BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 107

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3 - 6 NOVEMBER 2003

Evidence heard

This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:

Brian Cummings (Private Secretary to Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner); Thomas McGlinchey; Frank Lawton; Frank McCarron; Martin McGuinness (Adjutant of the Provisional IRA in Derry) and OIRA 2 (Command Staff Official IRA in Derry).

Summary of Evidence

Monday        6 November 2003    Brian Cummings, Thomas McGlinchey, Frank Lawton, Frank McCarron

Tuesday          7 November 2003       Martin McGuinness

Wednesday   8 November 2003       Martin McGuinness

Thursday         9 November 2003       OIRA 2

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.

INTRODUCTION

This week the Inquiry heard evidence from Martin McGuinness (Sinn Fein chief negotiator) who was the second in command of the Provisional IRA in Derry on Bloody Sunday.  He asserted that no PIRA member fired at the army on Bloody Sunday, other than what he described as a “symbolic firing” at the observation post on the city walls later in the day.  He described the events of Bloody Sunday as a massacre. 

The Inquiry also heard from a former member of the Official IRA who was present when another Official fired a shot at a Paratrooper.  This would appear to be the shot which struck the drainpipe on the Presbyterian Church prior to the Paras deploying into the Bogside.  OIRA 2 claims the shot was a spontaneous reaction to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.  He completed his evidence on Monday 10 November 2003 but it appears in its totality in this report.

The Inquiry also heard from several civilian witnesses and Brian Faulkner PM’s former Private Secretary, Mr. Cummings.

Brian Hodgman Cummings

Private Secretary to Brian Faulkner (Prime Minister, Northern Ireland 1972)

Made Statement to this Inquiry on 16 July 2003 [KC0015.0001]

Mr. Cummings was Principal Private Secretary (PPS) to Major Chichester-Clark.  When Brian Faulkner succeeded Major Chichester-Clark as Northern Ireland Prime Minister he appointed Dr. Robert Ramsay as his PPS.  However he retained Mr. Cummings as his Private Secretary.  He had responsibility for security matters.  He liaised between the PM, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the RUC, the army and the newly established Government Security Unit.  He was the point of contact for the General Officer Commanding (GOC), General Tuzo; the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Graham Shillington; and Mr. Faulkner.

Mr. Cummings attended the Northern Ireland Joint Security Committee (JSC).  He was not a member of the JSC.  The minutes were taken by Thomas Cromey but Mr. Cummings made occasional notes of matters concerning the PM.  This were manuscript aides-memoire.  They were never typed and were shredded unless a matter related to a particular file in which case a typed note would be filed.  Mr. Cummings also prepared briefings for Mr. Faulkner.

The Government Security Unit (GSU) was formed after the decision to give the Mr. Faulkner dual responsibility for the Premiership and Home Affairs.  Mr. Cummings said that contrary to the what was originally envisaged the GSU never had a role in security planning.  It did not determine policy for operational matters.  He disputed Lord Kilclooney’s assertion in his statement to the Inquiry that the GSU was where security policy evolved.  Mr. Cummings said policy recommendations were made to the JSC but it was the JSC that made decisions.

Government Security Unit

The GSU was headed by William Stout.  He was Mr. Faulkner’s personal security adviser and gave advice on security policy.  This he did in private meetings with Mr. Faulkner which Mr. Cummings was not privy to.  Those meetings were not minuted.  Morris Harris did the leg work for the GSU and Mr. Stout had a special role.  Mr. Cummings said he had no idea whether or not William Stout and Mr. Faulkner discussed what to do about the march on 30 January 1972.  Mr. Stout had access to Mr. Faulkner and they could well have discussed the issue.  Mr. Stout was not a great man for committing anything to paper.

Joint Security Committee

The Joint Security Committee was attended by the Chief Constable, the GOC, Mr. Faulkner and the UK Government Representative.  The JSC coordinated civil administration in relation to law and order.  It did make policy decisions on law and order issues but was not involved in operational matters.  These were left to the GOC and the Chief Constable.  The JSC would be briefed, either in person or in writing, by the army and police and would note what was reported but Mr. Cummings said he could not remember any instance in which the JSC made an executive decision as to how a particular event should be policed.  Mr. Cummings said the JSC could not veto an operational decision.  It would make its views known to the GOC but he was at liberty to ignore them in operational matters.  However Mr. Cummings said he was sure that had the GOC ever mentioned shooting unarmed civilians members of the committee would have expressed concerns.

Intelligence

RUC Special Branch assessments were circulated to the JSC as were forthcoming event schedules prepared by the RUC force control.  Mr. Cummings said he could not recall the JSC ever receiving army intelligence reports.  He agreed with a comment of Dr. Ramsay’s [KR0001.0005] that in the early stage of the army’s involvement in Northern Ireland some army intelligence assessments appeared naive.

Mr. Cummings said everyone within the Stormont government, the police and army were uncomfortable with the ‘no go’ areas.  There was always concern about Loyalist reactions.

Shooting Rioters

Mr. Cummings said he had no recollection of any hardening of attitudes following internment (August 1971) and specifically denied any knowledge of any suggestion that rioters should be shot.  However such a suggestion was articulated in a memorandum written by General Ford, Commander of Land Forces.  On 6 January 1972 the JSC had proposed that the GOC meet with business leaders in Derry to discuss the rioting in the city.  General Tuzo did not go but General Ford did and in the memorandum he wrote to the GOC on his return he said, "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring-leaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have been issued." [G4008.0300].

Mr. Cummings said the memorandum was an internal army document which would not have been seen by the Joint Security Committee.  However the minutes of the next JSC meeting, on 13 January 1972, record the following: “the GOC indicated that following a meeting with businessmen in Derry certain measures are in mind to put down hooligans.  It is a very difficult situation to solve within the law.”

Mr. Cummings claimed members of the JSC would not necessarily have questioned what General Tuzo meant by ‘certain measures’ but insisted that had anyone mentioned shooting unarmed civilians he would remember it.  He agreed the situation in Derry was at the forefront of everyone’s minds and the army was regularly asked if it could not do more to quell the rioting.  Mr. Cummings said every member of the JSC had a copy of the Yellow Card, the army’s rules of engagement, as did he.

Brian Faulkner’s Comments

Commenting on remarks Mr. Faulkner had made in parliament in May 1971 Mr. Cummings said Mr. Faulkner was alluding to the Yellow Card when he said “The army is not prepared to take half measures.  If they see anyone acting suspiciously they may fire to warn or with effect with or without orders.”  [OS0004.0134] Seamus Tracey QC, representing many of the families, asked if Mr. Cummings considered shooting people acting suspiciously to be within the remit of the Yellow Card.  Mr. Cummings said he believed Mr. Faulkner was referring to the terms of the Yellow Card.  However he said in the heat of the debate the PM may have departed from his briefing.

In the same debate Mr. Faulkner continued, to the approval of Unionist MPs, “people who go onto the streets in a riot situation deserve what is coming to them”.

27 January 1972

The Joint Security Committee met in Northern Ireland again on 27 January 1972 however Mr. Faulkner was in London for a meeting with Prime Minister Edward Heath.  Mr. Cummings said he did not go to London with Mr. Faulkner.  At the Northern Ireland JSC meeting the minutes record that the basic plan was to stop the march at army barriers in William Street.  It continued, the situation may develop into a riot “and even a shooting war.”  Mr. Cummings said he did not recall anyone appraising Mr. Faulkner that the JSC had concluded there was a risk of a shooting war.

Highest Level in Whitehall

Mr. Cummings denied that he was the source for the Sunday Times Insight team’s assertion that “any major operation in the Derry enclave had to be a political decision” [L0121].  He said the JSC had views on how certain matters should be handled but political input as to major departures from existing practice were more likely to come from the UK Representative, the Ministry of Defence or 10 Downing Street rather than the Northern Ireland JSC.  His view was that the two telegrams from Donald Maitland to the UK Representative at Stormont (at 16:10 on 27 January 1972 and 19:45 on 28 January 1972) showed that the operation in Derry was planned by the military at the highest level in Whitehall.

Army Press Claims Unreliable

At another meeting with Edward Heath PM on 4 February 1972 Mr. Faulkner is recorded as having said the tragic events in Derry “might clear the air.”  Commenting on the minutes of this meeting Mr. Cummings said Mr. Faulkner was sceptical about army claims to have killed terrorists in Derry on Bloody Sunday.  He said this scepticism was shared by others including himself because of a whole chapter of events where the army press office had asserted a particular version of events and within 24 hours the army’s assertions were not borne out.  The army would often claim ‘hits’ when frequently there were none.  It was often asked whether the army ever hit anyone.

Seamus Tracey QC, representing many of the families, questioned Mr. Cummings’ assertion that Mr. Faulkner was sceptical of the army’s claims.  After Bloody Sunday Mr. Faulkner is recorded as having said “Those who organised the march… must bear a terrible responsibility for providing the IRA with the opportunity to again bring death on our streets” [G0107.0651].

Mr. Cummings claimed he never discussed Bloody Sunday with Mr. Faulkner.

Thomas McGlinchey

Made Statements to NICRA (Keville Tape) in 1972 [AM0250.0008] and to this Inquiry on 8 January 1999 [AM0250.0001]

On 30 January 1972 Thomas McGlinchey was a student at St. Columb’s College.  He lived with his parents in the Creggan.  He comes from a prominent Republican family and is Patrick McGlinchey’s brother.  He was 17 on Bloody Sunday.  At the time his father was interned.  It was his coal lorry which led the march, driven by an uncle.

