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29
SEPTEMBER - 2 OCTOBER 2003
Evidence heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Major Lewis (Company Sergeant Major, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 165 (Bombardier, 53 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment); David Longstaff (Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Sergeant 041 (11 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment) and Soldier F (Lance Corporal, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 29 September 2003 Major Lewis
Tuesday 30 September 2003 Soldier 165, David Longstaff
Wednesday 1 October 2003 Soldier 041, Soldier F
Thursday 2 October 2003 Soldier F
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
This week the Inquiry heard evidence from Major Lewis, the Company Sergeant Major of Support Company on Bloody Sunday. He was responsible for discipline and ammunition. He admitted the account provided to Lord Widgery of a physical ammunition check was untrue. The Inquiry also heard from two members of the anti tank platoon. David Longstaff claims to have fired a shot on Bloody Sunday but was never asked to account for having done so. Soldier F was already known to have killed Michael Kelly but at the end of his two days of evidence he also admitted killing Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty. He may also have killed William McKinney.
Major Lewis
Company Sergeant Major, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made a Statements to the RMP on 14 February 1972 [B2030] and to this Inquiry on 20 July 2000 [B2111.0001], 23 November 2000 [B2111.0038] and 24 August 2002 [B2111.0045]
In 1972 Major Lewis was the Company Sergeant Major (CSM) of 1 Para’s Support Company. As the CSM he was responsible for discipline within the company as well as administration and logistics.
Statements
Major Lewis said he was only ever asked to make one statement in 1972 and that dealt exclusively with the ammunition count. He did not make a statement or give evidence to Lord Widgery. He did have a notebook, which he destroyed 20 years ago, which contained his notes of the ammunition count. He did not therefore make a statement about what he witnessed on Bloody Sunday before July 2000 when he spoke to Eversheds solicitors for the purposes of this Inquiry. He did say his statement to the Royal Military Police (RMP) of 14 February 1972 was unlikely to have been his first. He may have made a verbal statement that was never committed to paper, he said he was unaware of any other statement. He said he believed his RMP statement was simply confirming the account he gave to two plain clothes policemen on the evening of 30 January 1972 or the next morning. Major Lewis agreed that Major Loden had told him it would be necessary for statements to be made but he denied there was any need for him to have made his own statement about matters he had witnessed.
Major Lewis described various incidents in Belfast when other companies of 1 Para had come under fire. Support Company had experienced coming under fire but not as often as the other companies. He also described an incident in which a young Lieutenant had fired without himself coming under fire in the Markets area of Belfast, and another incident in which A, B, C and D Companies had fired a lot of ammunition.
Soldiers F and G “Mavericks”
When referring to men under his command in Support Company he said UNK 180, who was not present on Bloody Sunday, was an odd eccentric who gave him some concern. Private G and Lance Corporal F were mavericks but not to the same extent as UNK 180. He said had they been he would have done something to rein them in. He said F and G were more enthusiastic and carefree than other soldiers and were not too serious. They lacked discipline.
Briefing for 30 January 1972
Major Lewis said he did not now recall whether or not he was present at Colonel Wilford’s battalion orders group briefing but he was definitely at Major Loden’s briefing to Support Company. At this briefing there was no tactical appreciation as to who might seal off areas so as to assist in the arrest of rioters. Indeed there was a big if as to whether or not they would be deployed at all. Major Lewis said he did have a very clear recollection of having been given a specific warning about the danger of snipers in the Rossville Flats. He said this stuck in his mind because it was unusual to be given advance warning of possible snipers in a specific location. He said the warning came from Major Loden at the briefing. They were not told what to do about the danger.
Major Lewis said they did not know specifically what would happen until Colonel Wilford decided how he wanted to deal with the situation on the ground. He said it was not unusual for an arrest operation to take place without advance planning. He said the Paras were known for their flexibility.
Mood Before Going to Derry
Major Lewis said quite a few of them were sympathetic to the civil rights march. However they were also frustrated at not coming face to face with the IRA. Major Lewis admitted there was a perception before leaving that this might be such an opportunity. The thinking was that the IRA might realise they would be going in and that might draw them out into the open. Major Lewis said they were enthusiastic about such a possibility and they did foresee a clear possibility of a gun battle with the IRA. As the military wing of the Republican movement the Paras saw the IRA as military back up for the march. Major Lewis explained this logic by reference to the fact that they had been fired on before during riots in Belfast. However he conceded there was no history of the IRA using a civil rights march as an opportunity to attack the army.
They were not ordered to go in shooting but they did expect that they may be fired on. They were therefore conscious there could be a fire fight. They were very cautious but aware of the possible opportunity to win a battle with the IRA. In an interview with the journalist Peter Taylor (hereafter the Taylor Interview) Major Lewis had said: “we were told to expect some sort of sniper fire. I did expect to be fired at. It was an ideal opportunity for the opposition to have a go. I think we were all expecting to be fired at on the initial deployment.” In evidence he added it was his opinion that any battalion deployed during a riot into the Rossville Flats area would be fired on.
Risk to Civilians
He said it was the expectation of most of the men that they would be fired on. He said they were conscious of the risk to civilians. However it was not his decision as to whether or not they would be deployed. Major Lewis is one of very few Paras ever to have publicly acknowledged that innocent people were killed on Bloody Sunday. In the Taylor interview he said “I feel in my own heart a lot of these people were innocent. I feel very guilty… it was badly handled. By everybody. By me, the platoon sergeants, the individual soldiers and our superiors. There was control from above prior to deployment. It was contained. But after deployment, it became quite chaotic.”
In his book [B2111] Peter Taylor described it as a courageous interview and after it had been broadcast he spoke to Major Lewis again. He wrote, “It was as if a great weight had been lifted from his and the regiment’s shoulders.” However in evidence Major Lewis denied this.
Presbyterian Church
Major Lewis’ recollection was that once they got to Derry they were deployed directly to the vicinity of the Presbyterian Church on Great James Street. However when shown Major Loden’s Diary of Operations [ED0049.0010], which records the move to the church as not having occurred until 15:16, he accepted they must have deployed to Clarence Avenue first. Major Loden’s diary also records that he conducted a recce of the army barriers and the church between 12:20-12:45. Major Lewis said he remained at the command vehicle when Major Loden conducted the recce. He was not involved in any of the discussions regarding the subsequently abandoned plan to gain access to William Street via the small wall next to the church.
Major Lewis remained at the command vehicle whilst machine gun platoon were sent forward to the derelict building on William Street. Major Lewis thought INQ 1354 had driven Major Loden’s pig but accepted it could have been driven by Soldier 037. Because he remained in the pig Major Lewis did not hear the shot which struck the church but he said he knew they had been fired on because Soldier 033 told him. Soldier 033 was one of Major Loden’s radio operators. He was never made aware that Soldier A and Soldier B from machine gun platoon had fired 5 rounds from the derelict building.
Going In
As the men returned to their vehicles prior to deployment Major Lewis said he saw a soldier who he believes to have been Soldier P cock his weapon before getting into a pig. This angered him because it was against the army’s Yellow Card rules of engagement to cock a weapon unless there was an immediate threat. He decided he would speak to the soldier once they got back to barracks.
Major Lewis described the delay at barrier 12 whist they were sat in a convey waiting to go in. Major Loden was agitated and said something like “get that bloody barrier shifted.” They were delayed for between 2 and 5 minutes. They then drove in quite fast. The delay meant that the rioters saw them coming and ran off. At this stage Major Lewis still had no clearer view as to what it was they were to do when they went in other than to arrest rioters. He presumed the idea was to get behind the rioters and trap them between the vehicles and the army barriers to the north. He appreciated they would enter Rossville Street but was not aware how far they were going to go. He was concerned that the delay affected their ability to get behind the rioters. He was not aware of what orders Major Loden gave to the other vehicles in the convoy.
High Velocity Gunfire
The command vehicle stopped in Rossville Street close to the junction with Eden Place. As Major Lewis got out of the back of the pig he heard 2 high velocity shots. He has given different accounts of these shots in his statement to this Inquiry and his interview with Peter Taylor. In the 1992 interview Major Lewis had said he heard the crack of the shots going over head and this was what had led him to conclude they were incoming. To this Inquiry however, whilst maintaining his belief that they were incoming, he said he did not hear a crack of rounds passing over his head but rather a crack as they passed within 50 yards of his position. Pressed on the issue by Alan Roxborough, counsel to the Inquiry, Major Lewis conceded it was possible the shots were in fact army SLR fire. He said it was difficult to tell because of the echoes of the high buildings. He did not think they could have been the shots the Inquiry knows Lieutenant N fired from the other end of Eden Place because he felt they were closer than that. However it was possible these where the shots he heard.
William Dillon
William Dillon was arrested on the waste ground close to Major Loden’s pig and he is pictured in photograph EP0002.0007 being man handled towards Rossville Street. Major Lewis identified himself as the soldier in a gas mask standing next to the pig. He said he had no memory of Mr. Dillon’s arrest and specifically denied the photographer, Mr. Morris’ account of him having pointed a pistol and ordered Mr. Dillon to stop. Major Lewis said he was armed with a 9mm pistol but claimed he did not draw it at any time.
