BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 13

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20 - 23 NOVEMBER 2000

This week, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (BSI) continued to hear the opening statements from the lawyers representing the families of the dead and the wounded.

Some of the families and wounded are represented by different lawyers and because there is some overlap in the issues that they want the BSI to investigate, Arthur Harvey QC gave an overview of all the evidence and the other legal teams raised additional points or points specific to their clients.

There was one interlocutory hearing this week. Soldier 027's name was accidentally mentioned in a hearing. The Tribunal was asked to decide whether he could still remain anonymous.

Transcripts of the hearings can be found at the BSI website at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Mr Harvey continued to review the evidence following the structure created by counsel to the BSI, Mr Clarke. He introduced his examination of the five sectors with some general points on how the BSI should look at the evidence.

1.1 APPROACHING THE EVIDENCE

Mr Harvey said that the quantity and detailed nature of the evidence meant that rather than making matters clearer, issues could become more confused. He suggested that the Tribunal use three sources of freestanding evidence to get a clearer picture of what happened on Bloody Sunday. He said that the evidence of priests, journalists and from photographs provide an independent account of events.

1.1.1 Film footage and Photographs

Mr Harvey pieced together the photographs and film footage to show the situation on the ground and the sequence of events that day.

1.1.2 Evidence from priests

The priests present on Bloody Sunday have been accused of bias. Mr Harvey said that this is unfair because priests do not occupy the middle ground in questions of right and wrong. They have a compulsion, because of their calling to tell the truth. At a press conference the day after Bloody Sunday the priests said that what they had seen was murder.

1.1.3 Evidence from journalists

There were journalists present in each of the sectors. Mr Harvey said that they are professional, independent people who are used to appearing in traumatic situations. He said their independence is evident in the fact that some positioned themselves on the army side to watch the march and others viewed it from the point of view of the marchers. Mr Harvey said that all came to the same conclusion; 'what they saw was unjustified shooting at unarmed people.'

1.1.4 Questions to ask when assessing evidence

Mr Harvey said in looking at the evidence, two questions should be kept in mind:
· Do the soldiers statements and allegations measure up to the actual people killed and injured?
· Is there any justification for the soldiers firing at all?

1.2 ARRIVAL OF THE TROOPS

1.2.1 Location of the barriers

Originally the plan was that there would be an east-west axis, the soldiers would move from barriers 12 and 14 to drive the rioters towards the junction of Rossville Street and William Street.

In fact, the barriers were set further back from the point where the normally aggressive activity would take place against the army.

1.2.2 Difficulties with orders, entry and communication

Mr Harvey said that we have no indication as to precisely how the troops received their orders at either barrier. The brigade log states that at 4:07pm, an order was given over the secure link. Those orders had to be relayed in some way to the soldiers on the ground.

There is evidence that the paras had difficulties at both barriers. Some soldiers believed that the Royal Green Jackets at barrier 14 did not wish to open the barriers to allow the paratroopers to go through. The paras had to make their way through a narrow gap on the right hand side of William Street or go over the barrier. There was a delay of 30 seconds at barrier 12 to allow the barrier to be opened.

There was no message conveyed to indicate there had been any separation of the crowd. The only message relating to the separation of the crowd was conveyed from the Army helicopter. At 4:10pm a message was sent to Brigade HQ which said that the 'hooligan' element had moved away from William Street and that those in Chamberlain Street were making their way towards Free Derry Corner.

1.3 FILM FOOTAGE PLACED INTO SEQUENCE

Mr Harvey showed the various segments of film footage in the sequence they would have occurred. Helicopter footage shows the first two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) entering Rossville Street. One turns up Pilots Row and drives to Eden Place. The crowd had been spread from Free Derry Corner to the William Street and Rossville Street junction.

Mr Harvey pointed to the high speed that the Army vehicles arrive. They arrive in the same way, back doors are flung open, rubber bullets are fired and soldiers immediately pursue individuals who seem to run away rather than confront the soldiers.

ITN film shows Sergeant O and Lieutenant N's vehicles. At the north end of the gable wall of block 1 of the Rossville flats there are three soldiers, one is standing and one is kneeling looking up towards the entrance to block 1 and across the barricade. Two distinct shots can be heard.

Major Loden has given evidence that he moved his vehicle from Rossville Street into the waste ground after 10 to 15 low velocity shots were fired in front of his vehicle. These shots could not be heard on the film. Only two high velocity shots can be heard.

Mr Harvey said that what can be seen from the segments of various tapes placed together is that the vehicles arrive at speed. There is a mass movement away from the Army vehicles rather than any member of the crowd confronting them. The shots that are fired are single high velocity shots. At a very early stage, as Major Loden's vehicle arrives, the rubble barricade is clear which suggests that those who died at the barricades must have died either at that time or very shortly before. It also shows that after the arrival of the vehicle, shots continued to be fired and that Major Loden had to call out to his soldiers to cease firing.

1.4 SECTOR 1 (BEFORE 1 PARA ENTERS THE BOGSIDE/DAMIEN DONAGHY AND JOHN JOHNSTON)

1.4.1 Position of soldiers

The troops of the Machine Gun Platoon were positioned in the derelict building on William Street at around 3:40pm. This raises a number of questions;

· Why were the soldiers in this position at the height of the march and before there had been any trouble?
· Why were the soldiers spread throughout the building? Mr Harvey said this was a strange way to position soldiers if they were about to be sent out as a snatch squad.
· Why were they put into a building beyond the containment line? (A snatch squad usually move in to arrest from the containment line.)
· Did placing the soldiers in this position cause them concern considering they were in advance of protective cover?

Mr Harvey added that snipers were positioned on the roof of the GPO and a flat roof to the east of the Presbyterian Church by Colonel Wilford and Major Loden. This was inconsistent because Brigadier MacLellan should have been in control of the snipers.

1.4.2 Nail bombs

Soldiers A and B claim to have seen objects whizzing through the air and to have heard explosions. However Colonel Wilford, Major Loden, a radio operator and other soldiers were in an observation post (OP) overlooking the waste ground until after 4:00pm. Not one of them either heard or saw a nail bomb explode.

The OP was within earshot. (Major Loden heard the 'drainpipe shot' between 2:10pm and 3:40pm.) If those in the OP had heard any bombs they would have communicated that to the soldiers on the barricade to advise them to take care on the snatch operation. There is no radio communication to show that a message of this sort was communicated.

1.4.3 Soldiers A and B

Soldiers A and B fired five shots between them. They say they fired them across the junction of William Street towards the corner of the Nook Bar. Each of them described firing at a man approximately five foot seven tall and wearing a dark or blue windcheater.

John Johnston was 59 years old and Damien Donaghy was 15 years old. Neither was wearing a dark windcheater. Both Soldiers A and B claim to have shot a nail bomber and actually claim to have been able to see that nail bomber strike a match against a wall and light the nail bomb. Neither victim matches the description of the individual Soldiers A and B claim to have shot.

Rumours spread that two people had been shot. Mr Harvey said that it is possible that as a result of this someone came from the direction of Columbcille Court and directed some form of fire in a northerly direction towards either Abbey Taxis or the Presbyterian Church. He said that it is a matter for debate whether this is the 'drainpipe shot.'

1.4.4 The 'drainpipe shot'

No soldier mentions the drainpipe shot on the 30th or 31st. It is first recorded by Major Loden in his diary of operations. Subsequently there are a series of soldiers who claim to have heard it. Major Loden claims to have heard it in the OP but he does not alert any of his soldiers at barrier 14 or those who are awaiting orders in the grounds of the Presbyterian Church.

Mr Harvey said that this shot forms an escalating importance in the minds of the soldiers who are positioned in Abbey Taxis.

1.5 SECTOR 2 (ROSSVILLE FLATS CAR PARK; JACKIE DUDDY, ALANA BURKE, MICHAEL BRADLEY, MICHAEL BRIDGE, PEGGY DEERY, PATSY McDAID)

The evidence given by the soldiers and the trajectories they drew of their targets does not account for the death and injuries caused in this sector.

1.5.1 Margaret (Peggy) Deery

Mr Harvey described Peggy Deery as being 'airbrushed from history.' No soldier sees her, hears her screams or sees her being carried away. Lieutenant N and Sergeant O are on the waste ground around this time but cannot account for the shooting of Mrs Deery.

1.5.2 Jackie Duddy

The evidence of Father Daly is that he was running with Jackie Duddy and he saw him fall. The only person who claims to have shot anyone in and about this area is Soldier V. Soldier V claims to have shot at a petrol bomber; that is clearly not Jackie Duddy.

The police investigation came to the conclusion that Jackie Duddy had been murdered but no soldier was made accountable.

1.5.3 Alana Burke

Alana Burke was knocked down by Sergeant O's vehicle. She managed to make her way to the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville flats and was taken to 10 Joseph Place. She had a serious injury to her hip.

1.5.4 Michael Bridge

Photographs show Michael Bridge moving forward in the direction of Sergeant O's vehicle with his arms spread out behind him in a gesture of hopeless frustration. Mr Bridge is shot in the leg and taken to 33 Chamberlain Street. There is no trajectory from any soldier on the waste ground that accounts for this shooting.

1.5.5 Michael Bradley

Michael Bradley can only be seen on one photograph and it was taken after he had been shot. He was taken to 10 Joseph Place.