Thomas joined the march at the start at Bishop’s Field.  The crowd was huge.  He could not see the lorry at the front.  He was towards the back.  The atmosphere was great and his impression was that people did not intend to riot.  When he got to the Grandstand Bar on William Street he heard people screaming that two men had been shot.  He was told one of those shot was Bubbles Donaghy (Damien Donaghy) who he knew well because they played football together.  He was told Damien Donaghy had been taken to a house in Colombcille Court and he went to try and find him to see if he was OK.  He had not himself heard any shooting at this point.

He turned left into Abbey Street and went into Colombcille Court.  He stood in the courtyard for 15 to 20 minutes asking people if they knew anything about Bubbles.  He then heard gunfire coming from he area to the north end of Rossville Street.  There were hundreds of people in the courtyard and the sound of gunfire caused panic.  At the time he did not know if what he heard was live rounds or rubber bullets.  People shooting “the Brits are coming in” and everyone ran into houses.

Thomas McGlinchey ran into a house in Colombcille Court.  He believes this was 14 Colombcille Court.  There were a lot of people in the house and he made his way to a ground floor bedroom window.

From the window he saw two soldiers to his right.  He marked the position of the soldiers on a map [AM0250.0007] as at the north east corner of the courtyard to the north of Glenfada Park North.  In evidence he said the first soldier was bout 100-120 yards away and to his right.  He could not describe the soldier other than to say his face was blackened and he was wearing a helmet. 

Man Shot with Arms in Air

To his left he saw a man lying on the ground apparently shot.  Another man cautiously approached the body.  He had his hands in the air and was looking at the soldier.  He was in his thirties with blond curly hair.  He had nothing in his hands.  Mr. McGlinchey then heard two shots from the soldier to his right.  He seemed to fire from his hip.  He saw the man go down.  He appeared to have been hit in the torso.  Everyone in the house became hysterical.  He was very frightened.  He then saw four or five soldiers walk forward from the area where the soldier had fired towards the north east entrance of Glenfada Park North.

Gerard McKinney

Mr. McGlinchey placed the position of the body and the man he saw shot just north of the north west alleyway leading to Glenfada Park North.  However he said he recognised the photographs of people gathered around the body of Gerard McKinney.  The photographs the Inquiry has [P0692, 694, 697, 699, 700, 690.0001] show Gerard McKinney lying on the shallow steps between Glenfada Park and Abbey Park.  However Mr. McGlinchey could not have seen this area if he was in 14 Colombcille Court.  He said he could not be certain where he was but he thought he had correctly identified the window at which he was standing.

After the soldiers disappeared he made his way onto Abbey Street and then through Abbey Park.  He saw a Knight of Malta tending to the man he had seen shot and overheard him say he was dead.  He said the first man had already been covered in a sheet by the time he got outside.

Joe Mahon

On his way to Fahan Street West Mr. McGlinchey went through the alleyway between Glenfada Park and Abbey Park.  He recalls being told Joe Mahon, a friend of his, had been shot.  He saw Joe Mahon being tended to by a Knight of Malta but could not say where this was.  He remembers Joe Mahon having difficulty breathing but does not recall any blood.  He felt numb as he walked around.  He then came across the body of Bernard McGuigan behind the south gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.  He cut through Glenfada Park North on his way home.

Meeting in Central Drive

Later at about 19:00 he went to the disused launderette at Central Drive where there was a meeting.  He waited with a large angry crowd outside.  People were collecting names of the dead.  Martin McGuinness came outside and addressed the crowd who were anxious to get weapons and retaliate.  Mr. McGuinness said the Republican Movement would take action when appropriate but that no one should take any immediate action.  He calmed the crowd.  Mr. McGlinchey knew Mr. McGuinness to be a prominent member of the Provisional Republican Movement at the time however he did not know he was in the IRA.  An Official Republican also addressed the crowd.

Gerard Elias QC

Before lunch on 3 November 2003 Gerard Elias QC made further representations regarding the ruling by Lord Saville on 30 October 2003 to the effect that Myles O’Hagan could not be questioned about membership of proscribed organisations after Bloody Sunday.  Mr.  Elias had sought to question Mr. O’Hagan as to whether or not he was a member of the Fianna when he planted bombs in Queen Street in 1973.  Lord Saville ruled the question could not be asked since Mr. O’Hagan could incriminate himself and was not covered by the Attorney General’s undertaking as regards self-incrimination.

Mr. Elias said Lord Saville’s ruling was wrong in law and unduly restrictive since the Attorney General’s undertaking had been specifically clarified as extending to any matter which the Tribunal considers to be relevant to its search for the truth about what occurred on Bloody Sunday.

Lord Saville said nothing Mr. Elias said persuaded him he was wrong in his ruling last week.

Frank Lawton

Made his own Statement on 30 January 1972 [AL0006.0027] and another to the Widgery Tribunal on 24 February 1972 [AL0006.0022] and to this Inquiry on 1 April 1999 [AL0006.00001]

On 30 January 1972 Frank Lawton was in his mother in law’s flat on the sixth floor of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.  The flat was accessed via the landing on the fifth floor.  On entering the flat a staircase led up a further floor.  The bedroom window looked out over the car park and the living room looked out onto Rossville Street.

Mr. Lawton typed his own statement on the evening of 30 January 1972.  He then took this to the Broomhill Hotel where he gave it to John Hume.  He said he believed he discussed what he had seen with Mr. Hume and his statement may have been retyped at this time. He could have been interviewed again but could not now remember. 

From the open window in the living room Mr. Lawton watched the march turn down Rossville Street from William Street.  He saw the lorry at the head of the march and heard a man on the back with a loud hailer call people to Free Derry Corner to listen to speeches.  He could also hear the noise of rioting in William Street.  He heard the sounds of CS gas canisters and rubber bullets being fired.  The people in Rossville Street were clam.  At about this time he also heard a loud bang which at the time he thought to be a nail bomb exploding.  It sounded louder than a baton gun but he could not be certain it was a nail bomb.  He placed the origin of the noise near to the Grandstand Bar on William Street.  The bang was about 5 to 10 minutes before the Paras deployed. At some point he closed the window because CS gas was drifting over.

Army Drove In

Mr. Lawton then watched as three armoured cars, including a ferret car, drove down Rossville Street.  One turned into the entrance to the Rossville Flats car park the other two parked on Rossville Street.  Paratroopers jumped out of the vehicles and ran in all directions.  Some ran onto the waste ground, others ran towards Kells Walk and Glenfada Park.  None of the soldiers appeared to be taking cover.  He thought they were snatch squads but did not actually see them attempt to arrest anyone. 

Gunfire

Within seconds he heard high velocity gunfire.  These were rifle shots and they came from behind Block 1 so he ran to the bedroom.  He could not be sure whether or not he heard rubber bullets at this time but he definitely heard high velocity gunfire.  He had been trained in the use of weapons when in the Navy.

Jackie Duddy

When he got to the bedroom window he saw the body of a young lad lying in the car park.  He discovered later this was Jackie Duddy.  He was lying face down.  There were two or three people kneeling over him, one of whom was Father Daly.  They may have turned Jackie Duddy over.  He also saw a pig in the entrance to the car park.  He did not see Michael Bridge shot but did watch as Jackie Duddy was carried towards Chamberlain Street.  His chest was covered in blood. 

Father Daly’s Gunman

Then 30 to 40 Paras emerged from the end of Chamberlain Street.  He also saw another armoured vehicle in Chamberlain Street.  He did not see any soldier firing.  However he did see what has become known as Father Daly’s gunman.  He saw a man with a pistol fire a number of shots.  His recollection was that the man fired up Chamberlain Street from the corner at the south gable end of the west side of the street.  However he conceded it was possible that the man fired west towards the armoured car in the car park.

Mr. Lawton had not previously mentioned seeing a civilian gunman in any of his statements.  However he had mentioned it when he gave an interview to PRAXIS, a television company, in 1992 [O0008.0013].  He said in evidence he was sure he had seen the gunman.  He said it must have slipped his mind when making his statements and denied there was any reason for him concealing the fact.  He was never put under any pressure by anyone to deny having seen a civilian gunman.  He said the events of the day were very shocking and confusing.  He had seen a great deal and no one had previously questioned him on this matter.  He also did not mention seeing a soldier fire in Glenfada Park in his first statements.

Rubble Barricade

Mr. Lawton returned to look out over Rossville Street as rapid rifle fire continued from the north end of Rossville Street.  He looked down and saw three young men lying on the rubble barricade.  They were all east of the centre of the barricade.  To the north he saw soldiers behind the low walls at the south end of Kells Walk and others on the pram ramp.  Three or four others were further north in Rossville Street and there were others in Colombcille Court.  He did not see any of them fire.

Alexander Nash

He then saw an older man who he later learnt to be Alexander Nash run over to the barricade.  He was waving his hands in the air.  He knelt down between the bodies and seemed to try and pull them closer to the barricade.  Intermittently he raised his hands apparently trying to get the soldiers to help or to stop shooting.  As he did this the firing continued and Mr. Lawton saw bullets strike the concrete on the barricade immediately in front of Mr. Nash.  He was under the impression the soldiers were firing at him.  He recalls 3 to 4 shots directed at Mr. Nash.  He was unarmed and posed no threat.  Later he inspected the barricade and found bullet tracks on a block of concrete.

John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash

The three bodies at the barricade were all facing north with their feet towards Free Derry Corner.  They had all been shot by the time he saw them.  There was no one else, apart from Alexander Nash, with them at the barricade.  He recognised Michael McDaid because he knew him.  He was a distant relative of his wife.  The others were later identified to him as William Nash and John Young.  None of them had anything in their hands.

