BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY Week 103

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6 - 10 OCTOBER 2003

Evidence heard

This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:

Soldier H (Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier AA (Sergeant, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ 5 (Private, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 042 (Private, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); INQ 1345 (Corporal, Head Quarters Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Soldier 135 (Private, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Soldier 150 (Corporal, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Soldier 020 (Sergeant, 15 Battery Missile Regiment attached to 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 1924 (Captain, Adjutant and Operations Officer, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Soldier 127 (Army Technical Officer) and Soldier L (Private, Guinness Force, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment).

Summary of Evidence

Monday             6 October 2003   Soldier H

Tuesday              7 October 2003   Soldier H, Soldier AA

Wednesday      8 October 2003   INQ 5, Soldier 042, INQ 1345 , Soldier 135

Thursday             9 October 2003   Soldier 150, Soldier 020, INQ 1924, Soldier 127

Friday                  10 October 2003 Soldier L

A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.

INTRODUCTION

This week this Inquiry heard from three more soldiers who admit to having fired on Bloody Sunday.  Soldier H admits to having fired 22 rounds, more than any other soldier.  He claims 19 of these were directed at a gunman in a toilet window.  Soldier L was the only black soldier in 1 Para and he admits firing 4 shots.  Soldier AA was not in the Parachute Regiment.  He fired 8 shots in a separate incident in Barrack Street and claims to have hit an IRA gunman.  The Inquiry heard from a number of soldiers who were stationed at Barrier 20 in Barrack Street, including Soldier AA, where the vehicle carrying the injured Gerard Donaghy was stopped.  Soldier 150 drove the vehicle to the army post at the Craigavon Bridge and was sure there were no nail bombs on Gerard Donaghy’s body.  The army technical officer who defused the nail bombs allegedly found on Gerard Donaghy, Soldier 127, also gave evidence this week.

Soldier H

Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP on 31 January 1972 at 02:10 [B0218] and 02:30 [B0228]; and another undated [B0224], to the Widgery Tribunal [B0233] and to this Inquiry on 23 March 2000 [B0262] and 3 November 2000 [B0264.0052]

On 30 January 1972 Soldier H was a private in Support Company’s anti tank platoon.  He had been in the platoon for about 18 months having previously served in A and B Companies.  However he was working in the officers’ mess for 4 months prior to Bloody Sunday.  He said he had tried hard to forget about the events of Bloody Sunday.  Answering questions from Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, Soldier H said “I’ve been trying to get rid of all this and you’re trying to bring it all back again.”  He spent more than a decade in the army after Bloody Sunday and left having been promoted to a senior NCO.

Soldiers H, E and G were all friends.  E and G are both now dead.  H described G as about 5 foot 6 inches tall with blonde hair and chubby red cheeks.  He also said he carried a bit of weight.  Soldier E he described as taller with excellent management skills.  On Bloody Sunday E, G and H, together with Soldier F, acted as a four man unit known as a brick.  They worked as a four man team covering each other on all sides.  Soldier H said he did not recall being with David Longstaff who was also in anti tank platoon. 

Presbyterian Church

Soldier H said he remembered being at a church having a smoke when a high velocity shot hit the church.  He said he dived into the back of the pig when this happened.  He said the pig was in the churchyard.  He considered the shot to be confirmation that the IRA had deployed snipers around the Bogside.  His view was that the IRA did not want them in the Bogside which “had been their territory for 2 years.”  He also said the IRA were used to dealing with less trained troops and he felt the local regiments had not got a grip on the situation.  However he denied their intention was to go in and teach the Bogsiders a lesson.  He did not recall there having been a plan to go in via the wall to the east of the church.

Going In

When they drove in Soldier H was in the first anti tank platoon pig.  He understood they were going in to arrest rioters.  He said the engine in the pig “really screamed” what ever gear it was in yet claimed to have heard “a hail of bullets” hit it.  In his statements in 1972 and in evidence to Lord Widgery he referred to hearing only one shot hit the pig.  He conceded his 1972 accounts were likely to be more accurate and that it was even possible what he heard were stones hitting the pig, but he said this was unlikely.  He said it was very frightening.  It never occurred to him to check the pig for damage after the event.

When they debussed they put on their respirators because there was CS gas in the air.  He did not recall sheltering at a derelict building before moving to Kells Walk.  He did recall being at a low wall running parallel to the Kells Walk flats before moving south to the two low walls at the south end of Kells Walk.

Soldier H described the respirator as having curved glass which limited your vision to what was directly ahead.  Anything to the side was out of focus or blurred.  It was also difficult to breathe and noise was amplified.  He felt he was surrounded by thousands of hostile people and was already terrified at having come under fire in the pig.

Rubble Barricade

All Soldier H claimed to remember about being at the low walls was that he was with Soldiers E, F and G.  He recalled seeing the rubble barricade and people behind it but claimed he did not remember anyone firing at it or seeing anyone fall.  He also said he did not remember any gunmen or nail bombers at the barricade.

In his Widgery statement he had claimed they came under fire from the rubble barricade and he cocked his weapon.  When shown photographs of soldiers at the Kells Walk Soldier H said they brought back no recollection.  He did not remember seeing Soldier P, from mortar platoon, fire at a nail bomber just in front of him or a man with a pistol at the rubble barricade.  At the Widgery tribunal he claimed to have seen two gunmen at the barricade but again claims not to remember this now.  In the first statement he gave to the RMP he had said he had seen 4 gunmen at the barricade but in another statement made minutes later he said there were only 2.  Thereafter he always referred to only 2 gunmen.

Soldier H could not explain how he appears to have made two statements within 20 minutes of each other on 31 January 1972.  The second statement appears to be a complete re-write of the first and is certainly much more intelligible.  Soldier H admitted “there’s got to be an error there somewhere because you couldn’t do it (the second statement) in twenty minutes.”

In evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier H said the 2 gunmen he saw had “small rifles or machine guns.”  There he claimed the gunmen were firing at them and others returned fire from his position.  He now claims to have no memory at all of what happened at the rubble barricade.

Deaths at Barricade

Soldier H claimed to be unaware that Soldier F had killed Michael Kelly at the rubble barricade, a fact which is only known because the bullet recovered from Michael Kelly’s body was traced to Soldier F’s rifle.  Soldier H said Soldier F had never told him he had shot someone at the barricade.  He claimed to have no knowledge at all of how John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash came to die at the rubble barricade.  No soldier admits to having killed any of these three and their deaths are completely unexplained by the soldiers’ evidence.  Soldier H said he was unable to help the Inquiry as to how they died.

Soldier H also denied seeing Hugh Gilmour killed or any soldier fire from the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.

Soldier 027’s Account

The only soldier who has provided any explanation for these deaths is Soldier 027.  He said in his statement to the Inquiry [B1565.0039] that as they ran towards the low wall there was a crowd facing them to the south of the rubble barricade.  He said as Soldier F reached the wall he went into a kneeling position and, without pause or hesitation, commenced firing towards the centre of the crowd.  He reached the wall behind Soldier F as he fired.  Other soldiers then arrived and also commenced firing.  Some were standing, others kneeling.  He saw strikes on the barricade and also saw two men fall.  A Corporal from Guinness Force then elbowed his way to the front and also commenced firing.  He was exuberant and thought it was great.

Soldier 027 said he could not see what they were firing at.  He had the distinct impression that the soldiers thought it was an opportunity to fire their weapons and did not want to miss the chance.  At first there was steady firing at intervals of seconds but the level of shooting grew as more soldiers arrived.  His impression was that the firing continued for a number of minutes.

He said he had an image in his mind of INQ 635 firing but was not sure that he had.  He said Soldier F and Soldier G had “a preconceived idea and set about doing it as a pair of oppos.”

Soldier H said nothing like this happened.

Ceasefire Ordered Before Anyone Entered Glenfada Park

Soldier 027, who was a radio operator, also said he had a vivid memory of receiving a ceasefire order from Major Loden before anyone went into Glenfada Park.  He says he relayed the ceasefire to others in anti tank platoon before they went into Glenfada Park.  Soldier H said he did not recall a ceasefire order before they went into Glenfada Park.  Soldier H said the video clip of soldiers jumping over and going around the Kells Walk walls did not look like his platoon.  He said it looked like too many men to be his platoon.  He also said he did not think there were any pigs as far forward as they are in the video when he moved forward towards Glenfada Park.

Glenfada Park

Soldier H said he had no recollection of the route he took to get into Glenfada Park North but he was with Soldiers E, F and G.  In his Widgery statement he referred to moving forward and seeing a group of youths in the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court.  He claimed one of them threw a nail bomb at them but it did not explode.  They chased them into Glenfada Park.  Soldier G claimed to have fired two shots along this alleyway hitting a wall at the far end.  Again Soldier H said he had no recollection of that.

Soldier H said he did not recall Soldier J or Lieutenant 119 being present but he did recall the platoon sergeant, INQ 1694.

Soldier H was shown photographs of the body of Michael Kelly being carried into and across Glenfada Park North but he denied any recollection of the scene.  Those carrying the body say they were fired on by Paras who entered Glenfada Park from the north east entrance.

Terrified

Soldier H claimed he went into Glenfada Park to make arrests.  It is accepted he, Soldiers E, F and G all entered through the north east entrance.  Soldier H claimed he came under fire from his front but could not specify when or where this was.  He said he was absolutely terrified as he entered the Glenfada Park courtyard.  He said his knees were trembling.  He said he now only recalled feeling frightened not coming under fire.

Soldier H said Soldiers F and G probably went ahead of him and E because Soldier E was the commander of the brick and the commander never goes in first.  In Glenfada Park he described a group of civilians ahead of them at the south side of the courtyard.  He could not say how many there were.

First Shots

As he entered Glenfada Park Soldier H claims to have come under attack from nail bombers.  He claims a youth threw a nail bomb at him but it failed to explode.  He then claims to have seen another youth with a “smoking object” in his hands.  However in evidence to Lord Widgery he did not claim to have seen any smoke or fizzing coming from the object.  He agreed his earlier account was more likely to be accurate.  Before he could throw the object Soldier H shot this youth, missing with his first shot and killing him with his second.  In evidence to Lord Widgery he had said the first shot struck the wall behind the man.  Again the nail bomb failed to explode.

Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, asked if he was certain the man he shot had had a nail bomb given his evidence of being terrified and the difficulty of looking through a respirator.  Soldier H said it was possible he could have been mistaken but did not believe he was.  He said it was not possible to mistake anything else for a nail bomb.  The youth he shot fell to the ground but Soldier H said he did not know what happened to the body.  This was the first time he had fired at anyone in Northern Ireland.

Soldier H claims he was concentrating on his target and therefore does not know what his colleagues were doing at this time.  However he was aware of them firing at about the same time.  He said he did not think anyone fired before he fired his first shot.  In his first RMP statement Soldier H referred to seeing Soldiers F and G engage two nail bombers but in subsequent accounts the nail bombers become gunmen.

Third Shot

Soldier H then claims another youth came out from the south west alleyway and walked towards the body of the man he had shot.  This man bent down and picked up the unexploded nail bomb, turned and ran away. Soldier H shot him in the back from a distance of about 20 metres.  He claimed to believe the man was about to throw the bomb at him even though he had his back to him and was running away. 

Soldier H said in his first RMP statement that he aimed at the man’s central back but claims to have hit him in the shoulder.  He said he was sure he had hit the second man in the shoulder because the man put his right arm to his shoulder as he staggered away.  Of the nail bomb he said “there was no explosion and I assumed that he must have removed the fuse as he went.”

It was put to him by Seamus Tracey QC, representing many of the families, that it was incredible to suggest someone would walk towards a soldier who had just killed a man and pick up an unexploded bomb with a lit fuse and run off with it.  Soldier H agreed the man must have been mad.

19 Missing Shots

Soldier H then claims to have seen the muzzle of a rifle protruding from a small window above a larger frosted glass window in one of the flats in the south block of Glenfada Park North.  In his Widgery statement he claim it was hearing a shot which drew his attention to the window.  He claimed Soldiers F and G were exposed in the open and he had to engage the gunman behind the window.  He then claims to have fired 19 aimed shots through the window at the gunman.  He claims to have missed with the first 18 and to have hit the gunman with the 19^th.

Soldier H claims that the gunman, or his shadow, moved back and forth avoiding each shot.  However the rifle did not move during the alleged engagement until it was withdrawn when the gunman fell away, apparently hit by the 19^th round.  After the 17^th shot Soldier H had to change magazines because he had run out of ammunition.

Soldier H was a first class shot.  This meant he could hit a standing target at 300 metres.  He was only about 50 metres from the window and could not explain how he came to miss 18 times.  He insists all 19 rounds went through the window.  He also claims the window never shattered.  Christopher Clarke QC described the suggestion that the window did not shatter incredible and his failure to hit the man with 18 shots doubly incredible.  Soldier H agreed but insisted this was what had happened.

However no window in Glenfada Park North, frosted or otherwise, was hit by 19 bullets on Bloody Sunday.  A single bullet hit one window in the flats at the south side of Glenfada Park.  This was the (clear) bedroom window of 57 Glenfada Park, a flat occupied by a couple, Mr and Mrs McCartney, in their 70s at the time.  They and their son, Liam McCartney, confirmed this was the only damage and indeed Lieutenant 119 returned to Glenfada Park some days later with members of the Royal Military Police to investigate.  They found no exterior damage.  There is a photograph of the window with a single bullet hole [EP0035.0011].  Soldier H said it was “very very unlikely” all 19 shots had gone through this one hole.

Lord Widgery rejected Soldier H’s account of having fired 19 rounds into a window and said the rounds remained unaccounted for.  However Soldier H said he was never taken to task after Lord Widgery reported and the issue of his unexplained firing was never raised.  He was subsequently promoted to a senior NCO.  He denied he had given bullets to others such as Soldier F and Soldier G and claimed to have fired rounds fired by them.

Where Was He Firing?

Finally after insisting this is what had happened for two days Soldier H conceded the window he fired at could not have been the one identified in his trajectory photograph [P0012] and could not have been in Glenfada Park.  However he refused to accept he had not fired 19 rounds through a frosted window somewhere.

In fact in his first RMP statement Soldier H does not say the window was in Glenfada Park but the statement is so unclear it is difficult to understand what he is saying.  He describes being in Rossville Street “near the junction of the first shooting incident.”  He then speaks of a block of flats “extending east towards Chamberlain Street” and coming under fire from a concealed sniper on the west side of the flats about 200 metres away.  He then said he located the gunman firing from a 2-foot square toilet window in front of him.

In evidence Soldier H said he did not know to where he was referring.  Lord Saville speculated that if the junction of the first firing incident meant the low wall then Block 3 of the Rossville Flats could be 200 metres away towards Chamberlain Street.  Soldier H said he did not know.  The plan attached to his first RMP statement s [B0222] does not help because it only marks locations for two targets, both in Glenfada Park.

When asked if he had made up a story to cover unjustified firing Soldier H said if he were going to make up a story he would have made up a better one.  He was asked if any of his rounds could account for the unexplained deaths of John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash, William McKinney and James Wray.  When shown a photograph of three bodies in Glenfada Park [P0194] he said of one of them “there’s a chance that could be one of mine.”

The evidence before the Inquiry suggests Joe Mahon (who survived), William McKinney and James Wray were gunned down as the fled across Glenfada Park North towards the south west alleyway leading to Abbey Park.  Several others were also wounded as they ran for safety. Joe Friel was hit in the chest; Michael Quinn in the right shoulder and cheek; Danny Gillespie on the scalp and Patrick O’Donnell in the right shoulder. 

Evelyn Mahon (nee Lafferty) was a 16 year old Knight of Malta para medic on Bloody Sunday.  She ran across Glenfada Park from Abbey Park trying to get to the bodies of James Wray, William McKinney and Joe Mahon.  She shouted “don’t shoot, don’t shoot” and waved her medical bag but soldiers kept firing.  One shouted back “Your white coat makes a good target but your red heart is even better.”  Soldier H denied any knowledge of this.

Abbey Park

Soldier H denied firing from the hip in a fanning motion at people as they fled.  He said he could not help the Inquiry as to how those shot in Glenfada Park came to be hit.  He also claimed to have no knowledge of how Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney came to be killed in Abbey Park.  He denied ever going into Abbey Park or firing there.  He also denied seeing Soldier G going into Abbey Park.  However he did concede that if Soldier G had gone to the south west alleyway as he himself suggested; and if Soldiers E and F were on the east side; then he, Soldier H, would have followed Soldier G to cover his back.  He did not however accept that he did do this.

In addition Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty were killed behind the Rossville Flats and Paddy Campbell and Danny McGowan were both wounded there.  Soldier H said he did not know how they came to be shot and denied seeing Soldier F firing in that direction.

Not Enough Targets

There were therefore 6 dead and 7 wounded but anti tank platoon only claim to have engaged 7 targets in Abbey Park, Glenfada Park and behind the Rossville Flats.  When asked how this could be Soldier H said “we had our suspicions.”  He explained he and others believed many of those shot were killed by the IRA “to get rid of people themselves and blame the British Army.”  Soldier H denied any of his 19 shots accounted for any of the unexplained deaths and injuries.

Firing at Block 1

Soldier H returned from Glenfada Park to the pigs in Rossville Street.  He sat in one of the anti tank platoon pigs and whilst there heard Soldier F and Soldier G fire from positions close to the pig.  He did not see what they were firing at.

Debriefing

The only thing Soldier H remembers being said to him about his firing 22 rounds was the Company Sergeant Major being facetious saying, “If you fired 22 rounds you should have 22 bodies.”

Soldier H claimed there was no collusion or even discussion amongst members of the anti tank platoon to come up with an explanation for the ammunition they had fired.  He claimed none of them had any private supplies of ammunition.  However Soldier 027 has said there was an awareness as soon as they got back to the pig that there would be some explaining to do.  They were working out how many rounds it would be acceptable to admit to having fired.  They were all concerned when Soldier H said he had fired 22.  They thought his story about a gunman in a toilet window laughable.  Soldier H kept insisting there was no discussion at all in the pig.  Soldier H said Soldier 027 was writing a book and “we all know they’re fantasists.”

Soldier H said he was told sometime later that evening about the deaths.

Allegations

At the close of his evidence Christopher Clarke QC put a series of allegations to Soldier H so that he had an opportunity to comment on them.  He said the Tribunal may conclude that he fired the 19 shots as he described or at another window however they might also conclude they were fired other than as he had described and therefore may account for some of the unexplained casualties.  Soldier H insisted he fired all 19 at a window.  They might also conclude the first three shots were also fired without justification and/or that he was mistaken in thinking those he shot were in possession of nail bombs.  Soldier H said he did not believe he was mistaken.

Liam Clarke and Kathleen Johnson

On Monday 6 October 2003 counsel representing journalists Liam Clarke and Kathleen Johnson made representations to the tribunal regarding its subpoena requiring them to produce notes and transcripts of interviews they conducted in preparation of their book about Martin McGuinness.  Andrew Nichol QC said his clients were trying to assist the Inquiry but they had grave concerns about the safety of their sources.

Soldier AA

Platoon Sergeant, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP on 30 January 1972 [B], unknown [B0908.0023] and 3 February 1972 [B0908.0025], to the Widgery Tribunal [B0900] and to this Inquiry on 3 April 2000 [B0908.0004]

On 30 January 1972 Sergeant AA was controlling barrier 20 in Barrack Street.  His Lieutenant, Soldier 145, was stationed in a pig some distance behind the barrier.  Sergeant AA was armed with bolt action sniper rifle with a telescopic sight.

Sergeant AA said they were briefed that the IRA would be present and they would disrupt the march, firing on soldiers.  They were tasked not to permit the march to encroach beyond the Bogside.

30 January 1972

Sergeant AA referred to “so called” Bloody Sunday as “just another day.”  At some point a senior officer came across from the company Head Quarters in Hamilton Street.  Sergeant AA thought it was the brigadier but he did not know who it was, it could have been General Ford.