1.5.6 Patsy McDaid

Patsy McDaid is injured as he is making his way towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3. He is injured in the back which proves that he was running away.

Soldiers O, Q and R fired in that direction and claim to have shot a person in the chest which could not be Mr McDaid.

1.5.7 The Tucker photographs

The Tucker photographs were taken from block 2 of the Rossville flats. They show the position of the Army vehicles just before Jackie Duddy is killed. They show all the people from the waste ground between Rossville Street and Chamberlain Street moving away from the vehicles. Some are running and others are strolling but they are all making their way to the southeast and southwest corners between blocks 1and 2 and blocks 2 and 3 of the flats (the only method of exit).

1.6 SECTOR 3 (ROSSVILLE STREET BARRICADE; MICHAEL KELLY, WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG, MICHAEL MCDAID, ALEXANDER NASH, HUGH GILMOUR, KEVIN MCELHINNEY)

Mr Harvey used photographs and evidence from Father O'Keefe and Simon Winchester to analyse this sector.

1.6.1 Soldier F's accounts

Michael Kelly was killed by a bullet from Soldier F's rifle. However it is not until 18th February that Soldier F gave an explanation about the killing. On the evening of Bloody Sunday he did not say that he had fired towards the barricade at all.

On 17th February Professor Simpson reported that the bullet that had killed Michael Kelly had come from Soldier F's rifle. On 18th February a map outlining the trajectories of the soldiers' shots was prepared. This was the first time that Soldier F indicated that he had fired towards the barricade.

1.6.2 Photographic evidence relating to sector 3

A number of photographers took photographs from various locations around the barricade.

The photographs show what is happening shortly after the arrival of the vehicles down Rossville Street. The army vehicles can be seen on Rossville Street before Major Loden pulls up on the area behind block 1 of the Rossville flats. Michael Kelly can be seen at this stage with others standing by the barricade. Mr Harvey pointed to the fact that none of those show any signs of concern which would be expected if there were firearms around.

Photographs taken from behind the barricade show the point where the soldiers have moved onto the western side of Rossville Street. The people at the barricade are standing erect and appear to be openly confronting the soldiers. He suggested that it was an element of bravado that so many are stood behind a barricade, some with stones in their hands and others just openly taunting the soldiers. They were beyond the reach of the soldiers in terms of any snatch operation. Mr Harvey said that anyone who wanted these young men brought to book would only have one effective way to deal with them - by shooting them. He said that the photographs show that there is nothing more sinister than stones in the young men's hands.

Kevin McElhinney can be seen standing on the right hand side of the barricade. It is clear that he is not carrying a rifle. Mr Harvey suggested that if Mr McElhinney had a rifle it would have been suicide to stand in such an exposed position.

The photographs show two women standing in between the soldiers and the barricade. The women are standing at the corner of the waste ground. The way in which they are standing shows that they clearly do not feel that they are in any danger from live rounds. (Which again would be expected if there were people with weapons behind the barricade.) People are casually walking and standing.

Michael McDaid can be seen moving from left to right across the photograph with his back to the soldiers. People still had stones in their hands at this stage and there appears to be a genuine lack of awareness that Michael Kelly had just been shot dead. A group of soldiers can be seen to the south of the Rossville Hall, and one soldier can be seen at the front of the wall by the Kells Walk pram ramp (30 to 40 yards from Mr McDaid). There is nothing in Michael McDaid's right hand. His left hand is only partly visible in the photograph but it is clear that he is not holding a rifle, gun or nail bomb. Mr Harvey said that if Mr McDaid had been involved in any shooting or throwing a nail bomb it would have been very foolish to walk with his back to the Army. He was completely oblivious to any action that would bring about his death.

Mr Harvey asked, if the allegation that the barricade was used as a base to fire at soldiers is correct, how those at the barricade would have known that 1 Para would come so far down Rossville Street to confront them.

The soldiers have claimed that Kevin McElhinney was behaving unusually in doing the leopard crawl and have suggested that this movement indicates he was trying to conceal a weapon. Mr Harvey showed photographs of other civilians in the same position. He explained that this was the natural reaction of someone trying to shelter from gunfire in an exposed location. The individual tries to make himself into the smallest target possible and move out of the line of fire.

1.6.3 Father O'Keefe's evidence

Father O'Keefe is able to give a consistent picture of everything that happened at the barricade from his position at the gable end of Glenfada Park North.

He was making his way along Rossville Street in the direction of the rubble barricade when he hears the revving of the engines of the APCs. He was frightened of being run over or arrested. He said that even though everyone ran towards Free Derry Corner, they did not fear for their lives at this stage.

As the APCs halted, the crowd slowed down to see what was happening. Father O'Keefe ran through a gap in the rubble barricade and stood about 6 to 10 feet from the gable end of Glenfada Park North. He said that there were about 30 or 35 people in the general area of the barricade.

He looked up Rossville Street and saw the soldiers jump out of the APCs and take up positions. They were all carrying rifles. He saw some take up positions at Kells Walk and others take up positions in front of the APCs on Rossville Street. All the soldiers were holding their rifles to their shoulders. They pointed their rifles towards the barricade.

He has a clear recollection of a small group of 7 or 8 youths, towards the middle on the south side of the barricade who 'clearly intended to confront the soldiers.' He does not recall seeing any stones being thrown but said he had the impression that they were being thrown.

Very quickly after the soldiers had got into position the shooting started. The shots were coming from the soldiers he had seen adopting firing positions. Father O'Keefe assumed the soldiers were firing rubber bullets.

One of the young men at the barricade fell as the first cluster of shots rang out. He was facing the soldiers when he was shot. Father O'Keefe noticed him double over and thought that he had been hit by a rubber bullet. Four people ran out to the barricade and carried the young man (Michael Kelly) to the gable of Glenfada Park North.

Father Bradley anointed Michael Kelly whilst the firing from further up Rossville Street continued. Father O'Keefe took cover behind the gable wall and said that he looked to his right towards the rubble barricade and saw three bodies lying there. He did not see the three boys get shot but he could see they were dead. As he looked at the three bodies an older man came into his line of vision. The shooting continued and as he reached the bodies he suddenly fell on top of one of them. As he fell he looked across to Father O'Keefe's group and held his arm up.

Father O'Keefe looked around the corner of the gable wall and could see a soldier at the northwestern corner of block 1 of the Rossville flats. He was on one knee and was training his rifle on the corner where Father O'Keefe stood. Father O'Keefe ducked back round the corner and noticed a man making his way along the pavement on the western side of block 1 of the Rossville flats. The man was half on his back and half on his side and was pushing himself along on one arm towards the doorway of the flats (Kevin McElhinney). Father O'Keefe had the impression that he had been shot and was making his way to the doorway for cover. Just as he got to the doorway, he seemed to twitch and jerk and then lie still. Father O'Keefe said that it seemed as if he had been shot a second time.

1.6.4 Simon Winchester's evidence

Simon Winchester was walking down Rossville Street when he heard the Army vehicles coming in. He looked around and saw nine APCs. He made his way across the rubble barricade towards block 1 of the Rossville flats.

He saw some soldiers kneel down and fire from the western side of Rossville Street in his direction, the southern end of block 1 of the flats. He could see the body of the soldier jerking in coordination with the rifle reports.

Mr Winchester concluded that what he saw was unjustified firing at civilians.

1.7 SECTOR 4 (GLENFADA PARK AND ABBEY PARK; GERARD McKINNEY, WILLIAM McKINNEY, JAMES WRAY, GERARD DONAGHY, JOE FRIEL, MICHAEL QUINN, PATRICK O'DONNELL, DANNY GILLESPIE, JOE MAHON)

James Wray can be seen in the photographs of Glenfada Park North and clearly has nothing in either of his hands. Mr Harvey pointed to the fact that the photographs of Glenfada Park North show very little debris on the ground.

The death of William McKinney and James Wray cannot be accounted for by any of the shots allegedly fired by soldiers because they were shot in the back. The soldiers claim they were shooting at people facing them.

The occupants of the O'Rileys' and Carrs' houses saw a soldier fire at Gerard McKinney, who had his arms up pleading for his life, and at Gerard Donaghy, who was behind him.

The bullet of Soldier G was recovered from the body of Gerard Donaghy.

Within sector 4 there are four people killed and six people injured. (The sixth person is unidentified. Both Mr Quinn and Mr Conway state in their evidence that they saw a man with a gunshot wound to the thigh). All of the injuries, apart from the one sustained by Patsy O'Donnell, are consistent with people making their way to the southwest exit of Glenfada Park North.

1.8 SECTOR 5 (SOUTH SIDE OF BLOCK 2 OF ROSSVILLE FLATS AND JOSEPH PLACE; PATRICK DOHERTY, BERNARD McGUIGAN, DANIEL McGOWAN AND PADDY CAMPBELL)

The only soldier from 1 Para who claims to have fired in sector 5 is Soldier F. He marks the trajectory of his shot as going from the southwestern corner of block 1 of Glenfada Park North towards the region where Patrick Doherty's body is found.

It would appear that after the shootings in Glenfada Park North, Soldier F made his way to that corner and there is also evidence that Soldier G had moved across from the western side of Glenfada Park in that direction.

