The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry

Day 57: Wednesday 10^th February 2010

The evidence of Major Anthony Royce

Major Royce confirmed that he served for the Territorial Army from 1988 – 1993 in Northern Ireland. Following this he joined the regular army and was posted to Iraq on 6^th June 2003, returning on 26^th August of the same year. He initially envisioned his role to be that of Battle Group Liaison Officer, with the task of overseeing information and media operations.

After deployment to Iraq Major Royce took up the role of BGIRO (Battle Group Internment Review Officer), for which he had received no training for. He confirmed that he had received a limited amount of training on prisoner handling through ITDs (Individual Training Directives) which consisted of short presentation and videos on the handling of prisoners and civilians.

The overall message that Major Royce had got from the Geneva Convention was that prisoners should be treated in accordance with it and that they should not be killed, abused or forced to give any more information that their number, rank and name. He confirmed suggestions made by Mr Elias that prisoners should be treated humanely and in a way in which he himself would like to be treated had he been captured. Major Royce confirmed that the humane treatment of the prisoners was at the forefront of his mind during his time in Iraq and that it should not be suspended at any time.

Major Royce was asked to explain what he meant by a comment in his witness statement that said that the implementation of the Human Rights Act in Iraq was “idealistic and totally unrealistic”. He stated that in Iraq there was no policing by consent. Civilians had lived under a totalitarian regime based on policing by fear. He gave the example of Iraqi civilians putting pressure on British troops to shoot at looters. He explained that Iraqi people did not understand the concept of human rights, but insisted that human rights had not been suspended in Iraq.

Major Royce explained that he had not heard about the ‘Heath Ruling’ of 1972 and did not know whether or not conditioning of prisoners had been prohibited. He had not personally received any training on conditioning techniques himself, but was aware that many other officers had. He did have a vague idea of what conditioning techniques were before he was deployed to Iraq. He explained that he did not have reason to consider whether conditioning techniques were permitted or not upon his deployment to Iraq as he did not consider that such mechanisms would be required. He was however aware that such techniques would be used by certain forces.

Major Royce explained that he had not received any training in tactical questioning. What he did know was that tactical questioning occurred at, or close to, the point of capture in order to gain information that would be useful at that point, for immediate action. Major Royce gave examples of information relating to the proximity of enemy forces and booby traps.

Major Royce said that he had attended a lecture at which a lawyer had stated that hooding was not permitted in any circumstances. This instruction had been given by a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Legal Service. He explained that he was not told why the hooding was not permitted and did not believe this to be self evident.

Major Royce explained that he had not received any training in the use of stress positions and had not been told whether or not they should be used. This was also the case for training in the use of ‘plasticuffs’ and training in conduct after capture.

Mr Elias referred to a comment in Major Royce’s witness statement that mentioned that he had observed hooding being used by Black Watch at Camp Stephen when he arrived in Iraq. Major Royce explained that he did not think it appropriate to bring up the matter at the time, but made a mental note to bring it up at a later juncture. He explained that he assumed the use of hooding by Black Watch to be a SOP (Standard Operating Procedure). He explained that it was not unusual for SOPs to vary from what had been discussed in pre-deployment training. Major Royce said that he understood that hooding had been permitted for security reasons and for conditioning. When probed about the security element, he explained that any information that prisoners got about the British camp would be of use to insurgents.

A photograph of the TDF (Temporary Detention Facility) was shown to the Inquiry. It depicted a very small room with especially small windows. Mr Elias suggested to Major Royce that prisoners would not need to be hooded if they were made to face the wall as very little information about the camp could be gleaned from this limited positioning. Major Royce explained that prisoners were not made to face the wall and that they were able to wander around which was the justification for their hooding. Mr Royce confirmed that there was no time limit set on hooding.

Major Royce explained that stress positions were not discussed by Black Watch.

Appointment as BGIRO

Major Royce confirmed that he had been appointed as BGIRO in early July. Colonel Mendonca had wanted the position of BGIRO to be filled by an officer with a high rank, such as Major or above and this is why Major Royce was appointed.