High Velocity Shot

A small group of youths threw a few stones but they did not even bother to reply with rubber bullets or CS gas.  Then at about 16:00 a single shot came over.  Sergeant AA heard the crack of a high velocity round which he thought was fired from the Creggan towards the city walls.  He said it past about 400 metres from his position.  It was not close enough to cause concern.  He did not have access to a radio to report the shot.  The radio was in the pig with the Lieutenant.

In his statement to this Inquiry Sergeant AA gave a fairly precise time for the shot.  He said it was about 16:00 to 16:05 when the shot came over.  However in his RMP statement he had said the shot was at about 16:15.  After that first shot he then heard “one hell of a commotion.”  The Royal Anglians did not report this shot, it does not appear in their radio logs.  He said in his statement to the Inquiry he had heard SLR fire and a Thompson sub-machine gun but in evidence he said he could not swear he heard IRA gunfire.  He definitely heard SLRs.  He said there was a lot of rifle fire and there were a lot of echoes.  He was convinced he had also heard a Thompson but accepted he could be wrong.

Cortinas at Barrier 20

About half an hour after the first shot two Ford Cortinas arrived at the barrier.  They were both white but one had a red stripe.  Soldier AA saw the cars come up the hill.  His impression now was that once they stopped at the barrier all the occupants, save the dead and wounded man, abandoned the vehicles and ran away.  However the Inquiry is only aware of one man escaping.  Sergeant AA said at this time he had no idea what had happened in the Bogside.

He said he recalled an attractive woman who said she was a nurse.  His memory now was that she had got out of one of the cars but she was actually with a group of people who were trying to get through the barrier when the cars arrived.  Sergeant AA said he had no recall of Soldier 135 telling the nurse to “f off!”  Sergeant AA agreed it was possible rubber bullets were fired at those who ran away.  He said he did not remember Soldier 135 firing a rubber bullet at point blank range into one of the cars.  Lieutenant 145 would not allow them to chase after those who escaped which angered him.

Joe Friel

There was a man with a chest wound in the back of one of the cars (Joe Friel).  He was upright in the backseat.  There was a body on the backseat of the other car (Gerard Donaghy).  At the time he thought they had two shot terrorists and he wanted to arrest everyone in the cars.  His recollection was that no one was arrested although this was not in fact the case.  James Deehan, Hugh Leo Young and Eugene O’Donnell were all in the cars and all were arrested.

When he got to the car Joe Friel was the only one in it.  He looked in and saw he had a gunshot wound.  Friel said “I’m shot” and Sergeant AA replied “Yes, you’re shot son.”  He could not remember which car it was he got into but it was the one with Joe Friel in it. 

Gerard Donaghy

Gerard Donaghy was in the other car.  He died in the car.  When shown photographs of Gerard Donaghy’s body taken an hour or so later, Sergeant AA said “when I saw him he was in a bad way.  That could be him.”  He said he did not enter the second car he only looked in.  Soldier 104 and Soldier 150 drove the cars away.  Sergeant AA never searched Gerard Donaghy.

The RUC subsequently claimed to have found four nail bombs on Gerard Donaghy’s body.  Sergeant AA said he regretted not searching the body at the time.  In his statement to this Inquiry he had suggested he might have been told of the nail bombs within about half an hour when Soldier 150 returned from taking the car to Craigavon Bridge.  However in evidence he said the first time he had heard about the nail bombs was when he gave evidence at the Widgery tribunal.

Soldier 135 admits to having fired into the car to force the people out.  He also admits telling the nurse to “fuck off Florence this one’s shitted!”  Sergeant AA said he did not recall this, he was dealing with the other car.  It was also put to him that other soldiers threatened to shoot the passengers and said “One stiff is not enough.”  Sergeant AA said he absolutely understood that sentiment.  The soldiers were young working class guys who knew others who  had been shot at and blown up.  He said the assumption at the time was that they were dealing with terrorists.

Sergeant AA made no mention of the incident involving the Cortinas in any of his 1972 accounts.  He accepted he should have mentioned it but denied he had been trying to conceal his men’s aggressive behaviour in firing a rubber bullet into one of the cars or abusing those arrested.

Sergeant AA Firing

After the cars had gone Sergeant AA said a group of protestants came up to the barrier on their way back from church.  A man aged about 50 told him to be careful because there were some “bad buggers” around the corner.  He cocked his rifle because he took this to be a warning of gunmen.  He walked down Barrack Street towards Charlotte Place and saw a gunman with an M1 carbine to his left near the junction of Joyce Street and Windmill Terrace.  He was 5 feet 8 to 10 inches tall, aged about 24-25.  He only saw him for a couple of seconds.  The man was aiming the rifle as he saw him and Sergeant AA fired a round in his direction without raising his rifle from the hip.  He said it was not the best way to shoot but he had no choice.  The gunman fired at the same time and the bullet whizzed past his ear.  They missed each other.  His recollection was that the round fired at him hit Soldier 042 on the flack jacket.

Sergeant AA moved forward to try and find the gunman who ducked around behind a wall as soon as he had shot at him.  The description of the engagement with the gunman in his RMP statement is slightly different.  He did not specify the type of rifle the man had and also said he did not cock his weapon until he actually saw him.  Sergeant AA said this was incorrect the weapon was already cocked.  He said the statement he made at the time was not very detailed and he did not know the gravity of the situation when he made it.  He just wanted to get away.

Sergeant AA said it was naïve to suggest soldiers never fire from the hip.  He had served in Aden for two years and the first thing you do is fire a round to make the other guy duck or loose concentration.  If you get a chance you shoot to kill with your second.

Second Engagement

As he moved forward Sergeant AA said he was fired on by another gunman in a building in front of him.  He thought this gunman was in a building at the north west end of the waste ground beyond Barrack Street.  They exchanged fire and after 3 to 4 rounds the gunman went down.  Sergeant AA said he was sure he hit him.  He wanted to go forward to investigate but was ordered to return to the barrier by the Lieutenant.  His view was that the Lieutenant just wanted to calm things down.  They still did not know what had happened in the Bogside.  He never saw the man’s weapon only the muzzle flash when he fired.

Sergeant AA said there was only about 30-60 seconds between the two incidents and it was possible it was the same gunman both times.  The second time was more intense.  They were looking down each other’s rifles.  He would have finished the man off if he had not been called back.  He was later informed he had hit the man in the leg.  He said he thought the commanders lost their bottle.  The IRA had come out for revenge for what the Paras had done in the Bogside.  They just happened to be the people they went for.

Immediately after he was told not to go forward to the man he had shot there was another burst of gunfire from two locations.  Sergeant AA said 5 to 6 rounds were fired but not directed at him.  He did not see the gunmen but fired 2 to 3 shots at the locations he believed the fire had come from.  He was just trying to suppress the fire.  He believed he had identified targets from the sound alone.  They then pulled back to a defensive hold down mode.  He saw the gunman he had shot still in the same position 35 minutes later.  He did not see anyone come to his aid.

Mickey Doherty

About two weeks later Soldier AA’s Sergeant Major, Soldier 215, told him RUC Special Branch had confirmed he had hit the man in his leg and jaw.  He said this was backed up by Dublin but he did not know by whom.  The Inquiry has notes of an interview Mickey Doherty gave to the Sunday Times back in 1972 [AD0089.0001].  The notes confirm Mickey Doherty did fire but he claimed he fired only one shot at the soldiers at the barrier.  Sergeant AA was certain the gunman fired more than once.  Sergeant AA fired 8 rounds in total; one form the hip, 3 at the gunman when he hit him, and 4 later at the other two gunmen.  In an article in the Observer on 6 February 1972 Mary Holland wrote that an IRA sniper admitted firing and hitting a soldier in a flack jacket before being hit himself in the thigh and caught in the eye by a ricochet.

The Royal Anglian radio log [transcript W0106.0007] records an incident at 16:41, “one man hit in chest, wearing flack jacket, no injury.  One round returned.”  It also records rounds fired at two other Royal Anglian call signs and 2 rounds returned.  Sergeant AA said these were the engagements he took part in.

INQ 5

Private, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statements to the Inquiry on 25 July 2000 [C0005] and later [C0005.0008]

INQ 5 was a private in 7 platoon of C Company of 1 Para.  He was screened from the public and families.  He was radio operator to the platoon commander, Lieutenant 110.  In addition to him each of 7 platoon’s 2 sections had their own radio operator.  For the last ten years he has given numerous interviews to the media on behalf of the Parachute Regiment.

Immediately prior to 30 January 1972 INQ 5 had been on a parachute course in Cyprus.  He did not recall receiving a briefing for the operation in Derry.  He was carrying an A41 man pack radio on his back and this was tuned to the company net allowing the lieutenant to speak to the other platoon commanders.  He could not use the radio headset when wearing a helmet and was therefore wearing a beret.

Whilst waiting to go in at Barrier 14 Lieutenant 110 took his SLR because it was too heavy to carry as well as the radio.  The only weapon he carried was a baton.

INQ 5 said he had no recollection of hearing gunfire before they went in.  He said that he was wearing the radio headset and this was probably why he had not heard the 5 SLR rounds machine gun platoon are known to have fired, or the high velocity shot that struck the Presbyterian Church.

Going In

At some point they were ordered in and INQ 5 relayed the order to Lieutenant 110.  They asked for the barrier to be opened but it was only possible to get it a few feet away from the wall so they had to squeeze through or jump over.  The Inquiry knows 7 platoon was the first platoon to go in although INQ 5 did not recall this.

The civilians in front of the barrier ran away as soon as they went in.  As he ran in his headset fell off and at some point he lost the lieutenant.  In his statement to the Inquiry INQ 5 said he believed he had turned left off William Street into Macari’s Lane.  However Lieutenant 110, Soldier 003 and INQ 444 all say 7 platoon ran along William Street to the junction with Rossville Street before turning left down Rossville Street and entering the waste ground.  INQ 5 accepted they must be right.

