The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry

Day 5: Monday 20th July 2009

Mr Elias continued his submissions on Module 2 regarding the death of Baha Mousa.

Opening Statement by Counsel to the Inquiry Mr Gerard Elias QC continued.

The accounts of Captain Good, Corporal Schofield, Lance Corporal Liggins and Private Riley were given.  They visited the Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) on Monday afternoon.  Lance Corporal Liggins’ account contradicts the other’s accounts on the beatings.

The 14 hour rule had been breached and the Inquiry was urged to investigate why the men were not sent to the TIF when tactical questioning had finished.

The contrasting accounts of Corporal Payne, Private Cooper, Private Bentham, Lance Corporal Redfearn, and Lance Corporal Douglas into the final moments of Baha Mousa’s life were outlined.  Private Cooper states he saw Corporal Payne deliberately bang Baha Mousa’s head against the wall three times.  Lance Corporal Redfearn said Baha Mousa was thrashing around himself and struck the wall at least 10 times.  Douglas saw Payne and Redfearn beat Baha Mousa.

The medics’ response was also detailed.  Captain Keilloh failed to notice Baha Mousa’s injuries whilst attempting to resuscitate him and saw no reason to go to TDF and check the condition of the other detainees after Baha Mousa was pronounced dead.  The Inquiry was urged to consider whether their reaction, or lack of reaction, was appropriate.

Mr Elias detailed the injuries sustained by the detainees, displaying photographs from Baha Mousa’s post-mortem and SIB investigations, and discussed the differing views on exact cause of death given by the three pathologists.  The Inquiry was urged to investigate why some detainees were barely touched.

The court-martial charges and findings were outlined.  Mr Elias briefly considered each issue as they appear under the Module 2 issue list:

4. The conditioning techniques began immediately, continued after the end of TQing and the death, and was standard practice within 1QLR.   The Inquiry must investigate who was giving orders on the ground and what knowledge the chain of command had.

5. Mr Elias stated that the injuries sustained have already been detailed and it was clear they were sustained in BG Main.

6. There was a variety of evidence given on who inflicted the injuries.  Three categories existed: those who have admitted minor assaults (Lee, Slicker, Payne, Mackenzie, Reader, Graham, Allibone, Stirland); those with specific allegations against them (Payne, Bentham, Stacey, Fallon, Crowcroft, Rodgers, Redfearn, Roberts); and those not named who the Inquiry believe may have questions to answer (all in the multiple commanded by Rodgers, Crosby, Lawrence, Grist, S036, Jordan, Shakeshaft, Armstrong, Walker, Bolton, Brown and Huxley).

7. and 8. Other abuse took the form of rancid conditions, denial of toilet facilities, verbal abuse, being urinated on and humiliated.

9. The Inquiry was urged to investigate whether the likes of Peebles, Smith, Briscoe, Suss-Francksen, Seeds, Quegan, Engelfield and Mendonca did enough to prevent or report the abuse.

10. The Inquiry must ask whether the medics (Winstanley, Baxter, Kellioh) did  enough.

11. There appears to have been no formal checks on the detainees’ welfare apart from the medics at the end.

12. Why was there such a delay in delivering the detainees to the TIF? To date the justification has been a lack of resources, the TIF not accepting detainees after a certain time and TQing taking longer than expected.

13, 14 and 15. The Inquiry will consider the factual questions of what and who brought about the death of Baha Mousa but will not determine civil or criminal liability.

Mr Elias mentioned three key themes emerging from the evidence to date:  a wall of silence and collective amnesia; the adequacy of supervision; discipline, or lack there of, within 1QLR.

Mr Elias then turned to addressing the main training materials used up to and including pre-deployment training for Op-Telic.  He briefly mentioned: basic entry level training; promotion training; Individual Training Directives (ITDs); LOAC training; and Aide Memoires.

Chapter Six of the counter-insurgency (COIN) handbook was displayed making it clear that whilst interrogation in depth will continue, the five techniques are prohibited.  It also mentions the Parker Report findings and the JIC 72.

Mr Elias then considered, in broad terms, the Land Operations Volume 3 which was the doctrinal publication in force when the COIN was produced and its successor, the 1995 Army Field Manual.  Neither makes any reference to the prohibition of the 5 techniques nor the JIC 72.

The regimental police (or provost staff) were responsible for overseeing the detention of civilians during Op-Telic II.  The Inquiry has requested their training documents and this has been largely unfruitful although from what has been submitted it appears their training addressed neither prisoner handling nor the 5 techniques.

Mr Elias stated that the specialist training provided by the JSIO was of great importance to the Inquiry as it covered prisoner handling, TQing and interrogation.  Conduct after Capture (CAC) training was addressed and this was relevant because CAC (now called resistance to interrogation) training courses deployed the 5 techniques.