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PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL
LORDS COMMITTEE STAGE
GOVERNMENT AMENDMENTS
Government amendments are shown in red.
Amendments supported by Conservative Peers are shown in blue.
Amendments supported by Liberal Democrat Peers are shown in yellow.
Amendments supported by Crossbench Peers are shown in pink.
Amendments supported by Labour and Conservative Peers are shown in lavender.
Amendments supported by Liberal Democrat and Conservative Peers are shown in purple.
Amendments supported by Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Peers are shown in brown.
Government amendments are likely to be moved/debated before other amendments, but have not always been shown first in this document for the sake of clarity. Equally, different Peers of the same political persuasion have sometimes put down alternative amendments to the same clause.
Bill 61 53/4
Prevention of Terrorism Bill
CONTENTS
Control orders
1 Power to make control orders
2 Derogations from the right to liberty
3 Duration and renewal of non-derogating control orders
4 Duration of derogating control orders
5 Modification, notification and proof of orders etc.
6 Offences
Challenging and appealing against control orders
7 Appeals relating to non-derogating control orders
8 Appeals relating to derogating control orders
9 Jurisdiction and appeals in relation to control order decisions etc.
10 Effect of court’s decisions on convictions
Supplemental
11 Reporting and review
12 General interpretation
13 Other supplemental provisions
Schedule — Control order proceedings etc.
Bill 61 53/4
A
B I L L
TO
Provide for the making against individuals involved in terrorism-related activity of orders imposing obligations on them for purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further involvement in such activity; to make provision about appeals and other proceedings relating to such orders; and for connected purposes.
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—
Control orders
1 Power to make control orders
(1) The Secretary of State may [apply to the
High Court to] [subject in the case of a
derogating control order to having first obtained the leave of the court on an ex
parte application] [on the application of the
Director of Public Prosecutions] make
[apply to the court for] an order (called a
“control order”) against an individual if he—
(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting
is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity; and
[alternative amendment to subclause (a):
has reasonable grounds for
suspecting believing that the
individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity; and ]
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism, to make an order imposing obligations on the individual.
(1B) On hearing an application for a control order, the court may—
(a) grant the control order, with or without modifications;
(b) dismiss the application; or
(c) adjourn the application to a further hearing on notice to the individual concerned.
(1C) A control order shall provide a period for further review by the court unless the court is satisfied that the individual against whom it is made has had a full opportunity to contest the making of the order.
( ) No application can be made to the Secretary of State under Section 1(1) of this Act unless the Director of Public Prosecutions is satisfied that it is not possible to prosecute the individual to whom the application relates in a normal trial.
(2) A control order may impose any obligation in
subsection (3) below on the individual against whom it is made that the
Secretary of State
court considers necessary for purposes connected
with preventing or restricting further involvement by that individual in
terrorism-related activity (whether or not activity by reference to which the
Secretary of State was satisfied for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)).
(1) The Secretary of State may make an order
(called a “control order”) against an individual if he—
(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity; and
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes
connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism, to
make an order imposing obligations on the individual.
(2) A control order may impose any obligation
on the individual against whom it is made that the Secretary of State considers
necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting further
involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity (whether or not
activity by reference to which the Secretary of State was satisfied for the
purposes of subsection (1)(a)).
(3) The obligations that may be imposed by a
control order on the controlled person include,
(1A) In this Act "control order" means an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.
(1B) The power to make a control order against an individual shall be exercisable—
(a) except in
the case of an order imposing obligations that are incompatible with the
individual's right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, by
the Secretary of State; and
(b) in the case of an order imposing
obligations that are or include derogating obligations,
by the court on an application by the Secretary of State.
(1C) The obligations
specified in subsection (3)
that may be imposed by a control order
made against an individual are any obligations that
the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the court considers necessary for
purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual
in terrorism-related activity.
