BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 2

3 - 6 APRIL 2000

This is the second in a series of weekly reports covering the proceedings of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Derry. This week, counsel for the BSI, Mr Christopher Clarke QC continued with his outline of the work already done by the BSI. He dealt with the BSI's search for the rifles used on the day, the atmosphere before the NICRA march, the position of the IRA and he made a start on events in sector 1.

In the first week of the hearing, Mr Clarke said that confusion surrounded the question of how many rifles were fired on Bloody Sunday. 28 soldiers admitted to firing live rounds at the Widgery Inquiry. However 29 rifles were submitted to the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS) for examination after Bloody Sunday suggesting that live rounds had been fired from 29 rifles.

Mr Clarke believes that it was actually 29 rather than 31 rifles (see last week's BIRW report) which were submitted to DIFS as two separate registers and the report from the expert who examined the rifles at the time, refer to 29 rifles.

It is unclear what happened to the rifles after they had been examined. A DIFS form shows that seven of the 29 rifles were handed over to the Special Investigations Branch of the Royal Military Police (RMP). There are no entries made against the other rifles listed on the form to show where they were sent. As all the rifles were still working it is possible that they were all returned to the RMP.

The BSI has made a number of attempts to locate the rifles fired on Bloody Sunday. They wrote to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on 15 April 1998 and again on 1 September 1999 asking for help in locating the rifles and in identifying which soldier had used which rifle.

The MOD replied on 12 October 1999. It said that the register of which weapons are assigned to which soldiers, the 'Armoury Register' had not been preserved but that they would expect these types of records to be amongst the papers from the Widgery Inquiry.

The MOD informed the BSI that 7.62-mm L1A1 self-loading rifles (SLR) were the only make of rifle in general infantry service between 1970 and 1974. The UK had owned 140,000 of these rifles and they had been withdrawn from service more than ten years ago. Since that time the Army had sold most of these rifles and the remaining, 34,000 were in the process of being destroyed.

The BSI sent the MOD the list of serial numbers of rifles from the DIFS examination. One of the rifles was a sniper rifle rather than a SLR. Five of the weapons were held at a depot in Donnington, 14 had been destroyed, two were sold and a company that is currently under a MOD police investigation is holding the remaining eight.

Of the 14 weapons, which have been destroyed, eleven were destroyed after the BSI's first letter of 15 April 1998 and two were destroyed after the letter of 1 September 1999.

On 15 December 1999 the BSI wrote to the MOD asking for the preservation of the remaining rifles and asked why rifles had been destroyed as recently as September 1999 when the MOD had known about the BSI since April 1998.

The MOD claimed that they were unable to preserve the rifles until the BSI sent them the serial numbers of the weapons, which they had not done until September 1999. Even at that date the MOD said that the serial numbers which the BSI had sent was not sufficient for them to be able to check the 34,000 SLRs still in existence.

However when the MOD carried out further investigations they were able to account for all 29 rifles by the 29 September 1999. This was only five days after two of the rifles were destroyed. The eight rifles sent to the company under police investigation have been sold and the five rifles held at Donnington remain at that depot. The MOD said that they did not realise that the two rifles destroyed on 24 September were Bloody Sunday rifles.

By the middle of February 2000 it is clear that of the five weapons held at Donnington depot, two were subsequently destroyed. 14 weapons had been disposed of for destruction between 26 January 1998 and either 22 or 24 September 1999. Two rifles had been sold in1995 and eight had been sold more recently.

The researches of the police team investigating the whereabouts of the rifles discovered that the BSI had been working on a mistaken assumption that the serial numbers they had for each rifle was unique. Mr Clarke said that he believed at least one officer in the Border Master General's Department and possibly more knew this. The police are currently investigating whether the MOD 's Donnington depot also knew this and whether this information reached the BSI's contacts at the MOD.

The BSI had mistakenly been working off partial serial numbers. This means that even if the BSI could identify which year the rifle was manufactured there could be a similar rifle with the same partial serial number. There were two factories at Birmingham and Enfield manufacturing these rifles. The maximum number of matching partial serial numbers for each rifle is four. The police investigation team has identified nine of what is thought to be Bloody Sunday rifles as having unique serial numbers. Of this nine, six have been destroyed, two have been sold abroad and one is being held by the police.