Glenfada Park North

At about the same time as the firing at the rubble barricade Mr. Lawton noticed two soldiers in Glenfada Park North.  They were both Paras and both wore berets.  They were in the car park towards the south end.  Mr. Lawton said he distinctly remembered seeing the nearer of the two fire two shots in a northerly direction towards Colombcille Court.  When pressed he agreed he could have been wrong about the direction of the shots but he was certain he had seen the soldier fire.  The Para fired from the waist.  He saw the rifle recoil.

Bodies Collected

Mr. Lawton then saw an army vehicle approach the barrier, drive through and then back up close to where the men lay.  Three or four soldiers got out and lifted the bodies into the vehicle.  At about the same time Father Mulvey approached waving a white handkerchief.  The bodies were thrown unceremoniously into the vehicle.  They appeared to be dead.  Mr. Nash was waved away by the soldiers.  Father Mulvey appeared to argue with the soldiers to be allowed to administer the last rites.  The vehicle then continued down Rossville Street and stopped for a while near Joseph Place before returning up Rossville Street.

Other Firing

Mr. Lawton also referred in his statements in 1972 to firing which appeared to come from above him in the Rossville Flats.  However he is now uncertain that the fire came from the flats and believes it may have come from the walls.  These were 2 or 3 high velocity shots.  He had read reports that shots were fired from a sangar on the city walls.  He also learnt later that shots had been fired at a photographer in one of the flats above him.  He said the Italian cameraman showed him over two hundred spent cartridges he collected after Bloody Sunday.

Widgery Tribunal

Mr. Lawton gave evidence to Lord Widgery but described the outcome as disgusting.  It was a whitewash.  He felt ashamed to be an ex-British serviceman.  He felt rushed during his testimony there.

Frank McCarron

Made Statement to the Inquiry on 29 April 1999 [AM0082.0001]

Frank McCarron lived in the Creggan in 1972.  He went to the march on 30 January 1972 and had been to previous anti-internment marches.  They were frequent.  If someone was interned people would come onto the streets to try and get them released.  Whilst there was a political message to the march it was also a social event.  Mr. McCarron ran backwards and forwards along the route of the march meeting people and sometimes standing on walls to watch it.

There was nothing stewards could do to stop rioting at the army barriers blocking the march from reaching the Guildhall. Mr. McCarron watched the rioting from the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street.  When asked Mr. McCarron said he could not remember whether or not he had thrown stones that day but agreed he may have done after the Paras went in.

Someone shouted “the Brits are coming” and the crowd ran down Chamberlain Street.  When he got to the junction with Harvey Street he heard SLR gunfire.  He heard a whoosh and crack noise.  He thought the firing was to his right, i.e. west, as he ran down Chamberlain Street.  He remembered two shots specifically.  There could have been more.

He ran out of Chamberlain Street into the car park of the Rossville Flats.  There were about 50 people with him.  Some threw bottles at an army pig parked in the car park.  At this point he said some of the crowd turned to fight back with bottles and stones despite the two shots.

Jackie Duddy

Out of the corner of his eye Mr. McCarron saw someone lurch and fall forward onto his nose.  He was running as he fell.  He appeared to be running towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats.  He did not hear shooting at this time and was surprised to see the man fall.  He did not recognise him at the time but knew Jackie Duddy and someone said it was him.

Michael Bridge

The next thing he remembers is seeing Michael Bridge shouting something like “You’ve shot a wee boy, you’re big men, now shoot me.”  He was then shot.  He was gesticulating but not throwing anything when he was shot.  The shot was very loud and sounded very close.  Mr. McCarron said the soldier who shot him had either not intended to kill him or was a very bad shot.  He saw Mickey Bridge spin round on one leg and fall near the crowd around Jackie Duddy.  It was only when he saw Mickey Bridge shot that he realised how serious the situation was.

Father Daly’s Gunman

Mr. McCarron said he did not hear or see a man fire a pistol from the wall at the south end of Chamberlain Street where he was standing.  After Michael Bridge was shot the crowd he was in ran across the car park towards the playground below Block 3.  There were 30-40 of them.  As they reached the play ground a Para came around the corner at the end of Chamberlain Street and shouted for them to remain where they were.  However he went away.

He then heard further shooting as they ran south towards the low wall in front of Block 2.  He did not know whether this shooting was in the car park on in Rossville Street.  They jumped over the wall and landed on the backs of others already sheltering there.  They then headed towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. 

Patrick Doherty

When he got to the east end of Block 2 he saw a body in front of him to the south.  He did not see much blood.  The man, who he later learnt was Patrick Doherty, was lying on his front.  He helped to turn him over.  His head was towards Joseph Place and his feet towards Block 2.  He thinks he and others also tried to drag Mr. Doherty towards Joseph Place but cannot recall whether or not they actually managed to move him.  His impression was that Mr. Doherty was already dead.  He did not recall seeing Patrick Walsh who is pictured trying to crawl towards Mr. Doherty.

As they tried to pull Mr. Doherty towards Joseph Place the shooting started again.  He thought it was coming from the city walls but accepted he did not know where it was coming from.  He and others ran to the cover of the low wall running along the east side of Joseph Place and gradually crawled south along this wall.  There was steady shooting at this time.  They sat behind the wall waiting for the chance to get to St. Columb’s Wells.

Patrick Campbell

Once he got to St. Columbs Wells Mr. McCarron saw a group of people place an injured man into the back of a car.  He agreed with Barry Macdonald QC that what he saw could have been Patrick Campbell being carried into a car driven by Bernard McMonagle.  His impression was that this person was alive.

James Wray

Later he spoke to a Knight of Malta girl who had a note of those who were known to have been killed.  She had six or seven names but not that of Jackie Duddy so he told her about him.  She had noted James Wray’s name he asked if it was James Wray of Drumclifton.  She said that it was and asked if he would come and tell the family.

He went to the house with the girl and James’ brother Liam answered the door.  Liam said he had a feeling James had been injured and Mr. McCarron said it was worse than that.  Liam started to cry and his mother Sadie started screaming his name.  Mr. McCarron could not face going into the house after all that he had seen.  He went home and watched the 7 O’clock news.

He subsequently heard that people were saying the Royal Anglians had claimed to have killed three of the dead.  People said that they would pay for what they had done and they would not get a minutes peace.

Interview with Peter Taylor

Mr. McCarron said he could not remember speaking to Peter Taylor of the BBC but accepted he probably had done so.  Mr. Taylor’s notes of speaking to Conal McFeeley suggest Mr. McCarron was with him on Bloody Sunday.  Mr. McCarron said they were friends.  Mr. McFeeley said he was also with his brother Denis, Gerard Donaghy, Jim Begley, Patrick O’Hagan and Hugh O’Donnell.  Mr. McCarron accepted he knew all of them but did not recall being on the march with them

Mr. McFeeley admitted throwing stones at the army barricade but Mr. McCarron said he did not.  He also said he did not know Gerard Donaghy and others in the group were members of the Fianna.

Convictions

On 6 March 1974 Mr. McCarron was convicted of planting bombs in Park Avenue and Academy Road on 4 August 1973.  He was also convicted of possessing two more bombs on the same date.  He was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment for the explosions and 4 for the possession.  All the sentences were concurrent.  Mr. McCarron said he was not a member of the Fianna or any other Republican organisation on Bloody Sunday.

Martin McGuinness

Sinn Fein Chief Negotiator, formerly Adjutant, Derry Brigade of the Irish Republican Army (Provisional)

Made Statements to his own solicitors in May 2001 [KM0003.0001] and to this Inquiry on 19 December 2001 [KM0003.0008] and 6 October 2003 [KM0003.0081].

Martin McGuinness was 21 years old on 30 January 1972.  He was the adjutant and second in command of the Derry Brigade of the Provisional IRA.  In evidence he said he joined the Official IRA in 1970 but left to join the Provos very quickly.  He was not in command of the Provisional IRA in Derry on Bloody Sunday but he did become the officer commanding two weeks later.  He was effectively on the run at this time and had been since Internment was introduced in August 1971.

Mr. McGuinness said the IRA was not very well organised in 1972.  There were around 40 volunteers (PIRA) and the majority were aged between 20 and 23.  They gave themselves grand titles but they were nothing like a professional army in terms of numbers, training or equipment.  He estimated that they had a total of only about 25 weapons.

NICRA Approach

Mr. McGuinness said he became aware on Thursday 27 January 1972 that someone representing the Civil Rights movement had made an approach to the officer commanding the Derry Brigade (OC) requesting the IRA accept that there should be no military action on the Sunday to permit the march to be peaceful.  He said he was not aware of how the approach was made.  The next day the OC asked his opinion on the request and he expressed his view that the march would be very large and a “powerful expression of the people’s rejection of the Unionist regime and the British government’s repressive methods.”  He therefore agreed and on the Saturday morning there was a meeting at which the OC issued orders to all volunteers not to engage in military action.

No IRA Activity

Mr. McGuinness said it was not a difficult decision.  They all knew it would be a huge demonstration.  It would have been foolish to have attempted to engage the security forces with so many civilians in the Bogside.  He described the NICRA approach as “legislating for every possibility” particularly in light of the Paras’ violence towards protestors at Magilligan the week before.  He said he presumed NICRA were told of the decision and that they were in contact with Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan of the RUC.  It was therefore possible that the assurance that there was to be no IRA activity may have been passed on to him.  Mr. McGuinness said he had no personal contact with Mr. Lagan at that time.

The orders not to conduct military operations were for the duration of the march.  There was no specific order as to when they lapsed but it was understood that once the march was over the war resumed.