Soldier F says that he fired two shots which does not account for the fact that four people were shot in this area.

Photographs were shown of Mr Doherty on his haunches. His hands are clearly visible in front of him as he crawls.

The injuries to Mr Campbell, Mr McGuigan and Mr Doherty were all sustained from behind and none of them are accounted for by the soldiers' evidence.

The photograph of bullet holes to the window of the flat where Susan North and Fulvio Grimaldi were indicates that when required, the soldiers have the capacity to aim directly at the target they intend to shoot. Mr Harvey said that it is highly unlikely that the soldiers missed their targets on Bloody Sunday and accidentally killed others. He said the 27 people who were killed or injured were deliberately selected targets.

Kevin Finnegan QC said that allegations were made against the deceased and wounded since the day of Bloody Sunday to try and justify the shootings. These allegations ranged from the people who went on the march were at best unemployed hooligans to at worst lethal gunmen, nail bombers or petrol bombers or cover for lethal gunmen.

Mr Finnegan said that the images of Bloody Sunday are often not accompanied by any acknowledgement of the human pain and suffering left behind. There are continuing allegations made by members of the British Army. Mr Finnegan said that the BSI will need to consider whether there is any justification for those slanders to persist.

He added that there has never been any acknowledgement of the wrong committed by the Army by the soldiers on the ground that day or by their superior officers. The suggestion made by some politicians is that anybody associated with the march was entitled to all they got.

2.1 JACKIE DUDDY

Jackie Duddy was 17 years old and worked as a weaver in a shirt factory. He was a member of the Long Tower boxing club and had applied to join the merchant navy.

Soldier V shot someone in the general area that Jackie Duddy fell.

In an interview Soldier 2003 claimed to have shot Jackie Duddy. He accepted that Jackie Duddy had been running away from him and had posed no threat to him.

The police investigation into Jackie Duddy concluded that it was murder, but concluded that they were unable to bring charges against the soldier because they could not trace the bullet.

2.2 MICHAEL KELLY

Michael Kelly was two years into a five-year apprenticeship as a sewing machine mechanic.

There was no prosecution in Michael Kelly's case even though Soldier F's bullet was found in his body. The notes in the police file record the reason why there was no prosecution,
'…merely because in those instances there is evidence that the bullet causing the death was fired from a rifle in possession of the soldier while 20 other soldiers fired something in the region of 126 rounds of ammunition, but who cannot be identified as causing the death or wounding of any particular person.'

2.3 PATSY MCDAID

Patsy McDaid survived Bloody Sunday. He was a 24-year old plumber.

He was shot in the back as he ran for cover between blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville flats. He was one of the people who had carried Peggy Deery to 33 Chamberlain Street after she had been shot and had been looking for further first aid help for her at the time he was shot.

Mr Finnegan said that the fact that Mr McDaid was running towards this direction shows that the soldiers allegations about gunmen operating in this area was untrue since no one would run towards a gunman.

2.4 PATRICK CAMPBELL

Patrick Campbell was 53-years old when he was wounded. He was a married man with nine children and was employed as a docker. He was shot in the buttock in the Joseph Place area. Mr Campbell has since died. He was interviewed by the police after Bloody Sunday and the officer noted Mr Campbell's jovial and co-operative nature.

3 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF JOSEPH FRIEL, JOSEPH MAHON AND THE FAMILIES OF GERARD DONAGHY, WILLIAM McKINNEY, GERARD McKINNEY.

3.1 JOE FRIEL

Joe Friel was a 20-year-old tax-officer employed by the Inland Revenue. He was shot in Glenfada Park and taken to Altnagelvin hospital by car, but en route to the hospital he was transferred to the rear of an APC. He was eventually admitted to hospital at approximately 5:15pm that evening.

Mr Friel has given a consistent account of the shooting since Bloody Sunday. He said that he was trying to get back home to block 1 of the Rossville flats but could not get there because of the crowd at the entrance. Instead he ran to Glenfada Park North where he saw three, perhaps four soldiers in the northeast corner. One of those soldiers moved forward firing with his firearm held just above waist height. Mr Friel felt three shots and a blow to the body.

3.1.1 Alleged admission

Soldier 104 accused Joe Friel of having admitted to carrying a firearm at the time he was shot. Soldier 104 was a member of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment and was on duty at a roadblock at Barrack Street.

After he was shot, Mr Friel was placed in a car and driven towards Altnagelvin hospital. The car carrying Gerard Donaghy was just behind him.

Seamus Treacy QC noted the attitude of the soldiers on duty at the checkpoint at Barrack Street to the cars containing Gerard Donaghy and Joe Friel. Soldier 135 said that he had gone up to the car, put his baton gun on the side of the car resting on the window frame and he immediately fired and blew them out of there.

Soldier 104 got into the car carrying Joe Friel and drove it to the Regimental Aid Post (RAP). He claimed that Joe Friel admitted to carrying a gun.

Mr Friel has consistently denied that he was carrying a weapon when he was shot. Neither he nor his lawyers were aware of the allegation until he was cross-examined at the Widgery Inquiry.

None of the civilian witnesses who saw Joe Friel before or after the shooting saw him carrying a firearm. Soldier 104 admits he did not mention the admission to anyone until later that day when he said that he told his Platoon Commander Soldier 145. However Soldier 145 makes no mention of being told of the admission in his statements. This is despite the fact that he does actually refer to a conversation he had with Soldier 104 about Gerard Donaghy.

3.1.2 Mr Friel's civil action against the MoD

Mr Treacy said that it is clear that Soldier 104's evidence is false and completely unreliable.

Mr Friel brought a civil action against the MoD. The opinion prepared by the Crown Solicitor stated that there was no defence against Mr Friel's claim.

Additionally Mr Friel was never cautioned or charged for any offence arising out of the events of Bloody Sunday. He was never placed under arrest and his clothes were never taken away for forensic analysis.

3.2 GERARD DONAGHY

Gerard Donaghy was 17 years old and lived with his sister. He had been released from prison on Christmas Eve 1971 after serving a six-month sentence for throwing stones at policemen. This was the mandatory sentence for throwing stones in Northern Ireland at the time.

Mr Treacy said Gerard Donaghy was murdered. He considered two aspects of Mr Donaghy's case; the failure of the Army to take Mr Donaghy to hospital and the question of the nail bombs found on his body.

3.1.2 Failure of the Army to take Mr Donaghy to hospital

Dr Swords examined Gerard Donaghy in Raymond Rogan's house. He told Mr Rogan that Gerard Donaghy would have a chance of living if he was taken to hospital as soon as possible. Mr Rogan volunteered to take Gerard Donaghy in his car to Altnagelvin. Leo Young accompanied them.

Mr Young said that Gerard was still groaning while in the back of the car. At Barrack Street, the car was stopped by the Royal Anglian Regiment. Mr Rogan tried to explain that he was taking an injured man to hospital. He was dragged out of the car at gunpoint and thrown against the fence. Mr Young was also pulled out of the car and asked about Mr Donaghy. The soldier said 'let the bastard die,' pointed his gun towards Mr Young and told him that if he blinked he would blow his head off.

Soldier 135 has given evidence that when a nurse approached the car containing Mr Friel asking if she could help, he replied 'Fuck off Florence, this one is shitted.'

Mr Rogan's car was commandeered by the army and instead of driving straight to the hospital it was taken first to the Company Headquarters and then to the RAP at Craigavon Bridge. There has been no explanation for why this happened.

The delay in getting medical assistance to Gerard Donaghy might have been a significant contributory factor to his death. The BSI's experts have been asked whether Gerard Donaghy would have survived if he had received prompt medical attention.

Mr Treacy pointed to the fact that the other person taken to the RAP, Joe Friel, also had evidence fabricated against him.

3.2.2 Nail bombs - civilian evidence

There is overwhelming civilian, medical, military, forensic and police evidence which shows the nail bombs must have been planted on Gerard Donaghy by the Security Forces after he had been shot.

A number of witnesses have confirmed that Gerard Donaghy was wearing tight jeans that day. Raymond Rogan that if Mr Donaghy had nail bombs then he would never have carried him into his home because his children were inside.

3.2.3 Nail bombs - military evidence

Corporal 150 corroborates the civilian evidence. Within a couple of minutes after the arrival of the car containing Gerard Donaghy at the RAP he picked up Gerard Donaghy's arm to feel for a pulse. He did not see any nail bombs and said that he is sure that he would have done had there been any there.

Captain 138 examined Mr Donaghy twice. On neither occasion did he see a nail bomb. The examination involved unzipping Mr Donaghy's trousers. There was a gap of between 16 to 25 minutes in between each examination, in which time no bomb is found either by the medical officer or by anybody else.

The Irish Government's assessment of the new material concluded that Lord Widgery's finding that the nail bombs were probably in Mr Donaghy's pockets throughout is 'so extraordinary as to border on the farcical.'

Chief Superintendent Lagan heard rumours on the evening of Bloody Sunday that bombs had been planted.

3.2.4 Nail bombs - Departure from normal procedures

Samples from the explosive cores of the nail bombs were never forwarded to the forensic science laboratory for examination. This was a major departure from normal procedure. Captain 127 was the bomb disposal officer and said that in normal circumstances the Army would send samples to the laboratory to attempt to identify and trace the source or origin of the various elements in the bombs that were found by the Security Forces.