Mr Clarke said that the police investigation into the whereabouts of the rifles is continuing. He said it was a matter of 'considerable concern' that rifles had been destroyed when the BSI had twice sought assurances that they not be destroyed. Preliminary investigations suggest that a fault in the computer system meant that a warning not to destroy weapons only flagged up once the weapon had been destroyed. Mr Clarke said that reports that the MOD believed it was free to destroy weapons until the BSI formally requested them were incorrect.

There are 50 rifles that correspond with the partial serial numbers given to the MOD by the BSI. Of those 50, nine were unique numbers and so can definitely be said to have been used on Bloody Sunday. Mr Clarke said that it remains to be seen whether the remaining rifles can be shown to have been used on Bloody Sunday.

Mr Clarke said the forensic significance of the rifles would depend on whether they have been rebarrelled since 1972. In 1972 it was possible to match the bullets lodged in Michael Kelly and Gerard Donaghey with the rifles of soldiers F and G. No other whole bullets were lodged in the other people who were killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday.

Evidence exists which shows that Army weapons were modified to make them more lethal. Photographs of a baton (truncheon) with lead in the wood and a rubber bullet with a nail inserted in the middle were shown. A witness statement records the effect of a rubber bullet which had broken glass inserted in it. Mr Clarke will cover the evidence that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a modified bullet when he discusses events in sector 4.

This was planned as the fourth category of Mr Clarke's opening statement but he dealt with it at this stage.

Mr Clarke said that a number of witnesses had described a sense of foreboding and had commented on a charged atmosphere in the run up to the march. A number of witnesses at the Magilligan camp demonstration the week before said that soldiers made comments then that they would see them next week.

Mr Clarke reviewed the numerous witness statements, recording warnings to civilians to stay away from the Bloody Sunday march. Several witnesses recalled how in the morning and evening before the march, soldiers had said they would see them later. He said that whilst these could not establish what the army plans were for the day they reveal a high level of expectation that something big was going to happen.

One witness had an aunt who had nursed injured soldiers at Altnagelvin Hospital. He said that two commanding officers had visited the hospital before the march,
'They said to her she had been considerate with their men and that she should ensure that she should ensure that her family should not attend the march because their would be blood spilt.'

Photographers attending a press briefing at the City Hotel the evening before the march were told be an army press officer to go in behind the army rather than take pictures ''from the other side' because the Army is going in hard.''

Mr Clarke discussed evidence that possibly provides insight into the mindset of some of the Paras at the time of the march.

Photographs and witness statements show graffiti applauding the Paras for the deaths and injuries. Mr Porter took a photograph of a door in William Street on 31 January. It said 'Paras were here T.E., and they fucking hammered fuck out of you.' Six coffins and six crosses were drawn next to the writing. It is signed I Para and dated 30 January.

A series of photographs and maps were used to illustrate the geographical features of Derry City, the lie of the land and the street furniture. The city is divided by the River Foyle with the predominantly Catholic Bogside and Creggan sitting on the west side and the predominantly Protestant Waterside on the east side. Eleven maps will be used during the course of the BSI.

One of the central issues for the BSI to resolve is what part, if any, the IRA took on Bloody Sunday. Mr Clarke has divided this into two questions:
· Did the IRA agree to stay away that day or did they plan to snipe at the army?
· Did the IRA attack the Army to the extent that the soldiers' evidence suggests?

There were two wings to the IRA in 1972, the Official and the Provisional. Both wings were small, the Official IRA had 30 to 40 members in total and it is believed that the Provisional IRA probably had similar numbers.

A selection of evidence was presented from both civilian witnesses and journalists which said that the IRA had agreed to stay away from the Bogside on the day of the march.

Dr McClean sought assurances from the Provisional IRA that there be no violence on the day of the march. Ivan Cooper, the SDLP MP for mid Derry, met three IRA members to discuss his concerns and was told that the IRA would confine itself to defending the Creggan estate whilst the march proceeded. The IRA agreed to have patrols in the Creggan keeping a watch on the area in case the Army moved in whilst the march was on.

