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13 - 15 OCTOBER 2003
Evidence heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Soldier Y (Gunner, 15 Battery attached to 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); Soldier 203 (Private, Head Quarters Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier AD (Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ 419 (Private, 11 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Captain 138 (Captain, Medical Officer, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Mr John Wood (Regimental Sergeant Major, Special Investigations Bureau, 178 Provost Company); General Sir Mike Jackson (Formerly Captain, Adjutant and Press Officer, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 011 (Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment) and INQ 2225 (Captain, Military Intelligence Officer, Special Military Intelligence Unit)
Summary of Evidence
Monday 13 October 2003 Soldier Y, Soldier 203, Soldier AD
Tuesday 14 October 2003 INQ 419, Captain 138, Mr. John Wood
Wednesday 15 October 2003 General Jackson, Soldier 011, INQ 2225
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry recalled two witnesses who had already given evidence. General Sir Mike Jackson was recalled following the disclosure of a number of documents in his handwriting. He gave evidence in April 2003 but made no mention of having drafted statements for all the senior officers of 1 Para on 30 January 1972. In June 2003, whilst Major Loden was giving evidence, the Ministry of Defence produced for the first time a manuscript version of the Loden Shot List. General Jackson was recalled because he wrote that document. Soldier 203 was also recalled following the discovery of his conviction for membership of the Ulster Defence Association and possession of firearms.
The Inquiry also heard from two more soldiers who fired on Bloody Sunday, Soldier Y and Soldier AD. Mr. John Wood, who supervised the initial stages of the Royal Military Police investigation, and Captain 138, the medical officer who examined Gerard Donaghy before the ‘discovery’ of nail bombs on his body, both gave evidence as did INQ 2225, a Military Intelligence Officer stationed with RUC Special Branch in Derry.
Soldier Y
Gunner, 15 Battery attached to 22 Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 30 January 1972 [B0844] and to this Inquiry on 29 April 2002 [B0864.0001]
On 30 January 1972 Soldier Y was stationed at the Brandywell army post near the old city dairy. The post was variously referred to as the Brandywell, the Dairy or the Mex Garage. Soldier Y and a sergeant were positioned next to the old dairy building itself at its east wall.
Gunfire
Soldier Y recalled hearing and seeing the marchers in the Creggan up the hill. In his statement to this Inquiry he referred to hearing 3 to 5 single shots from a rifle. He did not know where they came from. However in evidence he said he had heard other gunfire before these shots. Long after seeing the marchers he heard shooting which he was told was directed at the observation post on top of the buildings to his right.
In his RMP statement made the same evening Soldier Y referred to the base having been under sniper fire and stoning for most of the afternoon. When asked about this he said there was more shooting in the morning. However when asked why his statement said “most of the afternoon” he said there was more firing in the early afternoon. He said he was sure about this. He also claimed there was stone throwing but said he did not see it from his position.
Engagement
After the gunfire referred to in his recent statement, i.e. the last, Soldier Y’s sergeant sent him forward to try and locate the gunman. He was carrying a sniper rifle with a telescopic sight and moved to a position by a narrow building about 25 feet beyond the dairy. He scanned the area with his sight and after 5 to 10 minutes claims to have seen a man behind some bushes in a field on the hill. He said that when the man stood up he saw he had a rifle. He told his sergeant who asked if he was sure. As he looked back he claims the gunman fired a shot at him. He saw the muzzle flash and the man then fired a second shot striking the wall next to him. His sergeant said he could fire back if he was sure he could see a gunman and he fired a single round. He claims the man fell backwards and says he believed he hit him. He conceded it was “very possible” the man just ducked away. He marked his position and that of the gunman on a photograph [B0864.0009].
Soldier Y said he continued to keep the area under observation but saw no further movement. About 20 minutes later he was asked to make a statement about what had happened and just as he was about to leave he heard a burst of automatic fire. He said this sounded too fast to be a Thompson sub-machine gun. There were about 10-11 rounds. He heard one round returned.
RMP Statement
In his RMP statement Soldier Y timed his engagement with the alleged gunman at about 16:40. The statement refers to only 2 incoming shots and those are referred to as having been directed at the observation post to his south west. He then records that the location of the gunman who fired was reported to him and that is why he began observations on the bushes. He then gives a description of the gunman he claimed to have seen as: young, clean shaven, with long dark hair, wearing a blue jumper and a dark jacket. He then described the gunman firing at him twice and his returning one round. He claims to have seen the man fall backwards but does not say he hit him.
Soldier Y said he reported the shooting to his sergeant but they did not have a radio with them. The radio logs record an incident of incoming fire from Kildrum Gardens at 15:50. That says, “two shots fired, no strike seen, no fire returned. Then at 16:25 there is an entry “at 16:23 1 shot at this location, no casualties, no fire returned.” And finally at 16:30 “3 more shots at 12 location, 1 round returned, no hit claimed” [See transcript at W0106.0007]. Soldier Y agreed the last entry could be a reference to his shots.
Unauthorised Ammunition
In answer to questions from Anthony Jennings QC, representing Paddy Ward, Soldier Y said it was always possible to get extra rounds of ammunition from the practice ranges if you wanted to.
Soldier 203
Private, Head Quarters Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP in 1972 [B2110] and to this Inquiry on 21 May 2000 [B2114.0001] and 7 October 2003 [B2114.0013]
From about December 1971 Soldier 203 was the ammunitions store man for Head Quarters Company (also known as Command Company) of 1 Para. He dealt with all arms and ammunition for Guinness Force (also called Composite Platoon). Soldier 203 gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on 5 March 2003 (Day 306). However since then the Inquiry has learnt that in 1978 Soldier 203 was convicted of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. He was also a member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
Conviction
Soldier 203 was therefore recalled so that issues arising from his conviction could be explored. Although he was not screened when giving evidence in March he was screened from view from the public and families on this occasion. In his supplemental statement Soldier 203 explained that he was born in Northern Ireland and joined the British Army in 1969. He served with 1 Para until July 1972 when he requested a transfer because he wanted to serve abroad. He joined the Gloucestershire Regiment in Germany before leaving the army in 1975.
UDA Member
Soldier 203 said that he returned to Northern Ireland with his wife and children. He said he was not accepted in the local community because he was treated with suspicion as an ex-soldier. He joined the UDA, which was not proscribed at the time, and said this opened doors for him socially. He denied he had violently anti-Catholic views and claimed to be unaware at the time that the UDA was engaged in sectarian violence killing Catholics. However he was commanding a battalion of the UDA by the time of his arrest in 1977.
Shooting
In 1977 he shot a man in the leg during an altercation at a UDA Social Club. There was infighting between Protestant para-military groups and members of the local Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were causing trouble at the club. Soldier 203 was involved in expelling a UVF man and a gun went off injuring the man in the leg. Soldier 203 said the gun was not his and had been handed to him immediately before by the club doorman. The next day the RUC raided his house and found a .32mm pistol and two magazines of ammunition. This pistol was not the gun used the night before.
Soldier 203 said none of the weapons or ammunition had come either directly or indirectly from the British Army. He denied any para-military activity or association during his period in the army. However he did refer to an incident which occurred whilst he was in 1 Para. In the summer of 1971 his father-in-law, who was a UDA volunteer, asked him to supply arms and ammunition. He refused and there was a row involving his wife. He says he reported the incident to a senior NCO (non commissioned officer) who insisted he make a statement. Soldier 203 said he then had an argument with the NCO and ended up hitting him because he refused to allow him to ‘rescue’ his children before making the statement. He served 28 days detention for striking the NCO. The NCO also interviewed the father-in-law but nothing further was done. His father-in-law died shortly afterwards.
Soldier 203 insisted as a professional soldier he acted without prejudice whilst serving in the army. He said he had never obtained unlawful ammunition or arms from the army. He said it would have been possible for him to have stolen arms or ammunition but any such theft would be discovered quickly by the regular checks conducted by officers.