Mr. McGuinness said Free Derry was a liberated area.  The IRA was engaged in a war against British forces and the struggle resumed after tea.  He had himself been patrolling the Brandywell and Creggan the night before Bloody Sunday.  The war had intensified following the introduction of internment.

2 Units Patrolling Creggan and Brandywell

After the meeting with the OC on the Saturday Mr. McGuinness spoke to the command staff to ensure all the volunteers knew their orders.  He spoke to many of the volunteers himself but others were instructed via the chain of command.  Everyone accepted the orders as sensible but there was some concern that with so many on the march in the Bogside there might be a danger of the army attempting to mount an operation in the Creggan or Brandywell.  Therefore Mr. McGuinness instructed that 2 units of four men should patrol these areas in two cars during the demonstration.  These men were armed and they were the only volunteers armed that day. 

Weapons Moved

Mr. McGuinness said all other weapons were placed in a closed dump for the duration of the march.  He said the PIRA had very few weapons in 1972 and these were therefore usually in circulation with volunteers.  However on Bloody Sunday he said they were collected, save those with the two active service units on mobile patrol, and placed in a secure dump.  Only he and one other volunteer knew the location of the dump.  He said the quartermaster probably had a list of all the weapons but a list was hardly necessary there were so few.

Sunday Times Interviews

The Inquiry has a copy of the notes Peter Jacobson took when interviewing IRA witnesses for the Sunday Times in 1972 [KM0003.0051].  A “senior member of the Provisionals” is recorded as having said the “arms were not withdrawn.”   The interviewee also says that no Provo had fired until sometime between 17:30 and 18:00 when two rounds were fired from a sub-machine gun.  In evidence Mr. McGuinness described ‘symbolic’ shots fired at the city walls from outside the Bogside Inn.  He denied saying the arms were not withdrawn and said he could not remember speaking to Mr. Jacobson.  He also denied that a car full of guns was sent for during the killings as recorded in the notes. He also denied accounts that after the shooting started weapons were brought down from the Creggan [AB0024.0004 and ED0024.0009].

Mr. McGuinness also refuted allegations apparently made to the Sunday Times by Ivan Cooper.  Mr. Cooper has since disputed the account Mr. Barry recorded in 1972 [KC0012.0065]. 

Praxis

Mr. McGuinness also denied comments attributed to him in the Praxis interviews in 1992 where it is suggested the arms were “left at home” to avoid hot heads over reacting.  He said this was not why the arms were moved.  Elsewhere in the interview the interviewee says “I’m not saying there wasn’t guns in the Bogside area or in close vicinity to the march…but they were in houses, few dumps.”  Mr. McGuinness said he could not recall having done the interview and could not therefore confirm or deny what was said.  He had done thousands of interviews over the years.  As regards any discrepancies arising from interviews (assuming they accurately recorded what he had said) Mr. McGuinness said any discrepancies arose from the fact that in an interview with a journalist he was not as meticulously accurate as when giving evidence to the Inquiry.

Identifying Locations

Mr. McGuinness refused to identify the location of the arms dump into which he said the guns were placed.  He said he believed the guns were brought to him and then he and another volunteer took them to the dump.  They were the only two who knew that was where the weapons were.

He also refused to identify the location of the house at which they met on the Saturday and again on Bloody Sunday itself.  He described this as their command base.  All he would say was that it was about 200 yards from the Bogside Inn.  This was the place to which volunteers would come to seek instructions or find out what was happening.  During the first day of his evidence Mr. McGuinness was asked by Lord Saville to identify these locations but Mr. McGuinness said he was bound by a code of honour not to do so.  He said he had come to the Inquiry to provide all the information he could to assist it in establishing the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday.  He repeated his public call for anyone who had evidence to give which might assist the Tribunal to come forward.  However he said he could not betray the trust of those who had provided assistance to the Republican movement and who might for their own reasons have difficulty in being identified.  He said thirty years later many people who had helped now had jobs or families and may have a great deal to loose if they were identified.  He said he could not tell anyone what to do.  He hoped people would come forward if they had anything to say but he had not sought anyone out to persuade them to do so.  Some had approached him for his advice and he had told them of his intention to give evidence.  He encouraged them to do the same but said it was a decision for each individual.  Only they could make such a decision.  He also said that so far as he was aware the former OC was still alive.  He did not know why he had not come forward to give evidence.  The same applied to the quartermaster and the training officer.  He said very approximately 75% of the 1972 volunteers were still alive.  He denied suggestions that his brother, Willie, and Raymond McCartney had been involved in warning witnesses not to testify.

Deciding to Give Evidence

Mr. McGuinness said he made his own decision to give evidence.  He said he did not seek anyone’s authority before deciding to make a statement.  He accepted he should have responded to the four letters the Inquiry had sent to him in 1998.  He said his reasons for failing to make a statement originally were complex.  He had to consider the possible impact on the Peace Process any evidence he gave might have.  He knew he would have to admit his membership of the IRA and there were a lot of factors to consider.  However he apologised for not responding sooner.

At the end of his first day of giving evidence Lord Saville asked if Mr. McGuinness would speak to those whose properties/houses were used to see if they would consent to him releasing their addresses.  The next day Mr. McGuinness said he had spoken to those responsible for the arms dump and meeting place locations and they had asked that he did not identify their properties.  Mr. McGuinness said he fully understood their concerns and would not under any circumstances divulge the information to the Inquiry.

Sean Keenan junior has made a statement to the Inquiry saying he was the explosives officer in Derry in 1972 [AK0046.0006].  Mr. McGuinness confirmed this was the case but said others would also have had some training in explosives.  Colm Keenan was not one of these.  He was subsequently killed by the British army.

Throughout his evidence Mr. McGuinness refused to identify any former IRA members or supporters and insisted he would never do so.

Fianna

Mr. McGuinness said he was never a member of the Fianna.  He had no dealings with them.  They were a scouting organisation, the youth wing of the Republican movement.  He insisted that they had no access to weapons or explosives.  The IRA’s policy was that you could not join until you were 17, until then you were considered too young for military action.  He said there were occasions on which 15 or 16 years olds joined having lied about their age but the policy was not to allow anyone under 17 access to weapons.

Paddy Ward

Mr. McGuinness said he completely refuted Paddy Ward’s allegations that he distributed nail bombs on Bloody Sunday or that he recruited Ward from the Official Fianna.  He said he had never met Paddy Ward and had never even heard of him until he surfaced in the Press in the 1980s.  He said he did know there were Wards in the Creggan but only became aware of Paddy Ward when newspapers articles appeared alleging he was an informer.  He said Paddy Ward’s account and that of unidentified sources contained in the Kathryn Johnston/Liam Clarke book, Martin McGuinness - From Guns to Government, were a bucket full of lies.  He said the allegations came from people hostile to the Peace Process and with their own agendas.  He said that in the context of the Peace Process he did not understand why anyone should have any fear of giving evidence to the Tribunal or of contradicting his account.

False Allegations

Paddy Ward alleges the Provisional IRA had around 200 weapons including brand new M1 carbines buried in crates under Oakland Park football ground.  Mr. McGuinness said this was rubbish.  He said Liam Clarke had been led up the garden path by Mr. Ward and others.  Another witness, Frankie Boyle, says he saw IRA weapons carried away at 02:00 in 6 or 7 cars.  Mr. McGuinness said it was one or two cars and after daybreak.

He also denied breaking into Duffy’s bookmakers on High Street with the intention of planting a bomb as alleged by another anonymous source given the pseudonym ‘Des Clinton’ by Clarke and Johnston.  Mr. McGuinness said it was ludicrous that his evidence was dominated by having to rebut false allegations by British agents and anonymous sources whilst TV cameras and journalists waited outside for a sensationalist story.  He said of the numerous allegations that he had been seen with a Thompson sub machine gun that in all the times he was interviewed whilst detained at Castlereagh, not once was any such allegation put to him.

30 January 1972

As dawn broke on 30 January 1972 and the risk of any army incursion subsided for another day Mr. McGuinness went to a safe house for a few hours sleep.  He was there until about 9:00 and then went to 10:00 Mass at Long Tower church.  He then made his way home arriving just before 11:00.  He instructed the two volunteers in charge of the two mobile units to remain in the Creggan and Brandywell at all times and also arranged to meet them after the march.  He was probably at home until about14:30.  Apart from reports of army activity around William Street all was quiet.  He interpreted the activity as confirming his suspicion that the army intended to stop the march in the William Street area to prevent it reaching the Guildhall.  The newspapers had been full of similar speculation.  All volunteers other than those out on patrol were advised they could either go to the march or spend the day with their families.  He saw a number of them on the march.

Mr. McGuinness said that there were no explosives or nail bombs in the Bogside that day.  He said what nail bombs and explosives the IRA had were in dumps well away from Rossville Street.

March

At about 14:30 he made his way to Bishop’s field where the march was assembling.  He was with his friend Colm Keenan.  The crowd was very large.  People were aware they were unlikely to be allowed to reach the Guildhall but in Free Derry the atmosphere was relaxed.  He wandered through the crowd and became detached from Colm Keenan.  The crowd was huge and he did not anticipate serious trouble.  However there was bound to be a riot at the barriers if the army stopped the march.  There is a photograph which shows Mr. McGuinness in the middle of the crowd as it is coming down William Street.

