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15 - 18
SEPTEMBER 2003
Evidence heard
This week the Inquiry heard from the following witnesses:
Soldier K (Sergeant, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier M (Private, Guinness Force, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); INQ 1237 (Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment); Soldier 030 (Gunner, 53 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment); INQ 1990 (Sergeant, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment); Captain 200 (Captain, Officer Commanding Head Quarters Company/Guinness Force Platoon Commander, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment) and INQ 1828 (Corporal, Royal Military Police, 173 Provost Company).
Summary of Evidence
Monday 15 September 2003 Soldier K, Soldier M
Tuesday 16 September 2003 INQ 1237, Soldier 030, INQ 1990
Wednesday 17 September 2003 INQ 1990, Captain 200
Thursday 18 September 2003 Captain 200, INQ 1828
A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the code given to a particular document by the Inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
Sergeant K completed his evidence on Monday but it appears in full in last week’s report (week 99). Two other firers, Soldier L and Soldier M, were scheduled to give evidence this week but Soldier L refused to attend. The tribunal issued a subpoena requiring him to attend but so far he has failed to do so. Soldiers L and M were members of Guinness Force and both fired from the low wall at Kells Walk towards the rubble barricade in Rossville Street. INQ 1237 was a member of anti tank platoon and witnessed Soldier F, Soldier G and Soldier J firing from the low wall. He was never asked to make a statement to the Royal Military Police and did not give evidence to Lord Widgery. Captain 200 was in command of Guinness Force and kept a number of contemporaneous manuscript documents which are available to the Inquiry.
Soldier M
Private, B Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 31 January 1972 [B0347] and 4 February 1972 [B0356], to the Widgery Tribunal on 5 March 1972 [B0372.0015] and to this Inquiry on 24 March 2000 [B0372.0001]
Soldier M was a driver in the Motor Transport platoon but on 30 January 1972 was a member of Guinness Force. He had joined the army at 15 and was 19 on Bloody Sunday. He spent 25 years in the army. He was present at the Presbyterian Church when a shot struck the drainpipe.
When they debussed from the lorry in Rossville Street Soldier M had to put on his gas mask. He said they were then called forward to the command vehicle, although he could not now remember if by this he meant Major Loden’s pig. He went forward with Soldier 039 whom he was supposed to be protecting. Soldier 039 was carrying a baton gun and Soldier M had an SLR.
Gunfire
Soldier M claimed that as he walked south in Rossville Street he came under fire. He said he saw 2-3 bullets strike the road a few metres to his right on the west side of Rossville Street, near the north end of Kells Walk. He said the shots sounded like low velocity. However in his second RMP statement he had said he was on the west side of Rossville Street, moving along Kells Walk when the shots struck the ground to his left near the junction of Rossville Street and Eden Place.
Gunman in Block 2
He said he did not now recall seeing a gunman but in his second RMP statement he had said he saw a man with a rifle on the top floor balcony of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. The gunman was about 15 metres from the south east corner. However he made no mention of seeing this gunman in his first RMP statement made the next day. There he just claimed to have come under fire from “snipers in the flats.”
Soldier M could not explain why he had failed to mention seeing a gunman when he gave his first statement to the RMP. He said the second statement was not made at his initiative or as the result of some further recollection on his part. He assumed the RMP had asked to see him again.
Then in his statement to the solicitors acting for the Widgery tribunal Soldier M claimed to have come under automatic fire from Block 2. This time he said the shots struck 10-12 yards in front of the command vehicle. Although he said a soldier engaged the gunman he again failed to say he actually saw the gunman. He denied this was because he had had second thoughts about what he had said in his second RMP statement. In his RMP statement (second) he said the Para was wearing a gas mask and engaged the gunman from a position 2 metres south of Eden Place/Rossville Street. He went on to say he saw the gunman run to the south east end of Block 2.
Soldier M’s second RMP statement was made at Coleraine in the presence of Colonel Overbury. He spent several days at Coleraine and both Sergeant K and Soldier L were also there at this time. Soldier M accepted they may have spoken to each other and influenced the contents of each other’s statements.
Soldier 039 Firing at Window in Kells Walk
Although they were working as a pair Soldier M said he would not necessarily have expected Soldier 039 to have seen the gunman in Block 2. Furthermore, Soldier M claims not to have witnessed Soldier 039 firing a rubber bullet through a window in a flat in Kells Walk. However he does claim to remember hearing a woman screaming abuse from the flat. Soldier 039 claimed there were two women throwing missiles from the flat and this was his justification for firing. Soldier M’s explanation for not witnessing Soldier 039 firing was that he must have been in front of him at the time. He said he had no recollection of Soldier 039 telling him about the incident. He denied omitting any reference to the incident because he was protecting Soldier 039. Ms. Kathleen Kelly, who was in the flat, said a soldier fired a rubber bullet through the window because her sister had shouted at soldiers who were firing live rounds at youths behind the rubble barricade. Ms. Kelly’s son was killed at the rubble barricade. There was also a photographer in the flat.
Rubble Barricade
Soldier M said there were no soldiers at the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk when he and Soldier 039 got there. There was still a crowd south of the rubble barricade. They were running in all directions, some were throwing missiles. In his first RMP statement he described the crowd as numbering 1,500 but in evidence he insisted this was not his estimate but that of the statement taker, Corporal Brobson. He said he had no idea as to the size of the crowd. However Corporal Brobson denies that it was him who came up with the figure.
In his first RMP statement Soldier M also claimed to have come under fire from the rubble barricade and that the crowd were throwing nail bombs and petrol bombs. He now says he has no recollection of this.
Firing at Men Crawling to Block 1
Soldier M says Soldier 039 pointed out two men crawling south of the rubble barricade along the western edge of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Both men were on their hands and knees. In his statements Soldier M claimed both men were carrying or dragging what looked like rifles. At this point Soldier M said he was behind the northern most of the two low walls at Kells Walk.
In evidence Soldier M claimed he had “always had the impression” the men “had the weapons across their arms or elbows.” However in his statement to this Inquiry Soldier M claimed the rifles were “on their right hand side, so they were not shielded from my view by the men’s bodies.” He said these meant the same thing and he “assumed” he meant the rifle butts were on the right hand side. However his memory was not clear. He said he had always been positive the men had rifles. There was no possibility they could have been anything else. In his first RMP statement he had described the men as “both pushing long black stick like objects in front of them.” Soldier M said he did not say “long black stick like objects” and again claimed Corporal Brobson had inserted these words. He could provide no explanation as to why the RMP officer should have diluted what he insisted was a positive identification of rifles. When asked about the discrepancy between pushing and carrying Soldier M claimed these were the same.
He aimed his rifle at the first man who had almost reached the doorway to Block 1. The man jerked forward and he believed he had hit him. He did not see what happened to the rifle. He then fired at the second man. He did not know if he hit him and he scrabbled forward and was helped into the doorway. Again he did not see what happened to the rifle.