Para Stole Weapons
Soldier 203 said there was an incident when a Para removed weapons from Palace Barracks after being asked to do so by his girlfriend however the theft was discovered within an hour and all the weapons were retrieved.
Soldier 203 said he had provided all the relevant documents to the Widgery tribunal regarding weapons and ammunition used on Bloody Sunday. He denied providing or being asked to provide extra rounds.
When questioned by Barry MacDonald QC, on behalf of some of the families, Soldier 203 denied the UDA was a terrorist organisation when he joined. Lord Saville intervened to say questions as to Soldier 203’s activities or attitudes in 1977 would not assist in determining the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday. He permitted Soldier 203 to be questioned as to his behaviour and or prejudices in 1972 but since Soldier 203 denied any wrong doing in relation to Bloody Sunday itself he was not persuaded any further questioning served any useful purpose. Soldier 203 denied having any sympathy with the UDA in 1972. He claimed his later involvement at a senior level was motivated to stop tit for tat sectarian violence and organise the UDA into a political outfit like Sinn Fein.
Mr. Macdonald specifically sought leave to question Soldier 203 about Observer B, a para-military and Security Service (MI5) source in Derry in 1972, who was later a commander in the UDA. However Lord Saville said that was a classic example of a satellite issue they could not go into.
Michael Mansfield QC said he would not question Soldier 203 further given the limitation the tribunal had imposed on questions relating solely to issues arising from his conviction. However for the record he pointed out that this witness’ evidence regarding the distribution of arms on Bloody Sunday was at variance with that given by INQ 449 and that was a matter he would be referring to in due course.
Soldier AD
Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 30 January 1972 [B0933] and 1 February 1972 [B0938], to the Widgery tribunal [B0942] and to this Inquiry on 19 March 2000 [B0943.0001] and 18 September 2003 [B0943.0010].
Soldier AD was a private and a sniper in the Royal Anglian Regiment. His platoon commander was Colour sergeant INQ 1720. On 30 January 1972 he was stationed in the first floor of a derelict building at 21 Long Tower Street over looking the Bogside. He was with INQ 653 and Soldier 022 at some point. They were observing with him in rotation. However INQ 653 has told the Inquiry he was never deployed in Derry. Soldier 044 was upstairs in the attic. In his statement to this Inquiry Soldier AD said INQ 653 had a radio but he now says he cannot remember a radio. Soldier AD had an SLR without a telescopic sight.
The rest of 5 platoon were manning barrier 18 below in Long Tower Street and Soldier AC was with Soldier 11 in a house on the opposite side of the road. Soldier AD did not recall any of his platoon being based on the city walls. Soldier AD marked his position on a photograph [B0943.0013].
Soldier AD said he was told at the briefing that 1 Para would be in Derry on Bloody Sunday but he did not know when they deployed. He heard the march and saw it. He believed there was a stand off with the army because he could hear rubber bullets and CS gas being fired. He also heard SLR gunfire. He said he did not know when or in what sequence he heard the SLR fire. He also said he heard non-army gunfire but he did not hear a Thompson sub-machine gun.
Soldier AD said he saw the crowd move down Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner and milling around the Bogside Inn. He said this was about the time he heard the SLR fire but denied he saw people taking cover.
Gunman
Soldier AD then says he saw a gunman appear from below an archway behind the Bogside Inn. He placed the gunman first on a low flat roof behind the Inn but when it was pointed out this was a roof and not ground level he said the gunman was in a covered alley leading to Meenan Square. He was about 250 metres away. There was a crowd of around 40 people in the area but they moved away from the gunman. They were not associated with him.
In 1972 he described the gunman as of medium build, 5 feet 10 inches tall, in his early 20s and wearing a dark windcheater or anorak. The man moved from the covered archway to lean on a wall and take up a standing firing position. He then saw a puff of smoke and heard the crack or thump of a rifle. He thought the gunman was firing towards the troops at the Double Bastion on the city walls.
Soldier AD Firing
Soldier AD fired two rounds at the gunman. The first went over his head but he claims to have hit the man in the chest with his second shot. He said it was not possible that he could have missed. He claimed some of the crowd then dragged the man’s body into Meenan Square. In 1972 he had said he did not see what happened to the weapon but in his statement to this Inquiry he said he saw one of the crowd pick up the rifle. At first when shown his 1972 accounts Soldier AD agreed he probably did not see what happened to the rifle but later he said he did see it picked up just not what happened to it thereafter. He had not said this in his RMP statement or his Widgery statement.
Manuscript Statement
In 1972 he did mention seeing a grey Ford escort approach Meenan Square shortly after the shooting. However this was not mentioned in a manuscript RMP statement attributed to him and dated 1 February 1972. Otherwise that statement is very similar to his first statement dated 30 January 1972. Soldier AD insisted the 1 February statement was not his and he had never seen it before. It bears a signature that appears to be his name but Soldier AD said he did not think it was his signature.
Soldier AD claims to have reported both the gunfire and his claim to have hit the gunman immediately to INQ 653 or Soldier 022. He also says the platoon commander, INQ 1720, came up to see what had happened and he reported directly to him.
Radio Logs
There is an entry in the Brigade Log [W0053] timed at 18:20 which refers to Shot Reps (reports) timed between 16:15 and 16:40. Item 1 refers to “gunman at grid reference 43051657 fired x 2 at Roaring Meg. Call Sign 21 in Long Tower Street fired 2 x 7.62 back. Gunman fell and was dragged to Meenan Square.” However Soldier AD said he did not recall being shown a map to mark the gunman’s position until he gave his RMP statement which was not until 20:55.
There are other references in the logs to earlier incidents of gunfire but they refer to 4 incoming shots and return of fire from the city walls. The timing Soldier 203 gave in his RMP statement and his statement for the Widgery tribunal was “about 16:45.” This accords with messages in the 1 Royal Anglian Regiment log [W0106.0007] at 16:41 and at the same time on the Porter tapes [W0137]. Both these records refer to 5 platoon and to 1 incoming and two outgoing shots. Soldier AD said he only heard one shot and agreed these entries could be referring to his engagement. They report no casualties on either side.
There is also a reference at 16:59 to a doctor in a grey car (station wagon rather than Escort) going to Lecky Road to treat an injured man. This would accord with Soldier AD’s recollection of a grey vehicle arriving shortly after the shooting.
Changing Times
However in his most recent statement Soldier AD questioned his 16:45 timing. Having been shown the earlier radio logs referring to 4 incoming shots at around 16:17 to 16:21 for the first time Soldier AD said he thought the time estimate of 16:45 was wrong. These timings are significant because the deaths and injuries in the Bogside at the hands of the Paras occurred between 16:10 and 16:35.
Soldier AD now says he does not know where the 16:45 time came from and he said assumed it came from the RMP. He also mentioned for the first time in his 2003 statement that he was not wearing a watch because it might have reflected light and given away his position. However there is no evidence to suggest why the RMP might have suggested 16:45 because they could not have got it from the logs. They give a time of 16:41. All the other messages refer to more than one incoming shot. Soldier AD expressed no reservations about the time of 16:45 when he made his first statement for the Inquiry in 2000.
Soldier AD insisted he hit the man he fired at.
INQ 419
Private, 11 Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made statement to the Inquiry [C0419]
On 30 January 1972 he was on patrol from the Mex Garage/Brandywell army post. The notes of the officer commanding C Company [G0095B.0580.0004] suggest 11 Platoon were tasked to man a road block in Ferguson Street and the junction with Foyle Road. However INQ 419 said he did not recall being at a barrier and believed he was actually on foot patrol.
