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David McIlwaine
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HomeArchiveDeath of Daniel Hegarty


The Death of Daniel Hegarty

1. Introduction

1.1 Rights Watch (UK)(RWUK) is an independent non-governmental organisation and registered charity that monitors the human rights dimension of the conflict and the peace process in Northern Ireland. Our services are available to anyone whose human rights have been affected by the conflict, regardless of religious, political or community affiliations, and we take no position on the eventual constitutional outcome of the peace process.

1.2 On 31st July 1972 Daniel Hegarty was killed by a British soldier in Derry. Daniel was just 15 years old. His cousin Christopher, aged 16, was shot in the head and was lucky not to be killed. Neither child was armed or offering any kind of threat to the soldiers. Nor was their cousin Thomas, aged 18, who was with them and who escaped injury.

1.3 Daniel was killed during Operation Motorman, a military action designed to clear out the no-go areas established, mainly by nationalists, to try to exclude the security forces from their neighbourhoods. He was one of two fatal casualties of the operation. The other man, Seamus Bradley, 19, who was shot in a separate incident, bled to death from a leg wound while in the custody of the army. He was an IRA member, but was unarmed when he was shot.

1.4 Daniel’s family were devastated by his death. For a number of years they have been trying, with the help of the Pat Finucane Centre, a Derry-based human rights group, and more recently RWUK, to establish the truth about what happened to Daniel. There seems to be remarkably little documentation available, and what has emerged is in dispute. At the time of compiling this report, crucial official documents relating to Operation Motorman are still under lock and key in the Public Records Office in London, closed under the 30 year rule until January 2005.

1.5 What is not in dispute is that Daniel was an innocent victim. However, the British government has repeatedly refused to acknowledge that Daniel should not have been shot. Daniel’s family has drawn up a list of what they need in order to be able to achieve closure:

These modest requirements are no more than any family would be due when an unarmed fifteen-year-old boy had been killed by a soldier, but so far the government has refused to accept that any wrong has been done, thus deepening the family’s feelings of grief and injustice.

1.6 This report sets out what is known about Daniel’s death and the context in which it took place. Because the available information is so fragmentary, the report inevitably raises more questions than it answers. Nevertheless, we hope that it will be the beginning of a process that helps to establish the truth about Daniel’s death and leads to the vindication, however belatedly, of his human rights.

2. 1972

2.1 1972 was a very turbulent year in the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and Derry was a very turbulent city. 496 people died in 1972 as a result of the conflict, the greatest loss of life in any single year. Perhaps significantly, 108 of those who died were British soldiers, their highest casualty rate of any year and more than twice as high as their next worst year.[1]

2.2 Far and away the most significant event of 1972, which has reverberated throughout the conflict, was Bloody Sunday on 30th January. Thirteen unarmed civilians died and a similar number were injured when the British army opened fire on a banned demonstration against internment without trial. An unprecedented second public inquiry into those events is presently sitting and has yet to rule, but many regard Bloody Sunday as the first attempt to eradicate the no-go areas, and Operation Motorman as having finished what Bloody Sunday started.

2.3 July 1972 was a particularly significant month. On 7th July secret talks took place in London between the IRA and the government. Their failure led to the ending on 13th July of a ceasefire instigated by the IRA on 26th June. July 21st, when the IRA set off 26 bombs in Belfast, killing 11 people and injuring another 130, has become known as Bloody Friday. Operation Motorman took place on 31st July. On the same day, three suspected IRA bombs exploded at 10:40 am in Claudy, killing nine people and causing serious injuries. Throughout the month, and indeed the year, loyalists continued their campaign of sectarian murder against Catholics.

3. The Planning of Operation Motorman

3.1 On 26th October 1971 the Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland, General Ford, issued an order to Brigadier MacLellan, commander 8 Infantry Brigade, who had overall command of the troops on Bloody Sunday,

"so far as possible, to recreate the state of law in the Creggan and Bogside as and when he could."[2]

Bloody Sunday failed to achieve that aim. The nationalist no-go areas in the Bogside, Creggan and Brandywell remained intact.

3.2 On 24th July 1972[3], the body known as GEN 79 met. GEN 79 appears to have been a Cabinet sub-committee and to have been established immediately after Bloody Sunday in anticipation of the resumption of direct rule. It met at least once a week, and sometimes more often. Its membership included, so far as we can tell, the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, the Home Office, Defence, and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, as well as more junior ministers. It was also attended by senior civil servants, the Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces, and by MI5. It was chaired by the Prime Minister, Edward Heath. The minutes of the GEN 79 meetings have not been released into the Public Records Office, but it is known that they discussed reaction to Bloody Friday and how to tackle the no-go areas.

3.3 The GEN 79 meeting asked the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lord Carver, to draw up a paper on army operations in Northern Ireland, which he did after consulting the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw; Sir William Nield, the Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office; and the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC), General Sir Harry Tuzo[4]. It is clear from this paper that the CGS was not invoking an off-the-peg contingency plan but was taking account of what he – and presumably GEN 79 – perceived as being a change of mood in Northern Ireland following Bloody Friday. He said:

“It is important to exploit quickly a situation in which firm and effective action by the Army against the IRA appears acceptable to a wide range of opinion, including a significant proportion of Catholics.”

He also admitted very frankly that the intelligence on which army operations were being based was wholly inadequate, saying:

“The Army’s search operations have been based on old or almost non-existent intelligence. Their success has been exaggerated for political and PR [public relations] reasons. Such yields as have been obtained were principally due to chance. Continuation at the present level cannot be expected to produce any better results and is likely in fact to produce diminishing returns. The degree of antagonism these operations are likely to arouse will probably increase as the memory of 21st July fades and the Army’s searches are seen to be random and resulting in searches of houses and arrests of individuals with no direct connection with the hard-line Provisional IRA.”

The paper argues for a reintroduction of selective internment and the “occupation” of the Bogside and Creggan in Derry and Andersonstown and Ballymurphy in Belfast. Such an operation would entail bringing in an extra three battalions and a troop of AVRE [Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers -converted tanks] for Derry and four extra battalions for Belfast. If only Derry was to be occupied, then the operation could go ahead on 31st July. The 30th of July was to be avoided because it marked the six months anniversary of Bloody Sunday. If the operation was to be launched simultaneously in Derry and Belfast, it would go ahead on 2nd August.[5] Operation Motorman was born from this paper.

3.4 Thus Operation Motorman, at least so far as Derry was concerned, gave effect to General Ford’s long-standing orders. However, it was not the result of lengthy planning and thought. It was an opportunistic response to Bloody Friday. Indeed, Sir Burke Trend, the then Cabinet Secretary, described Lord Carver’s proposals in a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, as being “designed to take advantage of the mood of public opinion generated by the bombing atrocities of Friday, 21st July”[6]. Furthermore, a week after Operation Motorman the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, WIlliam Whitelaw, told a delegation from the SDLP:

“‘Bloody Friday’ had made Operation Motorman inevitable.”[7]

In 1973 a history of the British army said of Bloody Friday:

“It was a callous attack which led to OPERATION MOTORMAN and the definite end of the Army’s low profile approach to security operations.”[8]

3.5 On the evening of 25th July 1972, the Chief of the General Staff, Lord Carver, and the Attorney General for Northern Ireland[9], Sir Peter Rawlinson QC MP[10], travelled back to England together from Northern Ireland. During their journey, they discussed Lord Carver’s proposal and drafted two amendments to the rules of engagement for the army, known as the Yellow Card.[11] The amendments read as follows:

  1. “Soldiers may fire without warning [emphasis in original] if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured. This supplements 12 of the Yellow Card.
  2. For this operation only, a company commander may order the firing of heavy weapons (such as Carl Gustav) against positions from which there is sustained hostile firing, if he believes that this is necessary for the preservation of the lives of soldiers or of other persons whom it is his duty to protect. In deciding whether or not to use heavy weapons full account must be taken of the risk that the opening of fire may endanger the lives of innocent persons.”[12]

Also released by the Public Record Office is a draft message from the General Officer Commanding, General Tuzo, to Brigade Commanders, in the following terms:

“All soldiers in Northern Ireland are very rightly conscious of the constraints which are placed upon us by the need to use minimum and reasonable force. We must operate within the law. As we approach a new phase of operations, I am writing to reassure you about our position.