In his first RMP statement Soldier M had said he was sure he had hit both men because he had seen them both jerk forward. In evidence Soldier M said he always believed he hit both men.
Soldier M also disputed he had described the second man as wearing a grey suit (RMP 1). In his Widgery statement he described the second man as wearing a light brownish jacket and light coloured trousers. He could not explain the change. In that statement he also said he fired on the second man only after another soldier fired. There was then a third shot. He said he did not know who fired the other first and third shots.
Kells Walk Pram Ramp
Soldier M then went through an alleyway and climbed onto a ramp overlooking the Rossville Flats. He was with a sergeant. He thought this was the pram ramp to the south of Kells Walk. He was then directed to escort some prisoners from Colombcille Court to Little James Street. Finally he was told to go to a derelict building in William Street with a view of Colombcille Court and Kells Walk. He was there for 20-30 minutes and observed several wounded people being escorted into a Volkswagen by a priest.
Soldier M had recorded in his Widgery statement that there were 2 ammunition checks made. One shortly after he had fired from the low wall and another at the derelict building. He could not now recall who did the checks but the magazines would have been examined to see how many rounds were left in them.
De-briefing
Soldier M said he had no recollection of ever speaking to Captain 200, the officer commanding Guinness Force, about having fired. Captain 200 claims to have interviewed all those from Guinness Force who fired. In his contemporaneous statement [B1982] he gives grid references for the positions from which soldiers fired and their targets. The grid references for Sergeant K and Soldier M targets are the same. However the reference does not reflect the position of the men crawling along Block 1 but is on the other side of Rossville Street near Glenfada Park. Furthermore the description of both targets is “gunman behind barricade.” Finally the reference is to only one gunman whom Soldier M is described as having possibly hit. He says he fired at two gunmen and believes he hit both. Consequently the description of the location, grid reference, number and outcome of Soldier M’s firing are all different to those contained in his RMP statement made the next day. Michael Mansfield QC asked therefore had Captain 200 made it up or had Soldier M lied to him? Soldier M said he had no memory of speaking to Captain 200.
INQ 1237
Private, Anti Tank Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statement to this Inquiry on 17 May 2000 [C1237]
INQ 1237 was posted directly to Support Company’s anti tank platoon in May 1971. 1 Para were already in Northern Ireland when he joined. Sometime after he was posted the army decided not to send soldiers under 18 to Northern Ireland. Some of those INQ 1237 trained with, who were a few months younger than him, were sent home.
Platoon run by Soldiers
INQ 1237 said he was mates with all the men in the platoon. They all lived together so got to know each other very well. There were tensions between some members: Soldier F did not like Soldier 147, and INQ 635 was always fighting with INQ 23 (David Longstaff). He said that due to his inexperience Soldier F looked after him. He described Lieutenant 119 as a “wee lad from Sandhurst” and “a bit green.” INQ 1237 described the soldiers of 1 Para as able to take control of a situation on their own. Inexperienced junior officers who were not liked did not last long. He described Soldier F as “very steady” and Lieutenant 119 was “not in this category”. He said of Soldier 027 he was a nice lad but a bit of a romanticist who did not belong in the army. Soldier 027 bunked above him for 4 months and he often saw him writing a diary in a notebook.
INQ 1237 travelled to Derry in a pig with Soldier 027. He cannot now remember who else was in the pig. After deploying in Derry the waited around for a couple of hours. At some point INQ 1237 was given a radio to act as one of Major Loden’s signallers. This may have been when Major Loden was at his observation post at the Presbyterian Church because INQ 1237 recalled climbing to an elevated position close to the confrontation, however he could not see the crowd. At some point an order came over the radio from Colonel Wilford. He did not pay much attention to the actual messages and handed the handset to Major Loden to speak directly to others. INQ 1237 was released by Major Loden and returned to anti tank platoon after passing the radio to someone else.
Going In
INQ 1237 was in a pig with Soldier 027, Soldier F and possibly INQ 23 when they got the order to go in. He said it was standard policy at the time to cock your SLR before going into a riot situation, leaving the safety catch on. He thought they were going in to control a riot that had got out of hand and the local battalions could not handle. He thought they would either run at the crowd to make them disperse or advance slowly towards them using the pigs as cover. He did not recall any orders to arrest rioters.
As soon as they debussed from the pigs INQ 1237 saw a large crowd to his front left across an open space. He had his SLR ready and scanned the Rossville Flats for snipers. He saw some people throwing objects from the flats. He described a hail of missiles including petrol bombs. He refused to accept he might have confused seeing petrol bombs with a different riot on a different day.
Firing at the Rubble Barricade
Although he said he did not recall the rubble barricade INQ 1237 described seeing 6 to 8 members of the platoon, some kneeling, in a line facing the crowd. He does not believe this was at the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk but they were about 100 yards from the crowd. He was several yards behind this group and CSM Lewis was behind him. Soldiers F, G and J were there and possibly INQ 1558. The group of them opened fire at the crowd. Although he described them as purposeful, aimed shots INQ 1237 did not see what they were firing at or any threat. This was only a few seconds after they had got out of the pig. He estimated 30-40 rounds, possibly more, were fired in a few seconds that seemed like an eternity. He did not see any civilian gunmen and claims not to have seen anyone being shot. He was concentrating on the flats. He was not aware of any incoming fire.
First Ceasefire Order
During this firing INQ 1237 said he was sure CSM Lewis came forward and shouted an order to ceasefire, “Ceasefire, stop your firing.” He said it all happened very quickly and took less then 90 seconds. CSM Lewis was the only officer in the area. Answering questions from Gerard Elias QC, representing CSM Lewis, INQ 1237 insisted it was the CSM who ordered the ceasefire and it was at this early stage.
He then remembers people waving white handkerchiefs and screaming, “You shot them” and “get help” although he said he could not see anyone injured in front of him.
Glenfada Park North
There was then an order to seal off the area to the right. About ten of them from anti tank platoon then went to the right. He remembers running down an alleyway to his right and then turning right again into an open area. There he was confronted by a priest and a small crowd wanting to get past. He was ordered to stop them. He told the priest and the crowd to move back and “all of a sudden one of the lads shouted from behind me ‘he’s got a weapon!’” Three or four of the lads ran towards the crowd but he said he did not know who they were or who shouted the warning.
INQ 1237 and others then moved the crowd back from the central area. He told the priest he would arrest him if he did not move. He said he did not remember any gunfire at this point and could not remember anything else until they returned to the pigs. Father Bradley, who was in Glenfada Park North, has given evidence of soldiers preventing from getting to the bodies of James Wray, William McKinney and Joe Mahon. He was also assaulted with a rifle butt.