Incoming Gunfire

In his statement INQ 5 said “a whole load of muck” came down on them as they entered the waste ground.  By this he meant incoming gunfire.  His platoon sergeant told him to take cover behind a burnt out vehicle on the waste ground because he did not have a rifle.  He agreed there was some gunfire before he got to the waste ground.  He did not recall any baton rounds.

He sheltered lying behind one of the vehicle’s wheels.  INQ 5 is not pictured at either of the burnt out vehicles in any of the video footage or any of the still photographs.  He said he was in no doubt that they came under fire as soon as they entered the waste ground.  He said he heard a mixture of high and low velocity weapons.  He also claims to have heard a Thompson sub-machine gun.  INQ 5 said they definitely did not fire first and there was a lot of enemy fire.  He has always believed that the IRA fired on C Company as they went in but were caught out when Support Company deployed to their right and returned fire.  However Support Company are known to have deployed onto the waste ground before C Company.

Support Company’s mortar platoon drove onto the waste ground and almost immediately started firing.  Lieutenant N admits firing 3 warning shots over the heads of a crowd in Chamberlain Street before C Company got to either the waste ground or Chamberlain Street.  INQ 5 insisted the first gunfire he heard was not SLR fire.

In interviews he gave to Lena Ferguson of Channel 4 television and the PRAXIS team INQ 5 claimed the gunfire he heard was definitely not SLR but was semi-automatic and that it was coming from the Rossville Flats.  In evidence INQ 5 conceded he did not know where the gunfire was coming from.  He said it was virtually impossible to tell the direction from which fire came because of the echoes off the high buildings.  He did not see any gunmen or the strike of any bullets.  He did not see any soldier fire.  He denied he could have been confused by hearing the sound of baton rounds being fired into thinking he was hearing low velocity gunfire.  Support Company fired around 50 on the waste ground.

Video 1

INQ 5 identified himself on a clip of Video 1.  He is seen running east across the waste ground holding a baton and a helmet.  The handset for the radio is swinging as he runs.  He is to the north of the burnt out vehicles as he approaches the camera which is positioned at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses close to Eden Place.  It is known this clip is relatively late on because Support Company vehicles can be seen withdrawing north up Rossville Street in the background.  Another radio operator is also pictured but he is carrying an SLR.  INQ 5 said he could not identify the man.

Radio Traffic

INQ 5 said he heard reports of casualties over the radio.  He heard “1 down, brown bread (i.e. dead)”  He did not know at the time whether these were army or civilian casualties.  He gave a hand signal to the soldier who was providing cover for him to indicate there were casualties.  He said INQ 1799, who is pictured on Video 1 at the burnt out vehicle close to Chamberlain Street/Eden Place, could have been the man covering him.

INQ 5 also said he heard contact reports over the radio.  Since he was on the C Company net this could only have been reports from others in C Company.  INQ 5 said the contact reports could have merely been sightings of gunmen, not necessarily people from C Company having opened fire.  No soldier in C Company admits to having fired.

After the firing died down he moved with others into the back yards behind the Chamberlain Street houses where he found 20-30 civilians.  They were told to put their hands on their heads and get out.  They were not arrested.

INQ 5 identified INQ 1334 as the soldier to the right in photograph P0501 which also shows arrested civilians sitting facing a wall at the north end of Chamberlain Street.  INQ 1334 denied this was him when he gave evidence but others have also identified him.

In 1991 INQ 5 participated with four other former Paras in an interview with journalists from Praxis.  INQ 2597 set up the meeting which was a 3 hour long discussion with journalists John Goddard and Tony Stark.  INQ 2121, INQ 554 and INQ 12 were also there.  INQ 5 denied Mr. Goddard’s claim that at the interview a number of them referred to David Longstaff as having killed a number of people on Bloody Sunday.

The later interview INQ 5 gave to Lena Ferguson in 1997 was also arranged by INQ 2597.  INQ 5 said he did the interviews because the only version ever heard was the Republican account of Bloody Sunday.  INQ 2597 has said Lena Ferguson told him she believed Martin McGuinness fired on Bloody Sunday.  INQ 5 said he could not recall this.

Lena Ferguson contacted INQ 5 directly in January 2001 to set up an interview with Katy Jones and Charles McDougal for the Jimmy McGovern Sunday dramatisation.  In the Jones interview INQ 5 refers to it being hard to stop young lads firing once they start.  However in evidence he said this was not a comment about what had happened on Bloody Sunday but his experience of dealing with young recruits in training.  He also referred to senior soldiers having a round “up the spout” so that they could react quickly.

“Casualties of War”

When speaking to Lena Ferguson in 1997 INQ 5 was asked if he accepted those who died on Bloody Sunday were innocent.  He replied that he did not care, “they were there, casualties of war.”  In evidence he said this was still his view.  He said “innocent people don’t go on illegal marches.”

When he provided his statement to the Inquiry INQ 5 denied having ever spoken to journalists.  Although the Jones interview in 2001 had not happened at that time he claims he forgot about the earlier interviews with Praxis in 1991 and Lena Ferguson in 1997.  When the Inquiry ordered Lena Ferguson and Channel 4 to reveal their sources Lena Ferguson refused to provide INQ 5’s name because he had refused to release her from the confidentiality undertaking she had given him.  INQ 5 could not explain why he had refused to allow Lena Ferguson to provide his name to the Inquiry.

INQ 5 claimed he did not know who the soldiers were who had fired on Bloody Sunday.

Soldier 042

Private, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP [B1665] and to this Inquiry on 4 April 2000 [B1669.0001]

On 30 January 1972 Soldier 042 was a private based at barrier 20 in Barrack Street.  His task was to protect the platoon sergeant, Soldier AA.  He was looking out for snipers.

Barrier 20

Sergeant 042 was a little way back from the barrier in a doorway.  At some point 2 or 3 cars approached the barrier from the direction of the Bogside.  Soldier 042’s current recollection was that the cars arrived before a crowd had gathered at the barrier but in 1972 he had said the crowd was at the barrier when the cars arrived. 

Cortinas

In his RMP statement Soldier 042 said there was a crowd at the barrier arguing with Soldier AA to be let through when 3 cars approached.  There was a white Cortina, a Hillman and another white Cortina behind with a red stripe.  The passenger in the first Cortina shouted to open the barrier because he was late for work but Soldier AA told him to “hang on.”  The passenger then said he had a sick man in the car.  Soldier AA went through the barrier and approached the car.  He went to the driver and Soldiers 029 and 135 went to the passenger.  At some point the Hillman, which contained an old couple, drove off.  Soldier 104 and Soldier 150 drove the other cars away.  Soldier 042 said he could not recall any of this now.  However he confirmed the cars did not ram the barrier at any point as was claimed by an RUC officer, sergeant Carson [JC0005.0001].

Incoming Gunfire

About 10-15 minutes later Soldier 042 heard three shots.  Soldier AA shouted “we’re under fire” after the first shot.  The shots came from a building at the end of the waste ground in front of the barrier.  Soldier 042 was still standing in the doorway.  The final shot ricocheted off the doorway and struck his flack jacket.  It hit the left side of the jacket, crossed his chest and exited the other side of the jacket.  He was uninjured.  He never saw the gunman.

In his RMP statement Soldier 042 referred to three incoming shots, Soldier AA returning fire with a single round then being hit by what was the forth incoming bullet.

INQ 1345

Corporal, Head Quarters Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statement to the Inquiry on 17 September 1999 [C1345]

INQ 1345 was a regimental police officer in the 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment.  On 30 January 1972 he was stationed at the Craigavon Bridge with three colleagues.  In his statement he said his duty was to escort injured people to hospital.  He spent 26 years in the army.

At some point a car came to the bridge with a body in the back.  INQ 1345 said they took it in turns to deal with vehicles arriving at the bridge and it was his unit’s turn.  The car was driven by a soldier who said there was an injured man in the back.  INQ 1345 said he did not know what happened to this soldier.  He claims he just left them with the car.  He said he did not think the car he saw was the white Cortina pictured in photographs he had been shown.

Gerard Donaghy

One of his men opened the rear door and a body almost fell out.  There was a man about 20 years of age in a zip up bomber jacket.  The driver had gone by this time.  INQ 1345 said all four of them were round the car.  The man’s head fell out of the car as they opened the door.  He said the man who opened the door, he cannot now recall who this was, went to pull the body out when an object fell on the ground.  It was a nail bomb.  He immediately recognised it as a nail bomb and they all scattered.  INQ 1345 said he shouted nail bomb and ran for cover.  He said he could not remember what happened after that.  He did not call the medical officer but he did tell control to get the ATO (army technical officer).  He said he did not leave anyone to guard the vehicle or the bomb even though he agreed it was a risk.  He did not see the ATO come or go.

After a while he was told the bomb had been dealt with and he should deal with the body.  He then put the body on a stretcher.  He thought he went with the body and his three colleagues in an army ambulance to Altnagelvin hospital.  However Gerard Donaghy’s body was taken to hospital in a civilian ambulance but two injured civilians were escorted to Altnagelvin in an army ambulance.  INQ 1345 accepted he may have gone to the hospital with the injured civilians however he only remember one.

He said an intelligence officer would have debriefed him at the bridge when he got back but could not now recall this.  He was never asked to make a written statement.

Extra Ammunition

INQ 1345 said anyone could get extra ammunition from the firing range if they wanted to.  He admitted he had come across bullets being modified into dumb dumbs but denied doing it himself or knowing anyone who did.  He also said anyone in the army or RUC could make a nail bomb if they wanted to.  He said it would not be very difficult.

He and his mates regularly drank in the Orange Lodges.  He described them as a “safe haven.”

 Soldier 135

Private, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1832] and to this Inquiry [B1835.0004]

Soldier 135 was 20 years old in 1972.  He was part of 7 platoon of the Royal Anglian unit guarding barrier 20 in Barrack Street on 30 January 1972.  The company commander was INQ 1343, the platoon commander Lieutenant 145 and the platoon sergeant Soldier AA.

Soldier 135 said they were expecting rioting on Bloody Sunday.  He had previously experienced nail bombs and petrol bombs being thrown during riots but never gunfire.  He probably had his SLR locked away in the pig when at the barrier.  He had a baton gun with him.  He said he was stationed on his own on a corner a short distance from the barrier.