Corporal 033
Major Lewis said some time after he debussed he noticed Soldier 033 pointing his rifle towards the Rossville Flats. He was concerned and he went up to 033 and asked him what he was doing. Soldier 033 said he had seen a gunman on the balcony of the Rossville Flats so Major Lewis stepped behind him and looked down the barrel of his rifle. He said, “I don’t think there’s anything there” and put his hand on his shoulder to calm him. Soldier 033 then lowered his weapon. Major Lewis was concerned because all he could see were civilians. The position to which Soldier 033 was aiming was on the top balcony of Block 2 about a third of the way in from Block 1. Major Lewis said he was conscious of the fact there were people running around. Soldier 033 has given evidence to the Inquiry and denied that this happened. Major Lewis said he was positive it did and that the soldier in question was Soldier 033.
Rocks or Bullets
The next incident Major Lewis described was seeing strike marks on the ground close to where he spoke to Soldier 033. Again his account in the Taylor Interview is much more certain than in his evidence to the Inquiry. He told Peter Taylor he saw two clear indications of low velocity rounds striking the ground 5-10 yards from his position. He said the strikes were similar to the marks rocks would make bouncing off loose soil. However in evidence he said he was not now certain if he had seen this at all or, if he had, whether rocks rather than bullets may in fact have caused the strikes.
Gas Masks
Throughout this period Major Lewis and most of the other soldiers, including Soldier 033, were wearing respirators. This greatly restricted lateral vision and even effected forward vision. In his statement to the Inquiry Major Lewis said “there is no doubt in my mind that wearing respirators was a significant factor in the events of the day.” He explained by this he meant that because his lateral and peripheral vision were restricted it was harder to see and control what was going on.
Firing at Kells Walk
Next Major Lewis recalls Major Loden trying to find out what was going on. He said there was a lot of traffic over the radio but it was hard to know what was happening. He therefore made his way to the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk to speak to the anti tank platoon sergeant, INQ 1694. He estimated this was nor more than 5 minutes and perhaps as little as 1-2 minutes after the incident with Soldier 033.
There was banging going on and when he got to the low wall INQ 1694 had soldiers on either side of him and behind him. There were 6-8 members of anti tank platoon at the wall. INQ 1694 was on the ramp between the two low walls. He was still wearing his respirator. Major Lewis was there when soldiers on either side on INQ 1694 each fired a shot. Major Lewis asked INQ 1694 what was going on and he was told “they had identified gunmen at the barricade.” He looked but could see absolutely no one at the rubble barricade. However he could see people to the left at Block 1 and behind, towards Free Derry Corner. He said there were people running around but he could not see any gunmen. There was shooting going on but he was not particularly concerned because of the explanation INQ 1694 had given.
Major Lewis then said he saw two high velocity rounds strike the ground 25-30 metres in front of him, towards the rubble barricade. He saw sparks and dust. He could not tell where they had come from but conceded they could have been fired by the soldiers close to him. He ran back to the command vehicle to report the shooting to Major Loden. He did not recall Major Loden ever going to the low wall.
North Gable End of Block 1
The vehicles then moved forward to the lee of Block 1. It was part of his responsibility to marshal the vehicles and ensure they had cover. Colonel Wilford came forward at this point. Although he accepted he was at the north east corner of Block 1 Major Lewis denied seeing Soldier U there or witnessing him shoot anyone. He denied Soldier U’s claim that he immediately reported killing a gunman to him. He also denied seeing Alexander Nash waving from the rubble barricade. In fact Major Lewis denies having seen anyone killed or even shot on Bloody Sunday even though he was right in the middle of the action.
Bodies
At some point a bald padre came up to him and asked who was in charge. He said there were dead bodies. Major Lewis took him to Major Loden who was at the command vehicle nearby. The padre and Major Loden spoke and Major Loden then called for ambulances over the radio. Around the same time Sergeant O reported there were bodies in his pig. Major Lewis identified the priest he spoke to as Father Mulvey as pictured in EP0004.0050. Major Lewis said he did not recall the priest asking to see the bodies in the pig or any argument about this. He left Father Mulvey with Major Loden and returned to observing from the north west corner of Block 1.
Unnecessary Firing
Major Lewis said he could not recall Captain 200 at the gable end of Block 1. Captain 200 described witnessing a soldier firing a rubber bullet at point blank range into a pig and speaking to Major Lewis about this. Major Lewis said he did not see this. Neither did he recall a discussion between Captain 200 and Major Loden about their concerns that there was too much firing and that it seemed unnecessary.
Captain 200 made his own statement after Bloody Sunday and the Inquiry has a manuscript draft of that statement. There appears in the draft, but not the typed version, a sentence which reads, “CSM went over to about 5 soldiers at grid reference 43241688 (the last digit may be a 5) to stop them firing.” Major Lewis said this was not a reference to him but that he believed it could be a reference to INQ 1710 who was Captain 200’s bodyguard on the day. INQ 1710 was a staff sergeant quartermaster sergeant major who could be referred to as CQMS or Q.
Major Lewis said perhaps 2 ambulances arrived before Major Loden ordered a ceasefire. He relayed the ceasefire verbally as should any officer or NCO in the vicinity of firing. It may also have been transmitted over the radio. There was a further ceasefire later when Major Loden ordered his men not to return fire even if fired on.
Browning Machine Gun
After the ceasefire order Major Lewis heard another two or three high velocity shots close to his position at the gable end of Block 1. He did not know where they came from but believed they were incoming. That belief was based on the fact that INQ 1826, the driver of the ferret scout car said to Major Loden “I think those shots were aimed at me sir.”
Major Lewis saw INQ 1826 put his SMG (sub-machine gun) through the flap at the front of the vehicle. He did not fire. INQ 1826 does not refer to this incident in his statement but does refer to an incident when he aimed and cocked the Browning machine gun mounted in the turret of the ferret car. INQ 1826 said he aimed the gun at a spot where he claimed he had seen smoke from a civilian gunman but as he cocked the gun Major Loden shouted at him, “don’t you dare fire that fucking thing!” He put the safety catch back on and returned to the driver’s seat. Major Lewis said this was not the incident to which he was referring. He doubted that INQ 1826 was actually aiming the Browning and said he did not believe it would have had any ammunition. It was too powerful a weapon to be used in any circumstances in an urban environment.
Ammunition Check
Although the picture Major Lewis painted of the ammunition check in both his statements was very clear, when questioned on the matter the position was far less straight forward. When he began his evidence to the Inquiry Major Lewis said that the reference in his RMP statement to the platoon sergeants conducting a “physical” ammunition check before leaving the Bogside was incorrect. When asked when he first realised this error he said “3 weeks ago” when he re-read the RMP statement. However he had specifically commented on the RMP statement and the precise circumstances of the ammunition checks when he made his statement to this Inquiry in 2000.
The Verbal Check
In his 2000 statement he again stated there was a physical check of ammunition whilst Support Company were still at the gable end of Block 1. Furthermore he refers to having read his RMP statement. He denied a suggestion from Michael Mansfield QC that someone had only recently alerted him to the problem that it would have been totally impractical to have conducted a time consuming ammunition count whilst still deployed in the Bogside. Major Lewis conceded he could not have done a physical count before returning to barracks but denied he had been told to change his evidence on this point. He claimed he became aware of the error himself and that he brought it to the attention of his solicitors. He referred to the word physical having been inserted into his RMP statement.
In the 2000 statement he said whilst still at Block 1 he ordered a ‘DEF’ check of who fired, how many rounds and how many rounds were left. This was a standard operating procedure (SOP) because it was only by physically counting the rounds each soldier had left that the rounds they claimed to have fired could be verified. In the statement he claimed he had the results of this check within 30 minutes. However he now concedes this is not true and that the DEF check could not have been done until they returned to Drumahoe. He said, “you couldn’t possibly do it.”
Far from doing a physical count Major Lewis agreed there was merely an oral check. Soldiers were simply asked; had they fired and if so how many rounds. Furthermore he did not question the soldiers himself but sent a corporal, Soldier 033, to each platoon to gather the information. He did not know whether Soldier 033 had spoken to each man who had fired and conceded this was unlikely. He agreed Soldier 033 probably spoke to a representative of each platoon and then brought him a note of the names of everyone who said they had fired and the number of rounds. Major Lewis made a note of the names and number of rounds in his notebook. However when Soldier 033 was questioned his evidence was that he just obtained a total from each platoon of the number of rounds they had fired, not who had fired them. Answering questions from Mr. Hoyt Major Lewis said Soldier 033 was wrong.
Questioned by Michael Mansfield QC Major Lewis refused to accept the figure produced, 94, could only have been an interim or approximate figure since several of those who had fired were probably not at Block 1 when the count was done. Major Lewis said the check was completed by 17:00 and it included everyone from Support Company who had fired. However at 16:45 Sergeant O had gone with 4 or 5 others, including Soldier S, to Altnagelvin hospital with the three the bodies in the pig. Both O and S admit firing rounds. It is also possible that some of the soldiers who had fired were at Fort George at this time dealing with people they had arrested.