Major Royce explained that the BGIRO role put him in command of the TDF. The RSM (Regimental Sergeant Major) had no responsibility at all for the TDF it was explained, though he did have some responsibility for staff.

Major Royce confirmed that it was Sergeant Smith who had responsibility for the hands on supervision of suspects, with Corporal Payne taking over this role when Sgt Smith was absent. Major Royce explained that he would visit the prisoners every half an hour. 

Major Royce explained that Sgt Smith would always have been present when conditioning was taking place. He explained that Sgt Smith would carry out the conditioning with other guards, usually placed outside, to assist in the event of escape by prisoners. There was however no official instruction that the guards had to be outside of the TDF. Sgt Smith’s role inside the TDF was to ensure that the detainees did not speak to one another and he could ask for the assistance of guards in this task if he so needed to.

Major Royce explained that he had more confidence in Sgt Smith than in Corp Payne. He explained that he had experience of ill-discipline on the part of Corp Payne when drunk on occasion.

Major Royce explained that there was no specific order or instruction that prisoners should be conditioned. The decision came out of a discussion with a colleague -  Major Robinson. Major Royce claims that the decision to implement conditioning was not his idea, but a direction from the chain of command from Major Robinson.

Major Royce explained that the doctor he worked with was uncomfortable with issuing Fit for Detention certificates for the prisoners. He was concerned that such certificates could be viewed as him advocating conditioning and that he may subsequently face reprisal from the General Medical Council. Mr Elias points out that this information was not recorded in Major Royce’s witness statement. Major Royce contends that he did not reveal this information previously because he did not think it relevant. Major Royce confirms that Fit for Detention Certificates were never signed, but that medical examinations to establish the fitness of prisoners were carried out. Mr Elias contends that, in order to ensure that prisoners were in the same condition on leaving the camp, as when they arrived at the camp, a certificate detailing this condition would be a vital cog in achieving this. Major Royce disagrees and claims that the actual process was the vital cog, and not its recording.

Major Royce confirms that no medical examination forms were sent to TIF (Theatre Internment Facility) and that no mandatory medical examination rules were set out in a written operation document. Major Royce contends that despite this he knew that examinations were being carried out because he saw them, however, not on every occasion.

Authority for Conditioning:

Major Royce explained that the authority for conditioning came through conversations with Major Robinson. There was a problem with the amount of TQers (Tactical Questioners) so it meant there was a delay in the time between capture and the process of questioning. Major Royce explained that they needed to maintain the ‘shock of capture’ to ensure that prisoners were still disorientated and confused when they were questioned. In order to maintain the ‘shock of capture’ prisoners should be conditioned through hooding and the use of stress positions. Major Royce did not discuss any other conditioning techniques with Major Robinson.

Major Royce explained that he did not question the use of conditioning with Major Robinson at this stage. He explained that he later went on to discuss the issue with Major Clifton. Major Clifton informed him that it was ok to use conditioning techniques. Major Royce explained that the reason he asked Major Clifton about the use of conditioning was because he knew that Colonel Mendonca would have asked whether or not he got legal sanction for its use, as it was not something that they’d discussed at any time before.  Major Royce explained that the use of conditioning was beyond what he predicted would happen and he confirmed, when asked, that he did think there might be a Geneva Convention issue with its use.

When asked whether or not the conditioning that Major Royce saw was humane, he answered that it was no excessively inhumane.

Major Royce explained that in a separate discussion he’d had a couple of weeks before, he was told that hooding could be used for security purposes. Major Royce explained that he did not specify a maximum length of time that prisoners could be hooded for as he did not think this necessary given that after a couple of hours prisoners would be handed over to RMP (Royal Military Police).

Major Royce explained that Major Robinson had told him that he needed to maintain the shock of capture and that this could be done through the use of conditioning and stress positions. Major Royce explained that he had a good idea of what stress positions were. He explained that he did not ask for formal instructions from Major Robinson, but that he took what he said as direction. Following this he had sought clarification from Major Clifton also, who informed him that the use of conditioning was fine. Major Royce explained that he did not mention the fact that he’d received contradictory advice on the use of conditioning  previously.

Major Royce was questioned over the fact that he’d not mentioned that he’d authorised the use of stress positions in his witness statement and asked whether or not this meant that he was only telling part of the truth. Major Royce denied this.