Gunfire

Soldier 135 said his recollection was of hearing SLR gunfire before any incident at his barrier.  He thought he had heard a Thompson sub-machine gun fired at some stage but placed this in the morning, before the SLR fire.

Cortinas at Barrier

Soldier 135 recalled a car approaching the barrier quickly up the hill.  His recollection was of the car stopping just in front of the barrier.  He only now recalled one car although in his RMP statement in 1972 he had referred to 3 cars.  There were three cars, although one drove off.  The car he recalled was the second of the two at the barrier.

The driver of the car he remembered said he had a sick man in the car.  He approached the passenger side of the vehicle and told the driver to turn off the engine at “get the f… out!”  He admitted firing a baton round into the car from point blank range to “emphasise” they should get out.  He said the rubber bullet hit one of the occupants and there was a cloud of blue smoke.  They then ran off.

Soldier 135 tried to reload the baton gun as he went around the vehicle which began to roll back down the hill.  He then noticed a body on the back seat of the car and opened the rear door.  There was a blanket covering the body which he pulled off to reveal a young man with a stomach wound.  He could see the boy’s stomach and a bullet wound of about 4 inches to his gut.  He assumed the wound was an exit wound because it was so big.  He did not see much blood.

Gerard Donaghy

Soldier 135 said he was sure the man was dead because his eyes were open and lifeless.  A woman in the crowd said she was a nurse but he said, “F… off Florence, this one’s shitted.”  He said he would have noticed had their been anything in the man’s pockets and was sure there were no nail bombs on the body when he saw it.  The youth in the car was Gerard Donaghy.  The RUC were subsequently to claim they found four nail bombs in his pockets.  Soldier 135 said there were no nail bombs in the car, “they would have been mad to have them in the car.”

He had to hold onto the wing mirror of the car to stop it rolling back down the hill until Soldier 150 came and got into the drivers seat.  Soldier 150 drove the car through the barrier and off to the post at Craigavon Bridge.

First Cortina

In his RMP statement Soldier 135 said there was a crowd of about 20 people, mostly women, trying to get through the barrier when 3 cars approached.  Soldier AA went to check the first Cortina.  He also refers to having fired a rubber bullet at the passenger of the first car as he ran off hitting him on the shoulder.  This was a man called Manus Morrison.

Second Cortina

Soldier 135 said it was probably the second Cortina into which he fired a second rubber bullet.  The driver said there was a sick man in the back.  In his RMP statement Soldier 135 said he opened the back door and found a youth aged 15-17 years covered to the neck in a blanket.

In his RMP statement there is no mention of Soldier 135 pulling back a blanket.  Soldier 135 said that part of the statement was wrong.  He was just told to sign it.  He remembered the statement was taken at an RUC police station.  It is recorded as having been taken at the Waterside Police Station by INQ 2035.

Raymond Rogan was in the second Cortina with Gerard Donaghy.  Hugh Leo Young was in the back of the car with Mr. Donaghy.  He was trying to get the boy, who he did not know, to the hospital before he died.  At the barrier 3 soldiers from the Royal Anglian Regiment approached.  They weren’t interested when he said he had to get the boy to hospital.  He was grabbed and pulled out of the car.  Mr. Rogan described [AR0024.0004] being held against a wall and a soldier saying “one stiff is not enough” as he put a gun to his head.  He said the soldiers were very aggressive and told him to shut up or he would be shot.  Soldier 135 said he may have said this.  He probably was very aggressive.

Mr. Young said [AY0001.0004] he was dragged out of the back of the car and the boy’s head fell onto the seat.  The soldier said “let him die” and Mr. Young told him he was an animal.  Soldier 135 said that was nothing to do with him.  Mr. Young was lined up against a wall with 3 others who he assumed must have come from the first car.

James Deehan [AD0023.0003] was driving the first car with the injured Joe Friel in the back.  Manus Morrsion was in the front passenger seat and there was another lad in the back.  The car was stopped at the barrier and the soldiers took no notice when he said there was an injured man in the car.  Manus escaped but was hit on the back by a rubber bullet.  Another rubber bullet was fired into the car at point blank range hitting him in the chest.  He was pulled out of the car and was told “go on run, we want to shoot you.”  Soldier 135 denied saying this.  James Deehan also said he was hit on the head with a rifle butt.  Soldier 135 said he might have struck someone but could not remember.

Soldier 042 Shot

Soldier 135 then remembered Soldier 042 being shot on his flack jacket.  He heard more than five shots at this time.

Soldier 104

Corporal, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP [B1680], to the Widgery Tribunal [B1690] and to this Inquiry on 13 May 2000[B1705.0001]

Soldier 104 was listed to be called on 9 October 2003 but he has failed to respond to correspondence from the Inquiry or his own lawyers.  He lives outside the jurisdiction of the Inquiry (i.e. the UK) and could not therefore be compelled to attend.  It was decided therefore his written evidence would have to be considered on its own.

There followed a discussion as to whether or not Sir Allan Green QC, who was instructed on Soldier 104’s behalf, could still put to other witnesses Soldier 104’s account given he had no current instructions.  The Tribunal decided that, although it would not normally be permitted since this is an inquisitorial Inquiry, anything which might assist them in determining the truth would be allowed.  Exactly what questions or matters could properly be put would have to be decided as the matters arose.

Soldier 104 was at barrier 20 when the cars carrying the injured Joe Friel and Gerard Donaghy arrived.  Although he never claimed it at the time in his statement to this Inquiry Soldier 104 now claims to have seen nail bombs on Gerard Donaghy’s body whilst at the barrier.  Soldier 104 drove the car Joe Friel was in to Craigavon Bridge.

Soldier 150

Corporal, 7 Platoon, B Company, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP [B1898] and to this Inquiry [B1918.0001]

Soldier 150 said in his statement to this Inquiry that relations between the army and the Catholic community in Derry used to be quite good.  He taught life saving at the local swimming pool.  However the situation deteriorated such that they had to withdraw from the Bogside and Free Derry was born.

Soldier 150 was based at barrier 20 on 30 January 1972.  His recollection was that at some point a group of people came to the barrier laughing and joking.  They were no threat and he believed they were allowed through.  Two cars then approached up the hill very fast.

Cortinas

In his RMP statement made at the time Soldier 150 said a group of well dressed people approached.  They appeared to have just come from church and it was decided to allow them through.  Whilst the people were there two cars drove up, a light blue Cortina and a white Cortina with a red stripe.  Someone in the first Cortina said he was late for work and asked to be allowed through.  Soldier AA approached the car and shouted there was a body in the back.  Soldier 150 then moved forward.  Someone shouted the occupants were trying to escape and he ran through the barrier.  He arrested the driver and front seat passenger who did not have a chance to get away.  He took them to Pitt Street and ordered them to stand facing a wall.  He left them in the custody of two privates, UNK 1094 and UNK 1095.  Later he made a second RMP statement stating the two men he arrested were James Deehan and Eugene O’Donnell.

Eugene O’Donnell

In a tape recorded interview made with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 1972 [AO0027.0009] Eugene O’Donnell said they could not get a doctor for the injured Joe Friel so tried to drive him to Altnagelvin hospital.  However they were stopped at an army barrier in Barrack Street.  Soldiers immediately attacked the car and he was dragged out.  The driver was hit with a rifle and they were held against a wall for about 30 minutes.  The soldiers threatened to kill them and they were made to sit and wait for about an hour.

James Deehan

The driver, James Deehan, made a statement to the RUC in 1972 [ED0034.0010].  He was only 19.  He borrowed a pale blue Cortina and drove an injured man to Barrack Street.  The army stopped them and he was pulled out of the car.  He was hit over the head with the butt of a rifle.  He was put against a wall and struck again.  He was told he would be shot if he turned round.  An arrest document [ARR0011.0003] confirms Mr. Deehan had a cut on the left side of his skull.

In his NICRA statement James Deehan said the lad in the front of the car with him was Manus Morrison.  Eugene O’Donnell was in the back with the injured Joe Friel.  Mr. Morriosn got out at the barrier to tell the soldiers that had an injured man but the soldiers weren’t interested.  Mr. Morrison ran off and was hit on the back by a rubber bullet as he fled.  Soldier 150 admitted he heard a baton round fired but said he did not see it.

Mr. Deehan went on that there was a more seriously injured man in the car in front and the soldiers fired a rubber bullet into the front of the car hitting the driver in the chest.  Mr. Deehan was pulled out of his car before he had time to stop it.  The soldier who grabbed him said “I want to shoot you, go on run.”  He was kicked whilst at the wall and all the soldiers were worked up.  One said “One stiff’s not enough, go on shoot them.  Your gun can go off by accident, go on shoot them.”  Someone in authority then came along and calmed them down.

Soldier 150 said he thought he arrested the two men, Deehan and O’Donnell, on his own.  He was not worked up or in a frenzy but they were in a hostile situation.  He claimed he was not physically aggressive but admitted using strong language.  He claimed he did not hear the threats or suggestions that the men be shot.  He denied striking James Deehan with his rifle.  No one was searched.

Gerard Donaghy

After he had taken the two men to Pitt Street he returned to the barrier and Soldier 135 was holding onto the wing mirror of the second car saying the brakes did not work.  Soldier 150 got into the drivers seat and started the car.  The handbrake didn’t work and it was difficult to start because it was on a hill rolling back wards.  He then noticed there was a young lad in the back who appeared to be dead.  His eyes were glazed.  His head was behind the driver’s seat.  There was a crowd gathering and he felt under pressure.  He stalled the car three times before he got it going and drove quickly through the barrier.  The door was still open and he hit the barrier on the way through.  It was difficult to drive with his kit belt on.  He said he did not recall any civilian offering medical assistance.