1D) Those obligations
may
in particular—
(3) The obligations that may be imposed by a control order on the
controlled person include, in particular
are—
(a) a prohibition or restriction on his possession or use of specified articles or substances;
(b) a prohibition or restriction on his use of specified services or specified facilities, or on his carrying on specified activities;
(c) a restriction in respect of his work or other occupation, or in respect of his business;
(d) a restriction on his association or communications with specified persons or with other persons generally;
(e) a restriction in respect of his place of
residence or on the persons to whom he gives access to his place of residence;
(f) a prohibition on his being at specified
places or within a specified area at specified times or on specified days;
(g) a prohibition or restriction on his
movements to, from or within the United Kingdom, a specified part of the United
Kingdom or a specified place or area within the United Kingdom;
(h) a requirement on him to comply with such other prohibitions or
restrictions on his movements as may be imposed, for a period not exceeding
24 12 hours,
by directions given to him in the specified manner, by a specified person and
for the purpose of securing compliance with other obligations imposed by or
under the order;
(i) a requirement on him to surrender his passport, or anything in his possession to which a prohibition or restriction imposed by the order relates, to a specified person for a period not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;
(j) a requirement on him to give access to specified persons to his place of residence or to other premises to which he has power to grant access;
(k) a requirement on him to allow specified persons to search that place or any such premises for the purpose of ascertaining whether obligations imposed by or under the order have been, are being or are about to be contravened;
(l) a requirement on him to allow specified persons, either for that purpose or for the purpose of securing that the order is complied with, to remove anything found in that place or on any such premises and to subject it to tests or to retain it for a period not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;
(m) a requirement on him to co-operate with specified arrangements for enabling his movements, communications or other activities to be monitored by electronic or other means;
(n) a requirement on him to comply with a demand
made in the specified manner to provide information to a specified person in
accordance with the demand;
(o) a requirement on him to report to a specified person at specified times and places.
( ) A control order may not prevent or restrict the controlled person from meeting with or contacting by telephone his legal representatives in connection with the control order or any other matter.
( ) A control order may not require a person to provide information or to answer questions.
( ) Where a controlled person is required to meet with or report to a specified person he shall be entitled to have his legal representative present.
( ) A control order may only impose an obligation on a controlled person to meet, report to or otherwise have dealings with, or to allow onto land or buildings in his occupation, a specified person or any other person who is a British citizen and is not in the employment of or under contract to any foreign government.
( ) A control order may not require the controlled person to talk to a specified person or any other person who is not a British citizen or is in the employment of or under contract to any foreign government.
( ) A control order may not affect the ability of a person who is not the individual who is identified in the control order and has a right to reside at a property or at the date of the making of the control order was habitually resident at a property from remaining at the property, receiving visitors or possessing articles for communications purposes.
( ) A control order may not prevent or restrict the controlled person from voting in person in any election.
( ) A control order may not prevent or restrict the controlled person from standing as a candidate in any election, including attending his election count.
( ) A control order may not prevent or restrict the controlled person from displaying a poster in support of or opposition to any candidate or political party at an election.
( ) A control order may not require the controlled person to leave the United Kingdom
( ) A requirement under paragraph (n) of subsection (3) shall not require any person to provide information which would incriminate himself.
(4) Every power by or under a control
order to prohibit or restrict the controlled person’s movements—
(a) includes, in particular, power to impose
a requirement on him to remain at or within a particular place or area (whether
for a particular period or at particular times or generally); and
(b) is subject (where they are applicable) to
the provisions of section 2.
(4) Every power by or under a
control order to prohibit or restrict the controlled person’s movements—
(a) includes, in particular, power to impose a requirement on him to remain
at or within a particular place or
area (whether for a particular period or at particular times or
generally); and
(b) is subject (where they are applicable) to the
provisions of section 2.
or generally
for no more than 12 hours each time; and
(b) Is subject (where they are applicable) to
the provisions of section 2.
(5) The reference in subsection (3)(m) to co-operating with specified arrangements for monitoring includes a reference to each of the following—
(a) submitting to procedures required by the arrangements;
(b) wearing or otherwise using apparatus approved by or in accordance with the arrangements;
(c) maintaining such apparatus in the specified manner;
(d) complying with directions given by persons carrying out functions for the purposes of those arrangements.
(6) The information that the controlled person may be required to provide under a control order includes, in particular, advance information about his proposed movements or other activities.
(6A) Nothing in this Act shall authorise the disclosure of information subject to legal privilege.
(6B) For the purposes of this Act, information is subject to legal privilege if it forms part of communications made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes of these proceedings being communications which would in legal proceedings be protected from disclosure by virtue of any rule of law relating to the confidentiality of communications."
(6C) Information provided by a person pursuant to a requirement under this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against that person unless subsection (6D) or (6E) applies.
