British Irish RIGHTS WATCH

# BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY #
Week 48

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TOP 21 - 25 JANUARY 2002 TOP

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

This week, the Tribunal heard evidence from John Hume MP, who was MP for Foyle at the time of Bloody Sunday.  Mr Hume was not present at the march having withdrawn his support due to concerns over the potential brutal conduct of the Parachute Regiment.

Kathleen Keville gave evidence concerning the taped statements she took from eyewitnesses on 30 and 31 January 1972, and Bernard Doyle, who did not attend the march, told the Inquiry of what he saw and heard from his home in Glenfada Park.  Thomas Barr, who was involved with NICRA at the time, was also absent from the march, having been stopped and detained by soldiers on his way to Derry to attend the march.

William O’Connell was involved in the taking of witness statements in the days following Bloody Sunday.  He was also one of those responsible for setting up a listening station to tape army and police communications on the day.

James Porter taped army and police communications throughout Bloody Sunday, evidence which had been offered to, and refused by, the Widgery Tribunal.  He told the Inquiry how he had been threatened with charges of spying by officials at the earlier tribunal.

Stephen Peak was fired upon by a gunman he identified as a soldier in a derelict building near Abbey Park and Doctor McCabe attended to some of the ‘minor’ injuries sustained.  He also gave evidence regarding the treatment of bodies in the morgue.

Sean McDermott and Hugh Deenan were in the Order of the Knights of Malta and attended to the wounded on Bloody Sunday.  Hugh Deenan saw Martin McGuinness in a portakabin in the Creggan in the early afternoon, and did not see him leave the area.

Pat Cashman was a photographer with the Irish Press who was hit by a rubber bullet aimed directly at him.  Christopher Doherty witnessed a lot of the shooting, and saw Mr Nash being shot.  He was arrested in Glenfada Park North and taken to Fort George.

Julien Daly was fired upon from the Walls on the day.  He also heard somebody suggesting that a wounded man should be taken to Letterkenny Hospital.

Noel Millar witnessed Barney McGuigan being shot, and Charlie Lomberton saw Michael Kelly being injured at the rubber barricade before later seeing the bodies of Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy.

Charles McGuigan, whose father, Barney, was killed on the day made an appeal to the soldiers responsible for his father’s death to tell the truth about what had happened.

OTHER ISSUES

Lord Saville announced that the Tribunal would relocate to Britain to hear the soldiers’ evidence in August / September 2002.  The exact location of the move is yet to be determined.  A video-link will be set up between the new location and Derry so that people in the city can watch the proceedings.  The facilities in Derry are to be maintained so that the Inquiry can return without delay to complete as much of their work as possible.

Congratulations were extended by the Tribunal to Mr Brian Kennedy, acting for Mr Mickey Bradley and Mr Mickey Bridge, who was promoted to senior counsel before Christmas.

A full transcript of proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk. 

1.                  John Hume MP’s Evidence

1.1      Questions on behalf of the Tribunal

John Hume was MP for Foyle at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He withdrew his support for the civil rights march that took place in Derry on Bloody Sunday following his experiences at Magilligan Strand.

1.1.1        Background to the civil rights movement

Mr Hume explained the background to the Civil Rights Movement and the reason why both the Magilligan and the Bloody Sunday marches had been called.  He said that the injustices in Northern Ireland at that time were dreadful and that Derry was the worst hit of all.  Elected politicians had been unable to achieve any changes to the situation from the Unionist Government.

1.1.1.1  Gerrymandering and discrimination in voting

Derry was 70% nationalist and 30% unionist, yet it was governed by Unionists by a system of gerrymander from 1920 until Stormont fell.  They divided the town into three districts:  two of those districts were Unionist, although they only contained 30% of the voters, and elected 6 councillors each.  The nationalist district, which contained 70% of the voters, elected eight. 

There was discrimination in voting as only rate or rent payers were entitled to a vote; somebody living with their parents was not entitled to vote, whereas the owner of a limited company was entitled to six votes in addition to their personal vote.  On one occasion, the mayor of the city owned seven limited companies so he controlled 42 votes plus his own which made 43. 

When Mr Hume was elected to Westminster, he was the first ever from the nationalist community to be elected to represent the Foyle.

1.1.1.2  Housing and unemployment

Local government in those days controlled housing so there was serious discrimination in housing as well.  Families had to double or treble up in houses and Derry had the highest level of unemployment in Britain and Ireland.  The unemployment rate was 35%.

1.1.1.3  Internment

According to Mr Hume, internment without trial was introduced by the Government of the day because people were seeking civil rights.  This had in turn increased the anger of people considerably and led to the marches.  The government had interned so many people they had to build a new prison on Magilligan Strand and the march at Magilligan was an attempt to show those interned without trial that they were not forgotten.

1.1.1.4  Ethos of the civil rights movement

 

All of these injustices combined led to the civil rights movement of the 1970s which was inspired by the civil rights movement in the USA, led by Martin Luther King. 

The movement was totally committed to peaceful methods.  It was not a political organisation and had support from many different parties, its objective being equality of treatment for all sectors of the community. 

1.1.2        Magilligan Strand

Mr Hume explained that his experiences at Magilligan on the weekend before Bloody Sunday had led him to withdraw his support for the civil rights march in Derry on 30 January 1972.

He described his astonishment at finding the British Army set up on the beach behind barbed wire as the very reason for deciding to hold the march on the beach was to demonstrate in the clearest possible way the marchers’ intention to avoid trouble of any description.  The view was that the peacefulness of the march would enable the message of the civil rights movement to get through to the world.

He told the Inquiry that the army attacked the marchers with CS gas and rubber bullets without any provocation whatsoever.

1.1.2.1  Confrontation with soldier

Mr Hume felt that the key piece of evidence he had to give to the BSI resulted from an altercation with a British Officer on Magilligan Strand.  Mr Hume asked the officer why the army was attacking a peaceful crowd.  The officer responded ‘Your Government sent us here’.  Mr Hume said that this was clear proof that it was the Northern Ireland Government, as opposed to Westminster, that had ordered the army onto the beach and given them the order to attack.

According to Mr Hume, this is the key question that the BSI should be looking to answer about Bloody Sunday:  who sent the British Army onto the streets of Derry and what orders were given to them?

1.1.2.2  Lack of army discipline

Mr Hume was asked whether he recalled an incident on the beach, given in evidence by Mr Bernard Gillespie, when an army officer had to beat a soldier’s hands with a baton to make him drop a baton gun he was firing indiscriminately at the crowd.  Mr Hume said he remembered having a strong argument with the Commanding Officer about soldiers doing exactly such things.

1.1.3        Withdrawal of support for Derry civil rights march

Mr Hume felt that if the army was firing rubber bullets and gas on a beach with no form of provocation from the civil rights marchers, then there could be no telling what they would do on the streets of a city.  He therefore withdrew his support for the civil rights march in Derry, despite having previously agreed to speak at the selfsame march.

During the week following Magilligan, he called a meeting of his own party members in the Ardoyne Hotel in Derry to tell them that the party now opposed the march due to fears for the safety of civilians arising out of the attitude of the army at Magilligan.  He also met privately with some of the march organisers to share his fears with them.

Mr Hume said that he did not take part in the march, did not support it and did not help organise it in any way.  He felt that his views regarding the march were widely known.

1.1.4        Politics of the civil rights movement

Mr Hume rejected the suggestion that he ever held or expressed the view that the Derry Civil Rights movement was politically dangerous.

He said that there existed a number of different civil rights movements at that time:  the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which was Belfast-based, the Derry Civil Rights Association and the Derry Citizens Action Committee.  The latter had been set up to counter the perceived Belfast bias of NICRA:  it was made up of people who were from Derry and knew the city and the area.

