PLASTIC BULLETS 2006

 JANUARY 2006

INTRODUCTION

British Irish Rights Watch is an independent non-governmental organisation that has been monitoring the human rights dimension of the conflict and the peace process, in Northern Ireland since 1990.  Our services are available, free of charge, to anyone whose human rights have been violated because of the conflict, regardless of religious, political or community affiliations.  We take no position on the eventual constitutional outcome of the conflict.

We are opposed to the deployment of plastic bullets because we regard them as lethal weapons that should have no place in the policing of a democratic society in the twenty-first century.

Between September 2002 and July 2005, no plastic bullets were fired by the police or the army in Northern Ireland.  Indeed, plastic bullets have not been used in the city of Derry, despite some serious incidents involving public disorder, since 1998[1].  On 1^st December 2004, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) told the Policing Board:

“Our intention is not to use them [plastic bullets] but we retain the right to hold them and the right to deploy them if the only alternative would be to use lethal force in the form of live rounds, which would be deeply unsatisfactory and extremely bad policing.  In the light of the current situation we would be able to reduce the daily number we keep, the number of officers we train, and the number of guns we need.”[2]

Although 33 plastic bullets were fired by the PSNI on two occasions in July and August 2005, BIRW was still hopeful that they were becoming a thing of the past.  However, ominously, the Chief Constable of the PSNI told the Policing Board that he had ordered a review of the guidelines for firing following these events[3].  Then over the weekend of 10^th and 11^th September 2005 very serious rioting by loyalists broke out which involved violent attacks on the police, including the firing of live ammunition.  The security forces responded by firing 389 AEPs (the latest form of plastic bullet), and our hopes were dashed.

In this report we examine the history of the deployment of plastic bullets, the deaths and injuries they have caused, the incidence of their use, domestic and international law and concern about plastic bullets, the recommendations of the Patten Commission, and the mechanisms for scrutinising their use that have been introduced relatively recently.  Of particular concern is that the firing of plastic bullets by the army currently comes under no proper independent scrutiny.

PLASTIC BULLETS – A LETHAL WEAPON

The onset of the violent conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969 was accompanied by serious civil unrest.  Crowd control techniques such as the use of water cannon and CS gas were not felt by the security forces to be adequate, and in the 1970s first rubber and then plastic bullets were introduced.  They were seen by the government as an alternative to the use of live ammunition to combat stone-throwers and petrol bombers[4] and by the security forces as a weapon that allowed them to control rioters without coming into physical contact with them[5].

Rubber bullets were introduced in Northern Ireland in 1970.  They were 5.75 inches in length, 1.5 inches wide, and weighed 5.25 ounces.  They caused an unacceptable level of casualties[6], they ricocheted unpredictably, and they tumbled in flight.  They continued to be used until 1975.

Plastic bullets were introduced in 1973.  The version in use until June 2005, the L21A1, was 4 inches long, 1.5 inches wide, and weighed 5 ounces.  Plastic bullets were made of a much harder substance than rubber bullets.

A plastic bullet fired at a range of 50 yards from its target has an impact energy of 110ft/lb, the equivalent of a 2lb weight being dropped from a height of 55ft.  An impact energy in excess of 90ft/lb has been found to cause death or significant damage.[7]  The shorter the distance from which a plastic bullet is fired, the greater its impact energy.  Most plastic bullets are fired at much closer range than 50 yards, sometimes at point blank range.  The guidelines for their use recommended a minimum distance of only 20 yards.

Problems have occurred with the manufacture and use of plastic bullets.  In 1997 a batch of the bullets had to be withdrawn after Ministry of Defence tests found that a significant proportion of the batch had muzzle velocities in excess of the recommended upper limit[8].  A second batch were subsequently found to be heavier than the permitted limit[9].  The Committee on the Administration of Justice has suggested that many, if not all, of the plastic bullets fired in 1996 may have been defective[10].  Independent observers monitoring the situation during the summer marching season in Northern Ireland in recent years have observed the guns used to fire plastic bullets jamming and overheating when used repeatedly[11].

Although intended as a non-lethal weapon, seventeen people have died as a result of the use of rubber and plastic bullets.  Between 1970 and 2005, 55,834 rubber bullets and 69,837 plastic bullets were fired, 125,671 in all[12].  Rubber bullets resulted in three deaths, giving a ratio of one death for every 18,611 bullets fired.  The 14 fatalities caused by plastic bullets result in a ratio of 1:4,988.  Thus plastic bullets have been nearly four times as deadly as rubber bullets, despite the fact that they were intended to be safer.

FATALITIES CAUSED BY PLASTIC AND RUBBER BULLETS

Five aspects of these shootings are immediately striking:

·         First, all but one of the victims were Catholics. 

·         Secondly, nine of the seventeen victims were aged 18 or under, the youngest being 10 years old.  Only five of the victims were aged over 21. 

·         Thirdly, many of the victims were not involved in rioting.

·         Fourthly, many of the victims were shot at much too close a range and were struck in the head or upper body, in contravention of the guidelines then in force.

·         Fifthly, six of the victims did not die immediately but lingered for between one and fifteen days.

On 17^th August 2004, Dominic Marron died of a heart attack at the age of 37.  He had been shot in the head with a plastic bullet by an RUC officer on 9^th May 1981, when he was only 14 years old.  He had to be treated in the intensive care unit and suffered brain damage and paralysis.  His family are convinced that his premature death was directly related to the traumatic injuries caused by being shot with a plastic bullet.[13]

INJURIES CAUSED BY PLASTIC BULLETS

In 1971, Emma Groves was blinded when a rubber bullet fired into her home destroyed both her eyes.  In August 1995, a year after the first ceasefire, Tommy Turner was hit in the face by a plastic bullet.  His facial bones were fractured in seven places and he required 64 stitches, the insertion of two steel plates, and plastic surgery.[14]  According to the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 615 people had been injured by plastic bullets between 1981 and 1999[15].  The report does not give the origin of this figure, but it is almost certainly an underestimate (please see below). 

The fact that the last fatality caused by a plastic bullet happened in 1989 does not indicate that plastic bullets are used less often, nor does it appear that they have become any safer.

