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10 - 12
NOVEMBER 2003
Evidence heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
OIRA 2 (Official IRA Command Staff, Derry 1972); OIRA 5 (Official IRA Command Staff, Derry 1972); OIRA 4 (Official IRA Command Staff, Derry 1972) and OIRA 1 (Official IRA Command Staff, Derry 1972).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 10 November 2003 OIRA 2, OIRA 5
Tuesday 11 November 2003 OIRA 4
Wednesday 12 November 2003 OIRA 1
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry continued to hear evidence from former members of the Official IRA including two who admit to having fired on Bloody Sunday. OIRA 4 has been referred to as ‘Father Daly’s gunman’ because he was seen by Father Daly when he fired a pistol at Paratroopers who had just killed Jackie Duddy in the Rossville Flats car park. OIRA 4 was taken ill whilst giving evidence and was taken to hospital. At present it is not known whether or not he will be fit enough to return. OIRA 1 fired a shot at Paras on or around the Presbyterian Church after Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot. This may be the shot which hit the drainpipe on the east side of the church. OIRA 1 completed his evidence on Monday 17 November 2003 but it is dealt with in full in this report. OIRA 2 was with OIRA 1. He began his evidence last Thursday and completed it on Monday 10 November 2003. All his evidence appears in last week’s report.
OIRA 5
Former member of the Official IRA Command Staff in Derry
Made Statements to his own solicitors (undated) [AOIRA0005.0001] and to this Inquiry on 3 March 2003 [AOIRA0005.0012]
OIRA 5 was never contacted by the Inquiry. He came forward as a result of a decision made by a number of former members of the Official IRA in Derry following an approach from representatives of some of the families of the deceased and injured. He said he hoped his evidence would assist the Inquiry in establishing the truth of what occurred and to provide some finality to the proceedings. However he said he was not entirely convinced that the outcome of the investigation will be a true picture of events because it seemed to him from following the proceedings that some of the agencies involved, particularly the security forces, were determined to frustrate the Inquiry.
OIRA 5 said he was a volunteer member of the Official IRA and a member of the command staff in Derry. He said he held no particular post within the command staff. He said they were not a professional army and although they did have certain officers, e.g. an officer commanding (OC) and a quartermaster, the command staff made collective decisions. The OC was the conduit for those decisions and for receiving orders from the Army Council in Dublin. OIRA 3 was appointed as OC shortly before Bloody Sunday after the then OC was arrested and imprisoned. The Army Council sanctioned OIRA 3’s appointment. OIRA 5 said there were about 25 members of the Official IRA in January 1972.
No Official IRA Operations
OIRA 5 said there were no operations by the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday. He said orders given the day before and on the day itself were that there were to be no weapons in the Bogside and no volunteers were to carry weapons on the march. He said there was no specific order from Dublin. The orders were consistent with the existing policy of defence and retaliation. There was a fairly simple discussion at which it was decided that with thousands intending to protest against internment they should do nothing to distract from the march by confronting the army.
No one was to initiate any action with the security forces. Command staff were authorised to carry personal protection weapons but OIRA 5 was not carrying a weapon. To his knowledge only OIRA 4 and Reg Tester carried hand guns on the day. All other weapons were removed from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan and Brandywell. OIRA 5 was not personally involved in moving the weapons. The weapons were moved so that they were not in the Bogside and so that they were available in the event that the army entered the Creggan or Brandywell. He said it was never contemplated that the army would attack the Bogside during the civil rights march.
He said in his statement that he would have felt some pessimism towards the march but that this was to do with personal reasons which were not discussed in evidence for fear of compromising his anonymity. He said he did not expect violence other than rioting. He had no expectation of any shooting.
March
OIRA 5 said he was on the march with OIRA 3 (the OC) and OIRA 4. Other volunteers may also have been there and he may have spoken to them but he did not recall doing so. The march was peaceful and light hearted. OIRA 5 said he was never at the front of the march, he tended to be towards the back. He recalled seeing members of the Parachute Regiment as he was walking down William Street. They were over to the left (i.e. north) somewhere. Some of them were sighting their rifles which he considered intimidatory especially in light of events at Magilligan Strand the week before when Paras assaulted a number of civil rights protestors.
OIRA 5 said he, OIRA 3 and OIRA 4 went passed Rossville Street and on towards the army barrier in William Street. They went passed the stewards who were directing the march down Rossville Street. It was not unusual for them to take a look at riots to see what was going on. However they did not seek to influence the behaviour of the crowd in any way. Some may have recognised them as senior republicans but he could not say if anyone suspected they were members of the Official IRA command staff.
Rioting at Barrier 14
OIRA 5 said he witnessed some stone throwing, it was nothing unusual. At the time rioting in Derry was an almost daily occurrence. In his first statement he said he recalled CS gas, rubber bullets and water cannon being used. However in his statement to the Inquiry he said he could not be sure whether he had seen this himself or whether he was just recalling what he had seen on television. He did not remember feeling the effects of CS gas. He said he thought the army was over reacting to a fairly small riot. He saw no nail bombs, petrol bombs or acid bombs. Nor did he see any civilians with guns. He was not aware at that time that OIRA 4 was armed. He only became aware of this later.
OIRA 5 said the Official IRA never used rioting crowds as cover for firing on the security forces. He said suggestions that crowds were co-ordinated to all duck or move aside for a gunman to open fire were ridiculous. It was impossible to control either a rioting crowd or the reaction of the security forces.
Gunfire
OIRA 5 then began to make his way down Chamberlain Street towards the Rossville Flats. Either just before or just after he entered Chamberlain Street he heard gunfire. At first he thought he heard rubber bullets or CS gas being fired and he began running down Chamberlain Street because people said the army was coming in. The situation became confused and people were running in all directions. By the time he reached the end of Chamberlain Street he heard high velocity shots behind him. On reflection he believes what he heard in Chamberlain Street was also high velocity gunfire. The nature and location of the gunfire made him aware that it was coming from the British army.
Rossville Flats Car Park
As he entered the car park to the Rossville Flats he looked to his right since he knew there was a wall and no danger to his left. He saw an army vehicle and a soldier standing next to it. They may have been more but it was just the one soldier who caught his eye. The vehicle was in the entrance to the car park at the corner of the flats. The soldier was at the left hand side of the vehicle down on one knee. He was pointing his rifle in the general direction of the flats.