(6D) This subsection applies where a person is being prosecuted—
(a) for an offence under section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911 (c. 6) (false statements made on oath otherwise than in judicial proceedings or made otherwise than on oath); or
(b) for an offence under section 2 of the False Oaths (Scotland) Act 1933 (c. 20) (false statutory declarations and other false statements without oath), or
(c) at common law for an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
(6E) This subsection applies where the person is being prosecuted for some other offence and—
(a) the person when giving evidence in the proceedings makes a statement inconsistent with the relevant statement; and
(b) in the proceedings evidence relating to the relevant statement is adduced, or a question about it is asked by or on behalf of the person.
(7) A control order may provide for a prohibition, restriction or requirement imposed by or under the order to apply only where a specified person has not given his consent or approval to what would otherwise contravene the prohibition, restriction or requirement.
(8) For the purposes of this Act involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or more of the following—
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission,
preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the
commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do
so;
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to
individuals who are known or believed to be involved in terrorism-related
activity; and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the
acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of
terrorism generally.
(b) conduct intended to facilitate the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts;
(c) conduct intended to encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts;
(d) conduct intended to support or assist another person’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.
(8) For the purposes of this Act involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or more of the following—
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct which knowingly facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity; and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally.
and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of
terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally.
and
(ii) the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism shall have the same meaning as in section 40 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11).
(8A) In this Act –
"derogating obligation" means an obligation on an individual which—
(a) is incompatible with his right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention; but
(b) is of a description of obligations which, for the purposes of the designation of a designated derogation, is set out in the designation order;
is of a description of obligations which, for the purposes of the designation of a designated derogation, is set out in the designation order;
"designation order", in relation to a designated derogation, means the order under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 by which the derogation is designated.
( ) All court proceedings in relation to control orders made under this section shall comply with the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2 Derogations from the right to liberty
THE BARONESS SCOTLAND OF ASTHAL
THE LORD KINGSLAND
THE BARONESS ANELAY OF ST JOHNS
The above-named Lords give notice of their intention to oppose the Question that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill.
(1) The Secretary of State may make
apply to the court for a control order
under section 1 imposing an obligation that is
incompatible with the controlled person’s right to liberty under Article 5 of
the Human Rights Convention if, but only if—
(a) he is satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities beyond reasonable doubt,
that that person is an individual who is or has been involved in
terrorism-related activity;
(b) he considers that the imposition of the obligation is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from risks arising out of, or associated with, a particular public emergency;
(c) there is for the time being a designated derogation in respect of that emergency from the whole or a part of that Article; and
(d) the obligation is of a description of obligations which, for the purposes of that derogation, is set out in the designation order.
(2) Where the Secretary of State makes a control
order imposing a derogating obligation—
(a) he must immediately refer the order to the
court and notify the controlled person that he has done so; and
(b) the court must consider whether the matters
relied on by the Secretary of State to justify the making of the order were
capable (if not disproved) of constituting reasonable grounds for him to make
the order he did.
(2) Where the Secretary of State makes a control order imposing
a derogating obligation—
(a) he must immediately refer the order to the court and notify the controlled person that he has done so; and
(b) the court must consider whether the matters
relied on by the Secretary of State to justify the making of the order were
capable (if not disproved) of constituting reasonable grounds for him to make
the order he did.
the Secretary of State has shown on the balance of
probabilities—
(i) that the person is an individual who is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, there is a designated derogation within subsection (1)(c) and the obligation is within subsection (1)(d); and
(ii) that the imposition of the obligation is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from risks arising out of, or associated, with a particular public emergency.
(3) The court’s consideration on a reference
under subsection (2)(a) must begin no more than 7 days after the day on which
the control order in question was made.
(3) The court’s consideration on a reference under subsection (2)(a) must begin no more than 7 days after the day on which the control order in question was made.
( ) The controlled person has a right to be heard on a reference under subsection (2)(a).
(4) On a reference under subsection (2)(a),
the court—
(a) if not satisfied that the matters relied on
by the Secretary of State were capable of constituting reasonable grounds for
him to make a control order against the controlled person, must quash the order;
(b) if satisfied that they were capable of
constituting reasonable grounds for the making of a control order against that
person but not for the making of one imposing a derogating obligation, must
quash the derogating obligation imposed by the order; and
(c) in any other case, must give directions for
the carrying out of a hearing by the court relating to the order.