Mr Hume said that he had some differences of opinion on political matters with the Derry Civil Rights Association but that this was normal given the fact that it was made up of people from different political groups.

1.1.5        IRA assurances

Mr Hume said that he did not receive any assurances from four members of the IRA that the IRA would confine itself to the Creggan.  He said that he would not even have known four members of the IRA at that time as they were a very secret organisation and people did not know who they were, apart from Martin McGuinness.

1.1.6        Events of Bloody Sunday

Mr Hume said that people had come up to his house in a panic, trying to find out what had happened to members of their family.  He went to the hospital to try to find out what was going on, where he was initially stopped by soldiers but eventually allowed through.   Dr Harvey gave him the list of names of the dead which he brought home.

The McDaid family was at his home on his return.  Mr Hume stated that he knew Michael McDaid well.  As Michael’s name was not on the list, Mr Hume reassured his parents that Michael was not dead and they left and went home.  Shortly afterwards, Dr Harvey rang to tell him that Michael’s body was indeed at the hospital, and Mr Hume then had to go down to tell Michael’s parents that he had made a mistake and that Michael was dead.

Mr Hume said that Bloody Sunday was the worst day in the history of the city in his lifetime.

1.1.7        Statements and interviews

Mr Hume said that there was an enormous amount of media present after Bloody Sunday and he gave a number of statements.  However, he was not personally involved in taking statements from eyewitnesses.

1.1.8        Bodies secreted away

Mr Hume did not remember any rumour about two additional bodies being secreted away.  He further said that if there had been any truth in such a rumour, people would have found out as such a thing could not happen secretly in a small city like Derry.

1.1.9        Security services transmission recordings

Mr Hume said that he had not been given tapes by Mr Porter to present to the Widgery Tribunal.  He was opposed to the Widgery Tribunal and asked people not to give evidence as he had no faith in its independence or impartiality:  a British judge who had himself been a commander in the British Army should not have been carrying out an inquiry into actions of the British Armed Forces in Derry.

1.1.10    August 1971 arrest and subsequent court case

Mr Hume said that in the August prior to Bloody Sunday, the British Army had arrived suddenly and unexpectedly on the streets of the Bogside in very large numbers.  The people had all come out of their houses to see what was going on and there was a lot of tension. 

Mr Hume had asked everyone to sit down on the street whilst he went to talk to the army.  He had told the army that their presence was causing a large amount of tension and that if they left, the people would return to their homes.   The commander thanked him for the information and the army left and the people got up to go home. 

However, as they got to the top of the street, there was another huge group of soldiers coming into the area.  Mr Hume got everyone to sit down again and approached the army.  As he approached, he was fired upon by a water canon which knocked him to the ground.  He explained what he had told to the Commander who responded that he was in charge.  Mr Hume was knocked over once again, lifted up and arrested and charged. 

Mr Hume refused to pay the fine imposed by the courts and challenged the ruling successfully.  Mr Hume felt his appeal was a very important case as it ruled that it was unconstitutional for the British Army to act under the laws of Northern Ireland.  They should in fact have been acting under the laws of the British Parliament.  As a result of that ruling, the British Parliament had to introduce some rushed legislation to legalise retrospectively all that the British Army had done previously in Northern Ireland, including Bloody Sunday.

According to Mr Hume, this case stands as clear evidence of the fact that the British Army on the streets of Derry on Bloody Sunday was being commanded from Stormont.

1.2      Questions on behalf of the Families and Wounded

1.2.1        Army aggression on Magilligan Strand

Mr Hume said that he did not believe that the soldiers ‘ran amok’ at Magilligan:  their Commanding Officers were with them and obviously told them how to behave.  He also said he assumed that the officers themselves must have got the order to behave in such a manner from the Department of Defence.

1.2.2        Official complaint regarding army aggression on Magilligan             Strand

Mr Hume made public statements about the army behaviour on Magilligan Strand but no official complaint, as there was nobody to make such a complaint to.  The marches were precisely against the treatment afforded to the people of Northern Ireland by the Government of Northern Ireland, and it was that selfsame Government that was commanding the troops to act in this way.

1.2.3        Official enquiries made to the British and Stormont Governments

Mr Hume could not remember whether he made any official enquiries concerning the body responsible for dictating policy in relation to the deployment of armed forces in Northern Ireland at that time.  However, he never received any information on this issue from the Stormont or Westminster governments, nor did he get any answer concerning the body responsible for sending the army onto Magilligan Strand and the streets of Derry.

1.2.4        Opposition to civil rights march

Mr Hume was told that a number of witnesses, including two of the wounded, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley, were not aware at the time of his opposition to the march.  Mr Hume said that he felt that people did know of his views, as he had spoken to his own party members and to the organisers of the march.  He did not recall specifically making a public statement on the issue or a statement to the press, but felt that people did know his views as they knew to find him at home on the day.

1.3       Questions on Behalf of NICRA

1.3.1        Support for the civil rights march on Bloody Sunday

Mr Hume said that up until the march at Magilligan he was fully supportive of the Derry march due to take place on 30 January.  It was his experiences at Magilligan which led him to oppose the march.

1.3.2        Meeting in the Ardoyne Hotel

Apart from party members, Mr Hume could not remember clearly who was present at the meeting, although he believed that the late Father Mulvey was there.  He met with the executive committee of the civil rights association on a separate occasion.

1.3.3        Meeting with Civil Rights Association members

Mr Hume believes that he met with Brigid Bond who was organiser of the Derry Civil Rights Association and informed her of his opposition to the march.

1.3.4        Meeting with Superintendent Lagan

Mr Hume said that he had contact with Mr Lagan throughout the whole period and would have been very aware of his views on the issue.  He did not remember the specifics of the conversations but believed that he would have complained about what happened and the fact that the army had taken over from the police.  Mr Hume did not remember Mr Lagan expressing his personal views about the upcoming march on the 30 January.

1.3.5        Sit down protest in Derry in August 1971 and subsequent charge

Mr Hume said that this protest was a spontaneous reaction to the fact that so many soldiers appeared in the streets suddenly without reason.  He said that following his arrest he was brought in front of the Derry Justices.  Charlie Hill QC, his barrister, brought the case further. 

Mr Hume believed that the ruling was very significant as it made clear that the British Army were acting under the command of the Northern Ireland Government, i.e. a government who were treating the minority of the people of Northern Ireland unjustly and could not be guaranteed to use the army impartially.

1.4       Questions on behalf of the soldiers

1.4.1        Magilligan Strand

1.4.1.1  Decision to walk on the beach

Mr Hume said the primary reason for holding the march on the beach was to demonstrate the marchers’ commitment to peaceful means.  He agreed with counsel that a further factor of the decision to hold the march on the beach was the fact that there would be nothing for the civilians to potentially throw at the army.

1.4.1.2              Aggression from marchers

Mr Hume did not believe that people on the march had been planning to make an assault on the fence on the beach, as nobody knew such a fence existed until the day.  Indeed, marchers were shocked to discover the fence preventing them from walking as they had hoped to get as close to the detainees as possible to make them aware that the march was taking place.

He explained that due to the ban on asking questions in the House of Commons about discrimination in Northern Ireland, the streets were the only place people were able to ask for equality for all sections of the community.

Mr Hume did not recall anybody suggesting that the marchers should ‘not break ranks and march on the fence’.  However, he felt that all that would have been meant by such a statement was for people to keep calm and walk together as a big crowd towards a meeting point.