Jackie Duddy
He felt vulnerable but there were others around him. One of those he saw was Father Daly who he recognised by his black coat and trousers. Father Daly ran past as OIRA 5 was running parallel with a young lad. The boy seemed to be amused that there was a priest running past him, he did not seem to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. He was told later this was Jackie Duddy. OIRA 5 said he did not see Jackie Duddy shot.
He realised he was very exposed in the car park and that the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 was crowded with people trying to get through so he then ran for cover to the low wall to his left and from there made his way through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. During this time he lost contact with OIRA 4. He did not see him in the car park. He only learnt later that he had fired from the south end of Chamberlain Street.
OIRA 5 said he did not feel he was personally being fired at. He had no sense of shots whizzing past him. He could not understand who the soldiers were shooting at. There were no IRA volunteers in the car park that he could see. Once he jumped over the wall he looked back and saw the boy lying on the ground with a crowd of people round him. The soldier at the pig was still in an aimed position and he assumed this was the soldier who had shot Jackie Duddy.
Joseph Place
OIRA 5 decided to head towards Meenan Square because it was a relatively safe place. He did not hang around to see what was going on in the car park. He was still with OIRA 3. They made there way east along the wall and through the gap to the rear of the Rossville Flats. He still could not understand what was going on. He realised at least one person had been shot but it made no sense. He made his way past the east side of Joseph Place and at some point lost OIRA 3 because they were not together when they reached Meenan Square. He was aware that he was visible to soldiers on the city walls as he made his way south but he did not feel under threat from there. He felt the gunfire was coming from behind him. The firing only seemed to calm down once he had reached Meenan Square.
Meenan Square
There were a lot of people milling about in Meenan Square. OIRA 5 said he remembered seeing Eamonn McCann and exchanging looks of incredulity. He had no idea at this stage how many people had been shot. His first concern was to get home and reassure his family that he was OK because he had heard a rumour, obviously wrong, that he himself had been shot. He did not see any cars arrive from the Creggan containing volunteers and guns.
Command Staff Meeting
OIRA 5 said he attended a meeting of the command staff at about 19:00 but left after about half an hour having been delegated to attend a meeting organised by the Civil Rights Association in a derelict shop in Central Drive. At the Official IRA meeting OIRA 1 and OIRA 4 reported firing from Colombcille Court and Chamberlain Street respectively. Another incident involving Mickey Doherty in Barrack Street was also reported. He said these were the only reports of firing so far as he remembered.
Mickey Doherty
Gerard Elias QC, representing many of the military witnesses, asked OIRA 5 how it was that Mickey Doherty came to be armed since he was not in the Creggan where all the weapons were supposed to be. OIRA 5 agreed Mr. Doherty, who is now dead, was not a member of the command staff and not therefore authorised to carry a personal weapon. However he was not strictly in the Bogside in the sense of the immediate vicinity of the march. He was not therefore in breach of the orders for the day. The defence and retaliation policy applied to him as with everyone else. The Barrack Street area was also vulnerable to incursion by the army and he was probably directed to be there for that reason. He probably already had the weapon however he would not have been where he was without instructions.
Answering questions from Lord Saville OIRA 5 agreed it was considered that the least likely area the army would invade was the Bogside because of the presence of so many marchers. The Creggan was considered the most vulnerable so two cars were stationed there. He denied weapons were removed to avoid them being used by hot heads. Mickey Doherty was an exception to the rule that the weapons be removed from the Bogside aside from command staff personal weapons. He was the only exception.
Civil Rights Association Meeting
At a meeting in Central Drive there was a discussion about collecting witness statements. He could not remember the detail as to how that was to be organised. Kevin McCorry chaired the meeting.
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)
OIRA 5 said any relationship between NICRA and the Official IRA was entirely coincidental. There were people who were members of both organisations but there was no sense in which NICRA was dominated or subverted by the Official IRA. No Officials had any role in organising the march in Derry. Gerry “The Bird” Doherty was an old and famous Republican but his role as chief steward on the day was not particularly significant according to OIRA 5. OIRA 5 was not himself either a member of NICRA or sympathetic to it. He said Officials in Derry had a luke warm attitude to NICRA’s politics.
OIRA 5 said there was no agreement between the Official and Provisional IRA on Bloody Sunday.
Commenting on the evidence of Kieran Gill OIRA 5 said he knew Mr. Gill very well and he had never mentioned to him that he had spoken to a member of the Official IRA who admitted firing from the door of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. OIRA 5 said he had never heard such a suggestion and he did not believe it to have happened.
Fianna
OIRA 5 said there was no such thing as an Official Fianna in January 1972. The Official Fianna effectively ceased to exist after the IRA split in 1969/70. There were youngsters associated with the Official Republican movement and they may have thought of themselves as a Fianna but this was a misnomer in the circumstances. He said they were never given access to weapons or explosives. They were not used in IRA operations. He did not know Gerard Donaghy and could not say whether or not he was close to the Official movement. You had to be 18 to join the Official IRA.
Interviews with Journalists
OIRA 5 said he was not one of the three Official IRA volunteers John Goddard and Tony Stark interviewed in 1991 for the Praxis programme. He said he was sure of this because in his statement Mr. Goddard says he was contacted by the Officials rather than the other way round [M0086.0057]. In his notes of the interviews [O0017A.0001] Mr. Goddard recorded that the Officials had sent their armed vehicles out of the area and if the British had any intelligence they would have known there would be no IRA activity that day.
Not Too Soft
OIRA 5 said he had never heard any suggestion at the time that the Official IRA were considered too soft. He said he was aware of the incident in January 1972 when a Scottish soldier was ‘arrested’ by the Officials. He said it was the right decision to release him after he was questioned and he was not aware of any dissention. He denied there was any change to become more violent thereafter. Edmund Lawson QC sought to suggest the killing of Gunner Ham in December 1971 was an example of the Official IRA’s more violent approach but OIRA 5 said he did not understand since this occurred before the kidnapping which Mr. Lawson alleged was the source of the ‘too soft’ allegations. Lord Saville agreed that was his interpretation of Mr. Lawson questions. Mr. Lawson said there was an on going policy of greater violence which OIRA 5 denied.