(4) On a reference under subsection (2)(a), the court—
(a) if not satisfied that the matters relied on
by the Secretary of State were capable of constituting reasonable grounds for
him to make a control order against the controlled person, must quash the order;
(b) if satisfied that they were capable of
constituting reasonable grounds for the making of a control order against that
person but not for the making of one imposing a derogating obligation, must
quash the derogating obligation imposed by the order; and
(a) if not satisfied that the Secretary of State has proved the matters in subsection (2)(b)(i), must quash the order;
(b) if satisfied that the matters in subsection (2)(b)(i) have been proved but not satisfied that the matters in subsection (2)(b)(ii) have been proved, must quash the derogating obligation imposed by the order.
(5) On a hearing by the court under
subsection (4)(c), the court must conduct its own hearing of each of the matters
that fell to be determined by the Secretary of State—
(a) in making his decision to make the order;
and
(b) in making his decisions to impose the
obligations imposed by the order;
and the court must make its own determination on
each of those matters.
(6) The powers of the court in making the
determinations under subsection (5) are confined to—
(a) power to confirm the order as made;
(b) power to quash the order;
(c) power to quash one or more obligations
imposed by the order;
(d) power to give directions to the Secretary of
State for the revocation of the order or for the modification of the obligations
it imposes.
( ) power to award to the controlled person their costs of the proceedings.
(7) If requested to do so by the controlled
person, the court must discontinue—
(a) a reference under subsection (2)(a); or
(b) a hearing under subsection (4)(c).
(8) In this Act—
“derogating obligation” means an obligation of a description of obligations which, for the purposes of the designation of a designated derogation, is set out in the designation order; and
“designated derogation” has the same meaning as in the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (see section 14(1) of that Act).
(9) In this section “designation order”, in relation to a designated derogation, means the order under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 by which the derogation is designated.
( ) All court proceedings in relation to control orders made under this section shall comply with the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
3 Duration and renewal of non-derogating control orders
(A1) The
Secretary of State
court
may make a control order against an
individual if he
it—
(a)
has reasonable grounds for suspecting
is satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that the individual is
or has been involved in terrorism-related activity; and
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual and
(c) has been informed by the Director of Public Prosecutions that there is no reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution of the individual for the terrorism-related activity.
( ) The court shall not impose a derogating obligation on an individual unless it is proved that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity.
(A2) The Secretary of State may
make a control order against an individual who is for the time being bound by a
control order made by the court only if he does so—
(a) after the court has
determined that its order should be revoked; but
(b) while the effect of the
revocation has been postponed for the purpose of giving the Secretary of State
an opportunity to decide whether to exercise his own powers to make a control
order against the individual
(A3) A control order made by the
Secretary of State is called a non-derogating control order.
( ) A control order imposing a derogating obligation is called a derogating control order and any other control order is called a non-derogating control order
(1) A non-derogating control order—
(a) has effect for a maximum
period of
specified in the order and not exceeding
12 months beginning with the day on which it is made; but
(b) may be renewed on one or more occasions in accordance with this section.
(2) A non-derogating control order
must specify when the period for which it is to have effect will end.
(3) The Secretary of State
court may apply to the
court to renew a non-derogating
control order (with or without modifications) for a maximum
period of not exceeding
12 months if he
it—
(a) considers that it is necessary, for
purposes connected with the purpose of
protecting members of the public from the
a risk of terrorism, for an order imposing
obligations on the controlled person to continue in force; and
(b) considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
(4) Where the Secretary of State
court renews a
non-derogating control order, the 12
month maximum
period of the renewal begins to run from whichever is the earlier of—
(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; or
(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
(5) The instrument renewing a non-derogating
control order must specify when the period for which it is renewed will end.
[(1) A non-derogating control order—
(a) has effect for a period of 12 months
beginning with the day on which it is made; but
(b) may be renewed on one or more occasions in
accordance with this section.
(2) A non-derogating control order must
specify when the period for which it is to have effect will end.
(3) The Secretary of State may renew a
non-derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 12
months if he—
(a) considers that it is necessary, for purposes
connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism, for
an order imposing obligations on the controlled person to continue in force;
and
(b) considers that the obligations to be imposed
by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or
restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
(4) Where the Secretary of State renews a
non-derogating control order, the 12 month period of the renewal begins to run
from whichever is the earlier of—
(a) the time when the order would otherwise have
ceased to have effect; or
(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the
date of renewal.