The circumstances under which a solder operates here are well understood and it is important to get into perspective the legal problem of the use of force. It is not possible to lay down general rules for all particular situations, but the soldier’s guiding principle in all circumstances is simply to take reasonable action in order to protect his own life and the lives of others. If the soldier acts reasonably and responsibly, he is not at risk in the courts.

The Yellow Card provides guidance which, if followed, should ensure that the soldier acts lawfully. With specific reference to paragraph 12 of the Yellow Card, soldiers may fire without warning [emphasis in original] if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured. Moreover, for this operation only, a company commander may order the firing of heavy weapons (such as Carl Gustav) against positions from which there is sustained hostile firing, if he believes that this is necessary for the preservation of the lives of soldiers or of other persons whom it is his duty to protect. In deciding whether or not to use heavy weapons full account must be taken of the risk that the opening of fire may endanger the lives of innocent persons.”[13]

3.6 Sir Burke Trend advised on 26th July 1972 on the pros and cons of Lord Carver’s proposals. In relation to Derry, he said:

“The advantages of the more limited operation are that it is a less extreme measure and that it concentrates on the areas of particular symbolic importance for the majority [Catholic] community. Its disadvantages are that an operation concentrated on Londonderry could provoke a major flare-up in Belfast, with which the Army might be ill-placed to deal; that it attacks areas which have recently been relatively quiet rather than the more serious trouble spots in Belfast; and that it is manifestly directed only against areas inhabited by the minority [Catholic] community.”[14]

3.7 It is clear from this memorandum that GEN 79 met again on 27th July 1972, but once again the minutes are not available. They discussed whether to put into force Operation Folklore, which was a contingency plan designed for circumstances where “the security situation had deteriorated to a point at which the Government were losing control of events”[15]. The only description of Operation Folklore currently available says that it was “… a more comprehensive military operation designed to subdue the Province and disarm the population”. Some of its elements apparently included the refusal of bail; proscription of terrorist organisations; stricter controls on the unlawful use of vehicles; a ban on possession of all firearms and explosives; and stricter border controls[16]. Operation Motorman has been described as “more limited” than Operation Folklore, which was described as “drastic and comprehensive”, and was still under review in December 1972[17]. It is clear that the meeting of GEN 79 decided not to put Operation Folklore into effect, but opted for Operation Motorman. It is also clear that they approved Lord Carver’s preferred option of taking out the no-go areas in Belfast and Derry simultaneously, as well as a few in other cities, namely Portadown, Armagh, Lurgan and Newry.

3.8 On 27th July the Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, caused the following instructions to be issued to the army:

“The Secretary of State for Defence has requested me, acting for the Chief of the Defence Staff, to send to you the following directions, based on the decisions taken by Ministers on 27 July 1972 in respect of this operation

  1. The aim of the operation is to restore law and order throughout the Province by making sure that there are no areas in which the Security Forces cannot fully operate.
  2. The first step in this process is to introduce a strong military presence into those areas, which have recently been dominated by the IRA; and as soon as possible thereafter to ensure that there are no obstacles to free movement of any kind in any area in the Province, other than those required by the Security Forces for the purposes of security; and finally gradually to track down and pick up arms, ammunition, explosives and the active terrorists themselves.
  3. It must be made clear to all under your command that it is of vital importance that, in pursuit of your objectives, they should do all they can not only to avoid antagonising those who are not directly supporting the IRA but if possible to isolate the IRA from support by the population at large. This will not be easy, but it is of the greatest importance if the aim of the operation is to be achieved, both in the short and the long term.
  4. An essential element in this is that there should be no departure from the overriding principle that only the minimum force necessary to achieve the immediate aim should be used, and that the acts of individual soldiers, as of the Army at large, should be seen to be in support of law and order. They must therefore be within the law. Commanders at all levels, in deciding the degree of force which is to be used, must bear in mind the importance of minimising the risk of casualties among innocent civilians and of damage to their property, as well as the risks to their own soldiers.
  5. The Secretary of State for Defence is fully confident that all under your command will conduct themselves with the discipline, restraint, courage and skill which has been so conspicuous a hallmark of the Army in Northern Ireland over the last three years.”[18]

3.9 The build-up of troops began straight away. 4,000 extra British soldiers were drafted into Northern Ireland, bringing the total British army presence up to 21,000. With 9,000 Ulster Defence Regiment men already stationed there, the total army numbers reached 30,000, the highest deployment since the conflict began.[19] Over half the UK’s infantry were in Northern Ireland[20]. The troops available in Belfast increased from 6,000 to 8,000, and those in Derry from 7,200 to 8,000. Seven extra battalions were deployed in all:

1 Para had, of course, been infamously involved in Bloody Sunday in Derry the previous January – this time they stayed away from the city. It is believed that the Coldstream Guards and the Scots Guards were sent to Derry[22]. The withdrawal of 1,500 men from the three Rhine battalions left the UK 20% below its required NATO strength in that arena[23], and illustrated the degree of the government’s commitment to Operation Motorman. A Ministry of Defence statement said:

“Following last Friday [Bloody Friday] the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that nobody could be in any doubt that very resolute and determined action must be taken against those responsible. The extra troops are required to enable this policy to be carried out.”[24]

Operation Motorman was the British army’s largest operation since Suez[25]. More troops were deployed than at the height of the Suez crisis[26]. The IRA at that time was estimated to have around 1,500 members altogether[27].

3.10 In an interview with RTE, the Irish broadcasting body, on 28th July 1972, William Whitelaw was asked why he had decided to send another 4,000 soldiers to Northern Ireland. He replied:

“I think one has to start from last Friday, described all over the world in many places as ‘Bloody Friday’. It certainly was. The most inhumane killings of men, women and children. Clearly designed to be so, which shows that the Provisional IRA were determined to pursue violence and, if necessary to wreck the whole community in Northern Ireland in pursuit of their objectives. That was a clear challenge which had to be faced, and it will be faced. I want to make it perfectly clear that I must protect the law-abiding community from terrorists and gunmen, who are seeking to wreck the whole place. That cannot be, and for that reason I must see that the Security Forces are enabled to go freely throughout the whole community. And they will be. And if that is to be the case, then I must make it abundantly clear that if they are to be able to move freely then all barricades from wherever they are put up, whoever put them up, Protestant barricades, Roman Catholic barricades all of them, the whole lot, must come down so that the Security Forces can move freely. I hope people will take them down themselves, if they don’t, I must make it perfectly clear that the Security Forces would have to do so in the interests of stopping killing and maiming of innocent men, women and children.”[28]

