BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY WEEK 4

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8 - 11 MAY 2000

The BSI has resumed after the Easter break. Counsel for the Inquiry, Christopher Clarke QC, continued with his opening statement. This week, Mr Clarke dealt with the orders given to 1 Para when they entered the Bogside, their entry into the Bogside and events in sector two which involved the actions of the Mortar Platoon in the car-park of the Rossville flats.

There are two principal questions surrounding this area:

1. Did Brigadier MacLellan ever give the order for 1 Para to launch the arrest operation? This is important because the Brigade Order, the document that set out the conditions for an arrest operation, stated that Brigadier MacLellan was the only officer with the authority to launch the operation.
2. If an order was given, what were its terms? Was it set out according to the original plan which was to enter barrier 14 and make arrests in the William Street/Little Diamond and William Street/Little James Street areas?

Mr Clarke examined the logs and transcript of army radio communication, statements from Army command, and radio technology in 1972 to see whether an order was passed to 1 Para from Brigadier MacLellan.

Colonel Wilford gave evidence that during the time that he received the order to launch the operation, he was located in the observation post near the Presbyterian Church. He was not based at any of the barriers. Brigadier MacLellan, Colonel Steele and Chief Superintendent Lagan of the RUC were located in offices in Ebrington Barracks.

At the Widgery Inquiry, Colonel Wilford said that he had asked for permission to put Support Company and C Company through barriers 12 and 14. However, this is not shown on the Brigade log or recorded on Mr Porter's tape.

The closest Colonel Wilford got to asking for permission to move is shown in radio communications before 4:00pm. He had informed Command that he had moved his units slightly forward from their original positions in preparation for any orders. At 3:55pm, he asked permission to deploy one sub-unit through barrier 14 into William Street/Little James Street. Brigadier MacLellan refused this request.

One of the preconditions to launching the arrest operation was that the rioters be sufficiently separate from the marchers. Brigadier MacLellan and Colonel Welsh both say that a message came from the helicopter at about 4:04pm that the tail of the crowd had passed the Rossville flats. There is no reference to this message in the Brigade log or on Mr Porter's tape recordings which had picked up the other radio communications from the helicopter.

The only message about the marchers' proximity to the Rossville flats is timed at 4:09pm, after the Paras had entered. It states that there are 200 people at the corner of the Rossville flats.

Colonel Steele claimed that at 4:04pm he went to see Brigadier MacLellan in his office and gave him a situation report. He said that this report would have included news about the separation of marchers from rioters, levels of violence and the numbers at Free Derry Corner. When Brigadier MacLellan asked him to confirm that Lieutenant Colonel Welsh was clear that the marchers were separated from the rioters, he repeated what Lieutenant Colonel Welsh had said at 3:59pm, that the crowd had moved down the Lecky Road and that a lot of people appeared to be returning to their homes. In other words, there was no further message from the helicopter at 4:04pm. Colonel Steele simply repeated an earlier one.

Colonel Steele said that at about 4:07pm, Brigadier MacLellan walked into his office and said that he would mount the arrest operation. Brigadier MacLellan said that the three-minute delay was to ensure that the marchers were separated from the rioters. Colonel Steele said that he relayed the message over a secure radio in his office. This message was not picked up by Mr Porter's tape recording. (see below at 6.4 for further evidence on secure radio communications)

Colonel Steele said that after relaying this message, he walked into the operations room to enter it into the Brigade log. The message was logged at 4:09pm and reads

'Orders given to 1 Para at 1607 hours for 1 sub-unit of 1 Para to do scoop-up OP through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street.'

Brigadier MacLellan said that this record in the Brigade log was not the same order he had given. He said that he had actually said
'You are to arrest rioters on the William Street/Rossville Street junction. You are not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the NICRA marchers.'

He claimed that he knew Colonel Wilford would be using three companies and would enter through barriers 14 and 12, although it is not clear from the available evidence how he could have known this. His account does not explain why the message in the Brigade log only refers to one sub-unit.