A solicitor in Northern Ireland, Eamann McMenamin of the firm Madden & Finucane in Belfast, put in a submission to the Patten Commission concerning his professional experience of dealing with cases of injury caused by plastic bullets during the disturbances surrounding the marching season in the summers of 1996 and 1997.  He received instructions in 24 such cases, five of them involving women and two of them involving children aged 13 and 15, both of whom sustained head injuries.  By June 1998 he had settled 17 of the cases, none of which went to court, and had obtained the sum of £428,204 in damages for his clients.  The settlements he achieved can be summarised as follows:

 In April 1999 a group of five senior doctors who had treated people injured by plastic bullets during the period 8^th to 14^th July 1996 in six different hospitals published their findings[16].  During that week, 8,165 plastic bullets were fired throughout Northern Ireland.  They treated 155 patients who had been injured by plastic bullets.  It is this figure that suggests that the figure of 615 injuries between 1981 and 1999 is likely to be an underestimate.  No fewer than 29,695 plastic bullets were fired in 1981, the year of the hunger strikes.  Seven of the 17 fatalities occurred in that year.  If the rate of injury was equivalent to that in the week surveyed by the doctors in 1996, 564 injuries would have been expected in 1981 alone.  The doctors’ figures also allow for a direct comparison.  The government asked Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary to study the RUC’s use of plastic bullets during 1996.  In their report, they gave a figure, which presumably came from the RUC themselves, of just 20 injuries for the period 1^st January to 25^th August 1996[17], although the doctors recorded 155 persons injured during just one week of that period, nearly eight times as many.

The 155 patients had sustained 172 injuries.  19% of these injuries were to the head, face or neck; 20% were to the chest or abdomen; and 61% were to limbs.  42 patients had to be admitted to hospital, three of them to intensive care.   The age of the patients ranged from 14 to 54 years.  28 of those injured were aged 20 or under; 66 were aged between 21 and 30; 24 were aged between 31 and 40; and 12 were aged 41 or over[18]. 16 of the victims were women.

Their findings show that at least 39% of injuries were sustained to the upper body, in contravention of the guidelines[19].  They also show that young men were overwhelmingly likely to be the targets of plastic bullets, with 19% of victims aged 20 or under and 44% aged between 21 and 30.  After reviewing other medical studies of the effects of plastic bullets, the doctors concluded that, whereas the previous standard for deeming such injuries to be life-threatening had been injury to the diaphragm or above, a more appropriate measure would be injuries to the abdomen or above.  By that measure, 39% of all the cases they treated involved life-threatening injuries.

Another firm of solicitors, Kevin R Winters & Co, have supplied details of more recent injuries suffered by some of their clients.

The guidelines for the use of plastic bullets say that they should be fired in order that they strike the target in the lower part of the body.  It is obvious that in the majority of these cases that the guidelines were not followed.  Several of these injuries were life-threatening, and have resulted in permanent maiming and scarring.  It is simply a matter of luck that no-one was killed.

ATTENUATING ENERGY PROJECTILES (AEPs)

On 21^st June 2005, the attenuating energy projectile (AEP), known as the L606A1, and formally referred to as an impact round, was brought in to replace the L21A1 plastic bullet, following research commissioned by the Northern Ireland Office to search for a less lethal alternative to the plastic bullet, as recommended by the Patten Commission on police reform. 

As the Oversight Commissioner whose office was established to oversee the Patten reforms has commented[20], the AEP is not an alternative, but simply a different type of plastic bullet.  Its principal difference from the L21A1 is that it has an air pocket in the nose of the bullet which collapses on impact, thereby diffusing the force of its contact.  In theory, it should be less likely to cause fractures, for example of the skull.

The Defence Scientific Advisory Council’s sub-committee on the Medical Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons (DOMILL) has produced a statement on the comparative potential for causing injury of the AEP as compared to the L21A1.  It concludes that the risk of an AEP impact to vulnerable areas such as the head and chest “will not exceed” that of the L21A1.  Nor does the AEP pose a greater hazard to the chest or abdomen. In other words, in these respects the AEP is no safer than the L21A1.  Its only benefits are that it is less likely to penetrate the skin, and that, should an AEP strike someone’s head, “the severity and incidence of skull fracture is likely to be lower with an AEP”, the bullet will intrude less far into the brain, and it will result in less brain damage.  However, DOMILL warns:

“The clinical impact of the reduction in damage to the brain and overlying skull from the AEP cannot be assessed confidently because of

limitations in current models for this type of impact. Notwithstanding the

uncertainties in the actual clinical consequences, the AEP certainly

demonstrates the potential for less severe clinical outcomes, compared

to the L21A1.”[21]

The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People, Nigel Williams, has expressed concern that no full child impact assessment has been carried out on the AEP, and has requested a full assessment of its impact on children.  His aim is that AEPs “should not be used in any circumstances where children are present and at risk of being harmed”.[22]

Controversy surrounded the introduction of AEPs.  There was no consultation exercise prior to their introduction.  A number of human rights groups took the view that the Chief Constable could not purchase AEPs without consulting the Policing Board because they could be considered as novel and/or contentious items.  However, after taking legal advice, the Policing Board seems to have concluded that the Chief Constable was only under a duty to notify them of any such expenditure, and they do not have the power to approve or disapprove of his decision to deploy AEPs, or, presumably, any other weapon.  If this is true, then it is a matter of grave concern, given the important role played by the Policing Board in ensuring that the PSNI complies with human rights standards[23].

Regrettably AEPs were used within three weeks of their introduction, after an unofficial moratorium on the use of plastic bullets which had lasted for two and three quarter years.  Twenty one AEPs were fired on 12^th July in Ardoyne, and a further eleven on 4^th August in Woodvale in north Belfast, all of them by the police[24]. 

In both cases, the police were faced with serious rioting.  In Ardoyne, nationalists rioted after an Orange Order parade, trouble which had been widely predicted following the revocation of Sean Kelly’s licence and his return to prison, which was perceived as a measure calculated to put pressure on the IRA to finally end any engagement in violence[25].  Sean Kelly’s subsequent release on the eve of the IRA’s announcement reinforced this perception.  It was reported that the police requested permission to fire AEPs up to eight times before permission was granted[26].  Nine blast bombs and dozens of petrol bombs were thrown at members of the security forces; about 100 police officers were injured; two journalists, two ambulance crew and eight other members of the public were also hurt[27].

It is not clear whether the eight members of the public who were hurt included two people who were injured by AEPs.  A 22-year-old man said that he had been singled out by the police as he stood by the side of the road.  He was hit in the stomach.  He said, “… I felt an awful pain.  I hit the ground and I could not breathe”.  A 15-year-old boy was hit on the back of the leg and hurt his knee as he fell.  His mother, who claimed that her son was not rioting and had his back to the police when he was hit, said, “He was very pale, shaken and confused and his leg was swollen.”  Both these people were later arrested for rioting.[28]  It is of particular concern that one of those hit was a child and the other was hit in the stomach, in breach of the firing guidelines.  It has been claimed that several other people were also injured by AEPs[29].

