The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry

Day 19: Thursday 8 October 2009

The Evidence of Dean Liggins, Anthony Mr Riley, Christopher Major Good and Michael Mr  Crosbie

The Evidence of Dean Liggins

Mr Liggins said that he was posted to Iraq in 2003 as part of C Company 1 Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (1 QLR) and that he was part of the unit that took over the role of G5 from the Black Watch.  Mr Liggins confirmed that Captain Dai Jones had headed G5 until his death, that Captain Jones was a popular man and his death had a marked effect on the regiment.

Mr Liggins said that he believed that sandbagging/hooding of detainees was standard practice in Iraq and that in certain situations detainees would be routinely hooded and that he had not been given training on hooding before being posted to Iraq.

Mr Liggins was responsible for driving officers to meetings and on such an occasion at Battle Group Main (BG Main) Mr Liggins had parked and was approached by one or two soldiers (who he does not remember save that they were 1 QLR) who told him that the people responsible for Captain Jones' death were being held in Temporary Detention Facility (TDF); Mr Liggins thought this would have been 5pm or 6pm.  Mr Liggins then went to the TDF out of curiosity.  Mr Liggins said he thought that Corporal Schofield was with him at the time.   Mr Liggins spoke to a 1 QLR sentry on the door of the TDF who allowed him in; Mr Liggins thought he went into the left hand room of the TDF. 

Mr Liggins remembered 5-7 detainees sitting cross-legged on the floor and one older man lying on his side but could not remember whether the men were hooded, adopting stress positions or plasticuffed but did not think they were.  After further questioning Mr Liggins said he remembered seeing the men's faces and being told that the old man lying on his side had a heart condition.  Mr Liggins said he remembered there being two soldiers in the TDF but did not know who they were.  Mr Liggins stayed in room with Corporal Schofield for 'a minute' then they walked out together; Mr Liggins did not see detainees being assaulted.  Mr Liggins felt that he and Corpora; Schofield were being allowed to take revenge on detainees if they wanted to. 

The Inquiry was told that on one occasion visiting the TDF Corporal Schofield had seen violent punching but Mr Liggins said he did not witness such an event.  Mr Liggins said it was very possible that the detainees were not the Baha Mousa detainees but confirmed that he had been told there was a father and son amongst the detainees.   Mr Liggins confirmed that, generally, 1 QLR treated detainees they caught with casual violence and that he witnessed this first hand.  Mr Liggins said he only visited the TDF once when these detainees were there.

Mr Liggins said he thought he remembered being told in a briefing that the population of Iraq should be treated with force.  Mr Liggins also remembered attending a meeting at a volleyball court where Major Kenyon said something along the lines of that 'he may have condoned a bit of harsh treatment but that it was time to stop it'.

The Evidence of Anthony Riley

Mr Riley remembered seeing hooded prisoners as soon as he got to Camp Ali Baba during the period of handover from the Black Watch and that hooding was standard procedure when detainees were arrested.  Mr Riley said he was not trained in hooding before being posted to Iraq.   After Captain Dai Jones' death Mr Riley was moved into the G5 unit  in early September; at that point Captain Major Good was leading G5. 

Mr Riley said as his training was minimal and as his health poor he would be bullied, verbally and physically, by other soldiers.  Mr Riley said that he was well regarded by soldiers due to his own sense of identity and level of understanding on certain matters.  Mr Riley said he often saw soldiers physically assaulting hooded detainees when there was no need for it.   Mr Riley said he remembered hearing about soldiers slapping Iraqi detainees and that Captain Major Good told him that they were members of the Garamsche tribe and had to be made example off.

Mr Riley said he never saw a commissioned officer slapping a detainee and that the vast majority of abuse came from NCOs and privates assaulting detainees.  Mr Riley said officers would reprimand soldiers that got too rough with detainees.  Mr Riley remembers the whole company being called and told by Colonel Mendonca that 1 QLR had let its standards slip in respect of the way they treated the Iraqi people; after this reprimand down, Major Kenyon apologised for asking soldiers to treat the Garamsche tribe in the way that he had asked and said that the wrong example had been set.

