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8 - 11
DECEMBER 2003
Evidence heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Michael Clarke (Explosives Officer, Provisional IRA, Creggan 1972); Patrick Moore (Fianna, Derry 1970); PIRA 17 (Command Quartermaster, Provisional IRA, Derry 1972) and Hugh Patrick O’Donnell.
Summary of Evidence
Monday 8 December 2003 Michael Clarke
Tuesday 9 December 2003 Patsy Moore
Wednesday 10 December 2003 PIRA 17
Thursday 11 December 2003 Hugh O’Donnell
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry heard evidence from two former members of the Provisional IRA in Derry in 1972. Michael Clarke was an explosives officer in the Creggan and PIRA 17 was the quartermaster for the whole of Derry. Patsy Moore was involved in running the Fianna before Bloody Sunday but denied any involvement in 1972. Hugh O’Donnell witnessed the shooting of Hugh Gilmore.
In addition the Inquiry also heard detailed submissions regarding the role of Colonel Overbury in the statement taking process prior to Lord Widgery’s Inquiry. Barry Macdonald QC and Lord Gifford QC, representing many of the families, submitted that there was evidence that Colonel Overbury had encouraged soldiers to change their accounts. Specifically they alleged he persuaded soldiers to alter their evidence so as not to suggest unarmed civilians were shot. Gerard Elias QC, representing Mr. Overbury, said the allegations against his client had never been put to him when he gave evidence and were in contravention of the Inquiry’s rules against making allegations without first giving proper notice.
Michael Dominic Clarke
Explosives Officer, Provisional IRA, Creggan 1972
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 2 December 2003 [AC0157.0005]
Politics
Michael Clarke joined the IRA in Derry just after Internment was introduced in August 1971. He had been in the Nationalist Party and campaigned for John Hume but he felt they were doing nothing to improve the situation. He worked as an electrician in England in 1968 but returned at the start of the Troubles. The B Specials and RUC were beating protestors in the streets. Then the army was brought in and they too were protecting the Unionists. His brother-in-law was a soldier and he asked him if he would shoot him if he was rioting. His brother-in-law said he would. He also said he was not allowed to have a conscience in the army.
Joining the IRA
Until 1971 he had been opposed to the IRA but his attitude changed after Sean Keenan Senior was imprisoned as part of internment. Mr. Keenan was a neighbour and he liked him. They were imprisoning people without trial and then when Cusack and Beattie were shot he decided the only answer was to meet fire with fire. He was 25 when he joined the IRA. He was a section leader in October 1971.
The IRA was in its infancy at the time. He became an explosives officer almost immediately because of his knowledge of circuitry. He was disciplined and kept himself to himself. He worked in the Creggan but lived on the Foyle Road with his parents.
He described the IRA vetting and swearing in procedure as very strict. He said the movement in Derry started in 1969/70. People got to know old IRA members and listened to their stories. There were only about 20 members in November 1971 when Eamonn Lafferty was killed. However membership grew after this and he agreed it could have been double this by Bloody Sunday.
Provisional IRA in Derry
Mr. Clarke’s recollection was that the IRA in Derry comprised a single battalion made up of two Companies; the Creggan and the Bogside. He did not think Derry became a brigade until months after Bloody Sunday. The companies were autonomous so he only knew about the Creggan company. However the companies did share weapons because there were so few of them.
Mr. Clarke said he did not know the identities of the battalion quartermaster or explosives officer, nor did he know the officers in the Bogside. He was the explosives officer for the Creggan. The Creggan quartermaster died of natural causes when he was still young. Mr. Clarke refused to name him in case his wife, who he believes may be still alive, did not know of his involvement. He did not know the names of those on the command staff or even other volunteers, the fewer names he knew the better.
He did know the volunteers in the Creggan but not necessarily by name. He said he did not know Eddie Dobbins by name in 1972. Mr. Dobbins has given evidence to the Inquiry indicating he was a Creggan PIRA volunteer. He was on active service on Bloody Sunday stationed in a car in the Creggan.
When Mr. Clarke joined explosives were very hard to get hold of so he made incendiary devices to set fire to buildings. He trained himself. Good explosives officers remained explosives officers.
Nail Bombs
Mr. Clarke used to make nail bombs by wrapping nails in corrugated paper around half a stick of gelignite. He agreed that in the early days these were sometimes put in cans but he believed that by 1972 he had stopped using cans in favour of tape. The tape was lighter.
A detonator would be inserted into a hole made in the gelignite and then a fuse was carefully inserted into the detonator. The fuse was then cut at an angle to expose the gunpowder in its core. A match (or two) was then taped to the fuse so that the match head met the open fuse. Mr. Clarke said he always used safety matches because the risk off accidental ignition was too great with red, non-safety, matches. It didn’t take more than 5-10 minutes to make a nail bomb.
Explosives were never kept in or near the house. In fact they were generally used immediately. He did not know where the explosives came from. If bombs had to be kept over night they were stored on manned barricades. Explosives dumps were only really used later once they had started making home made explosives.
Mr. Clarke said nail bombs were generally thrown at the end of a riot since after they were thrown people did not hang around to wait for the army’s response. He said rioters were given a “Republican nod” (i.e. a shout) indicating they should get out of the way before bombs were thrown. Four or five bombs would be thrown at the same time.
About 10% of nail bombs failed to detonate generally because the fuse was damp or the fuse wire was not cut at an angle. He said a lit fuse would not go out and to defuse a lit nail bomb you would have to pull out the detonator. Fuses were coated in tar which would melt once the fuse was lit. This meant the fuse would continue to burn even if under water. Detonators were shock and heat sensitive so nail bombs were not carried around any distance. The detonator would only be fitted just before a bomb was to be thrown. They were only ever distributed to volunteers.
When asked about evidence of a tray of nail bombs seen in Glenfada Park on Bloody Sunday Mr. Clarke said they were not his. He did not make any nail bombs on Bloody Sunday. His understanding was that the Official IRA never used nail bombs and he said he was certain no PIRA nail bombs were used on Bloody Sunday.
When they exploded nail bombs made a loud booming sound like a very big rocket at a firework display.
Nail bombs were anti-personnel devices. They were not used against buildings. To attack a building they would used incendiary or blast bombs.
Gerard Donaghy
Mr. Clarke was shown photographs of Gerard Donaghy’s body showing a nail bomb in his trouser pocket. Commenting on the photographs [EP0005.0026 and E0005.0027] Mr. Clarke said the nail bomb did not look like one he would have made. It was covered in too much tape and did not have corrugated paper holding the nails. It also had a very short fuse. He would usually use a 3½ inch fuse which would give about 7 seconds between lighting and detonation. On the close up photograph [E0005.0027] the match taped to the fuse could be seen but it was not touching the fuse. He said the fuse would probably not have ignited when the match was lit. Photograph E0005.0028 shows the separated components of the bombs allegedly found on Gerard Donaghy’s body. Mr. Clarke said he would not use a whole stick of gelignite for a single bomb. He said he did not know Gerard Donaghy.
He said he presumed it was possible for someone in the army to make a nail bomb and plant it on someone.
RUC Statements
Mr. Clarke was shown two statements he signed when in the custody of the RUC in 1977. INT0002.0160 is a long typed statement dated 11 October 1977. Mr. Clarke said this and a manuscript statement made the day before [INT0002.0159] were inaccurate and made under duress. He had not left the IRA before Operation Motorman as the first statement says. He did not leave until 1973 after his brother-in-law was killed.
Paddy Ward
Mr. Clarke said he knew nothing about the Fianna and had nothing to do with them. He said he had never been asked to train anyone in the Fianna and they would not have had access to explosives. He said he did not know Paddy Ward and had never met him. He would have known him if he was a youngster close to the IRA. He certainly would have known him if he had access to explosives as he claims.