(5) The instrument renewing a non-derogating
control order must specify when the period for which it is renewed will end.
The High court will set the limit of all non-derogating control orders.]
( ) It shall be immaterial, for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control order made by the Secretary of State, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters to which the Secretary of State's grounds for suspicion relate.
Insert the following new Clause—
Power of court to make derogating control orders
(1) On an application to the court by the Secretary of State for the making of a a control order against an individual, it shall be the duty of the court—
(a) to hold an immediate preliminary hearing to
determine whether to make a control order
imposing obligations that are or include derogating
obligations (called a "derogating control order")
against that individual; and
(b) if it does make such an order against that individual, to give directions for the holding of a full hearing to determine whether to confirm the order (with or without modifications).
(2) The preliminary hearing under subsection (1)(a) may be held—
(a) in the absence of the individual in question;
(b) without his having had notice of the application for the order; and
(c) without his having been given an opportunity (if he was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court;
but this subsection is not to be construed as limiting the matters about which rules of court may be made in relation to that hearing.
(3) At the preliminary hearing, the court may make a control order against the individual in question if it appears to the court—
(a) that there is material which (if not disproved) is capable of being relied on by the court as establishing that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
(b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the imposition of obligations on that individual is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism;
(c) that the risk arises out of, or is
associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated
derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention;
and
(d) that if the obligations that there are reasonable grounds for believing should be imposed on the individual are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order the risk arises out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention.
(4) The obligations that may be imposed by a
derogating
control order in the period between—
(a) the time when the order is made, and
(b) the time when a final determination is made by the court whether to confirm it,
include any obligations which the court has reasonable grounds for considering are necessary as mentioned in section 1(1C).
(5) At the full hearing under subsection (1)(b), the court may—
(a) confirm the control order made by the court; or
(b) revoke the order;
and where the court revokes the order, it may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the order had been quashed.
(6) In confirming a control order, the court—
(a) may modify the obligations imposed by the order; and
(b) where a modification made by the court removes an obligation, may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the removed obligation had been quashed.
(7) At the full hearing, the court may confirm the control order (with or without modifications) only if—
(a) it
in the case of a non-derogating control
order, the court is satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities, that the controlled person is an individual who is or has been
involved in terrorism-related activity;
(b) it considers that the imposition of obligations on the controlled person is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism;
(c) it appears to the court that the risk is
one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of
which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of
the Human Rights Convention; and
( ) in the case of a derogated control order, it is proved that the controlled person is an individual who is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity
(d) if the obligations to be imposed by the order or (as the case may be) by the order as modified are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order. that it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention.
(8) A derogating control order ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made unless—
(a) it is previously revoked (whether at the hearing under subsection (1)(b) or otherwise under this Act);
(b) it ceases to have effect under clause 4; or
(c) it is renewed.
(9) The court, on an application by the Secretary of State, may renew a derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 6 months from whichever is the earlier of—
(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; and
(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
(10) The power of the court to renew a derogating control order is exercisable on as many occasions as the court thinks fit; but, on each occasion, it is exercisable only if—
(a) the court considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for a derogating control order to continue in force against the controlled person;
(b) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention;
(c) the derogating obligations that the court considers should continue in force are of a description that continues to be set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order; and
(d) the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
(11) It shall be immaterial, for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control order made by the court, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters in relation to which the requirements of subsection (3)(a) or (7)(a) were satisfied
Insert the following new Clause—
Arrest and detention pending derogating control order
(1) A constable may arrest and detain an individual if—
(a) the Secretary of State has made an application to the court for a derogating control order to be made against that individual; and
(b) the constable considers that the individual's arrest and detention is necessary to ensure that he is available to be given notice of the order if it is made.
(2) A constable who has arrested an individual under this section must take him to the designated place that the constable considers most appropriate as soon as practicable after the arrest.
(3) An individual taken to a designated place under this section may be detained there until the end of 48 hours from the time of his arrest.
(4) If the court considers that it is necessary to do so to ensure that the individual in question is available to be given notice of any derogating control order that is made against him, it may, during the 48 hours following his arrest, extend the period for which the individual may be detained under this section by a period of no more than 48 hours.