OIRA 5 denied any marksmen were placed at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street as alleged in the Observer Galley Proofs [ED0024.0009]. He said he would have known about any such decision.
No Conspiracy
OIRA 5 denied a suggestion from Gerard Elias that the evidence from the former Official IRA members had been limited to that which they knew the Inquiry already had, i.e. the incidents in Colombcille Court and Father Daly’s gunman. Mr. Elias suggested this was why Mickey Doherty was not mentioned in his original statement. OIRA 5 said the incident involving Mr. Doherty had been common knowledge for years and denied there was any conspiracy to withhold evidence. He said he and others were asked to come forward and had done so. There were other former Official IRA volunteers still alive who had not come forward and he had not sought them out to persuade or dissuade them from doing so. He said everyone was aware of the Inquiry’s request that people come forward and it was a matter for them. All living members of the 1972 command staff had come forward.
OIRA 4
Former member of the Official IRA Command Staff in Derry
Made Statements to his own solicitors in 2002 [AOIRA0004.0001] and to this Inquiry on 3 March 2003 [AOIRA0004.0015]
OIRA 4 is another of the former command staff of the Official IRA in Derry to have recently volunteered evidence to the Inquiry. In his statement he said he hoped the truth would come out but he was not confident that this would be the case because the army, police and security services had obstructed the Inquiry.
OIRA 4 began giving evidence on the morning of Tuesday 11 November 2003. When being questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, he became ill and was taken directly to hospital. OIRA 4 is 66 years old. The Inquiry adjourned for the day. What follows is a summary of the little evidence OIRA 4 was able to provide before he fell ill and the contents of his two statements.
In January 1972 OIRA 4 was the adjutant and finance officer for the Official IRA in Derry. OIRA 3 was the officer commanding. OIRA 4 said he could not specifically recall orders given on or before Bloody Sunday but that he believed the standing orders for the defence of the ‘no go’ area of Free Derry were reiterated. He also understood there was an order that weapons be removed from the Bogside but he now had no memory of such an order being made. The intention of the Official IRA was that nothing should be done to diminish the public image of the march or to risk an attack on it by the army as had occurred at Magilligan Strand.
Moving Weapons
OIRA 4 said he played no part in the removal of weapons but his understanding was that all weapons, save those carried by command staff for personal protection, were placed in cars and taken to the Creggan. He agreed it was possible the weapons were already in cars and the cars were just driven to the Creggan. The cars were driven by volunteers who were tasked to defend the Creggan in case of an army incursion. OIRA 4 said he did recall concern that the Creggan might be entered by the army whilst everyone was on the march in the Bogside.
Armed
OIRA 4 carried a .32 automatic pistol on the day. He described this as a personal protection weapon carried in case of attack by the army or police. At the time he believed he was the only one armed but he learnt later that there was a second weapon. OIRA 4 said he was not expecting trouble, he carried the pistol most days. As a member of the command staff he was authorised to do so provided it was not required elsewhere. He did not have any spare rounds, only the 5 or 6 in the weapon. There was not much ammunition to go round and no one had spares. There were even fewer weapons. What they did have included a Thompson sub machine gun, rifles, some hand guns and possibly a Sterling sub-machine gun.
OIRA 4 said he did not know how many were in the Official IRA at the time but his best guess was between 20 and 30. Some volunteers attended the march but they did so in a personal capacity.
30 January 1972
OIRA 4 met the OC, OIRA 3, in the morning. He was with OIRA 3 and OIRA 5 on the march which they all joined near the start. They probably met other volunteers on the march but he could not now recall specifically doing so. He described in his statement seeing paratroopers to his left as they went down William Street. In his second statement he said he saw soldiers but could not be sure he knew they were Paras at the time. He said they were sighting down their rifles at the crowd which was un-nerving. In his later statement OIRA 4 said the march was about civil rights, it was never his intention to take on the Brits. It would have been stupid to do so with friends and family around.
When they reached the junction with Rossville Street they continued along William Street towards the army barrier (barrier 14). They passed the march stewards and saw that a small riot had started. There was some stone throwing and they went to see the reaction of the soldiers. The rioting was not at all unusual. It began before they got there and continued after they left. They took no part in the riot. OIRA 4 saw no nail bombs or petrol bombs. At no time did he see any civilian carrying a weapon. The army responded with rubber bullets, water cannon and CS gas. OIRA 4 recalled feeling the gas in the back of his throat.
Gunfire
As they turned down Chamberlain Street and headed south OIRA 4 heard gunfire behind him. At the same time people began to run. OIRA 4 did not know what was going on but he presumed what he heard was rubber bullets being fired by a snatch squad. When he got to the end of Chamberlain Street OIRA 4 first tried unsuccessfully to get into a house at the end of the street but it was too full so he started to cross the car park. As he entered the car park he saw the body of a young man being tended to by Father Daly, who he knew. He subsequently learnt the boy was Jackie Duddy. It was only at this stage that he realised the army were fired live rounds. There was confusion and distress as soldiers were firing into the Rossville Flats car park.
OIRA 4 ran back towards Chamberlain Street and moved along the wall of the gable end of the last house on the west side of the street. From here he could see an army vehicle near Block 1 of the Rossville Flats with soldiers around it firing towards the crowd of people around the body of Jackie Duddy. He formed the impression these soldiers had shot Jackie Duddy, although he did not see him being shot. There was a lot of high velocity gunfire but he could not say exactly where it was coming from.
In his statement OIRA 4 said he identified himself in a photograph standing against the gable wall. However he also said he did not actually recognise himself in the photograph. He just assumed it was him because he was the only person in the area with a weapon.
Firing at Army
OIRA 4 described in his second statement how he lost his temper. He said “the Brits were gunning down innocent civilians.” He drew his pistol as he moved west along the wall. As he got to the corner he fired two or three shots towards the army vehicle. He did not fire blindly to the north but west towards the soldiers and the vehicle. He was just aiming in the direction where he thought the army gunfire was coming from. He did not think about it at the time but said in his statement to the Inquiry that had the soldiers seen him he would have been shot to pieces. He was angry and firing out of frustration. He did not have good eyesight and was not wearing his glasses that day.