When questioned by Gerard Elias QC, representing many of the military witnesses, Mr. Clarke was asked to explain how he knew the Fianna had no access to explosives when he claimed to know nothing about them. Mr. Clarke said the passage in his statement referring to the Fianna having no access to explosives should have been removed.
Mr. Clarke said he certainly did not supply any detonators for nail bombs on Bloody Sunday. He also said it was highly unlikely anywhere close to the City Hotel would have been targeted because the hotel was frequented by journalists and NICRA were based there. The PIRA were a fledgling organisation at the time and could not risk injuring civilians. Had they done so they would not have lasted very long.
Weapons
So far as he could recall Mr. Clarke said in January 1972 the IRA had about 6 M1 Carbines, 1 or 2 Garrand rifles, 2 Thompsons and a variety of hand guns. He did not recall any .303 riles and said the Thompsons were virtually obsolete because it was very hard to get ammunition for them. They neither had the men nor the weapons to take on the army so they concentrated on causing economic damage by blowing up buildings in the city. These could not be insured so the Exchequer had to foot the bill. The quartermasters were responsible for storing the weapons. So far as he was aware patrols in the Creggan usually consisted of one car with two weapons or two cars and four weapons. There were only ever four to six weapons available in the Creggan at any one time. They patrolled at night to discourage army incursions. During the day an army incursion into the ‘no go’ area would have been met with a riot. If a particular operation was planned weapons would be made available. He dealt with explosives so had little knowledge of weapons or where they were kept. This was down to the quartermasters. He was not aware of any orders or action to move weapons out of the Bogside before the march.
30 January 1972
On the Saturday before Bloody Sunday (29 January 1972) Mr. Clarke went out on patrol at about 20:00. The patrol finished at about 07:00 and he went home to get some sleep. Either that night or the evening before (Friday) he had spoken to the Creggan officer commanding (OC) who told him it had been decided to suspend operations for the duration of Sunday’s march. There was a suspicion that the army might be planning an incursion into the Creggan so he was to remain in the Creggan on active service. There were no specific instructions as to what to do if the army did enter the Creggan but Mr. Clarke said there was no intention to take them on. They did not have the resources to do that.
On the Sunday morning he was at the command centre with other officers delegating volunteers to go out on patrol. His recollection is that the active service unit on patrol that day consisted of 6 or 7 men and two or three cars. There were weapons in at least two of the cars. The quartermaster remained at the command centre. Mr. Clarke said he may have gone in one of the cars himself but he could not remember. He refused to name any other members of the IRA who were there. He did not recall Eddie Dobbins being there.
Mr. Clarke said he did not hear any shooting at any stage during the day. He only found out what had happened as people started to come back from the Bogside. People were saying many people had been killed, some were hysterical and asking “Why didn’t you protect us?” There was panic and disbelief. Mr. Clarke said he spoke to some of the volunteers who had been on the march and they said there was no gun battle.
He decided to get in a car and go for a recce. There were weapons in the car but he could not be sure exactly what. The Creggan OC was with him in the car. He drove down Westland Street even though it is visible from the city walls. He got out at Frederick Street and walked to the Little Diamond. He was looking for a sniping position but was not carrying a rifle. He said he did not know whether or not he would have fired had the opportunity arisen. In any event on his way back to the car he was stopped by a member of the command staff. He refused to say who this was. He was told a ceasefire had been ordered until after the funerals of the dead. He was told to go back to the Creggan.
Did Not Fire
He said with hindsight the commander may have been looking for him. He said on reflection he was glad someone with a clear head had taken charge. He did not know at the time who had been shot or why. He said he was guilty of slight indiscipline in going to the Bogside without orders. However he did not fire a gun on Bloody Sunday and he said he was sure no one in the Creggan company had done so. He said at the time he had never fired a gun in anger. He said he was unaware, until evidence emerged during the Inquiry, that someone from the Bogside had fired ‘symbolic’ shots later that evening. He said he knew who had fired those shots but he would not name the person.
Later he walked down to the Bogside again. He had cooled down by this point. He said there was an eerie silence. People were stunned and he could not understand what had happened. He saw a Civil Rights banner where Bernard McGuigan had fallen. He said it was difficult to put into words the feelings of anger and frustration.
He said he was not proud of it but he threatened to kill his sister that night because she was married to a British soldier. They have not spoken since.
He was unaware of any debriefing that night.
He visited the homes of the deceased on the Tuesday and the funerals took place on the Wednesday. There was still a feeling of disbelief.
Mr. Clarke said after Bloody Sunday the Provisional IRA stopped simply reacting to events and started to fight.
Others’ Evidence
Commenting on other evidence Mr. Clarke said so far as he was aware the Rossville Flats were never used for sniping because they were too exposed and could be cut off easily. He did not believe the ‘Infliction’ allegation that Martin McGuinness fired from a Thompson sub machine gun or other allegations that he tried to plant a bomb in the bookies on Chamberlain Street. He also disbelieved Witness X’s claim to have been a Provisional IRA volunteer and to have fired two magazines of ammunition in Glenfada Park.
Mr. Clarke said there was no working relationship between the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA. It was the Official IRA’s decision not to pursue military operations that caused the split in 1969/70. He described them as decent guys who preferred to talk in pubs rather than take any positive action. They were not active in Derry until just before Internment.
Mr. Clarke said he knew nothing of any assurances given to NICRA about the IRA’s intentions on the day. However there was no way they could afford to put local people’s lives at risk during such a large demonstration. They would have put themselves out of business had they done so.
Mr. Clarke said he knew nothing about Father Daly’s gunman, OIRA 4, until he read about him in the late 1980s.
Mr. Clarke said he did not know George McEvoy, he was not the Creggan intelligence officer. He knew nothing of the alleged incident recorded in the Sunday Times notes (attributed to but refuted by Ivan Cooper) in which Martin McGuinness is said to have panicked and run out of the bookies on Chamberlain Street with a Thompson sub machine gun up his jumper [KC0012.0068]. He said the whole account, which includes a suggestion that Ivan Cooper saw bombs and weapons in a car and that three cars “packed to the teeth” arrived in the Bogside before the Paras pulled out, was complete nonsense. He also rejected Leslie Bedell’s account [AB0028.0004] of 2 dozen men with guns piling out of two cars which came down Westland Street from the Creggan.
Mr. Clarke said he had chosen to come forward to give evidence because the community needs the truth. However he would not break his oath of allegiance by naming names. He had approached solicitors in September 2002. He was told they could not act for him so he was put in touch with another firm (Noel Wilson & Co.) who wrote to the Inquiry on his behalf. He said he had been quite willing to make a statement in 2002 but Eversheds never came back to him.
At the close of his evidence Lord Saville said the Inquiry would have to revisit the issue of the names he had refused to supply after he had spoken to his own counsel, Mr. Moriarty.
Convictions
On 31 January 1979 Mr. Clarke was convicted in Belfast of 14 counts of causing explosions or possession of explosives during 1971 and 1972. One of these included a bomb at the Guildhall in June 1972. This was a week before Gerard Doherty blew up the same buildings. Mr. Clarke was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. He was also convicted at the same time of carrying a firearm with intent, and intimidation with the intention of hijacking.
Patrick Moore
Derry Fianna 1970
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 16 October 2003 [AM0505.0001]
Patsy Moore did not go on the Civil Rights march on 30 January 1972. He was at home looking after his 7 children, one of who was unwell. He lived next door to Bernard McGuigan who was killed on Bloody Sunday. Mr. Moore described him as a real gentleman. He was very shocked when he heard Mr. McGuigan had been shot. He was not involved in politics.