Anti Tank Platoon Ammunition Count
Back at the pigs he remembers CSM Lewis ordering an ammunition check and telling those who fired to take off their magazines and count their rounds. He had not fired so ignored the order but Soldiers F, G and J all said they had fired. The CSM called out as he made notes of the rounds fired by each man. Everyone looked up in surprise at the number of rounds fired by one soldier however INQ 1237 said he did not know who this was. Someone said, “he’s fired how many?” INQ 1237 had never been in an incident when so much ammunition was fired. He insisted it was the CSM and not the platoon sergeant, INQ 1694, who did the count.
Ambulances
At some point he remembers ambulances having difficulty gaining access to a road to his left. He said he did not know whether or not they eventually got through.
No Contact
Once they got to the barracks (Drumahoe) they were not permitted to contact anyone until a certain time. He remembers this because he was not allowed to call his mother for at least a few hours. Their weapons were not removed from them and they basically sat around cleaning them. At one point RUC officers arrived and spoke to Soldiers F and G. They were shown photographs of the dead but could not identify them. They were also asked to go to the morgue but INQ 1237 said he did not know whether or not they went.
Private G
INQ 1237 said he discussed the shootings with Soldier G. G told him he could not recognise the faces in the photographs but that there were gunmen in the crowd. He said it was appalling that they used innocent civilians for cover. Soldier F also said that gunmen operating in that way put innocent people at risk. INQ 1237 said the general feeling at the time was that around 20 people were killed and the IRA gunmen were buried over the border.
Widgery Tribunal
To his knowledge only 6 to 10 of the platoon were called to give evidence to Lord Widgery. He was never asked to even make a statement. He was surprised by this because he was a witness.
Arrested Civilians
INQ 1237 said he had no recollection of dealing with any prisoners. Even when he was shown arrest photographs in which he is pictured with two men he is supposed to have arrested he said he knew nothing about them. He was photographed at Fort George with Charles Glenn [P0503.0018] and George McDermott [P0533.0033]. However he said he knew nothing of their arrests. He was shown arrest statements in which he purports to have arrested the men for throwing stones at the security forces in William Street. He said he could not tell from the documents whether or not the signature on them was his. In any event Charles Glenn was arrested at the west end of William Street near Francis Street long after any rioting had ceased. He was a Knight of Malta medic who helped to carry Jack Duddy’s body away from the Rossville Flats car park. Mr. Glenn has told the Inquiry of assaults on prisoners. At Fort George he was taken in with Mr. McDermott even though he had not been with him when arrested. The RMP suggested the time and location of the arrest and the RUC told the Para he had to say they were throwing stones. He had never seen INQ 1237 before.
Soldier 030
Gunner, 53 Battery, 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP on 2 February 1972 [B1612.0010] and 16 February 1972 [B1612.0017], to the Widgery Tribunal [B1612.0018] and to this Inquiry [B1612.0030]
In 1972 Soldier 030 was on his second tour on Northern Ireland. He was stationed at the Craigavon Bridge. On 30 January 1972 he was posted to an army observation post (OP) on the city walls over looking the Bogside.
Statements
Soldier 030 made two statements to the RMP and a statement to the Widgery tribunal in 1972. In evidence he said he did not now recall some of what was in those statements and conceded much of what he had said in his statement to this Inquiry contradicted his earlier accounts. His second RMP statement was made in the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Overbury.
City Walls
From his position at the Platform Soldier 030 could see along the southern end of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats towards Glenfada Park. He could also see Joseph Place and beyond it Free Derry Corner. He was with Sergeant 001. They did not have a radio but the main OP was within shouting distance about 20 feet to the left (south). Soldier 210, the Company Sergeant Major, was there. There were also snipers in a building behind them providing cover.
Before the march a photographer approached the walls from below and began taking photographs. Soldier 030 reported the photographer to the command post and was told “you know what to do”. He then fired a rubber bullet at the man who “did not bother us again”.
The next thing he remembers is a shout from the command post “watch it, the Paras are coming in!” This was the first he knew of the Paras presence in Derry. By this time there were people all over the Bogside and Bernadette Devlin was on a trailer speaking over a loud hailer. However in his RMP statement Soldier 030 had said he did not know the Paras were in the Bogside until he saw one of them in Glenfada Park.
Gunman 1
Shortly after he heard the shout that the Paras were coming in Soldier 030 says he heard a single low velocity shot. He looked up and claims to have seen a gunman with a pistol standing behind the Rossville Flats. In his statement to this Inquiry Soldier 030 said that the man was firing north between the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He could not describe the man or his clothing. He said the man was surrounded by people milling around. He then claims to have seen puffs of smoke from the pistol as the man fired 2 or 3 shots in quick succession towards Butcher’s Gate.
However in his first RMP statement he placed the gunman between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. In his second RMP statement he placed him by a low wall in the courtyard of the Rossville Flats. He saw the man through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He said he could not explain why he had changed the location of the gunman. In his statement to the Widgery tribunal he said the gunman was firing in the direction of William Street. In that statement he also claims to have seen a body in the courtyard. In his first RMP statement Soldier 030 had the gunman standing but when giving evidence to Lord Widgery on 13 March 1972 he said he was kneeling [B1612.0022].
The description of the gunman in the first RMP statement was “long, dark well kept hair; brown jacket and faded, blue jeans.” Sergeant O had also described a man with a pistol with dark hair and jacket near a low wall. However Sergeant O placed the man below Block 3, behind a car and kneeling.
Soldier 030 claimed he reported sighting the gunman to the command post however he had previously admitted the first time he mentioned the gunman was when he spoke to an officer who visited the post later in the day. He said his first statement was made 2-3 hours later, however his first RMP statement was not made until 3 days later. In evidence he said it would have been Sergeant 001’s responsibility to report the sighting at the time.
He said he could not fire at the gunman because of all the civilians around him.
He then described all hell breaking loose and hearing a number of shots. In his recent statement he claims none of the shots were high velocity. However in his Widgery statement he said he did heard SLR fire from the area of William Street/Little James Street.
Bernard McGuigan
Although he said he could no longer remember, in his RMP statement Soldier 030 had said that he had seen a body by the telephone box behind the south gable end of Block 1. The body was in a big pool of blood.
Glenfada Park
In his first RMP statement Soldier 030 claimed to have heard a burst of gunfire from a Thompson sub machine gun. He said Sergeant 001 pointed to a wooden fence in Glenfada Park and he saw muzzle flashes as he heard a second burst. He had then said he aimed his SLR at the fence. Soldier 030 said he could not remember any of this now. In his second RMP statement he added that he saw a Para in Glenfada Park firing at the fence. He repeated this in his Widgery statement adding that the Para knelt down by the last tree and fired 3 shots at the fence. In this statement he also added that he had seen the Para turn and aim in his direction along the south end of Block 2 as he heard low velocity shots from below him. He could not see who was firing.
