BIRW RESPONSE TO STEVENS 3

RESPONSE TO STEVENS 3

1.            BACKGROUND

 1.1      Stevens 3 is the third investigation into allegations of collusion conducted by Sir John Stevens, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan [London] Police Service.

1.2      Stevens 1 was set up on 25^th August 1989 following the leaking of security force intelligence by loyalists anxious to prove that they were targeting active republicans rather than innocent Catholics such as Laughlin Maginn, whose murder led indirectly to the investigation.  In May 1990 a summary of Stevens’ report was published, which confirmed that collusion had occurred but concluded that it was not widespread or institutionalised.  Although many of the documents leaked to the loyalists originated from police files, not a single police officer was charged.  As a result of this investigation, 94 people were arrested, of whom 59 people were charged or reported to the DPP, resulting in 47 prosecutions and 183 convictions for separate offences.   32 UDA members were charged with 153 offences, 146 of which resulted in convictions.  11 UDR soldiers were charged with 15 offences, all of which led to convictions.  In addition to these 43 people, three others were charged with involvement in Loughlin Maginn’s murder.  British military intelligence agent Brian Nelson was also convicted of five counts of conspiracy to murder – but not the murder of Belfast lawyer Patrick Finucane – and other charges relating to terrorism.

1.3       Stevens was called in for a second time in 1992 after a BBC Panorama programme broadcast extracts from Brian Nelson’s journal in which he implicated himself and his handlers in the murder of Patrick Finucane.    Not even a summary of the Stevens 2 report was published and no-one was charged, although it is believed that both RUC officers and army handlers were reported to the DPP.

1.4       A third investigation by Stevens was not in contemplation until British Irish rights watch delivered a report, Deadly Intelligence, to the British and Irish governments on the tenth anniversary of Patrick Finucane’s death in February 1999.  The report set out everything they knew about the roles of military intelligence [the Force Research Unit or FRU], the police [Special Branch] and the secret intelligence service [MI5] in the murders of Patrick Finucane and several others, and about collusion between agents of the state and paramilitaries.  They pointed out that the British government need only consult its own files in order to ascertain whether or not BIRW’s allegations were true, and if they were accurate then a public inquiry would be essential.  The government has never refuted BIRW’s allegations, many of which have been substantiated by the Stevens 3 report.

1.5       Instead of establishing a public inquiry, the government chose to ask Stevens to investigate for a third time.  According to his letter of appointment, Stevens’ original terms of reference were:

“(A)         Conduct the investigation I [the Chief Constable of the RUC] originally sought on behalf of the DPP[1] into the document presented to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland by British/Irish Rights group [British Irish rights watch], but also to review the investigation of the murder of Patrick Finucane in its entirety.

(B)    In this matter you will have unlimited access to all intelligence and information available to and all files held by the RUC.

(C)    The composition of your team is a matter for you and I will ensure you have all resources you require at your disposal.

(D)    You may absorb into your investigation any matter elicited during its progress which appears to you to be linked or otherwise connected to it.

(E)     Should any further matter arise in the course of your enquiries which, in your view, requires separate or independent investigation or which you feel should be investigated by another officer, you will draw this to my immediate attention.”

These terms of reference were later expanded at the request of the Stevens team to include the murder in 1987 of Adam Lambert, in which Billy Stobie, who supplied the weapons for the Finucane murder, was allegedly involved[2].  They were then expanded again to include the examination of “certain issues surrounding the handling of agents”[3].

  1.6     The full report of the Stevens 3 investigation is understood to run to some 3,000 pages[4].  It contains a large number of hyperlinks that connect to a huge volume of documentary and other evidence.  A 45-page summary of the report was originally prepared, but was cut to just 15 pages of text shortly before publication, apparently in order to avoid prejudicing potential prosecutions[5].

2.         WHAT THE OVERVIEW SAYS

2.1.1    the timing of publication

            Sir John Stevens says that he published his summary because “the time is now right” to make the 21 recommendations he makes at the end of the overview[6].  He added:

“The publication of this report is later than I had originally hoped. This delay is due to a number of factors.  Firstly, as has already been mentioned, new terms of reference were added to the original emit of my Enquiry. 