When he got to the junction of Rossville Street and William Street he saw that although the main body of the march had turned down Rossville Street several hundred had proceeded up William Street towards the city centre.  He claims he then went to barrier 14 in William Street.  There was a lot of anger at being prevented from going into the city and it was obvious a riot would develop.  Since he was wanted by the army and snatch squads could be deployed into the crowd he did not remain at the barrier and returned to Chamberlain Street.  He was only at the barrier for about 5 minutes.  He did not want to be arrested and interned so made his way back towards Free Derry Corner via Chamberlain Street.

Paras Going In

Mr. McGuinness said as he moved down Chamberlain Street others ran past him shouting the British army was coming in.  He assumed there was a snatch squad operation going on behind him.  He couldn’t see any soldiers so he just continued walking down the street.  He said he was unconcerned at the time because he was unaware of anything more than a normal arrest operation in William Street.

Mr. McGuinness said he crossed the Rossville Flats car park and went between the gap between Blocks 1 and 2.  In the car park he said he saw a woman being carried, apparently injured.  He believes this was Peggy Deery who was shot in the thigh whilst in the car park close to the south west end of Chamberlain Street.  However he accepted it may not have been Peggy Deery since he says he had not at that time heard any shooting.  He also said the woman he saw was being carried towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3.  Ms Deery was taken into a house in Chamberlain Street.

Gunfire

In fact Mr. McGuinness said he did not hear gunfire until he reached Joseph Place, behind the Rossville Flats.  He said that up to this point he was not in the least worried or scared.  He said he had not seen any army vehicles in the car park.  Then he heard rifle fire which he recognised as British army SLR fire.  In his statement to this Inquiry he described hearing the first shots as he made his way towards Free Derry wall.  He said there were volleys of shots and they were coming from behind him but it was very difficult to tell the direction of gunfire because of all the echoes.  He said there was total confusion.  He did not know if the shots were aimed over people’s heads to frighten them or intended to kill people.   He did not know what the army was doing.  His eyesight was not very good and he could not see what was going on further north in Rossville Street but he did hear the noise of the Pigs driving down Rossville Street.

Timing

Mr. McGuinness says he left William Street just before the riot began and made his way south down Chamberlain Street as people ran past him.  However the Paras did not go in until the riot had been in progress for thirty minutes.  Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, and Edwin Glasgow QC, representing many of the military witnesses, both asked if he could account for the missing half hour.  Mr. McGuinness said it was very difficult to be precise about times more than thirty years later.  He may have left William Street later than he thought but he was not present in William Street when the water cannon was used.  He did not want to risk being arrested.  The fact that he did not hear gunfire until he reached Joseph Place suggests he was there when the Paras deployed.

Did Not See Anyone Shot

During the gunfire Mr. McGuinness saw people diving to the ground and running for cover, he did not understand what was happening.  The shooting was intense but he did not see anyone shot.  In fact, other than the woman he saw in the Rossville Flats car park, he did not see anyone who had been shot or injured at any stage.  He could see a crowd of people behind the rubble barricade in Rossville Street.  There were a lot of people around.

He crouched down to try and work out what was happening.  All he could think was that the gunfire was coming from the direction of William Street but he still had no idea what was going on.  The shooting lasted about 15 to 20 minutes.  There were breaks but it was intense.  It all sounded like single shots but there were a lot of them.  Mr. McGuinness said he believed a lot more than 100 shots were fired.

He then moved from Joseph Place across Rossville Street towards Lisfannon Park.  He went to the rear of Abbey Park to see if he could find out what was happening.  There he met people running from Glenfada Park.  They said the army was shooting people in Glenfada Park.  He was anxious to avoid being trapped by the army so moved around.  He never saw the soldiers and at no stage felt under fire.

Mr. McGuinness said he felt angry and could not believe what was happening.  He felt disgusted that the army had invaded the area and were shooting people but there was nothing he could do.  He said he wanted to get a rifle, to get some other volunteers and do something.  He then ran through Lisfannon Park towards Westland Street where he met another volunteer who said he had been shot at near the Rossville Flats.  They went to the safe house near the arms dump to meet other volunteers and decide what to do.  This was the place where they had met the night before.  It was where people knew to go. 

No Retaliation

There were a number of other volunteers already at the house and the OC arrived shortly after him.  Some went to check with the volunteers stationed in the Creggan and Brandywell areas to see if the army had also moved into those areas.  However these areas were reported as all quiet.  This surprised Mr. McGuinness because it meant the army had chosen specifically to attack the civil rights marchers.  At the meeting they formed the view that the army were hoping to draw the IRA into a fight.  A crucial decision was made not to respond to the army’s attack.  They were all very emotional and angry.  They still did not know exactly what had happened however they decided to leave it to the media who were present in numbers to report that the army had killed innocent marchers.  Mr. McGuinness said they knew that whoever had been killed, and at that stage they had no idea of the number of casualties, they were innocent marchers.  Their view was to allow the many journalists who were present to report what the army had done.  He did not want to take weapons into the area and potentially provide the army with an excuse to go further.  He said he was confident that no one disobeyed this decision even though people were emotional.  Other than those in the cars none of the volunteers was armed so to have fired they would have first to have come to him to get access to a weapon.

Mr. McGuinness and others then returned to Rossville Street to try and find out the extent of what had happened.  They were still unarmed.  They walked to Lisfannon Park via Elmwood Road and Westland Street.  On their way they met people who were shocked and dazed.  Gradually they learnt nearly 30 people had been shot, 13 were dead.  Mr. McGuinness described it as a massacre.  The British army murdered innocent marchers in an attempt to crush the civil rights movement and to teach the people of Free Derry a lesson.  They stood around trying to gather information. 

Symbolic Shots

Later in the day Mr. McGuinness said a volunteer did fire some “symbolic” shots at the army positions on the city walls.  These were fired from near to the Bogside Inn.  Mr. McGuinness was not present when this happened.  These were the only shots fired by the Provisional IRA.  On 31 January 1972 the Irish Independent reported a comment, attributed to the OC of the Bogside, that the PIRA had not fired first.  Mr. McGuinness said the reference to not having fired before the army should not be interpreted as implying they had fired back afterwards.

No Army Casualties

Mr. McGuinness said that had they chosen to do so IRA snipers could have shot and killed British soldiers on Bloody Sunday.  He said the accuracy of some of their marksmen was such that they could not have failed to have hit soldiers had they opened fire.  Edwin Glasgow sought to draw a distinction between incidents in which soldiers had been shot or killed whilst on patrol or riot duty to those which appertained on Bloody Sunday.  Mr. McGuinness accepted circumstances differ but insisted that had the IRA been intent on killing soldiers they would have hit someone.

Sightings of Martin McGuinness

Asked to comment on others’ accounts of his movements on Bloody Sunday Mr. McGuinness said he did not know anyone called Robert Canning and did not recall being in a portakabin used by the Defence Group of Creggan opposite St. Mary’s School.  He said Willie Breslin was mistaken in suggesting he had seen him at Free Derry Corner when the firing started and that he had not taken Mr. Breslin to a car to show him there were no weapons in it.  Mr. Breslin also says he saw Mr. McGuinness at Joseph Place 30 minutes earlier.

Mr. McGuinness said Noel McCafferty was genuinely mistaken when he said he had been fetched by some women who confronted 2 youths with guns in a stairwell close to the Bogside Inn.

Noel Breslin [AB0116.0005] claims to have seen Mr. McGuinness in High Street.  Mr. McGuinness said he was never in High Street but since you had to pass High Street when going down Chamberlain Street Mr. Breslin may have seen him there.  He did not recall seeing Noel Breslin.

Active Service Units

Mr. McGuinness said at some stage in the afternoon he did debrief the section leaders in each of the two cars on mobile patrol in the Creggan and Brandywell.  However he did not speak to Eddie Dobbins who was in one of the two cars.

Michael McDaid

Mr. McGuinness said Michael McDaid was a neighbour.  They had played football in the streets together as kids.  He was shot dead at the rubble barricade.  Mr. McGuinness described him as from a good family, very courteous and an impeccable dresser.

James Wray

Mr. McGuinness said he also knew Jim Wray.  He lived nearby and was dedicated to achieving civil rights.

Gerard Donaghy

Mr. McGuinness said he did not know Gerard Donaghy.  He was not a member of the IRA.  The Fianna did claim him as a member after Bloody Sunday but that was the youth movement, it did not signify he was in the IRA.

Mr. McGuinness described the events of Bloody Sunday as the worst day of his life.  It was devastating.  There was a meeting later that night somewhere in the Creggan.  Concerned people got together and he suggested a workers’ strike.  He did not remember much about the meeting.  He was still in a daze.

On his way back from the meeting he saw a bus carrying people to Buncrana for bingo.  He got on the bus and rebuked people.  He said on reflection he should not have done it and he had no authority to do so but people got off the bus.

Bodies Spirited Across the Border

Mr. McGuinness described the suggestion that IRA volunteers had been killed and secretly buried as ludicrous.  He said no IRA (Provo) volunteer was killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday.  Had they been he would have known about it and so too would most of Derry.  The fact that people had been killed could not have been kept quite in a small city for so many years.

Mr. McGuinness accepted people were taken across the border to be treated at Letterkenny hospital on occasions but IRA casualties were generally treated in safe houses as best they could.  The IRA had no treatment centres or medical facilities.  The civilian first aid post, such as that run by the Knights of Malta near the Bogside Inn, were entirely separate and had nothing to do with the IRA.  Mr. McGuinness accepted that there were occasions on which IRA volunteers were injured and the IRA had not publicly acknowledged the fact, however he said this was not the case on Bloody Sunday.