Soldier 150 said it was pretty obvious the boy was dead; he could see the wound to his abdomen.  He also said there was nothing on the body.  He drove the car to the Regimental Aid Post at Craigavon Bridge. RUC officers subsequently claimed to have found 4 nail bombs in Gerard Donaghy’s pockets.  Soldier 104 claimed in his statement to this Inquiry made in 2000 that he thought he saw a nail bomb on one of the bodies in the cars whilst at the barrier in Barrack Street.  This was the first time anyone had claimed to have seen a nail bomb at the barrier.  Soldier 150 he would have expected Soldier 104 to have warned him if he had seen a nail bomb on the body.  He would not have driven the car if there were nail bombs in it.

Lieutenant 145, who was in command at the barrier, told Soldier 150 to drive the car to company HQ round the corner.  When he got there he was told to drive to the Craigavon Bridge compound.  He was followed by the second car which he thought was driven by Soldier 135 but was in fact driven by Soldier 104.  When he got to the bridge he saw another man bleeding heavily from a wound to his backside.  He was older, about 50.

Logs and Times

The second in command of the 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment (1 RAR) made a record of incidents at the bridge on Bloody Sunday [CJ0002.0020].  The document is dated 4 February 1972.  Item 1 on the list refers to a white Cortina with a red flash stopped at barrier 20, containing a dead youth.  Item 2 records another Cortina, also stopped at barrier 20 containing a young man with a gunshot wound.  Item 3 is a car stopped at barrier 24 containing Patrick Campbell with a wound to the left buttock.  He is recorded as having been taken to Altnagelvin hospital in the 1 RAR ambulance, leaving the bridge at 16:45.  Soldier 150 said he did not recall seeing the third car arrive at the bridge but he did see Mr. Campbell.  Another Royal Anglian report [CJ0002.0018] recorded the cars’ arrival at barrier 20 as at about 16:25 and their departure for the bridge being at 16:36.  The Brigade radio log records at 16:50 “1 dead person returned to this location, has nail bomb in pocket. FELIX requested.”  At 16:52 the police radio log [D0007] requests police to be sent to the bridge because there is a dead body with nail bombs.  Both these times are after Patrick Campbell is recorded as having left the bridge in an ambulance.

Craigavon Bridge

At the bridge Soldier 150 parked the car and opened the back door to check the body for a pulse.  He lent in and held the man’s right wrist but could not detect a pulse.  At no time did he see any nail bombs and he did not think it possible he could have missed them had they been in his pockets as alleged.  Shortly after this the medical officer arrived.  He told the medical officer he thought the man was dead but there was an injured man in the other car.  The medical officer did a quick examination and told him he was right and that he would come back when he had seen to the other man.  The cars were parked quite close together.  The medical officer told him to move the car to one side which he did.  Soldier 150 was at the car for about 2 minutes before the medical officer arrived.  He did not recall seeing anyone else around the car, in particular any RUC officers.  He said he must have notified someone there was a dead body in the car when he arrived at the post but he could not remember having done so.  He said the barrier would have radioed ahead.

Sergeant Carson of the RUC made a statement on 9 February 1972 [JC0006.0002] claiming to have been told of a dead body in a car at about 16:00.  He said he was already on duty at the bridge.  He claims to have gone to the car and looked at the body which he says was covered in a blanket.  Soldier 150 said there was no blanket on the body when he saw it.  Sgt. Carson then said he opened the door and began searching the body for identification.  As soon as he opened the left hand trouser pocket he claims to have seen a fuse.  He said he spoke to the soldier who had driven the car to the bridge who, when told there were nail bombs on the body, responded “fuck me”.  Soldier 150 said he did not speak to an RUC officer at the bridge.  He said he would remember if Sergeant Carson had shown him the nail bomb as he claimed.

Another RUC officer, WPC Clara Hamilton, claims [JH0003.0002] she was with Sergeant Carson when he went to the car.  She claims it was her who discovered the nail bomb in the pocket.  She says she found a bulge and was trying to pull it out when Sgt. Carson said “get out it’s a bomb!”

Soldier 150 said the first he knew of any nail bombs being on the body was when he got to the Widgery tribunal.  He did not remember Soldier 104 at the bridge and was never told by him or anyone else in his platoon that there were nail bombs on the body.  Soldier 150 said he did not know where the nail bombs came from but they were “certainly not there when I saw the body.”

Soldier 150 thought he had seen Soldier 042 shot at barrier 20 but he accepted this may have happened whilst he was at the bridge and he may have simply been told about it.  The 1 RAR radio log [typed transcript is at W0106.0007] records a message regarding the cars at the barrier at 16:31 and the incident in which Soldier 042 was shot at 16:41.

Soldier 150 agreed with Seamus Tracey QC the cars did not break through the barrier as alleged by PC Scott [JS0002.0001].

Soldier 020

Sergeant, 15 Battery Missile Regiment attached to 22 Light Air Defence Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP [B1500.0010] and to this Inquiry on 13 June 2000 [B1500.0001]

On 30 January 1972 Soldier 20 was stationed with the rest of his battery at the Brandywell.  Major INQ 1320 was in command of the battery; Lieutenant INQ 971 was in command of the platoon.

Soldier 20 could not remember precisely where he was within the Mex Garage/Brandywell compound.  He recalled some of his men were in a temporary sangar inside an old toilet.  He moved around checking on his men.

He saw the march come down the hill towards the army post.  He accepted this could have been at about 15:00.  Later there was a single shot at the base.  Everyone panicked trying to work out where it had come from.  There were then one or two more shots and another two a few minutes later.

Soldier Y Firing

Soldier 20 said there was a report that a gunman had been spotted in the cemetery and the Lieutenant gave an order to fire if he was seen again.  Soldier Y then claimed to have shot the gunman in the cemetery.  Soldier 20 did not see him fire.  They were told not to go and collect the body.

Soldier 20 said the incident of the incoming fire and Soldier Y shooting the gunman happened at least 30 minutes after the crowd had left.  He did not think it was as much as an hour and a half later but he could not be sure of the timing because it was thirty years ago and he had had a serious illness which affected his memory.  It was the first shooting he remembered having heard that day.

In his RMP statement Soldier Y referred to the location coming under sniper fire and missile attack at around 16:40.  Soldier 20 said so far as he was concerned that did not happen.  He said there were very few missiles thrown.  They only came under fire twice, once from the cemetery and later from a derelict building.

 Soldier X Firing

Later Soldier 020 was in the temporary sangar with Soldier X when there was a burst of automatic gunfire he thought came from a Thompson sub machine gun.  He thought this was 45 minutes after the first shooting incident but agreed it may have been less.

Soldier 20 said the incoming rounds struck the general area of the sangar.  They came from a disused warehouse opposite.  Soldier 20 said he noticed a gap between the wall and the roof where someone had removed some breeze blocks.  He thought the gunman was at the side of the building.  He thought he recalled seeing the gunman leaning out of the side of the building and seeing Soldier X shoot him.  He claims to have seen the man fall from the building although he could not see where he landed.  They were not allowed to go over to investigate.

Soldier 20 said he was told the man was eventually taken by ambulance to Altnagelvin hospital where he was found to be dead on arrival.  Soldier 20 accepted he did not know this he had only been told it.

However in his RMP statement made in 1972 Soldier 20 had simply said he ordered Soldier X to fire at the gunman and he then disappeared inside the building.  Soldier 20 said he was not sure he had seen the man fall.  He also thought he had heard a second burst of automatic gunfire but this was not mentioned in the RMP statement.  He was now of the view that both the position of the gunman and his own position, as marked on the plan attached to the RMP statement, were incorrect.

Questioned by Mr. Moss on behalf of some of the military witnesses Soldier 20 agreed the burst of gunfire he heard could have been the gunfire referred to in the statement of Paddy Ward an former member of the Fianna (youth IRA).

Radio Logs

Arthur Harvey QC took Soldier 20 through the radio logs.  Soldier 20’s battery was dettached to the 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment (1 RAR) on Bloody Sunday.  The 1 RAR log [transcript W0106.0007] records a message from ‘H3’ (the Brandywell) at 16:49 as follows: “at 16:45 short burst from pre-fabs.  1 round returned.  No hit claimed.  Grid Reference 42531589.”

The Porter transcript of the actual words spoken to Brigade on the Ulster net [W0138] records “burst of fire from machine gun located at grid reference 42531589 at 16:45 wait, one round at gunman spotted.  No hit claimed.”

So the contemporaneous logs show no one was claiming to have hit a gunman at the time and only one incident of incoming fire was reported.  Soldier 20 agreed both shooting incidents should have been reported and it was possible he had become confused over the years.

INQ 1924

Captain, Adjutant and Operations Officer, 1^st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment

Made Statement to this Inquiry on 21 May 2000 [C1924]

INQ 1924 said the rioting in Derry was not too threatening at first.  He described it as friendly.  It would be a regular event on a Saturday with a break for people to go home for tea. However because of internment and the deaths of two local men at the hands of Royal Anglians the situation deteriorated such that they had to withdraw from the Bogside.

Craigavon Bridge

On 30 January 1972 INQ 1924 was deployed in the Royal Anglians’ command vehicle in the compound on the west side of the Craigavon Bridge.  He said he had a clear recollection of looking out of the window to his left at some point and seeing 4 or 5 cars with bodies in them.  They were about 25 yards away.  He described the bodies as still and he believed they were dead.  He said he was astonished to see the dead bodies because he had been monitoring the radio traffic and had only heard reports of a few isolated shooting incidents.

He said he did not know exactly where in the compound his vehicle was but it was facing the bridge.  The cars were between him and the road.  He accepted there may only have been three cars and that there was only one dead body.  There were two other injured civilians.

Gerard Donaghy

INQ 1924 said he thought it was odd that the cars had been abandoned.  In the one closest to him he could see a teenage boy lying on the back seat.  The rear door was open and the boy’s head was behind the passenger seat, towards him.  He could see a small light coloured object in the right trouser pocket.  He said he did not know whether or not he realised it was a nail bomb at the time.

His job was to concentrate on the radio and not be distracted.  He did not see any of the vehicles arrive.  He had no idea how long thay had been there before he noticed them.  There was no one around the cars when he saw them.  He did not leave his command vehicle.  At some point he spoke to the medical officer who asked him what he should do.  INQ 1924 said he told the medical officer to examine the bodies.  He said he thought it had occurred to him by this time that the object might be a nail bomb.  He discussed it with someone but was not sure who.  It could have been the medical officer.