In his first statement he said he did not know what it was he had hoped to achieve in firing. His intention was to try and dissuade the Paras from advancing any further than they had but he realised at the time that one man with a pistol was a futile gesture. So far as he recalled none of the soldiers even appeared to realise he had fired at them. None turned to return fire at him. They did not appear to react to the shots and probably did not even hear them over the sound of their own firing.
Michael Bridge
He does not believe he even came close to hitting any of the soldiers. He was too far away. Other civilians shouted at him to stop firing and he realised he could not do anything so retreated along the wall and returned the gun to his pocket. He then crossed the end of Chamberlain Street to the gable end of the eastern side. Just after firing he saw Mickey Bridge with his hands in the air gesturing towards the soldiers in what he believed was an attempt to get them to stop firing. He was shot in the leg. OIRA 4 said Jackie Duddy had definitely been shot before he fired. He said when he thought about it logically later he knew his shots made no difference whatsoever to the Paras firing.
No Other Gunmen
He again tried to get into the Nelis’ house at the end of Chamberlain Street but there was still a crowd of people outside trying to get in. OIRA 4 said he knew he had to get away because he had a gun so he followed two people who broke away from this crowd and moved across the car park. They were Fulvio Grimaldi and Susan North. He went along the eastern side of the car park following Mr. Grimaldi and Ms. North. He did not see a gunman as described by Sergeant O firing from behind a car beneath Block 3. He said he walked right past the position Sergeant O referred to. He did not draw his gun again and never saw another civilian gunman.
Commenting on evidence of other civilian witnesses OIRA 4 said he did not fire up Chamberlain Street or in the mouth of Chamberlain Street. In so far as anyone has said this is what he or she saw OIRA 4 said they were mistaken. His pistol was in his pocket the whole time other than when at the west gable wall. No soldier has ever mentioned seeing OIRA 4 fire. Ms. North has said as she walked a man next to her said he had a gun. OIRA 4 said he did not recall saying this but he was very conscious of the fact that he did have a gun so may well have said it.
OIRA 4 left the area via the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He had a memory of seeing a body as he reached Fahan Street but until interviewed by Eversheds assumed he was mistaken because he did not know that anyone had been killed there. However he now understands that there was someone shot in this location (Patrick Doherty). The man he saw was dead or dying, he did not stop to look. He just headed south. He wanted to get right out of the area.
Willie Breslin
Later that evening he went to Nell McCafferty’s house in Beechwood Road where people often met. At the time no one had any idea how many had been killed. OIRA 4 said he might have said what he had done however he cannot remember doing so. He completely rejected a suggestion by Mr. Breslin that he had said of the events of Bloody Sunday “this may be the best thing that has happened.” OIRA 4 said he did not say this to Mr. Breslin or anyone else. He said he did not recall seeing Mr. Breslin there. The statement sounded political to him and he was never much of a political animal.
Command Staff Meeting
There was a command staff meeting that evening at which he reported his actions to the OC. He could not remember anything else about the meeting other than there was no criticism of what he had done.
Other Civilian Gunfire
OIRA 4 said he subsequently became aware of an incident in Colombcille Court where another member of the Official IRA command staff fired a single shot at an army sniper in William Street. He also referred (in his first statement, made in 2002) to a volunteer being injured in an incident later in the afternoon (Mickey Doherty).
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
OIRA 4 said there was no Official IRA control of the Civil Rights Association. There may have been some overlap in membership but not in any organising role so far as he was aware. He was not aware of any assurance given to NICRA regarding the intention not to attack the army during the march but he thought such assurances would have been unnecessary given the general support of the Official IRA for the objectives of the march and the fact that they would not have wished to endanger anyone on it. Civil Rights marches were never used as cover for sniping at the security forces.
OIRA 4 said he was never aware of the Rossville Flats being used for sniping. They were overlooked by the city walls. There were no snipers there on Bloody Sunday.
OIRA 1
Former member of the Official IRA Command Staff in Derry
Made Statements to his own solicitors on 26 April 2002 [AOIRA0001.0003] and to this Inquiry on 3 March 2003 [AOIRA0001.0024]
As with other former members of the Official IRA OIRA 1 said he came forward to give evidence to the Inquiry as a result of an appeal made on behalf of some of the families of the deceased and injured. He said he had not wanted to give evidence and he was sceptical that the full truth would emerge given the history of the involvement of the British Establishment in Northern Ireland and the conduct of those representing the military witnesses.
Non Sectarian
OIRA 1 said he became politically active in the 1960s. At the time he was involved in the Labour Party, Civil Rights Association, People’s Democracy and the James Connolly Republican Clubs. He said attacks on Civil Rights protestors at Burntollet Bridge and Magilligan Strand as well as the introduction of Internment exemplified the treatment of Catholics who were simply pressing peacefully for equal rights. However people on the Left considered sectarianism an evil, it was not a religious fight. Social problems crossed the religious divide; they were trying to unite the working class of both communities but the fact that the army supported one side against the other made it difficult.
Official IRA
In January 1972 he was a member of the command staff of the Official IRA. Although there were offices such as adjutant, officer commanding (OC) and quartermaster the command was a collective. Decisions were made collectively and orders then issued by the officer commanding. OIRA 1 had no specific role within the command staff. The others were OIRA 2, OIRA 3 (officer commanding on Bloody Sunday), OIRA 4, OIRA 5 and Reg Tester (quartermaster). There were two units in Derry, the Creggan and the Bogside. He was in the Bogside unit but was not commander of the unit.
Defence and Retaliation
The standing orders for the Official IRA since the introduction of Internment in August 1971 were defence and retaliation. These orders came from Dublin, the local Derry command had no discretion to depart from them. The defence and retaliation strategy meant that the Official IRA was not engaged in a bombing campaign nor did it go and seek out targets. However defence of the Free Derry ‘no go’ area meant that any British soldier in that area was liable to attack. Defensive actions were spontaneous whereas retaliation might be planned. An operation in retaliation for the army killing a civilian might be days or even weeks later. OIRA 1 denied that the kidnapping of a soldier in January 1972 was at odds with these principals. He said so far as he was concerned, and he was not directly involved in the incident, the soldier was arrested inside the Bogside, questioned and released once it was determined he was not a threat.
