, the applicants made the point that, from the outset of the Inquiry, they were not afforded the opportunity to protect their identities by way of anonymity, as were not aware that their statements, including their names, had been disclosed until after this had happened.
Mr Clarke said that, although regrettable, the situation was not of the Inquiry’s making. He explained that shortly after the BSI (Bloody Sunday Inquiry) was established, it had received from the RUC statements of evidence and reports made by named officers in 1972. The material was not provided to the BSI with any request that it should be rendered anonymous. As such, it was delivered to a public inquiry that had made clear in its opening statement that it would make public all information received unless their were compelling reasons not to do so.
He said that a limited number of the witnesses in question had already given evidence to Lord Widgery under their own names and, therefore, the Inquiry did not understand there to be any good reason for withholding the names of those witnesses and the materials associated with them.
2.1.2 Ignorance of screening possibilities
A further submission made in the application was that the current applicants had been unaware of the fact that they could apply for screening, and, in particular, were ignorant of their colleagues’ applications in 1999 and 2000. Mr Clarke said that in 1999, the Inquiry was informed by the RUC that there were five officers whose personal circumstances justified an application for anonymity to the Tribunal. This application was granted in the case of three of those officers as the latter two had withdrawn their applications. He explained that Mr Montgomery and Mr Simpson, who were currently party to the application for screening, had been the two officers who withdraw their application in 1999.
2.1.3 Applications made on behalf of the Chief Constable of the RUC
Mr Clarke said that all the previous applications had been made by the Chief Constable on behalf of the officers concerned. He explained that the Inquiry is not able to deal directly with individual officers as only the police service is in possession of those officers’ addresses. He said that he felt that it was legitimate for the Inquiry to expect all further screening applications to be notified to it through the Chief Constable.
The Inquiry had notified the legal advisor to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (the PSNI, the name for the new police service, replacing the RUC) in December 2001 of its decision to call the additional police officers in February 2002.
2.2 submissions on behalf of the police
Mr Hanna began by saying that he had been unable to make contact with four police officers who have been called to give their evidence before the BSI and that there could be a further application for screening on their behalf sometime in the near future.
2.2.1 Disclosure of officers’ names
Mr Hanna said that his clients had expressed great concern at the fact that their statements were disclosed to the Tribunal in circumstances in which they were not afforded the opportunity to seek anonymity. If they had been given the opportunity that was afforded to the soldier witnesses to seek anonymity, they would have done so. Despite the response given by Mr Clarke, and despite the fact that the Tribunal is not in possession of the individual officers’ addresses, he felt that the obligation to communicate the disclosure of the officers’ names and statements lay with the Inquiry.
2.2.2 Ignorance of screening possibilities
Mr Hanna said that his clients regretted the disruption caused to the Inquiry’s schedule of witnesses by their application. However, as his clients had only recently found out about the possibility to seek screening, he said that the perceived tardiness of their application should not be held against them in any way.
2.2.3 Rights under Article 2 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights)
Mr Hanna said that, as upheld by the Court of Appeal in Ex parte A (the soldiers’ application for anonymity), the Article 2 rights (concerning the right to life) of his clients were clearly engaged. He said that the Tribunal should apply the test established by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ergi in deciding whether or not to grant screening to his clients.
Ergi established that, where a public authority is carrying out an operation which has the potential to invite some form of armed or terrorist response, an obligation arises on it to do all that is feasible to ensure that civilians and others involved are not put at unnecessary or unacceptable risk.
Mr Hanna submitted that the Tribunal should examine the nature of the subjective fears of his clients regarding the potential risk involved in giving their evidence unscreened, should then establish whether those fears are objectively justified, and should then consider to what extent those fears could be alleviated by granting them screening. Only then should the Tribunal balance that protection against any adverse consequences that might arise by granting screening to his clients.