Mr. Moore said he had not wanted to give evidence to the Inquiry. A few months ago a man came to his door with a letter from the Inquiry threatening to subpoena him. He was not on the march and did not feel he had anything to contribute. However he had been forced to come and give evidence.
Fianna
Mr. Moore said he was a member of the James Connolly Republican Club in Chamberlain Street. He was never a member of either wing of the IRA. He was involved with the Fianna. He claimed he was not aware that the Fianna was associated with either the Official or Provisional IRA at the time he was involved. He said he did not know the Fianna was a proscribed organisation.
Mr. Moore said he was involved with the Fianna in the capacity of an organiser or scout master between late 1969 and about early 1971. He said he could not remember exactly when he left but it was shortly after the split between the Provos and Officials. He insisted he had no involvement at all by 1972. He said an Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch (RUC SB) document dated 2 February 1972 [INT0002.0051] was wrong in stating he was the officer commanding the Fianna in January 1972 [INT0002.0059].
Mr. Moore said he was the leader of the Fianna in 1970 and this meant he was responsible for a group of youngsters aged 10-15 years. He took them out walking and camping and showed them how to survive out doors. They went walking in the hills around Fahan in Donegal. He insisted the Fianna was never anything like a military organisation whilst he was involved. It was like the Catholic Boy Scouts of Ireland. The boys did swear an oath of allegiance to Ireland when they joined and were taught Irish history however he said the Fianna was very much a physical thing. He said there was little difference between the Fianna and the English scouts.
Weapons Training
Mr. Moore denied the Fianna were involved in any kind of military activity at all. He said no weapons of any description were ever involved in any activities he was associated with the Fianna. He said he controlled the group himself and they did their own fundraising. None of the kids had a gun in their hands whilst he was in charge. Mr. Moore denied that he was the adjutant for the Fianna as suggested in INT0001.0042 (an RUC SB statement of an unnamed individual on a date that was not disclosed). There was no military structure to the organisation. There was no intelligence officer. He knew nothing about suggestions that Fianna members collected car registrations or were told how to make brakes fail on lorries. In the same statement it is alleged Patsy Moore showed the statement maker how to strip and assemble guns and that Mr. Moore asked him to join the IRA. Mr. Moore said this was all untrue and that Special Branch were trying to implicate him in the IRA because he was an ex-serviceman.
Mr. Moore had served in the British army for about 9 years. He left in 1964. He was trained in weapons. In 1970 or 1971 he and other ex-servicemen marched from the Creggan to the Diamond and burnt their medals and discharge papers in protest at the policies of the army in Ireland. He was also a member of the Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association. In his statement Mr. Moore said he held two walkie talkies for the CESA. He did not have them on Bloody Sunday and did not know if they were used by anyone else. They were useful in communicating when on barricades. They would pass on warnings of army movements.
Mr. Moore agreed some of the boys left his group after the split with the Provos. He left at about the same time because he did not want to see “kids fighting other kids.” He also spoke of them falling into the wrong hands. He was always associated with the Official Republican movement.
Mr. Moore was also a member of the Civil Rights Association. Bridget Bond was a good friend of his. He had participated in other marches and acted as a steward but he had no involvement in the arrangements for the march on 30 January 1972. NICRA was not a front for the IRA.
Paddy Ward
Mr. Moore said he had no recollection of Paddy Ward ever being in the Fianna. He said his only memory of Paddy Ward was in about 1983 when he was insulted by him on a bus after he had been teaching a Republican band in Dungiven. A lad who was also on the bus hit Paddy Ward in the face with a glass and as a result he lost an eye.
Mr. Moore said he did not recognise Paddy Ward’s description of the Fianna as being trained in the use of weapons and explosives. He said they were more involved in cleaning up gardens and washing cars. He said he was unaware of them doing intelligence work or assisting in military operations. It did not happen whilst he was involved. Mr. Moore said he had listened to Paddy Ward’s evidence to the Inquiry. He had also listened to other evidence since then but denied coming to listen to anyone in particular.
Gerard Donaghy
Mr. Moore knew Gerard Donaghy through his father. They worked together. In his statement he said Gerard Donaghy was definitely involved in the Fianna in 1970 but in evidence he said he could not recall having said this. In the statement he said Gerard Donaghy was just an ordinary scout. Mr. Moore said he knew nothing about alleged training camps referred to in another RUC SB statement [INT0001.0317]. The author claims he met Patsy Moore at his house but left when he started talking about politics. Later he claims Gerard Donaghy told him about a training camp coming up in Donegal. Mr. Moore agreed a number of boys did leave the Fianna but he denied any knowledge of them being recruited to the Provos by Martin McGuinness. He said he did not keep in touch with the boys and did not know what they did after he left.
Mr. Moore said he knew nothing of the theft of army uniforms from a cleaners on 9 January 1972 or the allegation that the theft was carried out by the Official Fianna, including Gerard Donaghy [INT0001.0333].
Mr. Moore said he did not know Pudger Paddy O’ Hagan.
He did know Gerry ‘Mad Dog’ Doherty, but did not know him until the late 1970s. They are friends, but he did not recall him as having been in the Fianna.
He does know Denis McFeely but only as a plumber. He knew nothing of his political activities.
He never had any dealings with Martin McGuinness. He did not know Eddie Dobbins.
Commenting on the evidence of Gerry O’Hara [AO0079.0010] Mr. Moore said the Fianna did not do intelligence. However everyone would report on movement of army vehicles. Everyone was on the alert but the scouts were not encouraged to do that kind of work.
PIRA 17
Quartermaster, Command Staff, Provisional IRA, Derry 1972
Made statement to the Inquiry on 4 December 2003 [APIRA17.0001]
PIRA 17 was the quartermaster of the Derry command of the Provisional IRA on 30 January 1972. He had held this position for about 6 months and was responsible for all PIRA weapons in Derry. There was also a quartermaster for the Creggan and one for the Bogside. He was also responsible for requisitioning explosives but not their storage or use.
PIRA 17 said he had been reluctant to come to the Inquiry to give evidence. After the Widgery Tribunal he had no faith in inquiries. He had listened to the evidence given to this Inquiry by the families and the soldiers and was aware that Lord Saville was anxious to hear from Provisional and Official IRA witnesses. He had not come forward earlier because of his scepticism. It was a big step as a Republican to give evidence about his activities in the IRA.
Orders for Weapons to be Secured
PIRA 17 said on the Saturday before Bloody Sunday the adjutant, Martin McGuinness, gave him his orders for the day. These had been discussed with the officer commanding (OC). No weapons were to be carried on the march. There was to be an active service unit patrolling the Creggan and another patrolling the Brandywell but all other weapons were to be placed in a dump. There was to be no military action during the march.
Later on the Saturday there was a command staff meeting. This comprised the OC, the adjutant, the training officer, finance officer and himself (QM). The intelligence officer (IO) was not at the meeting. The meeting was not specifically about the march. It was known there was to be a big march and there were rumours that the Paras were coming up from Belfast. The orders concerning weapons were confirmed. The Company quartermasters were then instructed to bring all weapons to PIRA 17 the following morning. They had their own dumps the locations of which would be known only to them and one other within the company.
In the early hours of the Sunday morning all the weapons were brought to PIRA 17 at a central location. He refused to say where this was. Once all the weapons were together PIRA 17 allocated 4 weapons to each of the two active service units and personally placed the remainder in a secure dump somewhere in the Bogside. Only he and Martin McGuinness knew the location of the dump. He was present when the weapons were dumped and said therefore he knew this had happened. He was not present when the 8 weapons were handed to the active service units. The active service unit were on duty in case of an army incursion into the Brandywell or Creggan. They were there as a token gesture to defend the areas in case of incursion and to ensure they knew what was happening there. PIRA 17 said he did not know the orders given to the active service units.