3.11 Although Bloody Friday and Operation Motorman were separated by only ten days, the army’s action was widely signalled by the media, who repeatedly suggested that the no-go areas would be targeted in response to Bloody Friday, and who reported on troop movements in detail. The IRA was said to be expecting to have to defend the no-go areas. There was widespread fear of casualties. In his original proposal, the Chief of the General Staff Lord Carver anticipated particularly stiff resistance in Derry:

“The IRA in Londonderry are more likely than elsewhere to oppose entry by a stand-up fight. The military plan to re-enter must cater for this. The more rapidly it is carried out, the shorter the fight is likely to be.”[29]

In his briefing to the Prime Minister on 26th July, Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend warned of

“The risk of heavy ‘civilian’ casualties, which we were formerly advised would be inseparable from an operation to reoccupy the Bogside and Creggan.”[30]

Eamonn McCann, a nationalist leader in Derry, was reported as saying that “if the army came to Free Derry people would be killed and Mr Whitelaw [the Secretary of State] would be responsible”[31]. On the eve of Operation Motorman, at 9:30 pm on Sunday 30th July 1972, William Whitelaw’s office issued the following warning:

“As from the time of this announcement (9 30 pm) there will be substantial activity in Northern Ireland. The object is to enable the security forces to move freely through all areas and so protect the community. Where such activities are taking place, people will best assist the security forces and protect themselves by keeping off the streets.”[32]

Originally, Sir William Nield drafted a much longer warning, that was more in the form of a justification[33], but this was obviously discarded.

3.12 Jack Lynch, the Taoiseach of Ireland, was informed of Operation Motorman by Sir John Peck, the British Ambassador to Ireland, a few hours before the troops moved in. President Nixon of the USA, the Vatican, and other heads of state, including members of NATO and the European Community, were also forewarned.[34] Sir John Peck conveyed the warning to Dr Patrick Hillery, then the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 8:45 pm on 30th July. Dr Hillery conveyed the message to Jack Lynch, who was electioneering in County Cork, who asked Sir John Peck to meet him at Divisional Police Headquarters in Cork at 12:30 am on 31st July. At the meeting, which lasted an hour, the Taoiseach said he would support Operation Motorman on four conditions:

3.13 Despite the heavy military preparations, the relaxation of the rules for opening fire, and the prevalent anticipation of heavy casualties, nowhere in the documentation available is there any suggestion the plans for Operation Motorman included any measures for dealing with civilian casualties, regardless of the experience gained from Bloody Sunday six months previously.

4. Operation Motorman in Derry

4.1 According to the military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, himself a Brigadier, 8 Infantry Brigade was commanded by Brigadier MacLellan[37]

and the following battalions were involved:

Four AVRE bulldozers manned by the Royal Engineers were used.[38] A battalion from the Royal Welch Fusiliers were also involved[39]. At least 1,500 troops and more than 300 armoured vehicles were deployed in Derry and removed 14 of the 15 major barricades.[40] However, the Irish News quoted an army spokesman as saying that as many as 4,000 troops were used in Derry[41]. The army’s situation report, issued at 7:00 am on 31st July, said the operation began at 4:05 am and by 7:00 am control over the no-go areas had been secured[42].

4.2 Operation Motorman encountered only token resistance from the IRA. In Derry, the army said that they fired rubber bullets to disperse a group of 30 youths in Central Drive, and defused a 100 lb bomb in Bligh’s Lane. Another bomb exploded in a bar in Dungiven Road, but no-one was hurt.[43] Later on 31st July the Provisional[44] IRA issued a statement in which they said they had deliberately absented themselves in order to avoid “very heavy civilian casualties”[45]. Their absence also meant that they evaded arrest. The IRA has been blamed for the three bombs that went off in the village of Claudy, eight miles from Derry, on 31st July, which killed nine people and seriously injured a number of others. No proper warning was given and Claudy was not a military target. The IRA has never accepted responsibility for what has been considered by many to be a cowardly attempt to demonstrate their continuing ability to wreak havoc.

4.3 Secretary of State William Whitelaw flew to army headquarters in Lisburn in Northern Ireland for a 5:00 am briefing from General Tuzo, the GOC, on the day of Operation Motorman[46]. At 6:50 am the Secretary of State’s office issued the following statement:

“So far the operation has been most successful. Barricades in Protestant and Catholic areas are coming down. Any that are not will be moved by the Security Forces. It would appear that the operation throughout Northern Ireland is going according to plan and I am delighted to say, so far as is at present ascertained, with virtually no casualties.”[47]

5. The Death of Daniel Hegarty

5.1 The only people to die during Operation Motorman were fifteen-year-old Daniel Hegarty and Seamus Bradley, who was nineteen.

5.2 When the army began their invasion of the no-go areas, local inhabitants sounded sirens to alert the neighbourhood. Thomas Hegarty, aged 18, and his brother Christopher, aged 16, were already up and dressed at their home at 53 Creggan Heights. Thomas had seen William Whitelaw’s warning on the television, and like everyone else he expected the no-go areas to be invaded. He was a member of the Rosary Crusaders and felt that it was his duty to go out to help anyone who was injured when the army entered Creggan. Thomas went down to Daniel, his cousin’s house at 22 Swilly Gardens. The two boys went to a shop in Central Drive. There they encountered Daniel’s father, Alexander, who was also in the Rosary Crusaders and was in the habit of patrolling the Creggan at night to make sure that shops were not broken into and cars were not hijacked[48]. It was cold and Daniel had no coat, so they went to Thomas’ house and picked up an old coat for him. Christopher joined them and the three boys went out together. They ran along the left hand pavement of Creggan Heights towards Circular Road. Daniel said that he would like to see one of the Centurian tanks that the army were expected to be using. They met a neighbour, Eddie Boy Moore, who lived at 90 or 92 Creggan Heights, just past Bligh’s Lane, and had a brief conversation with him. The three boys walked on for a further 10 or 12 yards, then Thomas saw two or three soldiers coming down Watery Lane opposite Lislane Drive. The soldiers stopped at the junction of Watery Lane and Creggan Heights. The boys immediately turned round and began to re-trace their steps. After a few yards Thomas crossed the road diagonally towards number 114 Creggan Heights. He was followed by Daniel and then Christopher. The boys were half running at this point. Thomas heard about four shots ring out as he reached the pavement outside the garden fence of number 114. He saw the barrel of a gun and tripod beside the gate post of number 114. Both Daniel and Christopher were struck by bullets and fell to the ground. About a dozen soldiers ran out of the alleyways beside numbers 112 and 114. One of them shouted, “Halt!” at Thomas and grabbed him. The soldier pulled Thomas along the road a short distance and then pushed him out into the road. Another soldier yelled, “Get out of the fucking road!” Thomas was not searched, questioned or arrested, and the soldiers went off towards Bligh’s Lane. Thomas returned to number 114 and found Christopher sitting cradling Daniel’s head in his arms. Christopher was bleeding from a head wound and Daniel was dead. Thomas supported Christopher to the door of number 14 and roused William Morrin, who lived there. Mr Morrin and Thomas carried Daniel’s body into the house and laid him on the floor in the hall. Christopher’s head was bathed and he later lost consciousness. At dawn two Knights of Malta ambulance men came to the house and gave Christopher first aid. At about 6:00 am an ambulance arrived and took Christopher and Daniel to Altnagelvin Hospital. The ambulance was twice stopped and searched on its way to Altnagelvin. Daniel’s father Alexander was told that his son had been shot by his friend Bertie Deacon, who was a member of the Knights of Malta, but was prevented from getting to Mr Morrin’s house by Operation Motorman. He first saw his son’s body in the mortuary at the hospital, where he went with Father Rooney to identify the body.[49]

5.3 None of the boys was carrying any object, let alone any weapon. Nor were they posing any threat to the soldiers, who, according to both Thomas and Mr Morrin[50], fired on them without warning. The soldiers’ later claim that they thought the boys were armed does not accord with their behaviour immediately after the shootings. If they thought they had encountered the IRA, why did they not detain Christopher? It must have been obvious that they had just shot two very young boys, yet they did nothing to assist them but simply made off.