Mr Elias showed the Inquiry MOD 636 which stated that conditioning would include hooding and stress positions. He then asked Major Royce whether there were also other elements. Major Royce explained that he was aware of the five techniques which also included– denial of water, food and sleep. Major Royce explained that water was never denied when he was BGIRO. He also explained that it was not unusual for prisoners to miss breakfast, but that this was an unavoidable happenstance. He explained that there was not be any sleep deprivation as prisoners were usually brought in in the early hours and TQing would end at lunchtime, though he insisted that this was not food deprivation.

Major Royce explained that the CO (Commanding Officer) was present and didn’t stop the conditioning, he was content that clearance had been sought and was happy with the process. Conditioning was viewed as an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure).

Mr Elias explained to the Inquiry that Major Robinson and Major Clifton did not accept Major Royce’s account that they gave him the green light to ahead with conditioning.

Major Royce said that he explained to his officers that they were required to condition and that this would involve hooding and the use of stress positions only. He was convinced that they were talking about the same thing when they spoke of conditioning.

Major Royce explained that Sgt Smith’s role was to replace prisoners’ hoods after they’d been removed for photographing and get them to adopt stress positions. He explained that he did not give him instructions on how to enforce the stress positions. Major Royce explained that stress positions were maintained by the instructions given by an interpreter and by physically putting the prisoners back in their positions. He had not given specific instructions on how to deal with prisoners who declined to adopt the stress positions. Mr Elias asked whether the use of force was permitted. Major Royce explained that he did not specifically tell Sgt Smith how much force was permitted, but believed that he would know as he’d had basic training.

Mr Elias referred to MOD 640 which stated that Sgt Smith was the only officer authorised for conditioning. However Major Royce explained that if there were a lot of prisoners at any one time then Sgt Smith would need assistance from other guards and soldiers. Major Royce explained that he did not give instructions to these assistant soldiers, but that he expected Sgt Smith to pass down his instructions.

Major Royce was asked whether or not he had concerns about soldiers being involved in the conditioning process, to which he answered no. He was then probed by Mr Elias who asserted that he had said in his witness statement that he had many concerns about soldiers and conditioning. Major Royce then went on to explain these concerns, stating the fact that the soldiers had not been trained in conditioning, the process was out of the ordinary, it could go on too long and the value of the information received through TQing could be reduced if it went on too long. Major Royce explained that he thought it was an unnecessary risk to the well being of the prisoner.

Mr Elias showed a video depicting aggressive conditioning to the Inquiry. Major Royce explained that this was not the conditioning that he had seen. He explained that the video depicted Corp Payne conducting the conditioning unsupervised, whereas he always saw Sgt Smith carrying it out. Major Royce explained that there must have been a significant slackening of rules since his time there.

Major Royce explained that shouting did happen on occasion during his time, but that Corp Payne in the video was being overly aggressive. On the issue of stress positions, Major Royce explained that during his time different ones were used. Prisoners would be stood up with their arms outstretched in front of their bodies, crouching or sitting cross-legged. Major Royce confirmed that the CO knew conditioning was taking place in the TDF. Major Royce assumed that everybody knew about conditioning, but he did not brief every single officer.

Mr Elias asked whether he warned Major Peebles about Sgt Smith and Corp Payne and their conditioning. Major Royce explained that he did discuss the soldiers, but did not warn Major Peebles against using Corp Payne for conditioning. He told him that Sgt Smith was better for the job. Major Royce confirmed that he believed six hours should be the limit for conditioning.

Mr Elias then went on to discuss the use of cots in the TDF. Major Royce explained that there were cots in the TDF for prisoners and that he did not recall a decision being made to remove the cots. He did recall the fact that cots were unavailable for a few days. Mr Elias referred to Corp Payne’s statement in which he said that Major Royce had instructed him to remove the beds on the instruction of the CO. Major Royce disagrees with this statement and it is not what he recalled.