Secondly last November a considerable amount of additional documentation from the Ministry of Defence, giving rise to several new and major lines of enquiry, became available to the Enquiry team for the first time.”[7]

2.1.2    In fact, his report, or at least a summary of it, was due to be published on a variety of earlier dates, but was continually delayed.  We believe there were two reasons for the delays.  One was that the Stevens team hoped to be in a position to prosecute Ken Barratt, whom a pair of Panorama documentaries broadcast in June 2002[8] alleged had confessed to being one of the two gunmen who murdered Patrick Finucane.  The other reason for the delay was, we believe, political.  The publication on 17^th April 2003 took place when the Northern Ireland peace process was at a critical point.  One of the British and Irish governments’ key objectives was to persuade the nationalist political party Sinn Féin to join the Policing Board.  They were refusing to do so because of their concerns, inter alia, about the role of the intelligence branch of the Police Service, Special Branch, in collusion.  The Stevens 3 summary, and in particular it s recommendations, were seen as strengthening the hand of Hugh Orde, the recently appointed Chief Constable of the PSNI[9] and formerly the officer in day-to-day command of Stevens 3, in reforming Special Branch.  Earlier publication of the summary might have destabilised the peace process; the actual date of publication provided a point of maximum leverage on Sinn Féin.  The 17^th of April had been designated as the date when the two governments would announce their final proposals for securing peace in Northern Ireland.  It was also the day before the Good Friday bank holiday and the fifth anniversary of the Northern Ireland peace agreement.  Under normal circumstances, the impact of any criticism contained in the summary report should have been lost in the reportage of momentous progress towards peace.  In fact, the governments were unfortunately unable to secure the progress needed, and Stevens 3 took centre stage, attracting headline coverage in Britain and Ireland, and as far afield as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Bahrain.

2.2       stevens’ main findings

2.2.1    Short as it was, the summary was indeed startling.  In a nutshell, Stevens said:

            “My Enquiries have highlighted collusion, the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, and the extreme of agents being involved in murder.  These serious acts and omissions have meant that people have been killed or seriously injured.”[10] 

            He also revealed that his investigation has “been obstructed”[11].  He further commented:

            “The failure to keep records or the existence of contradictory accounts can often be perceived as evidence of concealment or malpractice.  It limits the opportunity to rebut serious allegations.  The absence of accountability allows the acts or omissions of individuals to go undetected.  The withholding of information impedes the prevention of crime and the arrest of suspects.  The unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forces sanction killings.

            My three Enquiries have found all these elements of collusion to be present.  The co-ordination, dissemination and sharing of intelligence were poor.  Informants and agents were allowed to operate without effective control and to participate in terrorist crimes.  Nationalists were known to be targeted but were not properly warned or protected.  Crucial information was withheld from Senior Investigating Officers.  Important evidence was neither exploited nor preserved.”[12]

2.2.2   In relation to the murders of Patrick Finucane and Adam Lambert, Stevens found that “both murders could have been prevented”[13] and that “there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them”[14].  He also found that “the RUC investigation of Patrick Finucane ’s murder should have resulted in the early arrest and detection of his killers”[15].  He further concluded that information passed to Douglas Hogg MP, then Under Secretary of State for the Home Office, which led to his informing Parliament that “some solicitors were unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA”, was “not justifiable” and had “compromised” the Minister[16].

2.2.3   Stevens said that he had investigated BIRW’s allegation that the RUC had incited Patrick Finucane’s murder, but had found that,

“The absence of any record means that this criminal allegation cannot be substantiated against any RUC officer.”[17]

BIRW is aware that Patrick Finucane did record reports from some of his clients that his life had been threatened by RUC officers, but this evidence may not have been available to Stevens 3 because the Finucane family declined to co-operate with his investigation since it fell short of the public inquiry that they felt was justified by the BIRW report.  Naturally the RUC did not keep records of any death threats its officers may have uttered or of any incitement they may have engaged in.

2.2.4         

Another shocking conclusion reached by Stevens was that the RUC did not equally protect Protestants and     Catholics when the RUC was in possession of intelligence that their lives were at risk[18].  Although the summary does not state this explicitly, it is our clear understanding that he found that Catholics received much less protection that Protestants.