5.4 Daniel died from two gunshot wounds to his head[51]. He was shot by a soldier from A Company of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Scots. This soldier’s name has never been revealed and he is known only as Soldier B. He says the shooting happened at around 4:15 am. He made a statement to Staff Sergeant Kenneth Sherlock of the army Special Investigation Branch[52] at 8:10 pm on 31st July 1972. In this statement, which is anonymous and unsigned, he says that he heard someone shout, “The bastards are in!” followed by “Get the fucking bastards!” He then saw three youths running towards him. He says that he twice shouted to them to halt, and then shouted, “Halt or I’ll fire!” He thought that the leading youth had a revolver or perhaps a nail bomb in his right hand. He fired three 7.62 rounds from his general purpose machine gun, which was fed by a belt of 25 rounds, from a distance of 25 metres. He hit two of the youths, who fell to the ground. He was then immediately ordered away from the scene.[53]

5.5 The only other evidence available from the army is a similar statement by Soldier A. He was the officer in charge of Soldier B’s platoon. Soldier A’s name and rank are unknown. He made his statement to Corporal Peter Woodley of the army Special Investigation Branch[54] at 9:12 pm at St Peter’s school in Creggan, where the Royal Scots were billeted. He says that his section was tasked with holding the junction of Bligh’s Lane and Creggan Heights[55]. They advanced over open land behind Creggan Heights and Soldier B led them through an alleyway onto Creggan Heights. Soldier A instructed Soldier B to set up his gun on the pavement at the mouth of the alley. Three figures ran towards the soldiers, and Soldier B twice shouted at the men to stop. It was dark and difficult to see. The men continued running towards them and Soldier A and other members of the patrol all shouted at them to stop, but they did not do so. The men were about 20 yards away. Soldier B fired three rounds. Two of the men fell about six feet in front of the soldiers, on the pavement. He could see that one of the two men was moving. Soldier A immediately ordered his section to the junction of Bligh’s Lane and Creggan Heights. They did not stop to examine the bodies. He did not know what happened to the third man.[56]

5.6 It would appear from these two accounts that Soldier B fired on his own initiative, without receiving any order to do so. It would also appear that Soldier A ordered his men to leave the scene without offering Daniel or Christopher Hegarty any assistance, even though he could tell that Christopher, at least, was alive. It is quite clear from these accounts that the soldiers did not behave in the way they would have done if they had any genuine belief or even suspicion that any of the three youths was armed. It is inconceivable that they would have just walked off and left potentially armed men, two of whom they had just shot, when one of them, Thomas, was unhurt, and one of the two wounded was still capable of movement. At the very least they would have searched for a weapon and would have questioned Thomas Hegarty. Instead, they allowed him to go back to where Daniel and Christopher were lying, where he could have retrieved any weapon and fired on the soldiers. Furthermore, had they possessed the slightest interest in Thomas or Christopher Hegarty as suspected gunmen, they could have had them arrested on either of the two occasions when the ambulance was stopped on the way to the hospital. Both boys were in the ambulance with their dead cousin, so they were eminently identifiable, and Soldier B says that he saw an ambulance stop near the house where the boys were shot[57]. The only possible implication from the soldiers’ actions, both at the time of the shooting and subsequently, is that they knew full well that none of the three boys was armed.

5.7 It is also clear that Soldier B must have opened fire at much closer range than the 25 metres claimed by him or the 20 yards claimed by Soldier A. Both Daniel and Christopher Hegarty were half running towards Soldier B when they were shot. Had they been shot from such a distance, they would not have ended up only six feet from the soldiers on the pavement. Detective Inspector Cecil Scott, stationed at the Victoria RUC station in Derry, went to Creggan Heights at 8:00 am on 1st August 1972 and examined the area around number 114. He found a circular blood stain, 8 inches in diameter, on the pavement outside the house, approximately 7’8” from the right hand gate post and 8” from the edge of the wire fence around the front garden[58]. This evidence also indicates that the shots were fired at short range. If so, then it raises the question of whether Soldier B could see that the boys were empty-handed. The natural light was poor, but according to Soldier B the area was lit by army spotlights[59]. The police plan of the scene places these lights at the corner of Bligh’s Lane[60]. Soldier B claimed to have been able to discern something in Thomas Hegarty’s right hand and was able to give a description of the clothes he was wearing[61], but Soldier A said it was too dark for him to be able to describe the boys[62].

5.8 It is unclear from the soldiers’ statements how long they had been in the alley beside number 114. Both soldiers suggest that they had only just reached the gateway of number 114 when they spotted the boys running towards them[63]. However, it seems as if Soldier B’s machine gun was already in position on its tripod when he fired. Soldier A says that Soldier B

“… under my instructions set the GPMG [general purpose machine gun] up on the pavement at the mouth of the alleyway”.

He also describes Soldier B as being “in a kneeling position” when he fired.[64] One of the bullets that struck Daniel’s head travelled at an angle of 45% to the transverse (horizontal) plane[65]. Since he upright when he was shot, this suggests that he was shot from below, as would have been the case had Soldier B been kneeling on the ground. It is possible that the soldiers were already in position when the boys first passed number 114 on the other side of the road. If so, the boys did not see the soldiers, but the soldiers would certainly have seen the boys, and would have seen them turn round and head for home. The boys appear to have been oblivious of the soldiers’ presence when they started to cross the road towards number 114. Given that they had decided to go home to avoid encountering soldiers, and were already half running in their haste, it seems very unlikely that they would have deliberately run straight at a group of heavily armed soldiers, or ignored any warnings to halt. The question of how long the soldiers had been in position is obviously important in determining the facts of Daniel’s death.

5.9 Nor has it been established whether anyone did shout, “Get the fucking bastards!” as alleged by Soldier B[66]. Soldier A makes no mention of having heard this, nor another shout of “The bastards are in!” allegedly heard by Soldier B. However, if someone did say, “Get the fucking bastards!”, it would be important to establish who said it. In Soldier B’s statement, especially linked to the alleged shout of “The bastards are in!”, the implication is that the boys themselves, or other local people, shouted, and that what was said amounted to threats against the soldiers. However, if a soldier made either of these remarks, especially “Get the fucking bastards!”, then it could be interpreted as incitement to shoot the boys. If these remarks were made, and if, as we have surmised, the boys did not realise the soldiers were present, it is unlikely that they were responsible for them.

6. The Police Investigation

6.1 D/I Scott told the inquest that he conducted an investigation into Daniel’s death[67]. When he visited the scene of the incident over 24 hours after Daniel was killed, all he found was a bloodstain. There were no spent cartridges nor any other evidence. William Morrin told the inquest:

“I would like to say that after the army fired the shots I went outside. I saw four empty bullet cases lying on the ground approximately 6”/9” to the right of the concrete path about 2’ or 3’ in from my front gate on the inside. Mr McGill, a neighbour of mine, took possession of the four empty shells.”[68]

James McGill lived at 109 Creggan Heights. He was apparently interviewed by DC W Hetherington on 23rd September 1972. He confirmed having seen four empty bullet cases, but did not mention picking them up. [69] It is not known whether the RUC ever recovered these cartridge cases. The fact that there were four of them suggests that Soldier B may have fired more than the three rounds mentioned in his and Soldier A’s statements. Both Thomas and Christopher Hegarty say that they thought they heard four shots.