By the time he gave evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier 030 was claiming to have actually seen a gunman with a Thompson machine gun, running across Glenfada Park. He claimed the gunman was in the south west corner of Glenfada Park North (where James Wray and William McKinney were killed).
Finally, in his recent statement, Soldier 030 made no mention whatsoever of hearing a Thompson, seeing a gunman with a machine gun or anything that occurred in Glenfada Park. Instead he claimed to have seen a gunman wearing army combat dress, including a beret, carrying an automatic rifle. Soldier 030 said he assumed this was stolen army dress. He said he could not now remember where he was. Even though he was dressed like a soldier Soldier 030 said the man was definitely a civilian because he had long black hair.
When accounting for his memory altering so much over the years he said his account of seeing the Para fire must have been misinterpreted by the RMP at the time. In his recent statement he repeatedly said, “the RMP must have misinterpreted and misunderstood me”. But by the time he came to give evidence to Lord Saville Soldier 030 said he preferred to rely on his 1972 accounts.
Civilian Casualties
Soldier 030 says he then heard people below shouting that people had been shot. He saw an older man dragging a younger man who was on the ground. He did not know if he had been shot or not.
Later he heard ambulances arrive and saw bodies taken away. He saw one man being given the last rights by a priest as he was carried away on a stretcher. At this time he also heard two high velocity shots. He claimed these were the only two high velocity shots he heard all day, other than those fired by the gunman dressed as a soldier.
Soldier 030 now says he did not see any soldier fire a weapon.
Making Statements
When he got back to barracks the RMP were already there. Anyone who even heard firing was ordered to make a statement. Soldier 030 made a statement to an RMP officer and another RMP. There was also an officer from 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment present but he was not from 53 Battery. However the first statement available to this Inquiry is one dated 2 February 1972.
Widgery Tribunal
In his statement to the Inquiry Soldier 030 described giving evidence to Lord Widgery as a frightening experience because “the families … and their lawyers were shouting and bawling at us.” The families’ lawyers did not have access to the RMP statements at the Widgery tribunal.
INQ 1990
Staff Sergeant, Command Company, 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment
Made Statements to this Inquiry on 6 July 2000 [C1990] and 16 June 2003 [C1990.0013]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 1990 was escort to the second in command of his Battalion. However it is unclear precisely who that was at the time. The Inquiry believes it to have been Major INQ 1310, because he has made a statement to say he was the second in command on Bloody Sunday. However INQ 1990 said he believed it was INQ 2574. The Inquiry understands this officer was not present on Bloody Sunday.
City Walls
INQ 1990 was on the city walls acting as bodyguard to the major. He could not recall precisely where he was. He did not think he could see the rubble barricade but said he could see a little of the Rossville Flats car park through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He said he walked most of the length of the wall but specifically remembered being close to the Walker Monument.
Taping Radio Transmissions
In his statement INQ 1990 referred to the fact that the radio transmissions on the Royal Anglian Regiment battalion network would be tape recorded at busy times. This was because it was not possible to note all the messages sometimes. He did not know if it was taped on Bloody Sunday but he said he thought it would have been. The tapes would then have been transcribed. The signals officer would make the tapes. INQ 1990 was asked to sign the transcripts.
INQ 1990 said he saw the march assemble in the Bogside. There were thousands of people congregating at Free Derry Corner. He then claims to have seen hundreds of people loading rubble into crates and carrying them north towards William Street. He also claimed to see people filling crates with milk bottles. He denied he was exaggerating or that he could have been confused with a different day.
Gunfire
INQ 1990 said he heard 3 shots but could not say whether they were high or low velocity. He could not identify the type of weapon fired because of all the reverberations off buildings. There were still people milling around all over the place at this time. When asked he agreed the shots could have come from Eden Place where Lieutenant N fired across Chamberlain Street. However he said everyone at his position on the city walls went down as if the shots had been fired at them.
INQ 1990 said he did not hear the 100 plus SLR rounds or the 50 plus rubber bullets fired by Support Company. He said that did not happen while he was on the walls.
He said he saw a crowd of people cheering at Free Derry Corner. There was someone speaking from a platform. He did not see Bernadette Devlin.
Gunmen
INQ 1990 claimed to have seen between three and five civilian gunmen. One was pointing a pistol and INQ 1990 described him as a drama merchant. He claimed to have seen the man come out from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats. He went towards Joseph Place then west along Block 2. He was wearing a hood or mask. The man was pointing the gun but INQ 1990 said he was posturing more than aiming. He did not consider firing at the man. Nor did he report the gunman to anyone, even the major. He said he “did not feel the need to alert others.” He presumed others had seen the man. He claimed the reason he did not report the sighting, even after the event, was because his role was a very minor one. He accepted that by the end of the day he was aware civilians had been killed and there was much controversy but denied he had any responsibility to make a statement about the gunmen he claimed to have seen.
The second gunman he claimed to have seen had a machine pistol like an Uzi. He was calmer than the first and was pointing the gun towards the ground. He said he lost sight of the man as he went between Blocks 2 and 3. He was dressed entirely in black and was wearing a balaclava.
Later he claims to have seen a car arrive and drop off a third gunmen wearing dark clothing. He also had a black bobble hat. INQ 1990 claimed this man had an AR15 Armalite rifle. The car stopped at the junction of Fahan Street West and Rossville Street. The gunman then went and sat down on a grassy bank outside Glenfada Park South. However there was no grassy bank outside Glenfada Park. He then claims two further gunmen joined the third. These could have been the first two he had seen. He said he had a clear view of all 3 armed men but he never made any effort to draw them to the attention of anyone else.
INQ 1990 said he doubted he was the only person to have seen the gunmen. In fact he said it was impossible for him to have been the only witness to these gunmen. He could not explain why none of the other witnesses claim to have seen his gunmen.
No Mention of Gunmen
He was debriefed later in the day but said the debrief only concerned his administrative duties. When explaining why he did not feel the need to mention the gunmen he claimed to have seen even when he knew the army was accused of killing civilians he said “no one accused anyone of murder except the IRA and we had been accused of that for two years”.
He said certain people were told to come forward to give statements but he was not instructed to do so. He said he did not discuss the gunmen at the debrief because he “did not make a drama out of it”. He said two of the NCOs (non commissioned officers) below him were called at the Widgery tribunal. He assumed the major had seen what he had seen but INQ 1310 has said in his statement that he did not see “any unusual activity in the Bogside that day.” However he did recall the shots which were fired to and from the army position at the Double Bastion later in the day. INQ 1990 had no memory of these even though he said he was always within 10-15 yards of the major. INQ 1310 said he stayed on the walls until the shooting stopped because he would have remained to support his men.