However an intelligence summary states that the bombs were made with quarax. Mr Treacy said that this indicates the explosives from the nail bombs must have been retained by the Army for long enough to be able to carry out tests on them. The MoD has not made any documents available which refer to the retention, examination or disposal of the explosive.

Mr Treacy said that the evidence leads to the irresistible inference that the bombs were planted. He asked that the Tribunal finally set the record straight about Gerard Donaghy.

3.3 JOE MAHON

Joe Mahon was 16 years old when he was shot on Bloody Sunday. He was about to begin an apprenticeship as a joiner.

He was one of the people shot in Glenfada Park and described how James Wray was murdered.

3.4 WILLIAM McKINNEY

William McKinney was shot and killed in Glenfada Park. He was three days away from his 27th birthday and was the eldest of 10 children. He was engaged to be married and was employed as a compositor at the Derry Journal. He was a keen amateur photographer and filmmaker and took his camera to the march on Bloody Sunday.

3.5 GERARD McKINNEY

Gerry McKinney was 35 years old when he was killed. He was married and had seven children. His eighth child was born eight days after Mr McKinney was killed. Gerry McKinney worked for McLaughlin's wrought iron works in Derry and was very involved in the community.

Brian McCarthy made some general comments about the majority of people on the march before presenting personal portraits of the deceased and wounded.

Mr McCarthy said that the people on the march were just decent, ordinary people asking for justice and equality for all. The majority of people on the march already felt that they represented a generation of victims; victims of political, social and economic alienation.

4.1 MARGARET (PEGGY) DEERY

Peggy Deery died in 1988. She was a 38-year old widow with 14 children at the time of Bloody Sunday. She was shot in the leg and remained in hospital until 29th May 1972.

A statement was taken from her on 19th February 1972 and Mrs Deery tried to avoid saying that she was on the march. Mr McCarthy pointed to the context in which that statement was taken. Mrs Deery was aware that the people who had been shot were represented as gunmen or bombers. She had not seen her children for three weeks and was scared that she could lose her family. Mr McCarthy noted that there is also no attempt within that statement to get a description of the soldier who shot her.

Peggy Deery wore a calliper for the rest of her life and was the victim of taunts by patrolling members of the security forces.

4.2 ALANA BURKE

Alana Burke was an 18-year old accounts clerk and the eldest of 10 children. Her father died six months before Bloody Sunday and when her mother became ill, Alana took over responsibility for the family.

4.3 HUGH GILMORE

Hugh Gilmore was 17 years old when he was shot dead on Bloody Sunday. He was the youngest of 8 children and worked at the Northern Tyre Company in Derry.

4.4 KEVIN McELHINNEY

Kevin McElhinney was 17 years old when he was shot dead on Bloody Sunday. He was one of five children and was employed at Lipton's supermarket. He was teaching his father to drive and was due to give him his next lesson on the night of Bloody Sunday.

At the wake that was held for Kevin McElhinney, the Army arrived outside the family home and taunted those arriving and leaving.

5.1 JOHN YOUNG

John Young was 17 years old when he was shot dead. He was the youngest of six children and was employed by Tailor-Fit men's outfitters.

Karen Quinlaven said that the Young family found the way that John's body was treated at the barricade deeply distressing. (A large number of witnesses have described the rough manner that John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash were handled as they were put into the APC.)

No adequate explanation has ever been provided as to why the bodies were taken from the barricade at approximately 4:30pm and did not reach Altnagelvin until after 6:00pm.

Ms Quinlaven said that what is clear is that the manner in which the bodies were handled contributed directly to the forensic evidence used against the three men at the Widgery Inquiry and contributed to them being labelled as gunmen.

One of the issues that caused the Young family profound difficulty is the way in which Leo Young (John's older brother) was told about John's death. Leo Young was arrested at the Barrack Street checkpoint with Raymond Rogan (see para 3.2.1above). He was questioned about his family during his detention. Before being released, Mr Young was ordered to brush the floor of the alleyway in Ballykelly. A police officer called Detective Donnelly asked him how many brothers he had. When he replied 'two', Detective Donnelly said 'you only have one now.'

5.2 MICHAEL McDAID

Michael McDaid was 20 years old when he was shot dead on Bloody Sunday. He was the second youngest in a family of twelve and was employed as a barman. The manner in which his body was taken from the barricade has been a source of deep distress to his family.

John and Danny McDaid, Michael's brothers went to the morgue to identify his body. When they reached the morgue all those who had been killed were lined up against the wall and covered with a blanket. After they had identified Michael's body, John McDaid asked if he could be allowed to remain with Michael in the morgue but was refused permission. Yet throughout that time, armed police and soldiers had free access to the morgue.

5.3 PATSY O'DONNELL

Patsy O'Donnell was 41 years old on Bloody Sunday. He was employed as a roofing contractor and was married with six children. Within minutes of having been shot in the shoulder, he was arrested along with others who had sheltered in Glenfada Park.

Patsy O'Donnell was in obvious pain but no attempt was made to get him any medical attention. He was holding a handkerchief to his wound and repeatedly told the soldiers he had been shot but he was ordered to raise his hands above his head.

Those arrested were eventually taken towards the City Cabs taxi depot and civilians urged Mr O'Donnell to come inside and sit down. Immediately soldiers came and ordered him out. Mr O'Donnell was hit over the head by one of the soldiers, using either a rifle or a baton.

Mr O'Donnell was eventually released and had to remain in hospital for two weeks. He gave evidence at the Widgery Inquiry and felt that the focus of questioning centred on the existence of the fence which he had sheltered behind. He was prevented from giving evidence about his arrest and assault.

After Bloody Sunday, Mr O'Donnell suffered extensive harassment from the Army. He suffered house searches, was frequently arrested and detained for interrogation.

6.1 JOHN JOHNSTON

John Johnston was 59 years old on Bloody Sunday. He was the manager of a drapery store. He lived with his wife, Margaret at 50 Marlborough Street in Derry. He watched the march go past his house and then went to see 90-year old Tommy Duddy.

He was shot in the leg and shoulder by soldiers positioned no more than 30 yards away. He fell and struck his head on the pavement. Mr Johnson died on 16th June 1972. He died from a brain tumour which the neurosurgeon said could have been caused by the blow to his head.

6.2 DAMIEN DONAGHY

Damien Donaghy was 15 years old on Bloody Sunday. He lived with his grandparents and had just left school to begin an apprenticeship as an engineer.

He was shot in the right leg above the knee. Today his knee functions at only 75 percent.

6.3 DANIEL McGOWAN

Daniel McGowan was 37 years old on Bloody Sunday. He was married with eight children and worked at Dupont.

On Bloody Sunday, Mr McGowan saw Patrick Campbell who was wounded, at the south side of block 2 of the Rossville flats. He helped Mr Campbell into the passageway at the rear of Joseph Place. Mr McGowan was shot in the right leg and lay in the alleyway for almost an hour before he got help.

The family of Patrick Doherty are represented by Barr & Company Solicitors. Eilish McDermott QC outlined the themes that the family intend to pursue during the course of the BSI. Michael Topolski commented on points specific to Mr Doherty's death.

7.1 THEMES TO BE PURSUED

Ms McDermott said that the questions that the Doherty family will be asking this Tribunal to answer is

· Why did Mr Doherty die?
· What was the plan?
· Who ordered it, condoned it, and permitted it?

7.1.1 Transparency and accountability

The rights of Patrick Doherty and his family have never been upheld because there has never been any investigation or prosecutions brought about for his murder. The prosecuting authorities did not even respond to the coroner's verdict that this was 'sheer, unadulterated murder.' Instead a campaign of lies was mounted against the dead and wounded.

Ms McDermott questioned whether the Doherty family could be sure there would be no more lies. She pointed to the destruction of rifles by the MoD and asked whether there had been full disclosure of documents.

Ms McDermott said that the MoD is still refusing after 30 years to come out and tell the truth. She said that it was incredible that the MoD was not represented at the BSI. Instead there are lawyers representing individual soldiers whereas on Bloody Sunday they were not individual soldiers but were an army acting under orders. On the one hand the Government is saying that this Tribunal has been set up to establish the truth. On the other hand the MoD, the Government department that knows the truth and which was responsible for the operation, is not even present at the BSI.

Ms McDermott said that this attitude gives little hope to the Doherty family that there will be no more lies. They need to know;

· What documents and which witnesses are missing from the vast amount of material which has been amassed.
· What memos passed between senior military figures and the Cabinet after Bloody Sunday.
· Where John Taylor's (Chairman of the JSC at the time) statement is.
· What documents were destroyed? Why were they destroyed? Who destroyed them?

Ms McDermott asked if the Tribunal will get access to documents held under the thirty-year rule? (In general, government documents are not available for public inspection until they are at least thirty years old.) She read from an article printed in the Sunday Telegraph on 2nd July 2000. It said that a 1969 Government memorandum had been hurriedly recalled by the MoD after it had been released to the public under the thirty-year rule. The memorandum related to dismantling the Catholic barricades and was sent from the UK representative in Northern Ireland to the Home Secretary, James Callaghan. The UK representative recommended that Westminster should support Stormont and suggested that they would have to 'be cruel to be kind' to the Catholic population,
'In the last resort it must suit Catholics to get clobbered by us, if that is the only way we can get justice for them.'

