The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry

Day 4: Thursday 16th July 2009

Mr Elias concluded his submissions on Module 1 and moved onto Module 2 concerned with the death of Baha Mousa.

Opening Statement by Counsel to the Inquiry Mr Gerard Elias QC continued.

Mr Elias moved on to deal with wider army doctrines, outside of international war situations for example.  Documents were shown to the Inquiry describing how humane treatment of PoWs or civilian detainees was to be observed at all times and the best way to achieve military aims.  Documents included: JSP 469; The Queen’s Regulations for the Army; A Soldier’s Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict; Army Field Manual; aide memoires such as JSP 381 and JSP 383; UN Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners. JSP 383 was not adopted until July 2004.  There was no mention of the Ireland v UK case.  Blindfolding (not hooding), segregation and physical restraint might be necessary for short periods if it was justified in the interests of security.  Mr Elias noted that ICCPR applied to this case as well as the Convention.

An email from a naval commander demonstrated confusion at senior level of the ECHR applicability and on the question of whether hooding was lawful or not.   Mr Elias summarised the overall picture of army doctrines as follows: there was a marked absence of specific guidelines to soldiers on the ground for the 5 techniques and there was a lack of doctrinal guidance on interrogation and tactical questioning in general.   Mr Elias asked whether command and intelligence centres were adequate and whether soldiers sent to Iraq had sufficient training and resources.

Module 2

Mr Elias then moved onto Module 2 concerning the factual events during the 48 hours of Baha Mousa’s detention.   Mr Elias restated the context in Iraq as outlined in the overview.  He added that recent killings of British personnel at the time had had an impact on soldier’s attitude to Iraqi civilians and detainees.  Upon arrest of Baha Mousa and other detainees, rumours quickly spread that they were connected to recent killings.   Mr Elias drew a distinction between internees (confirmed threat to coalition forces) and detainees (temporarily imprisoned awaiting assessment of their threat – sent to Theatre Internment facility (TDF) if given internee status.  The original 14 hour deadline to do this had been relaxed.  The Battle Group’s role had expanded by this time so much greater Tactical Questioning (TQing) responsibilities.

1 QLR’s BG Internment Review Officer (BGIRO) for first half of Op-Telic II was Major Royce.  He drafted the 1 QLR Internment Procedure document following the authoritative document on internment procedures, FRAGO 29.  Extracts from Major Royce’s guidelines were shown to the Inquiry.  Various photographs detailing the layout of BG Main and a cast list of relevant characters was shown.

Outside groups also visited the TDF during the 48 hours including the media division accompanying a GMTV film crew, C Company and Royal Military Police (RMP).   All reported hearing shouting and moaning.  Local Iraqi interpreters were involved but to date the Inquiry has been unable to track them down.

Mr Elias stated that the question of who had command responsibility for the TDF guards received differing answers depending on who was asked.

Mr Elias then mentioned difficulties posed by available evidence.  Fading memories and deliberate memory lapses meant there were often discrepancies between accounts.  However, he intended to piece together what happened according to soldier, medic and detainee statements.

The 3 AK47s found in lobby of the Hotel Haitham raised suspicion that the hotel harboured terrorists.  Further suspicion was raised when arms (including grenades), money (in the region of £500.00), photographs of staff with weapons, and fake IDs found in adjacent rooms.  All the staff were arrested.  The detainees argued that the lobby weapons were for protection, the fake IDs allowed hotel to legally possess the weapons and that the photographs were just fun.  The adjacent room was a telecoms shop owned by C001 and not connected to the hotel.

Detainee C001 escaped and the treatment got harsher.  Baha Mousa’s father arrived at the scene and pointed to the theft of money by Lieutenant Rogers.  This was one theory for Baha Mousa receiving the worst of the beatings.  Private Fearon was caught stealing but not formally disciplined.  Someone radioed in asking, “do we do it normally or gently”?

Detainee 3 (D003) told the soldiers that C001 was at D005 and D006’s house. They went there and arrested D005 and D006. D005 alleged ill-treatment on the way to BG Main including a stop-over at Camp Stephen.  The army denied ill-treatment although one account says they went straight to BG Main whilst another admits stopping at Camp Stephen.

The video was shown again and Mr Elias identified the six detainees in the room with Corporal Payne and the interpreter. The cameraman is unknown.

There was much contradictory evidence (though six detainees are largely consistent in their accounts) on times.  However, there appears to have been a 2-5 hour delay in the medical assessment of detainees (D006 had his heart medicine taken from him).  The detainees were immediately double-bagged, put in stress positions, shouted at, deprived of sleep and beaten continuously for being unable to maintain ski-position.  It appears they received no food on Sunday.

Corporal Payne instructed Fallon and Crowcroft to maintain the stress positions on the detainees.  No water was available in TDF for detainees.  Major Peebles told Fallon and Crowcroft to begin conditioning detainees at 16.30 on Sunday.  Clearly it had already been going on.  Major Peebles also told them they may be involved in the RMP murders.

Resistance was offered once by the detainees when someone (possibly Baha Mousa) shoulder charged Private Fallon. Lance Corporal Slicker entered TDF and beat Baha Mousa.  He was later fined £600 for common assault.

Detainee evidence suggests Baha Mousa was singled out, particularly on the Monday.  Guards have stated he was more trouble than the rest, repeatedly removing his cuffs and standing.  He was moved to the middle room on his own with the cuffs behind his back.  A soldier accompanying GMTV saw Corporal Payne stamp on, punch, kick and gouge Baha Mousa.

Privates Hill and Lee allege Crowcroft and Fallon boasted about the beatings, the ‘choir’, and showed wounded knuckles and shins.  Warrant Officer Urey stated Crowcroft said in a Cyprus bar in 2005 that “we all kicked him to death”. Crowcroft argues he said “we may as well all have kicked him to death”, referring to a belief that they were all being hung out to dry by the army.