Body at Craigavon Bridge
Later when back at the Craigavon Bridge car park INQ 1990 saw a body being taken out of a car. The body was laid on the ground and someone emptied the pockets. After removing keys and other items INQ 1990 said he saw a nail bomb. This was laid on the ground sheet with the other possessions. Again he did not report what he had seen or discuss it.
Channel Four Interview
When he was scheduled to give evidence in June 2003 INQ 1990 admitted to having been interviewed by Alex Thompson of Channel 4 television. Consequently he did not give evidence at that time but made a further statement regarding that interview. He said he told Alex Thompson what he had seen but Alex Thompson was not interested. He had gone back to Derry at the time of the interview to refresh his memory.
Captain 200 (also referred to as Captain SA8)
Captain, officer-commanding Admin Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment
Made Statements to the RMP [B1979], to the Widgery Tribunal [B1984] and to this Inquiry [B2022.0001]
Captain 200 was in command of the Composite Platoon, also called Guinness Force, on 30 January 1972. He was the officer in command of Admin Company, a position he had taken over from Major Loden in November 1971. He later commanded B Company. He had served in Aden but said he was relatively inexperienced in modern urban warfare at the time of Bloody Sunday. Because Guinness Force was made up of older non-operational soldiers Captain 200 was one of the youngest in the platoon.
Captain 200 said his bodyguard on Bloody Sunday was INQ 1710 and he radio operator was INQ 024. INQ 1077 has told the Inquiry that he was Captain 200’s radio operator but Captain 200 said he had no memory of him.
Briefings
Captain 200 said there was talk of the Battalion being deployed to Derry in the week before Bloody Sunday but the first order was a warning order on 28 January 1972. That said they were to be deployed to Derry for an arrest operation and Guinness Force was to be included.
Colonel Wilford gave the battalion briefing. Captain 200 remembered the room was full and everyone was there down to sergeant level. The platoon commanders were there as were some senior NCOs. The battalion intelligence officer also gave a briefing. He said they were to expect IRA gunmen and ambushes. Colonel Wilford’s briefing was to the effect that they were to arrest as many rioters as possible. There was no detailed plan.
Captain 200 did not recall ever receiving a detailed tactical plan or Colonel Wilford’s “concept of how ... the battle will go.” The only discussion regarding details was when Captain 200 spoke to Major Loden at the Presbyterian Church. He understood C Company was to be to the east, Support Company (including Guinness Force) in the centre, and A Company to the west. They did not know the ground and had to work from maps. Captain 200 was not aware of any recce being done before the battalion arrived in Derry.
Captain 200 made his own hand written notes at Colonel Wilford’s briefing. The Inquiry has these [B2022.0056]. In these Captain 200 notes “the enemy” as: a) NICRA march; b) 3-8,000 (5,000) peaceful, hardcore; c) hooligan element; d) Rossville Flats; e) Frederick Street; f) deliberate attempt + IRA + riots + sniping, bombing,etc.
Rossville Flats and Frederick Street were marked as danger areas. Under friendly forces Captain 200 noted “soldiers subdued”. He agreed this was probably a reference to the local battalions.
Major Loden briefed Support Company later the same day. This confirmed Colonel Wilford’s orders and dealt with arrangements for travelling to Derry. Captain 200 briefed Guinness Force in the company office later that evening. He said the notes were his own as opposed to company files. He had prepared a note of the briefing with the intention that it be typed up and handed to his men. He did this because Guinness Force was drawn from various units and he could not be sure he would have the opportunity to brief them all personally.
Captain 200 referred to the Rossville Flats as a notorious killing ground and that the car park was known to be particularly dangerous. However he accepted this may have been based upon the reputation the flats came to have after Bloody Sunday. In any event Captain 200 said he was briefed on 29 January of the threat of gunmen and the danger of the Rossville Flats. His perception that IRA gunmen and ambushes were likely contrasted with the information provided to the Brigade Major, Major Steele, who has said “shooting was the last thing on anyone’s mind”.
Manuscripts
There is also another manuscript note Captain 200 made before Colonel Wilford’s briefing [B2022.0053]. This was a normal deployment request Captain 200 made with the company sergeant major. In the end he did not receive some of the vehicles and equipment he requested in this document. The equipment requisition referred to helmets, 4 with visors. He did not know if they got 4 but certainly Soldier 229 and at least one other had visors. The equipment list also referred to one loud hailer.
Another of Captain 200’s manuscripts is a roll for Guinness Force. He said he believed this was written by him on or after 29 January 1972. The typed version of this [B2022.0064] contains manuscript additions some of which are in Captain 200’s hand writing. These indicate: Private C, INQ 1175 and Soldier 229 all had visors on their helmets; Soldier 039, INQ 739 and INQ 748 all carried sub-machine guns; and INQ 1077 was a radio operator. In fact Soldier 039 only carried a baton gun and Captain 200 said he believed he had three radio operators; one for each of the two sub-units and his own.
Sequence of Events [B2022.0060]
Another document in Captain 200’s hand has a heading halfway down ‘Sequence of Events’. Above this there is a note:
1. Rossville Flats 3rd story
2. Barricade
a. Their position could be innocent civilians
b. Soldiers wouldn’t fire at innocent civilians
Under “Sequence of Events” Captain 200 listed the following:
1. Admin Coy
2. Guinness Force
3. orders
4. recce
5. church
a. access
b. h.v. shot (warned by K)
c. MG ptn
d. Return vehicles
6. Move to Rossville Street
7. dismounted/gas
8. Coy Cmdr – mor ptn - rioters
9. No SLR – automatic fire – lots of fire – fire from Sp Coy?
10. split (?) force
11. 3 men ATP barrier, 2 heads, fire positions, crowd dispersed, too bunched (my men)
12. Removed gas mask
13. Moved left
14. Coy Cmdr – concerned about firing – stop firing
15. pig with bodies
16. man behind barricade
17. move x, warned by signaller
18. firing at Rossville Flats, saw hand with what appeared to be a weapon in it
19. reported back 3 bodies
20. 1 body Abbey Park
Captain 200 said these were his notes for preparing his draft statement. He said he wrote out his own statement and it was typed onto an RMP statement form (hereafter referred to as his RMP statement). The exact date of this statement is not known.
Presbyterian Church
Support Company deployed to the Presbyterian Church on Great James Street as this was the intended route for entry into the Bogside. The plan was to go over the wall to the east of the church. Captain 200’s recollection was that motor platoon and machine gun platoon were to secure crossing points for Guinness Force and anti tank platoon to go through. However Lieutenant 119’s evidence was that anti tank platoon was to provide cover for motor platoon and machine gun platoon to go in.
Colonel Wilford asked captain 200 to recce the east side of the church. However the wall next to the church proved impractical because of the drop on the other side. In the event only a few members of Guinness Force deployed to the church before it was abandoned as an option.