Reg Tester was the third in command of the local brigade of the Official IRA. He said that the Officer in Command of the Derry brigade ordered that all weapons be moved from the Bogside into the Creggan for the duration of the march. He claims that on the morning of the march two weapons were missing. He said that the Officials arsenal was put into the boot of two cars and left in the centre of the Creggan for the entire day.

Journalists record a similar understanding that the IRA would stay away from the march. BBC cameraman, Cyril Cave saw a number of men in cars with rifles driving around the periphery of the Creggan estate. He said that that was the last he saw of these men for the entire day.

Mr Clarke said that some gunmen were around and either used or brandished weapons on some occasions. The following is a summary of the accounts from both civilians and journalist evidence.

There is civilian evidence of a shot being fired from a flat in Columbcille Court in a northerly direction. Dennis Bradley was a curate in a Derry parish at the time. He was in Columbcille Court when someone told him there had been a gunman in the area. The gunman was described as a 'Stickie' (a member of the Official IRA) and the Provisionals had sent him away.

The Sunday Times archive includes notes of an interview with a man called Joe Carlin. Mr Carlin describes being with two people at the march when he saw a boy matching the description of Damien Donaghy shot.
'While we were standing there a small boy by our side was hit. He just gave this cry or scream and fell to the ground….He was about 14 years of age, very young looking, wearing jeans and the usual garb, I think. He seemed to have been wounded in the leg. It was bleeding pretty heavily.'
The interview records that three men picked the boy up and carried him to Kells Walk. Damien Donaghy was taken inside a house in the northern most block of Columbcille Court. Mr Carlin said that 'immediately afterwards' he heard a shot from an upstairs window.

Another Sunday Times interview records a similar witness statement. Tony Martin was in a friend's flat at the top floor of Kells Walk. He said that when he came out of the flat he heard two high velocity shots from the direction of the Richardsons Factory or the Presbyterian Church.
'A few seconds later I distinctly heard the thump of a .303. Right beside us on the corner of Columbcille Court was fired - one round.'
He said that he saw an argument between the gunman (who he later learned was an Official) and some Provisionals.
'The Provos were trying to get the gun from the Official and stop him firing because of the crowd.'

Mr Clarke returned to Reg Tester's evidence. Mr Tester claimed that two weapons, a pistol and a .303 rifle were missing from the Official's arsenal. He said that he later learned that a member of the Official IRA had fired one shot in return for the shot which wounded and later killed John Johnstone. He could not confirm whether this account was true.

There is evidence that a man was seen with a rifle, which was not fired, at the north of the Kells Walk building. Eamonn Gallagher described how the man had been circled by a group of men who took the rifle off him and either broke it or dismantled it,
'I remember that one man said 'there will be no shooting here today.' There were no shots fired by the person holding the gun. There had been no shots at all up to that point.'

Anna O'Donnell said that a man with a rifle appeared after the British Army had shot a youth (presumably Damien Donaghy). She saw the man appear with an old rifle from behind the taxi office on William Street. He fired one shot, which did not hit anything, and he obeyed bystanders' instructions to put the gun away.

David Capper of the BBC was asked by some people to look at the two people who had been injured. He was taken to Columbcille Court via William Street. At the entrance of the flats he heard a 'very large report' fired from close to him. He did not see who had fired it but he thought it had been fired from amongst the crowd. In his statement to the BSI Mr Capper said,
'I then saw a short man of about 30 to 40 years of age wearing, I think, a brown overcoat, fire one round from a pistol toward some soldiers who were in the derelict building near the Presbyterian church on the other side of William Street. After the pistol was fired the man placed the pistol into his coat pocket and ran off.'

Similar but not identical evidence has been taken from Ciaran Donnelly of the Irish Times. He saw a crowd stoning a house on the north side of William Street near Tanners Row. He heard one shot, which he believed to be fired from a revolver. He did not see anyone with a weapon. Mr Donnelly records seeing a man aged between 40 and 50 fire a shot at a derelict house. He recalls 15 to 20 people telling the man to go away. He said that this is the only shot he saw fired by a civilian that day.