Sergeant O and Soldier P subsequently made errors in their accounts to the RMP with regard to how many rounds they each fired. Sergeant O originally said he had fired only 6 but later amended this to 7, whereas Soldier P originally claimed to have fired 11 and later reduced this to 9. However Major Lewis’ evidence was that when he did subsequently perform two physical checks of the remaining ammunition, counting every round, these checks confirmed that only 94 rounds had been fired by Support Company. (The figure of 94 does not include the 14 rounds fired by members of Guinness Force.)
Physical Ammunition Count
Major Lewis claims to have twice counted all the remaining rounds of the 2,950 issued to Support Company. Most of the rounds were still boxed. At Drumahoe the rounds were kept separately by each platoon. Major Lewis claimed he did a physical count of the ammunition in the presence of the RMP going to each platoon. However the first mention of this Drumahoe check, in the presence of the RMP, on the evening of 30 January 1972 was when he gave evidence. He had not referred to it in either in his 1972 or 2000 statements. He also said he did a further check the next day at Palace Barracks when the rounds were removed from the platoons and returned to the company armoury stores. He claimed both counts confirmed the original verbal return that only 94 rounds were missing.
The Loden List
Major Lewis said he had never checked his own record of who had fired and the number of rounds they had fired (in his personal notebook, now destroyed) against the evidence presented to Lord Widgery. He said Major Loden copied his list whilst in his pig. In answer to a question from Lord Saville Major Lewis said he could not recall exactly when Major Loden copied his list but he thought it was sometime between stopping at the end of William Street and returning to the forming up position at Clarence Avenue. He agreed Major Loden did not sit down and interview everyone. However he said he might have spoken to one or two who were involved in the shooting. Major Lewis said he had not seen Major Loden’s List of Engagements prior to this Inquiry. When shown the List Major Lewis said it might reflect the names he had given Major Loden that evening. However Major Loden’s List did not include the names of those claimed to have shot nail bombers and gunmen.
Mr. Toohey asked questions about the procedure and paperwork for accounting for the ammunition but the position remained far from clear. Major Lewis said as Company Sergeant Major he was issued with the 2,950 rounds sometime before 30 January 1972. When he received the ammunition he also received an “AFG 1033” issue document from the quartermaster at the battalion stores (Soldier 201). He then sub-issued the rounds on another form 1033 to each of the platoon sergeants. Any expenditure of ammunition then had to be “issued off in a certified manner, after a proper investigation.”
David Longstaff also claims to have fired a shot on Bloody Sunday but he has never been recorded as having done so. Major Lewis said he did not recall ever being told Mr. Longstaff had fired. He said if he had been told he would have put his name on the list of those who had fired. He conceded however it was possible he could have had a private supply of ammunition and the round was therefore never missed.
“We’re In Trouble”
After the verbal ammunition check Support Company withdrew first to the Presbyterian Church and then to Clarence Avenue. Major Loden then went to battalion HQ in the Gin Palace (mobile communications vehicle). When they approached the Gin Palace there were policemen clapping. Major Lewis assumed this was because of the civilian casualties, he was not proud of the RUC’s reaction, it made him feel uneasy. By this time they already knew, from the padre and Sergeant O, there were four or five people dead. This led him to believe there was likely to be some sort of Inquiry. Major Loden was not in the Gin Palace long but when he came out he was shaken and said words to the effect that there were eleven dead and “we’re in trouble.”
Major Lewis said the number of civilian casualties concerned him; it did not make sense that they should have received no casualties. He never attended a debriefing but later in the evening he spoke to the platoon sergeants to find out what had happened. He said that he was given reasonable explanations for most of the firing but that INQ 1694 was concerned about Soldier H’s account of firing at a face in a toilet window.
Soldier H
Major Lewis said he asked Soldier H what he had fired at and he said “a face in a toilet window.” He said the window was frosted and he thought the face was threatening. Major Lewis said he was angry and said “Bloody hell don’t you know why you fired?” He did not think Soldier H’s account plausible. He asked if he had seen a weapon and H told him he had seen a gunman. He did not seem to know what he had been firing at but Major Lewis did not press him. He said he never discovered what Soldier H had fired at. He did discover who the two soldiers were who had fired when he was at the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk but he could not now remember. He did not question the other soldiers because the platoon sergeants said they returned fire however he was concerned by Soldier H because his story was incredible. He conceded Soldier H may have fired at someone who was not a threat.
In the Peter Taylor interview Major Lewis referred to questioning Soldier H about his ammunition [B2111.0032]. He specifically asked him where he had got 2 extra rounds (Soldier H claimed to have fired 22 rounds but had apparently only been issued with 20). Soldier H had said, “I picked them up.” Major Lewis asked “where from” and Soldier H replied, “I don’t know.” Major Lewis then said he would speak to Soldier H later. He also told Peter Taylor that he had spoken to Soldier H again. However now Major Lewis says he never spoke to Soldier H again because the matter was in the hands of the RMP Special Investigations Bureau. In fact he claimed in his statement to the Inquiry that he was not concerned about Soldier H having had extra ammunition at all only the amount he had fired and his explanation. In that statement he claims all soldiers in Support Company had been issued with 50 rounds and H had not therefore fired more then his official supply. However when questioned by Michael Mansfield QC he agreed the transcript of his conversation with Peter Taylor was accurate. He could not explain why he told Peter Taylor he had followed up the issue of extra ammunition with Soldier H.
Lack of Discipline
Major Lewis said he had to take some responsibility for what he suspected was some loss of discipline on Bloody Sunday. When asked what he meant by this he said he felt there was a lack of discipline in some of the firing, particularly Soldier H. He said, “in one or two cases the response to incoming fire may have been over enthusiastic.” When pressed on this he said the feeling he had at the time was that “some soldiers responded over enthusiastically to a situation that could have been controlled by firing fewer rounds.” Having played a part in training the men he felt perhaps he could have done something that might have made a difference to what happened on Bloody Sunday. By this he said he meant perhaps he could have been more forceful in ensuring the return of fire was minimal. He said the situation could have been controlled a little bit more. However he had no role in any of the operational decisions made on the day.
Major Lewis agreed they had been led to believe they were going into enemy territory and that they may be fired on by snipers. The soldiers were nervous and anxious to identify and neutralise targets. He accepted this meant there was a danger that they would fire on someone who was not in fact a threat. However it was not his job to warn them of this danger. He said such a warning would have been desirable from officers. He agreed the men might have considered the rioters to have been sympathetic to the IRA.
Commenting on the fact that the anti tank platoon sergeant, INQ 1694, never made a statement about what occurred on Bloody Sunday (he is now dead) Major Lewis said he did give a hint that he was not happy about the behaviour of some of the soldiers in Glenfada Park. However Major Lewis never established who, other than Soldier H, INQ 1694 was referring to.
Widgery Tribunal
Major Lewis said he travelled to Coleraine to give evidence to Lord Widgery but was never called. He said he waited and was the last person expecting to be called. He was never told why he was not called. Whilst waiting to give evidence he had with him the form 1033 and the extract from his notebook in which he had written the names of the soldiers who had fired. He remembers attending for two or three days and on one occasion actually sat opposite Lord Widgery in the helicopter from Palace Barracks. He thought Lord Widgery stayed at Palace Barracks for the duration of his inquiry.
Major Lewis agreed no action was taken after the Widgery tribunal even though Lord Widgery concluded the firing in Glenfada Park “bordered on the reckless.”
Finally Major Lewis was asked to comment on remarks made by INQ 2003 in an interview he had given to a journalist, Paul Mahon in 1998. INQ 2003 said of Major Lewis: “ He does not give a shit about the system … or the status quo. He is dying to come out (and say what happened). He was not happy and not pleased about what happened. He was certainly not pleased with the officers in situ, Loden especially.” Major Lewis denied speaking to INQ 2003 or expressing these feelings.
Soldier 041
Sergeant, A Troop, 11 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP [B1664.0007] and to this Inquiry on 22 March 2000 [B1664]
Sergeant 041 was acting platoon commander of A troop of 11 Battery, 22 LADR. He had 28 men. 30 January 1972 he was tasked to hold barrier 13 in Sackville Street.
In his statement to this Inquiry Sergeant 041 referred to there being plain clothes observers on the march who were reporting back its size and what was happening. When asked about this he said he had just assumed this was the case because they were receiving information about the size of the crowd before it reached them.
Gunfire
Sergeant 041 did not hear any live gunfire before the Parachute Regiment deployed into the Bogside. Soldier Z, who was a Lance Bombardier at the barrier, claims to have heard a lot of non army gunfire and witnessed a shot strike the wall of a building immediately to the right of barrier 13. Soldier Z claims that as a result of this shot Sergeant 041 sent him to get his rifle. Sergeant 041 did not recall any of this.
After the Paras went in Sergeant 041 decided to partially dismantle the barrier and move forward to the end of Sackville Street, into Little James Street. Sergeant 041 said he was certain this happened after the Paras had deployed down Little James Street. At this time he heard live gunfire for the first time that day. He heard a number of shots but could not say how many, who fired them or where they were firing.
Soldier Z Firing
Soldier Z was in a kneeling position covering the area to the south and west. He was in a firing position. An incoming high velocity shot then struck the wall on the opposite side of Sackville Street. Sergeant 041 and his men were just on the waste ground on the south side of the street and the shot struck a building on the north side. He claimed he could tell the bullet had come from an Armalite rifle because of the damage caused to the wall. He said an ordinary high velocity shot spins and on impact would have buried itself in the wall. An Armalite bullet tumbles and does not penetrate but causes more surface damage. Sergeant 041 said the amount of masonry displaced told him the bullet was fired from an Armalite.