It was nevertheless decided to cut the barbed wire on top of the wall and on the roof of the GPO sorting office. Captain 200 was on the roof helping to cut the wire and managed to cut his hand quite badly.
Drainpipe Shot
In his RMP statement Captain 200 said he was on the roof when he was warned of movement in the Rossville Flats stairwell before a shot went over his head. Then he said he was absolutely sure the shot was fired from the Rossville Flats. He now said he could not recall the warning.
In his Widgery statement Captain 200 placed himself on the ground just behind the boiler house when the shot struck. In his statement to this Inquiry he said he was on his way down from the roof but in evidence said he said in could not be sure whether or not he had got down by the point the shot was fired.
Machine Gun Platoon Firing
Captain 200’s evidence regarding the shots fired from the derelict building on William Street was also unclear. In his RMP statement he referred to hearing a single SLR shot but in fact Soldiers A and B admit to firing 5 rounds between them. Captain 200 also said he heard a number of bangs and in answer to a question from Lord Saville agreed he may have mistaken SLR shots fired inside a building for baton rounds. Even by the time he made his statement to this Inquiry Captain 200 said he “subsequently learnt 2 SLR rounds were fired by machine gun platoon.” Brian McCartney, on behalf of some of the families, put it to Captain 200 that this was an example of how the army deliberately withheld and misrepresented information and even officers were kept in the dark. Captain 200 said he could not remember who had told him about the 2 shots.
Sequence of Shots
In evidence to this Inquiry Captain 200 said he could not recall whether the drainpipe shot came before or after the SLR shot. However in evidence to Lord Widgery he appeared to say the drainpipe shot came first [B2011]. He said that was his recollection at the time. The transcript of his evidence to Lord Widgery says “this does not include the high velocity shots” when he was asked about the first gunfire he had heard. In response to a question from Mr. Toohey Captain 200 said shots meant the shot which hit the drainpipe.
His draft sequence of events places “h.v. shot” above “MG ptn” and Captain 200 said this meant the drainpipe shot and machine gun platoon firing. When asked about the words in brackets he hesitated before saying “(Warned by K)” could refer to a warning by K. This demonstrated that he had Sergeant K’s cipher when he made the note. He said later he was never in any doubt the drainpipe shot came first but would not accept he had gained this impression from others rather than his own experience given he failed to say this at the time. He did accept he had received further information regarding the shots fired by machine gun platoon and that on the day he could have mistaken these shots for baton rounds if they were fired, as they were, from inside the derelict building.
Delay at Barrier 12
Captain 200 said they had to turn the vehicles around before they could drive to barrier 12 although others have described driving directly from Queens Street to Little James Street, via Great James Street. Captain 200 said they had to wait at barrier 12 for some time before they drove into the Bogside. He said they paused for about 5 minutes. He heard Colonel Wilford over the radio, he was becoming frustrated by the delay. However in evidence Captain 200 claimed he did not know why Colonel Wilford was frustrated and said he was not himself aware that the rioting was petering out before they were sent in.
Going In
When they drove through barrier 12 Captain 200’s understanding was that they were to arrest rioters. He said he assumed they would identify those to arrest by their behaviour. However once they debussed there was intense firing for about 15 minutes.
The two Guinness Force soft skinned lorries stopped at the north end of Rossville Street. When he got out Captain 200 ran forward to Major Loden’s command pig. He spoke to Major Loden who was at the rear of the vehicle. He was told to back up the motor platoon who had deployed onto the waste ground to the left. However Captain 200’s response to this instruction was to send half his men to the right towards Kells Walk. Captain 200 said Major Loden did not tell him in which direction to send his men so he decided to cover the motor platoon’s right flank.
He said the remainder of his men stayed by a building on the east side of Rossville Street whilst he went to the left onto the waste ground. However in his RMP statement he had said he split his platoon in half in order to send half (call sign 71A under Sergeant 002) to the right and the other half (call sign 71) to the “left to support motor platoon.” He now says he went alone onto the waste ground with his radio operator. From there he saw the anti tank platoon overtake 71A as they ran south along Kells Walk. However his impression was that the anti tank platoon moved down both sides of Kells Walk, i.e. some between Kells Walk and Colombcille Court. He stopped and shouted to Sergeant 002 to move up and support anti tank platoon.
In evidence Captain 200 said he could not remember the sequence in the first 2-3 minutes but that 71A bunched up and at some point became mixed with the anti tank platoon. In evidence to Lord Widgery [B2005] he said he had shouted to Sergeant 002 for 71A to move up and take over the positions vacated by anti tank platoon as they moved south and west from the low wall at Kells Walk.
In the meantime Captain 200 said he found several civilians sheltering by a wrecked vehicle on the waste ground. He shepherded them to safety at Chamberlain Street. In his RMP statement he said he then moved directly to the north gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. In evidence he said he could not remember what happened to 71 but that some of them came with him to Block 1.
Gunfire
Captain 200 claims to have come under fire at some point during this period. He said he was splitting his platoon when he heard a burst of automatic gunfire and 1 or 2 single shots. He said he did not pay much attention but was in no doubt he was under fire. He said he did not believe the automatic fire was in fact several SLRs being fired in rapid succession.
Captain 200 now says he believes he made two trips across Rossville Street, on one occasion running to Kells Walk. However there is no mention of this in his RMP or Widgery statements. In his statement to this Inquiry he recorded soldiers firing from the low wall towards an alleged gunman in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. However he now accepts that this happened much later.
Firing at the Rubble Barricade
In his Widgery statement Captain 200 said he saw at least three members of the anti tank platoon firing towards the rubble barricade. He could see a group of about 30 people near the southern gable end of Glenfada Park North and two people behind the barricade. The crowd were dispersing rapidly and it was at this time that he split his men and rescued the people on the waste ground. However he failed to mention seeing anyone firing at the rubble barricade in his first statement.
When asked about his recollections of anti tank platoon firing at the barricade Captain 200 said, “I have a difficult image of my memory at this stage.” He said he did not remember seeing anti tank platoon firing. In his recent statement to this Inquiry he said he “got the firm impression that there were gunmen behind the barricade taking sightings of where we were”. However when asked how he formed that impression Captain 200 said he could not remember saying this.
Captain 200 claimed he did not see anyone fall at the rubble barricade, nor did he see Soldier P fire at a nail bomber or at a man standing at the rubble barricade with a pistol.
Block 1
Captain 200 then says he saw Sergeant Major Lewis who directed him to Major Loden at the north end of Block 1.
When shown Video 48 and a large group of soldiers jumping over and running around the Kells Walk wall Captain 200 said he believed they were 71A because of the bunching. He recalled being concerned about his men becoming too close together.
There is also a soldier with a megaphone and a baton seen on the video walking in Rossville Street in front of the rubble barricade. Captain 200 said he did not think this was him and he had no idea who it was. Even though he had apparently requested a loud hailer for the operation Captain 200 insisted he did not remember using one. When he gave evidence Major Loden said he believed the man with the loud hailer was Captain 200.