He rejected the suggestion that there was hand to hand fighting on both sides and said the aggression was started by the soldiers.  They were fired upon with gas and rubber bullets.  Nobody would have attempted anything on a beach, as there would have been nowhere to run to aside from into the water.

1.4.1.3       Altercation with army officer

Mr Hume agreed with Counsel for the soldiers that the point the Commanding Officer on the beach was trying to make to him was that he and his men were following orders.  Mr Hume reiterated his belief that the key question was who was giving those orders. 

Contrary to the suggestion of Counsel for the soldiers, when the officer said to Mr Hume that the orders came from ‘Your Government’ he could not have been talking about the Westminster Government as Mr Hume was not in Westminster until 1983.  At the time in question, he was an MP in the Parliament of Northern Ireland.

1.4.2        Opposition to Bloody Sunday march

Mr Hume said his fears for Bloody Sunday were due to the potential army response to the march, not to the potential violence from marchers on the day.  He said that there were always young people on the marches who lost their temper and threw stones, but that the vast majority of marchers were peaceful.  He was worried that there would be a lot of gas and rubber bullets. 

However, despite his concerns about possible behaviour from the army, he never imagined that they would open fire on the marchers with live ammunition and that 13 innocent people would lose their lives.

1.4.3        Meeting at the Ardoyne Hotel

Mr Hume confirmed that the SDLP organised the meeting.  He could not remember how many people attended.

1.4.4        Rumour about bodies secreted away

Mr Hume said that there was a rumour on the day about additional bodies being secreted away.  However, this was due to the extent of confusion and shock over what had happened.  He said that the suggestion that the people had guns was nonsense.  Anybody who knew anything about Northern Ireland would know that if any of the people killed had been members of the IRA, they would have had an IRA funeral.  This has always and will always be the case. 

To this day, he has never heard of any IRA gunman being shot on Bloody Sunday.  If there had been any such activity, he would have heard about it from the people of the city.  Mr Hume went on to say that on occasions where the IRA had killed people they did not intend to, they had always publicly told the truth about their involvement.

2.                  Kathleen keville’s evidence

At the time of Bloody Sunday, Ms Keville was staying with Brigid Bond, the organiser of the Derry Civil Rights Association.  She had come to Derry as a researcher with an American film crew making a film about Northern Ireland, although the film crew had left Derry by 30th January.  She had a tape recorder and tapes for a project of her own which was to be an oral history of ordinary people living through the Troubles. 

2.1              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

2.1.1              Preparation for the march

Ms Keville helped to make approximately 100 armbands for stewards on the march but could not remember how those stewards were recruited.

2.1.2      IRA assurances

Ms Keville was not aware from general conversation what the IRA’s plans were for the day and never heard any concerns expressed about the possibility that the IRA might use the march as cover to attack the army.

2.1.3              Rerouting the march

Ms Keville remembers Mrs Bond receiving word from Superintendent Lagan that the march would not be allowed to proceed to the Guildhall and was aware that that the new destination was to be Free Derry Corner.

2.1.4              Arrival of the army

Ms Keville was stewarding the march at barrier 14 when Ms Ann Hope was struck by an object.  She brought her to a house on Chamberlain Street where she received treatment from a Knight of Malta.  Whilst in the house, Ms Keville went upstairs in the house to look out the window from where she could see the waste ground bordering Rossville Street. 

She saw two army vehicles arrive on Rossville Street from the direction of William Street which made no sense to her as the disturbance on William Street had broken up after the army’s use of water canon and the deployment of CS gas.  As soon as the vehicles stopped, the soldiers got out and in one continuous motion began to shoot in the direction of Free Derry Corner.  At first she thought that they were firing rubber bullets but then saw their rifles.

2.1.5              Tape-recorded interviews

Ms Keville made her way back to Ms Bond’s house which was full of people.  The suggestion was made that she make tape recorded statements from witnesses.  Ms Keville was taken to Dr McClean’s surgery where she made the recordings on the night of Bloody Sunday and the following day.

No instructions were given to her as to how the interviews were to be conducted and she did not go into them with an agenda.  The tapes had not been edited to omit references to a civilian gunman.  Ms Keville said she was alone whilst taping the interviews, with the exception of the first few for which Ms Bond’s 11-year-old son was also present.

She did not know how people had heard that she was taping interviews, but there were people waiting for her when she arrived and a queue persisted throughout the time she took interviews.  Nobody refused to be taped and, apart from one incident she vaguely recollected involving a young man not wanting to give his surname, nobody expressed unwillingness to give their names for fear, for example, of being arrested for rioting.

In total, Ms Keville personally recorded seven tapes of interviews.  The Tribunal is also in possession of a further two tapes recorded by other people, apparently with the use of Ms Keville’s machine.  The tapes were left with the Bonds after Bloody Sunday and Ms Keville had no involvement in transcribing them.

2.1.6        Notebook

Ms Keville recorded the names of the interviewees in a notebook, along with a summary of their relevant evidence.  The original copy of this notebook was provided to the BSI.  The only noticeable discrepancy between the tapes and the interviews is that the last interview noted in Ms Keville’s notebook does not feature on the tape.  Ms Keville was not sure how this occurred, but believed she could have forgotten to press record as she had done on one previous occasion.

2.1.7        Hand-written statements

Ms Keville also helped take written witness statements in a school hall in Derry.  She was not given any specific instructions about how to take them nor was she told to leave anything out from people’s accounts of the day.

2.2       Questions on Behalf of the Soldiers

2.2.1             ‘Ritualised rioting’

Ms Keville wrote in her statement for the Inquiry that she was aware of ‘ritualised rioting’ that took place between the Derry youths and the army at 4.00pm nearly every day.  She explained that her choice of words reflected how she had heard the incidents being described to her by locals:  the rioting occurred like clockwork, starting at 4.00 and finishing at 4.15.  She was not attempting to trivialise what was going on.  She regarded it at the time as a gesture of anger.

2.2.2             Notebooks

Ms Keville said it had originally been her intention to take notes during the interviews.  However, she had felt it more appropriate to pay attention to the people talking to her, as it would be a form of discourtesy to take notes whilst they were speaking and might distract them in what they were saying. 

Within 48 hours of taping the interviews, she listened to them and tried to make summaries of the salient points of each interview so that they could be easily categorised.  It was her belief that NICRA was going to transcribe the tapes and get signatures from witnesses.  She believes the reason this never happened is that she took the tape recorder when she returned to London, and there must not have been another one available.

3.                  SEAN McDERMOTT’S evidence

3.1              Questions on behalf of the Tribunal

Mr McDermott was a Knight of Malta who attended to some of the injured on Bloody Sunday.

3.1.1              Barrier 14

Mr McDermott could no longer recall a number of the incidents he described in his contemporaneous statement, such as two men being shot near Barrier 14.  He clarified for the Inquiry that he had meant to say in his 1972 statement that he saw the army firing gas canisters at the crowd, but had erroneously said the opposite.  He did not hear or see any nail bombs or petrol bombs during the time he spent at Barrier 14.

3.1.2              Columbcille Court

When the army opened fire, Mr McDermott ran to Columbcille Court where he saw a lone soldier who raised his gun and aimed it at him but did not fire.  Throughout this time he could hear high velocity fire.

3.1.3              Gerard McKinney

Mr McDermott treated a man on the steps outside Glenfada Park.  He originally believed him to have had a heart attack, so he and Robert Cadman administered mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and performed a heart massage.  However, it transpired that the man, whom he later discovered to have been Gerard McKinney, had been struck dead by a bullet. 