Sergeant 041 said Soldier Z immediately returned fire with a single aimed shot. He fired a tracer round and Sergeant 041 claims to have watched the bullet all the way to its target. However his accounts of the return of fire are inconsistent. In his statement to this Inquiry he referred to diving to the ground and rolling towards Soldier Z after Soldier Z fired. However he made no mention in his RMP statement of diving to the ground or seeing the tracer. Then he said he ran over to Soldier Z to discover what he was firing at, suggesting he did not see the tracer or the target. He then claims to have seen a man’s arm hanging from the window at which Soldier Z had fired.
Moving Target
Soldier Z and Sergeant 041 locate the building at which Soldier Z had fired in completely different places. In 1972 they both referred to a building on the corner of William Street and Abbey Street. Sergeant 041 said he was probably present when Soldier Z made his RMP statement although he denies there being any discussion as to the location of the building. The Abbey Street/William Street location is also referred to in the contemporaneous radio logs and marked on plans annexed to Soldier Z’s RMP statement. However the photographic evidence indicates there was no building on that corner on Bloody Sunday, it had been demolished.
When he gave evidence to this Inquiry Soldier Z changed the location of his alleged sniper from a building on the corner of Abbey Street/William Street to a derelict building in Abbey Street around 100 yards from the junction. Soldier Z claims to have shot a sniper in one of the top floor windows in the derelict tyre factory. However again the photographic evidence suggests it was not possible to see the tyre factory from his position in Sackville Street.
Radio Logs
Sergeant 041 reported the incident over the radio. He reported to the 11 Battery operations room who then reported to the 22 LADR Head Quarters. There is a log of the latter [W0098] which reads “16:35 (although this is probably a typing error and the time should be 16:53) 1 shot around Sackville Street. No strike observed.” Then at 16:56 “1 round fired at gunman in factory on Abbey Street/William Street, claimed hit, seen to fall.”
Sergeant 041 denied reporting that he had not observed the strike of the incoming round or that there was a 3 minute delay between it and Soldier Z firing. The 22 LADR messages are verified by the actual tape recordings of the messages relayed from their HQ to Brigade. (A Mr. Porter made recordings of the army radio transmissions at the time.)
Another anomaly is the fact that the Porter tapes recording the actual words spoken show 22 LADR HQ referred to the incoming shot as having come from the Rossville Flats. “1 shot from area Rossville Flats at our call sign at junction Sackville Street/Little James Street. No strike, no casualties.” Furthermore, nowhere is Soldier Z’s shot linked to the alleged incoming shot or referred to as return of fire.
Sergeant 041 denied he was lying.
There is evidence from a civilian witness, Steve Peak, who says he saw a man with a rifle in a building behind Abbey Street [see marked photograph at AP0016.0045].
Soldier 165
Bombardier, 53 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1971] and to this Inquiry on 25 June 2003 [B1977.0003]
On 30 January 1972 Soldier 165 was bodyguard to the 53 Battery commander, Soldier 159. Soldier 165 marked his position on the day as on the city walls, approximately half way between the Walker Monument and the Double Bastion.
Green Cortina
Soldier 165 claims to have seen a green Ford Cortina estate with no number plates being loaded from the back of a lock up in the Brandywell area. This evidence is significant since it appears to relate to evidence from a former member of the Provisional IRA, Paddy Ward, who says he loaded nail bombs into a green Cortina in this area. Soldier 165 claims he and Soldier 159 were fired at because the men loading the car noticed them watching. He also claims General Ford was present on the walls at this time and witnessed the incident.
However both Soldier 165 and Soldier 159 made statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 and made no mention of this incident, a Cortina or a lock up. No one reported the alleged suspicious activity or the green Cortina at the time but the 22 LADR radio log [W0094] does refer to 53 Battery reporting people taking photographs from a light blue Cortina at Foxes Corner at 12:20.
Furthermore Soldier 165 now claims to have been part of an undercover operation staged the evening of Bloody Sunday to break into the lock-up. This was purportedly at 02:30 on 31 January 1972. Soldier 165 claims they recovered combat suits from the premises and also encountered a marzipan smell indicating explosives had been stored there. However he again made no mention of any such operation in 1972 and the regimental historical record for 22 LADR [C2107.0042] records that there was such an operation but that it did not occur until 5 February 1972.
Incoming Gunfire
In his 1972 account Soldier 165 refers to incoming gunfire but there he does not link it to any observations or anything else. He said the shots were fired towards the Double Bastion, not at him. Soldier 159 timed the first incoming rounds at the city walls at 16:14, after the Paras had entered the Bogside. He also recorded them as being directed at the Double Bastion to the south. Soldier 165 gave no time in his RMP statement but now claims everything happened whilst General Ford was on the walls. However General Ford was on the walls at 14:45 and he has never referred to coming under fire there or witnessing any suspicious activity.
In his RMP statement Soldier 165 also recorded other gunfire as occurring as early as whilst the march was going along Lone Moor Road towards William Street. However this is not supported by any other evidence. Soldier 159 recorded the gunfire at 16:14 and later at 16:35.
David Longstaff (also known as INQ 023)
Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 3 April 2000 [C0023]
David Longstaff was a private in the anti tank platoon on 30 January 1972. He does not have anonymity because he participated in a television documentary under his own name in 1992. However in many statements his name has been redacted and replaced with the cipher INQ 23. He was known by other soldiers as Big D.
David Longstaff had been in anti tank platoon for about a year by January 1972. He recalled being in a pig on Bloody Sunday with Lieutenant 119, Soldier F, Soldier G, Soldier J and Soldier 036.
Like most former members of Support Company David Longstaff claims to have very little recollection of what occurred on Bloody Sunday. He said he could not recall the convoy in which he travelled into the Bogside or even seeing the rubble barricade. He said he could not remember where the pig stopped. All he recalled was being with Soldier F, Soldier G and Soldier J. He said he was following these men down Rossville Street. He was covering their rear.
Rubble Barricade
David Longstaff claimed not to remember the gunfire directed at the crowd at the rubble barricade where 4 people were killed. He claimed he could not even remember Soldier F, Soldier G and Soldier J firing from the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk. He said he did not recall anyone from anti tank platoon firing at any time.
Glenfada Park
All David Longstaff would say was that he took up a position at the north west entrance to Glenfada Park. Here he claims he looked north towards Colombcille Court thereby failing to witness anything that occurred in Glenfada Park. David Longstaff admitted being with Soldiers F, G and J and claimed to be covering their rear but was reluctant to admit he had entered Glenfada Park with them via the north east entrance. However he eventually conceded it was unlikely he would have left them when they went through the north east entrance and made his way separately to the north west entrance. He accepted he may have crossed the north side of Glenfada Park North having entered from the north east corner.
David Longstaff insisted that although he heard a lot of gunfire behind him he looked north and did not see anyone fire. He agreed he looked around occasionally but denied seeing any soldiers firing or any civilians fall. He said he was looking for a threat but there “didn’t seem to be much.”
He does admit to having seen civilians running in Abbey Park having apparently left Glenfada Park. David Longstaff said he was just to the north west of Glenfada Park when he saw this. A civilian witness, Joseph Gallagher, has given evidence [AG0018.0003] of seeing a Para arrive into Glenfada Park from Colombcille Court and whilst at the north west corner fire from the waist. David Longstaff denied firing in Glenfada Park.
David Longstaff said he did not see any civilian gunmen or nail bombers. He claimed he did not remember seeing Soldier H at any time. He kept repeating all he remembered was hearing gunfire. He did admit to having seen bodies on the ground. In answer to a question from Mr. Toohey, David Longstaff said he saw the bodies when he crossed the car park from north west to south east. He said he did not stop to consider whether those on the ground were injured or dead. He claimed it did not occur to him that they might need medical attention.
David Longstaff denied going into Abbey Park, where Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney were killed. He also denied seeing any soldier in the south west corner of Glenfada Park which leads into Abbey Park.
David Longstaff claimed he never discussed what had occurred in Glenfada Park with Soldiers F and G even though they were all close. He denied witnessing Soldier F killing Bernard McGuigan.
David Longstaff also claimed he was unable to identify any of the soldiers pictured in photographs or video taken on the day. He did however identify himself on the clip from Video 3 where prisoners arrested in Glenfada Park are being led through Colombcille Court.
‘Tour of Duty’
In 1994 David Longstaff participated in a television programme Tour of Duty about Bloody Sunday in which he returned to Derry. During the programme he met John Kelly, whose brother Michael was killed at the rubble barricade, and Liam Wray, whose brother James was killed in Glenfada Park. However he refused to discuss his memory of what happened with them. He said it was “inappropriate”. He said he was taken by surprise and felt tricked.
In one of the few comments he does make David Longstaff says there may have been “one or 2 errors of judgement… one or two rotten apples.” In his evidence to this Inquiry he refused to elaborate on what he meant by these remarks. He refused to say who he had in mind when he made these remarks but when pressed by Lord Saville and Seamus Treacy QC he eventually said he was thinking of Soldier H and Soldier 027.