PIRA 17 said there was no rift between the OC and Martin McGuinness. He had the utmost respect for both men and he denied that there was any personality clash between them. He did not know why Martin McGuinness replaced the OC shortly after Bloody Sunday. That was a decision taken by general Head Quarters. In his book Martin McGuinness - From Guns to Government Liam Clarke has alleged Martin McGuinness was seeking to oust the OC.
30 January 1972
PIRA 17 went on the march. He was not with anyone one in particular. The mood was light hearted although there was some apprehension given what had happened the previous week at Magilligan. He was not at Magilligan. However they were in Free Derry and PIRA 17 said this meant they were controlling their own destiny. He knew that situation would not last but he did not expect the events of Bloody Sunday.
PIRA 17 said his view was that the march should have been permitted to go to the Guildhall in the interest of safety. People wanted a dignified march to the city centre to protest at government policy. He said he could not remember when he first knew of the army road blocks erected to prevent the march from reaching the Guildhall.
PIRA 17 was also concerned because a number of innocent civilians had been shot by the security forces. He referred to the deaths of Seamus Cusack, Dessie Beattie, Kathleen Thompson and Billy McGranera. He did not want more innocent people killed. As a member of the IRA he was prepared to die but those who did not carry arms did not deserve to die. He had known Seamus Cusack well and he also knew the Beattie family.
The March
PIRA 17 was not a steward but he and others assisted stewards at times to keep the march moving past army barriers and minimise any confrontation. There was banter, i.e. shouting, jeering and stone throwing, but nothing serious. He said he did not know whether or not people were aware of his position in the Republican movement and whether or not this led them to listen to him. He said there were no IRA stewards so far as he was aware.
Derelict Building
PIRA 17 said he specifically remembered helping stewards when the march passed the site of the old Richards factory on William Street. This was the building with nine windows (known to the Inquiry as Abbey Taxis) in which machine gun platoon were stationed. He could not recall whether or not he actually saw the soldiers but he was aware they were there. There were about a dozen youths throwing stones at the building. There were definitely no nail bombs thrown. The presence of the soldiers antagonised the marchers and he remembers trying to keep the crowd moving. They did not want to give the security forces any excuse.
Nail Bombs
PIRA 17 said there were no IRA nail bombs available that day. None had been prepared because of the order for there to be no weapons. Nail bombs were only ever prepared immediately before they were needed. They were never stored in dumps. He said no one carried nail bombs that day and none were used. He personally discouraged the use of nail bombs and blast bombs because they were too dangerous.
Barrier 14
By the time he reached the junction with Rossville Street the lorry had already turned right and was heading towards Free Derry Corner. However a section of the march had proceeded up William Street and there was a riot at the old picture house. There were stewards near Chamberlain Street trying to get people away from the army barrier and back down towards Rossville Street. He did not remember stewards at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street.
Damien Donaghy and John Johnston
Whilst he was in the area of Chamberlain Street/barrier 14 he heard a whisper that someone had been shot behind him in William Street. He did not know how long he was close to barrier 14 but he went back towards Rossville Street to try and find out what had happened. He did not hear any shooting but the noise at the barrier was quite intense. There was a large crowd. At some point he discovered that two people had been shot. He knew nothing about the shot fired by OIRA 1 or the confrontation with Sean Keenan until later. The rumours of people having been shot caused a lot of confusion and worry in the crowd.
He returned to the area of barrier 14 where the riot was scaling down as people dispersed. He did not remember the water cannon being used but he was aware it was there. He assumed the army would fire CS gas and then charge to make arrests. He started encouraging people to move towards Free Derry Corner. He wanted to get out of the area himself because he did not want to be there when the snatch squads went in.
Paras Coming In
PIRA 17 moved away down Chamberlain Street. Things were relatively quite at first but then someone ran past saying the army was coming in and everyone should run. He began running and as he got just south of the junction with Harvey Street he heard SLR fire. This was the first gunfire he had heard that day. He did not look down Eden Place over to the waste ground so did not know what was happening there.
Intense Gunfire
He continued running until he reached the Rossville Flats car park. Once he got there the firing was intense and he flung himself to the ground. He was in the car park just south east of the end of Chamberlain Street. He did not feel under fire himself but it was impossible to say where the gunfire was coming from. It was SLR gunfire and he assumed it was coming from behind him. The sound was echoing off the flats. He lay on the ground with his head down.
He did not see much because he just lay down for cover but he heard people shouting ‘run’ and ‘stay down’. He did not see any soldiers. There was shock and confusion, no one was expecting this. He did not see Jackie Duddy. He said that had he done so he would have gone to help. He knew Jackie Duddy and described him as an ambassador for the youth of Derry. He was totally innocent. Nor did he see Michael Bridge or Michael Bradley shot. He did not see Peggy Deery shot or the civilian gunman, OIRA 4, known as Father Daly’s gunman. He said he was unaware of any of this. He just remembers screaming, total panic and fear. He shouted to people in front of him to stay down hoping they would not be shot if lying on the ground.
Running for Safety
PIRA 17 said he did not know how long he stayed in the car park but eventually there was a lull in the shooting and he ran to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He did not see Patrick Doherty’s body. He ran to Joseph Place. From there he ran south along the east side of Joseph Place. He must have run past the lorry at Free Derry Corner but does not remember it. He was focused on getting past Free Derry Corner to the Lecky Road where he knew he would be safe. At no stage did he see anyone shot or injured. He did not see any soldiers or army vehicles. He was not aware of shooting from the city walls.
Meeting Command Staff
PIRA 17 said he met Martin McGuinness and the OC at the junction of Drumcliff Avenue and Meenan Drive. There and then they decided the army was trying to draw them out into a gunfight and that they should not be drawn. They went to the safe house that was their usual meeting place. They discussed what to do and had a cup of tea. They were not going to get into a gun battle with so many innocent civilians around. After some time, he did not know how long, he was asked to go back and see if he could find out what had happened. He went alone but others may also have been sent. He was aware that other volunteers did arrive at the house but he was not sure if they were there before he left.
Returning to Rossville Street
He walked back to the area of Rossville Street. There was still a lot of panic. People were crying and he said you could see the despair on people’s faces. People wanted to get away from the Bogside, especially those who lived in Glenfada Park. He was in shock and it was impossible to establish who had been shot. By the time he got there the bodies had been taken away. Everyone was trying to find out about their relatives. People were terrorised. He felt frustrated because he could not get through to the hospital to find out what was going on there.
PIRA 17 said he was not aware of gunfire being directed at the city walls but later he did come to learn some shots had been fired. He was not there and did not know what weapon was used. However it must have been one of the weapons from the active service units because none were removed from the dump. He could not remember whether or not the active service units’ weapons were gathered in that evening.
IRA Weapons
PIRA 17 said he thought they had 21 or 22 guns in 1972. They were mainly survivors from the 1950s campaign. These were two Thompson sub machine guns, eleven Lee Enfield .303s and six hand guns. There were also two newer M1 carbines. They did not have any Garrands or Sten guns at the time so far as he could remember. The two active service units were each issued with a .303, a Thompson, an M1 and a hand gun. All the other weapons were in the central dump. At the time they had more volunteers than weapons. There were about 30 volunteers. The Rossville Flats were not used for storing weapons, they were not secure enough.
Explosives
PIRA 17 said his only role in relation to explosives was in requisitioning them. Otherwise they were the responsibility of the explosives officers. There was a command explosives officer, although he was not on the command staff, and explosives officers in the Creggan and Bogside. He confirmed Sean Keenan, who has made a statement to the Inquiry, was the command explosives officers. He did not know Michael Clarke who says he was the Creggan explosives officer. PIRA 17 said he did not know all the volunteers. Explosives were kept in separate dumps although they rarely had much commercial explosive. They had greater quantities of home made explosive.