Simon Winchester of the Guardian and Nigel Wade of the Daily Telegraph both gave evidence saying that they heard what sounded like high velocity fire, when they were standing outside the city cab's office. Mr Winchester noted the time of this shot at 4:05pm which would have been after Damien Donaghey and John Johnston had been shot. Mr Winchester believed it was a rifle shot and had come from the direction of the Little Diamond.

After Jack Duddy was shot Father Daly saw a gunman at the western gable end at the south of Chamberlain Street, who fired two or three shots. Father Daly recounts that the man took out a small handgun and fired two or three shots at the soldiers. He screamed at the gunman to go away.

Photographer, Fulvio Grimaldi took a photograph of a gunman at the gable end of Chamberlain Street.

An Insight article claims that this gunman was a member of the Official IRA. Journalist, Eamonn McCann, spoke to this gunman later. The man said he had taken the gun on the march for his own personal protection, but lost his temper when the Paras started shooting. He had fired one shot in anger.

A number of witnesses speak of seeing or hearing individual members of the IRA on that day.

John Leo Clifford saw 40 people, against the southern gable wall of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, being lined up and frisked by soldiers carrying rifles and batons. He then noticed a civilian carrying a .303 rifle running from the south-west corner of Glenfada Park South towards the north-east corner. Mr Clifford's nephew believed that the man was a member of the Official IRA.

James Donal Deeney recalls running across a road to St Columbs Wells and seeing a wounded man being helped by a woman and child. A car appeared and took the wounded man away. After half an hour passed he saw a few members of the Official IRA coming out of a house. Mr Deeney said that he saw one man hiding a rifle under his coat.

Father O'Gara said that after 30 seconds to a minute of soldiers opening fire he saw a young man fire three pistol shots from a walll at the cathedral side of Kells Walk. He said that the man was possibly aiming at the Saracen that was parked on Rossville Street.

Nell McCafferty of the Irish Times said that she saw two teenage boys appear out of a stairwell in the flats opposite the Bogside Inn. They were carrying two rifles. She told them to put the rifles away and the boys disappeared back into the stairwell.

The Insight team recorded that Billy Gillespie saw a gunman fire seven shots from the fifth floor of the Rossville Flats. Mr Gillespie has told the BSI that this is untrue, as he did not see any civilian gunmen that day.

Nigel Wade said that he had heard three shots by Long Tower Catholic Church at a late stage in the afternoon. He saw a man with a rifle standing by the church wall. The families inside the church told him that the gunman was a Protestant from the Fountain Street area.

Mr Clarke said there is little doubt that after the shooting by the soldiers in Rossville Street was either over or substantially over, a body of IRA men came down from the Creggan to Westland Street. The Officials and the Provisionals arrived seperately.

Evidence refers to their arrival in Westland Street and deploying to the flats to the north of that street and firing in the direction of the north where the soldiers were.

Leslie Bedell said he saw some cars pull up in Westland Street and men with rifles or automatics piling out. He claims that the men dispersed into the flats to the north of the street and start firing. The men were then pulled back and ran to a community hall on the other side of the street.

Michael Havord recalls that he saw a car screech down Westland Street and four boys jumped out, carrying Enfield .303s. He said that this was 30 minutes after the first shots.

Ivan Cooper has rejected a Sunday Times document purporting to be a record of a discussion with him. The document suggests that someone told Mr Cooper that the Provisionals had been sent for and that Martin McGuinness and others were trapped in a house in William Street. Mr Cooper said that the document is factually inaccurate and 'smacks of British security intelligence operating.'

Reg Tester who was driving the car carrying the Officials weapons around the Creggan claims that once he got word of events in the Bogside he drove to Westland Street. He claims that he took out a brand new M1 carbine and tried to fire it but it jammed.

The Sunday Times Insight team record that staff officers of the Officials had met on the morning of the march and agreed on the following;
· Only to fire on the Army if shot at first or if civilians were shot at.
· Never to open fire in a crowd.
· To send unarmed observers to the march.
· No weapons were to be taken to the Bogside except those held by the Bogside Official Unit in the safe dumps.
· All other weapons were to be kept in two cars, which would be on hand in the Creggan.

Three accounts differ in detail but agree that a lone Offical IRA man fired a single shot at a soldier who was believed to have earlier shot Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.