Patrick Campbell
INQ 419 recalled stopping a car containing an injured man. His recollection was that the car was driven by a woman and the injured man was a teenager or in any event under 30. He could not specifically recall it but INQ 419 said he thought they would have radioed in a report about stopping the vehicle. However the only car containing a woman and an injured man stopped by C Company of the Royal Anglians on 30 January 1972 was the car containing Patrick Campbell. Mr. Campbell was 52 on Bloody Sunday. He was shot in the buttocks and there was a woman in the car with him, although she was not driving.
There is an entry at 16:37 in the Royal Anglians radio log [W0106.0007] which refers to an injured man having been sent to the post at the Craigavon Bridge. INQ 419 agreed that could be a reference to the incident he was involved in.
Captain 138
Captain, Medical Officer, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1844], to the Widgery Tribunal on 8 March 1972 [B1847] and to this Inquiry on 15 June 2000 [B1859.0001]
In January 1972 Captain 138 was the medical officer for the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment. He was a locum and had only been in post for two and a half months. On 30 January 1972 he was stationed at the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) at the Craigavon Bridge. He could not remember the precise location of the building.
Gerard Donaghy
At some point Captain 138 was asked to go out of the portakabin because casualties were coming in. As he came out he saw a white Ford Cortina with a red stripe directly outside. He saw there was a body lying on the back seat. The head was behind the driver’s seat.
Position of Body
Captain 138 said he did not believe the body was in the position pictured in photographs available to the Inquiry when he first saw it. He said this because at no time did he establish the cause of death or even find a wound. However in the photographs which depict Gerard Donaghy’s body on the back seat of the car he is lying on his back and a large blood stain is clearly visible on the left side of his shirt. Captain 138 said when he saw the body it was lying on its left side turned in towards the back seat so that the blood was not visible.
First Examination
Captain 138 said he did an initial examination to check whether or not the man was alive. He went to the offside passenger door and leant in. He felt for a pulse on the right wrist and neck. It would have taken at least 30 seconds to check for a pulse. He also shone a light in the eyes to see if the pupils dilated and checked for any signs of breathing. After an examination lasting a few minutes, perhaps 3 or 4, he concluded the man was dead. At that stage he had been told there were other injured people in two other cars so he left the body and went to see to the other casualties.
Joe Friel and Patrick Campbell
Captain 138 remembered tending to two more injured men. One was young and not too badly injured (Joe Friel) and the other was older and was in a more serious condition (Patrick Campbell). Captain 138 described Mr. Campbell as in shock and having lost a lot of blood. He did a fairly rapid examination of each man and arranged for them to be sent straight to hospital. He then asked if any more casualties were arriving and, when told there were none, he returned to re-examine the body of Gerard Donaghy. He wanted to see if he could establish the cause of death.
Second Examination
Captain 138 returned to the first vehicle. The rear door was still open and he knelt on the running board with his right foot on the floor of the car. The body was still lying on its left side and he did not move it. He did lift the man’s shirt and examine the right side and chest but found no wound. He then felt the legs and undid the man’s trousers to see if there was any wound to the groin. He still failed to find any wound. He pulled the trousers back together and pulled the shirt back down. The body was not yet cold. Captain 138 said he was fairly certain he had not moved the body at all.
Nail Bombs
Once he stepped back out of the car it was moved about 30 feet away towards the river. In evidence to the Inquiry Captain 138 said he did not see any bombs and could not recall if or when he was told there were bombs on the body. He agreed that had he been told there were nail bombs on the body he would have stopped, or never begun his second examination.
Captain 138 said he thought he was away from the Cortina less than 10 minutes and the total time for all 4 examinations (2 on Gerard Donaghy) was probably less than 14-22 minutes.
RMP statement
Captain 138 said he had a vague recollection of making a statement to the RMP. In that statement he said he was at the Regimental Aid Post at about 16:30 when 3 cars were driven in, each containing an injured or dead person. The first car a white Cortina contained a dead youth aged 15-16. There was no obvious cause of death on a very quick examination. He then decided to tend to the injured men. After they were transferred to hospital he returned to the dead body to try and establish a cause of death. The statement continues, “It was then that I heard that there was some kind of explosive device on the body, so I decided not to move the body” until the ATO (army technical officer) cleared it and the car. After the ATO cleared the body it was transferred direct to the morgue.
Commenting on this statement Captain 138 said he still believed he did conduct a second examination of the body. An Incident Report dated 4 February 1972 which purports to be an extract from the Medical officer’s notes [C1347.0020] records, “youth about 16 dead on examination. Exact location of wound not visible from front. Medical officer did not turn over body because of nail bomb in pocket.” Captain 138 said he knew he did not move the body.
Times
There are a number of documents which assist in timing the arrival of the bodies at the bridge and what happened thereafter. Another Royal Anglian incident report [C1347.0018] records that the two cars containing Gerard Donaghy and Joe Friel were stopped at barrier 20 and then driven to the bridge at 16:36. Another entry in the same document refers to Patrick Campbell being detained at barrier 24 at 16:30 and being put into an ambulance at the bridge at about 16:45. These entries suggest the bodies must all have arrived at the bridge at about 16:40.
Then at 16:50 there is a reference in the Brigade Log [W0049] to “one dead person returned to this location, has nail bomb in pocket. Felix requested.” This entry is timed at 16:50, i.e. only about 10 minutes after the bodies arrived. Captain 138 said it was possible he completed all his examinations within 10 minutes.
The ATO was dispatched to the bridge at 17:05. He says he removed 4 nail bombs from the body. Captain 138 said he did not recall seeing the ATO or ever learning that he was there.
In his Widgery statement Captain 138 referred to the photographs as depicting the position of the body as he saw it. He refers to doing a second examination and moving the clothing but he did not see any nail bombs. He goes on to say he did not recall any bulky items but he could not say he would not have noticed a nail bomb had it been there. He went on to say he was only told about the nail bombs about 5 minutes after his second examination.
Captain 138 said he could not explain the discrepancy between his account to the RMP, that he did not move the body because of the presence of a nail bomb, and what he told those who took his statement for the Widgery tribunal.
Captain 138 was asked by Lord Widgery whether he thought he would have seen the nail bombs having regard to the nature of his examination. He replied “No.”
The notes of the forensic examination of Gerard Donaghy’s clothing [D0358] reveal a sketch of the jacket he was wearing. It had two breast pockets and two side pockets at the waist. Soldier 127, the ATO, claims to have found two nail bombs in the lower jacket pockets and actually had to cut them out. However the bullet which killed Gerard Donaghy went through one of these pockets. This is known because there is a bullet hole in the pocket. The bombs weighed 2Ľ pounds and 1˝ pounds. Two more were allegedly found in the trouser pockets.
Captain 138 said at no stage did he see any object on the body. In his recent statement to the Inquiry he said he thought it highly unlikely the nail bomb pictured in photograph E0005.0026, clearly visible in the right trouser pocket, was there when he did his examination. He said he would have noticed at least one of the bombs. He also said in the statement “It would have been extraordinary if I had not seen the nail bombs.”
Mr John Wood
Regimental Sergeant Major, Special Investigations Bureau, 178 Provost Company
Made Statements to this Inquiry on 15 May 2000 [CW0001.0010], 2 August 2000 [CW0001.0045] and 12 March 2003 [CW0001.0055]
John Wood was the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) of 178 Provost Company which was a Royal Military Police unit consisting of about 60 men. It was made up of senior non commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior NCOs. The NCOs were RMP officers and the senior NCOs, sergeants and above, were SIB investigators (the equivalent to CID in the civilian police). A soldier had to serve in the RMP for 18 months and achieve the rank of sergeant before they could join the SIB.
30 January 1972
The officer commanding the company was Captain INQ 1870. On 30 January 1972 Mr. Wood was escorting INQ 1870 to Derry to observe the march and riot. They were in plain clothes and driving an unmarked car. They had a PYE Westminster radio tuned to the Ulster Net (8 Brigade) but could also tune it to Head Quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI) or 39 Brigade (Belfast).