 2.3       attempts to obstruct stevens

2.3.1    Stevens sets out a number of determined efforts to obstruct his three investigations, as follows.

2.3.2    First, he says that Brian Nelson’s existence was not disclosed to him and that FRU tried to conceal the fact that they had seized Nelson’s intelligence store.[19]

2.3.3   Secondly, FRU tipped Nelson off when Stevens 1 were about to arrest him, with the result that he fled the jurisdiction[20].

2.3.4    Thirdly, on the eve of the new date set for Nelson’s arrest, Stevens’ incident room was destroyed by fire in what Stevens believes was “a deliberate act of arson”[21].

2.3.5   Fourthly, Stevens 1 were given written statements saying that certain documents they wanted did not exist.  Stevens 3 found this to be untrue and ultimately recovered all the documents.[22]

2.3.6    Fifthly, he received some disclosure only very late in the day[23].  In fact, he was unaware of the existence of these documents until his attention was drawn to them by Judge Peter Cory, a Canadian ex-Supreme Court judge who is also examining the Finucane case, among others.  Stevens says that he viewed this late disclosure with “considerable disquiet”[24] and that he is “investigating whether the concealment of documents and information was sanctioned and if so at what levels of the organisations holding them”[25].  We believe that his on-going enquiries will reveal other attempts to obstruct his work.

3.        STEVENS’ RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1      Stevens makes 21 recommendations at the end of the summary report.  He says that they should not be seen in isolation, but should be viewed together with the recommendations he made following Stevens 1[26]; the Blelloch report, which “established specific guidelines” for the handling of agents by military intelligence; the report of the Patten Commission on the reform of policing; the Police Ombudsman’s report on the Omagh bombing; and the report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary on Special Branch[27].  It is worth noting that only the Patten report has been published.  Stevens also recommends that all his recommendations in Stevens 1 and 3 and those of the Blelloch report should be “independently reviewed and audited within an agreed time frame”[28].

3.2      Almost all the Stevens 3 recommendations concentrate on the role of the police.

4.         WHAT THE OVERVIEW DOES NOT ENCOMPASS

4.1       reports to the dpp

            Much of the detail of the Stevens 3 investigation into the Finucane and Lambert murders and into acts of collusion by police officers and soldiers will be contained in reports on alleged crimes that will eventually be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions.  It is understood that there may be 20 or more such files in preparation.  Reports to the DPP are never published and the DPP is under no statutory duty to give reasons should he decide not to prosecute anyone reported to him by Stevens.  It remains unclear whether the majority of all eventual charges resulting form the three Stevens investigations will be against those who supplied information or those who received it.

4.2      other murders

            The BIRW report, Deadly Intelligence, included information concerning the murders of a number of other persons whom we alleged may have been  the victims of the same policies and practices which led to the death of Patrick Finucane.  These were the murders of Terence McDaid, Gerard Slane, Francisco Notorantonio, John McMichael, Patrick Hamill, Brian Robinson, Eddie Hale, Peter Thompson, John McNeill, Loughlinn Maginn, Paddy Flood and Eddie Fullerton.  We also drew attention to certain attempted murders, such as those of Alex Maskey and Joe O’Donnell.  Most of these victims were not involved in terrorism and some of them were elected representatives.  It is not clear to us whether Stevens 3 investigated these cases and if so with what result.  Although we do not know their names, it is now apparent to us that there were many more victims of the policies and practices criticised in our report.

4.3       stakeknife

            Much of the work of all three Stevens investigations concentrated on the role of Brian Nelson, FRU’s only loyalist agent.  The majority of FRU’s activities, however, were concentrated on infiltrating the republican paramilitaries, who were seen as being the “real” enemy.  Since 1999 it has emerged that FRU had an agent, known by the code name Stakeknife, who was highly placed within the IRA.  It has been alleged that in order to protect his cover, many people, including members of the security forces, members of the public who died in bombings, and people falsely accused of informing against the IRA, were allowed to die at the hands of the IRA.  These allegations suggest that what has been uncovered so far may be only the tip of a much larger and even nastier iceberg.

4.4       arms from south africa

             Deadly Intelligence alleged that Brian Nelson was centrally involved in helping Northern Ireland loyalists to obtain arms from South Africa.  His participation was authorised by FRU and he was helped by MI5.  This operation amounted to sanctions-busting.  From 1988, when the arms shipment arrived in Northern Ireland, to 1994, the loyalists’ capacity for killing more than doubled.  We believe that many of these deaths may have been caused by weapons from this shipment.  Although we know that members of Stevens’ team travelled to South Africa, we do not know how thoroughly this aspect of our report was investigated or what conclusions were reached.