Colonel Steele said that only the gist of the message was recorded in the log. He denied making a reference to just one company. He said that the order he had passed on applied to all three companies. This would mean that the Brigade log is materially inaccurate.

Questions that still need to be answered on this area:

· Was the order ever given at all?
· Why is the record of the order in the Brigade log so different from Brigadier MacLellan and Colonel Steele's account of what was actually said?
· Why does the Brigade log make specific reference to one company if the order was to apply to three companies?

Support Company entered through barrier 12 and moved down Rossville Street. 1 Para's radio message to Brigade (headquarters) gives a different account of their route. It states that Support Company had moved south through the church to the area of William Street directly south of the church.

Just three minutes after 1 Para's entry there is a message from Brigade telling C company to withdraw. The reference to just one company suggests that Brigade did not know that more than one company had been deployed. The message reads:
Brigade HQ: 65, this is Zero continuing. If you have not conducted any scoop-up then you should withdraw your call sign Bravo 3 (C Company) back to its original position, for any further operation. Over.

Colonel Steele said that the message about withdrawing was a suggestion rather than an order. He insisted that he knew that three companies had entered the Bogside. The reason he referred to C Company was because he had it in his mind that it was they who would be conducting the scoop-up operation.

The recording taken by Mr Porter gives a more comprehensive account of what was taking place. It reveals that Colonel Steele had issued an order to withdraw C Company rather than, as he claimed, made a suggestion:

Brigade HQ: Hello, 65, this is Zero. You were given instructions some time ago to move Bravo 3 from the area of William Street/Rossville Street back to its original location. Is this now complete? Over.

1 Para: 65. We have been telling you on the other means, on the secure means. In fact we have just given you a sitrep as to exactly what we are doing. Over.

The recording also suggests that up to 4:26pm, Brigade headquarters had only been told that C Company had gone through barrier 14 and Support Company had moved down south to the area of William Street.

Brigadier MacLellan was located at Ebrington Barracks. Both he and Colonel Steele had offices at the Barracks. There was an Operations Room next to these offices. Chief Superintendent Lagan gave evidence to Lord Widgery that throughout the day, the doors between the three offices remained open.

Chief Superintendent Lagan said that at 4:00pm the Brigadier came into his office and told him that the Paras 'want to go in.' He replied 'For heaven's sake, hold them until we are satisfied the marchers and the rioters are well separated.' When Brigadier MacLellan walked out without replying, Superintendent Lagan assumed that he had gone away to consider this suggestion.

After a short time, Brigadier MacLellan returned and said 'I'm sorry but the Paras have gone in.' Superintendent Lagan said that he interpreted this as Brigadier MacLellan expressing sorrow but also from the tone of his voice, suggesting that he was not personally responsible for the decision.

Mr Clarke said that there are a number of points to be made on this area.

· In the Brigade log, Colonel Wilford is shown expressing a wish to deploy one of his sub-units through barrier 14.
· The order as recorded in the Brigade log is an order for one sub-unit to conduct an operation through barrier 14 but the Brigade log shows that A Company is also engaged.
· No surprise is expressed by headquarters at the message in the log that refers to more than one company having entered the Bogside.
· No surprise is expressed at 4:26pm when a message is conveyed that two sub-units had moved in and got involved in a fire -fight.

It is however important not to take the communications out of the context. Mr Clarke suggested a number of further points to consider:

· It is clear that the details of the arrest operation had been left to Colonel Wilford.
· If the arrest operation was launched it might be possible that Colonel Wilford was justified in believing that he could use all of his Companies, unless a restriction had been placed on him.
· It might be surprising to restrict Colonel Wilford to using one sub-unit from one barrier in the arrest operation. Such a restriction would mean that the soldiers could only approach the rioters from a frontal direction. In that case the only way they could catch the rioters would be if they could run faster than them.
· Some of the messages prior to the entry into the Bogside, contemplate the use of several units.