Peter Pringle and Phillip Jacobson, members of the Insight team have provided an account of events in Glenfada Park in a recently published book called 'Those are real bullets, aren't they?' The account links the IRA man who shot the .303 from Columbcille Court with the man who ordered the weapons to be taken out of the car when the Paratroopers came through the barriers.

The sequence of events from all the Sunday Times reports appears as follows. There was an Official's car carrying weapons in Glenfada Park North. Two Officials arranged sniping positions for themselves on a first floor balcony in Columbcille Court. After Damien Donaghey and John Johnstone were shot, one of the Officials grabbed a .303 from the boot of the car, walked to the balcony and fired at soldiers on the right side of the church. Some Provisionals accused him of disobeying orders and putting the marchers at risk. He returned the weapon to the boot of the car. The Paras entered the Bogside through barrier 14. The Officials grabbed the weapons and ran to the Creggan. One Official disobeys orders and runs out of the north west corner armed with a .22 rifle and fires two or three shots.

Gerard Kemp of the Telegraph interviewed the Official sniper who claimed to have fired this shot. This account differs slightly from the Sunday Times team in that this account records the interval between putting the rifle in the boot and the arrival of the Paras as ten or fifteen minutes. Here the Officials are simply told to get their weapons out of the cars. One of them goes up a balcony and fires at the Paras. Another one fires with a pistol.

Mary Holland was working for the Observer newspaper when she interviewed an Official IRA sniper who fired two shots as soldiers on barrier 20 at Barrack Street. The sniper was posted in an empty house on the corner of Cooke Street and Joyce Street with orders to cover Bishop Street. He hit a soldier but it glanced off the zip of the jacket. The soldiers returned six shots in his direction. He was hit in the right thigh by one bullet and another ricocheted off a wall to graze the flesh of his eye. This was the only known IRA casualty of the day. Mr Clarke said that account suggests that the sniper had been given orders to fire on the soldier in Barrack Street.

Matters are further confused by attempts to trace the sniper and those who attended to his injuries. Dr McDermott recalls treating a man called Richard Doherty for a bullet wound to his right thigh. Hugh Deehan, a Knight of Malta, said that Dr McDermott's patient had an injury to his thigh and eye. A man called Micky Doherty had a gunshot wound in his thigh and eye. Michael Quinn gave evidence that he had seen a young man in an alley way leading to Abbey Park get shot in the leg whilst he was standing in Glenfada Park. John Porter saw a man coming out of Glenfada Park with an injury to his eye.

Staff officers have authenticated the following incidents. An Official fired and was wounded in the leg somewhere near Bishop Street early in the march. He is believed to be Micky Doherty. An Official fired two .22 pistol shots from the lane behind Joseph Place up at the Walker Observation Post.

Phillip Jacobson met a senior member of the Provisionals in the Bogside just after Bloody Sunday. The notes of the interview record that the Provisionals were under orders not to carry weapons on the march. The interviewee was confident that none of his members had defied that ban but he did admit that two rounds of submachine gunfire were fired by a Provisional between 5:30pm and 6:00pm, that is after the Army had stopped firing and carried away most of the dead. The IRA man fired from a position near Free Derry Corner at troops in the Rossville Street area.

The Irish Independent printed a statement from the Provisional IRA, the officer commanding the Derry brigade said
'in order to avoid any possibility of danger to civilians, the Derry Provisional command of the IRA ordered all weapons out of the entire area of the march route this morning. At no time did any of our units' open fire on the British Army prior to the Army opening fire.'

Mr Clarke said that Mr McGuinness is widely reputed to have been the officer commanding the Provisional IRA in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday. He said that he was present in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday and he is possibly in a position to give evidence from his own knowledge of what happened. The BSI has documents suggesting that Mr McGuinness was actively involved during the day and that he was armed with a Thompson submachine gun.

An article in the Sunday Times (26 March 2000) claimed that it is widely accepted and documented that Mr McGuinness was a Commanding Officer in the Bogside in 1972. It also claimed that he later rose to become a member of the IRA's Army Council and its Chief of Staff. Mr McGuinness had appeared at several IRA press conferences in Derry at that time.

There were sightings of Mr McGuinness that day although they are all towards the end of the day.