(5) An individual may not be detained under this section at any time after—
(a) he has become bound by a derogating control order made against him on the Secretary of State's application; or
(b) the court has dismissed the application.
(6) A person who has the powers of a constable in one part of the United Kingdom may exercise the power of arrest under this section in that part of the United Kingdom or in any other part of the United Kingdom.
(7) An individual detained under this section—
(a) shall be deemed to be in legal custody throughout the period of his detention; and
(b) after having been taken to a designated place shall be deemed—
(i) in England and Wales, to be in police detention for the purposes of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60); and
(ii) in Northern Ireland, to be in police detention for the purposes of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I.1989/1341 (N.I.12));
but paragraph (b) has effect subject to subsection (8).
(8) Paragraphs 1(6), 2, 6 to 9 and 16 to 19 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) (powers and safeguards in the case of persons detained under section 41 of that Act) apply to an individual detained under this section as they apply to a person detained under section 41 of that Act, but with the following modifications—
(a) the omission of paragraph 2(2)(b) to (d) (which confers powers on persons specified by the Secretary of State, prison officers and examining officers);
(b) the omission of paragraph 8(2), (5) and (5A) (which relates to the postponement of a person's rights in England and Wales or Northern Ireland); and
(c) the omission of paragraphs 16(9) and 17(4) and (4A) (which make similar provision for Scotland).
(9) The power to detain an individual under this section includes power to detain him in a manner that is incompatible with his right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention if, and only if—
(a) there is a designated derogation in respect of the detention of individuals under this section in connection with the making of applications for derogating control orders; and
(b) that derogation and the designated derogation relating to the power to make the orders applied for are designated in respect of the same public emergency.
(10) In this section "designated place" means any place which the Secretary of State has designated under paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) as a place at which persons may be detained under section 41 of that Act."
4 Duration of derogating control orders
(1) A derogating control order—
(a) has effect (subject to subsection (3)) for a
period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made;
(b) must specify when that period will end; and
(c) may not be renewed.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not prevent the
Secretary of State, whenever a derogating control order ceases to have effect—
(a) from exercising any power of his to make a
new control order to the same or similar effect for a further 6 month period; or
(b) from relying, in whole or in part, on the
same matters for the purpose of making that new order.
(1) A derogating control order—
(a) has effect (subject to subsection (3)) for a maximum
period of
specified in the order and not exceeding
6 months beginning with the day on which it is made;
(b) must specify when that period will end; and
(c) may not be renewed.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not prevent the
Secretary of State, whenever a derogating control order ceases to have effect—
(a) from exercising any power of his to make a
new control order to the same or similar effect for a further 6 month period; or
(b) from relying, in whole or in part, on the
same matters for the purpose of making that new order.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not prevent the Secretary of State, whenever a derogating control order ceases to have effect—
(a) from exercising any power of his to make
apply to the court for a new control order to
the same or similar effect for a further 6 month
period period specified in the order and not
exceeding 6 months; or
(b) from relying, in whole or in part, on the same matters for the purpose of making that new order.
(3) A derogating control order has effect at a time only if—
(a) the relevant derogation remains in force at that time; and
(b) that time is not more than 12 months after—
(i) the making of the order under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) designating that derogation; or
(ii) the making by the Secretary of State of an order declaring that it
continues to be necessary for him to have power to
impose apply for derogating
obligations by reference to that derogation.
(4) The power of the Secretary of State to make an order containing a declaration for the purposes of subsection (3)(b)(ii) is exercisable by statutory instrument.
(5) No order may be made by the Secretary of State containing such a declaration unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(6) Subsection (5) does not apply to an
order that contains a statement by the Secretary of State that the order needs,
by reason of urgency, to be made without the approval required by that
subsection.
(7) An order under this section that contains such a statement—
(a) must be laid before Parliament after being made; and
(b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which the order was made, ceases to have effect at the end of that period.
(8) Where an order ceases to have effect in accordance with subsection (7), that does not—
(a) affect anything previously done in reliance on the order; or
(b) prevent the Secretary of State from exercising any power of his to make a new order for the purposes of subsection (3)(b)(ii) to the same or similar effect.