2.2.4 Security situation
Mr Hanna said that, although the Special Branch assessment showed that here was no specific threat against the officers at the present time, nobody could predict what would happen in the future in Northern Ireland. If the Inquiry were to rule that his clients’ physical appearance should not be protected, the police officers would be fully unprotected at the end of the Tribunal, and there would be no going back on that fact were the security situation to take a dramatic turn for the worse.
He added that, since 1999, there had been various types of attacks on police officers by dissident republican terrorists who are not on ceasefire.
2.2.5 Real and genuine fears
Mr Hanna said that it could not be claimed with certainty that the motive behind attacks or killings of police officers over the years had never been their evidence at court proceedings. He mentioned the case of one police officer who had given evidence at the Widgery Tribunal and who had been killed 13 years later in 1985. He also said, in his statement to the BSI, Mr Montgomery said that he did in fact believe that his testimony to the Widgery Inquiry would be anonymous.
Mr Hanna submitted that his clients were concerned that covert pictures could be taken of them giving evidence from the Rialto cinema and other buildings where the proceedings might be screened via video link-up.
2.2.6 Potential adverse effects of screening
Mr Hanna said that the purpose of the Tribunal was to establish the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday and that the screening of witnesses from the view of the public would not impact upon the effectiveness of the Inquiry in any way.
He said that the European Court of Human Rights had ruled in Van Mechelen that even in criminal trials, anonymity did not necessarily violate the principles of a fair trial.
2.2.7 Screening of witnesses from family members
Mr Hanna said that the witnesses should be screened from all members of the public and that it would be impractical to differentiate between family members and the general public. He said that neither he nor his clients intended to imply that the families had any paramilitary connections.
2.2.8 Partiality of the Special Branch in security assessments
Mr Hanna said that the fact of the matter was that the Special Branch is the only agency which could provide threat assessments and that their assessment was objective evidence of the genuine fears of his clients.
2.3 Submissions on behalf of the families and wounded
2.3.1 Ignorance of screening possibilities
Mr Treacy said that, if the Inquiry were to conclude that the police officers in question were aware, or ought to have been aware, of the fact that they could have applied for screening at an earlier date, that would inevitably infer that the police officers did not have genuine and reasonable fears for their safety.
He said that the assertion that none of the applicants were previously aware that they could apply for screening was demonstrably false, as one of the applicants, Mr Montgomery, had previously applied for screening in 1999.
Furthermore, he said that it was not believable that some officers would have known about screening and some not, as only a limited number of officers had been called from what is a very close-knit security service.
He added that, given the intense media coverage surrounding the Tribunal and given the fact that police officers would know from the nature of their duties that they could apply for screening in the courts, the contention that officers were ignorant of previous applications for screening was not credible.
2.3.2 Rights under Article 2 of the ECHR
Mr Morgan argued that, in its rulings, the European Court of Human Rights clearly demonstrated that the right to life was a qualified right as opposed to an absolute right that would, for example, require a public authority to abandon or make ineffective any operation on the basis of a risk to life.
2.3.3 Applications made on behalf of the Chief Constable of the RUC
All of the early applications for screening were made by the Chief Constable, on behalf of the applicants, whereas the current applications were made on the officers’ own behalves. Mr Treacy suggested that this meant that a conscious decision was made by the Chief Constable in 1999 or 2000 to select out all those officers for whom it was appropriate to apply for screening. The bulk of the current applicants were not deemed to require such protection.
2.3.4 Security situation
As demonstrated by recent announcements by the Chief Constable and the recent decision to close Ebrington barracks, leading to the lowest number of soldiers stationed in Northern Ireland since the Troubles began, the security situation in Northern Ireland is the best it has been in the past 30 years.
Mr Mansfield submitted that, in view of this, and in view of the fact that in the entire history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, there had never been any attack on witnesses giving evidence at trials or other judicial proceedings, and that there had never been any targeting of police witnesses as a result of their giving evidence, there was no basis for the applicants’ fears.