Colonel Steele said that he was clear that there was no limitation to be placed on the number of companies to be used in the operation. He said that the reference to one company in the Brigade log was due to a mistake when the final log was drawn up.

Colonel Wilford told journalist Peter Taylor that he was only ever told to deploy one company. Once he had deployed one company he decided that he would need to protect his flank and so he made the decision to deploy a second company entirely by himself.

The second half of the order recorded on the Brigade log is not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street. This raises the question of whether there was a ban on conducting the type of operation that would involve chasing rioters southwards over an indefinite distance as opposed to encircling them in a limited space as was envisaged in the original plan, Operation Forecast.

This produces a further series of questions. Did Brigade either order or understand what was going on? There is nothing in the radio communications between 1 Para and headquarters to show that Brigade knew that the soldiers had gone as far as the Rossville flats or that they had entered the Bogside in vehicles.

The terms of Operation Forecast stipulated the circumstances when soldiers could take action:

· If an attempt was made by the marchers to breach the blockades.
· If violence was used against the Security Forces (including stone and bottle throwing and nail-bombing).

The evidence suggests that when the soldiers entered the Bogside, the riot had practically finished. Journalist Max Hastings was surprised to see the Paras enter. He was standing at barrier 14 and said that the crowd had almost disappeared. He normally expected to see a snatch squad go in when a disturbance was at its height. He said this point had already passed when the Paras went through barrier 14.

Mr Clarke said that the following interpretations could be placed on the Army's decision to enter:

· The Army was faced with a dilemma. Enter too early, they risked getting caught up with the marchers. Enter too late, the chance of arresting any rioters was reduced.
· Some might say that if the riot was nearly over, there was no point in sending in an arrest squad.
· The Army Command may have been determined that once rioting had broken out, arrests had to be made to show that the authorities were taking tough action against rioters.

The briefing conducted before the march suggests that it was this last interpretation of events, which was at the forefront of military thinking. Captain Jackson told Peter Taylor that the IRA would see the Paras entry into the Bogside as an invasion of their territory.

Mr Clarke said that the BSI would need to consider the following questions when they look at this category of evidence:

· Whether the Army should have gone into the Bogside to prevent a breakdown in public order or whether it would have been more appropriate to allow the riot to peter out of its own accord.
· Whether the plan was to enter and arrest as many people as possible if there was violence at the barricades, even if such action was not necessary.
· Whether this type of plan was justified.
· Whether Brigadier MacLellan was placed under any pressure from General Ford to launch the arrest operation.
· Whether the marchers and rioters were separated when the Paras entered.
· Whether Army Command had any basis for concluding that the marchers and rioters had separated.
· Whether the Para's tactic of driving down Rossville Street destroyed any separation that had existed between the marchers and rioters.

Radio communication was organised in a series of nets. Colonel Wilford would communicate with Brigade headquarters on the Ulsternet. A piece of machinery called the BID 150, which encrypted radio messages as they were sent, was introduced to Northern Ireland just before Bloody Sunday. This provided a secure method of communication between military personnel.

However to communicate by this secure means, both the sender and the recipient would need to have access to a BID 150. This was a bulky piece of machinery that would need to be transported in a vehicle or located somewhere static and secure.

On his own evidence, Colonel Wilford was located in an observation post near the Presbyterian Church when the orders to enter where given. The location and nature of that building made it unlikely that Colonel Wilford had access to a secure means of communication. Any secure message would have been relayed to him on non-secure means, which would have been picked up by Mr Porter's tape recordings. The only other possibility would be a connection to a BID 150 in Colonel Wilford's landrover but there is no evidence suggesting such an attachment.

A company went through barrier 11 in Lower Road at 4:12pm. Some soldiers went to the Little Diamond, some ran across the open ground south of William Street and some went in an easterly direction down William Street to link up with C company.

A company did not make any arrests. Colonel Wilford's evidence about the orders he gave A company conflicts with the Company Commander's Diary of Operations.