6.2 D/I Scott prepared a brief report on Daniel’s death for the coroner on 1st August 1972, the same day that he visited the scene of the shooting. There must have already been some contact with the coroner, Major Hubert O’Neill, because he is recorded on the post mortem report as having issued instructions for the autopsy, which took place at 2:00 pm on 31st July[70]. In the police report prepared on the following day, D/I Scott gave the following description under the heading “CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO DEATH”:

“The above named who was accompanied by two other youths was shot by Military at Creggan Heights, Londonderry, after the Military had entered the area with the intention of occupying the former ‘No-Go’ areas. It was alleged that one of the three youths had been carrying a gun.”[71]

It is obvious from this account that D/I Scott was aware of the soldiers’ version of events. He gives the same time as they do for the shooting and repeats their allegation that one of the three boys was armed. However, the Pat Finucane Centre have established that the RUC never interviewed any of the soldiers about the shooting[72]. Presumably the army passed copies of Soldier A’s and Soldier B’s statements, made the previous evening, to the RUC, but the fact remains that the RUC interviewed neither soldier, either as a witness or as a suspect.

6.3 The PSNI have produced copies of typed and unsigned statements which they say were taken from Thomas and Christopher Hegarty. The statement from Thomas Hegarty purports to have been taken at Victoria RUC station on 21st September 1972 by D/I Scott. However, Thomas Hegarty categorically denies that he ever attended the police station or gave any statement, there or anywhere else. The statement from Christopher Hegarty, which is a statement under caution, claims to have been taken by Detective Sergeant W J Cousins at 3:15 pm on 1st August 1972 at Altnagelvin hospital. It says that it was signed by Christopher Hegarty and by his father Daniel Hegarty. Christopher Hegarty says that he never gave a statement on that day or at any time. His sister, Mary Callaghan, has signed a statement in which she says:

“My late father Daniel Hegarty, my sister Ann Cavanagh and myself spent all the time at his [Christopher’s] bedside at no time was he left on his own. I can swear that at no time at all was he ever asked by any member of the POLICE or ARMY to make any kind of statement in the hospital or when he was released home.”[73]

Christopher Hegarty says that he was very poorly while he was in hospital, and for some time after he was discharged, and was in no fit state to give a statement to anyone. He also says that some of the facts attributed to him in the statement are wrong.

6.4 The police file contained purported witness statements from at least the following:

Only the last three statements, all of them from RUC officers, are signed. It would appear that no signed copies of the statements from members of the public exist[74]. As has already been seen, the RUC never interviewed the perpetrator, Soldier B, his officer, Solder A, or any of the ten or so other soldiers who potentially witnessed the shooting. In November 1999, the Pat Finucane Centre learned in a discussion with the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions that during the period 1969 to 1972, the RUC did not create a police file if someone was killed by the security forces unless the victim’s family made a formal complaint, presumably because such killings were not considered to be potential crimes. However, in April 1972 the post of Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland was created. The first post holder, Sir Barry Shaw, directed the Chief Constable of the RUC, Graham Shillington, that all fatalities caused by the security forces were to be investigated by the police and a file submitted to the DPP’s office. A police investigation file in respect of Daniel Hegarty’s death was sent to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions on 6th June 1973, almost a year after the shooting. On 17th July 1973 the DPP issued a direction of no prosecution.[75] It remains an open question, in view of both Thomas and Christopher Hegarty’s denials that they were ever interviewed by the RUC and the lack of signatures on any of the non-police witness statements, whether any of the witnesses, whether military or civilian, was properly interviewed.

6.5 Constable W T Cunningham, a Scene of Crimes Officer based at Victoria RUC station in Derry, has said that on 31st July 1972 he went to Ward 8 at Altnagelvin Hospital and took firearms swabs from Christopher Hegarty’s hands. If so, he must have done so while Christopher Hegarty was unconscious, as he has no recollection of it. Constable Cunningham also took away all of Christopher Hegarty’s clothing for forensic testing.[76] The PSNI have confirmed that there is no written record of the results of these tests in the police file but there is a note that the RUC received verbal confirmation that the tests were negative. The same is true of swabs taken from Daniel Hegarty’s hands and tests done on his clothing. No tests were done on Thomas Hegarty.[77] All of this provides clear evidence that neither Daniel nor Christopher Hegarty had handled any weapon and there were no real grounds for suspecting that any of the three boys had done so.

6.6 On 16th September 1972, some seven weeks after the shooting, Sergeant Samuel Penney, an RUC photographer, went to Creggan Heights and took just three photographs of the scene of the shooting[78]. Needless to say, these photographs taken so long after the event shed little light on the shooting.

6.7 The PSNI have also produced a copy of the police map of the scene of the shooting. Although it is entitled “LOCATION PLAN OF SCENE OF DEATH OF DANIEL A. HEGARTY”, it shows the three youths as being on the other side of the road from 114 Creggan Heights, opposite number 120.[79] Since it is not in dispute that Daniel’s body lay on the pavement outside number 114, this map is clearly wrong. Nevertheless, the PSNI insist that it is not. In a letter to the Pat Finucane Centre they say,

“I can advise that police believe that the position marked on the map was the location of Mr Hegarty when he was shot.”[80]

Inexplicably, the three police photographs taken of the scene do not include the position marked on the map. In October a new eyewitness came forward, who was about the same age as Daniel Hegarty at the time of his death and who lived on Creggan Heights. This witness spoke to Daniel minutes before he was killed. When the shots were fired the witness ran inside the house. At daybreak the witness came outside again and saw a body being put into the ambulance. A plastic sheet was spread out on the ground where Daniel had fallen, and was marked by a crucifix and some flowers. Photographs exist of this scene. The witness has a vivid memory of a Centurion tank coming up the street, and standing on the edge of the plastic sheeting to make sure that the tank did not destroy the evidence.[81]

6.8 The European Court of Human Rights has held that for an investigation into alleged unlawful killings by state agents to be effective, it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events[82]. In the context of Northern Ireland, the court found that, because the army is deployed in support of the police, the RUC was not sufficiently independent to conduct an effective investigation into deaths caused by the army.

6.9 Not only was the police investigation into Daniel Hegarty’s death lacking in independence, it was manifestly inadequate. The perpetrator, Soldier B, was not interviewed by the RUC, nor were any of the military witnesses. The scene of the shooting was not examined until over 24 hours later, nor photographed until seven weeks later. There was no proper scene of crimes investigation at all. The two survivors deny having given statements to the police. The police map is completely inaccurate. The fundamental conflicts of evidence between the soldiers and the survivors have never been investigated, so far as we can tell. By no stretch of the imagination has there been an effective investigation, whether measured by domestic or by international standards.

7. The Inquest

7.1 The inquest into Daniel’s death was held on 17th October 1973. The coroner, Major Hubert O’Neill, sat with a jury of seven people.