Those rioting on 12^th July, it has been alleged, were predominantly young people.  One journalist wrote, “… there was hardly a rioter from Ardoyne over the age of 16.  I stood there for two hours watching them.  They were all kids.  Recreational rioters, motivated more by the six-pack than the six counties.”[30]

In Woodvale, loyalists rioted after the police had conducted a number of searches, perceived by those affected as heavy-handed, in a bid to crack down on a bloody UVF/LVF feud.  Police were attacked with petrol bombs, fireworks and “an explosive type device”.  Forty officers were injured.[31]  It is not know whether anyone was hurt by an AEP.

A very large number of AEPs were fired over the period 11^th to 13^th September 2005, during serious rioting following a ruling by the Parades Commission that the Orange Order’s Whiterock parade be re-routed.  On 10^th September 2005, the police fired 207 AEPs (73 in east Belfast, 93 in west Belfast, and 41 in North Belfast)[32], and the police fired six live rounds and the army fired one after loyalists opened fire on them[33].  On 11^th September 2005 the police fired 31 AEPs (18 in east Belfast, 2 in west Belfast, 8 in north Belfast, and 3 in south Belfast).  The army fired 140 AEPs during these two days.  Less serious rioting took place on 13^th September.  In all 389 AEPs were fired between 10^th and 13^th September, of which 249 were fired by the police and 140 were fired by the army.[34]  The rioting was the most serious seen in Northern Ireland for a decade.  BIRW has seen one report of a woman being hit in the stomach by a plastic bullet which ricocheted.  The same article made unsubstantiated claims of broken legs, strapped-up shoulders and a 15-year-old who lost his testicles. [35]

According to the PSNI, the AEPs fired by them on 12^th July 2005 hit 12 people.  Twelve people were hit again on 4^th August, and 187 were hit during the period 10^th to 13^th September 2005.[36]  It is not known how many injuries were caused and it is also not known how many persons were hit by the 140 AEPs fired by the army.

Thus of the 282 AEPs fired between July and September 2005 by the police, 211, or 75%, hit their mark.  It is difficult to know whether this demonstrates accurate or indiscriminate firing, especially during September.  Once the report of the Police Ombudsman about these firings is available, a clearer picture should emerge.

FIRING RATES

It is surprisingly difficult to obtain accurate figures concerning the number of plastic bullets fired.  For example, the following figures emerged concerning firing of AEPs during 2005, apparently all emanating from official sources:

·         According to Plastic bullet probe, by Conla Young, Daily Ireland, 1.10.2005, quoting official spokespeople, the army fired 130 AEPs and the PSNI more than 430, giving a total of 580.

·         The Chief Constable told the Policing Board on 5.10.2005 that the PSNI and army combined had fired around 450 AEPs.

·         In evidence before the Northern Ireland Select Affairs Committee on 9.11.2005 he said that the PSNI had fired 260 AEPs and the army had fired 240, totalling 500.

·         According to the Northern Ireland Policing Board’s Human Rights Advisers, the PSNI fired 249 AEPs and the army fired 140 during the period 10^th to 13^th September 2005, plus 21 on 12^th July 2005, giving 410 altogether.  While these figures are, we believe, accurate for the dates in question, their report did not cover firing on 4^th August 2005.

In fact, the true total for the year was 421.

Different official sources give different figures and there is confusion over whether figures quoted apply to numbers fired by the RUC, the army or both.  These are the best available figures since 1970:

On average, 3,491 bullets were fired each year over the 36 year period, but an average of just over 1,000 plastic bullets were fired each year between 1982 and 1995[46].  However, the number of plastic bullets fired each year has varied considerably.  Large numbers of rubber bullets were fired by the army in the early 1970s, at the outset of the conflict.  In 1981, the year of the hunger strikes in Northern Ireland, the exceptionally high number of 29,695 bullets was fired.  Since then, the least were fired in 2000, when only 26 shots were recorded.  No plastic bullets were fired at all in Northern Ireland between September 2002 and July 2005[47].  This welcome respite came to an end during the marching season on 2005, when 21 AEPs were fired on 12^th July in Ardoyne and a further 11 on 4^th August in Woodvale in north Belfast[48] and another 389 were fired between September 11^th and 13^th[49].  Thus nearly as many AEPs (421) were fired in four days in 2005 as plastic bullets (431) were fired in the almost two year period from 1^st January 1999 to 31^st October 2002.

Until 1996, 1987 (2,575 bullets fired) and 1988 (3,065) saw the highest annual totals since 1981, but in 1996 6,002 plastic bullets were fired by the RUC in a single week during the Drumcree crisis.[50]  In 1997 some 2,500 plastic bullets were fired during the equivalent week[51].  In 1998, 823 bullets were fired during Drumcree, and in 1999, according to the RUC, only one plastic bullet was used at Drumcree[52].

Between 1998 and 2005, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of plastic bullets deployed, which is discussed below.  The equally dramatic increase in their use in 2005 is also discussed.

It should also be noted that the majority of the 56,824 plastic bullets fired between January 1981 and September 2005 have been fired by the police (76%), rather than the army (24%).  In 1992 the army fired more often than the police, but little significance can be drawn from that fact because only 88 plastic bullets were used in that year. 

The army has been responsible for 11 of the 17 fatalities caused by plastic and rubber bullets, as follows:

 Furthermore, one regiment, the Royal Anglians, was responsible for four of those deaths.

THE DECREASE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF PLASTIC BULLETS BETWEEN 1999 AND 2005

There are a number of reasons for the recent decrease in the deployment of plastic bullets.  The summer of 1996 saw very serious civil unrest, culminating in the standoff at Drumcree, which shocked the world.  The highest number of plastic bullets since 1981 were fired in a single week.

One factor has undoubtedly been the growing domestic and international concern about the use of plastic bullets, as set out below.  Human rights groups such as the Belfast-based Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, all sent observers to monitor the marching season, and in 1997 and 1998 an unprecedented number of such observers were present in Northern Ireland.  Such international scrutiny may have accounted for changes in tactics on the part of the RUC and for the decrease in the number of plastic bullets fired.

Another factor has been the relative increase in the level of unionist protest and the decrease in nationalist protest.  This has been particularly marked since 1998, when for the first time the Orange Order was prevented from marching down the Garvaghy Road.