C company entered through barrier 14. Colonel Wilford told Lord Widgery that this company entered on foot. This is contradicted by BBC film footage. One platoon went down Chamberlain Street and another went down William Street.

Ten vehicles carrying Support company drove through barrier 12 at about 4:10pm. Photographs and film footage was shown to illustrate the route which the vehicles took. The order of the vehicles is as follows:

Vehicle Carrying
1 APC Mortar Platoon
2 APC Mortar Platoon
3 armoured command vehicle Support Company HQ
4 Ferret scout car Support Company HQ
5 APC (empty but should have carried the Machine Gun Platoon)
6 APC (empty but should have carried the Machine Gun Platoon)
7 soft skinned 4 tonne lorry Composite Platoon
8 soft skinned 4 tonne lorry Composite Platoon
9 APC Anti-tank Platoon
10 APC Anti-tank Platoon

APC no 1 drove down Rossville Street and halted in the waste ground between Eden Place and Pilot Row. APC no 2 continued further down Rossville Street and halted in the car-park of the Rossville flats. This APC hit Alana Burke and, according to one eye-witness, a young man as it drove into the car-park. The remaining eight vehicles followed the two APCs in a convoy down Rossville Street. Hundreds of people ran south down Rossville Street and fled into the Rossville flats car-park.

Mr Clarke noted the following points from the series of photographs shown.

· People must have entered the car-park from Chamberlain Street, Macari's Lane and Eden Place as well as Rossville Street.
· The impetus for the crowd to move began when the barriers were being removed for the Paras to enter. There were about 200 people in the car-park of the Rossville flats who were funnelled into the two alleyways between the blocks of flats.
· In none of the photographs is there any indication that the people photographed around the barricades were carrying arms as opposed to stones.
· The photographs taken just as the Army vehicles stopped show the area up to the north part of block one of the flats is clear of people.

The BSI will need to consider the following issues in relation to this category:

· Whether 1 Para went in without any orders at all.
· If 1 Para did have orders to enter - what were they?
· Should the arrest operation have been launched at all on the information available?
· Was going as far as the Rossville flats inconsistent with the basis on which the Paras went into the Bogside, either because what they did amounted to a running battle or because the scoop-up operation was supposed to be conducted along William Street (an east-west axis) rather than Rossville Street (a southerly direction).

In this sector, the BSI is chiefly concerned with the activities of Support and C companies. The Army have always contended that soldiers of the Mortar Platoon came under considerable fire from the direction of the Rossville flats from bullets and nail, acid and petrol bombs. The majority of civilian witnesses said that the first shots were fired by soldiers. With limited exceptions such as 'Father Daly's gunman,' no-one saw civilians carrying or firing weapons. Mr Clarke said that one of the issues the BSI would needs to decide is whether the Army came under fire to the extent they say. If they came under fire, was this before or after the soldiers opened fire?

Mr Clarke examined the evidence relating to those soldiers who said that they fired live rounds in this sector. There are a number of discrepancies in some soldiers' accounts to the Royal Military Police compared with their later statements. Mr Clarke warned against reading too much into these discrepancies when they concerned accounts of shots fired by soldiers other than the statement maker. He said that in the first RMP statements, the soldiers had simply been asked to account for their own shots rather than those of their colleagues.

The following is a summary of the accounts of each soldier who admitted firing live rounds in this sector. These have been matched to accounts from civilian witnesses who are able to place soldiers in similar locations to those the soldiers say they were in when they fired.

Lieutenant N was the commander of the Mortar Platoon and travelled in APC no 1. He said that he chased a man who threw lumps of concrete at him. He then chased a crowd of 75 to 100 people who were running into Chamberlain Street. He said that the crowd stopped and threw stones and bottles at him and then surged towards him. He fired two shots over their heads. The crowd initially moved away but then came towards him again. He fired a third shot at about head height into the gable end of a building at the corner of Chamberlain Street. He fired once again at a man he believed was about to throw a smoking nailbomb from the corner of the southern most building on Chamberlain Street. He hit the man in the right thigh. Lieutenant N also accidentally discharged one unfired bullet.