7.2 The Hegarty family were not notified of the fact that the inquest was due to take place. The inquest on Seamus Bradley, the other young man to die during Operation Motorman, was scheduled to take place on the same day. Daniel’s father Alexander Hegarty only found out that the inquest was happening when Seamus Bradley’s father told him.[83]

7.3 The Hegarty family were not legally represented. There was no legal aid available to pay for a lawyer. Alexander Hegarty had contacted a local solicitor about Daniel’s death, but he had written to say that he would no longer be representing the family.[84]

7.4 The inquest heard evidence from D/I Scott, Daniel’s father Alexander Hegarty, his cousins Christopher and Thomas Hegarty, the neighbour William Morrin and the state pathologist Thomas Marshall. The coroner also had available to him depositions and statements from the other neighbour, James McGill, Joseph Stewart, the ambulance driver, and Sergeant Penney and Constable Cunningham of the RUC.

7.5 Under the law applicable to inquests at the time[85] Soldiers A and B, as persons who might have been responsible for the death, were not compellable as witnesses. Instead, their unsworn statements were tendered in evidence. Since they were not present, they could not be questioned about what happened. The European Court of Human Rights has held that such procedures prevent an effective investigation into deaths caused by agents of the state[86]. Deprived of the presence of the soldiers, the inquest could not make any serious investigation into the rights and wrongs of the shooting. The soldier’s incredible claim that they thought the boys were armed, which was belied by their behaviour, went unchallenged.

7.6 Quite properly, in view of the conflicting evidence, the inquest recorded an open verdict[87].

8. The Labelling of Daniel Hegarty as a Gunman or Petrol Bomber

8.1 It has been a matter of great hurt to Daniel’s family that he was publicly labelled as a gunman or petrol bomber and that the government has steadfastly refused to put the record straight.

8.2 The army began the process at the outset on 31st July 1972. Their 7:00 am situation report on the day’s events said:

“By 0514hrs 1 KOB [1st Battalion Kings Own Borderers] had secured Sector B - the remainder of the Northern part of the Creggan. Meanwhile a petrol bomber was shot (possibly dead) at Bligh’s Lane/Creggan Heights.”[88]

Only one person was shot at that location, and that was Daniel Hegarty.

8.3 At some point on 31st July, Sir Burke Trend , the Cabinet Secretary sent a memorandum to Edward Heath in which he gave the following account:

“No more than 32 rounds were fired by the Army during the operation. Five gunmen were seen to be hit; and two killed and two wounded bodies were recovered. The security forces sustained no casualties themselves, and were responsible for no casualties to ‘civilians’. The only incident causing ‘civilian’ casualties was the explosion of a car bomb at Claudy, south east of Londonderry, causing six[89] deaths and some 30 injuries.”[90]

Thus the army’s version soon reached the highest echelons.

8.4 That same day the then Minister for State for Northern Ireland, Paul Channon MP, read out a statement about Operation Motorman to the House of Commons, in which he said:

“The operations met with little resistance, and I am glad to be able to tell the House that known casualties were in all the circumstances extremely light. Two civilians were killed and two injured. These were people who, in spite of the warning issued, were present on the streets in the early hours of the morning.

It is a matter for very great regret that there were any casualties at all, but it is a tribute both to the discipline and moderation of the troops and to the good sense of the population at large that these extensive operations were successfully carried out at so little cost.”[91]

The then Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, repeated the Minster’s statement in the House of Lords. He told them:

“The information I have about the two who were killed is that one was 19 and the other 16, and that one was apparently in possession of arms while the other was suspected of being a gunman. This is more obscure, however, because his body was not brought in by the Army. No doubt we shall learn more about him later.”[92]

It is clear that the 16-year-old he referred to is Daniel, who was only 15. The other victim, Seamus Bradley, was 19 and died in army custody, so the “suspected gunman” is obviously Daniel, whose body was taken to hospital by civilian ambulance. These allegations were reported in the Irish News[93]. Despite Lord Carrington’s admission that his information was “obscure”, no further information was ever offered in either House concerning Daniel, and the record was never put straight. Des Browne MP, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with responsibility for victims, wrote to RWUK on 13th May 2003 saying,

“I am not aware of any further parliamentary statements mentioning Daniel’s death.”[94]

8.5 At a meeting at the Northern Ireland Office on 1st August 1972 to assess the aftermath of Operation Motorman, the minutes record:

“Of the two people killed in Londonderry one was a suspected gunman, the other a suspected petrol bomber.”[95]

8.6 Only the Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, sounded any note of doubt, and that was fairly muted. In a message to Prime Minister Edward Heath on 1st August 1972, the Taoiseach said:

“… I regret that there were two fatal casualties in Derry – the circumstances of one of which are seriously disputed – but, that the military activity taken throughout the North yesterday resulted in so few casualties is a considerable relief.”[96]

8.7 With the memory of Bloody Friday still fresh and the death toll in Claudy eclipsing the two deaths during Operation Motorman only hours afterwards, the media made no attempt to research Daniel Hegarty’s death. Most newspapers simply referred to the fact that two people had died during Operation Motorman. The Daily Telegraph referred in an editorial to “only two fatal casualties (both probably gunmen)”[97]. The Daily Express named Daniel, but wrongly gave his age as 16[98]. Only two local newspapers, the Derry Journal and the Irish News, carried Thomas Hegarty’s version of events[99]. Thus the army’ account slipped into the public domain virtually unchallenged.

8.8 In an account of the army’s history in Northern Ireland first published in 1973, Daniel Hegarty and Seamus Bradley were described anonymously as “a gunman and a petrol bomber”[100] and “terrorists”[101]. This description was repeated in reprints in 1976 and 1977[102].

8.9 Soldiers A and B perpetuated the myths about Daniel in their statements about his death, which were read out at his inquest in October 1973. Soldier A referred to the three Hegartys as “men” throughout his statement and at one point described them as “the three gunmen”[103]. Soldier B referred to them as “youths” and on one occasion described Thomas Hegarty as a man. He alleged that “the leading youth” was carrying a weapon.[104] The Hegarty in the lead was, of course, Thomas Hegarty, but this allegation has attached itself to Daniel.

8.10 It was left to Daniel’s father, Alexander, to speak up for his son. He told the inquest:

“I would like to say that my son was not a member of any illegal organisation. He used to help me in my free lance welfare work and has on occasion helped the Police. About 2½ years ago he helped to recover some stolen arms.”

Unlike the other victim of Operation Motorman, Seamus Bradley, Daniel Hegarty was never claimed as a volunteer by the IRA, nor buried with IRA honours, for the simple reason that he was not a member.

9. The Failure to Put the Record Straight

9.1 On 4th November 1999 Adam Ingram MP, then Minister of State for Northern Ireland, refused to re-open Daniel’s case.[105]

9.2 Following correspondence with the Pat Finucane Centre on behalf of the Hegarty family, in October 2002 the government finally confirmed that

“… Daniel Hegarty was not, and is not, classed as a gunman.”

However, this far from unequivocal vindication was marred by their assertion that:

“We have no evidence… that the soldier did not tell the truth at the time.” [106]

9.3 They went on to say:

The Ministry of Defence have informed us that they do not hold any documents which state whether or not the firing was in accordance with the ‘Yellow Card’ guidelines.”[107] We wonder whether the Ministry of Defence examined the question of the conformity of the shooting with its own rules at all.