The PSNI remains an overwhelmingly Protestant police force.  In 1998 92% of its officers came from the Protestant/unionist/loyalist community[53].  In 1996, CAJ’s observers reported occasions on which RUC officers seemed unable or unwilling to intervene when loyalists were rioting or Catholics needed police assistance[54].   They also reported naked sectarianism on the part of some RUC officers[55].  On the night of 11^th July that year, RUC officers were reported as having entered the casualty department at Altnagelvin Hospital in Derry and attacked a number of people, who would have been mainly nationalists, with batons.  The hospital manager had to ask the RUC to leave the hospital.[56]  On the other hand, a spokesman for the loyalist Ulster Democratic Party described the RUC as being heavy handed and “looking for trouble” on 9^th July 1996[57].

In more recent years not only have police officers come into confrontation with members of their own community, but they have been frequently criticised and even threatened as a result of that confrontation by community members who were outraged that “their” police were preventing them from marching contentious routes.  This has happened despite the fact that since 1998 the Parades Commission has relieved the RUC of making decisions about which marches should go ahead.

Another significant factor has been the improving climate in which civil unrest has occurred.  As the ceasefires, imperfect though they are, have endured, and with strong public support for the Good Friday Agreement, sustained political efforts to reach accommodation over contentious marches has helped to defuse the situation.  Although the atmosphere has been very tense indeed at times, and there have been many acts of violence including murder surrounding the marching season, from 1996 until 2004 each year saw a decrease in the level of violence compared to the previous year.  The review of the guidelines for the use of plastic bullets by the Association of Chief Police Officers mentioned below must also have contributed to the RUC’s greater restraint in recent years, while the setting up of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement put the RUC under the closest scrutiny it has ever experienced.

THE INCREASE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF PLASTIC BULLETS IN 2005

There can be no doubt that the PSNI came under sustained attack in July 2005 from nationalists and in August and September 2005 from loyalists.  There is also no doubt that the rioting in September 2005 was the worst in a decade and that live ammunition, petrol bombs, fireworks loaded with shrapnel and other deadly missiles were aimed at the police. 

Until the Police Ombudsman’s reports become available it will be difficult to tell whether the very large number of AEPs fired in September was proportionate to the threat experienced by the police.  Her reports are not likely to appear quickly as she will have to prepare reports on four fifths (82%) as many firings (281) for the fivedays when plastic bullets were fired in 2005 as she has produced altogether for the period April 2001 to September 2002 (344 firings).  She will not, of course, be able to comment on firings by soldiers.

The consensus among a number of reporters and photographers who were present during the September riots is that the response of the security forces was proportionate.  They witnessed few injuries from plastic bullets and those they did see appeared to be relatively minor, the injured being able to walk after being hit.  However, most of the journalists were kept well back behind police lines, so may not have seen everything that occurred.  They all said that they heard no warnings given by police officers, but also said that there was a great deal of noise, so it would have been very difficult to hear any warnings.  One photographer who was close to the action said that police officers were wearing so much protective gear that it would have been difficult for them to have made themselves heard, even if there had not been so much ambient noise.

It seems clear that the nationalist rioting in July 2005 was very largely provoked, although not of course excused, by the revocation of the license of Sean Kelly, as has been explained above.

The loyalist rioting in August was a response to their perception of searches carried out by the police as being heavy-handed.

The response to both riots by the PSNI did appear to be measured, in that only a small number (22 in July and 11 in August) AEPs were fired, although the fact that twice as many AEPs were fired against nationalists as against loyalists is troublesome in light of CAJ’s observations at Drumcree about differential firing[58].

The roots of the loyalist rioting in September are much more complex.  Whilst the ostensible reason for the protests was dissatisfaction with the Parade Commission’s ruling on the route of the Whiterock Orange Order parade, after the riots loyalists blamed poverty and deprivation in Protestant areas, which they felt were not benefiting from inward investment to the same degree as Catholic neighbourhoods.  However, one of the reasons for that is that loyalist paramilitaries continue to intimidate contractors, demanding “protection” money, deterring them from building new facilities and creaming profit from money intended to improve loyalist areas.[59]  A more deep-seated impetus for the violence lay in the underlying political situation.  The IRA were about to de-commission their remaining weapons and dedicate themselves to a purely political strategy.   The ceasefire of the Ulster Volunteer Force, one of the main loyalist paramilitary groups, was coming under increasing criticism, and, indeed, on 14^th September the Secretary of State declared that he no longer recognised their ceasefire.  One interpretation of the violence could be that loyalists were anxious to make a show of strength as a warning to the government not to underestimate their opposition to political dialogue with Sinn Féin.  The UVF may also have been sending a warning specifically to the PSNI, who have been attempting to cut collusive links with paramilitary informers, not to forget who their “friends” are.

By the same token, the heavy firing with which the police responded to the loyalist rioting may have been intended to show that they are capable of controlling the community with which their links have been too close in the past, and that they are able to act independently.  On the other hand, they may merely have been acting in self defence.

THE GUIDELINES FOR USING PLASTIC BULLETS

Until August 1997, the guidelines for the use of plastic bullets were not publicly available.  When they were finally placed in the public domain, it became apparent that the guidelines issued to the RUC and those issued to the army were not the same, despite the fact that both arms of the security forces frequently fired plastic bullets together at the same event.

Although plastic bullets had never been used in England and Wales at that time, guidelines for their use there were much more restrictive than those pertaining until very recently in Northern Ireland.  In England and Wales, plastic bullets could only be fired to protect life.  In Northern Ireland, they could be fired to protect life, to protect property, to preserve the peace, or for the prevention and detection of crime.  In England and Wales, plastic bullets could only be deployed on the authority of a senior police officer, whereas in Northern Ireland individual officers carrying riot guns could decide when to open fire.  In England and Wales, warnings were to be given before opening fire unless circumstances dictated otherwise, but in Northern Ireland warnings only had to be given if circumstances permitted.  Independent observers reported that in practice warnings were not given before opening fire in Northern Ireland.[60]

Thus in Northern Ireland, where plastic bullets are used and have caused 17 deaths and many serious injuries, the restrictions on their use were far less robust than they were in England and Wales, where plastic bullets were not at that time deployed.

On 1^st August 1999, following a review of the use of plastic bullets by the Association of Chief Police Officers, new rules were brought in that applied across the board.  From then on, plastic bullets could only be fired in order to protect life or to prevent injury of members of the public, police officers, or members of the emergency services[61].  The decision to use plastic bullets was to be taken by a very senior police officer and individual officers were under the command of a baton gun commander.  Warnings must always be given unless the circumstances preclude it.  Plastic bullets were be treated in the same way as live ammunition and would only be used by specially trained officers.  They could only used where other methods had been tried and had failed, or would not be likely to succeed if tried.