Ms McDermott said the fact that the MoD ordered this memorandum to be withdrawn fuels the fears of the Doherty family that the MoD is attempting to obstruct the work of the Tribunal.

7.1.2 Military policy in relation to the No-Go areas

Bloody Sunday cannot be seen in isolation. Ms McDermott said that there was clearly a military policy formulated for dealing with the No-Go areas which stretches from July 1970 to Operation Motorman in July 1972. Brigadier General Kitson was the person responsible for drawing up this policy.

7.1.3 Further issues central to the task of the Tribunal in its search for the truth

Ms McDermott said that the following areas will need to be investigated:

· The training of 1 Para, especially particular training for the discharge of its duties in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland.
· The role of General Kitson in its training.
· The history of 1 Para in Belfast.
· The relationship between General Ford, Brigadier Kitson and Colonel Wilford.
· The factors which influenced the choice of 1 Para; considering the reputation it had built up in Belfast.
· The education the soldiers in 1 Para had before deployment in Northern Ireland.
· Whether there existed a culture of cover-up and who was responsible for it?
· The relationship between the UK Cabinet, the Northern Ireland Cabinet, Lord Grey (the Governor of Northern Ireland) and the senior army commanders. In particular, the way the army commanders assumed control over all security matters after June 1970.
· The factors influencing General Ford such as Stormont ministers, loyalist groups, Protestant businessmen in Derry and army strategic interests.
· The reason why General Ford decided to be present on Bloody Sunday and how much control he exercised on the ground during the operation.

7.2 PERSONAL DETAILS

Patrick Doherty was 32 years old and was married with six children. He was employed at Dupont.

Mr Doherty was a regular attendee at NICRA meetings and was a steward on Bloody Sunday.

Photographs taken by Gilles Peress show the last moments of Mr Doherty's life and provide the proof that he was unarmed and was crawling on all fours when he was shot.

7.3 THE SHOOTING

Mr Topolski said that Patrick Doherty was murdered.

It may not be possible to pinpoint the exact spot where Patrick Doherty was shot. He died to the south of block 2 of the flats but might have been shot in the Rossville flats car park.

In Mr Clarke's opening he invited the Tribunal to consider whether Mr Doherty had been killed by a ricochet bullet. Mr Topoloski suggested that this was unlikely. He pointed to the report by Drs Shepherd and O'Callaghan which provides scientific evidence that Mr Doherty's trousers was the first surface the bullet hit. Mr Topolski said that this establishes that Mr Doherty was not hit by a ricochet.

The family of James Wray are represented by McCartney & Casey Solicitors. Anthony Gifford QC spoke about James Wray and outlined the themes to be explored during the BSI.

8.1 WHY DID JAMES WRAY DIE?

Lord Gifford said that to answer the question why did James Wray die , both direct and indirect causes need to be investigated.

8.1.1 Direct causes

At its simplest, James Wray died because a soldier shot him in circumstances which amount to murder.

8.1.2 Indirect causes

Lord Gifford said that indirectly, Mr Wray died because persons in authority deliberately created a situation in which the soldiers were authorised or permitted to commit murder.

To find out how that happened it is necessary to look at the background to the day and at incidents in each of the sectors. Lord Gifford said that inferences can be drawn from looking at exactly what happened. If, for example different soldiers fired at unarmed civilians in circumstances were they had no reason to feel threatened, then the inference may be that the soldiers were doing precisely what they had been authorised or ordered to do.

8.2 PERSONAL DETAILS

8.2.1 James Wray

James Wray was 22 years old and was employed as a refrigeration inspector by a company in Derry. He was engaged to be married.
He went on the march with his family.

8.2.2 The Widgery Inquiry

Lord Gifford read from transcripts of the Widgery Inquiry. James Wray's father had spoken at one of the preliminary hearings and asked for all statements to be used during the Widgery Inquiry. He told Lord Widgery that because of his position in the Army he was not suitable to chair the Inquiry. He asked that the Government be investigated as well as the military.

8.3 CONTEXT AND HISTORY

Lord Gifford told the Tribunal that they have a responsibility to understand and report on the reasons why participants in the events of Bloody Sunday acted as they did.

8.3.1 Confrontation with enforcers of the law

Lord Gifford said that it is important to understand why in 1971 and 1972 so many citizens were taking part in actions which appeared to be against the law of the land. He said that when the law and its enforcers promote gross injustice, decent people come to confront and oppose the enforcers of the law.

All the thousands of people who marched on Bloody Sunday believed that they were breaking the law because the march had been banned. In fact Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to peaceful assembly. Lord Gifford said in light of the fact that the UK had signed this Convention at the time of Bloody Sunday, the march had actually been lawful.

8.3.2 Discrimination

Lord Gifford cited the figures showing how the Unionists secured control of the Council. Gerrymandering ensured that the 14,429 Catholic voters and 8,781 other voters resulted in 12 Unionists and 8 non-Unionists. This meant that an entire community was disenfranchised.

8.3.3 Police Misconduct

Certain incidents contributed to the belief that justice could not be secured under the Stormont regime.

Lord Cameron concluded that the RUC were guilty of assault and battery when they invaded the Bogside in January 1969.

In April 1969 Samuel Devanney died after receiving a savage beating from RUC officers who had entered his home. The officers responsible were never held to account and the Chief Constable said that he could not carry out an investigation because of a conspiracy of silence within the police force.

8.3.4 Army misconduct

The Conservative party and Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling introduced a more aggressive security policy when they took over Government. The previous policy of cultivating goodwill with the local population changed to massive searches in Catholic districts in a manner that re-awaken distrust.

The killing of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beatty in July 1971 has been described as a key event which turned the population against the Army.

8.3.5 Internment

Internment without trial, reintroduced in August 1971 led to a high level of resentment. The Catholic communities saw it as an affront to human rights and bore the impact of this repressive measure.

8.4 EVIDENCE SUGGESTING TWO PLANS

Lord Gifford said that there is a body of evidence that points to the possibility of a plan to kill young people and to teach Catholics a lesson. He said that it was far too early to suggest, as Mr Clarke had, that there was no ulterior plan.

Lord Gifford asked the Tribunal keep their minds open to the possibility that there were two plans;

· the official plan - an arrest operation conceived by Brigadier MacLellan.
· the real plan - a killing operation which was too sensitive to divulge to anyone except those who really needed to know.

He pointed to six areas of evidence which suggested that a second plan existed.

8.4.1 The development of General Ford's ideas

Referring to the 7th January memorandum, Lord Gifford said that it was terrifying that General Ford could suggest shooting civilians as a means of restoring law and order.

Just 23 days after this memorandum, General Ford was overseeing the Bloody Sunday operation which in army terms might be described as shooting elements of the 'DYH'.

He said that the option outlined in the 7th January memorandum, whilst on the surface had been rejected for another option, in reality became incorporated into the Bloody Sunday operation.

8.4.2 Private 027's evidence

In his statement to the BSI, Private 027 described the briefing that took place the day before Bloody Sunday. The briefing revolved around the possibility of getting some kills. He remembers Soldier F nodding 'as if he had made his mind up.'

Lord Gifford said that it is important that the content of the briefing revolved around the possibility of 'getting kills' rather than receiving fire.

In the statement he gave in 1975, Private 027 gave a fuller account of the briefing,
'We were all in high spirits and when our Lieutenant said, 'let's teach these buggers a lesson, we want some kills tomorrow,' to the mentality of the blokes to whom he was speaking this was tantamount to an order (i.e. An exoneration of all responsibility).'

Lord Gifford said that the way that briefing came down the line needs to be investigated.

8.4.3 Guardsman 1141's evidence

Guardsman 1141 was a soldier in one of the resident battalions. He said that a couple of nights before Bloody Sunday, he was ordered to investigate the rubble barricade in Rossville Street to find out whether it was rigged with explosives. (This is the barricade where Michael Kelly, John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid were killed.)

Lord Gifford suggested that the reason this observation was carried out was because it was anticipated that the troops would advance as far down to or past the rubble barricade.

8.4.4 Evidence that the IRA would stay away

Lord Gifford pointed to the evidence which suggests the Army knew that the IRA had agreed to stay away from the march.

He said that the evidence in this area is still incomplete and awaits the statement of the intelligence officer known as 'Ingram' who said that he saw material which made it clear that the intelligence was that the IRA would stay away from the march.

Dr McClean indicates that from an early point it was common ground amongst the organisers that they had received an assurance from the IRA that they would stay away from the march. Lord Gifford said that it is certain that the army and police intelligence operators had picked up the same message.

Lord Gifford pointed to the fact that there is no primary record drawn up before Bloody Sunday suggesting that the IRA would exploit the march. He said that the Observer B material (about drilling in the Rossville flats) is lies. He asked why there are so many documents, drawn up after Bloody Sunday, suggesting that the IRA was going exploit the march.

8.4.5 Information received by the loyalist community

The loyalist community in Derry called off a counter rally planned for 30th January because of information they received that the NICRA march would be stopped by force and that riot and bloodshed would result.