Although Counsel expressed regret at the fact that police officers had been subjected to attacks over the course of the Troubles, there was no evidence to suggest that testifying at a trial increased the risk of attack in any way.
2.3.5 Genuine and reasonable fears
Ms McDermott asked the Tribunal to determine how many of the current applicants had given evidence in court over the last 30 years, and on how many occasions, as this would help to assess the genuine nature of their fears. She further added that at least two of the applicants, Mr McVicker and Mr McCoubrey, had very high public profiles in Northern Ireland, having given unscreened evidence at serious criminal trials and having appeared regularly, and recently, on television.
None of the six police witnesses who testified at the Widgery Tribunal in 1972 sought anonymity or screening at that time and there had never been any suggestion that they were ever subject to harassment of any kind following their testimony. One of the current applicants, Mr Montgomery, was one of the officers who gave evidence at the Widgery Inquiry, under his own name and without screening. Mr Treacy said that it was preposterous that, in the light of the political and security advances in Northern Ireland over the last 30 years, Mr Montgomery should feel the need for additional protection which he did not require in 1972.
It was further put to the Inquiry that the majority of the current applicants did not live in Derry and therefore did not have the same grounds for their fears as Mr Simpson, whose application for screening was granted by the Tribunal. It was also argued that, given the fact that in a lot of cases, the evidence of the applicants was less than contentious, there was no grounds for them to feel threatened as a result of giving their evidence.
2.3.6 Potential adverse effects of screening
Mr Treacy said that one readily identifiable adverse effect was the fact that Counsel on his side of the Guildhall could not see the witness giving evidence and that the families could no longer see the Tribunal. Furthermore, due to the acoustics of the screening box, the families had difficulty in hearing what the witnesses were saying. Therefore, if the screening application were to succeed, the families would effectively be excluded from one of the more important parts of the Inquiry.
Mr Treacy submitted that a ruling in favour of the applicants could open the doors for the Inquiry to degenerate into a farce with all security witnesses applying for screening, thereby excluding the families and the public from a large part of the Inquiry and damaging the principle and practice of open justice.
It was further submitted that, contrary to Mr Hanna’s contention, the role of the Inquiry was not only to establish the truth, but to restore public confidence and that the Tribunal’s credibility could be undermined by the ‘drip effect’ of the successive applications concerning anonymity, venue and screening. If the Inquiry was going to have to make judgments based in part on the demeanour of witnesses, a large number of whom were screened from public view, this would increase the risk that the public would not understand or comprehend the Inquiry’s conclusions.
2.3.7 Screening of witnesses from family members
Mr Mansfield asked the Tribunal if it would be possible to allow the family members to view the screened witnesses.
2.3.8 Application for screening on behalf of the soldiers
Mr Mansfield called on the soldiers’ legal representatives to clarify as soon as possible whether or not they would be applying for screening on their clients’ behalves.
2.4 ruling
Lord Saville said, although the lateness of the applications was regrettable, it did not show that the applicants’ fears were without foundation. He said that, unlike the soldiers, the police officers did not have the protection of anonymity and had to live in Northern Ireland where hundreds of their colleagues had been killed by terrorists over the last 30 years. Although the terrorist threat is reduced, it still exists, and the future is unknown.
He explained that the police officers’ fears stemmed not from the evidence they would give on the day, but from the opportunity to identify them that would be afforded to dissident groups were they not to be screened.
He said that the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had reasonable genuine fears for their safety that could be alleviated to a significant degree through screening.
Lord Saville underscored the fact that the issue of screening was of real importance since, in a public inquiry such as the BSI, the public should be able to view and judge the conduct of those giving evidence. However, he did not believe that public confidence in the BSI would be undermined to such an extent as to prevail over the reasonable fears of the police officers.
Lord Saville allowed the application, adding that, although the Tribunal had looked at the confidential material provided to it, its decision was based on the material available to all.
Timetable
of proceedings
Monday 4th: paragraph 1
Thursday 8th: paragraph 2
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