Although this tightening of the rules was welcome, it was no substitute for the banning of plastic bullets altogether.  Moreover, it opened up the way for this lethal weapon to be deployed in England and Wales as well as Northern Ireland, only months after the United Nations recommended the abolition of their use (please see below).  In fact, plastic bullets have been fired on many occasions in England and Wales, although only in one-on-one situations, rather than being used for crowd control.

There was another worrying aspect of the new guidelines: they defined the lower part of the body as “below the rib cage”.  This does not take account of the medical evidence quoted above, which suggests that injuries to the abdomen can be life-threatening.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has produced guidelines for the firing of AEPs[62].  Although the guidelines were not yet available on their website, ACPO kindly supplied the guidelines as amended on 16^th May 2005.  The preface to the guidelines makes it abundantly clear that the AEP is not an ideal means of crowd control:

“1.5  The AEP has not been designed for use as a crowd control technology but has been designed for use as a less lethal option in situations where officers are faced with individual aggressors whether such aggressors are acting on their own or as part of a group.

1.6    The AEP may be deployed in a variety of operational situations, however the objective will remain the same. The AEP is intended for use as an accurate and discriminating projectile, designed to be fired at individual aggressors.

1.7    In the event of it becoming necessary to use an AEP in a public order situation this must be restricted to use against clearly identified individuals who are presenting a threat which must be countered and other tactical options available for countering the threat posed are considered inappropriate in the circumstances.

1.8    It must be recognised that the use of a kinetic energy device in a situation of public disorder may have a profound impact on crowd dynamics with implications for public safety and order.”[63]

The Policing Minister for the UK, Caroline Flint stated when AEPs were introduced that the “AEP will be used only in accordance with guidance which is intended to provide authorised firers with a less lethal option in situations where they are faced with individual aggressors whether such aggressors are acting on their own or as part of a group.  It is not a crowd control technology; it is designed to be used against specific individuals in a variety of scenarios.”[64]  Indeed baton round usage elsewhere in the UK has as far as we know been solely against individuals. 

It is difficult to believe that in a situation where over 300[65] AEPs are fired on a single night, as happened on 10th September 2005, each and every one was fired with discrimination.

The guidelines provide that AEPs may only be fired in situations of serious public disorder

“…where their use is judged to be necessary to reduce a serious risk of:

(i)  loss of life or serious injury or;

(ii)  substantial and serious damage to property where there is, or is judged to be, a sufficiently serious risk of loss of life or serious injury to justify their use.”[66] [their emphasis]

 In relation to aiming AEPs, the guidance stipulates:

“The AEP should be aimed to strike directly (i.e. without bouncing) the lower part of the subject’s body i.e. below the rib cage. Officers are trained to use the belt-buckle area as the point of aim, at all ranges thus mitigating against upper body hits.”[67]

Unfortunately, this guidance does not mitigate the possibility of striking the abdomen or the genitals.

As regards the range at which the AEP should be fired, the guidelines say:

“Unless there is a serious and immediate risk to life, which cannot otherwise be countered, use at under one metre or aiming the weapon to strike a higher part of the body at any range is prohibited. In these circumstances the risk of serious and even fatal injuries is increased and the firer must be able to justify the increased use of force.”[68]

A range of only one metre is exceptionally close, and must increase significantly the potential to cause injury.  Considering that the recommended range for the predecessor bullet was 20 yards, such a short range gives rise to considerable concern, especially as the AEP is designed to have the same mass and muzzle velocity as its predecessor, the L21A1[69].

The guidelines specifically recognise the fact that AEPs can cause fatalities[70] and that they can ricochet and thus have the potential to harm others apart from the intended target[71].  The guidelines stress that:

“The initial discharge and any subsequent discharge must be proportionate, lawful, appropriate, necessary and non-discriminate, in all the circumstances. Ultimately, the decision to discharge the AEP is an individual one for which the officer will be accountable…”[72]

The guidance contains a section on aftercare, which says that early medical attention should be provided for anyone struck by an AEP[73].

The guidance prohibits the firing of AEPs from a moving vehicle[74].

The PSNI has produced its own guidelines for the firing of AEPs, General Order 21/2005[75], which were supplied to BIRW under the Freedom of Information Act in redacted form.  Since the guidelines were only issued on 21^st June 2005, the day the AEP was first introduced, and AEPs were first deployed by the PSNI on 12^th July 2005, there can have been little time for training in or absorption of the guidelines.

The PSNI guidelines state in the introduction that:

“The guidance reflects National ACPO Guidelines and takes cognisance of the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and should be read in conjunction with the Police Service of Northern Ireland Code of Ethics.”[76]

The guidance then goes on to make a number of important points, as follows:

“2.   SERVICE STATEMENT 

(1)     Police officers, in carrying out their duties, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent methods before resorting to use of force or firearms.  They may use force or firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any realistic promise of achieving the intended result.

(2)     Police officers responsible for the planning and control of operations where the use of force is a possibility, shall so plan and control them to minimise to the greatest extent possible, recourse to force and, in particular, potentially lethal force.

(3)     Whenever police officers resort to the lawful use of force or firearms they shall:

(a)    exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate object to be achieved;

(b)    minimise damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;

(c)    ensure that assistance and medical aid, where possible, are secured to any injured person at the earliest possible opportunity;

(d)    ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person are notified at the earliest possible opportunity;

(e)    where force or firearms are used, report the incident promptly to their supervisors;

(f)     comply with any instructions issued by the Chief Constable.

(Police Service of Northern Ireland Code of Ethics Article 4.1 – 4.3)

(4)     It is the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s intention that the tactical   option of the AEP will be governed by the following overarching principles and the guidance contained in the Code of Practice on the issue, Deployment and Use of AEPs in Situations of Serious Public Disorder (Appendix A):

(a)    The AEP has not been designed for use as a crowd control technology but has been designed for use as a less lethal option in situations where officers are faced with individual aggressors whether such aggressors are acting on their own or as a part of a group.