A report from the Sunday Post cited the Reverend James MacLelland, vice-president of the Democratic Unionist Association in Derry who said

'we were approached by the Government and given assurances that the civil rights march will be halted - by force if necessary.'

Lord Gifford asked who in the Government had given this information to the Democratic Unionists? He asked that statements be taken from Reverend MacLelland and Reverend Ian Paisley.

8.4.5 Events on the day

Lord Gifford said that this was not an arrest operation, it was a killing operation.

The soldiers fired in various circumstances in which they had no reason to feel threatened. In doing this they were in breach of the Yellow Card and the law. The soldiers were disciplined members of an elite regiment. Lord Gifford said that Bloody Sunday did not arise because of unfortunate acts of indiscipline and asked why the soldiers should have behaved in an undisciplined way. He said that far from being undisciplined, the soldiers were disciplined; they were following orders and at least some of them must have been following a plan to shoot as they did.

8.5 DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PLAN

Lord Gifford said that the investigation would need to look at how far the plan was discussed and approved by those above General Ford.

In deciding who was responsible for the deployment of forces on Bloody Sunday and for approving whatever plan was made it is important to understand the different centres of power involved.

It was unclear whether the Army, police or civilian authorities had ultimate control in Northern Ireland. There was also a tension between Westminster and Stormont because Northern Ireland's constitutional status was unclear.

Politically, the UK Government was in ultimate control of policy in Northern Ireland. Legally, the UK Government was in control of military operations. However the Stormont Government was an independent administration. Lord Gifford said that on a number of occasions, notably on the internment decision, the UK government was prepared to leave it to Mr Faulkner to take the initiative.

8.6 INFERENCES THAT EDWARD HEATH AND BRIAN FAULKNER KNEW THAT CIVILIANS WOULD BE SHOT

Lord Gifford suggested that Edward Heath, Brian Faulkner and their most senior advisors, knew that part of the military response to the march would involve firing at people who were not gunmen.

He said that this inference could be drawn by looking at interactions between General Ford and his senior officers, between Stormont and Westminster and within the Westminster institutions.

8.6.1 The 7 January memorandum

Lord Gifford said that it is inconceivable that the 7th January memorandum went no further than General Tuzo. He said it must have gone to General Carver and other senior people in the Ministry of Defence.

There is no mention in any of the documents that General Ford was ever criticised for this recommendation.

Lord Gifford said that General Ford's memorandum must have been discussed at the next meeting of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) on 13th January. The minutes of the JSC meeting record,
'The GOC (General Tuzo) also indicated that following a meeting with businessmen in Londonderry certain measures were in mind with a view to putting down the troublesome hooligan element there. It was a very difficult problem to solve within the law.'

The reference to a 'difficult problem to solve within the law' indicates that legal advice had been sought. Lord Gifford took this as an opportunity to ask the Tribunal to ask for documents about any legal advice that was given at this time. (Currently, the BSI does not have any documents relating to legal advice.)

8.6.2 The run up to 27 January 1972 JSC meeting

Lord Gifford examined the documents detailing discussions and meetings in the run up to the JSC meeting of 27th January. The documents reveal that the march was considered by a number of high level bodies and that a 'line' was to be adopted by General Tuzo and the UK Representative at the JSC meeting.

Sir Peter Hill-Norton, the Admiral of the Fleet, visited Northern Ireland on 24th January. A memorandum from this visit states that General Ford would be discussing the military response to the march with politicians in the JSC meeting.

AW Stephens, head of the section of the MoD responsible for Northern Ireland, sent a memorandum headed 'Current Situation on 26th January 1972.' It said that the choice of tactics for dealing with the march is a matter for the JSC and noted that the MoD and Home Office were in contact with General Tuzo and the UK Representative 'about the line which they will be taking at the (JSC) meeting.'

AW Stephens wrote a memorandum to the Assistant Permanent Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence in which he states that the JSC would decide how the Security Forces were to handle the march. However Mr Stephens added that it would be helpful to hear which line General Tuzo and the UK Representative would be taking at the meeting. He also asked to be informed of the outcome of the meeting. Lord Gifford said that this is significant because the meeting between Edward Heath and Brian Faulkner took place in the late afternoon of 27th January.

The minutes of the Director of Operations meeting (a security forces meeting) held on 26th January show that the Head of Special Branch was confident that 8th Brigade would know about any decisions made by the organisers of the march. Lord Gifford pointed to the fact that the minutes centre on containment of the march and do not mention anything about a 'shooting war.'

8.6.3 JSC meeting 27th January 1972

John Taylor, the Minister of Home Affairs at Stormont chaired the JSC meeting. Commander Anderson, General Tuzo and Sir Graham Shillington were present.

The minutes of this meeting give only a very brief mention to the march. The minute said 'The operation might well develop into rioting and even a shooting war.' Lord Gifford said that behind that minute must have been an intense discussion. He suggested that General Tuzo made the comment about the 'shooting war' because if it had been made by anyone else at the meeting it would be reasonable to expect him to respond to it.

Lord Gifford asked what had happened between the Director of Operations Meeting on the 26th January and this JSC meeting for expectations of the march to have moved from the issue of containment to the possibility of a 'shooting war.'
8.6.4 Meeting between Edward Heath and Brian Faulkner - 27th January

This was the first time that Brian Faulkner had met Edward Heath since 7th October 1971. Lord Gifford said that it was something of a coincidence that this happened to be just three days before Bloody Sunday. The records of this meeting that are available are incomplete.

The record does not say who else attended this meeting. It states that it took place at 5:45pm at 10 Downing Street. It mentions the march very briefly and states that the marchers should be referred to as 'civil disobedients' rather than 'civil righters' and that the TV cameras should see the march being stopped.

Lord Gifford said that simply because the record does not mention a plan, it does not follow one was not discussed at the meeting.

8.6.5 What really happened in terms of decision making

Colonel Dalzell-Payne (a senior officer of the General Staff) wrote a memorandum on 27th January which was written in case 'events on Sunday prove our worst fears.' Lord Gifford noted that whatever the 'worst fears' were they were not mentioned in the minutes of GEN 47 meeting or the meeting between the Prime Ministers. In Colonel Dalzell-Payne's memorandum he refers to a 'shoot to kill' policy as a last resort, implying that it was at least in mind.

In an interview for the programme, 'The Road to Bloody Sunday,' General Carver describes the situation in Derry in a similar way to the way in which General Ford described it in his 7th January memorandum. General Carver said that something had to be done about the 'gangs of hooligans' because the soldiers had to stand under a hail of stones and there was 'immense protests from the Protestant population.'

General Carver continued to say that it was agreed within the British Government that something had to be done. Lord Gifford said that this is direct evidence that a political decision was made in London after the protests and the discussions. He said it is significant that General Carver said the decision to be made was about 'hooliganism' rather than IRA exploitation about the march.

Lord Gifford pointed to omissions in the minutes and documents. Whatever was agreed in the British Government it cannot be found in any of the documents made available to the BSI. Similarly, there is no minute recording what the 'worst fears' are that Colonel Dalzell-Payne referred to in his memorandum of 27th January.

8.6.6 Approval of political leadership needed

Lord Gifford said that the best reason for inferring that the plan was approved by the political leadership is that it could not have been implemented without their approval. The chain of command runs from the soldiers on the ground to Colonel Wilford, to Brigadier MacLellan to General Ford, to General Tuzo to General Carver to the MoD to the Prime Minister.

8.6.7 Shooting civilians not seen as unthinkable

The desire to see law and order imposed by the shooting of rioters was not something that was new or unthinkable to members of the British Cabinet at the time.

In a GEN 47 meeting held in April 1971, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham cited an antique law allowing anyone seen as an enemy of the state to be shot. Lord Gifford asked whether Lord Hailsham attended the meetings held on 27th January.

On the night of 30th January, Jack Lynch, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland telephoned Edward Heath. Mr Lynch set out his concerns about what had happened in Derry. Edward Heath responded in a cold manner and showed very little concern for those who had been killed.

8.7 THEMES TO PURSUE

8.7.1 Racism

Lord Gifford cited a number of examples in the evidence of soldiers' abusive language and behaviour when they came into contact with civilians. He said this reveals a generalised prejudice on the part of the soldiers against the Catholic population of Derry. He said that this state of mind dehumanises the group being abused and makes it easier for the abuser to tell lies about them, use violence against them and even shoot them dead.

Lord Gifford said that the leadership of 1 Para will need to be examined to see whether that type of racism was encouraged or condoned.

8.7.2 Culture of lying

Lord Gifford said that it is impossible to build a framework of fact around the evidence given by the military witnesses because the soldiers are telling lies.

He pointed to examples within the evidence to show that a culture of lying existed in the Army. He cited the lies on the arrest forms, the statement returned to Private 027 that did not correspond with what he had told the statement-taker and Edward Heath's reminder to Lord Widgery that they were engaged in a propaganda war.

He used an example from Tony Geraghty's book about his experience in Northern Ireland to show the extent that the military would cover up for each other. Mr Geraghty referred to a shooting incident in Belfast in 1971. The Army told the press that the soldiers had fired 14 rounds when in fact the real figure was 1,454 rounds.

8.8 POINTS SPECIFIC TO THE SHOOTING OF JAMES WRAY

James Wray was struck by two bullets which may not have been fired at the same time. He fell as he ran with a number of others towards the narrow alley between Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park.