No Record of Firing
Elsewhere on the programme David Longstaff claimed to have fired a shot on Bloody Sunday. He was never recorded as having done so in 1972. In his statement to this Inquiry he said he was on sentry duty at the pig after returning from Glenfada Park when they came under fire from the Rossville Flats. He said he had a perception that the gunfire came from the roof and he fired an aimed shot in the direction from which he claims the shots had come. However in the Tour of Duty interview he claimed to have fired at a window.
David Longstaff could not explain why he had changed his account of where he had fired or why he referred in his statement to his target being 250 yards away when the distance between the pig and the flats was more like 25 yards. He admitted he never saw a target. Soldier F and Soldier G both admit firing a number of rounds at windows in the Rossville Flats after returning to the pigs but David Longstaff said he did not remember them firing.
David Longstaff said he told the platoon sergeant, INQ 1694, that he had fired one round. He claimed INQ 1694 was more interested in talking to others who had fired but he also claimed not to know who these soldiers were.
David Longstaff said he did not know why he was never questioned further about having fired. He said it did not cross his mind that he should speak to the RMP about having fired. He said he did not think it important at the time. It was the only time he ever fired in Northern Ireland.
Gerard Elias QC, acting for many of the military witnesses, put it to David Longstaff that had he fired and the platoon sergeant not reported it he was very lucky that no one else referred to him having fired in any of their statements. He suggested this was an improbable risk for INQ 1694 to have taken.
Arrests
David Longstaff said he had no memory of arresting anyone although he is recorded as having arrested James Kelly and George Roberts. His is pictured in arrest photographs with each of them [P0503.0022 and .0045]. He is smiling in the photographs. David Longstaff signed arrest statements claiming to have arrested Mr. Kelly and Mr. Roberts for throwing stones in Rossville Street. He accepted he did not see them in Rossville Street and that he must have lied, or signed a statement knowing it to be untrue. He said he did what he was told.
James Kelly, who was arrested in Glenfada Park, has given evidence [AK0012.0005] of David Longstaff sticking the barrel of his rifle in his stomach and saying, “Get your hands up you hairy fucker.” Mr. Kelly said he thought he was the first person in the south east corner of Glenfada Park to be arrested suggesting David Longstaff got there much earlier than he claims. Mr. Longstaff said he did not accept he was the first soldier to get to the south east corner.
Mr. Roberts was also arrested in Glenfada Park. He says Paras told him to sing God Save the Queen and when he refused one of them spat in his mouth [AR0013.0002].
There is an entry at 18:35 in the Brigade Log [W0053] from the RMP saying, “32 prisoners - Support Company has still not sent arrestors. Can action be taken to encourage those who made arrests or else we will have to release them.”
Soldier F
Lance Corporal, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 31 January 1972 (at 02:40 [B0121] and again at 14:10 [B0126]), and on 4 February 1972 [B0129], at 16:00 on 15 February [B0133]; to Colonel Overbury on 19 February 1972 [B0135]; to the Widgery Tribunal on or after 21 February 1972 [B0137]; to the RUC on 14 February 1972 [B0167.0063] and June 1972; and to this Inquiry on 2 March 2000 [B0167.0001]
Soldier F was a Lance Corporal in the Anti Tank Platoon in 1972. He joined the Parachute Regiment as a Private and was sent to Northern Ireland during the emergency tour of 1969. He returned as a Lance Corporal with the regiment’s 1971/2 tour. His first name, Dave, is within the public domain.
Soldier F knew Soldier G very well and they were good friends. He described G, who was a private, as about 5 foot 8 inches tall, stocky with fair/blondish hair. They worked together regularly. On 30 January 1972 he was also with Private David Longstaff, a member of the anti tank platoon whose name is within the public domain.
Soldier F also recalled Soldier E, Soldier J, Soldier 147, INQ 1581, INQ 635 and INQ 1694 the platoon sergeant. He claimed he did not recall Soldier 027.
Promotion
Immediately after the Widgery tribunal he was transferred from the Parachute Regiment but questioning was not permitted as to any of his subsequent activities or postings. However he was promoted to Warrant Officer class 2 (sergeant) and did not leave the army until 1988. Answering questions from Seamus Treacy QC, representing many of the families, Soldier F conceded he had never been criticised or disciplined by the army as a result of his actions on Bloody Sunday nor had his conduct on that day obstructed his career in any way.
‘No Go’ Area
Soldier F said he understood before going to Derry that the ‘no go’ area was controlled by the IRA and was a place the army did not go. He knew there was a hooligan problem but could not remember being told about the civil rights march. He could not remember being briefed. He believed the local units had their hands tied but denied the Paras thought they were going in to sort things out. He claimed he did not recall any enthusiasm about taking on the IRA.
“Lets Get Some Kills”
Soldier 027 has said [B1565.0033] that during the briefing for Bloody Sunday someone said “Lets get some kills tomorrow.” He also says this was repeated by Soldier F who was sitting next to him nodding. Soldier F was the first soldier in anti tank platoon Soldier 027 saw firing on Bloody Sunday and he believed Soldier F had made his mind up as to what he was going to do before they got there. He wrote of Soldier F, “He more than any other was responsible for instigating and perpetrating what occurred on Bloody Sunday.”
Soldier F said he did not know Soldier 027, did not recall any such discussion and did not know why Soldier 027 might want to lie about him.
30 January 1972
Soldier F claimed he could remember virtually nothing about the events of Bloody Sunday. This included any detail of the circumstances in which he shot dead at least three people and probably wounded others. Although he said he had fired on a few occasions prior to Bloody Sunday Soldier F had never before or since killed anyone in Northern Ireland. He repeatedly denied that he was lying when he said he could not remember anything and said he had been involved in many similar experiences. Seamus Tracey QC said it was a curious paradox that whilst none of the Paras seem to be able to remember what happened on Bloody Sunday the people of Derry cannot forget it. Soldier F said he could not explain why almost all the other Paras that have given evidence to the Inquiry also claim to be unable to remember. He said Bloody Sunday was the only occasion on which he killed anyone in Northern Ireland. Mr. Treacy asked why now 30 years later with benefit of anonymity, the Attorney General’s guarantee against self-incrimination, and giving his evidence in London rather than Derry he would not tell the Inquiry and the families what he knew. Soldier F just repeated he could not remember.
Whilst they were waiting to be deployed Soldier 027 says dum dum bullets were passed around the pig. These were ordinary 7.62mm bullets with a deep cross filed into the top. It was the first time Soldier 027 had ever handled one. Soldier F denied this happened.
Although he purported to have no memory of events of the day Soldier F said in his statement to this Inquiry that he did remember sitting with Soldier G having tea when Colonel Wilford spoke to them. He said they should stick together and work in pairs. Soldier F said it was a bit unusual for the commanding officer to do this and it did make him a little apprehensive.
Presbyterian Church
Soldier F said he was in the pig when he heard shots prior to deploying. He was told by others that a shot had hit the drainpipe on the Presbyterian Church. He said he recalled hearing Major Loden tell Colonel Wilford over the radio that they had come under fire. However Major Loden’s evidence is that he was in an observation post on the first or second floor of the church when the incoming round struck.
Going In
When they did deploy Soldier F was with Soldier G and David Longstaff. All he said he could recall was a lot of noise, shouting and explosions. He did not recall wearing a respirator but he could have done so. He said he could not recall being under fire. He did not recall the convoy of Support Company vehicles in Rossville Street but did recall people milling around at the rubble barricade.
He and Soldier G ran down Rossville Street towards the barricade. In his statement to this Inquiry he referred to hearing explosions but not incoming gunfire. In his first RMP statement (RMP 1) he said after they had run 30 yards they came under sniper fire from the Rossville Flats. He also claimed to have seen two nail bombs explode in front of him. He took up a position behind a low wall and again claimed to have come under sniper fire from the Rossville Flats. All he would say in evidence however was that if that was what he had said at the time then that is what he believed when he gave the statement.
Rubble Barricade
Soldier F said he did not now recall anything of what occurred at the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk or even arriving at the wall. He did not remember firing at anyone at the rubble barricade or anyone else doing so. He said he thought he was with 3 or 4 others at the wall. He did not recall the whole platoon being at the wall or Lieutenant 119, the platoon commander, being there.
Michael Kelly
Michael Kelly was shot dead at the rubble barricade and was probably the first of the four who died there to be shot. A bullet was recovered from his body and traced to Soldier F’s rifle. Soldier F was shown photographs of Michael Kelly at the barricade both before and after he was shot however he claimed he could remember nothing at all of what happened. He said he did not recall why he shot Michael Kelly. He also claimed he was not aware of others falling at the barricade.
In evidence Soldier F claimed he could only rely on his statement in 1972 as to the circumstances of his having killed Michael Kelly. However he had made no mention of having fired towards the rubble barricade in any of his RMP statements. It was not until 19 February 1972, almost three weeks later, when Colonel Overbury interviewed him that he admitted shooting someone at the barricade. Then he claimed he shot a man attempting to throw a nail bomb. He could offer no explanation as to how, when making all his previous statements, he managed to forget the first shot he had fired had killed a man at the barricade. Seamus Treacy QC put it to him that shooting dead an unarmed 17 year old boy was the act of a coward. Soldier F said he was not a coward. He said he acted in accordance with the Yellow Card.