(b)    The AEP may be deployed in a variety of operational situations,            however the objective will remain the same.  The AEP is            intended for use as an accurate and discriminating projectile,            designed to be fired at individual aggressors.  The issue,            deployment and use of AEP in a public order situation will be            subject to authority levels and command measures of the            highest integrity;

(c)    Whenever possible the System should be deployed in a 2 person team structure either when on foot or in a vehicle.  One officer will be deployed with the System and the other will assist in the recording of the use and effect of Rounds.  The minimum number of AEP System teams will be deployed in order to achieve the lawful objective;

(d)    The System will only be deployed in open view of the public when its use is imminent.  Otherwise, the System should remain in vehicles or kept discreetly behind front line officers until it is necessary to use them;

(e)    Where the use of  the System becomes necessary only the minimum number of Rounds will be fired in order to achieve the lawful objective;

(f)     Where Rounds are fired the facts will be promptly reported … setting out the circumstances and reason for using AEPs…  DCU  [District Command Unit] Commanders will make an immediate report to the Policing Board for Northern Ireland… providing the detailed circumstances and reasons why it was necessary to discharge the weapon system…   All incidents where AEPs have been discharged by police must be reported to the on-call SIO [Senior Investigating Officer] from the Office of the Police Ombudsman immediately…”

The guidance then appends the ACPO guidelines, which are clearly intended to give PSNI officers practical guidance in firing AEPs, rather than the PSNI attempting to re-write the ACPO guidelines.  Also appended are the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and information about training and storage of AEPs.  One appendix, Appendix B[77], was withheld from BIRW; we surmise that it contains details of the command structure used when firing AEPs is contemplated.

It is not known what the outcome has been of the review of the PSNI guidelines reported in early September 2005[78].

The Ministry of Defence, to its credit, responded promptly to our request for their guidelines for soldiers firing AEPs[79].  Unfortunately, however, they do not compare well with the PSNI or ACPO guidelines, which are far more detailed.

The army guidelines assume throughout that AEPs are “public order control equipment”[80].  While the guidelines stress that soldiers must use no more force than is absolutely necessary[81], and that lethal force must not be used other than for the protection of human life[82], there is no suggestion, as in the PSNI and ACPO guidelines, that AEPs are a less than ideal means of crowd control.  

Although the army guidelines say that AEPs must be aimed at selected individuals and not fired indiscriminately, they define the lower part of the body as “below the ribcage”, which could well be interpreted by soldiers as being higher than the “belt buckle area” mentioned in the ACPO guidelines.  The “below the ribcage” criterion raises the same concerns about the potential for serious abdominal injury as ACPO’s guidance, all the more so because of the height issue. [83] 

The army guidance also gives the shortest permitted range as one metre[84], which gives rise to same concerns expressed about range in relation to the ACPO guidelines. 

There is no mention of the special risk that AEPs pose if fired at children, although the guidelines do provide for medical assistance to be provided to casualties as soon as possible[85].  Nor is there any mention whatsoever of human rights, or of not firing from a moving vehicle.

Thus the same problem as existed with the predecessor plastic bullet has been replicated.  The army and the police, while working together and often firing AEPs together in the same conditions, work under very different guidelines.  It is perhaps not surprising that the army has been responsible for most of the fatalities and some of the more serious recent injuries caused by plastic bullets.

THE PATTEN COMMISSION AND PLASTIC BULLETS

The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (the Patten Commission) had this to say about the use of plastic bullets[86]:

“9.12 The most controversial aspect of public order policing in Northern Ireland has been the weaponry used by the police, in particular plastic baton rounds. These were introduced into service in the 1970s, replacing the earlier rubber bullets. Since 1981, a total of 41,657 have been discharged by the police, and 14,572 by the army. 11 deaths have been attributed to PBRs since 1981 (and 5 before that), and 615 injuries. The most recent fatality was in 1989, but the issue of PBRs remains highly controversial…

9.14 In view of the fatalities and serious injuries resulting from PBRs, and the controversy caused by their extensive use, we are surprised and concerned that the government, the Police Authority and the RUC have collectively failed to invest more time and money in a search for an acceptable alternative…

9.15 In common with many groups that gave us submissions, we would like to see the use of PBRs discontinued as soon as possible. All of us began our work wanting to be able to recommend that they be dispensed with straight away. But we do not wish to see a situation in which the police would have no choice but to resort to live rounds, sooner than would be the case today. For as long as the community in Northern Ireland contains elements prepared to use lethal weapons against the police, such situations would certainly arise. Use of live rounds would lead to more fatalities and serious injuries caused by police action – the very opposite of what we seek to achieve. An alternative to the PBR must therefore be sought urgently.”

They made the following recommendations:

“69. An immediate and substantial investment should be made in a research programme to find an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal alternative to the PBR [para. 9.15].

70. The police should be equipped with a broader range of public order equipment than the RUC currently possess, so that a commander has a number of options at his or her disposal which might reduce reliance on, or defer resort to, the PBR [para. 9.16].”

This was a disappointing stance.  To the best of our knowledge, plastic bullets have never been deployed for riot control in England and Wales, despite the occurrence over the years of a number of serious and violent riots, including race riots and riots against the poll tax and against capitalism.  English police forces have been able to police these riots without recourse to plastic bullets, and - although police officers, demonstrators and members of the public have all been injured on occasion – without loss of life or anything like the number of injuries caused by plastic bullets.  It is simply not the case that the RUC, or nowadays the PSNI, would have had no other means at its disposal than hand-held batons or live ammunition were it to abandon the use of plastic bullets.  Indeed, its claim to have fired only one plastic bullet during the week of Drumcree in 1999 shows that the RUC was capable of policing some situations of serious public unrest without resorting to plastic bullets, as does the example set by Derry, where plastic bullets have not been fired since 1998.

Although the Northern Ireland Office set up a working party to look into alternatives to plastic bullets, the outcome of its research has been disappointing.  In February 2004 Jane Kennedy MP, the then Minister for State responsible for security matters, admitted:

“It is our judgement that there is still no commercially available product that is an acceptable, more safe and effective alternative to the current baton round although we will continue to monitor all developments.”[87]

The Patten Commission make the following further recommendations in relation to the deployment of plastic bullets:

“71. The use of PBRs should be subject to the same procedures for deployment, use and reporting as apply in the rest of the United Kingdom. Their use should be confined to the smallest necessary number of specially trained officers, who should be trained to think of the weapon in the same way as they would think of a firearm, that is as a weapon which is potentially lethal. Use of PBRs should in the first instance require the authorisation of a district commander. This should be justified in a report to the Policing Board, which should be copied to the Police Ombudsman. Wherever possible, video camera recordings should be made of incidents in which the use of PBRs is authorised [para.9.17].”

74. Guidance governing the deployment and use of PBRs should be soundly based in law, clearly expressed and readily available as public documents [para.9.20].”