At least six others were shot at about the same time as Mr Wray and Lord Gifford compared the actions of the soldiers in this area to people on a 'turkey shoot.'

8.8.1 Actions of soldiers in Glenfada Park North

Soldiers E, F, G, H, 027 and Lieutenant 119 entered Glenfada Park North. Soldiers E, F, G and H admit to firing live rounds in Glenfada Park North. Lord Gifford said that this group of soldiers stand out because of their readiness to fire.

Soldier F killed Michael Kelly and on his own account had fired three shots before entering Glenfada Park. He then said that he fired towards the south of block 2 of the flats.

Soldier G fired shots before entering Glenfada Park. He fired in Glenfada Park and went through to Abbey Park and shot Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney. He rejoined Soldier F at the gable end of Glenfada Park North and the evidence indicates that two soldiers fired from this position.

Soldier E fired at the barricade from Kells Walk before he entered Glenfada Park.

Private H gave an account of firing 19 shots at a window in Glenfada Park, which even his commanding officer, Lieutenant 119 did not believe.

Private 027 said that when his group of soldiers reached the Kells Walk wall, Soldier F went into a kneeling position and 'fired at the centre of the crowd.'

8.8.2 The shooting of James Wray

John William Porter witnessed the shooting of James Wray from his kitchen window in 8 Abbey Park. A virtual reality panorama was shown of the view from Mr Porter's window. The alleyway leading from Abbey Park to Glenfada Park North and a portion of the Glenfada Park North courtyard were visible.

Mr Porter said that he saw James Wray stumble and then fall. Mr Wray tried to lift his head and his jacket jumped twice. Mr Porter saw two puffs of smoke. Mr Porter, Joe Mahon and John O'Kane said the two shots were fired while Mr Wray lay on the ground. Lord Gifford said this is supported by the configuration of Mr Wray's wounds.

Lord Gifford said that, in spite of this evidence, it is more likely that Mr Wray was first hit in the lower back as he ran across Glenfada Park North and he fell because he was hit. Mr Wray may have been paralysed by the first shot.

Lord Gifford said that it is possible Mr Wray could have lived if he had only been hit by one shot. John Porter had tried to go forward towards Mr Wray but he was driven back to his house by the soldiers' shooting. Mr Wray was executed as he lay on the ground.

8.8.3 Who was the murderer?

Joe Mahon described a blond soldier and a soldier named Dave. Lord Gifford said that he would be making submissions that the soldier's name be made public.

8.9 TACTICS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Lord Gifford asked how much concealment and distortion by the MoD is still going on. He said that the MoD remains as committed to winning the propaganda war in 2000 as they were in 1972.

He suggested that the MoD would try to deceive the BSI and pointed to the fact that rifles, helicopter footage, army photographs, legal advice given in 1972 and intelligence material have gone missing.

Lord Gifford asked for an interlocutory hearing to be held so that questions could be put to the MoD about the missing evidence. He said that it is clear that the MoD and the Security Services are hostile to the BSI and will do their utmost to thwart it from its goal of reaching the truth.

Lord Saville said that the Tribunal members would consider holding an interlocutory hearing. He asked Lord Gifford to compile a list of all the questions he wants to ask the MoD.

Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley were both wounded on Bloody Sunday. They are represented by Brendan Kearney, Kelly & Co. Declan Morgan QC raised five areas for the BSI to investigate and then discussed the issue of public confidence in the running of the BSI.

9.1 AREAS TO BE INVESTIGATED

9.1.1 The appointment of General Ford

General Ford was appointed to the position of Commander of Land Forces two weeks before the introduction of internment. He replaced Major General Farrar-Hockley who was sent to Germany. Mr Morgan asked why senior Army personnel were juggled around at such a sensitive time.

He asked;

· Whether General Ford was appointed to achieve a purpose.
· Whether that purpose was connected with any change in army policy towards civil disobedience.
· Whether General Ford's appointment was an indication of a more aggressive army policy.

9.1.2 General Ford's role as an observer and access to the secure net

Mr Morgan said that there are questions to be answered on who had access to the secure net and whether General Ford was present as an observer.

In an interview for Desmond Hamill's book 'Pig in the Middle,' General Ford said that he had sent a message to Brigadier MacLellan on the secure net 'suggesting he got a move on'. However in his BSI statement, General Ford said that he did not have access to the secure net.

The fact that General Ford recalls that he suggested Brigadier MacLellan should put the troops in, indicates that he saw his role as more active than that of an observer.
Additionally General Ford said that after hearing shots from the Rossville flats, he advised Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson of 22nd LADR to return D Company 1 Para to under command of 1 Para. Mr Morgan suggested that this type of decision was an operational military decision and not a decision for an observer to make.

General Ford also states in the Desmond Hamill interview
'What was happening in Londonderry that day was crucial to the future of that part of Northern Ireland…I, of course was determined to have a success. I felt so much could turn on this - not just there but in Belfast as well. As it was crucial, I went there.'
Mr Morgan said that this did not sound like a plan to contain a march or to carry out an arrest operation.

The fact that General Ford said the day was 'crucial to the future of that part of Northern Ireland' raises the question of whether a scheme was going to be put into operation and whether there was a plan within a plan.

9.1.3 The role of Brigadier Kitson

In his statement to the BSI, General Ford suggests that he was having operational discussions about 1 Para with Brigadier Kitson. He said

'I knew Kitson's view of that particular Battalion.'

On the 7th or 8th January General Ford issued a warning order to 1 Para that they should be available for the march. Mr Morgan said that in order to do this, General Ford must have at least discussed 1 Para's availability with Brigadier Kitson.

Brigadier Kitson was seen as an expert in tactics required with civil disturbance which suggests that he and General Ford must have discussed the march.

However there are no documents revealing these discussions. Mr Morgan likened this to the 'conspiracy of silence' which surrounds the 7th January memorandum.

9.1.4 Undercover Soldiers

Within the documents there is evidence that there were armed undercover soldiers on the march.

A member of the Royal Military Police states that he saw a prisoner at Fort George who later identified himself as an undercover SAS officer who had been arrested with the civilians.

Further evidence exists in the material used in the making of the Channel 4 programme 'Secret History.' A soldier said that there were four armed SAS people in plainclothes in the crowd.

Mr Morgan said that if there are reports of gunmen sighted within the crowd it is necessary to consider whether they were undercover soldiers.

9.1.5 Platoons responsible for shooting in sector 2

Mr Morgan asked whether Mortar Platoon were the only soldiers present in sector two. One soldier from Machine Gun Platoon states that he was in the Rossville flats car park at a time when there was just one APC parked at the corner of block 1.

Mr Morgan said that he is reluctant to accept that shooting in this sector was solely the responsibility of Mortar Platoon. He added that the issue of whether there was more shooting than is admitted in this sector needs to be investigated.

9.2 PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND THE WORK OF THE TRIBUNAL

Mr Morgan said that public confidence in the work of the Tribunal is at risk in relation to certain matters. He said that this should not be taken as criticism of the work of the Tribunal but he wanted to draw their attention to these matters.

9.2.1 Continued provision of anonymity

58 soldiers have expressly indicated that they do not want to be covered by the Court of Appeal ruling giving them the right to anonymity.

Mr Morgan suggested that the BSI contact these soldiers to confirm that they still did not want anonymity and if that is the case to release their names. He asked, in the interest of openness, that the Tribunal inform the public when they have contacted these soldiers.

Lord Saville said that the Tribunal would try to do this although he indicated, because of workload, it would not be a priority.

9.2.2 Missing documents

Mr Morgan asked where the documents are that show the response given to General Ford's 7th January memorandum. He said that if there was no response to the memorandum then a military expert should be asked whether that would be the normal procedure. If it was not in accordance with procedure then the question of why the procedures were not followed needs to be investigated.

9.2.3 Outstanding statements

Mr Morgan raised the issue of statements that are still not available despite a ruling on 15th June 2000, that draft statements would be distributed if signed statements were not returned. Mr Morgan said that Lieutenant N and Colonel Wilford's statements have not yet been made available to all the parties.

Mr Morgan said that there is a risk of perception that certain witnesses are exploiting the opportunities given by the Tribunal. He said that at the Widgery Inquiry, the Army witnesses were able to tailor their evidence because they gave evidence after the civilians. He said that it was important that all the statements are available by the time his clients give their oral evidence.

Mr Clarke said that the reason Colonel Wilford and Lieutenant N's statements had been held up was because they had been asked to comment on additional material.

9.2.4 Order of witnesses

The BSI has published a list of civilian witnesses and the order in which they will be called to give evidence. Mr Morgan asked the Tribunal provide a list of which military witnesses will be called in relation to which topic. He said that this would allay the concern that there are different rules for the soldiers compared with the civilians.

Lord Saville said that there are not different rules. He said the one basic rule is that the BSI will call witnesses who can materially add to the Inquiry by answering questions.

Mr Clarke said that there is no question of applying different rules to the soldiers. He said that he would be publishing a list of military witnesses next year. There are about 750 soldiers statements at the moment and there are others still coming in. All of them will have to be read before this list can be drawn up.

Mr Morgan said that by the time Michael Bridge gives oral evidence he will want to know which military witnesses are to be called. Lord Saville said that he could not give an undertaking that this could happen. He said that the soldiers' written statements would still be available.