Barrier
Mr. Wood and INQ 1870 were behind a barrier and watched the Paras go in. Mr. Wood said he had heard a gunshot before the Paras went in but said it had no discernable affect on them. His recollection was of being at barrier 13 and seeing pigs followed by Paras on foot. There were about 50 rioters at the barrier before the Paras went in. There was some confusion in moving the barrier. He and INQ 1870 went in a little distance behind the Paras to observe what was happening. INQ 1870 was new and Mr. Wood was educating him about the situation. However he realised they were in civilian clothes and there was firing going on so they retreated. He said they did not get as far as Rossville Street. He thinks they only got to the end of Sackville Street. He said he saw the Paras who had debussed from the vehicles taking cover at walls before the shooting began.
The Assistant Provost Marshall (APM), Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383, was also in Derry and he says he was standing near the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. Mr. Wood said at the time he was not aware INQ 1383 was in Derry. INQ 1383 claims to have seen a gunman in Kells Walk. Mr. Wood said INQ 1383 had not told him this.
Embassy Ballroom
Having retreated Mr. Wood noticed an escort vehicle outside the Embassy Ballroom and decided to go there because there were probably senior officers there who would have access to communications and know what was going on. Once they got to the roof there was a surge of gunfire. It was all high velocity and he assumed it was military. General Ford was on the roof.
Mr. Wood said he did not recall seeing soldiers firing but he did see military vehicles and civilians carrying bodies. He did not recall seeing ambulances. Mr. Wood said he knew immediately that they had work to do. Aside from the casualties he had seen himself there were radio reports. A staff officer he knew briefed him there were 5-6 dead. His immediate job was to establish where the Paras were going to retreat to so that they could start taking statements. He was clear at the time that the casualties had been shot by Paras, he deduced this from having seen them go in. He knew he had to get a team of SIB investigators from his HQ Lisburn. He contacted his Statement Reader, another member of 178 Company, and asked him to send as many men as possible. Eventually SIB staff were drafted in from England but this was after Mr. Wood himself went to England on 31 January 1972.
Morgue
Mr. Wood said he then took INQ 1870 to the RMP HQ at Bligh’s Lane before going to Altnagelvin to visit the morgue. Mr. Wood claims he did not see the bodies at the morgue but INQ 1383, the APM, says they spoke at the morgue and that the bodies were there. Mr. Wood said he could not recall this.
Gerard Donaghy
On his return from Altnagelvin Mr. Wood said he heard a message over the radio about a body detained with nail bombs. His recollection was of nail bombs but the message sent to Brigade from the Royal Anglians at Craigavon Bridge referred to only one. This was sent at 16:50. He went to the car park at the Craigavon Bridge and saw a Cortina. There were 10 to 15 people around including Royal Anglians and RUC officers. He said he did not think the car doors were open at the time. He arrived at about the same time as the army technical officer (ATO), Soldier 127. He said he supervised whilst the ATO did his checks.
The ATO’s evidence to Lord Widgery was that an SIB warrant officer told him there was a body with a nail bomb in a pocket. Mr. Wood accepted he had spoken to the ATO on his arrival. However he said he did not recall speaking to Sergeant Carson of the RUC. Mr. Wood said that when he went to the vehicle there was a nail bomb clearly visible sticking out of a pocket. He said he did not know if the car or body had been searched prior to his arrival. The ATO arrived before he could do much himself. He said he was not told the body had already been searched for identification. He said he was not aware of the medical officer, Captain 138, being present or of the ATO moving the car to the other side of the bridge.
In his statement Mr. Wood referred to the body sitting up behind the driver’s seat. However it was lying on the back seat until the ATO moved it. Mr. Wood said he could not recall ever seeing the body lying on the back seat as is shown in the photographs available to the Inquiry. Mr. Wood claims to have seen two nail bombs in the breast pockets of Gerard Donaghy’s jacket. He described it as “battledress” but it was a denim jacket. No nail bombs were ever in the breast pockets. Soldier 127, the ATO, claims to have cut two nail bombs out of the two side pockets of the jacket and to have found two more in the trouser pockets. Mr. Wood claims to have patted down the body and himself discovered bulges in the trouser pockets. Again his recollection is unclear since he says he did not enter the car until the ATO had made it safe but on everyone else’s evidence it was the nail bomb in the right trouser pocket which was visible from the outset and this was what had first alerted anyone to the presence of explosives. Mr. Wood said he did recollect the ATO cutting the nail bombs from the jacket but his recollection was of them being in the top pockets. There was in fact a bullet hole in the left jacket pocket which purportedly contained a nail bomb.
Mr. Wood said the ATO handed the nail bombs to him and he took Polaroid photographs of them on the bonnet of the car. He also said he took Polaroid photographs of the body sitting up. He said he handed the Polaroids to the ATO and never saw them again. None of these photographs are available to the Inquiry. He then left to go and pick up INQ 1870. The body was still in the car when he left. Mr. Wood said he did not think anyone “would go to the trouble of planting bombs on a body” but said theories of planting ammunition would be more credible.
RMP Investigation
On 14 July 1971 Mr. Wood drafted a protocol for RMP investigations [CW0001.0046]. This became the standard operating procedure for RMP/SIB investigations. It governed the conduct of all investigations into Internal Security Incidents, i.e. occasions on which soldiers fired. The investigation was triggered by a contact report of a soldier firing. It was mandatory for a soldier to make a contact report immediately after firing. This was basic training.
Removing Names
Statements were taken in the soldier’s own name and recording names of other soldiers. These statements were retained by the Assistant Provost Marshall in a red book. Copies of the statements with names removed, known as expurgated statements (at the Inquiry referred to as redacted), were made for general use. These were kept in a blue book and would be the versions handed to the RUC where necessary. No SIB officer or RMP statement taker (RMP Corporals) was allocated to any particular soldier, the process worked on a cab rank principal, the next available statement taker (i.e. SIB or RMP) dealt with the next witness.
Drumahoe
Mr. Wood and INQ 1870 went to the barracks where the Paras were stationed. They knew there were about 12 dead. They wanted to speak to anyone who fired, anyone who had been fired upon and anyone who had witnessed gunfire. Investigators and statement takers arrived from Lisburn and they set themselves up in a large hall in the barracks. Mr. Wood briefed the investigators as to the information required in the statements. He also briefed the soldiers to let them know what they were doing. Each interviewer was allocated a room and given a map. Most of the investigators knew as little about Derry as the Paras so they could not have taken statements without a map. They also had Polaroids of the deceased. Mr. Wood had already delegated a man to go to the mortuary and take photographs of the bodies before they were undressed by the pathologist. He did not think they had the radio logs when taking the statements but he had been briefed by Brigade as to the sequence of events.
Mr. Wood said he spoke to a Parachute Regiment officer who was present. It was not the officer commanding Support Company and may have been the Adjutant, Captain Jackson (now General).
Mr. Wood said they would not have asked soldiers to provide grid references for locations. They would be asked to read and sign the statement once it was completed. They would not be given a copy although the commanding officer, Colonel Wilford, might be sent a redacted copy if there was some concern about what was said. Mr. Wood said he knew nothing of INQ 1870 plotting positions of firers on a map as described by Corporal Brobson, one of the RMP statement takers [C1868.0003]. Mr. Wood said it was not really procedure to produce a shot plot at such an early stage. Mr. Wood said he never saw the Loden List of purported engagements [B2283.0020].
They did not have much in the way of initial contact reports to expand on. They were told there was a gun battle in which the Paras returned fire and people were killed. He and INQ 1870 made requests of a senior Para officers on the spot for details of who had fired.