Orders for 30 January 1972
OIRA 1 said that the orders for Bloody Sunday were for there to be no operations against the army. The defensive orders were reiterated and the safeguarding of civilian marchers was paramount. The Bogside was thought to be secure because there would be so many demonstrators in it. However there was a fear that an army incursion into the Creggan was possible consequently volunteers were directed to take two cars containing all the weapons to the Creggan. An attack by the army was not anticipated but it was considered possible. All weapons were to be taken to the Creggan in the cars and the Bogside was to be free of weapons for the duration of the march.
Weapons
OIRA 1 said the Official IRA was not well armed in 1972. In fact they had more volunteers than weapons and only had about 20-25 volunteers. He agreed they did have .303 rifles and a Sten gun plus some hand guns but he could not remember a .22. There were also some Thompson sub machine guns but not much ammunition. He said some of the weapons did not even work but were retained to encourage local people and discourage the security forces should they get intelligence of their patrols.
Moving Weapons
OIRA 1 said he did not personally see the weapons taken to the Creggan but they would probably already have been in the boot of two cars and the cars were simply driven up to the Creggan. He said he did not know when the cars were moved but it could have been the Saturday evening. He was asked by Lord Saville in so far as preventing the weapons from being seized by the army would they not have been safest in the Bogside. OIRA 1 agreed but said that the purpose of having the weapons was not just to keep them but to use them to defend the ‘no go’ area. He accepted that had there been a major operation in the Creggan a few volunteers with guns may not have been able to do very much but they were there to resist as best they could any incursion. He said the defence of the ‘no go’ areas was not achieved by the Official IRA but by the people of Derry. Since so many would be on the march in the Bogside it was felt best to have the weapons and some volunteers in the Creggan to delay or deter any army encroachment until people could get there. Weapons were not kept at volunteers’ homes in case they were searched.
OIRA 1 said he did not know anything of any assurances received by the Civil Rights Association. He only learnt recently that it was suggested the Official IRA had given an assurance no operations would be undertaken during the march. OIRA 1 was a member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and had been since 1969. He only went to public meetings, he was not an organiser. It was a broad movement and had nothing to do with Republicanism. NICRA was not a front for the Official IRA, it was just an organisation campaigning for better treatment.
Saturday 29 January 1972
Sometime on the Saturday evening OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 went to Colombcille Court to retrieve a .303 rifle that had not been accounted for. He said he was not ordered to get the rifle he just offered to do it. That was how they worked. He took responsibility for collecting it. It was routine. OIRA 1 said the intention was to recover the weapon and put it with the others in the boot of the two cars in to be taken to the Creggan the next day in accordance with the agreed instruction that all weapons be removed from the Bogside. He said he probably did not know exactly where the weapon was when he agreed to collect it. It was just known there was a weapon which was in a dump in the Bogside.
They may have driven to Glenfada Park North and walked from there. When they got to Colombcille Court people were still talking about two civilians who had been shot earlier that day. Two men, Robson and McLaughlin, were apparently shot on William Street by the army at 15:58. OIRA 1 said he did not remember what time they went to collect the rifle but it may have been around 21:00.
‘Too Risky’
OIRA 1said he felt uneasy and feared there might be undercover soldiers operating in the area. No one knew the exact circumstances of the earlier shootings and he decided to abandon retrieval of the weapon. It was just an instinct. They probably went for a pint intending to come back the next day. There was no great urgency.
Bloody Sunday
In the event they did not return until the afternoon, according to OIRA 1 whilst the march was in progress. He denied any intention of going to Colombcille Court to use the rifle in a pre-planned attack on the army. He said he could not be sure if he knew before going to collect it but the rifle had a broken sight and was not therefore suitable for a premeditated sniping operation. He said he presumed the weapon had previously been taken from the cars because it was damaged. Most of the weapons were kept loaded in the cars. It could have been the case that one of the reasons he went to collect the rifle was that it needed to be taken to be repaired but he could not remember specifically. He said he did not know exactly why the rifle was where it was or who had left it there. He said the Official IRA was not like a professional army with an armoury and set procedures. He said they had do make do as best they could with the resources available to them. His recollection was that the weapon was inside a closed area like a bin cupboard or a coal bunker. He thought this was on the ground floor outside the flats but could not be certain. The rifle was hidden behind some boxes or bins inside the ‘bunker’.
He accepted the location was not completely secure but denied it was totally insecure even though the door was not locked. He said it could not have been found unless you either knew where to look for it or conducted a thorough search. He only knew of the location because he or OIRA 2 had spoken to another volunteer who had told them where it was. He cannot know recall who that might have been. Asked if it were not extremely dangerous to have left a loaded rifle in an unlocked ‘bunker’ OIRA 1 accepted the arrangement was not perfect but denied any child had ever been injured by an Official IRA weapon. He added that the same could not be said of the British Army. They did not have a store for weapons, another for ammunition and someone to check everything in and out. He said the British Army had managed to destroy the rifles that killed everyone on Bloody Sunday despite all their allegedly rigorous controls.
Second Floor
Having found the rifle OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 went into a stairwell in Colombcille Court and climbed to the top. OIRA 1 said they did this so that they could remove the stock. He did not want to stand around on the street and could not have done it in the bunker. At the top of the stairs there was an area bordered by horizontal wooden slats. From here it was possible to see, through the slats, to the north. They could hear the noise of the march in William Street but OIRA 1 could not remember whether or not it was possible to see the marchers in William Street however he could hear others in Rossville Street so had the impression the march had turned down Rossville Street.
Damien Donaghy and John Johnston
Within a minute of getting to the landing OIRA 1 said he heard three high velocity shots. He thinks they were SLR shots. There was shouting and the atmosphere changed. He heard people say two boys had been shot. His immediate thought was that the army had shot two people. He looked through the slats but did not see either Damien Donaghy or John Johnston who were shot by Paras from machine gun platoon from a derelict building on the north side of William Street. Hearing the shots, hearing people say two people were hit and the change in atmosphere led him to realise what had happened. It was not a great surprise that the army had shot two people with no justification, they had done the same the day before.