Mr Elias referred to MOD 13428, which stated that no physical or mental pressure should be placed on POWs. Major Royce explained that he had not read the document. Mr Elias asked Major Royce whether he thought it would have been better to have a written document explaining how conditioning should be implemented, to which he replied that it wouldn’t because Sgt Smith gave verbal instructions when they were needed.

Cross Examination:

When asked whether or not he knew about the elements of the Geneva Convention that detailed mental and physical pressure and unpleasant and disadvantageous treatment, Major Royce said he was unaware of these details.

FRAGO (Fragmentary Order) 29 was referred to in which the term “if we abuse it we will lose it” was used by Major Royce. Major Royce explained that this meant that things needed to be taken seriously.

It was posed that the Court Martial evidence suggested that the conversations about conditioning happened before Major Royce wrote instructions, after which he wrote them, leaving out the details of conditioning. Major Royce explained that the policy was written before he had discussed the conditioning.

It was stated that many soldiers claimed they knew nothing about the use of conditioning. Major Royce explained that he did not mention it to every single officer but that he did mention it in group situations. When asked whether or not he wished the instructions on conditioning would have been clearer, he responded ideally, yes, but stated that it wouldn’t really have mattered if they had been.

On the issue of the handover to Major Peebles, Major Royce was asked whether it would have been important to tell him about the use of conditioning. Major Royce replied that he simply answered questions on the topics he was asked about.

It was put to Major Royce that because Iraq was such a brutalised society, more force against Iraqis was needed generally. He responded that this was not the case per se, but that they did need to be robust about criminality. He confirmed that they could be viewed as weak if they were not robust.

Major Royce did not agree that people had lost moral compass when they used conditioning techniques. He did not accept the proposition that the use of such techniques would have been different if the detainees had been white and European. He explained that race did not come into it. He accepted that the brutality of the Iraqi society was a factor.

Major Royce was asked why he asked Major Robinson about conditioning when he wasn’t a lawyer and he’d already received clear instruction from a lawyer at the previous lecture. He answered that it was a G2 matter and a matter of security and Major Robinson would therefore know about it.

Major Royce confirmed that Major Robinson had informed him that stress positions could be used, he did not however state which ones could be used. Major Royce explained then that he thought Dr Bartel did know conditioning was taking place because the TDF was very close to the medical centre.

Major Royce explained that Colonel Menonca was the best commanding officer that he had ever worked with and that he clamped down on ill-discipline very quickly and harshly.

Major Royce explained that about 70 prisoners were processed at the TDF when he was BGIRO.

When asked whether he and Colonel Mendonca had fabricated an account of what happened in Iraq Major Royce said that this was not true.

Major Royce confirmed that he did take on a semi-judicial role as the BGIRO in that he had to determine the guilt of prisoners and prepare evidence bundles to go to the TIF.

Major Royce explained that when he was handing over to Major Peebles there were 2 prisoners being held at the TDF and that they had dressings over their eyes. He understood this to be a conditioning technique but not one that was used in his time.

Major Royce explained that there were not usually more that 5 or 6 prisoners being conditioned at any one time.

Major Royce confirmed that he was concerned when he knew that Sgt Smith was to be given other duties as this would take away from his supervisory role. He explained that he did tell Major Peebles about his concerns with Corp Payne, telling him that he shouldn’t be involved in the TDF at all in an ideal world.

Major Royce confirmed that it was a quick handover from Black Watch to QLR and that the chain of command changed with a restructuring. The TQers played a very important role on the ground, he explained.

Major Royce said that Major Peebles had dismissed the concerns that he had voiced to him about Corp Payne.

Major Royce was questioned about the fact that at the Court Martial he had not mentioned the fact that he thought he had spoken to Major Clifton about hooding and that this was the first time it had been mentioned. He explained that he had never been definitive in his response then, and that now he did believe that he had done so.

Major Royce explained that not enough TQers were deployed to Iraq because the deployment happened very quickly.

Major Royce explained that his diary records helped him piece together the fact that there was a HUMINT Field Officer present even though the entries did not specifically state this.

Major Royce confirmed that prisoners were regularly held in the TDF over night but that they were not usually hooded overnight and that they didn’t remain in stress positions overnight. He explained that they may have been plasticuffed if they were not sleeping and depending on the numbers of prisoners.