Mickey Doherty

Mr. McGuinness said the reason he had never previously mentioned the fact that ‘Red’ Mickey Doherty of the Official IRA had been shot on Bloody Sunday (in an engagement with the army in Barrack Street) was because no one had asked him about it.  He said whether or not someone had fired on the army elsewhere in the city after the Paras had withdrawn had nothing to do with the murders of innocent civilians in the Bogside.  In any case he had no first hand knowledge of the incident.

Other Casualties

Gerard Elias QC, representing many of the military witnesses, introduced a schedule [OS0008.0042] detailing the evidence he says demonstrates that not all the civilian casualties have been accounted for by the known 13 dead and 14 wounded.  In particular he referred to a young man aged 19-20 shot in the leg in the south west corner of Glenfada Park North.  Mr. Elias said the casualty was referred to in the evidence of Michael Quinn [AQ0011, DAY 169], Hugh Duffy [AD0156, DAY 150] and Patrick Kelly [AK0021, DAY 158].  Mr. McGuinness said he did not know the witnesses and there was no IRA member shot in Glenfada Park.

Mr. Elias also referred to apparently unidentified casualties in the following locations:

Location                      Witness

stairwell of Block 1    (Ian Harkin [AH0008, DAY 96] and Jim Norris);

St. Columb’s Wells      (Nigel Wader, Simon Winchester, Anthony Harkin, John Barry, Kieran Gill and Noel Doherty);

Meenan Square        (Soldiers AD, 004, 022 and referred to on the Porter Logs [W0130 to W0133]);

rubble barricade       (George Roberts and Michael Wallace, and photographs E0014.0012 and E0014.0016]).

Mr. McGuinness said he had no knowledge of anyone else being shot.  He said it was ridiculous, it could not have been hidden.  Mr. Elias also referred to a publication by the photographer Fulvio Grimaldi (Irlanda Un Vietnam en Europe) in which Mr. Grimaldi says the number of IRA dead will never be known.

Mr. Elias also suggested the IRA used the events of Bloody Sunday for propaganda purposes and sought to collect photographs from photographers.  He suggested the IRA gathered as best it could any incriminating photographs so that it could claim no IRA volunteers had been active or shot.  Mr. McGuinness said the only one engaged in propaganda after Bloody Sunday was the British army spreading lies about the dead and injured.  He said it was the military who had destroyed thousands of photographs and the rifles that were used on the day.  He accepted that some photographs might have been collected by IRA volunteers but so far as he was aware there was no policy to do so and in any event there was no way they could have done so.  He said there were hundreds of photographs of the casualties

Infliction

Mr. McGuinness described the allegation that he fired the first shot on Bloody Sunday as rubbish and a blatant lie.  He said he had no idea whether or not Infliction actually existed.  Infliction is an alleged MI5 source who claims he spoke to Martin McGuinness in 1984 and that he told him he had fired the first shots from a Thompson sub machine gun.  Infliction has refused to give evidence to the Inquiry.

Mr. McGuinness said the allegations by Observer B, another anonymous MI5 source who has not given evidence and is now dead, that the IRA were drilling in the Rossville Flats prior to Bloody Sunday was also a lie.  He said the Rossville Flats were observed by the army from various observation posts and were never used for drilling.

Mr. McGuinness also denied alleged conversations Willie Carlin claims to have had with him.  He said he was only shown Mr. Carlin’s statement [KC0005.0005] the day he came to give evidence and he considered it quite improper that he should be confronted with allegations from someone known to be a British agent at such a late stage.  He said it was all rubbish.  He said although Mr. Carlin was associated with the Sinn Fein in the Waterside he hardly knew him and Mr. Carlin had manufactured the alleged conversations.  These essentially contain a suggestion that Mr. McGuinness had admitted to having difficulties when firing a sub-machine gun.

Official IRA

Mr. McGuinness said he was not aware of any discussions with the Official IRA before Bloody Sunday but at some stage, possibly on the morning itself, he became aware they had agreed not to take any military action during the march.  He also became aware a day or two later that there had been an incident in Colombcille Court in which some Provisional IRA volunteers had confronted members of the Official IRA over a rifle.  He said the incident was reported to him by Sean Keenan.  He said he was not aware at that time that a member of the Official IRA had fired.  He also became aware later that an Official IRA man had fired from the end of Chamberlain Street.  He said the incident was widely reported.

Sceptical

Mr. McGuinness said he was originally sceptical about the Saville Inquiry because he did not think an English Law Lord could adjudicate where the British Army had murdered civilians.  Even when giving evidence he said he still doubted the independence of the Tribunal.  However he said he did not mean to question the integrity of the members of the Tribunal who he acknowledge had given up a sizeable part of their lives to investigating Bloody Sunday.  He said he “journeyed in hope” that the Inquiry would find that innocent people were murdered in cold blood.

Anthony Jennings QC, representing Paddy Ward, showed Mr. McGuinness a pamphlet [M0111.0162] published in 1976 called Derry Through The Lens.  It contains a number of photographs by Willie Carson including one of nail bombs in beer cans with “PIRA” written on them.  The booklet states that the cover was designed by Martin McGuinness.  Mr. Jennings showed it to Mr. McGuinness to support Paddy Ward’s contention that nail bombs were generally made in cans, something Mr. McGuinness and others deny.  In evidence Mr. McGuinness said he did not design the cover and suggested it might have been another Martin McGuinness.  Mr. McGuinness also disputed Paddy Ward’s claims that the IRA had a lot of explosives at the time.

Disclosure Order

At the close of his evidence Mr. McGuinness was asked again by Christopher Clarke QC if he would identify other IRA witnesses who could corroborate his account that none of them fired on Bloody Sunday.  Mr. McGuinness said he had explained the reasons why he would not do so.  Lord Saville then told Mr. McGuinness that the Tribunal would have to consider what steps to take in light of his refusal.

OIRA 2

Former Member of the Derry Command Staff of the of the Official IRA

Made Statements to his own solicitors in January 2002 [AOIRA0002.0001] and to this Inquiry on 3 March 2003 [AOIRA0002.0013]

In 1972 OIRA 2 was a full time official and member of the command staff of the Official IRA in Derry.  There were 6 to 7 people in the command staff including the officer commanding (OC), second in command/adjutant and quartermaster.  All command staff were full time.  OIRA 2 did not have a particular role but sometimes ran education classes and drafted press releases.  OIRA 3 was the second in command but became the OC just before 30 January 1972.  Mr. Reg Tester was the quartermaster.  There were fairly regular staff meetings but they would also meet informally.

OIRA 2 said he thought there were between 20 and 30 volunteers in the Official IRA in Derry in 1972.  This included the command staff.  They were split into two units, one in the Bogside and the other in the Creggan.  He and OIRA 1 were in the Bogside unit.  Each unit also had an OC and a quartermaster.  He said he did not know any volunteers outside Derry but accepted there may have been volunteers in Donegal under the command of the Derry OC about whom he had no knowledge.  The Army Council and Chief of Staff were in Dublin.  OIRA 2 said many of the 1972 volunteers were still alive but he said he would not name names.  He said it was well known that the Inquiry had called for people to come forward and give evidence, that was why he was trying to assist the Inquiry.  However whether or not individuals chose to come forward was a matter for them.

Defence and Retaliation

OIRA 2 said that the national strategy of the Official IRA at the time was one of “defence and retaliation.”  He explained this meant they were under orders not to initiate attacks on the army or RUC unless in retaliation for some aggressive act on the part of the security forces.  This had been the strategy since Internment.  Lord Saville asked if by this he meant the security forces using lethal weapons and OIRA 2 agreed.  Actions short of lethal force would be met with non-lethal responses such as rioting.

Fianna

OIRA 2 agreed there was an Official Fianna but said he had no dealings with them.  However there would have been a line of communication through which the OC could pass orders to the Fianna.  He was shown a heavily redacted record of an RUC Special Branch interview of an unidentified person on an unknown date [INT0001.0317].  The details have been withheld to avoid compromising the source.  That document purports to record that Gerard Donaghy was in the Official Fianna.  OIRA 2 said he never knew Gerard Donaghy.

He was shown another similar document, also undated, which apparently referred to an incident on 9 January 1972 when a quantity of army uniforms were stolen.  The document [INT0001.0333] claims that these were stolen by the Official Fianna, including Gerard Donaghy.  OIRA 2 said he had no knowledge of the incident.

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)

OIRA 2 was not a member of NICRA and although he accepted some Official IRA volunteers might also have been members of the Derry Civil Rights Association he said there was no formal relationship between the two organisations.  When asked whether or not the Official IRA had infiltrated the Civil Rights Association he said he had no knowledge of any infiltration and that the Official IRA were too busy to engage in such a course of action. 

Weapons

OIRA 2 said so far as he could remember the Official IRA only had 12 to 15 weapons in January 1972.  These included a couple of .303 rifles, a couple of carbines, a .22, some hand guns and a Thompson sub machine gun.  He said there was also a .306 rifle and there may have been a Sten gun.  He could not recall a Sterling machine gun and he only remembered one Thompson but he agreed Mr. Tester would know better.   They also had explosives but he said the Official IRA did not tend to make nail bombs.  He conceded nail bombs were thrown in Derry quite frequently but denied any personal knowledge of them.  He said he knew nothing about making nail bombs but he had seen photographs of them.  Those he had seen in pictures were in tins.

Gunner Richard Ham

OIRA 2 was asked what he knew about the circumstances of the shooting of a 20 year old gunner from the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment on 29 December 1971.  OIRA 2 said he had no knowledge of the incident in which the soldier was shot in the chest by an IRA sniper on the roof of a derelict building in Bishop’s Street.  OIRA 2 said he would have been aware of shooting incidents at the time but he could not now recall this particular incident.  In relation to the shooting he clarified that the ‘defence and retaliation’ strategy included firing on soldiers by virtue of the presence alone.  He said in their view at the time Derry was occupied by British forces and retaliation in its broadest sense included sniping on soldiers.  However he also said the killing of Gunner Ham could have been precipitated by another incident about which he now has no recollection.