Yellow Card
In his first statement Soldier F had said he had cocked his weapon with a round in the breach as soon as they deployed and prior to even claiming to have heard any incoming gunfire. In evidence he said this was standard procedure in 1Para. However he changed his evidence when he made his Widgery statement to claim he heard shots as soon as they debussed and then cocked his rifle. The Yellow Card did not permit a rifle to be cocked unless a soldier was about to open fire.
John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash
Soldier F claimed he was not aware of others having fired from the low wall. In fact, aside from Soldier F, the only members of anti tank platoon who admit to having fired from the wall are Soldiers E and J. (Soldiers K, L and M from Guinness Force also admit doing so but this was at a later stage.) Soldier J claims to have shot at a nail bomber at the barricade but to have missed. Soldier E claims to have fired at the top floor of Block 1. Consequently on the soldiers’ evidence there is no explanation for the deaths of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash who were all shot and killed at the rubble barricade.
Soldier F claimed he did not see them fall did not know who shot them and did not know how they died. He denied a suggestion from Christopher Clarke QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, that there was a conspiracy of silence.
Hugh Gilmour
Hugh Gilmour was apparently shot at the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He is pictured in photograph P0662 [also numbered P0441] just by the doorway and appears to have just been hit. He staggered to the end of Block 1 where he died. He may have been struck by two bullets, possibly the first hitting him in the left arm whilst he was at the barricade.
Soldier F said he did not see Hugh Gilmour shot and did not know who killed him. Soldier U has admitted firing from the north west corner of Block 1. Soldier F said he did not see this.
Firing Into the Crowd
Soldier 027 said in his statement to the Inquiry [B1565.0039] that as they ran towards the low wall there was a crowd facing them to the south of the rubble barricade. He said as Soldier F reached the wall he went into a kneeling position and without pause or hesitation commenced firing towards the centre of the crowd. He reached the wall behind Soldier F as he fired. Other soldiers then arrived and also commenced firing. Some were standing others kneeling. He saw strikes on the barricade and also saw two men fall. A Corporal from Guinness Force then elbowed his way to the front and also commenced firing. He was exuberant and thought it was great.
Soldier 027 said he could not see what they were firing at. He had the distinct impression that the soldiers thought it was an opportunity to fire their weapon and did not want to miss the chance. At first there was steady firing at intervals of seconds but the level of shooting grew as more soldiers arrived. His impression was that the firing continued for a number of minutes.
He said he had an image in his mind of INQ 635 firing but was not sure that he had. He said Soldier F and Soldier G had “a preconceived idea and set about doing it as a pair of oppos”.
Soldier F denied this was what had happened.
Glenfada Park
Soldier F claims he moved to his right into Glenfada Park because he was following another soldier however he claims not to know who this was. He accepts he was with Soldier G and David Longstaff. He claims not to remember anything about what occurred in Glenfada Park where 2 people were killed and 5 wounded. Two others were killed in Abbey Park just beyond the south west corner of Glenfada Park. All Soldier F would admit to is remember firing in Glenfada Park but claimed he did not now recall when, where or why he had fired.
Ceasefire Ordered Before Anyone Entered Glenfada Park
Soldier 027, who was a radio operator, said he had a vivid memory of receiving a ceasefire order from Major Loden before anyone went into Glenfada Park. He says he relayed the ceasefire to others in anti tank platoon before they went into Glenfada Park. Soldier F said he did not recall a ceasefire order before they went into Glenfada Park. He said he was not sure whether the whole platoon went into Glenfada Park. In evidence to Lord Widgery [B0153] he said Soldier E had ordered him into Glenfada Park.
Soldier G admits to having fired along the alleyway which runs east west off Rossville Street and along the north of Glenfada Park North. Soldier F has never referred to this shot and claims not to recall it.
Soldier F claimed he did not see people carrying the body of Michael Kelly across Glenfada Park. He denied firing at these people as they tried to carrying the dying Mr. Kelly to safety.
Various photographs show the group carrying Michael Kelly and others trying to escape through the south west alleyway which led to Abbey Park. Soldier F denied seeing anyone fleeing.
Joe Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray
When cross-examined at Widgery [B0162] Soldier F said he saw 3 people at the south end of the Glenfada Park North car park. However to Lord Saville he denied seeing the bodies of James Wray, William McKinney and Joe Mahon lying in that area. William McKinney and James Wray were both killed and Joe Mahon seriously wounded.
One of Soldier F’s trajectory photographs [P0007], marked at the time of the Widgery tribunal, shows F as having fired two rounds towards the area in which Joe Mahon and William McKinney fell. Soldier F specifically denied shooting Joe Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray.
Soldier G’s trajectory photograph [P0011] shows he fired 3 shots into the south west corner of Glenfada Park. Soldier E’s [P0006] shows he fired two shots south along the east side of the courtyard.
Soldier F said there were explosions and a lot of shooting going on at the time.
There is a photograph of the bodies of Joe Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray lying on the south side of the car park [P0686]. It was apparently never shown to Lord Widgery.
Wounded
In addition to Joe Mahon four others were also wounded in Glenfada Park North. Joe Friel was hit in the south west corner by a bullet which crossed his chest from right to left. Michael Quinn was hit in the right shoulder by a bullet which ended up in his right cheek. Danny Gillespie was hit by a bullet which grazed his scalp and Patrick O’Donnell was shot in the right shoulder whilst crouching at the east side of the car park.
Shot as they Fled
Soldier F said he did not remember how seven people came to be shot in Glenfada Park. He said there was a lot of activity and confusion. It was put to him that people were shot as they fled towards Abbey Park, most were hit on the right side of their bodies, but Soldier F just said he could not remember. He denied they were firing from the hip and fanning their rifles as they fired.
Joe Mahon
Joe Mahon was shot in the pelvis whilst he was banging on the fence at the south side of the car park trying to escape. He was probably hit by a bullet which had passed through William McKinney since they both fell at the same time and the bullet recovered from his body was badly deformed. The forensic evidence of puncture marks in his shirt suggests the bullet had already hit something, or someone else.
William McKinney
William McKinney was hit in the right side of his back and the left arm. It is possible both wounds were caused by the same bullet, possibly the bullet which also hit Joe Mahon [pathology report E0002.0042]. Soldier F denied he had shot William McKinney but Lord Saville and Christopher Clarke QC drew his attention to evidence which suggested he had. He admits to having fired two rounds at a man standing, he claims with a nail bomb, on the south side of Glenfada Park. His trajectory photograph indicates the position of his target was very close to if not in the position where McKinney fell. His evidence in 1972 was that he hit the man in the arm and chest. Soldier F denied murdering William McKinney.
James Wray
James Wray was shot twice in the back. The pathology evidence demonstrates that one of the bullets must have hit him whist he was crouching or whilst on the ground. Joe Mahon saw James Wray shot. He saw him hit in the back and then a blond haired Para stood over him and shot him where he fell from point blank range.
Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney
Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney were both killed in Abbey Park just beyond the alleyway leading from the south west corner of Glenfada Park North. Lord Widgery said he could not be certain whether they had been shot in Glenfada Park or Abbey Park but the Inquiry has photographs which show the body of Gerard McKinney lying where he fell near the shallow steps at the north east corner of Abbey Park. The civilian evidence is clear they were both killed near this location.
Gerard McKinney was shot in the left armpit. The bullet exited the right side of his back. The wounds demonstrate he had his hands in the air when he was shot. Soldier F said he did not see any soldier enter or fire towards Abbey Park. He denied going there himself or firing into that area. The bullet recovered from the body of Gerard Donaghy was traced to Soldier G’s rifle. He has never given an account of how or why he killed Gerard Donaghy. Soldier G is now dead.
Abbey Park
According to the accounts they gave to Lord Widgery Soldier G said he went down the west side of the car park whilst Soldier F went down the east side. However Soldier G denied ever going through the alleyway into Abbey Park or ever firing in that area. The fact that the bullet which killed Gerard Donaghy came from Soldier G’s rifle proves he lied to Lord Widgery. Soldier F said he was unaware of any of this. He said Soldier G never told him he had fired into Abbey Park or that he had shot someone on the ground in Glenfada Park. Since Soldier G admits to firing 6 rounds but none of these in Abbey Park he either lied about where he fired those 6 or he fired more than 6. Soldier F claimed he did not have a private supply of ammunition and that he was unaware of Soldier G having any such supply.
Not Enough Targets
There were 9 people shot in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park, 4 of whom were killed. However when added together the total number of targets members of anti tank platoon claimed to have fired on in the area is at most 6 (excluding Soldier H’s alleged gunman in a toilet window). In addition there were 4 people shot behind the Rossville Flats.
Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty
Bernard McGuigan was shot in the back of the head behind the south gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Patrick Doherty was shot in the buttocks near the north gable end of Joseph Place. Both were killed. Paddy Campbell and Danny McGowan were also shot behind Block 2.