Paddy Ward
PIRA 17 said he did not know of Paddy Ward until he heard about him this year. He was wrong in saying Colm Keenan was the explosives officer. PIRA 17 said he had no dealings with the Fianna but they had no access to weapons or explosives. He said Paddy Ward’s account of the arrival of stocks of M1 carbines was fantasy. It never happened. Furthermore he denied there was any arms dump on the Lone Moor Road/Brandywell Road where Paddy Ward claims to have collected a rifle.
Martin McGuinness
PIRA 17 said he saw Martin McGuinness on the morning of the march and again when he met him and the OC near Meenan Square. He did not recall seeing him at any other stage but said it was impossible that he could have had a weapon without his knowledge. He did not see Gerard ‘Mad Dog’ Doherty on Bloody Sunday.
Sunday Times Notes [KC0012.0065]
PIRA 17 described the notes of an alleged interview Ivan Cooper is purported to have given to the Sunday Times shortly after April 1972 as “complete nonsense”. In the notes PIRA 17 is said to have taken the film from a camera man who photographed them moving weapons at Hogg’s Folly. PIRA 17 said he was never at Hogg’s Folly on Bloody Sunday and the incident did not happen. He is alleged to have apologised to Ivan Cooper, who is claimed to have witnessed the incident. PIRA 17 said he would not have apologised to Ivan Cooper for anything.
PIRA 17 said he knew nothing of the alleged incident in a house in William Street where Martin McGuinness, George McEvoy and he are alleged to have been intending to fire on the army. PIRA 17 said he was never in a house on William Street on Bloody Sunday and so far as he was aware George McEvoy was not in the IRA at the time. He said the reference to Ivan Cooper seeing gelignite bombs and guns in the boot of a car was also nonsense.
Totally Innocent
PIRA 17 said he knew James Wray, they used to work together. He described him as a pacifist. He also knew William McKinney, they used to learn the accordion together. He was very anti-violence. He had also worked with Bernard McGuigan and Gerard McKinney. Gerry occasionally acted as a steward on marches. Both were opposed to violence. He also knew Patrick Doherty. PIRA 17 said no one killed on Bloody Sunday was a member of the IRA and none of them had weapons. They were all totally innocent.
Hugh Patrick O’Donnell
Made statements to NICRA (Keville Tape 3) on 31 January 1972 [AO0032.0018, Inquiry transcript at AO0032.0020]; and to the Inquiry on 3 March 2000 [AO0032.0001] and 13 November 2003 [AO0032.0023]
Hugh O’Donnell was 18 years old on Bloody Sunday. He joined the march with his friend Jim Begley. Mr. Begley subsequently died in a car accident. Mr. O’Donnell and Mr. Begley left the march when it entered Westland Street and they went straight up Rossville Street to William Street. When they got to William Street the front of the march had not arrived and there was some abuse exchanged between people and soldiers in Sackville Street.
At some point a man approached them and asked if they would help form a line of stewards to prevent the crowd from going north over the waste ground towards the soldiers in Sackville Street and Little James Street. The man gave them blue arm bands and they held hands in a line north of William Street. When questioned Mr. O’Donnell said he did not recall any line of stewards across William Street to prevent people going up William Street to barrier 14. The line they formed was to stop teenagers throwing stones at the soldiers in Little James Street and Sackville Street.
When the lorry arrived at the head of the march it turned down Rossville Street but a lot of people continued up William Street. Mr. O’Donnell said there was a large tightly packed crowd which stopped out of sight at the barrier in William Street. He could hear the noise and knew there was trouble in William Street. He also heard what he believed were rubber bullets being fired by soldiers in Sackville Street. CS gas was also fired and this eventually forced them to break up the line of stewards. Youths pushed through to get to the soldiers. They was some stone throwing. It was just like an ordinary riot.
At one point he helped hold a piece of corrugated iron which youths used as a shield against the rubber bullets. Jim Begley had disappeared by this time.
Paras Coming in
Mr. O’Donnell then bumped into another friend Tom Heaney. They were at the junction of William Street and Little James Street when the Paras drove in. They saw the vehicles coming down Little James Street and “ran like hell into the Bog.” At the time the army snatch squads always stopped at the top of Rossville Street, they never came beyond William Street. He was shocked when he saw the army drive into Rossville Street. He was running alongside the vehicles until he got onto the waste ground.
Waste Ground
He ran past Eden Place and then Pilot Row towards the Rossville Flats car park. There was a huge crowd but he was running on his own. People were running in all directions, it was chaos. One of the vehicles overtook him and drove onto the waste ground ahead. There were soldiers getting out of the vehicles and he had to make his way between a soldier to his right, the army vehicle ahead and the wire fence to his left. As he ran there was a burst of gunfire. There were something like 6-12 shots and they came from his left. There were soldiers behind the backs of the houses in Chamberlain Street and he assumed this was where the fire was coming from.
There were crowds of people in the car park and streams were running between Blocks 1 and 2 to get out. He followed them through the gap. People were shouting and asking if anyone was hit. He was worried about his two brothers who were on the march. He did not see anyone throwing missiles in the car park. He did not see Jackie Duddy or others shot in the car park.
He went around Block 1 into Rossville Street and wandered back north. He met Jim Begley again close to the entrance to Block 1. He said two people had been shot dead in the car park. He was very upset. Mr. O’Donnell did not know if he had actually seen the bodies or not. He did not know who they were.
Rubble Barricade
At this point Mr. O’Donnell said there was still a sense of danger but people felt the army had “done all their killing for the day” so there was no panic. There were soldiers at the northern end of Block 1 and on the opposite side of Rossville Street. There were army vehicles parked in Rossville Street. People were angry as well as frightened. The army had fired on a fleeing crowd and people started saying they were bastards and there was no need for it. He and others were so angry they picked up stones and started throwing them at the soldiers. A crowd of about 30-50 advanced north up Rossville Street beyond the rubble barricade. They were only throwing stones.
Whilst he was standing in Rossville Street he saw soldiers advancing down the western side of the street. He did not feel under immediate danger. The next thing there was an awful burst of gunfire straight down Rossville Street. He and everyone else dived to the ground. He was lying on the ground a few feet north of the rubble barricade. He started to get up but the shooting became more intense and there was no cover so he had to stay down. It was totally shocking and unreal.
As soon as he could he stood up to see where the firing was coming from. He saw a soldier with a black face (he did not know if his skin was black or he was wearing camouflage) standing just out from the north west corner of Block 1. There were other soldiers popping in and out from the corner but this one was standing separate. He came out and pointed his rifle. The rifle was at his hip and he fired. Mr. O’Donnell said he saw the soldier fire more than once but he could not saw how often he fired. He was casual, standing in the open without cover, firing without any regard for what he was firing at. It was crazy. Other soldiers were also firing.
He ran for the rubble barricade and jumped over it. It was terrifying. There was panic and people were falling at the barricade. He did not know if they were shot or they had tripped. He just kept running. He thinks he remembers bullets hitting the barricade. The shooting was intensifying. He ran as fast as he could for the south end of Block 1. He was running really fast and as he ran he was a ware of someone next to him, to his left, matching him stride for stride. He felt he could almost touch the man next to him, it was as if they were running in a race. Then the man was knocked forwards.
Hugh Gilmore
Mr. O’Donnell said he did know Hugh Gilmore but they were not close. He did not recognise him at the time but from he has learnt subsequently he believes he was alongside Mr. Gilmore when he was shot. They were both running very fast but suddenly the man next to him was flung forwards in an unnatural movement. All the time there was the constant crack of SLR fire. The man dropped to the ground near to the end of Block 1. Mr. O’Donnell jumped over him to get around the corner. Bullets were flying around and people said “get in here” as he got round the corner. There was a group of people crouching by the telephone box.