4.5       the role played by mi5

            The shadowy secret intelligence service MI5 had a seat on the Tasking Co-ordination Groups[29], and so was aware of all significant intelligence known to the RUC and had a say in what action was taken, or not taken, in response to that intelligence.  MI5 also had a liaison officer stationed with FRU.  We have reason to believe that MI5’s role has been insufficiently examined by Stevens.  This is of particular concern since MI5 is known to be interested in taking over the anti-terrorism intelligence role from the police in Northern Ireland, as it has in England.  No such handover should be permitted until their role has been thoroughly investigated.

5.         response to stevens 3

5.1       Much of the reaction to the publication of the summary report was markedly disingenuous.  There was little if anything in the summary that was not already in the public domain and the report had been comprehensively and authoritatively leaked in the fortnight prior to publication.  Indeed, if anything, there was more information available in media reports than was actually contained in the summary.  Nevertheless many seasoned commentators expressed themselves shocked by its contents.  Perhaps it is not so much the fact, which was already known,  that these things happened that is shocking – although it certainly is shocking – but that the most senior police officer in the United Kingdom has now confirmed that they happened.

5.2       The Irish government repeated its call for a public inquiry, saying that the report’s findings were “of the utmost gravity”[30].  The British government described the report as raising “very disturbing issues”, but said that “it is important that the criminal justice process takes its course”[31], signaling that it is no hurry to set up a public inquiry.  Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson MP, who is thought to be an unofficial spokesman for Prime Minister Tony Blair, said in a television interview that there was no evidence of a state conspiracy to murder Catholics, and smeared the families of the victims by saying “… let’s be clear, a propaganda war has replaced the dirty war…”.  “All that is behind us now,” he added, in what must surely have been a triumph of hope over experience. [32]

5.3      Political reaction followed the fault lines in Northern Ireland politics.  The nationalist parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, re-iterated their existing calls for a full public inquiry.  Unionist politicians were more circumspect.  UUP leader David Trimble said that a judicial inquiry was “the last thing we want”, and suggested that the Stevens 3 report should be referred to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which sits in private[33].  DUP MLA Ian Paisley Junior asserted that the report conclusively showed that institutionalised collusion did not exist and accused those who wanted a public inquiry of wanting to “blacken the name of the police”[34].

6.         WHAT HAPPENS NOW?

6.1      The British government continue to hope to put off until tomorrow what ought to be done today. Stevens 3 brought them four years’ delay, and last year they brought in Judge Cory to take a separate look at the Finucane case, behind closed doors.  He is not due to report until October 2003, but we have no doubt that he will recommend a public inquiry because the evidence in favour of one is overwhelming.

6.2      In the meantime, time is on the government’s side.  Billy Stobie, who supplied the weapons in the Pat Finucane murder, was himself murdered[35].  Brian Nelson has recently died. Those are two key witnesses whose testimony will never be heard at a public inquiry.  The gun used to kill Pat Finucane has been altered by the army and is no evidential value.  The gunman Ken Barratt’s taped confession has been “lost”.  He and other witnesses are now in fear of their lives.

6.3       British Irish rights watch believes that only a full, international, independent, public inquiry will be able to cut through the obstacles placed in Stevens’ path and enable the full truth to emerge.  The victims of the illegal policies and practices adopted by the army and the police during the Northern Ireland conflict deserve nothing less. We have no doubt that, had similar things happened in England, there would have been a public inquiry years ago.  Public inquiries can be problematic, but they are the only mechanism currently available for making those who abuse the powers and trust conferred on them accountable for their actions, and for making recommendations to ensure that past malpractice cannot be repeated.  The Finucane family and the many other victims of FRU and Special Branch misconduct have waited too long for justice.  What has emerged about what happened is far too serious to sweep under the carpet, and we doubt that the full truth has yet been told.  Unless these matters are confronted and dealt with truthfully and honourably, Northern Ireland will never be at peace.  A public inquiry is the only way to lay the ghosts of the past and to give full effect to the reforms envisaged by the Good Friday Agreement.

British Irish rights watch

April 2003

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