(9) In this section—
“40 days” means 40 days computed as provided for in section 7(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (c. 36);
“the relevant derogation”, in relation to a derogating control order, means the designated derogation by reference to which the derogating obligations imposed by that order were imposed.
[(1) A derogating control order—
(a) has effect (subject to subsection (3)) for a
period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made;
(b) must specify when that period will end; and
(c) may not be renewed.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not prevent the
Secretary of State, whenever a derogating control order ceases to have effect—
(a) from exercising any power of his to make a
new control order to the same or similar effect for a further 6 month period; or
(b) from relying, in whole or in part, on the
same matters for the purpose of making that new order.
(3) A derogating control order has effect at
a time only if—
(a) the relevant derogation remains in force at
that time; and
(b) that time is not more than 12 months after—
(i) the making of the order under section
14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) designating that derogation; or
(ii) the making by the Secretary of State of an
order declaring that it continues to be necessary for him to have power to
impose derogating obligations by reference to that derogation.
(4) The power of the Secretary of State to
make an order containing a declaration for the purposes of subsection (3)(b)(ii)
is exercisable by statutory instrument.
(5) No order may be made by the Secretary of
State containing such a declaration unless a draft of it has been laid before
Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(6) Subsection (5) does not apply to an
order that contains a statement by the Secretary of State that the order needs,
by reason of urgency, to be made without the approval required by that
subsection.
(7) An order under this section that
contains such a statement—
(a) must be laid before Parliament after being
made; and
(b) if not approved by a resolution of each
House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which the order was
made, ceases to have effect at the end of that period.
(8) Where an order ceases to have effect in
accordance with subsection (7), that does not—
(a) affect anything previously done in reliance
on the order; or
(b) prevent the Secretary of State from
exercising any power of his to make a new order for the purposes of subsection
(3)(b)(ii) to the same or similar effect.
(9) In this section—
“40 days” means 40 days computed as
provided for in section 7(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (c. 36);
“the relevant derogation”, in relation
to a derogating control order, means the designated derogation by reference to
which the derogating obligations imposed by that order were imposed.
The High Court will set the limit of all derogating control orders.]
[NB there is a joint notice of intention to oppose Clause 4 in its entirety]
5 Modification, notification and proof of orders etc.
(1) If while a non-derogating control order is in force the controlled person considers that there has been a change of circumstances affecting the order, he may make an application to the Secretary of State for—
(a) the revocation of the order; or
(b) the modification of an obligation imposed by the order;
and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to consider the application.
(1) If while a control order is in force
the controlled person considers that there has been a change of circumstances
affecting the order, he may make an application to the Secretary of State for—
(a) the revocation of the order; or
(b) the modification of an obligation imposed
by the order;
and it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of State to consider the application.
(1) If while a control order is in force the controlled person considers
that there has been a change of circumstances affecting the order, he may make
an application to the Secretary of State
court for—
(a) the revocation of the order; or
(b) the modification of an obligation imposed by the order;
and it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of State court to consider
the application.
( ) If while a control order is in force, the Secretary of State considers that there has been a change of circumstances affecting the order, he may make an application to the court for—
(a) the revocation of the order; or
(b) the modification of an obligation imposed by the order,
and it shall be the duty of the court to consider the application.
(2) The Secretary of State or the court
may, at any time (whether or not in
response to an application by the controlled person)—
(a) revoke a non-derogating control order;
(b) relax or remove an obligation imposed by such an order;
(c) with the consent of the controlled person, modify the obligations imposed by such an order; or
(d) make to the obligations imposed by such an order any modification which he considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by the controlled person in terrorism-related activity.
(2) The Secretary of State may, at any
time (whether or not in response to an application by the controlled person)—
(a) revoke a control order;
(b) relax or remove an obligation imposed by
such an order;
(c) with the consent of the controlled
person, modify the obligations imposed by such an order; or
(d) make to the obligations imposed by such
an order any modification which he considers necessary for purposes connected
with preventing or restricting involvement by the controlled person in
terrorism-related activity.
(3) The Secretary of State or the court
may not, by virtue of subsection (2)(d), make
make to the obligations imposed by a
control order any modification the effect of
which is that a non-derogating control order becomes an order imposing a
derogating obligation; but this does not prevent the
Secretary of State—
(a) from exercising any power of his to make a
new control order imposing such an obligation on the same individual; or
(b) from relying, in whole or in part, on the
same matters for the purpose of making that new order.