Mr. O’Donnell dropped to the ground and with the assistance of another man pulled Hugh Gilmore round the corner. There were bullets sparking off the road and the pavement in Rossville Street. Mr. O’Donnell lifted Hugh Gilmore’s jumper and saw a black hole the size of a tennis ball in his stomach. There was smoke coming from the hole. His eyes were closed and there was blood coming from his mouth and nose. Mr. O’Donnell rolled up his jacket and put it under his head. Later the body was moved further away from the corner.
There was a lot of confusion and panic. People were shouting he was dead and others were shouting for first aid. Mr. O’Donnell identified himself kneeling over Hugh Gilmore’s body in photograph EP0032.0003. In addition to the bullets coming down Rossville Street there were also bullets striking the ground in Rossville Street which Mr. O’Donnell believes came from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. He saw the sparks as the bullets struck the ground and said the sparks suggested some of the bullets were fired from the Rossville Flats car park.
Rubble Barricade
He took a quick look back up Rossville Street and saw around 10 people lying at the rubble barricade. He had the impression one of them had been shot. He could not describe the man or the reason why he believed he had been shot other than perhaps because he was more exposed whilst the others were lying or crouching.
At the time Mr. O’Donnell thought the soldiers would come up Rossville Street and kill them all where they were. The shooting seemed to go on and on. He thought “Jesus they’re going to wipe us out today”. There was no reason for what was happening, the soldiers were not being fired on. The soldiers moved openly and did not behave as if they were under fire. His greatest fear was the machine gun on the Ferret car.
Joseph Place
Mr. O’Donnell’s father then wandered over in a daze. He asked if he had seen his mother or brothers but Mr. O’Donnell said he had not. He then said “I have to find your ma”. Mr. O’Donnell told him not to go anywhere but they then both went south to Joseph Place. Mr. O’Donnell was beginning to panic about the scout car moving further up Rossville Street and took the opportunity to get away. He said he felt rotten because he was leaving others to tend to Mr. Gilmour.
At the first or second house in Joseph Place they met a first aid girl helping a wounded man into the house. Mr. O’Donnell told her about Hugh Gilmore but she said something like “what do you expect me to do, this guy’s been shot”. She appeared to be in shock.
He felt safe for a while but then there were more shots which hit the ground in front of Joseph Place. At the time Mr. O’Donnell thought they came from the city walls. He and his father went through the alleyway in the northern block of Joseph Place. There were a lot of people taking cover in the alleyway. At some point a bullet struck the wall between him and his father. He remembers being hit by the dust from the wall however he cannot now remember where this happened.
Mr. O’Donnell met his brother on the east side of Joseph Place. He jumped down from the upper car park saying they were shooting from the walls. Together the three of them, and a lot of others, crawled south along a low wall towards St. Columb’s Wells. People were panicking and screaming. At the south end of Joseph Place they saw another group of people at the north end of Columb’s Wells. They told them when to run across the open ground to get to where they were. All the time he heard constant firing in Rossville Street and occasional shots from the walls.
St. Columb’s Wells
Mr. O’Donnell said he felt safe once he got to the Wells. He was then in a state of shock and his father, who had composed himself, took charge. He asked a priest to help a man who had been shot and was in the back seat of a car. Mr. O’Donnell said he had a strong recollection of dead and wounded in the area. People were being brought out of houses and put into cars. There was a white car with a red cross. There may have been a dying man in the car. He had an impression of a lot more bodies but could not describe it further. It was like a nightmare. At one point there was more shooting which actually came into the Wells. It was not close but came from the walls.
Keville Taped Interview
Mr. O’Donnell made a statement on tape in 1972 however he now has no memory of having done so. When played the tape he could not recognise his own voice however the content of the interview is very similar his recent statement to the Inquiry. When questioned about the transcript of the tape Mr. O’Donnell he said there were a number of things he could not now recall. In 1972 he had described an incident on the waste ground when he saw ahead of him a soldier hit a young man with the butt of his rifle. He had also referred to seeing a soldier firing his rifle on the waste ground. He no longer remembered either. In 1972 he also referred to the black soldier firing near the north end of Block 1 as having just stepped out of a Saracen. He did not recall Jim Begley leading a charge over the barricade. The 1972 statement suggests the shot which hit a wall next to him occurred just before he entered the alleyway under Joseph Place.
Paddy Ward
Mr. O’Donnell said he knew Paddy Ward in 1972 and 1973. His aunt married Paddy Ward’s uncle.
Gerard Donaghy
Mr. O’Donnell said he knew Gerard Donaghy. He also knew Denis McFeely, his brother Conal, Frank McCarron, Paddy O’Hagan and Kieran McLaughlin. They were all friends. He did not know Gerard Donaghy was in the Fianna and was unaware any of the others ever was. He also knew Gerry O’Hara who has made a statement saying he was the leader of the Fianna on Bloody Sunday. Mr. O’Donnell was asked about a person with a beard and wearing glasses seen standing in the doorway to Block 1 of the Rossville Street as Hugh Gilmour ran towards. Another witness has identified this man as Paddy O’Hagan but Mr. O’Donnell said the man in the photograph [P0190/P0663] was definitely not Mr. O’Hagan. He did identify Jim Begley at the rubble barricade just before Michael Kelly was shot in photograph P0419. Mr. Begley is wearing a dark jacket and has long black hair. He is standing next to and in front of Michael McDaid.
Submissions Regarding Colonel Colin Overbury
On Tuesday 9 December 2003 Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, introduced a debate about Colonel Overbury and allegations made against him by Madden & Finucane Solicitors and McCartney & Casey Solicitors on behalf of many of the families. The submissions continued over the next three days.
This matter dates back to August 2002 when Madden & Finucane wrote to Mr. John Tate, then Solicitor to the Inquiry [OS0008.0054]. Appended to that letter was a ‘Notice of Allegations and Issues concerning Colonel Overbury.’ This was expressed as a supplemental notice to that served on 10 December 1999. On 13 September 2002 Mr. Tate wrote to Madden & Finucane [OS0057.0001] stating that the Inquiry was not satisfied that the allegations should be allowed to be pursued because they had not been made in 1999 in accordance with the Inquiry’s ruling of 12 October 1999 [OS0008.0053.0001]. Madden & Finucane replied on 16 September 2002 [OS0008.0058] stating that they were not at present asserting any positive case against Mr. Overbury, rather they were raising issues of concern and therefore the terms of the 1999 ruling did not strictly apply. In response Mr. Tate wrote on 17 September 2002 [OS0008.0066] stating that whilst the Inquiry was confused by the suggestion that their Notice of Allegations was not in fact asserting allegations they would proceed on the basis that no allegations were being made. Colonel Overbury then gave evidence on 3 October 2002 [DAY 243, Week 67] when no specific allegations were put.
A year later on 8 October 2003 the Inquiry wrote to all interested parties to enquire as to what allegations were still maintained against any of seven named senior figures including Colonel Overbury [OS0008.0078]. On 18 November 2003 Madden & Finucane replied [OS0008.0085] stating that in exercising his supervisory role over collation of the evidence in 1972 Colonel Overbury helped to conceal the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday by:
a) Doing his best to ensure soldiers made no admissions;
b) Persuading Soldiers V, 15, 40 and 134 to withdraw or modify the accounts given in their original statements to the Royal Military Police;
c) Ironing out problems in the soldiers’ accounts;
d) Colluding in the suppression of evidence, in particular the army photographs;
e) And colluding with counsel for the army and counsel to the inquiry at the Widgery Tribunal to ensure the previous inconsistent statements of Soldiers F and V were not raised when those witnesses gave evidence to Lord Widgery.