He then saw an RUC policewoman at the car and when she had gone he could no longer see the bomb.  He assumed she had removed it and he thought this was very stupid.  He did not see any other RUC or army personnel at the car.  He did not see the ATO (army technical officer – also known as FELIX).

Soldier 127

Captain, Army Technical Officer

Made Statements to the RMP [B1783] and to this Inquiry on 20 June 2000 [B1783]

Soldier 127 had been qualified as an army technical officer (ATO) for 3 years in 1972.  On 30 January 1972 he was based in Derry part way through his first tour of Northern Ireland.  On the day he was stationed at the RUC police station at Victoria Barracks.  He had his own direct contact with the Brigade Operations Room.  He said he had radios linked to the Brigade, Regiment, Battalion and Company networks.  He was also linked to the RUC net.

In his statement to this Inquiry INQ 1924 claimed he heard not only high velocity gunfire but also revolver shots.  When asked by Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the Inquiry, if he could really hear low velocity revolvers from inside the building he was in he said “Of course, otherwise I would not have said it.”  He said he did not believe he was confused by the sounds of baton rounds and CS gas being fired.

At some point he was put on standby when someone said they were going to need FELIX.  He said about 30 minutes later he was called out to an incident at Craigavon Bridge.  His assistant drove him to the bridge.  He said he could not recall who his assistant was.

The Brigade Log [W0049] has an entry at 16:50, “1 dead person returned to this location, has nail bomb in pocket, FELIX requested.  ATO tasked.”  The Porter tapes [W0138] record the actual words were “one dead person who was returned to this location has nail bomb in his pocket.  We request FELIX to come and sort it out.”  Another message from Brigade to the Royal Anglians followed “can you pass that to FELIX who is with you.”

However Soldier 127’s RMP statement says he was not notified until 17:05.  He said his assistant would have kept a diary of times.  He did not know why there was a 15 minute delay.  When cross-examined at the Widgery tribunal Soldier 127 said he was outside when he was called to the operations room and was told to go to the bridge.

Gerard Donaghy

Soldier 127 said he was directed to a Cortina in the army compound.  In his statement to this Inquiry he said the vehicle should not have been there because it was putting army personnel at risk.  He said he could not recall whether or not the soldier who had driven the car was there but said it was criminal for him to have driven a car with a nail bomb in it to that area.  He said the soldier probably did not think.  He said he could not remember who briefed him about the car and its contents.  There were a lot of people around including RMP Special Investigations and RUC.

He said one member of the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) introduced himself.  He was a warrant officer.  He said there was a car with a dead body it it and he thought there was a nail bomb in one of his pockets.  Soldier 127 then drove the car to the car park on the other side of the bridge (east).  He parked the car with the boot towards the river in case there were explosives in it.  There were a number of others milling around including SIB and RUC Special Branch.  He also said he recalled a civilian being present and being told he was one of the people who brought the car in.

Soldier 127 said he was not told someone had tried to pull the nail bomb out of the trousers.  He did not recall being told the body had been searched or moved.  He did not recall seeing the medical officer or being told he had examined the body.  He may have conducted an initial examination before he moved the car.

Photographs

The next thing he did was a controlled explosion to blow off the lock on the boot.  This is recorded at 17:33 on the 1 RAR radio log [W0106.0008].  He said photographs were taken throughout by both his assistant and one or two others.  However the Inquiry only has 5 photographs; 3 of Gerard Donaghy’s body in the back of the car and one each of the nail bomb components and their wrappings.  Soldier 127 said photographs were taken at several stages by the RUC, SIB and his assistant.  He said those taken by his assistant may not have been preserved.  He said the photographs of the body the Inquiry did have were taken before he moved it.  When cross-examined at the Widgery tribunal Soldier 127 said photographs were taken every 15-20 seconds during his clearance procedure.

Soldier 127 found two nail bombs in the man’s jacket and another in his right trouser pocket.  He did not see the one in the left trouser pocket until he lifted the body.  He noticed the wound to the stomach when he sat the body up.

He agreed the nail bomb in the right trouser pocket was obvious and plain to see for anyone with normal eyesight.  He eased this bomb out and assumed he made it safe by removing the detonator and safety fuse before handing it to a scenes of crime officer (SOCO).  He then removed the two bombs in the jacket pockets.  He had to cut the pockets to remove them safely.  Once they were made safe the components were bagged up separately.  They are pictured in four bags on the ground in the car park in photograph EP0005.0028].

Soldier 127 said he retained the explosives and detonators and handed the other components to the RUC.  He agreed it was usual to hand over a small quantity of the explosive for evidence and analysis.  However it seems this was not done.  He would only test the explosives himself if there were unusual and he did not recognise them.  These explosives were Gelonex and Quarrex both of which were known to him.  Gelonex was very common in Derry.  Soldier 127’s report [B1798.0026] showed he returned to his base at 19:00.

Soldier 127 claimed he was not aware at the time that it was alleged the nail bombs were planted.  He said he did not hear this until after the Widgery tribunal.

Soldier 127 said he always produced a written technical report for Technical HQ in Lisburn.  This detailed the clearance procedure he adopted and included sketches and photographs.  He did not know if the technical report was requested at the Widgery tribunal.

Bullet Hole in Pocket

The Forensic Science Service compiled a report on Gerard Donaghy’s clothing on 21 February 1972.  That demonstrated that there was a bullet hole in left pocket of Gerard Donaghy’s jacket.  Soldier 127 found a nail bomb in this pocket.  The position of the bullet hole meant that either the nail bomb was not there when Gerard Donaghy was shot or the bomb had to have been hit. However there was no evidence to suggest any of the nail bombs allegedly found on his body showed any signs of damage.  Soldier 127 said he did not recall a bullet hole in the jacket or any damage to any of the bombs.

A Dr. Lloyd has provided an export report for the Inquiry [E0001.0006] in which he says he would expect there to be damage evident on the bomb.  He also concludes there was a significant chance that the bomb would have exploded when struck by the bullet because, whereas military explosives are designed to withstand bullet strikes, Gelonex is impact sensitive.

Soldier 127 claimed that there would be such a risk only if the bullet had been fired from very close range.  He claimed if it were more than 2-3 feet away the bullet would have lost energy and was less likely to detonate the explosive.  He said the majority of civilian explosive was in pristine condition making it less vulnerable to impact detonation.

Quarrex

Commenting on an army intelligence document dated 2 February 1972 [G0108.0654] Soldier 127 said he did not agree that Quarrex, a quarrying explosive, was uncommon.  The report detailed that 3 of the 4 nail bombs were made of Quarrex and said it this suggested there was a lack of explosives available to civilians because Quarrex was uncommon and unsuitable for nail bombs.  Soldier 127 said it was not the first time he had come across Quarrex in Derry.

Soldier 127 made up a live nail bomb for demonstration purposes at the Widgery tribunal.  He said he made this up from his own stocks of explosives.  He kept stores of explosives from those recovered and those issued to him.

Soldier L

Private, Guinness Force, 1^st Battalion Parachute Regiment

Made Statements to the RMP on 31 January 1972 [B0312], to the Widgery Tribunal on 5 March 1972 [B0320] and to this Inquiry on 25 February 2003 [B0346.0001]

Soldier L did not attend when scheduled on 17 September 2003 and a subpoena was issued requiring him to attend.

Soldier L was screened from the view of the public and families.  He said he still regarded the situation as very dangerous. 

Soldier L joined the army in 1969.  He said he was uncertain of his rank on 30 January 1972 since he had been a Lance Corporal at times but was busted down back to Private for insubordination.  This happened more than once so he could not now recall what his rank was on Bloody Sunday.  The documents available to the Inquiry suggest he was a private.

Race and Racism

Although he was screened to avoid being seen Soldier L’s race and skin colour were raised by Cathryn McGaghey, counsel to the Inquiry.  Soldier L is mixed race and was content to have his skin tone described as similar to that of footballer Rio Ferdinand.  Ms McGahey referred to him as mulatto.  A number of times during his evidence Soldier L referred to being disliked or discriminated against.  He said he was considered the “stupid nigger who might fuck things up” and the “only coon in the battalion.”  He said he was left out of the loop and not told what was going on.  Others conspired against him.

Eradicating IRA

Soldier L described being briefed that the IRA controlled ‘no go’ areas.  He said the Paras were quicker at getting stuck into the no go areas than the ‘crap hats’ (i.e. other regiments).  In his statement to this Inquiry he referred to “eradicating the IRA’s hold.”  However he did not mean this was said at the briefing for the operation on 30 January 1972.  He did not recall the formal briefing which was probably given by Captain 200.  By eradicating the IRA’s hold he meant the Paras general approach to no go areas at the time.  He said Derry was “on the list” of places for the Paras to be deployed.  He attributed the policy to Colonel Wilford.

Nightmares and Visions

Soldier L described a number of events, often quite intensely, some of which are known not to have happened and others which appear very improbable.  He also referred to having nightmares about what occurred on Bloody Sunday and said he suffered from post traumatic stress disorder.  He had had lots of traumatic experiences.

Martin McGuinness

Soldier L claimed to have seen Martin McGuinness both on the streets of Belfast and in Derry.  He said he had had Mr. McGuinness in his sights during a riot prior to 30 January 1972 and waited in vain for the order to kill him.  He also claimed to have seen Mr. McGuinness at Free Derry Corner on Bloody Sunday itself.

Father Daly

Soldier L also claimed to have witnessed a priest collecting rifles from the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and hiding them under his cassock or coat.  He claimed he wanted to search the priest, who he believed to be Father Daly, when he was helping someone into an ambulance on a stretcher.  Soldier L said he believed the rifles were on the stretcher under the body but he was told he could not search a priest.