Sheila Ingram recounts how she was walking down Lecky Road when she saw Martin McGuinness and some other men coming from the walkway running from Meenan Park and Lecky Road. They were walking towards the direction she had come from,
'It was apparent from their faces that they were wondering what on earth was happening and I think one of them must have shouted 'what is happening?' I distinctly remember shouting 'so much for your protection then, they are killing people down there.' I knew by that time that the Army was killing people, you did not need to see it to know what was happening. I had always assumed since that moment that Martin McGuinness and his friends must not have been on the march that day.'

Mr McGuinness had written an article in the Derry Journal, which Mr Clarke suggested meant he had direct knowledge of the behaviour of the IRA on the day. Mr McGuinness's article said,
'Bishop Daly is correct when he states that the only shots fired that day were by one person who fired one or at most two shots in acts of desperation after the Paratroopers had slaughtered the marchers.'

One of the allegations is contained in a record of an interview with Ivan Cooper. Mr Cooper has rejected this document in its entirety and there is no record of who wrote it. The notes claim that Mr McGuinness was trapped in a house in William Street when the troops moved in.

The second allegation comes from the Security Service archive. It is taken from a memorandum of the debriefing of an informant called 'Infliction' that took place in April 1984. 'Infliction' said that Martin McGuinness had admitted to firing a single shot from a Thompson machine gun from the Rossville flats that precipitated Bloody Sunday. This memorandum was circulated to other branches of the Security Services.

Mr Clarke said that the BSI had written to 40 people who they believe either to be members of, or connected with the IRA in Derry in January 1972. He said that 'with some honourable exceptions' most have not replied.

Barricades were erected at 24 spots in Derry on the 30 January. By 1:00pm all troops were in position. Barriers were left open until the last minute.

The barricades, which the BSI is most concerned with, are;

· Barrier 12 at Little James Street
· Barrier 13 at Sackville Street
· Barrier 14 just beyond the junction of William Street and Chamberlain Street

Troops were positioned as follows;

· The 1st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards manned barricades 1 to 7, 9 and 11.
· The 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment with A Company of the Second Royal Green Jackets manned barricades 12 to 17.
· The 1st Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment commanding the 15th and 42nd Battalions of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment manned barricades 18 to 26.
· 1 Para, the Brigade arrest force were in their assembly point at the Foyle College carpark.

The BSI is most concerned with A Company, Support Company and C Company. No soldier in either A or C Company is said to have fired live rounds on the day. The assembly point was in the Foyle College carpark and then the companies moved to their forming up positions. Company A formed up in Springham Street. C Company remained in the Foyle College carpark. Support Company formed up in Clarence Street.

Support Company was operating with four platoons under the command of Major Loden. Their total strength that day was 103 men. They were to go through barrier 12 in Little James Street. The four platoons were

· The Machine Gun Platoon (who were not armed with machine guns)
· The Mortar Platoon (who were not armed with mortars)
· The Composite Platoon (also known as the Administrative Platoon or the Guinness Force).
· The Anti-Tank Platoon

Colonel Wilford said that in the whole of the operation that day there were about 320 Paratroopers. C Company and Support Company, the two companies actually involved in the operation, had a total of 176 soldiers.

The soldiers of 1 Para were, for the most part armed with SLRs. Major Loden's evidence was that all the men in his company had an SLR, except 15 men who were armed with riot guns, of whom 12 also had SLRs and 3 had sub-machine guns.

Journalist gave evidence that some soldiers carried truncheons only and others had baton guns only.

Among the tasks given to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment was to hold a containment line, to be prepared to halt and disperse marches entering the area from north and south and to maintain a reserve to counter hooliganism especially on the William Street line.

1 Para was ordered to maintain a Brigade arrest force, to conduct a scoop-up operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible.

At about 12:20pm, Major Loden, the Support Company Commander, began a reconnaissance of the barriers. At this stage, Major Loden expected to go over the wall east of the Presbyterian Church, but he had been warned that he might have to go over any of the barriers according to where the trouble developed.

As a result of the reconnaissance it became clear that this route into William Street had drawbacks. A decision was made to get into a derelict building on William Street from the church. The derelict building had nine windows and it was believed to be a better observation post to watch the passage of the march.