OIRA 1 said he had no recollection of having seen either Damien Donaghy or John Johnston being carried away even though they were carried towards Colombcille Court from the ‘laundry’ waste ground directly in front of his position. He also had no memory of actually seeing the march in William Street. When shown aerial photographs [P0200] suggesting he did have a view over the ‘laundry’ waste ground and onto William Street OIRA 1 said that could have been the view he had but he still had no memory of seeing the march.
He could not remember if he had noticed him before the shooting but he saw a soldier beyond William Street. He was by a ledge or a wall and pointing a rifle towards the crowd. OIRA 2 may have said “that’s the bastard who fired.” He was sighting along his weapon which was pointing at the crowd.
Firing at Soldier
OIRA 1 believed he was looking at the soldier who had just shot the two people and that he may have been preparing to fire again. His instant reaction was to take aim and fire a single shot at him. He was trying to prevent him from shooting anyone else. When he fired he could only see the soldier’s head and shoulders however he did have a clear view. He said he could not now estimate how far away he was but he believed the soldier was somewhere between the derelict building on the north side of William Street and the west side of the Presbyterian Church on Great James Street. When he fired the soldier disappeared. OIRA 2 said he thought OIRA 1 had hit him but he may have just retreated. He did not fire in panic; he fired a shot to prevent others being shot in William Street. He did not feel under any immediate risk before he fired. He agreed he did not know if the soldier he fired at had fired himself. He may have just been looking down his sights.
Not Sniping Location
OIRA 1 denied he had gone to the location with the intention of firing on the army. The wooden slats offered no protection from incoming fire, they also prevented a clear view of all but a small area. The weapon was broken and had he intended to fire on the army he would have used one with a proper sight. The fact that the weapon was loaded was not a coincidence. Weapons and ammunition were often stored together. He could not recall what ammunition was in the rifle but it had a small magazine that would have held probably 5 rounds. There may have been two or three in it. He probably checked to see there was no round in the breach as soon as he could so as to ensure the weapon was safe. This would have been done immediately but he has no recollection of having done it. They had not taken either the rifle or the ammunition with them to Colombcille Court. They were not carrying any other weapons. He had only fired because they were standing there with a rifle and the army had just shot two people. OIRA 1 denied having a reputation for being a good shot. He said he was not a sniper.
Drainpipe Shot
OIRA 1 said he was aware that it was said a shot had hit the drainpipe on the east side of the Presbyterian Church. He said in his statement that he did not think this could have been his shot because he did not think he could have missed so badly even though the front sight on the rifle was broken. However in evidence he conceded it could have been the same shot.
After he fired OIRA 1 said he still did not feel under any immediate danger. He had only seen the one soldier and he did not think the army were about to enter the Bogside. However he knew they had to get out of the area, they had no back up and had just fired.
Confrontation
They had been at the top of the steps no more than a few minutes. About half way down the stairs they met a group of about six people. There was an argument in which someone said, “what are you doing?” or “get the fuck out of here.” Others suggested they fire again. OIRA 1 said he was unaware at the time that some of those they met were members of the Provisional IRA. He said it was a very short incident, less than a minute, and over time so much has been said about it, over the years people had come to believe it was more than it was. He said he did not recall OIRA 7 being there. He said Father Denis Bradley was not one of those who was there as some have said. It has been suggested that Vinnie Coyle disarmed him. He said he was not disarmed and he would have remembered if Vinnie Coyle had been there. OIRA 1 said the Peter Mullan’s account [AM0450.0008 and DAY 152, line 204] of the incident was incorrect. That was not the incident he was involved in.
OIRA 1 said he did not know Sean Keenan in 1972. Sean Keenan was in the Provisional IRA and has recently made a statement to the Inquiry [AK0046.0002] saying he was present at the altercation with OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 in Colombcille Court. Mr. Keenan refers to leaving barrier 14 before the riot began and then being approached by a hysterical woman in Rossville Street who told him there were two or three men with a rifle in Colombcille Court. He went to the location and recognised OIRA 2 on the stairwell. He knew OIRA 2 was a ‘Sticky’ (Official IRA). There was an argument. He had not heard any shots at all. OIRA 1 said Sean Keenan’s account of the confrontation was reasonably accurate however he thought there was rioting going on at the time he had fired.
OIRA 1 said he had no knowledge of the alleged gunman with a pistol referred to by David Capper [M0009.0017] as firing at soldiers in a derelict building on William Street. He did not see any such gunman.
Glenfada Park North
The two of them then walked from Colombcille Court to the car in Glenfada Park North. OIRA 1 put the rifle in the boot and locked it. The car was left there until after the march. At some point he and OIRA 2 separated. OIRA 1 said he was pretty sure he kept the keys but he could not remember exactly what happened to them. He said he thought he kept them and later gave them to another volunteer to collect the car. There was only the one weapon in the car. He remained in Glenfada Park North for 10-15 minutes until the Paras came in. He identified a bearded man on the extreme left of photograph P0420 as possibly him however he was not sure. He also accepted the man could be Don Coyle, a good friend of his. OIRA 1 said he could not recall having seen Mr. Coyle on the day but he may have been with him.
Photographs P0420 and P0428
OIRA 1 has identified a man in photograph P420 as possibly himself. The man is in the area where he was in, he could not be sure but it might be him. The man he was referring to has a beard and is pictured to the left of a crowd in the south west of Glenfada Park North. OIRA 1 was also shown a blurred photograph of the Glenfada Park North car park taken from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. It shows two cars in the south east corner of the car park: a small dark car parked facing south and a bigger lighter coloured car next to it facing east. Gerard Elias QC, representing many of the military witnesses, said there was evidence that the lighter car had not been in that position very long. He implied that two figures seen crossing the car park towards the south west entrance, leading to Abbey Park, may have come from that car and that one of them was apparently carrying a large object under his left arm. The man, although blurred, was similar to the man OIRA 1 identified in photograph P0420 in so far as both have dark hair and are wearing dark trousers and a light coloured jacket. OIRA 1 said he had no idea who this might be. He did not recall seeing OIRA 7 in Glenfada Park. OIRA 1 said he saw no weapons in Glenfada Park. OIRA 1 agreed the image of a car on the helicopter film [still E0024.0011] was in the approximate position in which he believed the car containing the rifle was parked. He denied any knowledge of others being around the car or getting weapons out of the boot.