Daniel Gillespie and the family of William and Alexander Nash are represented by MacDermott & McGurk Solicitors. The family of Bernard McGuigan is represented by Desmond Doherty & Co Solicitors. Michael Mansfield QC examined the background to Bloody Sunday and discussed the soldiers' arguments.

10.1 REASONS THE BSI WAS SET UP

Mr Mansfield said that the recognition that those who were killed and injured on Bloody Sunday were done an injustice has only just begun.

In January 1998, the Prime Minister gave two reasons for setting up the BSI. Firstly, the families had conducted a dignified search for the truth. Secondly, there was no connection between those who died or were wounded that day and illegal activity of any kind.

Mr Mansfield reminded everyone of the Coroner's verdict in 1973 when Mr O'Neill concluded the shootings were 'sheer, unadulterated murder.' He noted that after this, the rules of the Coroners' Courts were changed to stop coroners from making those findings again. Mr Mansfield said that this was how far the authorities would go to ensure that there would not be recognition of the fact that innocent people were killed without justification.

Mr Mansfield said two simple facts prove that Mr O'Neill was justified in reaching his verdict.

· Most, if not all, of the casualties were the result of army gunfire.
· None of those who were killed or wounded were engaged in any activity which merited them being chosen as targets.

In other words, they were innocent victims.

10.2 KEY QUESTIONS

Mr Mansfield said that the key questions for the BSI are;

· Was the use of lethal force unlawful, in the sense that it was more than the minimum force needed to support the civil authority responsible for law and order?
· If the force was unlawful, who authorised it and why did they authorise it?
· Was the soldier defending himself or his colleague against a perceived threat based on reasonable grounds of imminent, serious physical injury or death from the civilian whom he killed or wounded?

Mr Mansfield asked what the military are saying about the identified people who were shot. They were doing nothing to merit being shot other than being there.

He said that it appears the soldiers are saying they were subject to a storm of fire which meant that they had to use lethal force. However those who they had to use this force against all disappeared.

Mr Mansfield asked whether there was ever another group against whom lethal force was used or needed.

10.2.1 The soldiers' submissions to the BSI

Mr Mansfield examined the summary of arguments that the soldiers have given to the BSI. He asked a series of questions about their arguments.

He asked why none of the soldiers or their senior officers have recognised that military fire killed innocent people. They are still not accepting that they fired at innocent people.

He pointed to the fact that some of the soldiers who fired weapons appear to have had complete loss of memory. He asked how they could have forgotten that they killed civilians on the streets of the UK.

The soldiers are saying that they reacted 'reasonably to mob violence and the use of lethal force against them.' Mr Mansfield asked who the people are that the soldiers believed were threatening them.

He asked what the soldiers meant when they say 'it does not follow that those who have been identified as having been killed or wounded on 30th January 1972 were themselves gunmen or nail bombers.'

Mr Mansfield said that responsibility has been erased by the soldiers and there is still a long way to go before the truth is recognised. He asked how much protection the soldiers want before they finally admit the truth and whether they would ever admit the truth.

10.3 BACKGROUND

Mr Mansfield gave an overview of the history to Bloody Sunday. He said that the background to the NICRA march was civil protest not civil unrest.
By 1968 and 1969, the Bogside and Creggan had become a ghetto, isolated and imprisoned by unionist politicians. Universal suffrage was denied until the civil rights movement began again in 1968. Mr Mansfield said that change only occurs when people stand up for values and make them known to a wider public. When NICRA began alerting the world to these inequalities, they were banned.

The authorities rushed to oppress all forms of protest. Issues around housing, employment and the vote were converted into a general concern to push the issue of civil rights to the forefront. Energy was turned to the question of internment and when marches were banned the struggle was converted into how it was possible to ensure that basic issues of civil rights were made public.

The authorities defined the situation in terms of a simple equation. Anyone who lived in the Bogside and Creggan was a Catholic. Anyone who was a Catholic was a nationalist. Anyone who was a nationalist was sympathetic to the IRA. This simple equation reflected the thinking of the soldiers. The Paratroopers and other soldiers saw anyone on the street as a legitimate target, irrespective of what they were doing.

Mr Mansfield noted that this mentality is still evident amongst the senior officers. In an interview for 'Remember Bloody Sunday,' Colonel Wilford was unwilling to accept that anybody who was shot was innocent. He said that anybody on the march was out to make trouble.

10.4 BERNARD McGUIGAN

Bernard McGuigan was 41 years old and was married with six children. He was employed as a painter and was respected as a 'community man.' He was treasurer of a local tenants association and worked with the local school to try and stamp out vandalism.

Mr McGuigan left his house at 2:30pm to go to the march and was joined by two friends.

The shooting started at about the time that the speeches were about to begin. Photographs show Mr McGuigan sheltering with the group at the south end of block 1 of the Rossville flats.

Geraldine Richmond's evidence describes how Mr McGuigan waved a white handkerchief as he tried to reach Patrick Doherty. Ms Richmond said that Mr McGuigan stepped out sideways and she then heard two distinct shots. Mr Mansfield suggested that Soldier F or one of the soldiers in Glenfada Park North shot Mr McGuigan. He noted that Soldier F initially made no reference to shooting to the south of the Rossville flats until his rifle was associated with another death. Mr Mansfield said that Barney McGuigan had been shot for being there and for having the audacity to try and help someone else.

10.5 ALEXANDER AND WILLIAM NASH

Alexander Nash was 52 years old and was employed as a painter. He was married with 13 children. His son, William Nash was 15 years old and was a docker. The family had just celebrated a wedding. John Nash was married on Saturday 29th January. William wore the new suit he had bought for his brother's wedding to the march. He also wore a ring that one of his sister's had given to him - a keepsake that was never returned to the family.

The march started around the corner from where the Nash family lived in Creggan Heights. Photographs were shown of William Nash at the barrier. One photograph shows him throwing a stone but Mr Mansfield pointed to the fact that it was nothing more lethal than a stone. He then went down to the rubble barricade where he was shot.

Alexander Nash heard the shooting and went to the barricade to find that William was one of the young men that had been shot. Mr Nash gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that he raised his arm when he reached the bodies at the barricade and was shot. Mr Mansfield said that it is unlikely that Alexander Nash was shot by a low velocity weapon being fired in the doorway of the Rossville flats.

The most likely candidate to have killed William Nash is Soldier P. In his statement to the BSI, Soldier P said that he has no recollection of firing his weapon.

10.6 DANNY GILLESPIE

Danny Gillespie lived at 81 Lisfannon Park. He was shot in the corner of Glenfada Park North. He had walked down Rossville Street and ran into Glenfada Park North when the APCs arrived. The bullet that was fired at Mr Gillespie grazed the top of his head. Mr Gillespie went to a person's house for treatment.

10.7 CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Mr Mansfield said that the only way the soldiers can justify the use of lethal force is to say that there were other victims who were acting unlawfully. The soldiers described facing high velocity fire, small arms fire, machine-gun fire, petrol bombs, acid bombs and nail bombs.

The only soldier who suffered any injury was the soldier who accidentally shot himself in the foot. None of the vehicles were damaged. No weapon was found on the street. Mr Mansfield said that the soldiers' account has been grossly exaggerated to justify the amount of fire they have admitted to.

The fact that the soldiers used unlawful force is demonstrated by the disappearance of the Army photographs. Mr Mansfield said that if there had been any hint of bombs or weapons in the photographs they would have been used in 'piling up the case' against the deceased at the Widgery Inquiry.

He asked how the situation could arise where soldiers could pull triggers without justification. Free Derry was entirely unacceptable to the political and military authorities. There had to be reoccupation at the earliest opportunity and if innocent civilians were killed it was seen as an unfortunate but necessary price to be paid for an attempt to flush out the IRA.

Mr Mansfield said that, at the end of the day, what was on everybody's mind was that the Bogside and the Creggan would be retaken by force. He pointed to a directive issued by General Ford on 7th October 1971which said the overall mission was to

'occupy and dominate the Creggan and Bogside, when sufficient forces are available.'

Mr Mansfield said that Operation Forecast was not a scoop-up operation. It was an operation to gather up whoever happened to be on the streets on the assumption that everyone in the Creggan and the Bogside was up to no good.

Private 027 applied for anonymity to be granted to him for the duration of the BSI. The Tribunal has already ruled that soldiers are entitled to anonymity if they want it unless their names are already in the public domain. (However the Court of Appeal judgment which led to this ruling did not define what constitutes the 'public domain.')

Private 027's name was accidentally mentioned in a previous public hearing of the BSI by a lawyer acting on behalf of the soldiers. The Tribunal was asked to decide whether this meant that his name was now in the public domain.

Mr Geoffrey Bindman appeared on behalf of Private 027 and argued that his name was not clearly in the public domain. He said that there were degrees of public domain. He also said Private 027 is a prime candidate for anonymity because he might suffer threats from two sources.

The Tribunal are still considering their ruling on this matter.

Paragraph 1 - 1.8 Monday 20
Paragraph 2 - 6.3, 11 Tuesday 21
Paragraph 7 - 8.7.2 Wednesday 22
Paragraph 8.7.2 - 10.7 Thursday 23

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