Bodies in a Pig
When he made his visit to Major Loden at Block 1 Captain 200 said he saw two bodies in a pig. He also saw a Para fire a baton round into the back of another pig at point blank range. He said he was concerned by this but he did not look to see who was in the pig or question the soldier. William Doherty and Duncan Clarke were in the pig having been arrested on the waste ground. Mr. Doherty was badly bruised when a Para fired a rubber bullet at his arm. Captain 200 said he did not know there were prisoners in the pig because he did not look. When questioned as to why, as an officer, he failed to do anything about what he saw he said he thought he remembered Sergeant Major Lewis saying something.
Unnecessary Firing
Captain 200 said when he spoke to Major Loden they both expressed concerns about the amount of firing from their men. He said they both agreed there was too much firing and Major Loden then gave the order to ceasefire. Captain 200 said he thought Major Loden was in his pig when he got there and he came out to speak to him.
In his RMP statement Captain 200 located the excessive firing as coming from the right hand side of Rossville Street. Captain 200 said his impression at this time was that “the situation was contained.” In evidence to Lord Widgery Captain 200 had said Major Loden was on the radio but that when they spoke they agreed there was too much firing. Major Loden then shouted across to the soldiers on the west side of Rossville Street to stop firing. Captain 200 denied that his concern about the firing resulted from his awareness that innocent civilians were being shot. At no time did he give an order to ceasefire.
Lord Gifford QC, acting for the family of James Wray, asked Captain 200 about a sentence that had been crossed out in his draft statement. It came immediately after the sentence concerning the unnecessary firing. Captain 200 agreed it had read “Company Sergeant Major went over to 5 soldiers at G.R. 43241688 to stop the firing.” Captain 200 said he could not remember that happening. The sentence did not appear in his typed statement. The grid reference represents a position at the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, on the west side of Rossville Street. Another sentence in the draft, which was not crossed out, does not appear in the typed version. This reads, “At this time the anti tank platoon were withdrawing from Glenfada Park”. Captain 200 could not explain why the sentences were omitted. He agreed he did recall seeing soldiers returning from Glenfada Park. He was concerned about the firing there and later went to investigate.
Captain 200 said he did not see Alexander Nash waving from the rubble barricade. Mr. Nash had been shot in the shoulder and was with the dead body of his son William.
Firing at Block 1
Captain 200 then says he dashed across Rossville Street but before he did so he was warned about a man firing from Block 1 by Major Loden’s radio operator. Captain 200 claims he saw a glimpse of an arm from a window. There was a small object in the hand. The hand disappeared again and Captain 200 went down an alleyway towards Colombcille Court. He then heard firing from Kells Walk. He heard 2-3 shots but claimed he did not see anyone firing when he returned to see what was happening. However he did see 2-3 soldiers on top of the Kells Walk pram ramp.
Gerard McKinney
In his RMP statement he referred to moving across Rossville Street with his signaller to the area north of Glenfada Park. He said he then moved with his escort to the north west corner of Glenfada Park (grid reference 43181689) where he saw a body on the pavement north east of no. 8 Abbey park. The body was being attended to by a priest and 2 civilians. When shown photographs of Gerard McKinney being tended to by a 2 Knights of Malta Captain 200 agreed this was the scene he witnessed. When they saw him they shouted “don’t shoot!”
Captain 200 said he had gone to clarify reports, via his radio operator, of three bodies in Glenfada Park. This was about 2 minutes after Major Loden had ordered a ceasefire. He did not know where Glenfada Park was at the time and he stumbled across the body in Abbey Park. He denied ever seeing the bodies in Glenfada Park. He spoke to one soldier from the anti tank platoon to find out where they had gone.
When he came back to Rossville Street Captain 200 was ordered by Major Loden to get all his men out across the west side of Rossville Street. He was ordered to withdraw to Kells Walk/Colombcille Court. The 71 group was then used to escort prisoners. He next saw 71A in the area where they had debussed.
In his RMP statement Captain 200 had said there was “casualty evacuation” going on from 6 and 10 Abbey Park. It was at this time he claimed to notice a gunman with a pistol firing from a window in the centre of the third story of Block 1. Captain 200 said in evidence he saw “the gunman” before he saw the body in Abbey Park. He went on in the RMP statement “my men engaged the target in the window and also at the barricade but I was on the radio at the time and cannot definitely say who fired and if hits were made.” In evidence Captain 200 said he realised he was wrong and that it was in fact Soldier F, from anti tank platoon, who was firing. However Soldiers C and D, both from Guinness Force, also admit firing at Block 1. They were on the Kells Walk pram ramp. Captain 200 said he recalled being next to someone who was firing at Block 1 but that was at the low wall. Christopher Clarke QC pointed out he had never previously admitted being next to a soldier firing from Kells Walk towards Block 1 and only Soldier E admits firing at Block 1 from the low wall. He also referred to his men firing at a gunman at the barricade but Captain 200 said he thought this might be a reference to Support Company.
Later as it was getting dark Captain 200 said there was automatic and single shot fire coming from the direction of Free Derry Corner.
Debrief
Captain 200 said he was asked to find out who of his men had fired, from where, how much and at what. He said he only wanted a brief summary because it was getting dark and they would be moving off soon. A list of those from Guinness Force who admit to firing (Soldiers C, D, K, L and M) appears at the end of his RMP statement. It also appears in the manuscript draft statement Captain 200 retained [B2022.0040]. He said he re-wrote the draft in fair hand and then handed that in to be typed up. That is what became his statement. However there was an even earlier version of the firer’s details in the form of notes he made at the time, i.e. on 30 January 1972.
In his Widgery statement Captain 200 said he was given a list of firers by his Colour Sergeants before they moved from the forming up position in Clarence Avenue. He then spoke to all those who had fired. The radio logs [W0091] record 1 Para at Clarence Avenue between 17:00 and 18:35. He got the basic information and told Major Loden who had fired and the number of rounds. He did not have the grid references for the firers’ locations or those of their targets at that time. He did not have these until he got maps out when back at Drumahoe. He said the rest of the information was “gathered over the next few days.” He said there was a time when soldiers did detailed plotting of targets but this was with the Adjutant, he was not present.
The Loden List
Captain 200 said he did not remember providing any of the details contained in the list of ‘engagements’ prepared by Major Loden and General Jackson. Major Loden claims the list of 15 nail bombers and gunmen fired on by the Paras came from his debriefing of the soldiers who had fired. However he was not able to say whether or not it purported to include those C, D, K, L and M claim to have fired at. Captain 200 said the main thing at Clarence Avenue was to establish how many rounds had been fired. When they got back to Drumahoe all those who fired were briefed by the Adjutant, Captain Jackson (as he then was). Captain 200 made notes of names, grid references, etc. in his draft statement.