During the evening of 30 January 1972 and the morning of 31 January 1972 Mr. Wood took statements from the following soldiers: AC (at 20:25), AD (20:55), Z (21:30), AA (22:10), Q (00:30), A (01:00), B (01:10), 017 (01:30) and T (02:00). The first four are not Paras. There were a total of 18 statement takers. No one else was present at the interviews, only interviewer and interviewee. Mr. Wood said he knew the soldiers in Support Company well. He was also based in Belfast and had a good relationship with the Paras. They often provided him with a bodyguard. Mr. Wood went to London on 31 January 1972 and was replaced by INQ 1835 who was the training officer for 178 Provost Company.
Lots of Excess Ammunition
In his statement Mr. Wood claimed that he believed it was a waste of time to have taken statements from the quartermaster because there was so much spare ammunition in Ireland. He said the philosophy in Ireland seemed to be completely different to that in England where a soldier would be court martialled for having a single extra round. He said the SIB team “covered the issue” of spare ammunition but he could not recall the outcome.
Improper Suggestions
Mr. Wood was shown Soldier 018’s statement to the Inquiry [B1491.0005]. Soldier 018 said he was told the RMP needed him to confirm the location of a gunman in the Rossville Flats to corroborate the accounts of Soldiers F and G. He said he was led to believe the information concerning the alleged gunman was true and he therefore signed an RMP statement in which he said he had seen the window they had fired at. In fact he was sitting in a pig looking in the opposite direction. INQ 5 also says he included details which were untrue at the suggestion of the RMP. Mr. Wood said this was improper but claimed he could not see the requirement for it. He said they were not there to orchestrate the evidence. He said it was too soon for script writing. He said he did not think there was any but in any event it would not have been done at this stage.
No Cover Up
Mr. Wood admitted it was usual for soldiers to be evasive when interviewed by the SIB but he told them he would not countenance a cover-up. He said there would be penalties for any soldier who lied. However he was unable to explain why Soldier H, who Lord Widgery found to have lied about firing 19 rounds into a window in Glenfada Park, was never disciplined or even spoken to about the dishonest account he had given. Mr. Wood said that was beyond his remit but he understood consequences would follow if soldiers did not tell the truth. He denied he had personally sanitised Soldier T’s account of being struck by acid by removing the word ‘battery’ from his statement. Mr. Wood said Soldier T could not have known the acid had come from a battery and he therefore left it out. He denied this was an example of the RMP making a statement more credible by altering a witness’s account.
He said the SIB investigation could not be said to be exhaustive. They simply amplified the initial contact reports. Their brief was to inform higher military command of what happened and to answer immediately allegations raised by civilians. It was not a normal SIB investigation. They took short proforma statements. If a soldier said they saw a rifle in a man’s hand they would include the description of what it was they saw. They would only describe it as specifically a rifle if the soldier saw it being aimed or fired. Mr. Wood had attended a number of courses at the Metropolitan Police. The soldiers were not cautioned and the Judges Rules on interviewing suspects were not applied. The soldiers were under orders to give statements. This was part of the protocol not a rule especially for Bloody Sunday.
Mr. Wood said they had limited resources and time. They were not producing statements for criminal proceedings or a public inquiry. He could not explain why at least three crucial witnesses, Soldiers 018, 036 and 147 (all members of anti tank platoon) were not interviewed until 4 February 1972.
General Sir Mike Jackson
Formerly Captain, Adjutant and Press Officer, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the Inquiry on 20 March 2000 [CJ0001.0001] and 9 September 2003 [CJ0001.0061] in the meantime he gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on 7 April 2003 [DAY 318]
General Jackson is now the Chief of the General Staff, i.e. head of the British Army. In 1972 he was a captain and the Adjutant to the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment. He became Adjutant for 1 Para in Spring 1971 shortly before Colonel Wilford became the commanding officer. He was also the battalion press officer and acted as Operations Officer.
The Jackson Manuscripts
General Jackson gave evidence to the Inquiry on 7 April 2003 [DAY 318] (BIRW Weekly Report 88). Since he gave evidence a large number of manuscript documents in his handwriting have emerged. On 11 June 2003 Major Loden was giving evidence about what has become known as the Loden Shot List [B2214]. The typed document titled ‘List of Engagements’ purports to record 15 incidents of soldiers firing on gunmen and nail bombers on Bloody Sunday. On the second day of his evidence Christopher Clarke QC and Lord Saville were questioning Major Loden about discrepancies between the List and the accounts given by the soldiers who had fired [DAY 343] (BIRW Weekly Report 94). The next morning Christopher Clarke QC announced that overnight a hitherto unseen copy of the List had been provided to the Inquiry by Mr. Jeremy Williams of the Ministry of Defence. That was a handwritten version of the List and Edwin Glasgow QC, who acts for both Major Loden and General Jackson, confirmed the document was written by General Jackson [DAY 344, page 15]. A series of other documents have also now emerged including manuscript statements of: Colonel Wilford; Major Loden; INQ 10 (the officer commanding A company); Major 221A (oc C Company) and the battalion intelligence officer (INQ 7). All the documents (hereafter the Jackson Manuscripts), excluding 4 pages of Colonel Wilford’s statement, are in General Jackson’s hand.
Recall
After lunch on Thursday 25 September 2003 Lord Saville announced that the Inquiry had now received a further statement from General Jackson dealing with the new documents and it had been decided to recall General Jackson. Lord Saville said the tribunal had also that day received representations from Michael Mansfield QC’s instructing solicitors addressing reasons why General Jackson should be recalled. Lord Saville described the document as useful but said the decision to recall the witness had been made before he had seen it.
Corporal Dismissed for Disclosing Papers
Before General Jackson gave evidence on 15 October 2003 Christopher Clarke QC gave a more detailed explanation of the circumstances in which it is said the new documents came to light. On 3 August 1998 a young Corporal at 8 Brigade Head Quarters in Derry wrote to his brother as part of a debate they were having about Bloody Sunday. The debate had arisen as a result of the announcement of the Saville Inquiry (January 1998). The Corporal enclosed with his letter copies of the Jackson Manuscripts and the Widgery Report. Mr. Clarke said that an officer discovered a copy of the Corporal’s letter on a photocopier and the letter and contents were intercepted in the post before they reached the brother.
The Corporal was then Court Martialled, reduced in rank and dismissed from the army with disgrace. Mr. Clarke said the Inquiry had read the transcript of the Court Martial proceedings. The Corporal had found the documents in an unsecured filling cabinet the year before when conducting a clearout.
Lord Saville added that Mr. Clarke’s account of the circumstances in which the documents had come to light was “wholly accurate” and that there was no point in distributing the documents relating to the Corporal and his Court Martial.
Supplemental Statement
General Jackson’s second statement to the Inquiry is dated 9 September 2003. In it he acknowledges authorship of the manuscripts. He said he had no recollection of having written the documents when he had given evidence in April 2003. He said that now he had seen them he did vaguely recall writing them but not the precise circumstances in which they were written. He said he believed they were written at Drumahoe Barracks in the early hours of 31 January 1972. He said he did not get any sleep that night.
General Jackson said he could not say why he wrote the statements but surmised they were produced on instruction from higher authority from Head Quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI) or even London. There is a letter dated 31 January 1972 from the 8 Brigade Major, Lieutenant Colonel Steele, forwarding the documents to HQNI. Answering questions from Christopher Clarke QC General Jackson said the order would have either come from Brigadier McLellan to Colonel Wilford or directly to him via the Brigade Major (or another officer acting on instruction from the Brigadier). He said he imagined he was told to obtain statements from the commanders and the information required.