These recommendations were partially met by the introduction of new guidelines for the deployment of plastic bullets on 1^st August 1999.  However, the Patten Commission went further than those guidelines in two respects.   First, it recommended that reports on authorisations for the firing of plastic bullets should be made to the Policing Board and copied to the Police Ombudsman.  The 1999 guidelines did not require any such reports.  However, they did say that in England and Wales a report should be sent by the Chief Constable to the Home Secretary on any incident in which plastic bullets had been fired, but they did not require such reports in Northern Ireland.  The ACPO guidelines on firing AEPs, introduced in May 2005, have finally implemented this recommendation in full, and the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland is automatically notified of and investigates every firing of plastic bullets by police officers.  Secondly, the Patten Commission recommended the video-recording of incidents where plastic bullets are fired, which is not provided for in either the 1999 or the 2005 guidelines.

 On the question of accountability, the Patten Commission makes an important point:

“9.18 The police must be fully accountable for public order policing as for any other aspect of their work.  Several submissions suggested to us that police in riot gear should be capable of being identified.  We agree with this and we recommend that officers’ identification numbers should be clearly visible on their protective clothing, just as they should be on regular uniforms.”

In their 1996 report, CAJ drew attention to the practice of RUC officers in riot gear wearing no identification numbers. [88]  On 6^th July 1997, solicitor Rosemary Nelson, who was murdered in March 1999, was assaulted by a number of RUC officers on the Garvaghy Road as she tried to represent the interests of the Garvaghy Road Residents Association. She gave the following chilling account of her experience[89]:

“I went up to the police lines and asked, ‘Could somebody please tell me what’s going on here?’  One of them grabbed me by the arm and took me into them, right into the circle [of riot shields] and said, ‘Rosemary, you Fenian fucker’, and they threw me about a bit.  I said, ‘Can I have your number please?’  Somebody else said, ‘F… off.’  The difficulty there was, because of the way they were dressed, there were no numbers distinguishable, you just couldn’t see any numbers, and they were wearing balaclavas.  I can’t recall ever being so frightened in my life.”

Since then, the RUC has taken to wearing identification numbers, and to marking police vehicles more clearly.  In the riots of September 2005, PSNI officers in riot gear had identification numbers clearly displayed on their riot helmets.

Finally, the Patten Commission makes another recommendation about accountability:

“9.19 We recommend that the Policing Board and, as appropriate, the Police Ombudsman should actively monitor police performance in public order situations, and if necessary seek reports from the Chief Constable and follow up those reports if they wish.”

This is a welcome recommendation.  It is important that monitoring public order policing is not left solely to NGOs, but that agencies with responsibility for policing standards should take this on board.  The Northern Ireland Policing Board has asked its human rights advisors to monitor the policing of certain major incidents, such as the rioting in Ardoyne on 12^th July 2004[90] and that which took place in September 2005, and the Police Ombudsman now monitors all plastic bullet firings by police officers.

SCRUTINY BY THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN OF THE FIRING OF PLASTIC BULLETS BY THE POLICE

In 2000 the Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland was established to carry out independent investigations into complaints against the police. 

Since 24^th April 2001, under a protocol agreed with the Chief Constable, the  Police Ombudsman has examined every discharge of any weapon by PSNI officers.  She has produced 31 reports on the firing of plastic bullets, which are summarised below[91]:

The Police Ombudsman has yet to produce her reports on the firing by the police in July, August and September 2005 of 422 AEPs.  It has been reported that she has received more than 50 complaints from both loyalists (about alleged heavy-handedness) and nationalists (about alleged inaction over loyalist roadblocks) concerning policing of the riots[92].

As can be seen from the summary of her reports, although the Police Ombudsman has on occasion made recommendations for better police practice, she has found every single firing that she has examined to have been lawful, proportionate, and justified.

The Police Ombudsman’s reports cover 337[93] plastic bullets fired by the PSNI between 24^th April 2001 and 11^th September 2002, which was in fact the total number of plastic bullets fired by police during those two years, which suggests the PSNI did not fire any between 1^st January and 23^rd April 2001.

The solicitors’ firm Kevin R Winters & Co reported injuries suffered by their clients being hit by plastic bullets on 14^th June 2002, 28^th August 2002, and 29^th August 2002, but none of the Police Ombudsman’s reports cover incidents on these dates.  On 14^th June 2002, Kevin Winters reports a schoolboy struck on the leg and taken to hospital.  The Police Ombudsman has no record of any firing.  On 28^th August 2002 Kevin Winters records five injuries involving five bullets.  One youth was struck twice in the back and another male was struck in the shoulder while going to the assistance of the youth.  Another man was hit in the arm and another was hit in the upper rib cage and ended up on a ventilator.  A fifth male was hit in the leg.  On 29^th August 2002 a male was struck in the foot, according to instructions received by Kevin Winters.  The Police Ombudsman has no record of firings on either or these dates.  Since the Police Ombudsman has not reported on these incidents, it can only be assumed that the plastic bullets were fired by soldiers, over whom she has no jurisdiction. 

Kevin Winters’ instructions also include shootings on two other occasions which were not mentioned by the Police Ombudsman.  On 14^th May 2002, the Police Ombudsman records that the PSNI fired three plastic bullets and the army fired another ten.  She reports that the police hit two people, one in the thigh and the other in the knee.  The army must have caused the other seven injuries reported to Kevin Winters.  Four of these shots hit their victims above the waist.  One woman suffered a shattered elbow, a youth worker who was trying to mediate had his arm broken in three places, another male was hit on the chin and a sixteen-year-old boy was hit on the breast bone and coughed up blood.  On 13^th June 2002, Kevin Winters & Co reported four persons hit, one of them twice.  Four of the bullets struck their targets on the legs (one woman suffered a broken leg), and one struck the upper arm.  The Police Ombudsman did report on the events on that date, but recorded only one unspecified injury, caused by the army.

The Police Ombudsman has recently published a report on the firing of plastic bullets during 2001 and 2002[94].  Confusingly, the report only covers the period 12^th July 2001 to 11^th September 2002, during which the L21A1 plastic bullet was fired, rather than predecessor L5A7.  In her report[95] she says that the L21A1 was introduced and the L5A7 withdrawn in June 2001.  Seven other incidents, as follows:

Lurgan, 24 April 2001

Garvaghy Road, Portadown, 26 May 2001

Ardoyne, North Belfast, 20-21 June 2001

Corcrain Road, Portadown, 26 June 2001

Corcrain Estate, Portadown, 12 July 2001

Ardoyne, North Belfast, 26 July 2001

Ardoyne, North Belfast, 9 January 2002

are covered in an earlier report by the Police Ombudsman[96].  It is not clear to us why the five incidents from June 2001 onwards are not included in this report, if it is aiming to give a holistic picture of the firing of the L21A1, unless L5A7s were used in these five incidents, after they had been withdrawn.