Captain 200’s List – The Draft Statement [B2022.0047]
Sergeant K is recorded as having fired once at “gunman at barricade (grid reference) 43231683, missed.” However Sergeant K says he fired at a man crawling towards Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and that he almost certainly hit him. Sergeant K was the Battalion marksman. The grid reference for Sergeant K’s target refers to a position on the opposite side of Rossville Street from Block 1. Captain 200 could not explain the discrepancies and said that if that is what he recorded then that must have been what Sergeant K told him.
The entry for Soldier M is identical to that for Sergeant K save Soldier M is recorded with a “possible hit.” However Soldier M has said he fired at two gunmen in the same position as Sergeant K, i.e. crawling towards Block 1, and that he always believed he hit them both.
The entries in respect of Soldier L record him as having fired into the rafters of a derelict building, twice at the rubble barricade and once at the same gunmen fired on by Soldiers C and D in Block 1. Soldier L denies firing into the roof of a building or firing at a gunman in Block 1. Instead he claims to have fired 2 shots at a gunman in a derelict factory in Abbey Street. The grid reference for Soldier L’s shots at the barricade is identical to that for Soldier M and Sergeant K. However with Soldier L Captain 200 did not even record what he was firing at, the list does not say gunman or nail bomb, it just says fired at barricade.
Serious Fabrication
Michael Mansfield QC put it to Captain 200 that there were only two possible explanations for the discrepancies between his account and that his soldiers told the RMP. Either he was seriously negligent when questioning them and noting their replies or there was serious fabrication. Captain 200 denied he was seriously negligent or involved in a conspiracy. Mr. Mansfield said the failure to record Soldier L’s target at the barricade demonstrated he must have been extremely negligent. Captain 200 could not say whether or not he had asked Soldier L if he had killed anyone at the barricade. At this point Lord Saville interjected to say, “Is it possible Soldier L just loosed off 2 shots at the barricade?” Captain 200 agreed that must have been what happened.
INQ 449, who was also in Guinness Force, has told the Inquiry he fired a shot on Bloody Sunday but that this was never recorded. Captain 200 said he had no memory of INQ 449 ever reporting that shot.
Briefed by Commanding Officer or Adjutant
Captain 200 said he was not personally asked to make a statement but drafted his own statement after he was told to record in writing what had happened. He said he was briefed by Colonel Wilford or Captain Jackson. He was told he had to work out who had fired, from where, and at what. This was after his preliminary questioning of the firers on the ground. Captain 200 said “the adjutant was coordinating this.” He said Major Loden or Captain Jackson also briefed the firers.
Captain 200 said the soldiers who were interviewed by the RMP were accompanied by an officer. He accompanied many soldiers although not those from Guinness Force. He said his role was only as an observer and he was there because the soldiers did not have legal representation.
“This Week in Ireland” Thames Television
Captain 200 participated in a television interview shortly after Bloody Sunday. There were four officers interviewed including Lieutenant N, INQ 2032 and another Lieutenant from A Company. Captain 200 denied the interview was a damage limitation exercise by the army and 1 Para. He said he only knew about the interview about 30 minutes before it happened. He said he was concerned about speaking to the Media but Colonel Wilford had cleared it. It was possible that the adjutant, Captain Jackson, set up the interview.
Captain 200 had identified certain comments in the transcript of the interview which he accepted he may have said. The first [A1 on B1991] referred to the shot which struck the drainpipe of the Presbyterian Church. The next comment appears to have been made by the same person and reads, “my troops engaged a nail bomber and a rifleman firing from the left hand corner of the flats.” However Captain 200 said he could not remember saying this. He did indicate he said, “I saw at least 2 gunmen, one firing from the 3rd floor of the Rossville Flats and at least one with a weapon behind the rubble going across (Rossville Street)” [A2 B1993]. However Captain 200 does not say he did see a gunman either at the rubble barricade or in the Rossville Flats. He said his “perception at the time” was that he had seen a man with a pistol but thought about it and realised he had not. He had seen a man at the barricade but no weapon. He denied he was trying to create a smoke screen in the interview or that if he had seen gunmen he would know it.
Another comment he accepts as his own was “absolutely everything points to a deliberate drawing in of the army into that area. It could well be in fact a planned ambush” [A4 B1994].
Widgery Tribunal
Captain 200 said he was not aware of anyone trying to learn lessons after the Widgery tribunal reported. He left Northern Ireland three weeks after the Widgery tribunal but returned for Operation Motorman in July 1972.
INQ 1828
Corporal, 173 Provost Company
Made Statement to the Inquiry on 6 November 1999 [C1828]
On 30 January 1972 INQ 1828 was an officer of the Royal Military Police (RMP) manning a prisoner reception centre at the army post at the Craigavon Bridge. His duty was to wait for prisoners to arrive and then process them by taking their photographs and completing the necessary paperwork.
So far as he was aware no prisoners were brought to his reception centre that day. However it was possible a few prisoners may have been handled by the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) in another building.
Hugh Leo Young
Hugh Leo Young has told the Inquiry [AY0001.0005] that he was taken to a long hut in an army barracks near the Foyle Road. There he was handled by soldiers in camouflaged uniforms but who appeared smarter and better dressed than ordinary soldiers. INQ 1828 said he would not have been wearing camouflaged clothing. Mr. Young said his hands were swabbed and his clothing removed for forensic analysis. He was then interviewed by the RUC. INQ 1828 knew nothing about Mr. Young or any other prisoners that day.
Gerard Donaghy
At some point during the day INQ 1828 was told that a body had been brought into the base in the back of a car. He went out and saw a Lotus Cortina. He identified the vehicle in photograph P0706 as possibly the one he saw. He looked in through the driver’s door and saw a young man on the back seat. He described him as being over 30 years old, of average build and wearing a light grey sports jacket. INQ 1828 said the man could have been the one pictured in photographs he had been shown by the Inquiry.
INQ 1828 said there were quite a lot of people milling around the car and whilst he was there someone leant into the back. He could not say whether the person was male or female, army or police. He could not describe the person in any way. As the person came out of the car he saw a nail bomb. He assumed the nail bomb had been found as the person searched the body. INQ 1828 said the body in the car was at the base and not in the car park on the other side of the bridge.
INQ 1828 accepted he did not see the nail bomb when he looked at the body in the back of the car. He agreed he was unlikely to have been the only person who looked into the car. There were a lot of people milling around. He just saw someone, who he presumed to be a member of the security forces, holding a nail bomb outside the car.
INQ 1828 said he had heard a rumour at the time that some of the people shot on Bloody Sunday had not in fact been shot that day. The suggestion was that they were brought out of deep freeze and dumped on the streets. He said he could not recall who made the suggestion. It was just chitchat.
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