Mr Riley said that he spoke to Mr Liggins and Corporal Schofield who said there were shocking things going on in the TDF.  Mr Riley decided to go and have a look for himself and walked into the left hand room of the TDF and remembered seeing a young, skinny healthy man sat down; Mr Riley said that the man was unhooded and showed no signs of injury.  Mr Riley then went into the smaller middle room where he saw a detainee lying face forward with his head over, what Mr Riley presumed to be, the latrine.   Mr Riley said he was told in the court martial that the position of the detainee he described in this middle room was not physically possible;  Mr Riley did not disagree with this sentiment but said this is the impression he left with.  Mr Riley remembered this man being badly bruised to the eye, with cuts to the face, blooded lips and broken nose (Mr Riley thought this as his nose was not straight) and that he was filthy and the room he was in smelt.  Mr Riley said that this detainee was unhooded and conscious but could not remember whether he was cuffed.  Mr Riley then walked into right hand room and saw two soldiers, one young soldier and one older overweight soldier who worked in stores shouting at the detainees; Mr Riley thought there were 5 detainees in this room.  Mr Riley said these detainees were sandbagged, had arms restrained behind their backs, kneeling down with faces to wall and were moaning, whimpering and seemed in a state of distress.  Mr Riley said the stocky soldier was physically and verbally assaulting one of the detainees saying 'sit up Grandad, stop slouching', and kneeing him in the back numerous times.  Mr Riley said the room was hot , smelt and he saw what he believed to be faeces on the floor.

Mr Riley confirmed his disgust to Corporal Schofield after this incident and also told Warrant Officer (WO) Parry the following day, a company sergeant major, of what he had seen in the TDF.  A few days later Mr Riley told the battalion chaplain and later touched on what he had seen when he spoke to Major Quegan.  Mr Riley confirmed that the following year he had contacted Amnesty International.  Mr Riley said he also spoke to the Daily Mirror newspaper and BBC Panorama.  Mr Riley confirmed that he had not been paid by the Mirror or by BBC.

Mr Riley said that soldiers often referred to Iraqis using derogatory terms and whilst officers did not use such words, the officers would not pull soldiers up for using offensive language.

Mr Riley also felt that the Royal Military Police should not have been investigating the matter given how close they were to the events.  Mr Riley said he saw no evidence of collusion between soldiers with respect to the investigation.

The Evidence of Major Christopher Major Good

Major Good confirmed that he was currently a Major in the British Army and  when he was posted to Iraq in September 2003 he was a Junior Captain, attached to 1QLR and that he replaced Captain Dai Jones, in his role in G5, after he died.  When asked about hooding,  Major Good said that it seemed to be standard operating procedure in Iraq and that although it would have been covered at Sandhurst,  Major Good could not remember what training he had received on hooding before being posted to Iraq.  Major Good remembered walking in the left hand room of the TDF and seeing hooded and unhooded Iraqis but could not remember whether said men were restrained or in stress positions.  Major Good remembered some men having no top on and remembers the Iraqis having cuts and bruises and that there was one soldier in the room.  Major Good was read extracts from his statement describing very specific conditions of the detainees but Major Good said did not recall all these events.  Major Good said he had issues with the way the RMP had taken his witness statement; Major Good told the Inquiry that the 2 NCOs paraphrased what he said during a 5 to 6 hour interview and that as he was busy signed the statement but did not take a great deal of time to read his statement.

The Evidence of Intelligence Officer Michael Crosbie

Mr Crosbie said that he had joined the Territorial Army (Territorial Army) in 1998 and went to Iraq on Op Telic 2 where he was attached to 1 QLR where he was an Intelligence Officer.  Mr  Crosbie confirmed that he had not been given training in hooding or stress positions with regards to detainees before being posted to Iraq.  Mr  Crosbie only recalled seeing detainees in one instance in Iraq, during the aftermath of Operation Salerno.