Soldier H

Another event Soldier L says he witnessed but which did not occur was Soldier H firing a whole magazine of ammunition into a body on Rossville Street.  Soldier L claims to have put the body into an army ambulance and graphically described it falling apart as he did so.  None of this is supported by any other evidence although Soldier H certainly did fire at least 22 rounds 19 of which are unaccounted for.  Soldier L says he went up to Soldier H and stopped him firing.  He took his gun off him and returned it to him after making it safe.  He said Soldier H “threw a wobbly” and it was sad to see because he “loved him dearly.”  He said several men lost it in Ireland and other lads left the battalion spending years in mental hospitals.  When asked why he had not mentioned the incident involving Soldier H when he gave evidence to Lord Widgery he said no one was going to drop him in it and all soldiers were covered by the Official Secrets Act.  He expressed the view that it was inappropriate to brand soldiers doing a job for their country as murderers.  No one remotely understood their position.  He hoped this Inquiry would be more understanding.

Explosives

Soldier L also claims to have crossed the rubble barricade in Rossville Street and found 3 pounds of plastic explosives.  He described a long detonator chord running away from the barricade which he claims to have made safe.  He believes it was a booby trap.

INQ 1671

Soldier L believed INQ 1671 was in Guinness Force on Bloody Sunday but he is not recorded as having been in Derry.  Soldier L claims to have seen him shoot dead a gunman on the waste ground who was trying to pull a pistol out of a belt.  There is no evidence to support this.  INQ 1671 is now dead.  Soldier L identified INQ 1671 on Video 17 at 7 minutes 50 seconds.

In his recent statement Soldier L refers to having seen lumps which he took to be explosives thrown from the Rossville Flats roof.  However he had not mentioned this in his earlier statements.  Soldier L said he assumed they were explosives.  He also claimed they came under fire from the Rossville Flats whilst in Rossville Street but all he refers to having seen is two men on the roof of the flats.  He said he did not see weapons but “why else would they be on the roof?”

30 January 1972

Soldier L recalled being at the Presbyterian Church when a shot struck the drainpipe causing it to shatter.  He said part of the pipe landed on Lieutenant N’s head.

Joseph Lynn

Joseph Lynn was arrested on Bloody Sunday in a derelict garage near the north west corner of Rossville Street and William Street.  He was on the waste ground when Support Company drove into the Bogside and ran to the building where he climbed into the rafters.  Soldier L claims he pursued Mr. Lynn into the building with other ‘rioters.’  The others escaped through the back but once in the building he became aware of Mr. Lynn in the roof.  He ordered him to get down and arrested him.

However Mr. Lynn’s account is that two Paras came into the building whilst he was hiding in the rafters.  A white soldier fired 2 rounds at him when he refused to get down.  The soldier who fired then arrested him.  This was a Para as tall as he was.  Soldier 229 was subsequently photographed with Joseph Lynn at Fort George [AL0039.0011] but is clearly shorter than Lynn.  Soldier 229 admits being in the building but he claims it was Soldier L who fired one warning shot.  Soldier L repeatedly denied firing at all in the derelict building.

“You Don’t Want to Hear It”

From the derelict building Soldier L says he took his prisoner back to a pig where he also left some of his kit.  He then moved south down Rossville Street along the west side next to Kells Walk.  It is at this time that he claims to have witnessed INQ 1671 shoot a man with a pistol and Soldier H firing into a body.  When asked why these incidents had not been referred to in his statements in 1972 Soldier L said there were many things left out of his statements.  He said he made 4, not 2, RMP statements and the primary one that remains, and is in the possession of the Inquiry, was reduced from 8 pages to only 3.

He said he would not tell the full truth because no one wanted to hear it.  He said the present Inquiry was a white wash as was Widgery.  There was no point in him telling the truth about what happened because “you’d need another 2 years of this Inquiry if I told you that.”  He said he was told not to get involved.  There were certain things he was told not to mention.  The Special Investigations Bureau and others controlled the situation in 1972.  He was told to keep his mouth shut.  Up until now he has been told to keep quiet, not just in 1972 but “all the way along.”  He said the Inquiry had been told plenty of half truths and plenty of half lies.  He then said things had been edited out of his statements.

At the close of Ms. McGahey’s questioning Lord Saville directed Soldier L’s counsel, Ms. Rosamond Harwood-Smart QC, to speak to her client before he was questioned by other counsel.  He said she should advise him to tell the Inquiry what if anything he has not already mentioned.  Lord Saville referred to paragraph 58 of Soldier L’s statement where he said the statement dealt with everything as best he could remember it.   After a short adjournment Ms. McGahey said she had spoken to Ms. Harwood-Smart who had said Soldier L was simply referring to those paragraphs of his statement Ms. McGahey had not raised with him.  This was the only evidence he had not given.  Ms. McGahey then asked Soldier L if this was correct and he said it was.

Kells Walk Low Walls

Soldier L next remembers being at a low wall at the south end of Kells Walk.  There were two parallel walls either side of a short ramp.  At the Widgery tribunal Soldier L was identified as the soldier standing to the left of the forward of the two walls in photograph EP0002.0008.  Soldier L agreed this was him and said Soldier M and Soldier 032 were to his right.  Sergeant 002 and Sergeant K were also there.  Colonel Wilford is behind the rear wall with a signaller.  Asked why he was standing in the open when he claimed there was incoming fire Soldier L said they were trained to go forward, seek and destroy.  He was standing so that he could get a better shot.

Firing at the Rubble Barricade

Soldier L claims to have seen two men crawling with rifles from the rubble barricade.  However his accounts of the incident, and particularly the rifles are contradictory.  In 1972 he only ever mentioned one rifle.  He now says he had a discussion about the gunmen with Sergeant 002.  He said “they’ve got rifles serg” to which Sergeant 002 replied “yes, one’s got a carbine.”  Sergeant 002 then gave an order to fire which was affirmed by Colonel Wilford.  Colonel Wilford said “In your own time commence firing.”  With this he opened fire at the rear of the two men crawling away.  He said it was a godsend to have his Colonel behind him.  He could not have had any better authority.  He took the order to fire from the colonel.

Soldier L says he fired an aimed shot hitting the rear of the two men.  The man kept crawling so he shot him again.  Someone else also fired.  The man was killed but the forward of the two men then collected his rifle and carried both to the entrance to the Rossville Flats.  Soldier L said he had constant nightmares about the incident.

Soldier L said the other man was shot as he was getting up from crawling.  He said he smashed into the door at the entrance to Block 1 and went through the glass.  He was pulled through and this is when Soldier L claims to have seen a priest take the two rifles away.

When asked about the discrepancies in his accounts Soldier L said they all knew there were two rifles.  He said there was discussion when back at barracks and they also all got together to talk things over.  He said this was just to reaffirm what they did was correct.

In his RMP statement Soldier L is recorded as having said a shot was fired from the doorway at Block 1 however he now said he was not clear about this.  In his Widgery statement he referred to ordering an older man to come out from behind the rubble barricade and someone on the 6^th floor of Block 1 holding a pistol.  He then said a man with a rifle came out of the doorway.  He now says he does not think he saw anyone fire from the doorway.

Moving Forward

Soldier L then claims he moved forward to the rubble barricade.  He wanted to get to Free Derry Corner where he had been told there was a building used by terrorists.  He was on his own as he went forward beyond the rubble barricade.  This is when he claims to have seen Martin McGuinness at Free Derry Corner and the explosives at the barricade.  Soldier L said he did not see the bodies of John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid at the barricade, only the old man.

Firing at Abbey Street

When moving out of the Bogside Soldier L said he came under fire at the north end of Columbcille Court.  He fired a shot directly west towards a window in a building in Abbey Street.  He was uncertain how many rounds were fired at him and could not be sure if he fired one or two rounds in return.  Soldier L said he knew he only fired 4 shots in total, he said he did not fire inside the derelict building but could not be sure if he fired 2 or 3 from the low wall and 1 or 2 at the window in Abbey Street.

Captain 200’s Shot List

Once they returned to the forming up position at Clarence Avenue Captain 200 claims to have spoken to all 5 soldiers from Guinness Force who admit to having fired on Bloody Sunday.  In a statement he drafted himself and dated 5 February 1972 Captain 200 records Soldier L as having fired one round at a possible sniper in the roof of a derelict building.  Soldier L said he did not recall speaking to Captain 200 and thought it was unlikely he did so.  He said Captain 200 did not like him and it was more likely he had reported his firing to a Corporal.  The Corporal then told Sergeant 002 who would have told Captain 200.  Either way he denied telling Captain 200 that he fired into a roof.  He said he was debriefed back at the church.  He said different people were claiming different things.  He was told to shut up and go to the back of the class.  They did not want to know anything from him.

Captain 200’s list also records Soldier L as having fired 2 shots at the barricade.  However no target is recorded and the grid reference for Soldier L’s position places him not at the Kells Walk wall but at the southern end of Glenfada Park North.  Soldier L said this was wrong, he fired from the low wall towards the men crawling towards Block 1.  Captain 200 also has Soldier L firing one shot at “the same gunmen as soldiers C and D.”  Soldiers C and D claim to have fired at a gunman in Block 1 from a position on the first floor of Kells Walk.  Soldier L said he did not fire at Block 1 but at a window in Abbey Street.

The plan attached to Soldier L’s RMP statement [B0315] records him as firing from Glenfada Park North to Block 1 and firing in the derelict building.  He said this was wrong.

Bernadette Devlin

Soldier L also said there was general banter about killing Bernadette Devlin.  They had all suggested it.  He had been reminded about this when speaking to a soldier recently.

When asked by Ms. McGahey if he was saying there was an order to shoot Ms. Devlin, Soldier L said no one gave an order but it would not have been a problem had it happened.  He said they were trained to do as they saw fit and it was all part of their daily work of eliminating terrorists.  He regarded Ms. Devlin as a terrorist.

Questioned by Michael Mansfield QC Soldier L said, “I don’t want to contribute to another white wash.  I’m not under orders now.”  He did not want to be at the Inquiry, he did not believe any of the lawyers wanted to know the truth.  He said he had been living with it for 30 years and he needed the truth as much as anyone but he was not being listened to.  He said he had tried to learn from his past mistakes.  Michael Mansfield QC asked if the reason he was not listened to was because he was incapable of telling the truth.  Soldier L said “maybe.”

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For Peace Justice & Human Rights

|13 January, 2004 |