9.4 In 2003 RWUK entered into a protracted correspondence with Des Browne MP, the then minister responsible for victims in Northern Ireland, in an attempt to persuade the government to acknowledge definitively that Daniel was not a gunman or a petrol bomber, and that he should not have been killed. His final letter to us was disappointing:

“… The Government has never declared Daniel Hegarty a gunman. It is for the courts, not the Government, to decide if someone is guilty of a crime… I do not claim that the Government records tell the complete story of what happened on 31st July 1972, but they are all I can provide. It is not for me to pronounce on what represents the truth in a case such as this. You ask that the Government acknowledge that Daniel Hegarty should not have been killed. No child should be killed. That is why the Government continues to strive to achieve peace in Northern Ireland… I must stress again that what I cannot do is pass judgements based on the limited historical records available; it is the job of a judge to declare people innocent or guilty. No judge has ever declared Daniel a gunman, and he should therefore be assumed innocent of any such accusation.”[108]

9.5 There is no hint in any of correspondence with Des Browne that the government or the army is prepared to accept responsibility for Daniel’s death, let alone be held accountable for it.

10. Conclusion

10.1 At the inquest into Daniel Hegarty’s death, a barrister, Mr McCartney, put it to Christopher Hegarty, himself only 16 at the time of the shooting, that Daniel would still be alive if they had not gone out that night[109]. Since that was self-evidently true, Christopher was forced to say, “Yes.” However, it is not possible to draw a line under the shooting of an unarmed fifteen-year-old by a soldier by simply blaming the victim.

10.2 Operation Motorman was a huge military operation, planned and approved at the highest levels in the land. It was always envisaged that there would be heavy casualties, and it had been accepted by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet that such casualties were a price worth paying in order to restore control over the no-go areas. It must be acknowledged that the government’s decision to issue a warning to the people of Northern Ireland to stay at home, and their decision to do so by and large, fortunately kept the casualties to a minimum. However, there is no evidence on the papers currently available that the government or the army planned for the contingency that some people – whether out of a sense of social service like Rosary Crusaders Alexander Hegarty and his nephew Thomas Hegarty, or curiosity to see the tanks, as in Daniel’s case – would be on the streets. As had already been seen on Bloody Sunday, combat troops who are psyched up for a battle with the IRA are not best equipped to deal with unarmed civilians who, from their point of view, get in their way. Sadly, there is also no evidence that any lessons had been learned from Bloody Sunday.

10.3 One of the saddest things about Daniel Hegarty’s death is that very few people, apart from his shocked and grieving immediate family, stopped to ask even the most basic questions about how it was possible that an unarmed child could be shot by a soldier. In the litany of bloodshed that characterised 1972 in Northern Ireland, Daniel’s death was eclipsed by the next atrocity, the terrible bombings in Claudy, and he rapidly became just another statistic. Yet all the hallmarks of a shoot-to-kill incident were there. Daniel was not involved in the IRA, he was unarmed, as were his cousins, he was not offering the soldiers any threat. By all accounts the three boys did not even realise the soldiers were there. Nevertheless, Daniel was killed and Christopher was lucky to escape with his life. Afterwards the soldiers claimed, as they did in so many other cases, to have believed that Thomas – not even Daniel – was carrying a weapon. The police thought so little of the shooting that they carried out no proper scene of crimes procedures and never interviewed any of the soldiers concerned. The DPP returned a virtually automatic decision that no-one should be prosecuted. The inquest shed no further light on the shooting. Daniel Hegarty went down in history, quite wrongly, as just another gunman or petrol bomber.

10.4 In this report, we have tried to put Daniel’s death under the spotlight that it deserves; to rescue his case from obscurity and ask the questions that should have been asked when he was killed. In particular, it has to be asked whether he was murdered.

10.5 Since the original investigation into Daniel’s death was so poor, and since papers that may be relevant to his death are still hidden from public scrutiny, that question remains to be answered. However, we believe that Daniel Hegarty’s family deserve an answer. They deserve the fresh investigation into his death that they have sought.

10.6 They are also entitled to an immediate, public, and unequivocal acknowledgement from the government that Daniel Hegarty was not a gunman, but a wholly innocent victim. We also think that they deserve an apology, not only for Daniel’s death, but for the hurt and misery they have suffered over the years of trying to clear Daniel’s name.

10.7 We call upon the British government, without further delay, to:

OCTOBER 2003

(this report was originally written in August 2003, but is being updated as new information comes to light)

[1] Lost Lives, McKittrick et al, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1999, p. 1473

[2] Insight, Sunday Times, 23 September 1972

[3] PREM15/1016 109690, covering letter from Ronnie Custis at the Ministry of Defence

to Christopher Roberts in Prime Minister Edward Heath’s office, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER UK EYES ONLY

[4] PREM15/1016 109690, covering letter from Ronnie Custis at the Ministry of Defence to Christopher Roberts in Prime Minister Edward Heath’s office, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER UK EYES ONLY

[5] PREM 15/1011 109690 army operationS in northern ireland, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER

[6] PREM 15/1011 109690 Memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, headed GEN 79, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET

[7] PREM 15/1012 109690, NOTE OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY BEGINNING AT 7 20 PM ON MONDAY, 7 AUGUST 1972, AT LANESIDE, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked SECRET

[8] The British Army in Ulster, Volume 1, by David Barzilay, Century Books, 1973, p. 44

[9] From 1972 to 1974; he was also Attorney General for England & Wales at the time

[10] Now Lord Rawlinson of Ewell, having been made a life peer in 1978

[11] PREM15/1011, further letter from Ronnie Custis at the Ministry of Defence to Christopher Roberts in Prime Minister Edward Heath’s office, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER

[12] Ibid, Annex A

[13] PREM 15/1011 109690 DRAFT MESSAGE FROM G.O.C. TO BRIGADE COMMANDERS, undated, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER

[14] PREM 15/1011 109690 Memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, headed GEN 79, 26 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET

[15] PREM15/1016 107108, memorandum from Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Prime Minister Edward Heath, 12 December 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET

[16] PREM15/1012 109690, memorandum from Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Prime Minister Edward Heath, 9 August 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked SECRET

[17] PREM15/1016 107108, memorandum from Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Prime Minister Edward Heath, 12 December 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET

[18] PREM 15/1011 109690 headed OPERATION MOTORMAN, 27 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET – PERIMETER – the copy released has some minor handwritten amendments at paragraphs 2 and 3 that are not easy to decipher

[19] ANOTHER 4,000 TROOPS ON WAY, Newsletter, 28 July 1972

[20] British Army home depots are quiet, Irish Times, 1 August 1972

[21] ANOTHER 4,000 TROOPS ON WAY, Newsletter, 28 July 1972

[22] Troops all set, by Brigadier W F K Thompson, Military Correspondent, Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1972

[23] ANOTHER 4,000 TROOPS ON WAY, Newsletter, 28 July 1972

[24] 4,000 extra troops may mean no-go area action, Belfast Telegraph, 28 July 1972

[25] The British Army in Ulster, Volume 1, by David Barzilay, Century Books, 1973, p. 45

[26] THE ARMY IN ULSTER MUST BE STRONG, The Times, 29 July 1972

[27] Time to back up the Army, by Richard Cox, Daily Telegraph, 29 July 1972

[28] PREM 15/1011 109690 EXTRACTS FROM MR WHITELAW’S STATEMENTS, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003

[29] PREM 15/1011 109690 army operationS in northern ireland, paragraph 4, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET PERIMETER

[30] PREM 15/1011 109690 Memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, headed GEN 79, 26 July 1972, paragraph 7 (a), released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked TOP SECRET

[31] Big army push against no-go areas begins, by Simon Hoggart and Derek Brown, The Guardian, 31 July 1972