Paras Coming In/Rubble Barricade
The next thing OIRA 1 remembers is looking round the corner of the south gable end of Glenfada Park North and seeing the army vehicles in Rossville Street. He heard gunfire and saw someone fall. He said he could not be sure but thought the man he saw fall was wearing a white shirt. He could not be sure the man had been shot he just saw him fall whilst the firing was going on. OIRA 1 said it would not have been the first time he had seen the army shoot people for no reason. He had seen Seamus Cusack shot and many other incidents. He said the man he saw fall could have been Michael Kelly or John Young. He saw a number of people standing at the rubble barricade. None of them was armed. He only saw one person fall.
OIRA 1 said his impression at the time was that the shot which appeared to hit the man who fell had come from the city walls. He said this was just the feeling he had at the time. He did not know why he thought this but he did look up towards the walls. He now believes he was probably mistaken. He also saw people bring the body of a boy (Michael Kelly) into Glenfada Park.
The next thing he remembers is moving to the other end of the gable wall and looking back north in Glenfada Park. There were still a lot of people in the courtyard. He then saw a soldier enter from the north east entrance. He was big and wearing a helmet. That was all he could say to describe him. OIRA 1 said he had the distinct impression that this soldier fired but he did not see any muzzle flashes. He was carrying his rifle at waist height and at the same time OIRA 1 heard a burst of gunfire. He ran with others who were running across Glenfada Park North towards the south west entrance leading to Abbey Park. He did not feel he was personally being shot at and did not sense bullets whizzing past him. He had no idea how many shots were fired. He did not recall anyone tripping or falling around him. He did not see any civilians with weapons nor did he see anyone he recognised as a member of either wing of the IRA.
Abbey Park
OIRA 1 said he ran out of the south west entrance to Glenfada Park North and turned left past the houses in Abbey Park. He went into the back door of a house in Abbey Park where there were a lot of other people and an injured man lying on the floor. A car reversed up to the house and the injured man was driven away. He believes the people in the car were later arrested but is not sure. He never learnt the identity of the injured man. He could not remember whether or not the shooting continued whilst he was in the house.
After a while he left the house and went onto the Old Bog Road (Fahan Street West). There were a lot of rumours flying around but no one knew what had happened. There was a lot of anger and some where asking where the IRA had been. People were talking about getting guns to attack the army, they were saying “where are the guns?” OIRA 1 thinks he met the OC, OIRA 3, at about this time. He did not mention the rifle in Glenfada Park to anyone except possibly OIRA 3. He was still confused and in shock.
‘Red’ Mickey Doherty
OIRA 1 said he understood the two cars with the weapons did come down from the Creggan at some point but he did not see this for himself. He was never aware that anyone other than himself, OIRA 4 and Mickey Doherty had fired. At some point he heard a report that a volunteer had been wounded and he made his way to Vinnie Coyle’s house. It may have been Vinnie Coyle who told him. He met a number of people there including a man with a slight injury to his leg. OIRA 1 was only there for a few minutes. The injured man (Mickey Doherty) was OK. OIRA 1 said he understood that Mickey Doherty fired because the army had encroached into he ‘no go’ area or had fired first but this was just what he was told, he had no first had information about the incident.
Command Staff Meeting
Later OIRA 1 attended a command staff meeting. He cannot remember much about it and says he was still in a state of shock and very angry. He thought talking was pointless and it was just another meeting. He said he wanted to go straight to Ebrington Barracks and “take people out.” His view did not prevail and it was agreed any retaliation must wait until after the funerals. He reported the shot he had fired and OIRA 4 also reported having fired. OIRA 1 said he could not remember specifically whether or not the incident involving Red Mickey was referred to but he thought that it was. OIRA 1 said he also learnt sometime after the meeting that another volunteer, Reg Tester, had tried unsuccessfully to fire a weapon.
Secrecy
OIRA 1 said the official position adopted after Bloody Sunday as regards public statements was that they would deny that anyone in the Official IRA fired. He said to have admitted firing even one shot at the time would have been used by the British army to justify what they had done in killing innocent civilians. The army and British government were already engaged in a propaganda exercise by lying about what had happened. This was one of the reasons why he says the comments attributed to various Official IRA sources by various journalists did not come from him. He was not at the press conference held later that evening.
Speaking to Journalists
OIRA 1 said he never spoke to any journalist in any sort of formal interview however there were a lot of journalists around at the time and he cannot deny ever having to spoken to any of them. The Inquiry has a number of published and unpublished articles and notes written by various journalists in 1972 which purport to record accounts from various Official IRA witnesses.
Sunday Times - John Barry [AOIRA0001.0001]
The Inquiry has notes made by the Sunday Times Insight team during their investigations in 1972. When giving evidence to the Inquiry editor John Barry said that he believed a section of the notes related to conversations with OIRA 1. OIRA 1 said he had never been interviewed by John Barry. He said there were a lot of journalists who spoke to people in pubs and he did not deny he could have spoken to him however he did not accept the comments attributed to him were his own. He said some of the details were correct but others were wrong.
He specifically denied saying he was in command of the Bogside unit, he also doubted there were 16 men in the Creggan as recorded by Barry. He denied scouting army positions or being on the corner of Rossville Street and William Street. It was not a pre-planned sniping position, he would not have told John Barry it was. He also denied that there was any criticism of the Official IRA for failing to defend the people in the Bogside. He said the reference to having fired from behind wooded slats on the top floor of Colombcille Court did not come from him. He had not arranged with a woman in the flats for the door to the washing area to be left open. He did not get the rifle from the car and he did not tell Barry the altercation was with Provos.
There is also reference in the notes to 5 or 6 Stickies (OIRA) in the car park of Glenfada Park North toying with the idea of “making a fight of it.” OIRA 1 said he did not see any other Official IRA volunteers in Glenfada Park. He denied there were other guns in the car. There is also reference to three people being shot at the barricade in a burst of machine gun fire. OIRA 1 said this was wrong. He said the Para he saw in Glenfada Park could have had either a Sterling sub-machine gun or an SLR, he could not remember. However what he heard was all high velocity gunfire. He said the suggestion that he had met another volunteer with a .303 rifle down his trousers was ridiculous because you wouldn’t be able to move with a rifle down your trousers.
Another Sunday Times document, an article that was published in 1972 [L0211], refers to the Official IRA reporting one defensive shot and seven unauthorised shots fired out of anger and frustration. This suggests there was Official IRA gunfire in Glenfada Park.
Other Sunday Times notes [AM0024.0005] refer to an interview with Tony Martin in which he claims to have met an IRA man in Fahan Street. He is recorded as having said the IRA man told him there were two rifles in a car in Glenfada Park and he asked for help in retrieving them. OIRA 1 said he had no recollection of speaking to Tony Martin and there was only one rifle in the car.
Observer ‘Galley Proofs’ 6 February 1972 [ED0024.0009]
The Inquiry also has a version of an article never published because of the Widgery Tribunal. There the acting OC, presumably meaning OIRA 3, is reported as having said the Official IRA had two marksmen placed in positions coving William Street/Rossville Street and William Street/Little Diamond. They were armed and had orders not to fire until the area was clear of civilians. OIRA 1 said this was all untrue. He said all the journalists were exchanging stories and there was no coincidence just because a number got some things correct. A lot was also wrong. OIRA 1 said he did not know where the journalists had got it. The unpublished Observer piece also refers to only a single Official IRA shot fired at a soldier on his own in William Street. OIRA 1 said he did not believe any of it had happened.
Sunday Press 6 February 1972 [L0171]
OIRA 1 also denied the contents of an article by Vincent Brown in which he refers to two volunteers returning to a block of maisonettes to collect two rifles. This article also refers to firing on a soldier in William Street but specifies this as having come from a .38 revolver. OIRA 1 said it was all wrong.
Sunday Telegraph – Gerard Kemp [L0120]
Gerard Kemp wrote an article in 1972 in which he claimed to have spoken to the person who fired the Presbyterian Church shot referred to in the Widgery Report. OIRA 1 said he never gave a formal interview to any journalist and did not know Mr. Kemp. The article describes hearing the shots which hit Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, returning to a car in Glenfada Park to collect a rifle and firing from the upper storey of some maisonettes from behind some planking. It also refers to firing from a pistol. OIRA 1 said although some of the details were accurate other parts were untrue and none of it had come from him. He said the reference to him being a sniper who had killed three British soldiers since August 1971 was nonsense.
The article goes on to describe the interviewee being in Glenfada Park and James Wray being shot just behind him, then going to a house in Abbey Park containing an injured man. He then went to find a relative (his own not the injured man’s). OIRA 1 said many of the details were correct and did reflect what he did but he insisted he did not speak to Kemp and he suspected journalists had all written the same story changing the details around. OIRA 1 denied Mr. Lawson’s suggestion that having been identified by Mr. Mullan he had to come forward but was only willing to admit what the Inquiry already knew. OIRA 1 said he made his decision to give evidence before he was aware of anything Mr. Mullan had said.
OIRA 1 described the account attributed to Liam O’Comain by Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnston [AO0082.0005] of an Official IRA decision to “open up on Bloody Sunday” as fantasy.
Kieran Gill [M0105.0013]
Kieran Gill was a journalist on the Derry Journal and has made a statement to the Inquiry where he claims he and Peter Pringle came up with a theory about the shooting of Alexander Nash. Mr. Nash was shot in the shoulder whilst trying to stop soldiers firing at the rubble barricade where his son William and two others (John Young and Michael McDaid) lay dead. Mr. Gill refers to having a conversation with an Official IRA volunteer who admitted firing on Bloody Sunday. Mr. Gill says he said “so you shot Alexander Nash” at which point the man looked horrified. He claims the man then admitted to firing 3-4 shots from a pistol up Rossville Street from the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. OIRA 1 said this was all wrong and Mr. Gill was totally confused. He denied he had spoken to Gill in 1972 and said he understood Mr. Pringle had also refuted the account.
OIRA 1 agreed he had spoken to Mr. Gill recently since providing his statement to this Inquiry. Mr. Gill made a supplementary statement in May 2002 [M0105.0028] claiming he made contact with the man he interviewed in 1972 via the address he had visited 30 years before. He claims the man refused to release him from an agreement as to confidentiality and that he also refused to give evidence to the Inquiry. Mr. Gill claims he made contact so as to comply with a request from the Inquiry to reveal his source.
OIRA 1 said Mr. Gill was lying. They had spoken but after he had made his statement and been granted anonymity by the Inquiry. He did not refuse to release Mr. Gill from any undertaking, he told him they had no such agreement because he had not spoken to him in 1972. OIRA 1 said he told Mr. Gill that the incident he referred to in his first statement of an IRA gunman firing from the doorway to the Rossville Flats was nonsense, it had never happened. He denied ever providing Kieran Gill with any information about Bloody Sunday.
Others Confused
At the end of his statement to the Inquiry OIRA 1 said that he had been shown a lot of evidence from different people much of which appeared to deal with his activities on Bloody Sunday. He said that many of the witnesses had amalgamated details that they had seen or heard with information that had gleaned from talking to others. Consequently many of the accounts are contradictory or confused. He said riots and civilian gunmen were a day to day occurrence in Derry at the time.
Paras Attack Planned
OIRA 1 expressed the view that the Paras were sent in to get the rioters and Civil Rights Association off the streets. He said this was supported by General Ford’s comments about shooting selected ringleaders only a few weeks before Bloody Sunday and the Queen awarding Colonel Wilford a medal after Bloody Sunday. He said either it was pre-planned or the Paras run amok. He thought it unlikely the Paras would have acted as they did in killing innocent civilian unless they thought that was what expected of them. It was inconceivable Colonel Wilford would have been commended if the British establishment considered that his soldiers had run amok. He said that had the British government admitted it was all a mistake much of the anger could have been avoided because the lies about the dead being nail bombers and gunmen made it all worse.
OIRA 1 admitted he did not want to come to the Inquiry to give evidence but he had done so as a result of requests made on behalf of the families. They wanted the truth to be told and he decided to come forward about three years ago. He did not seek anyone’s authority before doing so and did not discuss his decision with other Official IRA witnesses before speaking to his solicitors.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