OIRA 2 said he did not know who had killed Mr. Ham and did not even know if it was the Officials or the Provisionals involved.  An RUC Special Branch assessment for the period 16 December 1971 to 4 January 1972 [G0047A.0298.0001] attributes the killing to the Official IRA (IRA Goulding).  OIRA 2 accepted OIRA 1 was a sniper but said he would not comment on the suggestion that he might have killed 3 soldiers prior to Bloody Sunday.

Kidnapped Soldier

OIRA 2 said he had very little knowledge about the kidnapping of a soldier prior to Bloody Sunday.  He said he could have been out of Derry when the soldier was abducted.   The soldier, [INQ 2245], has given evidence to the Inquiry.  He said he was kidnapped on 17 January 1972 whilst visiting his girlfriend in the Creggan.  He was apparently questioned by the Official IRA and then released to the anger of some more hard line Republicans.  OIRA 2 said he was vaguely aware such an incident had taken place and that some within his organisation were unhappy about it.  He conceded some within the Republican movement might have held a perception that the Official IRA were too soft however he denied knowledge of any steps being taken to change any such perception.

Bloody Sunday

OIRA 2 said that the command staff met twice in the lead up to 30 January 1972 and at the meetings the policy of defence and retaliation was affirmed.  This was passed on in the form of orders from the OC to all volunteers.  The orders would also have been passed down to the Official Fianna.  He said Malachy McGurran, chair of the Republican Clubs, would have known the orders given by the OC for no offensive military action on Bloody Sunday.  OIRA 2 said there was no detailed discussion as to the circumstances in which it would have been appropriate to engage the army but there was a specific order that all weapons were to be moved from the Bogside up to the Creggan.  He said he had learnt after Bloody Sunday that the Provisional IRA had adopted a similar strategy of non-intervention.  He was not aware of any approach by NICRA or any assurances that may have been given to them.  He described the suggestion by ‘Witness X’ [AX0001.0002] that there was to be a joint operation by both wings of the IRA as highly unlikely. 

The view at the time was that it was possible the army might attempt a search/arrest operation in the Brandywell or Creggan whilst everyone was in the Bogside on the march.  Consequently some volunteers were on armed patrol in the Creggan and Brandywell.  However the possibility of a full-scale assault on the Bogside during a massive Civil Rights march never entered anyone’s mind.  Unarmed observers would have been sent on the march.  In light of the violence handed out to demonstrators at Magilligan the week before the Official IRA were anxious not to do anything which the army might use as justification for a similar assault on the NICRA march.  There was talk that the Paras would be in Derry because they were the ones who had attacked people at Magilligan.  However the worst that OIRA 2 had contemplated was arrests and a few beatings.  No one could have imagined what actually took place.

Arms Dumps

OIRA 2 said his understanding was that all weapons were ordered to be moved out of the Bogside and into the Creggan.  However in an interview with the Sunday Times in 1972 [S0034] Reg Tester, then quartermaster for the Officials, is recorded as having said the weapons were all to be stored in safe dumps in the Bogside.  OIRA 2 said, as quartermaster, Mr. Tester would know the location of the dumps.  He did not know the specific locations.  Mr. Tester, who has yet to give evidence, has said in his statement that the orders were for the guns to go to the Creggan [AT0006.0007]. 

OIRA 2 insisted the reason for moving the weapons had nothing to do with any fear that they might be used by mavericks who might fail to heed the orders not to initiate an engagement.  They were taken to the Creggan so that they would be secure.

Ammunition

OIRA 2 said ammunition was in very short supply at the time.  Some would be in the possession of the unit quartermasters but Mr. Tester would have controlled the majority.

Weapons in Bogside

OIRA 2 said the only weapons he was aware of that were not removed to the Creggan where 2 side arms carried for personal protection by Mr. Tester and OIRA 4.  He was also aware that there was a damaged .303 rifle that had not been accounted for.  He could not remember being specifically tasked to do so but he made efforts to retrieve it.  Weapons were in such short supply that they could not afford to lose even a rifle with a broken sight.  He said Mr. Tester probably knew the rifle was missing but may not have known exactly where it was.  OIRA 2 said he learnt of the rifle’s location from a volunteer in the Bogside.  He said he was not now sure who that person was but in any event he refused to identify him.  The volunteer had left the rifle in an insecure place in Colombcille Court.

Colombcille Court

Having discovered where it was OIRA 2 went with OIRA 1 to go and retrieve the rifle so that it could be moved to the Creggan with the other weapons, pursuant to the order.  He had been told the rifle was in a bin or coalbunker on a landing in Colombcille Court.  He did not know if the occupier of the flat was aware of its location but presumed the volunteer would have obtained permission before leaving it there.  Although it was hidden inside the bunker it could have been discovered quite easily so there was a need to move it.  He understood the rifle had been there for a few days.  He said it may have been placed there because the volunteer just wanted to rid himself of the weapon at the time.  He agreed it was unsatisfactory for the weapon to have been left in an unlocked bunker where anyone, including a child, may have found it.

Saturday 29 January 1972

OIRA 2 said he and OIRA 1 went to recover the weapon on the Saturday evening.  When they got to Colombcille Court they became aware of an incident in which the army had fired shots and possibly wounded two civilians.  They felt uneasy and had the impression there might be army patrols still in the area.  It was dark and under cover units might have been at work.  It was on the border of the ‘no go’ area.  They felt it was too dangerous to recover the weapon there and then so abandoned the idea and decided to return the next day.

30 January 1972

The command staff met again at about lunchtime on the Sunday and reaffirmed its position regarding military action and the march.  Later OIRA 2 and OIRA 1 returned to Colombcille Court to collect the weapon.  The intention was to remove it and get away.  There was never any intention to use it. 

There is some uncertainty about the precise time that OIRA 2 went to collect the weapon.  In his statement to the Inquiry OIRA 2 said they went to collect the rifle in the morning.  He said in evidence that this was incorrect.  They did not go until after the command staff meeting at lunchtime.  His recollection was that they went before the march had reached William Street.

OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 had driven to Glenfada Park and parked in the car park in Glenfada Park North when they went to collect the rifle the night before.  An enhanced still from the helicopter film taken on Bloody Sunday does just show a light coloured car parked next to the east block of Glenfada Park North [E0024.0011].  OIRA 2 agreed this could be a picture of the car they used.  It could have been a green Avenger, he cannot remember.  He now believes that they left the car in Glenfada Park over night and went back to Colombcille Court on foot.

They went to the landing in Colombcille Court and collected the rifle.  OIRA 2 said he could not now remember precisely where the weapon was.  He could not remember whether or not it was loaded but there was a magazine on it and it may have contained 2-5 rounds.  He agreed one of them would have checked to see if it was loaded before moving it.  He thought OIRA 1 did this.  They then moved to a landing on the third floor where there was some cover so that they could dismantle the rifle.  He believes they intended to remove the butt to make it easier to carry.  They were now at the north end of Colombcille Court overlooking William Street.  When asked OIRA 2 said the location at Colombcille Court was not a suitable sniping position because the only cover, wooden slats at the end of the walkway, would have been useless as protection from army return fire.  A bullet from an SLR would have gone straight through them.  He said that the reason for going to the third floor balcony may have been because they heard or were told of the army firing on the crowd in William Street.  His belief was that this was still before the main body of the march had passed down William Street.

Damien Donaghy and John Johnston

Just after they collected the rifle OIRA 2 said he heard a commotion in William Street.  He heard someone shout, “Two boys have been shot.”  He said he did not now remember whether or not he had actually heard the shots himself.  He said he must have heard them but he cannot now recall.  He and OIRA 1 looked up and saw a soldier in a sniping position on top the Presbyterian Church.  This was the only soldier they saw and since he appeared to be aiming at the crowd below them in William Street they assumed this was the soldier who had shot the two boys.  OIRA 2 said he assumed the shout was accurate even though he had not seen either of the two people who had been hit.  On this basis they thought they were entitled to retaliate.  It was a split second decision, they did not think about it in detail. 

Firing at Army Sniper

They thought the soldier they saw had just shot two people and was about to fire again.  OIRA 1 fired a single shot at the soldier who immediately disappeared out of sight.  OIRA 2 said at the time he thought OIRA 1 had hit him.

Ms. McGahey, counsel to the Inquiry, asked if they had not had enough time to collect the weapon and get away before the incident in which Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot.  OIRA 2 agreed they may have had sufficient time to dismantle the weapon and escape but they were probably distracted by what was going on around them.  He agreed they were in a vulnerable position but denied he knew there were army snipers all around.  He said that although they were on the edge of the no go area they felt secure and that the army would not come in because of the large crowd in William Street.  He denied there had been any pre-planned intention to fire.   It was just a coincidence that they were there with a rifle at that time.

OIRA 2 said that whilst they might have collected the rifle earlier he did not feel the risk of being seen or shot was increased by waiting until the march was going by.  So far as they were aware the army were concentrated at the barriers and those on observations would have been watching the march.  He only saw the one soldier and did not feel the danger was too great to do what they had to do, i.e. collect the rifle.  He denied Ms. McGahey’s suggestions that they were in grave danger had the army come in because he said no one expected the army to attempt to enter the Bogside during the march.  He felt the risk was greater the night before when they abandoned the attempt.