Soldier F is the only soldier to admit firing behind the Rossville Flats. He claimed to have shot a man with what he thought was a pistol near the far (east) end of Block 2. However, as with his account of firing at the rubble barricade, the first mention of the two shots he claims to have fired here comes in his statement of 19 February 1972 to Colonel Overbury. The trajectory photograph for these 2 shots [P0008] places Soldier F at the south gable end of the east block of Glenfada Park North. The exact position of the alleged gunman is not marked but the line of fire extends to the east retaining wall behind the Rossville Flats.
In evidence Soldier F said he was unaware he was the only soldier to admit having fired in this area. He said he was unaware of anyone else having done so. When shown photographs of Bernard McGuigan [P0728] and Patrick Doherty [P0715] lying dead Soldier F said he was “not sure” if he had killed either or both men.
Soldier F’s account to Colonel Overbury was that he ran to the south east corner of Glenfada Park North and heard pistol shots coming from the wall at the east end of the Rossville Flats. He dropped to one knee and saw a man facing him. The man was the only person in the area from which the gunfire had come. He turned as if to run and Soldier F fired two shots at him. He saw the man fall. Answering questions from Christopher Clarke QC Soldier F said he did not kill Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty and cover up by alleging he had shot a gunman. He could provide no explanation for their deaths or the injuries to Paddy Campbell and Danny McGowan.
Anti Tank Platoon Killed 6 and Wounded 7
The total shot and wounded in Glenfada Park, Abbey Park and behind the Rossville Flats was 13. At most anti tank platoon claimed to have fired on 6 targets. Soldier F said he could not explain why the deaths and injuries do not tally with the soldiers’ evidence. He claimed he was unaware of any difficulty in explaining what had happened.
Soldier 027’s Account
The only member of anti tank platoon to have provided a more plausible account of what happened is Soldier 027. In his 1975 version [B1565.0014.0005] he wrote that Soldiers E, F, G and H leapt over the low wall and turned right. He followed them into Glenfada Park where there were around 40 civilians trying to escape. Soldier H fired from the hip felling two men. Soldier H then killed a wounded man on the ground. He said Soldier E shot another and 4 were killed by Soldier F and Soldier G. It all happened in seconds.
Commenting on the above when he gave his statement to this Inquiry [B1565.0044] Soldier 027 said he did not now know how much of the 1975 account was hearsay. However he believed it was how the events had unfolded and that the prime movers were Soldier F and Soldier G. He said “their aggressive actions incited other loonies to join in.” He went on to say F and G had fired more rounds than they had admitted to. He described them as self sufficient and a law unto themselves. He had the feeling they probably enjoyed it all.
Soldier 027 described the atmosphere in the pig as “not so much euphoria as a release of tension.” There was almost a silence of “bloody hell what happened there?” He said the platoon hung together, they looked to protect themselves and each other from any inquiry. There was already recognition that there was a problem that would have to be explained away. There was sorting going on as to who had fired what. In particular Soldier H said he had fired 22 rounds. To fire 22 aimed shots would have taken a lot of time. There was no anger or recriminations they just considered what they were going to do about it.
Soldier 027 said no one knew what Soldier H had fired at. He said he fired at a body that kept moving and they thought he was so stupid he was firing at a dead body that kept moving because he kept hitting it. Soldier 027 said Soldier H was not circumspect enough to keep quiet. The platoon sergeant, INQ 1694, heard Soldier H say he had fired 22 and said “ah” shaking his head.
Soldier F said he did not recall any discussions. He was not aware Soldier H had made up a story.
Coleraine
Soldier 027 also described being flown to Coleraine before the Widgery tribunal with a number of the anti tank platoon. There they poured over aerial photographs drawing lines all over the place. He said the authorities ended up with sophisticated looking spiders webs which bore no relation to fact. Soldier F said he did not recall this.
Civilian Witnesses
One of those who was in Glenfada Park North was Father Bradley. When giving evidence to Lord Widgery he said a soldier arrived at the south east corner and was surprised to find a group of people there. “He pointed his rifle and ordered us to move towards William Street.” A few other soldiers then arrived. Father Bradley was pulled and tugged causing him to fall off the foot path. He then saw a soldier fire 4-8 rounds from the hip or chest. Soldier F said this was not him.
Evelyn Lafferty was a 16 year old Knight of Malta para medic on Bloody Sunday. She was in Abbey Park and saw the three bodies on the ground in Glenfada Park North. She went through the alleyway into Glenfada Park waving her medical bag shouting “don’t shoot, don’t shoot!” As she tried to get to the bodies she was shot at by a Para who said, “your white coat is a good target but your red heart is a better one.”
Soldier F’s Version 1
Soldier F’s first RMP statement was taken at 02:04 on 31 January 1972 and Soldier G’s was at 02:15. In evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier F described “everyone milling around in barracks for about 4 hours” before the statements were taken. In his first RMP statement Soldier F claimed to have come under sniper fire from the Rossville Flats whilst at the low wall. He fired 3 shots at a gunman in the third window along on the second floor of Block 1. All three shots struck the window. He then claimed he fired 2 shots at a nail bomber in Glenfada Park before returning to Rossville Street and firing 8 more shots, in two sets of 4, at windows in Block 1. In evidence to Lord Saville he said he did not recall being in the back of Major Loden’s pig discussing his firing.
Soldier F’s Widgery Version
By the time he gave evidence to Lord Widgery in March 1972 Soldier F admitted to having fired his first shot at a man, he claimed with a nail bomb, at the rubble barricade. He then claimed to have shot the nail bomber in Glenfada Park but added firing twice at an alleged gunman behind the Rossville Flats. Again he claims 8 more shots were fired at windows in the Rossville Flats.
Soldier F said he could not explain the discrepancies, there were errors in his statements, he got confused. However as Christopher Clarke QC pointed out he was not confused as to how many rounds he had fired because he consistently claimed to have fired only 13 however he had reordered and reallocated these 13 rounds. He had taken the three rounds he originally claimed to have fired at Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and allocated one to account for the bullet found in the body of Michael Kelly and two to account for a death behind the Rossville Flats. Soldier F could not explain how he could have forgotten to mention these incidents in his first statement. He just said there was a lot going on.
Why Glenfada Park
Other discrepancies in the statements include the alleged reason for going to Glenfada Park. In his first account (RMP 1), after the three shots fired at Block 1 which he subsequently redistributed, he said he saw 30-40 rioters leave the rubble barricade and go to the right into Glenfada Park. This was his explanation for going there. However by 4 February 1972, when he made his third RMP statement (RMP 3) he was claiming to have seen only 3 men move from the barricade to Glenfada Park but also, for the first time, that he saw a gunman amongst them. In this statement he also claims to have seen Soldier G shoot at a gunman in Glenfada Park. Neither reference to gunmen appears in his first statement.
Soldier F could offer no explanation. Still in this further detailed statement he failed to mention firing either at the rubble barricade or behind the Rossville Flats killing, on his account, two people.
Photographs of Gerard Donaghy
In his second RMP statement (RMP 2) Soldier F claimed to have killed Gerard Donaghy, who was shot in Abbey Park. The statement is brief and simply records that Soldier F said he had been shown photographs of the body of Gerard Donaghy. He then said “I am reasonably sure I shot this man during a full scale riot in Glenfada Park in possession of a nail bomb.” In the statement he claimed to identify Mr. Donaghy by reference to his denim jeans and jacket and the wound to his left hand side. However Soldier G is known to have shot Gerard Donaghy because the bullet recovered from Donaghy’s body was traced to his gun. Gerard Donaghy was killed in Abbey Park not Glenfada Park. Soldier F said he was unaware of this. He claimed Soldier G never told him about killing Gerard Donaghy.
Whilst in this statement Soldier F refers to there being a full scale riot going on later (Widgery statement) he claimed he saw only 3 people in Glenfada Park.
When shown photographs of Gerard Donaghy in the back of a car [P0702, P0703] and at the morgue [P0150, 0151, 0153] Soldier F said he could not remember if any of these were the photographs he was shown in 1972.
Soldier F’s fourth RMP statement (RMP 4) deals with people he claimed to have arrested. He went to Fort George at about 19:00 to identify prisoners who he claimed he recognised as having been rioting at the rubble barricade. By the 15 February 1972 therefore he was making a statement about alleged rioters but had still made no mention of killing people at the barricade and behind Rossville Flats.
The Overbury Statement
Finally on 19 February 1972, in a statement made directly to Lieutenant Colonel Overbury of army legal services, Soldier F first mentions firing on the barricade and behind the Rossville Flats. The statement begins, “I have now read my previous statements … and realise I have mistaken the sequence of events.” It goes on to say of the original three shots fired at the Rossville Flats “I fired these shots later.” The implication therefore is a simple error as to the order of events. However in fact what the statement records is the addition of the alleged engagements with a nail bomber at the rubble barricade and a man with a pistol behind Block 2. When he gave evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier F said the explanation for his sudden recollection of killing the alleged gunman was being shown aerial photographs. The significance of claiming to be mistaken only as to the sequence of events is that Soldier F managed to add two further engagements but maintain his overall expenditure of ammunition as only 13 rounds. In this version his first shot is the one that killed Michael Kelly.