There is a discrepancy in the accounts Soldier N has given on the order of the rounds he fired.

Private 19 was with Soldier N when he fired his shots. His account differs from Soldier N's in that he said the crowd did not return after the first warning shots. He also counted a different number of warning shots.

The French photographer, Gilles Peress, said that he saw a soldier as he turned the corner into Eden Place. He identified himself as Press and continued walking across Eden Place. He said that the soldier then fired at him and the bullet went into the window of a house in Chamberlain Street.

Mr Peress' account is corroborated by the evidence of John Mitchell McLaughlin. He said that he had taken cover behind 14 Chamberlain Street when he turned and saw the photographer frozen with his hands in the air. Mr McLaughlin shouted at Mr Peress to run towards him when a shot rang out.

There are other civilian accounts of shots being fired by a soldier in the corner of Eden Place. Two of those witnesses mention an elderly man being beaten up by the Paras in the gap leading from Chamberlain Street to Eden Place.

Joseph Alphonsus Nicholas said that he and a few others tried to rescue the elderly man. One of the soldiers fired a shot and Mr Nicholas ran away.

Patrick Clarke saw the man being beaten with a baton. He saw a gun appear from around the corner and fire a shot at 13 Chamberlain Street.

Michael Bridge saw soldiers climbing out of the APC that halted on the wasteground below Eden Place. He recalls one soldier firing in his direction. Mr Bridge said that it was not an aimed shot, the soldier's rifle was about waist/chest height when he fired.

William Terrence McClements said that a soldier in the alley way between Chamberlain Street and Eden Place 'casually swung his rifle' towards Mr McClements and fired.

William Columbo McCloskey, William Leo Carlin, Joseph McKinney and Sean Eugene O'Neill also gave accounts of soldiers in this location firing towards them.

One of the rules laid down in the Yellow Card is that soldiers can only fire aimed shots. This means that, on his own account, Lieutenant N had broken the rules in firing over the heads of the crowd. During the Widgery Inquiry, he explained why he had taken this action,
'I fired those shots to save life. If that crowd had gone through that little gap to my position and started stoning me at point blank range they would undoubtedly have injured myself and my soldiers.'

Lance Corporal V was in the first APC. He said that he could hear explosions and rifle fire as he debussed. He said the first thing he saw when he got out of the APC was a man in a uniform wearing a respirator. He ran at the man and pinned him against the wall with his rifle. He realised the man was a first-aider when he heard him call 'Knight of Malta.'

Soldier V has been shown the photograph of a Knight of Malta lying crumpled on the ground with two soldiers walking away. He said that he could be one of the soldiers in the photograph.

He said that he could hear machine gunfire and saw bullets hit a wall to his left. He believed the shots were coming from the Rossville flats,
'It was enemy fire directed at me personally. I do not remember how many shots I heard or how many hit the wall. However, hearing the shots confirmed to me that this was not a straightforward arrest operation but a situation in which I may need to use my rifle.'

He said there were 100 people milling about at the end of William Street. He saw a man about to throw a bottle with a lighted fuse attached. His view was obscured for a moment. He fired and saw the man fall backwards. The petrol bomb did not explode but Soldier V said that he saw it still burning on the ground.

He said that four or five people came towards the man he had shot, one of them was a priest who was waving a handkerchief. The position Soldier V saw his target fall is the same location that Jack Duddy fell. However Jack Duddy does not match the description that Soldier V gave of his target.

In his first statement to the RMP, soldier V said that he had fired at his target after he had thrown a bomb. In later statements, he said that it was only after he had fired that he realised his target had already thrown the bomb. (This is important because if his first account is correct, he could not say that he had fired in self-defence or defence of others).

