The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry

Day 6: Tuesday 21st July 2009

Gerard Elias QC continued his submissions regarding Module 2 and the death of Baha Mousa. He then moved to Module 3 regarding training.

Opening Statement by Counsel to the Inquiry Mr Gerard Elias QC continued.

Mr Elias concluded his examination of the Module 2 considerations, picking up on the issues surrounding Conduct after Capture (CAC) and resistance to interrogation training from before.  Post the 1972 directive explicitly banning the 5 techniques, they were still being used in the above training.  Special categories received practical training whilst all servicemen received theory and lectures.

Risk was therefore present that lines on what is and is not allowed became blurred and servicemen become ‘contaminated’ via exposure to prohibited techniques.  A post 1^st Gulf War letter was shown suggesting a move away from aggressive interrogation techniques in any form of training as they contradict the Geneva Conventions and evidence suggests that more subtle techniques were a more effective anyway.

Module 3

Mr Elias turned to Module 3 issues: Training and Chain of Command.  Mr Elias began by reiterating how hard it was for the public to appreciate the circumstances 1 QLR operated in: the tempo of operations; stretched resources; environmental demands; danger on the ground; breadth and depth of responsibilities; difficulty in communicating.

Mr Elias began by caveating the outline he would attempt to build of the most important orders on prisoner handling in three ways:  commanders may simply say they relied upon the MoD doctrine of the time (JWP 1-10 and AWP 2.5) both of which were silent on hooding; the Inquiry had not yet seen a directive (if one existed) on prisoner handling following cancellation of part II of the 1972 directive in 1997; and the method of giving orders in theatre varies and may be verbal and undocumented at times.  Various documents were shown on subject of prisoner handling.

Colonel Baldwin complained to Colonel Vernon that the Defence Intelligence Security Centre (DISC) PoW camp next to his were hooding, cuffing and using stress techniques on detainees.  DISC said they were not under command of 1 UK Div and hooding was permitted anyway.  Colonel Vernon referred this matter to Lieutenant Colonel Mercer (SO1 legal).   Mercer visited the Joint Field Interrogation Team (JFIT) and saw the techniques in action, and wrote to General Brims stating that they may have been within army doctrine but were outwith Geneva Conventions.  Brims made a pre-planned visit and thought it was fine in that the hoods were only used for security when transferring prisoners.

There was a contradiction in the court martial evidence.  Brims believed Mercer advised him hooding was permitted for security reasons.  There was a letter from Soldier 2 (S002) to Mercer evidencing that the intelligence side of 1 UK Div believed hooding was legitimate for security purposes.

A note from Major Davies (SO2 Legal at national contingent HQ in Qatar) stated hooding was permitted for security reasons.  Cuffing was also legitimate for valid reasons.  Stress positions or water deprivation were not allowed and time restrictions to hooding and cuffing applied.  In his statement to the court martial he went on to say that the number of PoWs had been underestimated and the JFIT could not cope.  Hooding was legal for limited purposes and he believed PJHQ agree with him.  Further documents suggest both intelligence and legal divisions were advising that hooding was permitted for security purposes.  Other documents suggest blindfolding rather than hooding techniques were taught by the Joint Services Interrogation Organisation (JSIO).

Following an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Report complaining about treatment of PoWs in Um Qasar, various statements by army personnel claim hooding was banned and replaced by goggles or blindfolds. Mercer claims General Brim ordered this.  The nature and timing of this order must be investigated by the Inquiry.  It was clear that in mid-2003 the UK doctrine on interrogation was inadequate and lacked clarity.