Mr. Clarke said these allegations were not put to Colonel Overbury when he gave evidence and, contrary to the Inquiry’s intention regarding fairness to witnesses, allegations were now being made on which the witness had had no opportunity to comment. Furthermore the allegations were not based upon any new evidence. Consequently the inquiry wrote to Madden & Finucane on 2 December 2003 [OS0008.0094] indicating that so far as they were concerned the allegations were not justified.
So far as McCartney & Casey are concerned Mr. Clarke said they had made no allegations against Colonel Overbury until 15 October 2003 [OS0008.0080] when they replied to the inquiry’s letter of 8 October 2003. Therein McCartney & Casey said that they were not making allegations but the Tribunal was entitled to draw inferences from the evidence Colonel Overbury had given. They specifically referred to the fact that four soldiers from the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment (Soldiers 15, 30, 40 and 134) were called to Lisburn to see Colonel Overbury and then changed their accounts in material respects regarding witnessing unlawful firing by members of the Parachute Regiment. The Inquiry wrote back on 12 November 2003 asking for clarification and on 19 November 2003 McCartney & Casey said [OS0008.0087] the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that Colonel Overbury had sought to conceal the fact that soldiers had fired without lawful justification. Mr. Clarke then referred to a comment of Lord Saville made during Lord Gifford’s cross-examination of Colonel Overbury that he (Lord Saville) did not consider Lord Gifford’s questioning to amount to any allegation against the Colonel. This was not disputed.
Before Barry Macdonald QC (instructed by Madden & Finucane) and Lord Gifford QC (McCartney & Casey) were invited to address the Tribunal Mr. Toohey asked Mr. Clarke to what extent could the Tribunal criticise witnesses they had heard without making a specific allegation of misconduct or incompetence as defined in their October 1999 ruling. Mr. Clarke replied that courts criticise witnesses everyday and that there was nothing to prevent the tribunal from making any criticism of the quality, accuracy or honesty of a witness’ evidence.
Submissions by Madden & Finucane
Mr. Macdonald stated that the objective of the Inquiry’s October 1999 ruling was to avoid a witness being ambushed or taken by surprise by an allegation. He asserted that it could not be said that Colonel Overbury had been ambushed or taken by surprise since he had been given full and detailed notice of the issues upon which their allegations were founded. In their original Notice of Allegations in 1999 [OS0008.0053.0005] Madden & Finucane had made the broad allegation that Colonel Overbury had interfered with the course of justice. This was amplified in their 2002 Notice which set out in detail the matters about which they proposed to question Colonel Overbury. That notice was drafted and served before they had been served with Colonel Overbury’s statement to the Inquiry (Colonel Overbury had made an earlier statement in support of the soldiers’ claim for anonymity). That was not served until 3 September 2002. Mr. Macdonald said, as stated in their letter of 16 September 2002, they had avoided making positive allegations against Colonel Overbury without reasonable cause and that the Notice was drafted prior to making any such allegations so as not to prejudice the witness and to ensure he was notified of the matters which gave grounds for suspicion or concern. They were endeavouring to balance their obligations not to make allegations without proper evidential foundation and to give adequate notice.
Mr. Macdonald said their criticisms of Colonel Overbury had been made abundantly clear and no witness to the Inquiry had been given greater or clearer indication of what was alleged against him. The 2002 Notice referred to the suppression of previous inconsistent statements at the Widgery Tribunal, the suppression of the 1000s of army photographs, the alleged coaching of Soldier V and the further statement of Soldier F (made on 19 February 1972) in which for the first time Soldier F admitted to shooting someone on the rubble barricade and someone behind Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.
Changing Stories
In this his fourth statement Soldier F completely changed his account now claiming to have fired at these two new locations (the rubble barricade and behind Block 2) he had never previously mentioned but still claiming to have fired the same number of shots. The timing of the statement, taken by Colonel Overbury, coincides with the ballistics results which revealed that Michael Kelly, killed at the rubble barricade, was killed by a bullet fired from Soldier F’s rifle. Soldier V had originally said he had shot dead a man after he had thrown a petrol bomb that failed to explode. In a later statement to solicitors acting for the Widgery tribunal Soldier V claimed he shot the man before he realised he was no longer armed. Colonel Overbury denied any recollection of having spoken to Soldier V but it is known that when Soldier V repeated his original account to Mr. Heritage of the Widgery team, before his Widgery statement was finalised, Colonel Overbury’s junior, Major Bailey, stopped the interview in order to seek advice from Colonel Overbury.
Mr. Macdonald sought to place reliance on the Inquiry’s letter of 17 September 2002 in two respects. Firstly the Inquiry said it had copied the correspondence to those acting for Colonel Overbury, therefore Colonel Overbury was on notice of the issues at that time. Secondly the Inquiry specifically said that it did not propose to allow Madden & Finucane to make allegations or to ask questions that amounted to doing the same thing. He therefore restricted his cross-examination of Colonel Overbury to raising the issues rather than putting specific allegations. The Inquiry’s letter continued that nothing was static and if further material were to come forward then the position would change. Lord Saville intervened to ask did he accept that, as stated in Madden & Finucane’s letter of 16 September 2002, at that time he had no basis for making allegations of grave misconduct against Colonel Overbury. Mr. Macdonald replied he had reasonable suspicions but he had not at that time questioned the witness.
Lord Saville said Mr. Macdonald had a duty to make any allegations he had to the witness so that the witness had the opportunity to deal with them. Mr. Macdonald said the situation with Colonel Overbury was difficult because the matters alleged against him were almost exclusively within his own knowledge. There was no independent civilian evidence in relation to Colonel Overbury’s dealings with soldiers’ evidence and he could not therefore properly make an allegation until he had heard what Colonel Overbury had to say about the suspicions concerning his conduct. However Christopher Clarke QC said this turned on its head the Inquiry’s protocol on putting allegations to witnesses so that they might comment on them and Gerard Elias QC, representing Colonel Overbury, said it was a basic principle of advocacy that counsel should make plain to a witness what is alleged against him.
Mr. Macdonald also relied on the evidence of the 1 Para medical officer, Captain 219 [B2162.0008] who referred to a meeting a Palace Barracks in Belfast where he says officers and lawyers sought to tell them what to say at the Widgery Tribunal. He was very disturbed by the meeting and said “they were almost putting words in our mouths.” Mr. Macdonald accepted he had omitted to put Captain 219’s evidence to Colonel Overbury.
Lord Saville asked if the issue as to suppression of evidence was not outside the ambit of their investigation. He said the Inquiry was tasked with establishing the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday. They obviously had to determine the accuracy or reliability of witnesses and their statements but once they had determined that a statement was untrue or incomplete he questioned why it was that they needed to consider how any particular statement came to be made. What did it matter even if Colonel Overbury exerted improper influence to lead a soldier to give a false account if at the end of the day they had already decided the account was unreliable? Mr. Macdonald replied by saying that he was raising the examples of soldiers’ statements which can be shown to have altered as a result of or following some intervention by Colonel Overbury. If his submission is right, that Colonel Overbury was suppressing evidence unhelpful to the army, it is probable that the manipulation occurred more frequently than just the few examples he was highlighting. The fact that the Inquiry has the documents which show Soldiers V, F and others changed their accounts during the period of Colonel Overbury’s involvement did not mean others were not also persuaded to change their evidence. He argued only if the Inquiry fully understood the role Colonel Overbury was actually playing in the management of evidence before the Widgery Tribunal could they properly asses all the evidence they had to consider. Furthermore it was not just a question as to whether or not the later statements were themselves untruthful or inaccurate. The fact is that the witnesses who changed their accounts not only stuck to their new statements when giving evidence to Lord Widgery, thereby calling into question the veracity of that evidence, but also in their evidence to this Inquiry. The question was not therefore academic. Further at the Widgery Tribunal neither counsel to the Inquiry nor counsel for the army put to Soldiers F or V their earlier RMP statements. They therefore failed to raise previous inconsistent statements with the witnesses, as they had a duty to do, and ensured that those representing the families had no knowledge of those earlier statements (none of the RMP statements were disclosed to the families lawyers). Mr. Macdonald alleged Colonel Overbury must have played a part in this decisions to conceal the earlier accounts.