General Jackson said all the statements are in the same format and he was therefore covering specific topics pursuant to orders from 8 Brigade. Answering questions from Michael Mansfield QC he said the documents were part of the “operational reporting process” and entirely separate from the investigative process conducted by the RMP. His task was to report what had happened up the chain of command. This was his explanation as to why the List and other documents failed to mention the names of the soldiers who had fired or even how many rounds had been fired. None of these officers was re-interviewed by the RMP. General Jackson insisted the names of the soldiers and even the amount of ammunition expended would have been of no interest to higher command. He accepted he had access to the battalion radio log when making the statements. He agreed the formal structure of the statements suggested they were not taken down verbatim and that the corrections to the manuscripts suggested they were a “joint effort” with the officers concerned. He denied ever speaking to the platoon sergeants or junior officers.
The information was required as a matter of urgency. As the Adjutant the task of interviewing or compiling the statements of all the 1 Para senior officers fell to him. He claimed he was merely a scribe acting under orders. He believed the manuscripts were handed directly to 8 Brigade in their manuscript form hence corrections were initialled by him before the statements were signed and handed up. They were subsequently typed up, probably at 8 Brigade.
General Jackson said he could not recall the process of writing the statements but he expected that he had sat down with each of the officers and asked for their account of what happened. He said one or more of them may have provided notes from which he constructed the statement with or without further discussion.
When Did He Last See Them
In his recent statement General Jackson said that he did not think he had seen the manuscript documents since he handed them in to 8 Brigade. He went on “this is to some extent borne out by the fact that, as I understand it, they were only recently discovered within documents still held at 8 Brigade” (i.e. in 1998). He was not questioned about why the documents were not disclosed to the Inquiry until June 2003.
The Loden List
The manuscript version of Major Loden’s list of engagements [B2214.0005] was annexed to his statement of 31 January 1972 which General Jackson also wrote. That document included Major Loden’s Diary of Operations setting out times at which particular events occurred. Both the Diary and the List contain information Major Loden, or someone else, must have obtained from other soldiers since Major Loden does not claim to have witnessed all that is recorded in the documents. General Jackson said he could not remember exactly how the documents were created but agreed Major Loden probably had notes which must have come from debriefing his men. He said, “the List was a convenient way of providing details of how many gunmen and bombers had been engaged.” He said he would not have copied out Major Loden’s notes if they were in a presentable form but he suspected they were in his A5 field notebook and too scrappy to just forward without re-writing. He said they did not have access to photocopying facilities at that time. The List is not dated. There is another typed version of the List in a different, tabulated format [G0104.0632]. It is essentially the same although some of the grid references vary. General Jackson said he did not know how that document was produced.
Did Not Check List
General Jackson claimed he did not ask Major Loden how he had compiled the list of alleged targets. He said he did not discuss the firing with the RMP or the individual soldiers; it was not his place to do so. Christopher Clarke QC said it was not apparent on the face of the List what it purported to record. It was unclear for example as to whether or not it was intended to include: the details of all those who had fired; all the engagements; or all the shots fired. In the event it appears to not to include the totality of any of these. General Jackson said he was in no position to double-check what Major Loden had recorded.
He said he did not know if Major Loden had a list of the names of all the soldiers who had fired or a record of how many rounds they had fired. However he surmised Major Loden must have had such a list. Mr. Mansfield said he too surmised Major Loden must have had a list of names but Major Loden’s evidence was that he did not. The Company Sergeant Major, Major Lewis, has said he also had a list of names which he handed to Major Loden. The List included the number of rounds fired. Nowhere, either in the List or the Diary of Operations, is there reference to the number of live rounds fired on Bloody Sunday. However the number of rubber bullets is mentioned. General Jackson said he did not know why the figure for live rounds was not included. Company Sergeant Major Lewis claims the number was known even before they left the Bogside.
Widgery Shot Plots
General Jackson said he did not check the grid references Major Loden provided even though he subsequently plotted on maps the positions of the firers and their alleged targets. This was apparently done at the behest of the Widgery tribunal and General Jackson said he spoke to each man who fired and placed stickers on maps to mark their position and the position of their alleged targets. He created a map for each soldier who had fired and these shot plots were handed to the Widgery tribunal. However not one of those maps has survived. Instead the Inquiry has a single compilation shot plot used at the Widgery tribunal [Q0007]. General Jackson said he did not create the compilation chart but that it probably was produced from his plots. The date of that document is not known since the only date on it is 18 February 1971, and this appears to be the date of the last revision of the map on which the plotting was done.
General Jackson denied cross checking his plots for the individual soldiers either against the accounts they had provided to the RMP or against Major Loden original shot list. He said he presumed this was done at the Widgery tribunal however, since the Loden List appears not to have been referred to at Widgery, this was never done until attempted recently by lawyers at this Inquiry. When the grid references in Major Loden’s list are plotted not only do they bear little resemblance to where the soldiers told the RMP they had fired they also explain few if any of the deaths. General Jackson said he had no way of knowing whether or not the Widgery shot plot reflected the plots he had created. He agreed with Mr. Mansfield that in attempting to produce an accurate account for Lord Widgery he would have wanted to corroborate where possible the information the soldiers gave him. However he could not remember whether or not he had the Loden List with him when he did the plotting. Lord Saville intervened to ask whether in fact he had retained a copy of the List since the one he wrote out was handed in to 8 Brigade. General Jackson said he did not know but the List was typed up at 8 Brigade. Mr. Mansfield said he must have known there was such a list, since he had written it, even if he did not have a copy. General Jackson said he did not know. General Jackson also said he did not know whether or not he had the soldiers RMP statements or the maps attached to each of those statements when he plotted his maps with the soldiers. His plots were done on much more detailed maps than those used by the RMP.
Civilians, Not Gunmen Shot
General Jackson said he did not understand why Mr. Mansfield doubted the account he and Major Loden had given as to the circumstances in which the List had been created. Mr. Mansfield explained the doubt arose from the fact that the List refers only to nail bombers and gunmen being shot when in fact 13 unarmed civilians were killed and others wounded. Mr. Mansfield asked if General Jackson appreciated his counsel, Edwin GlasgowQC, had conceded that none of those killed was a gunman or nail bomber. General Jackson said he was aware of that.
In relation to discrepancies between the List and other evidence General Jackson said, “I am sure that any errors or omissions are the result of oversight or some other proper and innocent reasons.” However he denied any involvement in the content of the List. He just put Major Loden’s list into a more presentable form. He could not explain specific errors in the List, such as the reference to a barricade at the end of Chamberlain Street or the repetition of entries 14 and 15. He said he knew the information came from Major Loden interviewing the soldiers but he was not present when this was done and only one soldier has ever referred to speaking to Major Loden. General Jackson said he could not remember if he asked Major Loden where the information had come from but it would have been standard procedure for it to have come from his debriefing the firers. There is no reference in Major Loden’s statement/Diary of Operations to him interviewing the soldiers.
Mr. Mansfield asked if General Jackson was shocked when he first saw the List since it records firing on gunmen and nail bombers yet he had seen neither whilst in the Bogside during the operation. Furthermore he claims not to have seen a single soldier fire or anyone shot. General Jackson said he knew the totality of the casualties before he came to write out the List.
General Jackson agreed he did participate in arranging for soldiers to be interviewed by the RMP at Drumahoe. He accepted he would had to have known himself the names of those who had fired so that they could be interviewed by the RMP. He would have been told the names by Major Loden and probably made a note.
No Conspiracy
He went on in his statement to say it was “beyond credibility” to suggest any attempt was made to alter or sanitise the truth. He said it was inconceivable that any of the officers involved could have been engaged in any attempt to distort or cover up what happened without it having been obvious to him. He said it would have been clear to him if anyone had not been telling him the truth.
Telling the World about Nail Bombers and Gunmen
When questioned by Michael Mansfield QC General Jackson denied knowing that the List was immediately circulated by the Army both within Britain and abroad to provide an explanation or justification for the deaths on Bloody Sunday. He said he was aware on 31 January 1972 that there was likely to be a public inquiry but said he did not know the List would be made public.