Drainpipe Shot

OIRA 2 agreed that there was a strong correlation between the shot OIRA 1 fired at the soldier on the roof of the Presbyterian Church and the shot which he was told hit the drainpipe on the east side of the church.

Confrontation

As they exited the stairway into Colombcille Court itself OIRA 2 saw a crowd of 30 to 50 people.  A number of local people told them to get the rifle out of the area.  OIRA 2 said someone also wanted to take the rifle off them to use it himself.  It was not a big incident.  There was a bit of pushing and shoving but nothing serious. He recognised some of the people but did not know if any of them were in the Provisional IRA.  There was no animosity.

Sean Keenan, a member of the Provisional IRA, has said in his statement to the Inquiry [AK0046.0003] that he recognised the man without the gun and knew he was a Stickie (i.e. Official IRA).  He says there was a heated exchange that did not turn into anything major.  He had been directed to Colombcille Court by a woman he met in Rossville Street who told him there were two men there with a gun.  According to him this was after the march had turned down Rossville Street and after he had gone to barrier 14.

Commenting on the evidence of Peter Mullan [DAY 152] OIRA 2 said he thought Mr. Mullan may have confused two events.  There was an altercation with a BBC camera crew in Colombcille Court and OIRA 2 said Mr. Mullan’s evidence suggested he had merged this with seeing OIRA 1 with the rifle after they left the stairwell.

Theresa Bradley

Edmund Lawson QC, representing many of the military witnesses, asked OIRA 2 if he was aware of the evidence of Ms. Theresa Bradley who says she saw a civilian gunman fire a revolver from a balcony on the west side of Kells Walk opposite the position from which OIRA 1 admits to firing.  OIRA 2 said he was unaware of her evidence.

Paras Going In

OIRA 1 and OIRA 2  returned to Glenfada Park and put the rifle in the boot of the car.  They decided not to move the car at that time and split up.  OIRA 2 ran out of Glenfada Park North as people were running down Rossville Street.  He then heard a crescendo of high velocity gunfire.  He ran past Free Derry Corner where Bernadette Devlin and others where crouching for cover on the back of the lorry.  He continued running down the Lecky Road.  He was too frightened to stop.  He did not see anyone shot, he just heard the shooting.

Although he did see people lying on the ground OIRA 2 said he did not think he saw any of those who were shot.  The people he saw were probably just taking cover.

Command Staff Meeting

Later that evening OIRA 2 and OIRA 1 reported the incident in which OIRA 1 had fired to the OC at a command staff meeting.  OIRA 2 said the OC was quite happy with what they had done and agreed it was in retaliation for the shooting by the army.  Others also reported at the meeting what shots they had fired.  One volunteer reported firing two shots from a pistol.  This was OIRA 4, also known as Father Daly’s gunman. OIRA 2 said these were the only incidents he remembered being reported.  OIRA 2 said he did not recall the incident in Barrack Street involving Mickey Doherty being reported at the meeting.  A press release was drafted.  Later that evening there was a press conference.

OIRA 2 said the OC, OIRA 3, chaired the press conference.  He said he did not recall there being any discussion or decision to deny that they had fired.  A statement reported by the Press Association said “the officer claimed that the Official IRA had at no time fired shots in the immediate vicinity of the area where the deaths occurred” [ED0012.0004].  It went on to say that to the best of his knowledge the officer said there was no shooting at all directed at the army in the William Street/Rossville Street area.  However he did admit certain military activity outside the immediate district and during an engagement with troops one volunteer received leg and neck injuries [ED0012.0005].

An article by Mary Holland [M0042.0003] records that “the IRA insists none of its marksmen fired a shot within the area where the killings took place and that such shots that were fired came after the 13 civilians were killed.”

OIRA 2 denied that he was party to any lies.  He said he and other former Official IRA members had decided to assist the Inquiry as a result of a request by some of the families.  He therefore made his statement in 2002.  He said he did not think they had been economical with the truth.  On the contrary he said it was the British establishment that head been economical with the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday.  Mr. Tester has said in his statement that the Army Council in Dublin took a decision that there were to be no admissions as to Official IRA gunfire.  That line had never changed.  OIRA 2 said he had no knowledge of that.  He said the families had approached them and they had admitted what they had done.

Earlier Accounts

OIRA 2 said he had no recollection of ever giving an interview to any journalist after Bloody Sunday but he conceded it was possible that he and others may have spoken to journalists informally in the Bogside Inn. 

Sunday Times

There are records in the Sunday Times archives in which OIRA 2 and others are mentioned.  Journalist John Barry made notes of an interview with OIRA 1 in 1972.  OIRA 1 disputes the interview.  The notes record OIRA 1 as the OC of the Bogside section.  OIRA 2 said this was wrong.  The notes also refer to the rifle having been stored in the car from the outset and pre-planned counter-sniping positions having been selected in Colombcille Court.  The notes accurately record a description of the location from which OIRA 1 fired and refer to it as a place where washing was hung.  OIRA 1 is recorded as having said they had arranged in advance for the door to the washing area to be left open by a woman in the flats.  OIRA 2 said this was all wrong and that the position from which OIRA 1 had fired was not one that would have been chosen as a sniping position because it provided no effective cover.

In another Sunday Times interview [S0034] Reg Tester is recorded as having said Official IRA members were in the vicinity when Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot and that they then rushed to get a weapon.  OIRA 2 said this was inaccurate.

OIRA 2 said he had heard tell of a story recorded by Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times and Kieran Gill of the Derry Journal that they interviewed an Official IRA volunteer who admitted to firing a pistol from the doorway of the Rossville Flats.  OIRA 2 said he was not the person they had spoken to and he did not know who it was.

Observer Galley Proofs

There are also Galley Proofs, i.e. drafts, of an article that was never actually published in the Observer in 1972 [ED0024.0009].  These report an interview apparently with the OC of the Derry Official IRA where he refers to marksmen having been stationed to cover Rossville Street/William Street and William Street/Little Diamond.  OIRA 2 said they were not that professional and although there could have been observers posted he had no knowledge of any marksmen.  However he said he would not necessarily have known every detail of operations.  He also denied the suggestion in the article that since many of the older volunteers were arrested and interned the leadership of the Official IRA was young and inexperienced.  He was 25 at the time.

Statements to Journalist Exaggerated

There is an article that refers to a 4 man Official IRA active service unit [L0171 – Sunday Press] and another [L0210 – Gerard Kemp, Daily Telegraph April 1972] refers to retrieving the gun from the car.  The later also refers to the interviewee having killed three British soldiers since August 1971.  OIRA 2 said he thought the journalists had got some basic facts accurate but had then embellished them to make a story.  However he also accepted the suggestion that Official IRA members themselves may have been anxious to say they had done more than they had in order to boost their standing.  He denied there was a feeling that they had not done enough on Bloody Sunday to protect people, he said no one could have expected them to take on a unit as well trained and equipped as the Paras.  However some may well have exaggerated their role after the event.  He did not know anyone who had done so.

He denied he or OIRA 1 carried a hand gun on the day.  He said he knew the rifle was put in the boot of the car because he was with OIRA 1 when this was done shortly before they parted.  He made his way to his mother’s house before going to the command staff meeting in the evening.

Speaking in London

There is a Metropolitan Police Special Branch document which contains a record of a speech OIRA 2 made at an anti-Internment demonstration in Kilburn on 5 February 1972 [INT0002.0067].  OIRA 2 said he did speak at the rally but could not now remember what he had said.  He is recorded as having said the Official IRA fired in an attempt to draw army fire away from the innocent and only after the army had been firing for 20 minutes.  He also referred to seeing bodies in pools of blood.  OIRA 2 said that if this was what he had said then it was poetic licence.  He was trying to convey what had happened.  He accepted he did not have any memory of seeing bodies or seeing people carried away.  He denied the shot fired by OIRA 1 was intended to draw fire.  The position from which he fired did not offer any protection from incoming fire.

Willie Carlin

OIRA 2 said he had no knowledge of the alleged disarming of two Official IRA men by Provos as described in an alleged conversation between Willie Carlin and Martin McGuinness.  Mr. McGuinness has said the conversation never took place.

OIRA 2 disputed the accounts of Eamonn Gallagher [AG0008.0002] and David Capper about the confrontation in Colombcille Court and a middle aged gunman, aged 30-40 years, firing a .38 or .45 at soldiers in William Street. 

‘Red’ Mickey Doherty

OIRA 2 said he had heard that Mickey Doherty had been injured on Bloody Sunday but had no first hand knowledge of the incident.  OIRA 5 said in his statement that the engagement involving Mickey Doherty in Barrack Street was reported at the command staff meeting.  OIRA 2 said he had no idea how he had a weapon.  However he said he would not necessarily have known if Mr. Doherty had been posted as a sniper or observer.  He said this could have been on a need to know basis.

OIRA 2 said no one was tasked to be a sniper in the Rossville Flats.  He said it would be a stupid place from which to fire because they were overlooked by the city walls.  He said to his knowledge the Rossville Flats were never used.  He said he had read various reports of gunmen firing from the Rossville Flats but he was not aware of anyone actually having done so.

OIRA 2 said he has never been aware of anyone other than OIRA 1 (Colombcille Court), OIRA 4 (Father Daly’s gunman) and Mickey Doherty having fired on Bloody Sunday.

At the end of his evidence Lord Saville said that the Inquiry was tasked with establishing the full truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday.  To that end he said the Inquiry may return to the issue of those OIRA 2 refused to name as other members of the Official IRA on 30 January 1972.

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|14 January, 2004 |