Moving Targets
The three shots now said to have been fired ‘later’ are said to be the first of the 8 he originally claimed (in RMP 1) to have fired at the Rossville Flats after returning from Glenfada Park. However in RMP 1 he said those 8 were fired in two groups of 4 at two different gunmen in two different windows. By the time he gave evidence to Lord Widgery he was claiming to have shot at three gunmen in three windows. Further the trajectory photograph [P0007] marks three windows but none of them on the floors or in the positions referred to in the Widgery statement. Soldier F denied he was making it up as he went along. The other circumstances have also changed in that in RMP 1 he was simply told which windows others had seen gunmen in and he fired at “something” which moved. In the Overbury and Widgery statements he claims not only to have seen each gunman but also seen them fire.
There is a photograph of a window in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats with bullet holes in it [P0544], only there are six holes. There was a photographer in the flat but, according to the occupants, no gunman.
Evolving Evidence
The detail of the final statements suggests they were made with an awareness of other evidence. Soldier F’s bullet was found in Michael Kelly’s body and ballistics linked the bullet to his rifle. The rifles had been sent for examination between 7th and 15th February 1972. On 19 February 1972 Soldier F gave his first account of shooting a man at the barricade holding a large object with sparks coming off it.
Patrick Doherty
Furthermore the description of the alleged gunman shot at the east end of Block 2 becomes very specific in the statement Soldier F made to the Treasury solicitors for the Widgery tribunal. The Widgery statement is undated but must have post dated the Overbury statement. There Soldier F says of the gunman “he was in a half crouching position moving to the right as I shot him”. Eilis McDermott QC, counsel for the family of Patrick Doherty, put it to Soldier F that this was an absurd description included to account for the pathology evidence [D0400] which demonstrated Mr. Doherty was shot in the buttocks as he was crawling away.
Donna Harken, who was 15 at the time, was next to Mr. Doherty when he was shot. She was at the northern end of Joseph Place. She described how he was crawling away when he was shot in the buttocks. Another man, Patrick Walsh tried in vain to reach Mr. Doherty but was prevented from doing so by continuous gunfire from Glenfada Park. At the end of her evidence to Lord Saville [DAY 171, page 126] Ms. Harken said Mr. Doherty was murdered. He was innocent. He was shot by a coward, not even shot in the back.
Soldier F agreed Mr. Doherty’s widow and 6 children were entitled to know who had killed him. Eventually at the very end of his evidence he was asked again by Christopher Clarke QC if he accepted he had shot Patrick Doherty, Soldier F said “Yes.”
Bernard McGuigan
When questioned by Michael Mansfield QC on behalf of the McGuigan family Soldier F said he was unaware that there were military witnesses who saw him shoot Bernard McGuigan. Since he is the only soldier to have admitted firing from the corner of Glenfada Park North towards the south of the Rossville Flats he is the obvious candidate for shooting those shot behind Blocks 1 and 2. Furthermore he is identified as having fired there on the shot plot produced at the Widgery tribunal. Soldier F accepted he was kneeling at the lamppost near the south gable end of the east block of Glenfada Park North when he fired.
Lieutenant 227, who was in command of the army observation post on the city walls above the Bogside on 30 January 1972, saw a Para fire from exactly Soldier F’s position and also saw Bernard McGuigan fall near the telephone box behind Block 1. His statement to Lord Widgery [B2189] records: “The kneeling soldier fired 2 deliberate shots towards my right and downwards (he was looking from above). The shots were aimed I believe in the direction of the near end of Block 1. As he did this I saw a man falling. He was a few paces out from the end of Block 1 where a small group of people were gathered.” He then identified the man he saw fall as the man pictured in photographs EP0025.0017 and .0018. These are photographs of Bernard McGuigan lying in a pool of blood behind Block 1.
A civilian witness, Geraldine McBride (nee Richmond), was with Mr. McGuigan and others cowering behind the south gable end of Block 1, near the telephone box. In her statement [AM0045.0005] she said Mr. McGuigan was a community man and he could not stand doing nothing whilst he heard calls for help from a man who had been shot. He said they wouldn’t shoot him if he waved a white handkerchief but they all told him not to go. He walked out slowly and she saw bullets going past. Then as he turned to look back at her she saw a bullet hit him in the back of his head. His head exploded and she saw his eye blown out.
Soldier F was then shown the mortuary photographs showing the wounds to Mr. McGuigan’s head and face. He insisted he could not remember whether or not he had shot Mr. McGuigan but when Michael Mansfield QC asked if he would accept all the evidence indicated he must have done he said he did accept he had.
Mr. Mansfield then identified the evidence that showed that the army knew Soldier F had killed Mr. McGuigan. Aside from Lieutenant 227, his Sergeant Major (Soldier 040) made a statement on 2 February 1972 and two more soldiers (Soldier 134 and 025) made statements on 3 and 4 February 1972. Since Soldier F was the only one who placed himself at the south gable end of Glenfada Park North the army knew he was the only candidate. However Soldier F denied being approached before he made his statement of 19 February 1972 to Colonel Overbury.
On 16 February 1972 Soldier 040 and Soldier 134 also made statements to Colonel Overbury. Soldier F said he did not know this.
Even in his statement to this Inquiry Soldier F was still lying about his Overbury statement claiming, “the statement re-orders the sequence but does not raise any new issues.”
Arrests
Malachy Coyle was amongst the crowd in Glenfada Park. His account [AC0097.0005] is of 4-5 soldiers running south across Glenfada Park. He said one stood out. He did not have a helmet and had dark hair. He ran to the south gable end and discovered the crowd which had been sheltering there. People started screaming, “don’t shoot” and he responded, “I’ll shoot you you Irish bastards, you Irish scum.” He was very angry and out of control. Mr. Malachy described him as acting like he was high on drugs. He also saw a young boy fall, apparently shot by this soldier, in the far south east corner.
In RMP 4 Soldier F identified Thomas Bradley, Patrick Norris, Terrence O’Keefe and Michael McCallion as people he had arrested. He was photographed with each and he appears relaxed however he denied he was smug or happy [ARR0005.0001, ARRR0046.0001]. Whereas in RMP 4 Soldier F claimed all four men had been rioting at the rubble barricade, in the arrest reports all are alleged to have been throwing stones in William Street. Soldier F signed statements alleging he had witnessed each of them throwing stones and arrested them in William Street. In fact Mr. Norris and Mr. McCallion were arrested in a taxi in William Street and Father O’Keefe and Father Bradley were arrested in Glenfada Park.
Later on 13 June 1972 [ARRoo46.0005] Soldier F made a further statement regarding the arrests in which he then claimed not to have arrested Patrick Norris and to have no idea who did. The statement was made as a result of a complaint by Mr. Norris that property had been stolen from him.
Brutality at Fort George
Father O’Keefe has given a detailed account of what occurred at Fort George [H0021.0051]. He described two soldiers: one 5 feet 9-10 inches tall with blond, whitish hair; another 5 feet 7-8 whose name was Soldier F. He said the first had a frightening almost psychotic look about him. They were both assaulting young lads. They ordered heaters to be brought in and made people stand in front of them. At one point Soldier F asked a man if he wanted a drink and spat in his mouth. Father O’Keefe was amongst the last three to be charged. An army officer came in and asked who was charging them, Soldier F said he was and he then said to Mr. O’Keefe, “You were throwing stones weren’t you?” He replied, “No I’m a Roman Catholic priest and a lecturer in philosophy.” Soldier F kneed him in the groin and said “you should have been wearing your fucking collar then.” Later when Soldier F was kicking someone else an RUC officer intervened and said the people were in police custody and if he assaulted anyone again he would charge him with assault.
The brutality at Fort George was reported in the press at the time [L0193] and Soldier F was named. Soldier F said he never saw the reports but he makes specific reference to newspaper allegations naming him in a statement he made on 15 February 1972 [B0167.0034]. There he refers to an article in the Sunday Independent dated 6 February 1972 dealing with allegations of maltreatment at Fort George by Barry Liddy and Dennis McLaughlin. Soldier F said he had forgotten about the article. He claimed he had never harmed a prisoner or even slapped anyone in his entire 2 years of service in Northern Ireland.
Soldier F denied being party to or witnessing any brutality at Fort George.
Divis Flats Operation 3 February 1972
Soldier 027 has given an account of an operation at the Divis Flats in Belfast when anti tank platoon deployed to lure out gunmen. There was a burning barricade which Soldier 036 rammed with a pig. Several civilians were severely beaten up including a man who was run head first into the side of a pig by Soldier F and Soldier G. The man was knocked unconscious then tortured in the back of a pig. He and another man who had also been badly beaten were too obviously injured to be handed over to the RUC so they were dumped outside a bar on the Shankill Road in the belief they would be killed by Loyalists. Both men were Catholics. In fact they were rescued from a mob by another army patrol.
Soldier F denied he was involved in any such incident. The two men were Raymond Muldoon and Francis Creagh. An internal army memorandum dated 8 July 1974 concedes responsibility for the men’s injuries and recommends substantial compensation. The document demonstrates that the army knew who was involved in the incident but no other documents concerning this matter have been disclosed. Lieutenant 119, the commander of anti tank platoon, denied his men were involved but Soldier 027 says it was them and specifically Soldiers F and Soldier G. Soldier F said to the best of his knowledge he was never questioned about the incident.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