Soldier 011
Private, 5 Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1398.0012] and to this Inquiry on 2 October 2003 [B1398.0001]
On 30 January 1972 Soldier 011 was stationed on the first floor of a derelict house on Long Tower Street with Soldier AC. Soldier AC was a sniper and Soldier 011 had a baton gun. The rest of the platoon were in the road below them.
In his RMP statement the location of the house is given as 20 Long Tower Street but Soldier 011 recalled being closer to the junction with Stanley’s Walk. Number 30 Long Tower Street, opposite that junction, would appear to offer a better view over the Bogside. This is roughly where Soldier 011 thought the house was.
Soldier 011 said he only ever recalled seeing one map and this was when the platoon commander threw one up to them after Soldier AC fired. Soldier 011 claims to recall hearing nail bombs explode. He denied he could have mistaken the sound of rubber bullets being fired in the distance.
Gunmen
Soldier 011 claims to have seen two gunmen fire from the same location. After each gunman fired a shot he claims Soldier AC shot them and their bodies were dragged away. However the location of the gunmen as recorded on the shot plot [Q0016] for the Royal Anglian Regiment (RAR) is around 900 metres from their location. Soldier 011 agreed you could not see anything at 900 metres; a person would be “like an ant” at that distance. The same grid reference for the gunman’s location appears in a report from 8 Brigade to the AIG, Military Intelligence Command, Special Investigations Bureau and the RUC [G0098.0591]. That document is time at 06:15 on 31 January 1972.
Soldier 011 was unable to locate the position of the gunmen on any of the aerial photographs he was shown by Alan Roxborough, counsel to the Inquiry. Answering questions from Arthur Harvey QC, representing some of the families, Soldier 011 agreed the grid reference could only have come from him or Soldier AC.
Gunfire
Soldier 011 said that he heard the crack and thump of an incoming high velocity shot. In his RMP statement he timed this at 16:45 and this accords with the time on the Royal Anglian shot plot. In his statement to this Inquiry he described the gunman’s position as being between two huts situated on allotments. On the map he marked for the purposes of this Inquiry [B1398.0014] Soldier 011 marked the gunman’s position as at the corner of Lecky Road and Stanley’s Walk. However this is only about 200 metres from his position in Long Tower Street. In the plan attached to his RMP statement Soldier AC had marked the position of the gunman as on the escarpment above the gas works, about 600 metres away. Soldier 011 agreed this was possible but said he did not recall the gas works at all.
In his statement to the Inquiry Soldier 011 said he heard the crack and saw the muzzle flash as the gunman fired 3 to 4 rounds. Soldier AC fired 2 shots in return. Soldier 011 said he did not recall seeing the gunman fall or him being dragged away.
In his RMP statement he claimed to have seen a gunman about 400-500 metres away go down on one knee between some huts. He saw a muzzle flash and heard a crack. Soldier AC fired two rounds in return. He then claimed to have seen two other men come from behind the huts and drag the gunman away.
Gunman 2
Between 5 and 15 minutes later Soldier 011 claims to have seen another gunman in the same location as the first. He said he may have picked up the same rifle. In his RMP statement he referred to again seeing the muzzle flash and hearing the crack of a shot from the rifle. Soldier AC again returned fire, this time with three shots. He claimed to have seen the gunman fall and again saw the dead or injured man dragged away. He said he did not now recall this but would not have put it in his statement in 1972 if he had not seen it.
Soldier 011 now says he believes the firing he witnessed was earlier than he had said in 1972. He said he had recently been shown a clip from Channel Four News in which a recording of the army radio communications refers to gunfire from the Bogside at16:20. He now says he believes this was the gunfire he witnessed. The 1 RAR shot plot records two incoming shots at 16:30, although the direction is stated to be unknown, and 5 outgoing shots at 16:45.
Radio Logs [W0130]
The Porter transcripts (verbatim transcripts of army communications on the Ulster Net recorded by a civilian, Mr. Porter) reveal a message from the Royal Anglians at about 16:17; “we have just had four shots fired at our call sign Quebec 21 on the walls. Two high velocity rounds returned. Over.” Quebec 2 may be B Company.
A further message at about 16:21 refers to a further round fired from the area of the Bogside Inn and a man was seen to fall.
Another message at 16:35 refers to further shots at Quebec 21 at Bishops Street/Long Tower Street. This was a Royal Anglian position slightly to the north east of 30 Long Tower Street.
However there is no record of any radio message reporting gunfire at Soldier 011’s location. Nor is there any reference to two gunmen being hit.
Thompson
Soldier 011 also claims to have heard the sound of a Thompson sub machine gun before hearing a lot of SLR fire. However he said he could not swear to having heard a Thompson. His reaction to the SLR fire was “what the fuck’s going on there?” He admitted there was talk in the barracks and that one of the things discussed was hearing Thompson fire however he said he was recounting only what he himself heard. He had never heard a Thompson before that day.
Soldier 011 denied Soldier AC had just fired off 5 rounds in the general direction he believed he had heard gunfire. He denied he had been brought in to corroborate Soldier AC claim to have shot two gunmen.
INQ 2225
Captain, Military Intelligence Officer, Special Military Intelligence Unit
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 17 September 2003 [C2225.0001]
Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland
In March 1971 INQ 2225 was posted to the newly established Special Military Intelligence Unit (Northern Ireland). The SMIU was created to improve communication and cooperation between Special Branch (SB) and the army by placing Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) in Special Branch offices. The SMIU was headed by the senior MIO, INQ 2220, a Lieutenant Colonel at RUC SB HQ at Knock. INQ 2225 was posted to RUC Divisions N and O which fell within 8 Infantry Brigade. He was based in the RUC SB offices in Victoria just off the Strand Road. He worked with Chief Inspector Sam Donnelly, head of Special Branch in Derry. He had a wide and flexible remit to go wherever he wanted and talk to whomever he wanted. He was not privy to all SB files and meetings but over time his access to information improved.
The new MIO posts within SMIU effectively replaced Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILOs). Whereas MIOs worked within Special Branch and liased with the army MILOs worked within the army and liased with the civil power. The post of MILO arose historically from the army’s deployment abroad in crisis situations as with the Air Portable Brigade. Many mistakenly continued to refer to MIOs as MILOs.
INQ 2225 had little contact with intelligence outside 8 Brigade whether from the senior MIO at Knock or Head Quarters Northern Ireland intelligence staff. His principal military contact was Captain INQ 1803, (GSO3 Int and Sy), who was responsible for intelligence and security at 8 Brigade. Captain 1803 prepared Brigade intelligence summaries (INTSUMs). It was through INTSUMs that INQ 2225’s intelligence would be reported up the army chain of command as and when appropriate. He also had frequent contact with the Brigade Major, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Steele, and the various operations rooms of the units based in Derry.
Internment
INQ 2225 said he spent his first six months in Derry getting to know the town, his Special Branch colleagues and their targets. He spent a lot of time on the streets watching riots and public meetings. He said that prior to internment (August 1971) he knew all those who were to be interned by sight. He knew who they were, where they lived and other details. After internment movement within the Bogside and Creggan was restricted so they increased their reliance on photography. Having built trust with Special Branch and completed his own familiarisation process he was able to facilitate joint army/SB search and arrest operations.
IRA in Derry
INQ 2225 said that by January 1972 Special Branch, and through him 8 Brigade, had a good working knowledge of both the Provisional and Official IRA and their associated organisations. He described the Patrick Pearce Republican Club as a front for PIRA and the James Connolly Republican Club as a front for OIRA. INQ 2225 said he knew Martin McGuinness was a PIRA officer in Derry but he did not know his rank. He did not know the name of the officer commanding the Derry PIRA.