Missing Photographs
Mr. Macdonald then went on to the issue of the disappearance of the thousands of army photographs apparently taken on Bloody Sunday but never produced to this Inquiry. He said that countless army witnesses allege they saw civilian gunmen, nail bombers, petrol bombers, acid bombers, etc. However there is not a single photograph of anyone with any sort of a weapon other than a stone. It is known from the army photo coverage order for the day that there were at least 10 military photographers specifically tasked to take photographs of anything suspicious or of intelligence value. Mr. Macdonald said it was reasonable to conclude that since no photographs incriminating civilians have ever been produced by the army none ever existed. Indeed Colonel Overbury, who has at some point admitted to having seen thousands of army photographs taken on Bloody Sunday, has said there were no photographs of civilian gunmen.
Lord Saville intervened to asked again if the missing photographs were of no consequence why should he and the Inquiry concern themselves with the circumstances or fact of their disappearance? Mr. Macdonald explained that were the photographs entirely neutral then there was no reason for them to have been suppressed. The fact is there were photographs and they must have shown something therefore the only logical conclusion for their disappearance has to be that they incriminated soldiers. It would only be necessary for the army to conceal photographs if they were, or might be, damaging.
Whilst it had previously been assumed that Lord Widgery had seen all the photographs the evidence before this Inquiry suggests that they were probably withheld even from him. They were in the possession of the Army Legal Services Team before the Widgery Tribunal and Colonel Overbury was a key member of that team. He has changed his evidence in relation to the photographs having said first he did see them, then he could not remember what they depicted and at another time that he did not see them at all. When asked about the photographs he claimed they would have been the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshall (DAPM), INQ 1898. However in his statement INQ 1898 denied any knowledge of them. He said they would have been in the possession of the Assistant Provost Marshall (APM), INQ 1383. However when INQ 1383 gave evidence he claimed he did not have any space to store photographs and had no recollection of having seen them.
Mr. Macdonald said that everyone in the relevant chain of command had passed the buck and no one accepted any responsibility for what had happened to the photographs. He said since it is known the photographs did exist and there was a system for recording them it is inconceivable that they could have disappeared without them having been deliberately suppressed. Given his pivotal role in the legal services team Colonel Overbury was the obvious suspect and this was therefore his basis for submitting the allegation that Colonel Overbury had suppressed them.
So far as the suggestion that the allegations were raised “exceptionally late” [OS0008.0099] Mr. Macdonald said their Notice of August 2002 was served even before they had seen Colonel Overbury statement.
Submission by McCartney & Casey
Lord Gifford made some submissions arising from Colonel Overbury’s evidence to the Inquiry. He said his concerns arose from the fact that Colonel Overbury had said [DAY 243, page 56] that four soldiers from the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment had been interviewed by him in Lisburn on 16 February 1972 to get some clarification about the shootings on the rubble barricade. He said the 4 soldiers’ evidence was “a little confusing.” Lord Gifford said that three of these 4, all of whom were observers overlooking the Bogside, had originally made statements to the effect that they had seen soldiers shoot unarmed civilians as they fled. Their original accounts therefore suggested Paras had unlawfully killed civilians. However after being interviewed by Colonel Overbury the three soldiers amended or changed their accounts to provide possible justifications for the soldiers having fired.
Lord Gifford had put to Colonel Overbury in cross-examination that it was not a coincidence that Soldiers 15, 40 and 134 had changed their accounts after speaking to him. When asked if the reason they were chosen for re-interview was the fact that their RMP statements indicated innocent people had been shot Colonel Overbury said he could not remember why they had been brought to him to make further statements. However he did say his task was “to put something together that was more consistent.” Mr. Elias interrupted Lord Gifford’s cross-examination suggesting he was making allegations of which he had not given notice but Lord Saville said he did not consider the questioning to imply any allegation against Colonel Overbury.
Lord Saville reasserted his view that Lord Gifford had not made any allegation at the time and he therefore asked that he clarify the precise criticism he was now making. Lord Gifford said his allegations were contained in a letter from McCartney & Casey, his instructing solicitors, of 15 October 2003 [OS0008.0080]. There Colonel Overbury was accused of concealing evidence by virtue of the statements he took from Soldiers 15, 40 and 134. The Inquiry then sought further clarification of the allegation and on 19 November 2003 McCartney & Casey wrote again [OS0008.0087] saying Colonel Overbury caused the following soldiers to modify their accounts: A, F, L, 15, 30, 40 and 134. However Lord Gifford said he only now intended to rely on the statements of Soldiers 15, 40 and 134. Lord Gifford pointed out that Lord Saville had himself questioned Soldier 15, when he came before this Inquiry, as to how he had come to give a completely different account to that contained in his original RMP statement. (Soldier 15 had said he saw a soldier at the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats shoot a man in the back as he ran away. After being interviewed by Colonel Overbury he said the man had turned to face the soldier before being shot in the back. When he gave a statement to this Inquiry he claimed the man was not shot in the back [DAY 360] Week 98).
Submissions by Gerard Elias QC
Gerard Elias QC said that the allegations against his client were “legalised claptrap”. He complained that allegations were now being raised 14 months after Colonel Overbury had given evidence. He said there was a world of difference between exploring issues with a witness and making allegations. He pointed out that his instructing solicitors had been copied the correspondence between the Inquiry and Madden & Finucane wherein Madden & Finucane asserted they were not making any allegations. Consequently this was the basis on which they proceeded not only in relation to Colonel Overbury’s evidence but also that of other witnesses such as Soldier 030, 134, etc. He asserted that not only was it grossly unfair to Colonel Overbury for allegations to be raised after he had given evidence but that, had he known these allegations were being made, he may have questioned other witnesses about the circumstances in which statements were taken. He also said that the allegations, which amounted to a conspiracy involving Colonel Overbury and the witnesses he interviewed, were never put to those witnesses. Further more Soldier 040 was not called, his statement was simply read, and neither Madden & Finucane nor McCartney & Casey requested he be called to deal with these allegations. The same was true of the DAPM, INQ 1898, in relation to the photographs. As for Soldier 030, alleged to have changed his account because of Colonel Overbury’s influence, Mr. Elias pointed out he had never provided any evidence suggesting any fire from the Paras was unlawful and therefore the claim in relation to his evidence was nonsensical. Soldier 134 specifically said he changed his evidence after speaking to Soldier 040 and it therefore had nothing to do with Colonel Overbury. Again Soldier 040 was not called and no one asked that he be called to deal with this issue. Mr. Elias said the whole thing was a scattergun of serious allegations of criminal misconduct.
In reply Mr. Macdonald pointed out that representations had been made that both Soldier 040 and INQ 1898 be called.
Christopher Clarke QC summarised the position for the Inquiry. The Tribunal could decide to allow the allegations to be made; reject them on the basis that there was no substance to them or there was prejudice to Colonel Overbury; or recall Colonel Overbury (and or other witnesses) so that any unfairness could be addressed.
Lord Saville said the Tribunal would give a ruling on the submissions as soon as possible.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