3.1.4              Glenfada Park North

Mr McDermott followed a fellow Knight of Malta, Eibhlín Lafferty, into Glenfada Park North.  She had her hands raised and was shouting: “first aid, don’t shoot.”  Mr McDermott saw sparks on the ground around Ms Lafferty’s feet caused by bullets striking the ground.  He then saw three other bodies lying in the courtyard, including the body of Jim Wray.  There were two soldiers in the corner of the courtyard who appeared to be laughing.

He shouted for people to call an ambulance, and it arrived approximately 30 minutes later.  He recalled two bodies already being in the ambulance when it arrived.

3.2  Questions on behalf of the families and wounded

3.2.1      Jim Wray

Mr Harvey QC, representing the family of Jim Wray, extended their thanks for Mr McDermott’s efforts to save him.  He further asked why Mr McDermott had failed to mention Mr Wray’s name in his 1972 statement.  Mr McDermott thought that he did not recognise Mr Wray at the time, due to his confusion and panic.

3.3      Questions on Behalf of the Soldiers

3.3.1        Collective memory

Due to the fact that there was some difference between Mr McDermott’s statement to the Tribunal and his contemporaneous taped statement, Mr P. Clarke questioned him about how he distinguished between what he actually remembered, what he saw himself and what he had heard from others.  Mr McDermott said that today was the first time he had heard the taped interview and that he could not even recollect making such a taped statement.  What he had told the Tribunal was what he now recalled of the events.

3.3.2        Glenfada Park

Mr McDermott had stated in his contemporaneous statement that he had seen seven bodies in Glenfada Park.  He said he believed he was mistaken on this as he now clearly remembers seeing only three.

4.                  BERNARD DOYLE’S EVIDENCE

4.1              Questions on behalf of the Inquiry

4.1.1              Glenfada Park North

Mr Doyle did not go to the march and was gardening in his front garden in Glenfada Park North when he heard high velocity shots from an Armalite from the Columbcille Court area.  He saw people running from Glenfada Park North across Columbcille Court in the direction of his house.  A number of those people ran into his house for shelter.  He saw Jim Wray and beckoned to him to go into his house.  However, Jim Wray continued past his house and was tripped up by a soldier who was chasing him.  He said he saw the soldier pointing an Armalite at Mr Wray but did not see him being shot.

4.1.2              Petrol bombs

Mr Doyle said he saw two petrol bombs being thrown at soldiers from a derelict flat at the top of the Rossville Flats after he saw Jim Wray.

4.1.3      IRA involvement

Mr Doyle said that he had a friend, Mr Jim Doherty, who was in the Provisional IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He said that Mr Doherty had told him that the Provisional IRA had been given the order to stay away.  He said he would not answer any further questions about the Provisional IRA or the Official IRA.

4.2                   Questions on behalf of the soldiers

4.2.1             IRA involvement

Mr Doyle said that he had seen no Official IRA or Provisional IRA members with weapons on the day and said that the army were the only ones to open fire.

5.                  THOMAS WILLIAM BARR’S EVIDENCE

Thomas Barr was involved with NICRA at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He was stopped and detained on his way to the march in Derry and therefore did not make it to the march.

5.1              Questions on Behalf of the Tribunal

5.1.1              NICRA activities

Mr Barr attended one NICRA Executive Committee meeting prior to Bloody Sunday on behalf of his brother who had been interned. 

5.1.2              Knowledge of IRA

Mr Barr was asked about his knowledge of IRA membership and activities in Derry and Strabane.  He told the Inquiry that it was widely known that members of NICRA had made contact with the IRA and had been assured that the march would be peaceful:  he believes he got this information at Brigid Bond’s house, but further stated that everybody knew that this was the situation.  He himself did not know who was a member of a paramilitary organisation at that time.

5.2              Questions on Behalf of the Soldiers

5.2.1              NICRA activities

Mr Barr said that, in addition to the Executive Committee meeting he attended on behalf of his brother, he was also involved in fundraising activities for NICRA in London.

5.2.2              Arrest and detention on 30 January 1972

In the absence of documentation concerning Mr Barr’s arrest and subsequent detention and interrogation at Ballykelly, Mr Glasgow asked Mr Barr why he believed he had been stopped.  Mr Barr said that he did not know whether the sole reason he and his three companions were arrested was to prevent them going to the march.  He did believe that the soldiers had got orders from the police to detain them.

5.2.3              Knowledge of the IRA

Mr Barr reiterated that he would only be able to speculate as to who might have been a member of a paramilitary organisation at the time of Bloody Sunday.  He was not prepared to do that.

6.                  William Francis O’Connell’s Evidence

At the time of Bloody Sunday, Mr O’Connell was a committee member of the Internee Dependents’ Fund, set up to raise money for dependents of those interned.  He was also secretary of the Derry Citizens’ Council, the aim of which was to prevent the regular rioting in the William Street area.  Prior to 1969 he had been involved in organising youth activities with the St Eugene’s Boys Club and the County Derry Amateur Boxing Board, through which he knew two of the dead, Jackie Duddy and William Nash.  He was also a founding member of the SDLP and was secretary to the party in Derry.  He later became major of Derry.

6.1  QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

6.1.1              Magilligan Strand

Mr O’Connell told the Inquiry that he was present at the march at Magilligan and had seen marchers being attacked by soldiers and sustaining severe head wounds from soldiers’ batons.  He did not agree that the use of force by soldiers only began after the crowd attempted to cross the wire fence set up by soldiers on the beach and believed that the soldiers were intent on stopping the peaceful march.

6.1.2              Rumours of a confrontation between the army and the IRA

Mr O’Connell said that, following Magilligan, there was a general expectation that there would be some sort of a confrontation around Aggro corner during the march on Bloody Sunday.  The general feeling was that this was what the army anticipated and that they would try to encourage the IRA to confront them.  He suggested that the expectation was that there might be some form of ‘shooting war’.

6.1.3              Listening stations

As a result of the general sense of trepidation, the Internee Dependents’ Fund decided to set up two listening stations in houses in the area to listen into army and police radio communications on Bloody Sunday.  Mr O’Connell said that one of those stations was operated by Mr Porter although, under cross examination, he agreed that Mr Porter may have established his post prior to Bloody Sunday, as part of his duties for the Derry Citizen’s Council. 

Mr O’Connell provided the Tribunal with the name and telephone number of the person living in the house in Jacqueline Way where the other listening post was established.  It was his belief that the tapes made at the second listening post had been provided to Mr Porter.

6.1.4              Rossville Street

Mr O’Connell said that he saw two Saracens entering Rossville Street, one of which drove across the waste ground and stopped beyond Eden Place and the other of which headed towards the Rossville Flats.  He recalls the second Saracen hitting a civilian, whom he now believes to be Alanna Burke, as it drew to a halt.  Soldiers got out of the vehicle and started to fan out across Rossville Street.

6.1.5              Victoria Barracks police station

Mr O’Connell was sent with Michael Durey to Victoria Barracks by John Hume in order to find out what had happened to the people who had been arrested.  He recalled seeing a number of police officers at the barracks, along with Superintendent Frank Lagan who did not look very happy.  Mr Lagan informed him that the people had been taken to Fort George and would be released soon.  He further told Mr O’Connell that they had been treated all right.  There was no mention of anybody having been shot on the day.

6.1.6              Sisters-in-laws’ eye-witness accounts

Mr Clarke asked Mr O’Connell for the names of his sisters-in-law and their friend who had told him what they had seen whilst sheltering in the Long Tower Church with journalist Simon Winchester and local man Matt Morrison.  Mr O’Connell informed the Tribunal that his sisters-in-law were Myra McGinley and Bernadette McAnee.  He wrote the name of their friend on a piece of paper for the Inquiry.

6.1.7      Eye-witness statements

Mr O’Connell was involved in the decision by the Derry Citizens Council (DCC) to take statements from eyewitnesses to establish what had happened.  The chairperson of the DCC, Michael Cavanan, was also involved in taking statements.  They arranged for two QCs to take the statements.  Mr O’Connell believed that Charlie Hill QC was one of those appointed.  He recalled having personally taken approximately 20 to 30 statements, although the total number was more sizeable.  These statements were different to those taken by NICRA and were provided to the Widgery Tribunal directly.

The statements were taken over a period of more than seven days following Bloody Sunday.  He recalled some statements having been taken in the Ardoyne Hotel on Northland Road.  Mr O’Connell acted as runner for the QCs on one day, and subsequently took statements himself by going from door to door in the Rossville Flats and along Rossville Street and asking people to provide him with a statement.  Nobody he approached refused to give him information about particular things they had seen that day.

Mr O’Connell had attached a copy of one of the statements he took to his own statement for the Inquiry.  He agreed to make copies of the statements still in his possession available for the Inquiry.

6.2              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES AND WOUNDED

6.2.1              Rumours of a confrontation between the army and the IRA

Mr O’Connell clarified that he had not expected the IRA to be drawn into shooting at the army.  However, he said that following the attack on the marchers at Magilligan, there was a feeling that the army was in some way trying to encourage a confrontation between the IRA and the army on Bloody Sunday.  He confirmed that he had not received any information suggesting that the IRA was willing to be drawn into such a confrontation.

6.3              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SOLDIERS

6.3.1              General sense of fear in the lead up to the Derry march

Mr Glasgow suggested that the fear that something bad would happen on the march that Mr O’Connell spoke about in his statement referred to the possible ‘shooting war’ between the soldiers and the IRA.  Mr O’Connell said that this was not the case and that the fear he described related to the expectation that the Paras would behave in the same way they had done on Magilligan Strand.

6.3.2              Listening stations

Mr O’Connell said that listening posts were common in Derry at the time and that anyone who had a radio listened in to the army and the police.  The listening station he set up was set up the night before the Derry march.  He had been previously been informed that the tapes made at this station had been given to the BSI, but found out recently that they had in fact been given to Mr Porter.

The recordings made of army and RUC transmissions were to be used as a record of what happened on the day.  Mr O’Connell said that there was no intention to pass the tapes on to any other party, nor did this occur.

6.3.3              Anonymity of witnesses

Mr Glasgow asked Mr O’Connell why he had felt the need to protect the identity of two of the people he named for the Inquiry by writing their names on a piece of paper.  Mr O’Connell said that he was respecting the wishes of the person who made the recordings.  He did not know whether other people were apprehensive or reluctant to come forward.

6.3.4              Rioting in William Street

Mr O’Connell heard rioting in William Street in the early stages of the afternoon as the march approached the barriers in William Street and Upper James Street.  He himself was at Aggro Corner, at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street.  He described hearing the sound of banging and breaking glass.  He did not recall hearing rubber bullets, but felt that he would have heard them had they been fired.

Mr Glasgow asked whether there could be any other reason apart from the level of noise from the rioting that would have prevented him hearing the two live shots that were fired approximately 75 yards behind him, injuring two people.  Mr O’Connell felt that the derelict buildings between him and where the shots were fired, coupled with the noise from the rioting would have muffled the sound of the shots.

6.3.5              Conversation with RUC officer

Mr O’Connell had made a remark to an RUC officer on the day that from then on, he would always have to wear his gun in Derry.  Mr O’Connell said that he made this remark because he was upset and angry about what he had seen on the day.  He felt that the actions of the army had left the RUC with a very difficult legacy in which they would have to work in the future.

6.3.6              Sisters-in-laws’ eye-witness accounts

Mr Glasgow told Mr O’Connell that, contrary to what Mr O’Connell’s sisters-in-law told him at the time, Mr Winchester had told the Inquiry that he did not feel that the shots that they all witnessed came from the city Walls.  Mr O’Connell reiterated that the women had told him that they had been fired on from the Walls which would have been very prominent on the left-hand side of the churchyard in which they were sheltering.

6.3.7              General feeling towards the army in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday

In his statement to the BSI, Mr O’Connell wrote that in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, nobody had any sympathy about anything that might happen to the Paras in the future.  He disagreed with the fact that this lack of concern existed prior to the events of Bloody Sunday, recalling occasions when people from the nationalist community attended to soldiers who had been shot.  He further disagreed with Mr Glasgow’s suggestion that crowds cheered when bodies of soldiers were carried away.

7.                  JAMES ANTHONY PORTER’S EVIDENCE

Mr Porter is a radio enthusiast and listened in to army and RUC communications in the years leading up to Bloody Sunday.  He listened in to these transmissions on Bloody Sunday from his shop at 38 William Street and provided copies of his taped recordings to both the Widgery Inquiry and the BSI.

7.1              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

7.1.1              Military observation post on William Street

Mr Porter owned another shop at 26 William Street, the upper part of which was derelict.  He told the Inquiry that the top floor of this shop had been used as a military observation post since 1971, as it afforded a view onto William Street and into the Bogside.  People had seen army faces in the windows of the attic, causing it to be bombed on two occasions. 

Mr Porter described how, on occasions prior to Bloody Sunday, he had seen the army arrive in Macari’s Lane to the side of the building in an armoured Pig, climb onto the roof of the Pig and use a ladder to gain access to the building.  Mr Porter had seen army activity above his shop during the six months leading up to Bloody Sunday.

The building opposite above McLaughlin’s shoe store was also used as an observation post and it was from that building that a man named Starr had been shot on the corner of Chamberlain Street, prior to Bloody Sunday.

Mr Porter’s shop had a sign outside with the name ECKO which was a television brand at that time.  Mr Porter believes that the call sign ‘Echo’, identified on the recordings made on Bloody Sunday, might have been transmitting from 26 William Street, as the army would indicate that they were looking out from a building in William Street and that they were observing the Bogside.   ‘Echo’ was also used as the call sign from the Embassy Building.

7.1.2              Listening station

Mr Porter told the Inquiry that he had listened to police transmissions since 1968.  He listened in for two reasons:  firstly, he believed that history was being made in Northern Ireland at that time and wanted to get first class information about what was happening.  Secondly, he used the transmissions to protect his property:  he explained that if a riot occurred in or around William Street the police would usually telephone Protestant key holders to inform them of the riot so that they could try to protect their premises.  However, they never called Catholic key holders.  As Mr Porter was a Catholic, he decided to have his own hotline to the security forces so that he could go to his shop if he heard of any trouble.

Mr Porter regularly taped the recordings.  He had, for example, taped all the transmissions during the Battle of the Bogside and had provided the tapes to the Scarman Tribunal.

7.1.3        Whereabouts of the tapes made on Bloody Sunday

Mr Porter confirmed Mr O’Connell’s testimony to the Tribunal that the tapes made at the other listening station that was active on Bloody Sunday had been given to him.  The originals of his own 17 or 18 tapes were deposited with a friend in the Republic of Ireland for safekeeping.  The tapes made by the other listening post were identical to those made by Mr Porter and as such were kept in his shop in case anybody wanted to listen to them.  These tapes were destroyed, along with photographs and an army baton, in July 1972 when Mr Porter’s shop was petrol bombed.

7.1.4        Recordings of transmissions on 28th January 1972

Mr Porter commented on a taped transmission made two days before Bloody Sunday which recorded a soldier being given orders to shoot a man dead in the William Street area.  The soldier had informed base that a nail bomb had been thrown from behind a wall beside the Grandstand Bar, but did not explode. 

Mr Porter drew the Inquiry’s attention to the fact that the soldiers first refer to the man as having thrown a gelly bomb, and subsequently call it a nail bomb.  The soldier who identified it as a nail bomb was approximately 100 yard away. 

A man came into view whom the soldier identified as the person who had thrown the bomb and was given the order to ‘shoot him dead’.  Mr Porter believed in fact that there was no bomb thrown at all.  He went down to the area with his camera and carefully examined the surroundings but saw no evidence of a bomb of any description.  He also said that ‘Felix’, the army technical officer who was usually called to dispose of such bombs, was not called to the scene.  Mr Porter said it was his belief that the youth had thrown a firework or a brick.

7.1.5        Recordings of transmissions on 29th January 1972

Mr Porter also taped transmissions on 29th January which recorded details of a man hit by army fire in the same general area as where the army had been told to shoot dead the rioter on the previous day.  Once again, Mr Porter left his shop to photograph the area:  by that stage the army had left but he took a photo of the general area.

He told the Inquiry that on a different occasion that day, he also heard the army report a large explosion from the rear of the city baths.  It was assumed that a bomb had exploded accidentally and that there was the possibility of casualties.  On Bloody Sunday, there was mention on the transmissions that there was a report of a child being killed and carried out of the Bogside.  The transmissions seemed to suggest that the army thought that this child was killed by the bomb the previous day.

7.1.6        Nets and frequencies in use on Bloody Sunday

Mr Porter said that there were at least two nets theoretically available on Bloody Sunday:  the Brigade Net and the Secure net.  He told the Inquiry that the name ‘Secure net’ was a misnomer in that anyone could listen to it:  if it was being used in a built up area, people received it through their television sets as the frequency used by the army was allied to some of the television frequencies used at the time.

Mr Porter told the Inquiry that he was able to calculate the frequency being used by the army by looking at the length of the aerials on the army vans or backpacks:  a trained eye can work out the frequency by looking at the length of the aerial in use.

Mr Porter said that he would have been able to tell if something was being transmitted in cryptic or scrambled form that day, although he would not have been able to decode it.  He rejected the suggestion that when using a secret device the army might keep the aerial secret.  According to Mr Porter, in order for an aerial to have been able to transmit, it would have had to be in the open, especially in built-up areas.

Mr Clarke told Mr Porter that there was a lot of evidence in existence suggesting that the army had used a BID 150 Encryption Unit linked to a Larkspur radio as the secure means of communication on that day.  Mr Porter said he had learnt about that since Bloody Sunday.

7.1.7        Receivers and tape recorders used on Bloody Sunday

Mr Porter explained that he had two tape recorders running on Bloody Sunday:  the recorder recording army transmissions was set up to respond only when there was actual transmission.  The police recorder was ‘in real time’.  The army recorder was tuned into the Brigade Net.  Mr Porter also tapped into the secure net intermittently with the use of a third transmitter, but did not record those transmissions.

He also had other receivers that were tuned into other frequencies that the army used at the time which scanned over a range of frequencies and automatically picked up any frequency being used within a specified range.

7.1.8        Shots fired on William Street

Mr Porter heard approximately three or four rifle shots fired in upper William Street at approximately 3:55pm on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday.  These were the first shots he heard on the day.  He said that there was nothing about these shots on the army radio.  Mr Porter went on to say that he had been listening in to the transmissions since approximately 2 o’clock on the day, and had heard every minute detail of what was happening being reported back to brigade headquarters, such as people coming out of doors, the number of people standing at a corner, etc.  However, despite upwards of 200 shots being fired on the day, the radio was entirely silent on this matter.

Despite the shots, an army transmission from ‘Nine Zero (90) Alpha’ states shortly after 3:55 that ‘all is peaceful’.  In light of this, Mr Clarke asked Mr Porter whether he was sure of the timing of the shots.  Mr Porter confirmed that he was.

7.1.9        Rioting on William Street?

Mr Porter was looking out of his window and saw that William Street was empty.  At the same time, a message came from command asking ‘90 Alpha’ whether there was still a ‘hooligan element’ in the area of William Street, to which ’90 Alpha’ responds yes. 

Mr Porter told the Inquiry that the response is hesitant, as if 90 Alpha was not really certain whether there was anyone in William Street or not.  It was his belief that the soldier answered yes so as to please the person with whom he was speaking.  Mr Porter went down into William Street to take a picture of the deserted street, although he agreed that he could not see what was going on at the eastern end of William Street.

7.1.10    Arrival of Paratroopers in William Street

Mr Porter described seeing about 100 paratroopers entering William Street through barrier 14, followed by a man he understood to be General Ford waving a stick and shouting.  He then saw a dozen paratroopers go into and around the alcove of Mr Gorman’s shop on William Street, whilst other Paras filtered into the Bogside area via Chamberlain Street and Isaac’s Lane.

Mr Porter said that, despite General Ford’s own account of not going through Barrier 14 at that stage, he was sure that he had seen him outside his window at that time.  Although he did not immediately recognise General Ford, he saw him on the television on the evening of Bloody Sunday and recognised him as the officer in battle dress who had been shouting orders to soldiers outside his window.  Mr Porter saw General Ford leave William Street with his radio operator and other soldiers approximately five minutes later, after the first shots were fired from Chamberlain Street into the Bogside.

7.1.11    Radio command post

It was Mr Porter’s belief that the Paras in the alcove of Mr Gorman’s shop in William Street constituted the radio command for the operation for a number of reasons:

·        An army radio vehicle, identified by the fact that it had two aerials mounted on the roof, came through Barrier 14 and parked about 10 yards away from the Paras towards Aggro corner

·        Mr Gorman’s chemist shop appeared to be the main focal point for Paras on the ground

·        Transmissions were of such strength that they were overloading the receiving equipment, indicating that they had to be within a 100 yard radius

7.1.12    Waste ground near Eden Place

Mr Porter described that he saw the bulk of the paratroopers who had entered via Barrier 14 running via Eden Place towards the waste ground.  There were approximately 200 to 300 civilians on the waste ground running and attempting to take cover.

Mr Porter later looked out of his window and saw armoured vehicles and about 100 troops in the waste ground.  He described one vehicle as careering around the waste ground.  Mr Porter formed the opinion that the driver was deliberately trying to hit people with it.  One person was hit but got up and ran away.

7.1.13    Chamberlain Street

Mr Porter left his shop and walked towards Chamberlain Street past four or five pigs (armoured vehicles) parked in front of his shop in William Street.  There were no civilians in William Street at this stage.  He was expecting to see two bodies on Chamberlain Street, as he had just heard on the army transmission, but saw only residents, reporters and a few soldiers who were standing at the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street.

7.1.14    Aggro Corner

The army transmission states that C Company had come through barrier 14 at this stage.  However, when Mr Porter returned to his shop, he could see only 12 paratroopers at Aggro Corner, most of whom appeared to be drivers of the army vehicles parked next to them. 

7.1.15    Presbyterian Church

Mr Porter saw Support Company leaving the Presbyterian Church.  A group of approximately a dozen of these soldiers climbed over the rear wall of the church and over the flat roof down into William Street and crossed into Kells Walk.

7.1.16    First shots fired in the Bogside

The first live fire that Mr Porter heard on Bloody Sunday after the troops entered the Bogside consisted of three or four shots which appeared to come from the direction of Chamberlain Street.  He explained that the height of the Rossville flats caused the sound of the shots to echo and re-echo.  Shortly afterwards, the army radio transmission records a message saying that four shots were fired at the army and that they had returned fire with two high velocity rounds.

Mr Porter’s analysis of the situation was that the soldier in question fired two shots, one towards the Rossville flats and another which hit a wall in Chamberlain Street.  He did not believe that shots could have been returned at a gunman by the Bogside Inn, as the area was full of people returning home after the march.

7.1.17              Captain from Royal Anglian Regiment

Mr Porter left his shop and went to the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street where a small group of people had gathered.  A captain from the Royal Anglian Regiment was telling a journalist that some people had shot dead a young boy and had dumped the body to discredit the army.

7.1.18              Graffiti

When Mr Porter returned to his shop, there were still a number of paratroopers on the street outside.  He observed one of the paratroopers writing something on the shutter at the front of the shop.  He took a photograph of this area in the days following Bloody Sunday, in the presence of Mr Gorman, which showed graffiti on the shutter saying something to the effect of:  ‘Paras were here and they fucking hammered the fuck out of you’.

He later told the Tribunal that within minutes of taking the photograph of the graffiti, an unmarked van pulled up and men in identical boiler suits, short hair and brightly polished boots got out, took down the offending shutter, loaded it into the van and drove away.

7.1.19              Doctored baton

When Mr Porter returned to the scene where he had witnessed the paratroopers writing on the shutter, he saw a baton propped up against the shutter.  A hole of approximately four or five inches had been drilled in the baton and had been filled with lead to give weight to the end of the baton.  The baton had a name and a regimental number on it.  Mr Porter also took a photograph of this item, although this was later destroyed in a petrol bomb attack on his shop.

7.1.20              Number of shots fired on Bloody Sunday

Mr Porter was of the belief that over 200 high velocity shots were fired in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.

7.1.21              Sound of machine-gun fire

On Bloody Sunday, Mr Porter noticed helicopters, hovering above the Bogside, altering the pitch of their blades in order to maintain a constant height.  This produced a sound that was similar to low velocity machine gun fire, although Mr Porter was able to correctly identify the sound on the day due to his experience listening to such helicopters.

7.1.22              Gerard Donaghy

Mr Porter was allowed to play a portion of his tapes which referred to the nail bombs allegedly found on the body of Gerard Donaghy.  The tape clearly stated that one single nail bomb had been found on the body, as opposed to several bombs.

7.1.23              Copies of tapes given to RTE

Mr Porter was contacted by a friend of his who was Head of News at RTE and asked for copies of his tapes.  A week after providing the copies to RTE, he was visited by the Deputy General of RTE who asked for his permission to make transcripts of the tapes for the Widgery Tribunal.  It was Mr Porter’s belief that the transcripts were made by the Irish Department of Justice.

7.1.24    Army receiver used on Bloody Sunday

Mr Porter was given an AR43 Mark II receiver by one of his pupils at the Londonderry Technical College who was in the army.  He was told that it was the secure link transceiver that had been used in the army headquarters in Ebrington Barracks on Bloody Sunday. 

However, the Tribunal has received evidence that the AR43 radio was not in general use at the time of Bloody Sunday as it was developed specifically to enable communication between aircraft helicopters and forces on the ground.  Mr Porter agreed that his student might have been mistaken.

7.1.25              Photograph of Mrs McCartney’s house

In February 1972, Mr Hill, Counsel for the families at the Widgery Tribunal, asked Mr Porter to visit Mrs McCartney’s house at 57 Glenfada Park to take a photograph of the window of her flat through which a soldier had claimed to have fired 19 bullets on Bloody Sunday.  Mr Porter took six or seven photographs and gave all but one of them to Mr Hill.  Mr Porter provided the remaining photograph in his possession to the BSI.

The photograph provided by Mr Porter did not appear to correspond with other photographs of the Glenfada Park flats, suggesting that it was not in fact a photograph of Mrs McCartney’s house.

7.2              Questions on behalf of the families and wounded

7.2.1              Secure BID encryption device

Mr Macdonald asked Mr Clarke to explain exactly what he was referring to when he said that the Tribunal had received a significant amount of documentary evidence that the army had used the BID encryption device as their secure link on Bloody Sunday.  It was Mr Macdonald’s belief that he was not in possession of any such evidence.

Mr Clarke said that the only evidence in the Tribunal’s possession of statements from soldiers saying that it was in use on the day, and a memorandum indicating that the Brigade were hoping to receive such a device.  He confirmed that the Tribunal had not received any document either acknowledging receipt of the encryption unit or referring to it having arrived.

7.2.2              Secure net

Mr Porter said that specific communications he listened into on the high frequency transmission he located prior to Bloody Sunday led him to believe that it was the secure net being used by the army as opposed to the usual Brigade Net.  He last heard communications on this frequency in the days leading up to Bloody Sunday.

He told the Inquiry that on Bloody Sunday there was a fault with the Secure net and that soldiers on the ground did not appear able to locate the faulty equipment.  He taped Lt Col Wilford telling the various soldiers on the ground to check their equipment, but nobody reported that their equipment was faulty.

7.2.3              Frequencies used by the army

Mr Porter told the Inquiry that the army transmitted on a limited range of frequencies:  large numbers of the band were already used for commercial purposes such as radio telephones, broadcast stations, vets, etc., and this meant that only a very narrow range of frequencies was available to the army and police.

The police and army tended to transmit within three narrow band ranges, the Secure net being located on one of the higher frequencies as people would not normally have had the equipment to be able to listen into it.

7.2.4              Communications from soldiers in danger

Mr Porter said that from his experience of listening into army communications prior to Bloody Sunday, it was standard practice for soldiers to make very detailed radio reports when they came under attack from gunmen or people throwing nail bombs or petrol bombs.  The reports relayed over the Brigade Net would provide a grid reference point locating the spot from where the alleged firing had come and would also provide a description of the alleged offender.  This never happened on Bloody Sunday.

7.2.5              Suppression of evidence at the Widgery Tribunal

Mr Porter said that it was clear to him when he offered his tapes to the Widgery Inquiry that they did not want to hear his evidence.  Mr Porter had been brought into a room where there were a number of officials from the Tribunal, including a Mr Stocker and an army officer.

A squaddie was called in to test Mr Porter’s knowledge of aerials and radio transmitters:  he carried a backpack on his back from which there was an aerial protruding.  Mr Porter was asked whether he could identify the frequency at which it was transmitting.  He answered correctly and the soldier left.

Mr Porter had expected to be congratulated for providing such valuable evidence to the Widgery Tribunal but instead was told that he had acted improperly.  He described the attitude in the room as hostile towards him.  Lord Widgery then entered the room and repeated the questions he had already been asked by people in the room concerning why and how he had made the recordings.  Mr Porter said that it was suggested at one stage that he was fronting for the IRA.

Mr Porter played a portion of one of his tapes to the group in the room, made on the Friday before Bloody Sunday, which recorded the army getting the order to shoot dead a man said to have thrown a nail bomb.  He said that a murmur of surprise went round the room at this stage due to the clarity of the recording.

He offered his tapes to Lord Widgery who responded that he was tired of hearing about Mr Porter’s tapes and that the Inquiry was over.  Mr Porter realised that he had been called at the last minute on the last day of the Inquiry.  His evidence was never called.

7.2.6          Appropriateness of Mr Macdonald’s questioning concerning Widgery

Lord Saville questioned the appropriateness of Mr Macdonald’s line of questioning, reiterating the remark he made in his opening statement to the effect that it was outside the scope of the BSI to examine the Widgery Tribunal.

Mr Macdonald said that the issue of suppression of evidence before the Widgery Tribunal was still a live issue for the BSI, in particular with regard to the pending application for an interlocutory hearing in relation to the concealment, destruction or disappearance of army photographic and cine film evidence taken on Bloody Sunday.  Two of the people directly involved in the questions being raised about the content of the cine film are Mr Smith, Secretary to the Widgery Tribunal, and Mr Duick, Deputy Secretary to Mr Smith.