INQ 2225 provided the Inquiry with a list of names of people he said were members of the IRA in 1972. He prepared the list from memory with some assistance from published sources such as books and newspapers. He also looked at one of the 8 Brigade INTSUMs of 1972. In evidence he said he believed all those he named were active within the IRA around 1972. However some on the list may have joined the IRA after Bloody Sunday, others were only in the Fianna, some were on the run in Donegal (post internment) and some may have been dead.
NICRA
INQ 2225 also monitored other political organisations including the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). He described NICRA as initially a broad church including both Protestants and Catholics but said that by January 1972 Special Branch believed it had “attracted the interest of the Official IRA.” INQ 2225 also described NICRA as the focus for “extreme political” groups such as People’s Democracy. INQ 2225 said he would have expected both wings of the IRA to have attended the January 1972 anti-internment demonstration along with most of the people of the Creggan and Bogside.
Riots
INQ 2225 said he had no recollection of the IRA ever using a civil rights march to provide cover for firing at the RUC or military. However the IRA did use the regular riots in Derry as opportunities to attack the security forces. There were almost daily riots in which the Derry Young Hooligans would attack the security forces. INQ 2225 claimed “there would be some god fatherly figure, usually someone with PIRA connections, who could turn the riot on or off like a tap. There would usually be a pause for tea and then there was often a resumption of the riot afterwards.” He said one such individual was Barney McFadden, he is pictured in photographs taken during the riot in William Street on 30 January 1972.
Sniping
INQ 2225 said Special Branch debriefings of IRA members revealed that the IRA would work out firing angles in advance of a riot so that they could fire at the military or police without having to stop a riot. He said this was how Major Alers-Hankey was killed. He admitted there was no intelligence to suggest IRA snipers were in prearranged positions on Bloody Sunday.
After internment they relied heavily on information from those arrested to provide intelligence. There was very little operational intelligence on the IRA because they were unable to enter the Bogside. For this reason INQ 2225 said Special Branch did not know what plans the IRA had for 30 January 1972. He said to have known Special Branch would have needed a source “deep within the IRA.” He was questioned about this assertion by Barry Macdonald QC acting for many of the families. Mr. Macdonald drew his attention to the evidence of Dr. Ray McClean [DAY 175] who said he and several others had made approaches to the IRA and been assured there would be no IRA activity on the day. INQ 2225 said if this was common knowledge to some it was not known to him or Special Branch. His recollection was that at the time Special Branch had no information as to the IRA’s intentions on 30 January 1972.
IRA Resources
INQ 2225 said he thought Martin McGuinness’s estimate of 40-50 PIRA members in January 1972 was low and that the OIRA also had around 30 activists. However there were not hundreds of gunmen and bombers and their activities were generally restricted to sniping. Their weapons included M1 carbines, Thompson sub-machine guns, Garand and .303 rifles and some pistols. They also had access to large quantities of nail bombs and explosives. INQ 2225 said he knew of the IRA using Meenan Square, the Little Diamond, Bishops Street Without and St. Columbs Wells for sniping. He did not recall the Rossville Flats being used.
INQ 2225 said he was aware that there was a plan to arrest as many Derry Young Hooligans as possible. He knew this from attending 8 Brigade HQ, not any particular briefing. He said he could not recall Chief Inspector Donnelly’s feelings about the planned operation. He said the was bound to be a riot and there would be snatch squads deployed to make arrests. He understood the arrest operation was to take place at Aggro Corner, outside the ‘no go’ area. The ‘no go’ area began south of William Street. INQ 2225 said anyone who believed the army could go into the ‘no go’ area without risking gunfire from the IRA was extremely naďve.
30 January 1972
On 30 January 1972 INQ 2225 drove to RUC Victoria and made his way up onto the city walls. He had no specific role on the day. He was in plain clothes. He often observed from the Walker Monument. He said it was known from Special Branch that the garages behind the Bogside Inn were used to store weapons and explosives. The garages were also used as a rendezvous point. Shortly before lunch he met INQ 1803 and his photographer, UNK 1096. INQ 2225 said he believed he did later see some of UNK 1096’s photographs of the riot at barrier 14.
Did Not See Nail Bombs
Captain 021 and Captain 028 both claim to have met INQ 2225 on the walls and to have been told that he had seen people preparing or distributing nail bombs at the garages. INQ 2225 said this was incorrect. He did not recall seeing any such thing and he thought it highly unlikely anyone would be preparing nail bombs within sight of the city walls. He said it was quite possible that on 30 January 1972 or on some other occasion he had told one or both of them that the garages were used to store explosives. He subsequently participated in an army raid on the garages shortly after Bloody Sunday. INQ 2225 marked the position of the garages on a photograph [C2225.0019].
Later in the day INQ 2225 was in Waterloo Place watching the riot at barrier 14. At some point he recalled seeing General Ford with a command vehicle. There was a fierce riot in William Street at barrier 14. He recalled a water cannon being used. There was no sniper fire at barrier 14. INQ 2225 did not recall hearing any gunfire before the Paras went in. He was watching as the barrier was pulled aside and the Paras went in as a snatch squad. The crowd ran away down William Street and Chamberlain Street.
INQ 2225 was anxious to see who the Paras had arrested so he advanced down William Street to the waste ground to the north. He went over to a line of prisoners but did not go right up to them. He did not recognise any known terrorists amongst those arrested. Mr. Macdonald asked INQ 2225 if he might be the man pictured in photographs P0955 and P0956 close to the end of a line of prisoners. INQ 2225 said the man was not him and he did not know who it was. He was armed with a Browning 9mm pistol but did not fire it.
INQ 2225 claimed he did not recall hearing any gunfire at all. Later he went to Fort George to see if any of those arrested were of interest to him. None of those arrested were terrorists. Special Branch said two or three were of interest but he was not interested in non-terrorists. He said he thought he went to Ballykelly where prisoners would have been questioned but said he could not recall anything of that.
Bodies Taken Across the Border
INQ 2225 said he was always sceptical about claims that large numbers of bodies were taken across the border on Bloody Sunday. He said troops tended to assume they had hit targets often when they had not. They then assumed the body had been taken across the border because there was in fact no body. He said he was doubtful about reports of people being taken to Letterkenny for treatment. He was aware people injured in riots or by gunfire were regularly treated by Dr McDermott and Dr. McLean.
Observer B
INQ 2225 also said he had no knowledge of the MI5 source Observer B and the suggestion that the IRA had been seen drilling in the area of the Rossville Flats was unfamiliar to him. He was not the army intelligence handler for Observer B.
Photographs
INQ 2225 said he did see some of the army photographs taken on Bloody Sunday. He said photography was a major intelligence gathering device. All such photographs would have been stored at 8 Brigade by INQ 1803 but INQ 2225 could provide no explanation as to why very few had survived.
Intelligence on IRA having Fired on Bloody Sunday
INQ 2225 said IRA activity increased after the publication of the Widgery Report and they were too busy dealing with the present to look into what had happened on Bloody Sunday. However in 1972 a Special Branch officer did tell him an IRA detainee (Witness X) had admitted firing two magazines of M1 carbine as the army came down Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday. However the documents the Inquiry has relating to the debriefing of Witness X [AX.0001.0002] refer to him having fired in Glenfada Park not down Rossville Street. This is also referred to in an HQNI INTSUM [G0134C.0906.0012] which also mentions a joint operation by the Official and Provisional IRA. INQ 2225 said he had always recounted the story as concerning firing in Rossville Street. That is what he believes the Special Branch officer told him. However Colonel INQ 2241, General Staff Intelligence Officer at HQNI, wrote to INQ 2220, the head of SMIU, requesting the RUC re-interview Witness X in an attempt to establish whether or not the IRA had fired first [G0134C.0906.0009]. This suggested the information they had did not suggest the IRA fired at the army as they drove into Rossville Street. INQ 2225 said this was the only intelligence he was aware of concerning IRA firing on Bloody Sunday.
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