[32] Ibid

[33] PREM 15/1011 109690 DRAFT TEXT FOR FINAL SUNDAY NIGHT WARNING, 28 July 1972, paragraph 7 (a), released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003

[34] Minister denies ‘military solution’, by Robert Fisk and Christopher Warman, The Times, 1 August 1972 (copy filed 31 July 1972); ALL-PARTY PRAISE FOR ARMY, by H B Boyne, Daily Telegraph, 1 August 1972

[35] The UDA had set up a few no-go areas of their own, essentially as a ploy to bring about action against nationalist no-go areas; the UDA had said that they would dismantle their barriers as soon as the army destroyed nationalist barricades

[36] PREM 15/1011 109690 telegram from Sir John Peck to Sir William Nield and others, 31 July 1972, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003

[37] Wrongly spelt in the newspaper article

[38] No resistance ARMY DELIGHT AT ‘OPERATION MOTORMAN’, by Brigadier W F K Thompson, Military Correspondent, Daily Telegraph, 1 August 1972 – this account is largely verified by the army’s own situation report for the day (see below) and by the website of the Light Infantry at http://www.army.mod.uk/1li/history/LI_68_93.htm

[39] PREM 15/1011 109690 SITREP ON OPERATION MOTORMAN AS AT 310700a, 31 July 1972, paragraph 9 c (5), released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked CONFIDENTIAL

[40] Provisionals threaten ‘greater toll’, by Christopher Sweeney, The Times, 1 August 1972

[41] two die in bogside invasion, Irish News, 1 August 1972

[42] PREM 15/1011 109690 SITREP ON OPERATION MOTORMAN AS AT 310700a, 31 July 1972, paragraph 9 c, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked CONFIDENTIAL

[43] PREM 15/1011 109690 SITREP ON OPERATION MOTORMAN AS AT 310700a, 31 July 1972, paragraph 9 c, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked CONFIDENTIAL

[44] Both the Provisional and the Official IRA were active in Derry at the time

[45] WE PLANNED NOT TO BE THERE – Provos, Irish News, 1 August 1972

[46] Minister denies ‘military solution’, by Robert Fisk and Christopher Warman, The Times, 1 August 1972 (copy filed 31 July 1972)

[47] PREM 15/1011 109690 EXTRACTS FROM MR WHITELAW’S STATEMENTS, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003

[48] Witness Deposition of Alexander Hegarty, 16 October 1973

[49] This account is based on interviews with the Hegarty family by the Pat Finucane Centre and RWUK

[50] Witness Deposition of William Morrin, 16 October 1973

[51] Report of Autopsy, Thomas K Marshall, MD, FRCPath, 31 July 1972

52] Witness Deposition of Kenneth Sherlock, 16 October 1973

[53] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972

[54] Witness Deposition of Peter Woodley, 16 October 1973

[55] According to the government, the platoon was tasked with removing a barricade there – letter from Des Browne MP to the Hegarty family, 18 February 2003

[56] Witness statement of Soldier A, 31 July 1972

[57] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972 – Soldier A also says he saw an ambulance, although somewhat earlier than Soldier B, whose account is more detailed

[58] Witness Deposition of Detective Inspector Cecil Scott, 16 October 1973 – there is also photographic evidence of this bloodstain

[59] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972

[60] LOCATION PLAN OF SCENE OF DEATH OF DANIEL A. HEGARTY

[61] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972

[62] Witness statement of Soldier A, 31 July 1972

[63] Witness statements of Soldiers A and B, 31 July 1972

[64] Witness statement of Soldier A, 31 July 1972

[65] Report of Autopsy, Thomas K Marshall, MD, FRCPath, 31 July 1972

[66] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972

[67] Witness Deposition of Detective Inspector Cecil Scott, 16 October 1973

[68] Witness Deposition of William Morrin, 16 October 1973

[69] Statement of James McGill, 23 September 1972

[70] Report of Autopsy, Thomas K Marshall, MD, FRCPath, 31 July 1972

[71] Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY POLICE REPORT CONCERNING DEATH, 1ST August 1972

[72] Letter from Superintendent R D McCausland, RUC, to Pat Finucane Centre, 4 August 2000

[73] Signed statement of Mary Callaghan

[74] Letter from Superintendent R D McCausland, RUC, to Pat Finucane Centre, 16 June 2000; letter from victims’ minister Angela Smith MP to Mark Durkan, SDLP, 4 July 2003

[75] Letter from the DDP to the Pat Finucane Centre, 22 November 1999

[76] Statement of Evidence of W T Cunningham, 16 May 1973

[77] Letter from Superintendent R D McCausland, RUC, to Pat Finucane Centre, 4 August 2000

[78] Witness Statement of Samuel Ross Penney, 7 March 1973

[79] LOCATION PLAN OF SCENE OF DEATH OF DANIEL A.HEGARTY

[80] Letter from Acting Assistant Chief Constable WBS Tosh to Pat Finucane Centre, 22 September 2003

[81] New witness saw boys seconds before shooting, by Paddy McGuffin, Derry News, 9 October 2003

[82] Jordan v UK, ECrtHR, 2001, paragraph 106

[83] Pat Finucane Centre interview with the Hegarty family, October 1998

[84] Ibid

[85] This rule has recently been changed following the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Jordan et al v UK

[86] Jordan v UK, ECrtHR, 2001, paragraph 142

[87] VERDICT ON INQUEST, 16 October 1973

[88] PREM 15/1011 109690 SITREP ON OPERATION MOTORMAN AS AT 310700a, 31 July 1972, paragraph 9 c (4), released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked CONFIDENTIAL

[89] Three more people died later of their injuries

[90] PREM 15/1011 109690 memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, 31 July 1972, paragraph 2, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked SECRET

[91] Hansard, House of Commons, 31 July 1972, column 32

[92] Hansard, House of Lords, 31 July 1972, column 30

[93] Entry of ‘no-go’ areas by no means end in itself – Channon, Irish News, 1 August 1972

[94] Letter from Des Browne MP to RWUK, 13 May 2003

[95] PREM 15/1012 109690 NIOM (72) 30 Note of a meeting at 12 noon on 1 August, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked CONFIDENTIAL

[96] PREM 15/1012 PRIME MINISTER’S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL NO T230/72, 1 August 1972, telegram from Sir John Peck to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and others, released by the London Public Records Office on 1 January 2003, marked SECRET

[97] OUSTING THE IRA, The Daily Telegraph, editorial, 1 August 1972

[98] Gunmen quit Derry but ‘the fight will go on’, by Frank Howitt, George Hill, John Ley and Gerard Burke, 1 August 1972

[99] “Prague-like” invasion of Bogside and Cgrggan, Derry Journal, 1 August 1972; TWO DIE IN BOGSIDE INVASION, Irish News, 1 August 1972

[100] The British Army in Ulster, Volume 1, by David Barzilay, Century Books, 1973, p. 46

[101] Ibid, p. 48

[102] These allegations may also have been repeated in a 1978 reprint

[103] Witness statement of Soldier A, 31 July 1972

[104] Witness statement of Soldier B, 31 July 1972

[105] Letter from Adam Ingram to Alexander Hegarty, 4 November 1999

[106] Letter from Des Browne MP to the Hegarty family, 4 October 2002

[107] Ibid

[108] Letter from Des Browne MP to RWUK, 31 March 2003

[109] Inquest On Second “Motorman” Victim, Derry Journal, 9 [19?] October 1973

27th October 2003

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