At the time of the Widgery Inquiry, a member of the Widgery staff warned Soldier V that his first statement would mean he would incriminate himself. Colonel Overbury, a legal adviser to the MOD, ordered Soldier V to make a statement. This meant that because Soldier V was ordered to make a statement, his statement could not be used in any subsequent proceedings against him. (In other words, by ordering him to make a statement, Colonel Overbury protected Soldier V from any further legal action.)

There are other discrepancies in Lance Corporal V's accounts of the types of missiles that were thrown by the crowd when he debussed from the APC.

A petrol bomb is not included in the definition of a firearm as laid out in the rules of the Yellow Card. On Lance Corporal V's own account, he acted outside the rules.

Mr Clarke suggested that if Lance Corporal V's first account to the RMP is correct then the BSI may consider his firing was not justified.

Soldier Q travelled in the first APC. He was in an arrest group of three soldiers and said that he was being stoned by a group in the forecourt of the Rossville flats. He said that he took cover at the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville flats. He heard four or five low velocity shots and moved to the east side of Block 1.

He saw a man at the junction of Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville flats. He said that the man was throwing nailbombs. When the man came around the corner again, Soldier Q fired. The man fell and was dragged behind the building by somebody. The nailbomb, which the man had been holding, dropped to the ground and rolled away without exploding.

Private S was the driver of the first APC. He said that as the soldiers got out of the APC they came under fire within a matter of seconds. He ran towards the backs of the houses on Chamberlain Street.

He said that he saw a gunman in between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville flats. He heard distant bangs, which could have been rifles or bombs and four shots passed close to him, striking somewhere behind him. He said that as soon as he identified the gunman, he fired three aimed shots at him. After 30 to 40 seconds, he saw the gunman again in the same position. The gunman fired again, so Private S fired another three shots at the man. He thinks he hit the man. There were people 'milling about' the gaps between the flats which obstructed his vision. When the gunman fired again, Private S fired another three shots. The gunman fired again and Private S fired another three shots, which would be the fourth time he opened fire. This time the target jerked back.

On Private S's evidence, there was a body on the car-park from the time he first started shooting. If this is an accurate account it would mean that, whilst people were tending to Jack Duddy, Private S fired 12 bullets over their heads and according to his evidence 7 or 8 bullets were returned in the opposite direction.

His accounts of the type of bombs being thrown from the Rossville flats has changed. There is a discrepancy in the location he said the shots fired at him landed.

Sergeant O controlled the second APC. This APC halted midway between Block 1 of the Rossville flats and the side wall of 36 Chamberlain Street.

He could see people running through the courtyard of the Rossville flats. He turned northwards towards the wasteground and tried to arrest a man who had thrown a bottle.

He said that the soldiers came under intensive fire from the Rossville flats. He claimed that 80 to 100 shots were fired at the soldiers in a space of a few minutes. During cross-examination at the Widgery Inquiry he conceded that this would make the gunmen very poor shots as the soldiers had not incurred any casualties in what was a very confined area.

He said that he could see a gunman behind the wall at the southeast of the car-park who was using a red cortina as cover. The gunman fired six shots in Sergeant O's direction. Soldier O fired three shots and the man was thrown back out of sight. This target has still not been identified.

He claims to have seen another gunman on the balcony of the southern end of Block 3 of the Rossville flats. He believed the man was carrying a M1 Carbine. He fired three shots at the man and believes he hit him in the shoulder or head. This target has still not been identified.

Sergeant O moved back to his APC. Bottles, stones and acid bombs were being thrown at the soldiers. He told his men to fire is any more acid bombs were thrown.

He said he came under fire again. This time the gunman was at ground level at the corner of Block 2 of the Rossville flats. He believed the gunman was using the same weapon as his previous target in Block 3. The gunman fired at him once or twice, so he fired two rounds back at him. He does not think that he hit this target.

7.5.1 Discrepancies in Sergeant O's accounts

There are discrepancies in the number of rounds that Sergeant O said he fired at his second target. It is not clear whether he saw his second target's body being dragged away. There is a discrepancy in whether he warned Private T about acid bombs before Private T fired. There are inconsistencies in the type of bombs he claims to have been attacked with.

Soldier R was in the second APC and believes that he heard pistols being fired from the direction of the Rossville flats and the alleyways between Block 1. In evidence to Lord Widgery he described running to take cover from the shooting on a route that would have taken him directly into the immediate range of fire.

He caught sight of a man on the eastern side of Block 1 of the flats. Soldier R said the man had a smoking object in his hand and was about to throw it at which point he fired. Soldier R believes he shot the man in the shoulder.

He said he saw an arm appear from the alleyway between Block 2 and 3 of the flats. He could see a pistol and it was firing in his direction. He fired two shots at this target but could not say whether he had hit the person.

Private T said that he heard a burst of fire from the direction of the centre of the Rossville flats. He moved to the rear of his APC and looked up to the windows of Block 1 of the flats. He could see stones and bottles being thrown from the window. He said that a bottle landed near to him and he recognised the smell of acid. His platoon sergeant (O) ordered him to fire if any more acid bombs were thrown. He said that shortly after that order, another bottle landed close to him and covered him from the waist downwards. He fired one round at the man he believed had thrown the bottle who was on a verandah three storeys up. He fired another round but he did not see the man again.

Originally Private T said that he fired at the man just as he let go of the bottle. He later changed it to firing after the man had thrown it but before it had hit the ground. (The second version gives him more time to have assessed whether the bottle contained acid or not).

Soldier 013 said that he chased a boy into the stairways of one of the blocks of flats and fired baton rounds up the stairs. He also fired baton rounds at windows in the Rossville flats. His logic for doing this was that windows make good firing positions and he wanted to keep people away from their windows to prevent them shooting at soldiers. He does not know which windows he fired at.

Soldier 2003 has given contradictory but potentially highly significant evidence of his role in Bloody Sunday. He was a Private in the Mortar Platoon of Support Company. It is possible that he is also known as Soldier Q.

He told the makers of the Insight programme that he was the soldier who had shot Jack Duddy. He then told solicitors for the BSI that this was false and he had been on leave on Bloody Sunday. In a subsequent telephone conversation to those solicitors he said that he had actually been present on Bloody Sunday. He then instructed his own solicitors and said that his latest comments had been misheard and he did not want to co-operate with the BSI voluntarily.

He has admitted to shooting Jack Duddy to other sources. In November 1999 he told McCartney & Casey Solicitors that he had been on duty on Bloody Sunday. He claimed to have seen the Platoon Sergeant shoot six people and a soldier shoot a man in the hip and then empty a magazine into the man's head. He said that he had received threats recently and had been warned not to give evidence to the BSI.

Madden and Finucane Solicitors have a record of a telephone conversation which took place between a member of their firm and Soldier Q. The soldier said that he had shot Jack Duddy and that he had not made the statement put forward on his behalf at the Widgery Inquiry. He said that his evidence had been changed. He had hit the wrong man when he shot and killed Jack Duddy.

Major Loden was in the armoured command vehicle which followed the first two APCs through barrier 12. His vehicle stopped just before Pilot Row and the remaining seven vehicles lined up in positions behind him.

The soldiers started to make arrests and Major Loden said he heard a burst of fifteen rounds of low velocity fire directed at him. He told his men to get back into their vehicles. They drove further down Rossville Street, to the north of Block 1 of the flats. He said that he heard continuous fire for the next ten minutes.

This is the platoon which travelled in the two four-tonne lorries. The captain in charge was the soldier known as Widgery 200. He was told to assist the Mortar Platoon. He saw them open fire with riot guns on the crowd. He said that he saw most of the crowd fleeing in the direction of Glenfada Park.

Part of the Composite Platoon went to the east side of Rossville Street.

The anti-tank platoon travelled in the two APCs at the back of the convoy. Members of this platoon went through the archway under the pram ramp of Kells Walk and eventually went down to Glenfada Park north.

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