The Para log shows that at 15:16pm orders were given for Support Company to move forwards from Clarence Avenue to Queens Street and A and C Company had orders to move to Prince's Street.

Major Loden's account of these events was that Support Company was to deploy into assault position in Queen's Street and gain access to William Street over the six foot wall in the east of the Presbyterian church.

The Mortar Platoon was to cut the wire covering this wall.

The Anti-Tank Platoon was warned to take up anti-sniper positions on the rooftops of houses on the south side of Great James Street.

The Machine Gun Platoon was ordered to move into the derelict building.

Major Loden, Colonel Wilford and Captain Michael Jackson were in an observation post to the southwest of the church. Major Loden said he could see rioting taking place in Little James Street.

As the marchers passed by the church, some stones were thrown by some of them at the soldiers in the derelict building and at the wire cutting party. Both units fired rubber batons, Machine Gun Platoon fired four rounds and Mortar Platoon fired two rounds. Stones and bottles were thrown at soldiers on the GPO roof and after five minutes the soldiers on the roof were ordered to pull back to the church.

At some stage the plan to move forward either over or through the wall at the eastern side of the church was changed.

A sergeant in the Mortar Platoon, Sergeant O, gave an account of the change of plan. He said that when the reconnaissance group returned he was told to move to an area around the general sorting office and the Presbyterian Church. He had been told the plan was for him to drive his APC through a wall at the south end of the churchyard and for the rest of Support Company to follow him.

The intention was that once they had got through the wall, Support Company would stop its vehicles at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street and get in behind the rioters at Aggro Corner. The rioters would then be trapped and arrests could be made. The plan to drive through the wall was then abandoned because it became clear that the APC could not drive through the wall.

Whilst Sergeant O was standing near the wall he said a shot came over his head and struck a drainpipe near the church. He could not say where the shot had come from,
'After we heard this shot, the mood in the churchyard became serious: we realised that the prospect of the Rossville flats being used by snipers had become a fact.'

After the shot hit the drainpipe, Colonel Wilford gave the order for the soldiers to go in. Lieutenant N had spoken to Major Loden and he ordered Soldier O to follow him in his APC through barrier 12.

Mr Clarke took a break from the army's movements to look at how the march was progressing.

The march began at Bishop's Field in the Creggan. It went down through Central Drive and then east along Linsfort Drive into Iniscarn Road and Rathlin Drive. It went into South Way and along into Lone Moor Road, passing the Brandywell recreational ground. It turned east into Brandywell Road and then up to Lecky Road. The march moved further up Westland Road and moved back into Lone Moor Road. It turned right into Creggan Street and into William Street. It passed St Eugene's Cathedral and went down William Street into Rossville Street.

A coal lorry on which several people stood with a Civil Rights Association banner led the marchers. There were people from all over Northern Ireland 'from many walks of life.' Many saw it as a historic day 'as one in which popular protest against perceived injustice could make its point by sheer numbers.'

There were some people on the march who intended to riot. 16 year old Paddy McCauley said that after events at Magilligan,
'I and other hardcore rioters were looking for a showdown with the British Army…We were going to get our revenge on 30th January by attending the march and forcing our way to the Guildhall Square.'

The march was originally planned to go to the Guildhall Square. By the time it had started, the Civil Rights Association had decided to go to Free Derry Corner instead of going to barrier 14 at the bottom of William Street. Instead two NICRA executives were to approach barrier 14 and make a formal protest, showing that they had attempted to reach the Guildhall Square, and had not persisted when faced with the Army's opposition.

Thomas McGlinchey drove the lorry that led the march. When he reached the junction of Rossville Street and William Street, some marchers tried to persuade him to go on to the Guildhall. However he followed his instructions and turned into Rossville Street to drive to Free Derry Corner.

John Hume estimated the number of marchers at 15,000. These numbers were to cause problems for the stewards. Father Bradley recalls his annoyance at what he saw as disorganised stewarding. He said that the public address system was inadequate and resulted in confusion in William Street,
'some of the marchers went down to Free Derry Corner and others went on to the barrier in William Street.'

Mr Clarke will continue with the progress of the march next week.

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