Mr Crosbie said that on the day of Operation Salerno (14th September 2003) his role was to check a list of names against names on the hotel register at the Al Haitham Hotel.  He believed Major Englefield was in charge.  When Mr  Crosbie got to the Hotel he spoke to a male civilian who claimed to have seen, through a window, two soldiers taking money out of the safe, which Mr Crosbie reported to Colour Sergeant Hollender (in charge of internal discipline) who gave the offending soldier a dressing down.  Mr Crosbie got the male civilian to give him a statement.  The civilian wrote his statement in Arabic and gave it to Mr  Crosbie; although Mr  Crosbie had an interpreter with him and he got the interpreter to translate what had been written in English,  Mr Crosbie said he could not remember what the statement said.  Mr Crosbie said he did not remember what he did with the statement but that he would have likely given the statement to either Hollender or Englefield.  Mr Crosbie said that the man who had given him the statement said his son was one of the detainees and asked whether he could be released.  The Inquiry was shown a scrap of paper with 'Second Lieutenant Mike' written on it along with a telephone number which Baha Mousa's father said had been given to him.   Mr Crosbie said that it was his writing and that this would have been the number at Camp Stephen that was manned by interpreters; Mr Crosbie said he was unaware that Baha Mousa's father tried contacting him over the next couple of days.  Mr Crosbie remembered the detainees being taken to the toilet in the Hotel; when asked whether he was aware that Muslims would not wish to be taken to the toilet against their will, Mr Crosbie said he was not aware of this.  Mr Crosbie said he did not see soldiers being violent to detainees in the Hotel.

Mr Crosbie said that he questioned detainees in the restaurant and asked them whether they knew where the escaped detainee (C1) lived and one of the detainees said he knew; Mr  Crosbie said that, at the time, he believed this detainee to be Baha Mousa's son but admitted he knew now this was not the case.  The Inquiry was told that there was considerable evidence showing that the detainee who offered to help was D3.  Mr Crosbie then went by Land Rover with D3 to C1's house.  At C1's house Mr Crosbie could not find C1 but there was a father and son (D5 and D6) present along with two females.  Mr  Crosbie said that one of the females gave him medication for the older man but Mr  Crosbie could not remember what he did with it.  Mr  Crosbie said that gates and doors were damaged as part of the 'hard knock' on this house and that when the house was searched some electrical equipment was found.  Mr  Crosbie said that no ill-treatment was meted out to D5 and D6.  Mr  Crosbie was unsure but believed all the men (specifically, D3, D5 and D6) were put in the same vehicle and taken to Camp Stephen before going to BG Main as he was having radio problems.  It was suggested to Mr  Crosbie that D5 and D6 were taken to Camp Stephen for conditioning and that the detainees had said they had been assaulted there; Mr  Crosbie said he did not witness anything and that the detainees were with guards at Camp Stephen while he was in the operations room speaking to Major Englefield for orders as he could not get a radio signal.  Mr  Crosbie said that when he drove the detainees to the TDF they were not threatened or abused.  At the detention centre Mr  Crosbie said he believed he handed the detainees over to Corporal Payne.  Mr  Crosbie paid one more visit to the TDF, to check up on D5 and D6, and saw D5 and D6 asleep in the left room and remembers seeing detainees, wet and grubby, kneeling in a horseshoes shape in the right hand room.  A soldier in the right hand room showed Mr Crosbie the choir by lightly tapping (the force you would use to knock on a door) each detainee in the back in order to produce a groan.  Mr  Crosbie thought the soldier was larking around and that the choir would stop if he left the scene.

Mr Crosbie confirmed that he remembered speaking to Colour Sergeant Livesey  who said that some detainees had been put next to the generator before interrogation and that this had been a useless thing to do; under cross-examination Mr Crosbie said that Colour Sergeant Livesey did not seem to condone this type of behaviour.