The Police Ombudsman prefaces her 2005 report by saying:

“The use of baton rounds by the police and army has been contentious since the beginning of the Troubles. 17 people died from injuries sustained from plastic bullets (the precursor to the baton round) in the period ending in 1989.”

This gives a very misleading picture.  Every version of the plastic bullet, including the L21A1, has been officially called a “baton round”.  The L21A1 did not replace the plastic bullet, it was just another version of it.  Also, the Police Ombudsman makes no mention of the very serious injuries that have been caused by plastic bullets since the last fatality in 1989.  In BIRW’s view, the fact that no-one has been killed by a plastic bullet since 1989 is more a matter of luck than judgment.  As the Policing Board’s Human Rights Advisers have pointed out in their reports on rioting after the Whiterock parade in 2005, it was remarkable that no-one was killed[97].

The Police Ombudsman summarises her findings as follows:

“2.    … The Police Ombudsman has now produced 31 reports relating to PSNI baton round incidents during 2001 and 2002. The first seven of these Reports were summarised in a publication in 2002; this paper summarises the findings of the subsequent 24 reports.

3.      The police discharged 299 baton rounds during the 24 incidents (on average 12.5 per incident), of which 209 hit individuals (hit rate of 71 per cent …).  The maximum number of baton rounds discharged in one incident was 60 …

4.      Seventy Police Officers were involved (on average 2.9 officers per incident and 4.3 baton rounds discharged per officer).  Ten incidents involved only one Police Officer. The maximum number of Police Officers involved in any one incident was nine. The maximum number of baton rounds discharged by an officer was 20 with a hit rate of 85 per cent.

5.      Twenty-one of the 24 incidents were within Belfast (ten in North Belfast) and the other three in Portadown and Crossmaglen.

6.      The majority of hits (69 per cent) struck people’s legs or feet, 14 per cent struck the body above or on the waist and 16 per cent struck the groin or buttock.

7.      Of the 299 baton rounds discharged, 52 per cent were aimed at petrol bombers.

8.      Ninety-eight per cent of baton rounds discharged were in accordance with the ACPO guidelines that the target range should be 20 metres or more.

9.      In all the incidents examined the Police Ombudsman concluded that the discharge of the baton rounds was fully justified and proportionate, as were the authorisation and directions given. The deployment and use of the baton rounds in the vast majority of incidents were in full accordance with the relevant Force Orders and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance. No occurrences of police misconduct were found.

10.    However, some deficiencies were found in police practice and processes that have led the Police Ombudsman to make certain recommendations regarding public warnings to be given, the issue of ammunition, the videoing of baton round discharges, the presence of baton gunner assistants and the facilitation of interviewing officers involved in these incidents.

11.    There were 43 recommendations made to the PSNI via Regulation 20 Reports resulting from 15 of the 24 baton round incidents. These are highlighted throughout the report.

12.    There were 15 complaints from members of the public in relation to 8 of the 24 baton round Incidents.”

We are puzzled by the mention of only 15 complaints relating to 8 incidents, as according to a letter from the Police Ombudsman to BIRW, she received 20 complaints about the firing of plastic bullets during 10 incidents between 12 July 2001 and 13 June 2002[98].  All but one was categorised by her office as “oppressive behaviour”; the other being classified as “other”.  The twenty complaints concerned ten separate incidents.  Six of these took place in north Belfast, three in east Belfast, and one in Portadown.  None of the complaints was upheld.  The full details are as follows[99]:

The incidents on 12^th July 2001 at Corcrain Road, Portadown, and 26^th July 2001 at Ardoyne do not feature in the list of complaints contained in her report[101].

We also feel that the Police Ombudsman’s summary of injuries received is somewhat misleading.  As it is, the categories used by the Police Ombudsman, which presumably reflect the categories used in police reports about firing, are very general.  For instance, the term “arm” disguises the reality of a shattered elbow.  However, by lumping together hits to the buttock and hits to the groin, which are very different in terms of their potential to cause serious injury, she obscures the fact that only 2 of these hits were to the buttock, while 28 were to the groin.  Our own analysis of the injuries listed in her report is as follows:

Thus 70% of hits were to the leg, foot or buttock, 4% were to the arm, and 26% were to the waist, torso or groin.  It is these 26% of hits, or one in four, that have the potential to cause serious injury, although injuries to knees, ankles, wrists and elbows can also be serious.

The Police Ombudsman also says that 209 of the 299 plastic bullets fired during the period covered by her report hit people, yet she lists only 185 injuries (plus one where the area hit is not identified). 

The report mentions in a footnote that,

“A recent report by Laurence Rocks Clinical Director of Emergency Medicine at Belfast’s Royal Victoria Hospital examined records of people injured during May-June 2002 due to baton rounds.  It reported that there were no head, face or neck injuries compared with 41% such wounds in previous studies of injuries caused by the old L5A7 baton round. However, it noted that there were still injuries to the chest.”[102]

This survey covered a short period of time in just one hospital – arguably, casualties during July and August including areas outside Belfast, such as Portadown, might have been of greater significance.

According to the Police Ombudsman, 98% of the plastic bullets fired were fired from the correct range of 20 or more metres.  This means that 2%, or six bullets, were fired at too close a range.  Two of these were fired at a range of 15 – 20 metres, one was fired from 15 metres, and three were fired from 10 metres.

According to her report:

“Due to personal safety considerations, it is not normal for investigators or any other member of the Police Ombudsman’s staff to visit the scene of an incident while any public disorder is still ongoing.”[103]

While we are mindful of the need to ensure the safety of her staff, given that she says

“… one particular issue that is of great concern to the

Police Ombudsman is the frequent lack of proper video evidence

of baton round discharges. Research carried out in this Office

on videos supplied by PSNI found that in only a minority of

cases were the actual baton round discharges recorded.”[104]

BIRW is concerned that the Police Ombudsman is heavily reliant on the reports made out by police officers concerning firing.  This concern is underlined by the fact that, while reports to solicitors suggest that innocent persons have been hit by plastic bullets, the Police Ombudsman’s report attributes all 299 plastic bullets to a guilty party[105]: