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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE
NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION’S
REVIEW OF POWERS RECOMMENDATIONS
A Paper for Consultation
May 2002
1
GOVERMENT RESPONSE
TO NIHRC’S REVIEW OF POWERS RECOMMENDATIONS
A Paper for Consultation
CONTENTS:
Page
Chapter 1 Introduction 2
Chapter 2 Independence (recommendations 1-4) 5
Chapter 3 Resources (recommendations 5-7) 9
Chapter 4 Reviewing & advisory functions (recommendations 8-13) 14
Chapter 5 Casework (recommendations 14-17) 20
Chapter 6 Promotion & education functions (recommendations 18-21) 23
Chapter 7 Investigation (recommendations 22-24) 27
Chapter 8 Incidental functions (recommendation 25) 31
Chapter 9 Impact of the proposed Commissioner for Children legislation 32
Chapter 10 Equality Screening 33
Annex Equality Screening Form 34
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
1. Section 69(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 required the Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission to make recommendations to the Secretary of State, after
its first two years of existence, on ways in which its effectiveness could be
improved,
including in relation to the powers and duties conferred on it by Part VII of
the Act.
The Commission’s report, containing these recommendations, was received by the
Secretary of State in March 2001.
Context
2. In assessing the Commission’s recommendations, we have been mindful of the
fact
that the Commission has a pivotal role in safeguarding human rights for the
people of
Northern Ireland. However, it is operating within the context of the wider
democratic
institutions and principles within Northern Ireland, including those required by
the
Belfast Agreement. These provide important roles for others, both in the running
of the
country and the protection and promotion of human rights.
3. The Government itself – both directly and through the
creation of an appropriately
structured body of law and law enforcement agencies – also has an obligation to
safeguard and protect the human rights of the people it serves. This, alongside
the
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, which allows democratically elected
politicians
to hold the Government of the day to account and to take ultimate decisions on
the law
of the land, already creates the basic framework within which the Commission
operates.
4. Throughout the UK and elsewhere, the police and the courts have a crucial
role as
the front line defenders of human rights. In Northern Ireland, there is a
further range
of institutions, set up with the object of helping both to build confidence in
the integrity
of the system and to hold it to account.
3
5. In addition, we have been mindful of the proposals of the Northern Ireland
Executive to create a Commissioner for Children, with a broad remit to promote
and
protect children’s rights and interests within Northern Ireland. The
Commissioner will
obviously have an important role to play in championing human rights and will
become a significant new player in this field.
6. The duties and powers of the Commission need to be complementary to these
other
bodies (and the many others involved in protecting and promoting human rights)
to
avoid duplication if the system is to work effectively and to the benefit of the
people of
Northern Ireland. The Commission’s recommendations have been considered in this
context.
7. Another consideration has been the extent to which legislation is required to
give
effect to the Commission’s recommendations. In many cases, the outcome could be
achieved – or, indeed, has already been realised – without the need for primary
legislation. This provides a quicker means of delivering what the Commission has
asked for.
8. In light of this, the Government would particularly welcome comments, as part
of
this consultation, on whether the priority should be to deliver the objective of
the
Commission’s recommendations or to enshrine – or clarify – them in legislation.
Consultation arrangements
9. This consultation paper represents the Government’s draft response to the
Commission’s recommendations. We are proposing to accept many of the
recommendations. In cases where we are proposing not to accept a recommendation,
this is often because the proposal duplicates existing provisions allowing the
Commission to act in a particular way.
10. Before we finalise our decisions and take action, where necessary, to give
effect to
these, we want to hear others’ views on the subject. We would seek to bring
forward
4
legislation, if it was needed to implement the response, subject, of course, to
the
availability of Parliamentary time. The precise wording of any legislation would
be a
matter for Parliamentary Counsel.
11. The purpose of this consultation is two-fold:
(a) First, we are interested to hear others’ views on the proposed response and
the
assessment of the Commission’s recommendations.
(b) Secondly, we wish to consult with interested groups on our screening of the
proposals in this response for compliance with the statutory equality duty set
out in section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act. The screening assessment is set
out in Chapter 10 of this paper.
12. Comments on either of these issues should be sent, by 16th August 2002 to:
NIHRC Review of Powers
The Northern Ireland Office
FREEPOST LON17694
London SW1P 4YS
Fax: 020 7210 0248
Email: reviewofpowers@nio.x.gsi.gov.uk
Telephone: 020 7210 6584
Textphone: 020 7210 6577
5
Chapter 2 Independence
13. We noted in the previous chapter of this document that the Commission was
not
the only body with responsibility for protecting and upholding the rights of the
people
of Northern Ireland.
14. The Government accepts the importance of the Commission retaining
independence from other organisations, including Government itself. Only in this
way
will the Commission be seen by all sections of the community in Northern Ireland
to be
a worthy custodian of human rights for all. Clearly similar considerations also
apply
to, among others, organisations like the police, the Equality Commission, the
Police
Ombudsman and the Chief Electoral Officer. All of these bodies need operational
independence in order for the public to have confidence in their impartiality
and
integrity.
Recommendation 1
In section 68(3) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the following underlined
words should be inserted: “In making appointments under this section,
the Secretary of State shall establish an independent selection process,
complying with the requirements of section 75 of this Act and of the
Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions, approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 48/134 of 1993, and
as far as practicable secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are
representative of the community in Northern Ireland.”
15. The Government agrees that it is important for
appointments to non-departmental
public bodies to be made in a way that guarantees appointment on merit and in a
manner free from political patronage. It also accepts the emphasis of the UN’s
Paris
Principles that it is important for the Commission’s membership to be as
representative
as possible of the community that it serves.
16. These important principles of independence and representativeness are
achieved, at
present, in the following ways:
6
(a) Independence At present, NIHRC appointments are made by the Secretary
of State in accordance with the guidance issued by the Office of the
Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA). This process provides for
independent oversight of the appointments process throughout, by the inclusion
of an OCPA-approved representative on the selection panel and applicants’
right of appeal to the independent Commissioner for Public Appointments.
Additionally, the Commissioners’ mandate is established by legislation and their
terms of office are set at the start of the appointment (subject to possible
renewal), thus providing the stable mandate for Commissioners as
recommended by the Paris Principles as being necessary for independence.
(b) Representativeness This is currently achieved by the requirement in s.68(3)
of
the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which requires the Secretary of State “so far as
practicable [to] secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are representative
of
the community in Northern Ireland.” Public appointments are, as mentioned
above, also governed by the OCPA guidelines and the requirements of s.75 of
the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which places a statutory duty on public
authorities to promote equality of opportunity and good community relations
across a range of groups.
17. The Government believes that this process, established under the Public
Appointments Order in Council 1995, safeguards the independence of the
appointments process and there is no need to legislate again to reinforce that
position.
However, we accept completely the importance of ensuring that appointments to
the
Commission are governed by legislation that guarantees independent oversight to
the
process and a representative outcome.
18. We have also had regard to the legislation governing appointments to other
countries’ human rights commissions. Legislation governing appointments in many
other countries, including Ireland, is similar to that in Northern Ireland.
7
Recommendation 2
A new section 68(3A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998, which reads: “Each member of the Commission shall serve
impartially and independently and shall exercise or perform his or her
powers, duties and functions in good faith without fear, favour, bias or
prejudice and subject only to the law.”
19. The Government agrees that it is important that the Commission acts – and is
seen
to act – in a way that is impartial and independent from other agencies. We
therefore
support the principle of this recommendation. The Commission is already governed
by extensive legislative requirements providing that it should act impartially
and
without bias, including the provisions of sections 75 and 76 of the Northern
Ireland
Act. And, of course, Commissioners – like other citizens – are subject to the
law. The
proposal in recommendation 2 is already well covered by the legislation.
Recommendation 3
Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 7 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [“The
Commission may employ staff subject to the approval of the Secretary of
State as to numbers and as to remuneration and other terms and
conditions of employment”] should be deleted.
20. The provision is included in order to ensure proper accountability for
public
expenditure. This is an important principle to safeguard, and the framework set
out in
the Northern Ireland Act in respect of the Human Rights Commission is common
across most of the public sector, including the Policing Board, the Police
Ombudsman
and the Equality Commission.
21. We agree, however, that the setting of the Commission’s overall budget and
the
retention of controls over remuneration and other terms and conditions of
employment
provide sufficient discipline and assurance in relation to the use of taxpayers’
money.
Within that context, we are therefore content to remove the need for the
Commission to
seek Ministerial approval to the number of staff they employ.
Recommendation 4
A new paragraph 12 should be inserted into Schedule 7 to the Northern
Ireland Act 1998, which reads “The Crown shall enter into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the Commission in respect of all relevant matters
8
to ensure that the Commission’s status as an independent human rights
commission as set out in the Principles Relating to the Status of National
Institutions, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
Resolution 48/134 of 1993 is guaranteed.”
22. The Government agrees that it is important to establish, through an
administrative
agreement such as a Memorandum of Understanding, the relationship between it and
the Commission. This is the normal procedure for managing, at a practical level,
the
relationship between a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) and its sponsor
Department.
23. The procedure is not normally covered by legislation but rather as an
administrative arrangement between the organisations concerned. This is also the
case
in other countries. The legislation setting up human rights commissions in a
range of
other countries (for example, Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand and
South Africa) makes no specific provision for the sponsor department and the
commission to enter into a formal memorandum of understanding of the type
proposed in recommendation 3.
24. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Commission are in the
process
of agreeing a Memorandum of Understanding. It is the Government’s intention that
this would, among other things, clearly delineate the roles and
inter-relationships of
the Commission and the Northern Ireland Office, as its sponsoring Department, in
order properly to preserve the Commission’s independence and ensure appropriate
procedures for accounting for, for example, public money.
25. The Government supports the principle of Recommendation 4 but is not
persuaded
that this process, which is essentially one of administrative procedure, needs
to be
prescribed by law. The Northern Ireland Office is committed to agreeing a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Commission as soon as possible.
9
Chapter 3 Resources
26. The Commission makes a number of recommendations for
ensuring it has access to
greater resources than it has had to date. In considering these recommendations,
the
Government has had regard to the fact that there is a finite pool of public
money
available and, in each case where this is distributed to part of the public
sector, there is
a need to demonstrate value for money.
27. We have made clear from the Commission’s inception that we are willing to
consider sympathetically any bid for additional resources, supported by a
properly
costed business case. Indeed, the Commission’s budget for the financial year
2001-02
was increased from £750,000 to £1.3 million. Like other NDPBs – and, indeed,
Government Departments – the onus is on the Commission to demonstrate why the
money is required.
Recommendation 5
A new section 68(3B) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “The Commission shall be provided with sufficient
resources to ensure that it can carry out each of its functions effectively.”
28. The Government is committed to ensuring that the Commission has appropriate
funding to enable it to fulfil its role as set out in the Northern Ireland Act
1998 and
envisaged by the Belfast Agreement. This desire needs to be set in the context
of
needing to ensure appropriate funding also for other public bodies and services.
The
Government has a duty to ensure that it achieves value for money in the way in
which
it allocates resources. It cannot allow any organisation to write itself a blank
cheque.
29. The Act provides for the Secretary of State to make available funds for the
Commission out of money voted by Parliament. That is the basis on which the
Commission’s initial annual baseline of £750,000 was set. It is also the norm
for public
bodies’ funding, including, for example, the Policing Board and the Police
Ombudsman
as well as the Equality Commission (whose funding is set by the Office of the
First
Minister and Deputy First Minister, with approval from the Department of Finance
&
10
Personnel). The position in other countries is similar, with responsibility for
setting the
budget generally falling to the Minister in charge of the sponsor department.
30. In setting this initial budget – which represented three times the budget of
the
Commission’s predecessor body, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human
Rights (SACHR) – the Government made clear that it was prepared to consider
sympathetically a bid for additional resources, supported by a business case
demonstrating the added value in outcome terms that would accrue from the extra
funding. Again, this is the norm for other public bodies.
31. During the course of this year, the Government has responded to a series of
bids
from the Commission, bringing the total available to the Commission for
2001-2002 to
over £1.3m, an increase of 74% on its baseline. We have recently received the
Commission’s bid for more long-term increases to its baseline, and are
considering it
carefully, taking account of other pressures on the public purse.
32. The existing arrangements put the Commission in the driving seat in terms of
assessing what resources are necessary to fulfil its duties but also place an
obligation on
it to demonstrate the value for money justification for providing them. The
Government believes that these remain the most appropriate means of ensuring
that
the Commission has access to adequate resources and that there is proper
accountability for money paid out of the public purse.
Recommendation 6
A new paragraph 6A should be inserted into Schedule 7 to the Northern
Ireland Act 1998 which reads: “Subject to the duties imposed by section
68(3A) [impartiality and independence of Commissioners], and in order to
further its activities for the promotion and protection of human rights in
Northern Ireland, the Commission may from time to time apply for or
accept grants from lawfully constituted bodies or raise funds through the
provision of services or other lawful activities.”
33. The Government agrees that the Commission should be able to accept funding
from
other sources. This is, in fact, already the case. However, in order to ensure
value for
11
public money, the Commission is not entitled to receive money from outside
sources
for which it has already been allocated money by the Government. In other words,
there should be no duplication of funding.
34. For this reason, the terms of the Commission’s grant agreement require it to
check
first with the Northern Ireland Office, as its sponsor department, before
applying for
funding from an outside source. If the outside money is to cover activities
additional to
those for which the Commission has already received funding, there will be
nothing to
prevent the Commission accepting it. If, however, Government has already funded
the
activity for which the money is intended, the Commission would not be able to
accept
it.
35. All of this remains an important principle of funding of public bodies and
an
important tenet of the proper use of public money. As with the proposal in
recommendation 3, this is primarily an administrative arrangement and would not
normally be dealt with through primary legislation. That is the case in most
other
countries, although we note that the New Zealand legislation makes explicit
provision
for its human rights commission to accept funding from a variety of sources.
36. The Government will ensure that the arrangements under which the Commission
may accept funding from outside sources are clearly set out in the Memorandum of
Understanding discussed in relation to recommendation 3.
Recommendation 7
A new paragraph 2(2A) should be inserted into Schedule 7 to the Northern
Ireland Act 1998, which reads: “The Chief Commission and two of the
other Commissioners shall be appointed on a full-time basis.” The
Commission does not, however, wish this recommendation to be
implemented unless the necessary associated resources are made available
to it for the payment of two extra full-time Commissioners.
37. The Government recognises the increasing workload facing the Commission. In
response to this, the Government agrees that some structural amendments to the
Commission’s composition are required to increase the membership resources
12
available to it. That is why the Secretary of State announced the appointment of
four
new members to the Commission last November.
38. We are not immediately persuaded that the answer is to create two full-time
Commissioner posts – on top of that of the Chief Commissioner. While we want to
strengthen the Commission to make it more able to function effectively, we need
to
balance this with the need to avoid making this into a large and unwieldy
organisation.
It is already relatively unusual within UK bodies to have a full-time Chair of a
public
body and creating, particularly on a statutory basis, three full time positions
would be
a further departure from the norm. There is a danger that this could create a
two-tier
system with the possibility of either the part-time Commissioners being
marginalised
or the burden of work falling disproportionately to the full-time members. We
recognise, however, that some other countries specify the extent to which their
commissioners should be appointed on a full-time basis.
39. A further consideration is that public appointments are meant to bring
people from
all walks of life into contact with the management of the public service. In the
main,
this is done on a part-time basis, in conjunction with other work, thus helping
to ensure
what the UN Paris Principles describe as ‘pluralist representation’. Much of
that could
be lost if all or some of these appointments became full-time. We would restrict
considerably the field from which we could draw and this would be to the overall
detriment of the public service, in this case the Commission.
40. An alternative model that might achieve some of the
workload-sharing benefits
desired by the Commission while not losing the important diversity of
membership,
might be to increase the Commission’s membership and create a position of Deputy
Chief Commissioner. All of these positions could be filled on a part-time basis,
and the
Deputy Chief could be appointed from among the existing Commissioners. This
would help to spread the workload as well as bringing a wider spectrum of
experience
to the Commission’s membership. The announcement of four new appointments last
November already achieves the first element of this proposal.
13
41. As to amending the legislation to require certain
positions to be filled on a part-time
basis, the Government believes that, just as the overall size of the Commission
is not
prescribed by statute but is rather left flexible, it would be a mistake to
prescribe in law
the time-commitment to be expended by the Chief Commissioner and any other
Commissioners. In doing so, this would remove flexibility for the future (for
example,
to make more posts full-time or more part-time) and potentially also reduce the
pool of
candidates interested in making themselves available for these important
positions.
That would not be in the Commission’s – or Northern Ireland’s – interests.
42. The Government therefore proposes to respond to the
Commission’s
recommendation in the following way:
(a) increasing the Commission’s current membership; and
(b) creating the position of Deputy Chief Commissioner
43. No legislative changes are required to increase the
Commission’s membership and
this increase has already been effected. A Deputy Chief Commissioner can be
appointed on an extra-statutory basis but the Government may choose to put the
position on a statutory footing along with the other amendments to the Northern
Ireland Act proposed by this document. This could be achieved with minor
amendments to Section 68(2) and, in Schedule 7, paragraphs 2(3), 2(4), 3(2) and
8(2)(a).
44. The Government intends that the first Deputy Chief
Commissioner should be
appointed, from among the current group of Commissioners – all of whom have been
appointed through an open and transparent process – in the spring of 2003, once
the
new appointees have had a chance to settle in and once the other Commissioners’
second term of appointment has begun.
45. We will keep under review the desirability of
increasing the number of full-time
Commissioners and will consider changing the status quo if that appears to be
appropriate. However, this could be achieved without legislation.
14
Chapter 4 Reviewing & Advisory Functions
46. The Commission’s role in reviewing law and practice
relating to the protection of
human rights is particularly crucial. The Government welcomes the work that the
Commission has done so far in this field and looks forward to further
contributions to
the debate on how best to ensure adequate protection of rights in future.
Recommendation 8
In section 69(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the following underlined
word should be inserted: “The Commission shall keep under review the
adequacy and effectiveness in Northern Ireland of law, policy and practice
relating to the protection of human rights.”
47. It is not clear what additional areas would be covered
by this inclusion than are
already covered by the reference to “law and practice”. The Commission’s report
does
not make this explicit. The position in other countries appears to be similar to
that
applying to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission at present.
48. We would welcome comments, as part of this consultation
exercise, on the issues
that are currently not covered by the legislative provision that might usefully
be
covered in future. Subject to the responses received, the Government will
consider
whether any gaps exist and, if so, how best to address them, whether through
legislative or administrative means.
Recommendation 9
A new section 69(1A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “Without prejudice to subsection (1) the Commission
shall keep under review the implementation in Northern Ireland of the
Human Rights Act 1998 and of the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.”
The Commission does not, however, wish this recommendation to be
implemented unless the necessary associated resources are made available
to it for the performance of this duty?
49. A duty to keep under review the implementation of the
Human Rights Act (HRA)
and any Bill of Rights (BoR) for Northern Ireland is conferred on the Commission
by
s.69(1). The HRA is, and any BoR will be, the fundamental building blocks
against
15
which other human rights protections are interpreted. Reviewing the
implementation
of these is, therefore, at the heart of the Commission’s existing duties. As
with other
aspects of its work, it is open to the Commission to bid for increased resources
to
support its work on this duty.
Recommendation 10
A new section 69(2A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Commission shall, before the end of the period of
three years beginning with the making of the recommendations required
by section 69(2), report to the Secretary of State on the extent to which the
recommendations made have been implemented, make such further
recommendation for improving the Commission’s effectiveness as it
thinks fit and, for these purposes, obtain the assistance of independent
assessors.”
50. The Government agrees that the Commission should be
able to make further
recommendations on ways in which its effectiveness might be improved. We would
like, however, to go further that what the Commission has proposed and avoid
tying
this process to a formal, time-bound arrangement, since this would potentially
require
another change of legislation in five years’ time further to extend this duty.
We also
believe it is unnecessary to tie the Commission’s hand to using external
assessors to
support this work; this should be a matter for the Commission to decide itself,
rather
than being bound to do so by the statute.
51. We therefore intend to bring forward a more open-ended
amendment to the
Commission’s founding legislation, by amending the existing section 69(2) to
make
clear that the Commission may, from time to time, make further recommendations
to
the Secretary of State as it sees fit, without any specific time limits.
Recommendation 11
A new section 69(3A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Secretary of State and the Executive Committee
shall refer to the Commission all draft laws and policies proposed for
Northern Ireland as early as practicable and before they are introduced to
Parliament or the Assembly or made available to the general public.”
16
52. The Government endorses the principle that the Human
Rights Commission should
have the opportunity to comment on draft legislation and changes to existing
practice
as it relates to human rights protection. This is an important part of the
Commission’s
work. The Commission’s specific role in relation to Assembly legislation is set
out in
section 69(4) of the Northern Ireland Act, and the provisions of section 69(3)
also
establish the Commission’s role in advising Government and the Executive on
necessary human rights provisions.
53. However, the Commission is not the only organisation
with expertise in human
rights issue, nor is it the only body charged with proofing Westminster
legislation to
ensure compliance with the Convention Rights. The requirement in section 19 of
the
Human Rights Act, that the responsible Minister make a statement on its
compatibility
with the Convention Rights, is an important process and ensures that human
rights
standards are always considered as part of the development of policy and
legislation.
Departments are required to include an analysis of compatibility in the
explanatory
memorandum that accompanies a Bill and Parliament then has the opportunity to
consider this.
54. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights
naturally takes a particularly
active interest in the area of compatibility. In addition, plans are underway
(set out in
the Memorandum published last December by the House of Commons Modernisation
Committee) to increase the opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny and for
consideration of draft legislation within Parliament. This will strengthen the
existing
procedures. The Commission will have the opportunity to alert the members of the
standing and select committees set up to take forward this task to its views,
and they
will therefore be able to draw on that expertise, as required, in carrying out
their work.
55. There may, of course, be occasions when it is not
practicable to refer draft
legislation to the Commission before it is introduced. To tie either the
Government or
the Executive to this process, given the opportunity after legislation is
published for the
Commission to comment, seems to us to be unnecessarily prescriptive. It is also
the
case that other interests – not just human rights considerations but, for
example,
17
equality issues – have a legitimate interest in scrutinising new legislation and
practice.
To afford the Human Rights Commission a unique role in this regard would not be
right.
56. The Government therefore does not propose to amend the
Northern Ireland Act in
this way. We have considered the position in other countries and believe this
approach
is in line with their governing legislation.
Recommendation 12
A new section 69(3B) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Commission shall advise the Secretary of State on
the desirability of the United Kingdom becoming bound by international
instruments on human rights.”
57. The Government welcomes the Commission’s views on the
desirability of the
United Kingdom being bound by international instruments on human rights. Indeed,
insofar as the needs of Northern Ireland are concerned, we consider this is
within the
Commission’s existing duties imposed by the requirements of s.69(1) – to keep
under
review the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice relating to human
rights –
and, in particular, of s.69(3) – to advise the Secretary of State of legislative
and other
measures which ought to be taken to protect human rights in Northern Ireland.
(emphasis added)
58. The power to give such advice clearly already exists
within the Northern Ireland
Act. The question here is whether this should be imposed as a specific duty on
the
Commission. This would remove the Commission’s discretion, something that we
would not wish to do lightly. The Government would welcome views on whether this
is a desirable change or whether it would be better to leave the position, as at
present,
to the discretion of the Commission.
Recommendation 13
A new section 69(4A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Secretary of State and the Executive Committee of
the Assembly shall have due regard to the Commission’s advice.”
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59. The Government agrees that it is important for the
Commission’s advice to be given
appropriate weight in the consideration of law and practice affecting human
rights
issues.
60. In addition, the Government has ensured, through the way in which the Human
Rights Act and Northern Ireland Act were framed, that there are a number of
other
safeguards to ensure that human rights considerations are at the heart of policy
and
law making:
(a) The obligations on public authorities created by the Human Rights Act make
clear that such bodies must act compatibly with the Convention Rights, unless
statutorily barred from doing so, and Ministers must consider the implications
for human rights before introducing legislation to Westminster.. Parliament will
hear the Ministerial ‘section 19’ statement about the compatibility of the
legislation and will take that into account when considering a Bill.
(b) Within the Assembly, the Human Rights Commission has a formal role in
advising on the compatibility of Bills on devolved matters.
(c) The Human Rights Act gives the Courts strong powers to strike down, or
declare incompatible, legislation that has not properly taken account of these
rights and, of course, provides an opportunity for victims who believe their
human rights have been denied or violated to take cases to the courts.
61. Given this framework, there is already an obligation on
a par with that set out in
s.75 of the Northern Ireland Act, referred to in the Commission’s report,
requiring
public authorities, save in very particular circumstances, to act in accordance
with the
Convention Rights. Just as with the provisions of the s.75 statutory equality
duties, this
obligation goes beyond having regard – or due regard – for the views of any
single
organisation.
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62. It will ultimately remain the responsibility of
Government and Parliament to take
decisions about how best to determine policy and frame legislation, within the
context
set by the Human Rights Act. The Commission has an important advisory role to
play
in that process, but it remains for Government to take its own decisions, based
on
advice from many quarters and with proper regard for the democratic princple, on
the
way to proceed. For the Commission’s role to go beyond this – or for Government
to
be bound by the Commission’s advice – could blur the proper distinctions between
the
role of Government and that of the Commission, compromising both the
Commission’s
independence and Parliamentary sovereignty.
63. Within that context, the Government and the Executive
will wish to avail of a
variety of sources of advice in preparing legislation. In relation to human
rights
aspects of the legislation, these sources are likely to include – but not be
confined to –
the Human Rights Commission. The Government accepts the importance of ensuring
that the Commission’s advice is taken properly into account and, subject to the
outcome of this consultation, we will seek to amend the Northern Ireland Act as
necessary.
20
Chapter 5 Casework
64. Section 69(5), Section 70 and Section 71 set out the
parameters within which the
Commission may provide support to individuals bringing proceedings in relation
to
the protection of human rights and may bring proceedings in its own name.
65. As a general point in considering these
recommendations, the Government has had
regard to the discussions that took place at the time the Northern Ireland Act
was
going through Parliament and the advice to the Government at the time that
certain
powers – including the power to intervene as a third party or to be called as a
friend of
the court – would automatically be available to the Commission. The statement by
Paul Murphy, then Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, cited by the
Commission in its report, represents the genuine understanding of the Government
at
the time.
66. The Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland’s ruling in
2000 that the Commission
did not have these powers since they were not explicitly set out on the face of
the Act
clearly changes this position. The Government has no wish to frustrate the
Commission from having access to the full powers that Parliament – and
Government –
understood it was conferring on it in 1998. It remains possible that the appeal
that the
Commission is now taking to the House of Lords will resolve the matter without
the
need for further legislation. But, if not, the Government will be willing to
bring
forward amendments to the Northern Ireland Act to make these powers explicit.
Recommendation 14
In section 69(5) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 a new paragraph (c)
should be inserted which reads “[The Commission may] give information
and advice involving law, policy or practice relating to the protection of
human rights.”
67. The Government believes that, implicit in its role in
supporting individuals and
promoting awareness of human rights issues, the Commission already has the power
to give information and advice in this way. However, subject to the outcome of
this
21
consultation and, in particular, the question raised about the definition of
‘policy’ in
relation to recommendation 8, we would be happy to bring forward an amendment in
response to this recommendation to remove any doubt that may exist.
Recommendation 15
In section 69(5) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 a new paragraph (d)
should be inserted which reads “[The Commission may] intervene as a
third party on any matter or in any proceedings in any court, tribunal,
inquest, hearing or adjudicative process involving law, policy or practice
relating to the promotion or protection of human rights in Northern
Ireland and the persons conducting the court, tribunal, inquest, hearing or
adjudicative process shall have due regard to the points made by the
Commission in its intervention.”
Recommendation 16
In section 69(5) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 a new paragraph (e)
should be inserted which reads “[The Commission may] appear as amicus
curiae on any matter or in any proceedings in any court, tribunal, inquest,
hearing or adjudicative process involving law, policy or practice relating
to the promotion or protection of human rights in Northern Ireland and
the persons conducting the court, tribunal, inquest, hearing or
adjudicative process shall have due regard to the points made by the
Commission as amicus curiae.”
68. As discussed above, it had been the understanding of
the Government that the
power to apply to intervene as a third party or be called as a ‘friend of court’
(amicus
curiae) was implicit in the Commission’s existing powers. Subject to the outcome
of the
Commission’s current application to the House of Lords, the Government intends
to
bring forward an amendment that will allow the Commission to be called as amicus
curiae or to apply to intervene as a third party in proceedings. Any
intervention would,
of course, be with the leave of the court concerned.
69. The courts are, of course, already obliged to have due
regard to all the evidence
placed before them in a particular case and the Commission’s contribution would
be no
exception. In addition, under the terms of the Human Rights Act, the Courts are
explicitly obliged to act in a way that is compatible with the Convention
Rights, unless
statutorily barred from doing so. That obligation exists irrespective of what
intervention is made by the Commission. It will remain a matter for the
individual
22
court to decide what weight to give to each piece of evidence or intervention
put before
it.
Recommendation 17
In section 71(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the reference to section
69(5)(b) of the same Act should be deleted – so that the Commission will
then have the power to bring proceedings in its own name and when
doing so rely on Convention rights.
70. The European Convention on Human Rights is explicit in
Article 34 that it expects
proceedings to be brought by victims, not by third parties. That principle was
reflected
in the wording of s.7 of the Human Rights Act, which restricts the ability to
bring
proceedings on the grounds that a public authority has acted unlawfully within
the
terms of the Human Rights Act to victims or those who could become victims as a
result of the alleged denial of human rights. As the Northern Ireland Act makes
clear,
the creation of the Human Rights Commission here was not intended to disapply
this
rule.
71. This is not just a question of legal tradition,
although it is worth noting that a
proposal to allow courts to decide matters in the abstract, without a real case
in front of
them, would mean a major departure from the basis on which our justice system
works. In reality, breaches of human rights affect individuals, and are
therefore
arguably best judged by their effect – or potential effect – on the individual.
72. If the Commission wishes to test a point in court, in
which it wishes to rely on
Convention Rights, it should not, in practice, be difficult for it to find
someone who has
been – or could be – adversely affected and can therefore be assisted to bring a
test
case. For these reasons, the Government is not persuaded that it would be
appropriate
to amend the Northern Ireland Act in the way proposed.
23
Chapter 6 Promotion and Education functions
Recommendation 18
A new section 69(6A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “The Commission may express an opinion, as far as the
position in Northern Ireland is concerned, on the reports which the United
Kingdom is required to submit to United Nations bodies and committees,
and to regional institutions, pursuant to its treaty obligations.”
73. The Commission has already made submissions to United
Nations bodies and
committees on the state of human rights in Northern Ireland. The Government
welcomes the fact that it has done so and considers it appropriate that the
Commission
should be free to do this, subject to the reports being accepted by the United
Nations
bodies concerned.
74. There may be merit in expanding the Commission’s
founding legislation to make
clear that the Commission has the power to make such representations to the
Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland and, in principle, are willing to bring forward an
amendment to this effect if the point cannot be adequately covered by our
response to
recommendation 25 (see below). We would welcome comments on whether this
should be limited to clarifying the Commission’s power to do this or whether, as
with
recommendation 12, it should be made a formal duty.
75. It should be borne in mind that the periodic reports
the United Kingdom is required
to submit to the various international bodies are formal statements of the
discharge of
the UK’s discharge of its functions under international law. They cover the
whole of
the UK and other territories for which it is the High Contracting Party. The
Commission’s expertise is, of course, confined to Northern Ireland, and any
comments
it mades on the reports would need to be limited to areas affecting Northern
Ireland.
Recommendation 19
A new section 69(6B) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Commission may consult with, and attend the
meetings of, such national or international bodies or agencies having a
knowledge or expertise in the field of human rights as it thinks fit.”
24
76. The Government accepts that the Commission should be
able to consult with such
bodies as it sees fit, subject to the need to ensure that the Commission
continues to be
and be seen as independent of outside influences and, of course, the rules of
the bodies
and agencies themselves.
77. The Commission argues that recommendation 19 is
required to ensure that there is
no doubt about the Commission’s powers to act in this way. However, the rights
of
freedom of expression and of freedom of association contained in the European
Convention on Human Rights, incorporated within UK domestic law under the terms
set out in the Human Rights Act 1998, already confer these rights on the
Commission.
In addition, the power given to the Commission in section 69(6)(b) to conduct
research
would adequately cover research and association with a wide range of bodies and
sources of expertise.
78. Subject to the comments received in response to this
consultation the Government
is content, in principle, to bring forward an amendment to clarify the position,
possibly
in conjunction with any amendment associated with recommendation 25 (discussed
below). Clearly, there would continue to be a need for the Commission to
prioritise
work on this area within its own budget.
Recommendation 20
A new section 69(6C) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “Statutory authorities with responsibility for education
or training in Northern Ireland shall consult with the Commission when
determining or reviewing the human rights aspects of the content or
delivery of education (including the Northern Ireland curriculum).
79. Bodies providing education and training within Northern
Ireland will, for the most
part, be public authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act and will
therefore
already be required to act compatibly with the Convention Rights, within the
terms of
section 6 of that Act. It seems likely that many of them will want to draw on
the
Commission’s expertise in this regard and the Government supports this.
25
80. Responsibility for education and training lies with the
devolved administration in
Northern Ireland. It would be inappropriate for the Government to legislate on
these
matters without first consulting the Executive.
81. In parallel with this consultation exercise, therefore, Ministers have
written to the
Northern Ireland Executive to seek their views on the Commission’s proposals.
Subject
to their views and to specific issues raised in response to this consultation,
we are
content in principle to bring forward an amendment to this effect.
82. This would not, however, oblige these authorities to
follow the Commission’s
advice or absolve them of the need to seek their own legal advice as required.
Recommendation 21
A new section 69(6D) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “The Commission shall monitor the content and
delivery of the Northern Ireland Curriculum from the point of view of the
promotion and protection of human rights.” The Commission does not,
however, wish this recommendation to be implemented unless the necessary
associated resources are made available to it for the performance of this
duty.
83. The Government agrees that it is important for the
Commission to be able to
monitor all aspects of public life to assess the adequacy of work aimed at the
promotion and protection of human rights. This includes, of course, the
education
sector. The provisions in section 69(1) of the existing legislation already
provide the
Commission with the power to fulfil this in relation to the Northern Ireland
Curriculum as well as in relation to other areas of public life. The Act,
however, does
not make this explicit as a specific duty on the Commission.
84. However, as with recommendation 20 discussed earlier in
this chapter, the area
specifically covered by this recommendation falls within the responsibility of
the
Northern Ireland Executive. We are seeking the views of the Executive in
parallel with
this consultation exercise, including about the extent to which such a role
might be
played by the proposed Commissioner for Children.
26
85. Subject to their views and those expressed in response to this consultation,
we are
content in principle to bring forward an amendment to make this a specific duty
on the
Commission. As with all areas of the Commission’s work, it remains open to the
Commission to bid for additional resources to support this work. The Government
is
committed to considering sympathetically any such bid, supported by a properly
costed business case, within overall public expenditure constraints.
27
Chapter 7 Investigation
86. The recommendations made by the Commission in relation
to its investigatory
powers create the greatest challenge, raising as they do a potential conflict or
duplication with the role of the Commission and those of the courts and law
enforcement authorities all of which have an important role to play in
protecting and
promoting human rights within the United Kingdom.
Recommendation 22
A new section 69(8A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “The Commission shall, in order to assure itself that
human rights are being protected or to investigate any alleged violation of
human rights, have access to all places of detention in Northern Ireland
and to all places where persons are in the care of a public authority or of a
person or body exercising functions of a public nature.
87. The Government accepts that it is crucial for places of detention to be
inspected to
protect against abuses of human rights in them and to guard against unfounded
allegations of abuse. In the interests of transparency, the Government does not
want to
prevent the Human Rights Commission from having the opportunity to assure itself
that human rights are being appropriately protected in places of detention. The
Northern Ireland Office specifically sought to facilitate the Commission’s
recent
investigation into the juvenile justice centres, subject only to the need to
ensure the
individuals’ (and, where appropriate, parental) consent.
88. However, it does not follow that the Human Rights Commission should
necessarily
be the lead body with responsibility in this area. Bodies like the Police
Ombudsman,
the HM Inspectorate of Prisons, the lay Visitors for both police stations and
prisons, the
Independent Commissioner for Detained Terrorist Suspects and the Social Services
Inspectorate already have important statutory roles in protecting detainees from
denial
of their human rights. The Government believes that it would confuse the issue
if the
Commission were to seek to take on board or duplicate these functions. This
position
28
is consistent, in relation to policing, with the concern raised by the Patten
Commission
(paragraph 6.23) that a “confused proliferation of scrutiny into the police
service” was
to be avoided, since it would undermine the role of the Ombudsman. Similar
considerations apply to the prison service and other areas.
Recommendation 23
A new section 69(8B) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “For the purposes of conducting investigations under
section 69(8), the Commission may apply ex parte to a magistrate for a
warrant to authorise the Commission, subject to strict safeguards
protecting the Convention rights of all persons in those premises, (a) to
enter and search premises if it reasonably believes that a human rights
violation has occurred or is occurring there and (b) to remove any article
discovered in those premises if it reasonably believes that a human rights
violation has occurred or is occurring there and (b) to remove any article
discovered in those premises if it reasonably believes that the article
provides evidence of a violation human rights.”
Recommendation 24
A new section 69(8C) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads “For the purposes of conducting investigations under
section 69(8), the Commission may require a person whom the
Commission reasonably believes to be in possession or control of any
information, document or thing that is relevant to an investigation being
conducted by the Commission, (a) to furnish that information, document
or thing to the Commission and (b), where appropriate, to attend before
the Commission to answer fully and truthfully any question put to him or
her by the Commission (other than a question the answer to which might
incriminate the person) and (c) , if so requested by the Commission, to
sign a declaration of the truth of his or her answers to any questions put to
him or her under paragraph (b)”.
89. In both these cases, what is proposed would give the Commission powers akin
to
those of a court (including the powers of the police acting on behalf of the
courts to
investigate crimes). The Government believes that these would seriously muddy
the
waters between the role of the Commission and those of the courts and the police
–
and, in the case of alleged abuses by the police, the Police Ombudsman.
90. The role proposed by recommendations 23 and 24 would sit uncomfortably with
the Commission’s significant and important power to assist complainants in the
ordinary courts. They are quite different roles. The one would be, desirably,
29
supporting one particular side of the argument; the other inevitably more
judicial and
neutral.
91. In the first mode, the Commission would be the complainant’s friend, helping
to
argue his or her case. In the second, it would be more like an inquisitorial
tribunal in
its own right. People giving evidence to it would have to be allowed legal
representation. Issues such as applications for public interest immunity would
have to
be decided. There would therefore be a strong case for the Chief Commissioner
and
some of its members being judges, or at least lawyers. These may not always be
the
most suitable people for the other, more advisory functions and, in compliance
with
the UN’s Paris Principles’ requirement that commissioners should represent the
pluralist nature of civil society, the Government does not wish to be overly
prescriptive
about the backgrounds from which members of the Commission should be drawn.
92. There could also be a conflict between these roles if the Commission were to
be
involved successively in both the initial investigation and any subsequent
proceedings
before an established court. For the Commission to operate in both modes in
succession in the same case, using compulsory investigative powers to obtain
evidence
which then featured in a court case where it actively assisted the applicant
could,
arguably, itself be a breach of the defendant’s Convention right to a fair
trial.
93. The Government has made clear that it is prepared to be as open and
co-operative
as possible with the Commission in carrying out its work. If the Commission
believes
that a public authority has unreasonably withheld relevant information from it,
it has
the power to seek a judicial review of the decision. The courts – themselves
public
authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act – have the power to order
disclosure if they see fit, once a case has been brought before them. This route
has been
available to the Commission since its inception.
94. We recognise that the Commission has argued that, to date, it has been
dissatisfied
with the access given to it, citing in particular its investigation into
Juvenile Justice
30
Centres. In that case, the Government sought to ensure that the Commission had
access to all relevant documentation to enable it to carry out its
investigation.
95. Public authorities have a duty to ensure that they continue to protect the
rights of
those in their care – or of those on whom they hold data. It was for this reason
that it
was necessary to seek individual children’s consent before allowing the
Commission
access to them. It was the role of the juvenile justice centre management to
ensure that
the children had the opportunity to give this consent and, if they were not
prepared to
do so, to respect the children’s wishes. In a number of cases, the children did
not wish
to be interviewed by the Commission’s representatives. To have forced them to be
interviewed would have a breach of their privacy.
96. In short, it is the Government’s view that there are conceptual and
practical
difficulties in the Commission having, on the one hand, the right to take cases
in its
own name in the ordinary courts and the power to assist litigants in such cases
(both of
which were specified in the Belfast Agreement); and, on the other hand, separate
tribunal-like investigative power (which were not mentioned in the Agreement).
.In
addition, the option of judicial review is already available if the Commission
is
dissatisfied with the response from the organisation concerned.
97. The Government recognises that there are some human rights commissions in
other
countries, including Ireland, which, within a different legal framework, have
powers
arguably analogous to those requested here. But, for the reasons given, the
Government believes that they would fundamentally change the nature of the
Commission, create and unacceptable confusion of roles and have the potential to
raise
human rights difficulties of their own.
31
Chapter 8 Incidental functions
Recommendation 25
A new section 69(10A) should be inserted into the Northern Ireland Act
1998 which reads: “The Commission may do anything incidental or
conducive to the performance of the functions set out in this section.”
98. A number of other countries have a similar ‘catch-all’ clause in their human
rights
commission legislation to make clear that their commissions can do anything
incidental
to assist them in the conduct of their business. We are content to introduce a
similar
provision along with the other amendments proposed for the Northern Ireland Act
in
this paper.
99. The Government believes that such a provision might remove the need for
specific
legislative provision for some of the other recommendations made by the
Commission,
since these would be incidental to the Commission’s primary functions rather
than
specific powers in themselves. This could apply, for instance, to
recommendations 12,
14, 18 and 19, and could offer a more flexible way forward to the Commission. We
would welcome comments on this point.
32
Chapter 9: Impact of the proposed “Commissioner for Children”
legislation
100. The Government is aware of the Northern Ireland Executive’s plans to
introduce
legislation to the Assembly to provide for the creation of a Commissioner for
Children.
Such a person would, among other things, have a key role in promoting children’s
rights and in reviewing law and practice in Northern Ireland relating to
children’s
rights.
101. There are clearly some similarities in the duties of the proposed
Commissioner
for Children and the Human Rights Commission. It is in the interests of
everyone,
particularly Northern Ireland’s children, that there should be no duplication of
work
between the two bodies and that, similarly, nothing should be able to fall
between the
two stools.
102. There will, of course, be a need for administrative agreements between the
two
bodies to minimise duplication. We believe, however, that there is a need to
amend the
Northern Ireland Act to permit the Human Rights Commission not to fulfil some of
its
specific duties in relation to children if it is satisfied that the work is
being effectively
carried out by the Commissioner for Children. We are in discussion with the
Office of
the First Minister and Deputy First Minister within the Northern Ireland
Executive
about the precise mechanism for effecting this within the relevant pieces of
legislation.
33
Chapter 10 Equality Screening
103. All designated public authorities in Northern Ireland are required to
comply
with the statutory equality duty, set out in section 75 of the Northern Ireland
Act,
which requires them, in carrying out their functions to “have due regard to the
need to
promote equality of opportunity –
(a) between persons of different religious belief, political opinion, racial
group, age, marital
status or sexual orientation;
(b) between men and women generally;
(c) between persons with a disability and persons without; and
(d) between persons with dependants and persons without.”
In addition, and without prejudice to the above duty, public authorities are
required to
“have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations between persons of
different
religious belief, political opinion or racial group.”
104. The Government has considered the recommendations – and its response –
against the screening questions set out in the Northern Ireland Office’s
Equality
Scheme, approved by the Equality Commission in November 2001. The results of
this
exercise are set out in the attached annex.
105. For the most part, there is no specific differential impact. This reflects
the fact
that it is not so much the powers and duties awarded to the Commission that can
have
an impact on groups within the section 75 categories, but rather the manner in
which
the Commission carries out its work in response to these powers and duties. This
will
be a matter for the Commission to assess as part of the implementation of its
duties
under section 75. An impact assessment of the Government’s policy in this regard
is
therefore not recommended.
34
ANNEX
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
EQUALITY SCHEME SCREENING FORM
Function ID: Powers to be awarded to the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission in response to its recommendation on ways in which its
effectiveness could be improved.
Screened By Human Rights & Equality Unit Date : 27.11.01
Recommended Action - Review Priority 1 [ ]
Review Priority 2 [ ]
Review Priority 3 [ ]
No Current Action []
Decisions Review Date / / (3 years)
Signed – Group Chairperson
_____________________________________
Questionnaire
1A Does the function referred to above involve any action which is likely to
have
an adverse differential impact on a person1 on the basis of their:
YES DON’T KNOW NO
Gender [ ] [ ] []
Sexual Orientation [ ] [ ] []
Religion [ ] [ ] []
Political opinion [ ] [ ] []
Disability (physical, mental, learning) [ ] [ ] []
Race or ethnic origin (includes Travellers) [ ] [ ] []
Age [ ] [ ] []
Dependant Responsibilities / dependancy [ ] [ ] []
Marital status [ ] [ ] []
1 Person includes all individuals or groups with whom the Department interacts –
employees, the public,
contractors, purchasers, etc.
35
1B If the answer to any of the above is YES please briefly describe the impact
and
the affected group
N/A
2A Does the function referred to omit any action, the addition of which would
promote the equality of opportunity, social inclusion or welfare of any person2*
on
the basis of:
YES DON’T KNOW NO
Gender [ ] [ ] []
Sexual orientation [ ] [ ] []
Religion [ ] [ ] []
Political opinion [ ] [ ] []
Disability (physical, mental, learning) [ ] [ ] []
Race or ethnic origin (includes Travellers) [ ] [ ] []
Age [ ] [ ] []
Dependant Responsibilities / dependancy [ ] [ ] []
Marital status [ ] [ ] []
Other (please specify) ________________ [ ] [ ] []
2B If the answer to any of the above is YES please identify briefly the
suggested
amendment and beneficial impact:
N/A
3A Is there any conflict between the rights of any one person3* and those of any
other person contained within the effects of this function?
YES DON’T KNOW NO
[ ] [ ] []
3B If YES please specify
N/A
2 Person includes all individuals or groups with whom the Department interacts –
employees, the public,
contractors, purchasers, etc.
3 Person includes all individuals or groups with whom the Department interacts –
employees, the public,
contractors, purchasers, etc.
36
4 If an adverse impact has been identified how would you categorise it:
Significant Impact – Must be addressed [ ] Priority 1
Moderate / Low Impact – Readily addressed [ ] Priority 1
Significant Impact – Difficult to address in current circumstances [ ] Priority
2
Moderate Impact – Not readily addressed [ ] Priority 2
Low Impact – Not readily addressed [ ] Priority 3
5. SCREENING ANALYSIS
Screening aims to identify those policies, functions or duties which are likely
to have the greatest
impact on equality of opportunity and community relations.
5.1 Is there any evidence of higher or lower participation or uptake by
different
groups within any of the nine categories?
Please tick? YES [ ] DON’T KNOW [ ] NO []
If yes, give details:
N/A
5.2 Is there any evidence that particular groups have different needs,
experiences,
issues and priorities in relation to the particular main policy area?
(please tick) YES [] DON’T KNOW [ ] NO [ ]
If yes, give details:
Although people may perceive that they have had different experiences of dealing
with the Commission , altering the Commission’s powers is unlikely to impact in
a
differential way on groups within any of these categories. It is for the
Commission,
in screening the policies it adopts to implement the powers and duties it has
under
its legislation, to ensure there is no adverse differential impact on any group
within
any of the nine section 75 categories.
37
5.3 Is there an
opportunity to promote equality of opportunity or good relations
by altering policy?
(please tick) YES [ ] DON’T KNOW [ ] NO []
If yes, give details:
N/A
5.4 Have consultations in the past with relevant representative organisations or
individuals within groups indicated that particular functions, policies or
duties
create problems that are specific to them?
(please tick) YES [ ] DON’T KNOW [ ] NO []
If yes, give details:
Different groups and individuals have different views about the Commission’s
recommendations. These comments have, however, not been articulated in terms of
a particular need for people from those groups.
6. If the answer to any of the questions in this section is YES or DON’T KNOW,
proceed to consideration as to whether to submit the function, policy or duty to
a full
impact assessment.
If the answer to all the above question is NO a full impact assessment is not
required.
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REQUIRED: YES [ ] ; NO [] ; DON’T KNOW [ ]
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
For Peace Justice & Human Rights