He said that it appeared from Mr Porter’s evidence that when he attended the Widgery Tribunal, he was led into a room containing between four and six people, including Lord Widgery, who led him to believe that it would be better if his tapes were not made available to the public.  Mr Porter was told that he could be charged with spying, carrying a penalty of up to 20-years imprisonment.

Mr Macdonald said that if either Mr Smith or Mr Duick were in the room and if they were party to the attempt to suppress evidence about the tape recordings, then it raised the likelihood of the fact that they could be party to the suppression of army photographic evidence.  He said that there was some suggestion that army photographs and cine film could have been concealed from the Widgery Tribunal, raising concerns as to the conduct of the Secretariat of the Widgery Tribunal.

Mr Macdonald argued that, before the BSI could determine the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday, it needed to be confident that it was in possession of all the evidence available, and whether people may have suppressed or attempted to suppress evidence or intimidated a witness.

His line of questioning was seeking to establish whether any witness, such as Mr Smith or Mr Duick, who might be called to give evidence before the BSI, was engaged in evidence suppression or witness intimidation.  If witnesses before the BSI have previously been engaged in such activities, there is the possibility that they might act in a similar way with regard to the BSI.

Mr Macdonald’s questions to Mr Porter concerning the Widgery Tribunal outlined above were allowed.

7.3              questions on behalf of the soldiers

7.3.1              Soldiers coming over wall of Presbyterian Church

Mr Glasgow was surprised at the fact that Mr Porter claimed to have seen a lot of soldiers coming over the wall by the Presbyterian Church.  Mr Porter said that he had both seen a number of soldiers coming over the wall and heard on the radio transmissions that Support Company was advancing from the Presbyterian Church into William Street.

A tape was played of an interview given by Mr Porter to Channel 4 in which he described 100 soldiers coming over that wall.  Mr Porter admitted that he had used poetic licence in describing the number of soldiers who came over the wall, but that this was to a certain extent immaterial:  100 soldiers from Bravo 5 came into the area, whether it was over the wall, over the roof, or down the street.

7.3.2        Eyewitness account and deductions made from recordings

Mr Glasgow asked Mr Porter whether he was able, with a delay of 30 years, to distinguish between what he had actually seen on the day and what he had deduced from the tapes, especially since he had written in his statement to the BSI that he was with his tape recorder for the full five hours during which he was taping communications. 

Mr Porter explained that what he meant by this was that the recorder was under his control at all times, even though he himself made a number of trips out of his shop to take photographs or to assess the situation.  He confirmed that his evidence was based both on what he had seen and what he had deduced from the tapes.

7.3.3              Rioting on William Street

Mr Porter confirmed that he had looked out of his window and had seen the street clear of rioters when he heard the hesitant army transmission saying that there was still a hooligan element still present in the street.

7.3.4      BID 150 encryption unit

Mr Porter said that there was no secure unit in operation on Bloody Sunday.  He said that he had spoken to army officers who had been in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday who had confirmed to him that the BID 150 unit was not in operation on Bloody Sunday.  He said that he had not included this in his statement to the BSI as his statement contained only facts, not second hand information.

He explained that shortly after he had attended the Widgery Inquiry, he was stopped by an army patrol in William Street.  He was photographed and his photograph, with the caption ‘unsympathetic’, was posted in a montage of wanted people supplied to all army checkpoints in Northern Ireland.  This led to him being arrested at every checkpoint he went through, and held at Fort George, with whomever was in the car with him at the time, for up to five hours.  His house was also regularly searched by armed soldiers who went through all his personal affairs.

This continued without respite over a period of five years, from 1972 to 1977.  During that period, he became friendly with a number of the officers and would often offer them a drink when they arrived at his house to search it, and would sit and talk to them.  He said that Bloody Sunday often cropped up as a topic of conversation.

During one such conversation, he was told that the BID 150 was an enormous piece of equipment and a heavy consumer of current.  It was in the radio car in Waterloo Place but ran down the car battery so that the radio car, and the unit, were out of commission when the troops entered the Bogside.

7.3.5              Graffiti on shutter

There was some confusion as to whether Neil McKenna or Billy Gorman was with Mr Porter and his employee, Joseph Barnett, when he took the photograph of the graffiti on the shutter.  Mr Porter could not recall whether both men were present or just one of them.

7.3.6          Copies of tape recordings made

Mr Porter told the Inquiry that he had sent a copy of the tapes to RTE, who had transcribed the tapes for their own purposes.

7.3.7              Photograph of Mrs McCartney's house

Mr Porter was further shown that the picture he claimed to be that of Mrs McCartney at the window of her flat did not correspond with the description of the window provided by Mrs McCartney’s son, William McCartney.

7.4              further questions on behalf of the tribunal

7.4.1              Photograph of Mrs McCartney's house

Despite the evidence to the contrary, Mr Porter was adamant that the photograph he took was of Mrs McCartney at the window of her house.

7.4.2              Statement given to Widgery Tribunal

Mr Porter gave a statement to the Widgery Tribunal on the 14th March 1972 when he attended the Inquiry, which he signed it in the presence of Mr McKenna, another witness and the gentleman taking the statement.  He was then brought into a room where he was questioned about the tapes.

7.4.3      Test of knowledge of aerial transmitters

Mr Porter clarified for the Tribunal what had happened when the squaddie, carrying the backpack with the radio antenna, was introduced into the room where he was being questioned about his tapes.  He said that he was asked to identify the frequency of the squaddie’s equipment by looking at the length of the aerial.  He guessed the frequency correctly and explained the simple formula he used to the people in the room.

8.              STEPHEN PEAK’S EVIDENCE

Mr Peak was a student at the LSE (London School of Economics) at the time of Bloody Sunday.  As he was particularly interested in housing issues, he was invited to attend the march by a representative of the Creggan Tenants Association.  He attended the march with four other students from the LSE.  On their return to England, they produced a leaflet documenting their experiences and eyewitness accounts of what had happened on the day.

8.1              QUESTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE TRIBUNAL

8.1.1              Doctored rubber bullet

Mr Peak took a close-up photograph of a doctored rubber bullet which he was shown by a man on William Street.  The man told him that a razor blade had been inserted into the hole, although there was nothing in it when Mr Peak saw it.  He was sure that the bullet was fired that day, as there were a number of bullets lying on the ground around.

8.1.2      Gas

Ms McGahey questioned him about his statement suggesting that the crowd fired two gas canisters at the army.  Mr Peak explained that he meant that the crowd had thrown back at the army the gas canisters that had been fired at them.  Mr Peak remembered the air being thick with gas and being shown how to use vinegar in a handkerchief to help him breathe.

8.1.3      Army sniper / Gunman

Mr Peak heard the first shots when he was at Free Derry Corner, listening to Bernadette Devlin.  He and his co-student, Ms Harrison, started to make their way towards William Street which is where they had left the three other students they had travelled with. 

As they sheltered at the rear of buildings on the West side of Abbey Street, they were fired at by a man whom Mr Peak believed to be a soldier.  He identified the gun shot as coming from a short magazine Lee Enfield rifle and explained to the Inquiry that his knowledge of the sound and sight of fire arms stemmed from the fact that he used to work very close to an army firing range.  He was sure that it was a live round due to its sound and the impact it made on the wall between him and Ms Harrison.

Mr Peak told the Inquiry that he was convinced that the man was a soldier and not a civilian sniper, positioned in the building due to the clear view down Rossville Street which the location provided.  Mr Peak had seen him from the waist up and he had been wearing a dark green or brown military jacket.  It wa